Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 25, 2003
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 4, 1948
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5.pdf1.91 MB
,f iiirtiatiapired For Release 4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WINTRY SU8JEC ORIG14N ?Tomb. Indo te Vivi-. 25X1 INTELLIGENCE REPORT Ch4T Minh 25X1 25X1 DATE: 25X1 45e ? tember DIST. ;1).;;;;.1. .1.9147 PAGES 15 SUPPLEMENT OuVRIBLerieli 3t Wren 'WAR Li R&E J C&D La_ -I-- 2 5X1 25X1 25X1 BACKGROUND 14 The first peel evoltin It.oceifee piace ie 1927. It as rut' reprsed t ., 171e-eel leperialiets efi, not -eacceed in ceuele,,ee t of the struggle, n the .:oetraryv it heeeroe Inree,dre and 6trcncer.. C. 1930 the l'relee''e4te Cerevre!ce, !tete' fe.,:e.7e.7i eesuit r several ree:teee.3. C;;,!ruels rt1e or ft,f whi V been inspir(il Third Int cle i7 1; The 1:oOiT("Zi corinunist affilfleted t;se and submitte itte .to tee ee5sre ofr? the Mire' Inlernationel.. ehe of 1930/31 eid nee :uac t ing eese2te from the eiint of Indochinese indele eeece. leeeeeee fr6r the polnt ef view of the Ind Communist Party tbA9 e7/20e.,- Ne.,ere a period of ho rie and exTeeaio this decade; flizZ`r C..;.L 100 1, 'DRA.f7; eg yeueg t name le foe& it I opsib leave Indochine 11:1 var'!' )1,7;3 TUTIteS 71:'; Eually eir via anee or arrived in the13':I.:7eei, wt .re elee ;:ce-it-;: courses er ye-tying length wet Int. The greater peoeui ,Jon ftt reeeeens attended clesses at the eun University in Nose It thle University it wa exral1y recognized Annawse converts 0i:eerie:ft 3111 1#0 :170 thou the VC'S t f?..7.tel1igent and as any nationality. *e nueber o them attained the degree of "Agreges Re' highest degree which thet se lee]. of COITIMUltirint accorded. 41,t the same number of them esteeliehed themselves on terms of int: late friendship French students or the Zuropeae seetion of the Uctrevueet 'University t fol.expl the fe:teeezhii, tetweee 110 oh l Minh and .:.'%er Indochinese f. with Thorez and ot'esr French Commurist leaders of future as well t future Marshal Throe., eerie, In Indochina ire]!, after anothe7 struggle. from 71936 77, o 1939 he Ccrirunists fai3ed 't 7 make any importa. CLAS8iF;CATI0N COTIDENTIn DcivJrAt Yr", 17, viz:. A SS reit Ciess. eleNeet TO: DDA AI,Nnts, 4 kith: DDA REG. Dateli tJ1_ r-ees. o r TS Apr 77 /76 jirit Juno ;6:r of -110 withs, 1tations 4:T.," of ,:dnese. . During to tanco. sen at the 110118 of e, the 3, a oscow; lente with the 'lsperate 7ains, 25X1 s 1REFERAL CR L13141 25X1 aritill101110 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R00080077000 25X1 3-5 Approved For Releate 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R0008007700 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP -2. 25X1 08-5 except for the coneolidati-1 ce'he Pam/ and the acquisition of new r-erutts. Tlis was' achieviin desointe the re-t that a large number of the leadere :end Party members were thrown into orfison, The last and most violent insurrectien before the Japanese occuration was thii of Coehinchina in 1940: but it also rutlleesly repressed, with much bloodshed. .ns a result of this repr.seirn, two 'mportant leaders met their death: WIIH Kai, sister-in-law of VO nguyen Map, led NGVFon Phone. These two lad been the Indochinese delerates to ,e 193P World Conoress cE the Third int, rnati(nal in oscow. A ).are number Party members in Indochina were throTh into prison: The Ienal colony of P( ito Condor (Con-Lon, Cochinchina), where NCUYnr van Tao, DAD duy Ky, NOM!! an Ninh and many others were confined; the Triscos cf Lao pao (106-40, 16-35), E' (l0'-U1, 14-20), an re Thuot (10E-05, 12-40) in Annan; the rrisens r: Song-La (103-54, 21-20) and Nohia-ne (104-311 21-35) in Tonkin (TRAN huy Lier as confinrd at Nghia-Lo); and the Central frisces in Hanoi, Hue, Saigon led Vinh. 2. With the outbreak of th rar in Furoye in 1939, Germany's attack on 1941 and the complete ehaerc in the policy of the Comrunist rarties J countries of the ,orld, the Indeelfreee norrunist Party, like the re:. adopt new tactics, It ?8- to idc ireler et er the USSR to conceal he3 with the Cermunist -arLies cf ieri,us centries, in order to avoid r. to the Allies who -ere hel-'-o the USSR in the ear. In accord with A policy of the Th:ed Internatierol, the Indochinese Corrvnist Party lit dip-vise itself an r tiro into secrecy. Ferino'rg in 1940 Oommunisr rive rar to Natiealisr in "J.ndocnioa. Tile history cf Vietnan entered rhase with this 'r rcrtant t. 'nene wliele was taken ny the Indochinese Party; it was a turning or Teat ronseepence. Jb USSR in n all the t, had to eelations offense ceneral to. nad to n new enmunist irvruoir-rT An JnnTRL7-rTS nr? V11 'T T.T.71! COnTRCL 3. reg!nning in 1940 and re cl':o elime at the end of 1941 arid the bE.1 ming of 1942, there wale Wati-nalist f'eeelts ruch no those at Fac Son (106 2, 21-52) and at Dinh Ca (11)6-04, 21-44), duerrilla arhies were formed. The IT rniam Lneratien Army (Viet ram (ini-rnorg-q1pn) was founded. The Resist, Movement against both the French anr Teraecse became est nlished. And as the e(anter- mcaseres and orrrcssieo ter lloth the Frfnch and Japanese grew rrogrese ly more brutal and unbearable, the lorle brear6 more and more rcady to Sein rolutionary organizatiens. advcin,age of th's etatc of affairs, the Commul Party embarked on the following tarties (1) Creaticr of new reee'lutionary lertics such as (a) The Pemoc 1.c Party (Dan Chu rang); this Tarty --r3.; in fact organized by a Communist, NGUN dinh Thi who later--under the rrEsent Viet n'inh Coyernment--'recare Pr(sident c Cultural Associat'en for Yat:eral nelfare, In organizing the "Deacer 0 Party he we- assisted by DUOnG due Hioo, a former President of the Students .ssociation, by VU dinh Poe, ni rr sent t'ei_ster of T?istice In the Vietnam Gover 'nt, and by DO due nue, who became the nceretery-Cinerel cf the Democretic Par n (b) The Vietnam Revolutierary Youth arty (Viet ram T'anh Wien each nenh Dom, .oi Hoi). created at Liuchol (Kwarrsi, Cl-'ne) by 110. chi Vinh (nossibly under a lionym), who retired as its leader shrtly after its cre-tion. (c) The New Vi am Party (Tan Viet rr,,Y rree nang) rt el 7LT, also cre-ted by HO chi Minh, but or a different ore cf his nueerce? aliases; thin tire, LY Thuy. (:)) Strengthe-nino and c Leoirneerent cf the Indochinese Coommist rty itself, but now in a more lel-tle and eeeret form. (1) Cr- tion 'of Natiera' n:farc Associations (Doan The Cuu Quoc Examples of thcee arc: NaLn nal nelfer( n:sociatiens of youth, of ',omen, of I. ants, of )7ornere; and esrocially cf the PTe-Ven (Tv Ve Cuu Quoc)--"Self-Defens ssociations) (4) Fermatice1 of a roli'ica: front: The Viet rinh. This Front, ' a-Tearance, was the result of the merger of e71 the Tletiena elfere Associallons d of several political eartieo of wh,ch the most important as the Indo-Chinese Cor nist Party and the second meet important?but. 'far less so--the Democratic Party, 4? Turin" the Jamanes- Oecurnticr, te organizat'rn cf the Vi,' Minh was follows: (1) On the 7)ne est level then- were the Tieu-To ("little nests"), V !eh in fact were cells renoistieo of P te10 rersons each. Each Tieu To chose a .e:ate Thede deleeates formed a comr.rit'ee on thr next hieler level. Thus, s ny step by the 885T process on aserndie,' levrns, thr following came into existent CeNFIDnnenen Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA- 25X1 Approved For ReleaseRpy28/30,,,,p)1117,172c-RF47R00080077 ? -3.. (2) Khu-EJ--Committee for a Khu (district) in the coun-f-ry, or Thanh-Bo-- Committee for a town; (3) Tinh-rw--CommIttce 20,, o 4) 'Cu-Bo?Committee for a Xu (largr rerjrnal division); and rim gy, .(5) Tong-Po--General Directi,g Comittee. The role of the Tin-To was that of a cell which multirlied and rccruiced new party memhrrs. Th Tanh-Bo (Town Cormittees) and Tinh-Bo (Provincial qommittees) organized Peolle's Committees which were at tat tine called "National Liberation Committees." The PeoTio's Committees, :'urifr the Japanese Occuratio:, had a character rhich wao at orre &minl3tr(tiv-, rditical and military. T e Tong-Bo (General rireftinr Commitee) durinr th( Jaralz:se Occupation elected an Txecutive Committee which wat name( the "Vietnam 1,111raticn Committee", with HO 4 ) Minh as President. Aft'r th',: urrlinr nf Aurust 1",5, it was this Committe( , with the addition of a few nemlurs wile were neutral an( in rarticular harmless, lich became the ProvisA, Covernrem. The Tieu-'Jc2 oo longer havinc any : -ticular function to fulfill, (Alarrealed, and the Peort-*s Committees became tl provisional organs -)f addlinistraticr,. liorever, they soon tended to bee Flectoral Colleges )ily) leaving all active adri,i-Aratirn to the "Exeo-ive Committees" of ti-e 'oo3"_e's Cf-pittees. r . In August 1945 the tie' V,n1 o.;1.2.. the po-Er in -'he name-of the People cild formed a Nat1rra.71' , ,i,vcrnrnt. '2111:. Government oas a Provonal Go % .,iment ane was recornized :.s illa. I,; 7flo C:e Viet rinh \hich dominated both f?,L5 Covernrent and the :(irle's CoilLIc,,,es; and, more ,v2tIcular1y, it was Communist Party rld("t ,'orinatec t le Viet Einh. (3e1 raragrar)-s 23-40 f( ' Eistory of Viet rinh rasio (.1.1c:i rrof, .1?i,f," 1-,,o 17)47), 6. But the Communists ..,!,nter' knoTn to the reorl of Vietnam and th at larre that Vi-tri 7:as a "Dcrc zorn nn' that the 'tetnrim Govc.vnment a "Dcmocrotic" Cover- rt /-,-r,,ented all -f th, reorle and ! ,luded non-partisahs also, :or,se-lu(nt-:.y, ", February 19/(,, ,?lectir-nsw held. Fror the Viet r:,W r,'n% 02 vie tl' follc-inr is t.'e ;tory: "Lone lists o arddatew.:TE t-(sonted and I1L12,07,tc macl?_ry set ..2; to make certain ti, true si,s or tie reoy ?slcud h( ex:v-ssed. 'et since if wa th rt rereal eiectien ev r 1 ld Jr Vietnam, `,h(- vo s natura115, ,. 7 a:Ct. f.on ?(Hf,7bedy, and was necessary Hr th ro- visional 'o Trovid,,2, th;t:,.dance. Th,s s'hey by meals of n a6eq'litc "Inforrat, crr 3.ervite, wil?t pave the ,e6,1e th, -cessary details who were t1( truly latrJeti andidates. The r n was that thr people 7)ted overwl-clrc2-Fly for a Coation Government--whtc:, Included represeatives o all al-L(,:1 an: a nuir(r of 'h'partisans. Thus as impossJlr to Lose the V:,,-tn(r. Government of L. ,,ch 1946 of being do ,1 lated by a ,i1T1d larv% , since t as elected by univer', 1 suffrage of all t prorie and eci,.,_ff,d only a dre'ity of Viet tinh mbr's. An: this , certanly had qrht tc br Hvovernment, t,111( it as a arty w rerr .3ented a eerLip pereci.v-of the oorulati(n a23o had the r. y a hn,: 1: led the si:if-gle for he vo-ntry's inde!enden,o, ll7iy, i as iLrossible to ace the Co:, on., f fart:, of dor,r&tinr the Viol, Minh, asnIch ie., in rovertEr 19! the comrunfFt iarty voluntarily (ssolve-1 itself , ti - ood of the Republic." On hi-!-et level (1, c Coi-ernmLnL), this was c Co-ri,nst-dor Ited st'to in arrearance. C. the lo-or levcis t was now, at lecw in ori-earanc the I.' oriels Corriti-es ba -:(re in cflarr of local afrinlsir t,:n. 7. The nature of the adrin' Government (3o7toml:.rr and rr-sint there Is the Vietnam Cc-;,ftsed (even now) of 1 r:he Vit rinh fail to 7.c otr en of indoe; ina as it evolved Lier Lr Provi 4Fehruex 1)4(,), the Coalition Gove_nmen`, Vietnam Co-cr-rent is an follows: On .,!-d 7t-A.1;cst 1 ernmont itoelf, viichIs, as the Viet /}cihi r-,Int co rs ( ' -qrtios and sore nor-rart\san int out that ?11l the ment imortent po5 ar eut CoNFIV 1, 25X1 sters. by ,.....?._ 1, I ,., I LALI V p L.,,,,,,,, 4, .1E , .pt ! ,,? , ' c) eN , x.ts TI,M,1.46514 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 Approved For Releast-RFAIVA522gftM8M1007R000800 0008-5 25X1 Viet Linh members. The Covernno1-0 {-tees directives and crliers to tae txecutive Committees on each level: no (the three large dIvisions of Toridn, Araam, Cochinchina); Province (Tinh); ristrici (Huyen); and Village (al). Tt Executive Committees of the ka and Tinh are chosen b: the People's Cor it,tees of those divisicn:, with the a-rroval of the Txecutive Committees on h ecier levels. The People's Corritia=es are elected by he 'people by direct u,versal srffrape. The Executive Committee of the no is chosen he all the Fxer-tive Committees of the Tinh in that 90; and the Executive Comrittee of the Poyen is chosen by all the Executive Corrittees in the Xa of that Huyen Thus ;.ere is at least an arreararre of der,cratic methra's of choosing thc local adr nistration. rtut the Viet Mint intimate ti "It must br recognized t.t. Viatnar has eratoyed the benefits and lotfilled the duties of 'Demooracy- for only a very short time. Democracy represents the most reasenable rolisical trPnd for the Torld in general; and mast there- fore be prfserved in Vietnam at all costs. Vietnam must certainl: not retrace its sters and r turn to 31aorry and feudalism. Th.rofcre it is ert'rely loairal to fear that the reorle's Cormittees mirht risunc:erstand ry orders of the Governoent and ri roo the risk of rfvertinr to the Imre, -at aosition of the frrrer 411(ro;ells des rotal-les' which -ore rere ru,pts of the Frrnch. In order to. or t-eract an evil which is rore than a sibility, ane to avert t'is donrer it in logical to rrovide these Too-le's ommittees (or their rae7.otive Gera tt) with Advisors." This has been doro with rreat coercy and efficiency. At Freocnt such a visors arc very nurcrous arid roe erono-.terce in variruo ferns (Fararrt:hs State Can-no The State Can-Po (Can no !rhe 7uoc) , This 1,crr ray hedefin(d as "!.on rs provided by tirr 2late" (See rota torrtnology at era- CP rep fiurina the Japanese Cco' Tati r the Coo-no were aoarts who had already Teived adelra'e training .arost earl 'ere yciano roaolotionarics, In ti Tions controlled hr the 'Jet rirh ouarril1as there were about 30 Car-Po schoo The course lasted free' 115 to 30 ,a.ys rach school coarrhsed taut 30 stu .ts, who were being rrerared to 1-ercre at the sere tire political leaders and ,,,!rrilla chiefs. Som( +reinirr -ai r-von in rolitical doctrine and organizati but priociral emphasis was (r course on rilitary zatters--wearcns, ieioli .ns, sabetare, esplora o. The re' rses were conducted by Can-ro, the stude them- selves bccoriro rotential (arello oron ihe co tietier. of their -ourse. he irrortance V-eat !tol to those qohcals Is evale:ced by : ae fact that they were oroaani7ed h 140 -hi Frill 1-1rse:f are his irredilte ent .oage of senior political aderi., sr :eray insrired schools were h,P even - the regions defiri'ely controller' by 'Jto Jalaresc. These schools :ere of ursa clooducted in Frcat oecrecy, ond roaed a'oot frequently from r)doe to .ce. The eueler of ,r each ct sually not ;,cre .t.'-an 10 at an one tit - In Vats latter tyre -f ,r4leiral earhanis :as en educatian fo larv'estine rolitical organisation ond poi,l000C,a to create thy gre 'oot -ossible mber of Tieu-To, and to oloT nca rerooi?,- eleaeotar:- leo-ors in weapons in or to enal-le the to deCond -Ureraelvoo ord to cruani2e the "Tu-Ne" clf Ief e Units . and to ansaosioato Ja7arese Tro-Jaren, 3' tr''ters r!en necc oary. fter the Jaranese Surrondea ;test a!' t.e country came ealokly unr'er the dor:Inst. r of the Viet rinh; corseqoently the ferara Can-'c orratly exceeded the sui -'y and it vas receosarT 'o rrtn nm-: ores hacti17, Can--o sr' cols srranr ur in tntity. rtriog the -rriodo of the Pr t oisi-2 al Govern nt artl cf the ic-1::tien a a. rnment, rocr?tie-o yore lo:- lor-rtlnt; therefore, althourh rJ:itary ocirline continued :to ho ea'ervee in tla? n-' ools, leas than half of the course. ,ere military; tle rera'rder wer. en ,(::tIcal selatects Ar., the teconique o (rope- randa-arartierlari: a -r Clrlo of tla Viet 'int, Party an( ti" , it Government. At t' sane care ti-r Icopoor, there ,erf sore Can-'o ho rece 'ed acre "let lied r'litar: sastrootifo; t'r:e were rer were destined to ta! charge of the crrariza+4en (Tu-ve) which :ere to replace the ,' lee and fulfill the sate anotiros, Py 4?9 tire, the Tu-Veo-originally rati ,a1 Nelfare AsscciatIrls for 5elf-1efense--'oae ceased to be Nati(nal Welfare Assaf oAiens and had "-,ecore a rerc srecialize isird cr organ37at-,o (See raraorork 11) ;Mile its 25X1/ =FEY,. Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 Approved For Releasea3g704346k4i6146-660AR000800770008-5 25X1 primary functirn was tlat of a Militia and Police Force, its intimate knowledge of local conditions and leronali'les even within a minute quarter of a city (the Tu-Ve were organizedotroets and hlocks within a city) result in its intelligence bervicee being culled upon by various sorts of political and police organizatirns (see below) toolvally also, as Naticnal Welfare Aseoc4ctions for all class s an caterories sprang up in almost every regicn, the Viet !Intl deemed it neresqary to rrovitle them -nit, Specialist Technical Advisors (Can e Ky Thuat Chuyen he), such as the Can-4o assiEned tr advise the local Nati-nal ,olfure Associlt!cns of Iea-ants, of Fnrrers, of Nor'ers, etc. The State Can-ro as the: creually d;velered in the F.ovisional anc'. Ccalificn Goveronerr% periods into the full flowering of the rresent period may be divided roughly into several catcrories: (1) Can-Po for adrinistrativc services--to help the Exccutivo Cwmittees of the People's Comnittees. 2 Mtlitary Can-Po for the crganizaticn of Local Militias. ( 25X1 0 Can-Po for the Cultnral Associatirns and for Propaganda, excivaing the teachers used in the program cf mass educat4cn in reading and writing. (4) Can-Po to act as Srn:ialiot Technical Advisors--for Anriculturs, Handi- crafts, Fighway C:TmlIsions, etc. Ts category is given only enough o,litical indoctrination to make sure ."hat they will net run counter to governmenn directives, (5) Can-Bo to act as nr, Meld' representatives and observers in .leiahhorirg countries 9,, State Can-no are usually cho en from anon E the porulaticn of the locally to which they are de5-tined to anoirned in order to be on more friendly Lald intimate terms with the reorie with whom they have to deal. The State ran-Bo ForriAa sursrficial instruec'n in Viet Linh organizaticn and doctrine. In the instructirn on doctrine, a cnrtir amount of Marxist phraseology is used; but the theory enunciated is chiefly "anti-Fascist"; much emphasis is placed on,the dominant role of the "majority.' This is becauE,e the Viet Minh do not oish the true Communist character of th( to be toe widely known among the ',tate Can-Bo. PurinP the course of instrocticr on doctrine, discussien groups are fre:nlently 'cad, 'hich enables the instructora to fulfill another important (sec2 t) role: that of spies for the Goyormnnt, for the Turiene of checkirg on the :ralty, opinicrs and activities of local allele:Ls. The St te Can-Bo are give i titles indicating the function ohlch tYey falfia; for example, Mr. X is a I ,paganda Can-Pc; tr. Y Is Ye t Can-ro, r s an :,rIicultnre Can-Pod o Th cs a:Len-Bo receive their tr,' ,ing i se' nolo controlled IT the r(sree'ive Ministr '.s; for examrle, Administr tive an-no 1- school contrcr.ed by the Ministry c' the Interior. These schools are more or less overs.:thot is, C,eir existcnce as well no the idery ,of the pupils is '.nown. The oorrseo arc ernfidentiall and stronrero &o not permitted to attend. ncse Can-c are teoretically under the orders i the Ministry TI'ler ants them, and ti.eir rower is confined to the fund c.i and area specifically ass:lc-rod to them.. As seen as one or them is assinec o a certrin locality, he proceed to that locality and reRains there with . Peoples Committee or o Welfare Associati(n of that, locality. They fill the role of advisers to these Coomitteen or tl'o;e Associaticls and submit their re;oots to their rc7reelive riristre.J. iu i r(0,23ty these rercrts are oulmitt:c through another Committee, known as the "Tint Minh Committee 11122111I-Einh-galriat222 10., The Viet 1 inh Commi tees (Uy-nun lie: Li oh). Mhourh the urrisi:, of resulted in tic scizure of re er hi the Vietnamese, the Viet Vtchntil. to find To s-ons fcn not ananOon'nr its role, claiTinn that: "(1) The Viet Minh is a ,folitical Front which led the Vietnamese r, freedom; (2) Tic Viet Mini is a Front 19hich Terin!ents a pot oft and (3) The Vit Minh claims the privilege cc being the Front whin the most revolutionary and most democratic restioe; therefore, it of continuing ,o guide the Troll(' along the lath of 'democr-cy', a. thf- People's Cormitteos from dereneratng into Reactirn, These Pe( Committees, of course, arc Cormittees ciente(' by tie people, but an sAjfet to human error which vould run th( risk of injuring rather the people," 25X1 colFlUo -1-n" Joust 1945 ontinued rle to masses; presents the duty preventing naturally an serving REFERLNCE CENT k LIBRARY Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 'REFERENCE CENTER LIBRAkil Approved For Release .?..0911/Relitricztrni,,-08TtFjp000800770008-5 25X1 The funetices of the Viet Eilh Committees which consist o rersonrel who are State ran-o, arc tis follows: (1) To act es advisors to the Peorleis Coemittees and the rxecut ee Com- mittees of the Pecrleis Comr4ttees. The Viet Virh intiate that since it is the duty of the Viet V.-irh Corrittces to act as advisere to the People's Committees, it is entirely lorical that the Viet linh Comittees should control the activities of the Stf.te Can-Po, who are at the 3me time themselves advisors to the Peerle's (ommittees and (nearly all) rhers of the Viet Yinh Party. T17lse Can-"o must Ty advised hew to obey both the State .and the Party"0 (2) To continue to aet as "Fnlir'Iteners" of the ?eerie, inasmuch the Viet Eirb is a "revoluticrar7 ane a derocrritic" rarty. In order rrr:erly te fulfill t' Is second funct4rn, it le necessary for the Viet Yinh Committees to extend the circle of their nctivities ale to r'cruit new Party Tembers to consol-dlte the Party's rrsiticr in the rarTs of the reople. The sl-plest method for 'le Viet rel..nh to aceorel'eh tiI rurrese is: (a) To serree Troraeanea or 1,ehelf cf thc --rty ane of the Gov lement at the same time; t1-:is rroraganla is maee ur by the Proraeanda Can-Bo an( the Cultural Associat/(ne; ? (b) To ex4end the activity of the Nat4cnal iclfare Assrciation- and to arouse everyboey eo becore a rember of one or rem of these Acv3c(iat Farners are rut under rrrssnrr to join Farrerts Asscciatiens, women to join-4 ranis Assoriations, isael,crs to on Pers Associat4cns. Pressure to joi these Associations rests on the thesis thst they are essociatiens for Publi ,elfare (the Annamese name l'qs alreqt tlo sier4ficance of Illaticnal Srlvatior , and that it' is the duty of eeeryone to he Tatriotic and to work for the salvat of his fatherland and naticn. Thus, without beloneinr to any rolitical Tart, at ally it is sufficient for a rersrn to eri any one of these Associations to find himself in the Vet Mieh. This lesees no oprortunity to the individe ... to join any other party than the Viet VIA% This situation has been conraeteiy fulfilled in nearly all the rrovinces, hut to a siirhtly lesser extent in the c.'Aies, But in the cities as well thi pre-Gin:es there is always a Teredy in cale the , reelllation Is reluctant to :Icin the Associatices. This reredy is ca2. d the ',-;ong-Ar paryzU (c) The Gong-An (Pub3ic Safety or Surete). The Viet Kith Ter out that "the Peoele'e Corittc te care rf admiristration in the varic localities and, with the aid of Cee-90 ard of Viet Mirh CorTiitees, are char y3 with the '"uty of inrrevine rereitirrs In tl-et lo ality and of advaerine tt mork of reconstructier in order to make the people hal-ey This, therpfoz, is a ronetructeve and rceitiee t'sk. The Cone-An, on the other handy charged with a ''estrective drty--not, of course, deetructive of the procr .s of recorstru,t4-r. and bae-iness, but deutruc:tve of tic eleicnts ane factors --t4ch are tt.erselvet :lertrertivc of tat Irogress--or, a regativr uty so to sreak--that of se-ere:P.44-- thc elerent4 an( factors eich deny t: -csitive value of that rcsitive eoele," The a-ents of the Con--An arc called Trinh-Sat (Trilh rears to eerier( r to co-quer; but also ecaes e!reer or ur*--ei'diced;")Lkt mernE to cbserve,) The Tr -Sat of the Cor-An must not corfnree it} the Cvil Yolice -hich are l':.orn as e-An for the rrovinres and ranh-Sat Per the cities. '.:!or should it be cenfused ?.-th the Tu-Ve or rilitia. Yest e the Tri ,bee;et are ardent youne men eith zealous 100 alert minds, ,Some of them aro eraduatee re Can-Bo schools. Otters are veteran memt Les of the Viet L'irh Party focr the eaee of the Ja-anese Cccuration. There are ' ,t kinds of TrinheSat for the eong-An: ?41) TrArh-Set Chinh-tri (Political Trinh-e,) They are charged with relitical arfairs and 'eve the duty of watch*!-e suse; OUS charicters and ralccrteetc---n a word t-csr who belong or m'eht belom ,o a party other than the ViPt Yinh ane who rirht riot against the Government. Trinh-Sat Kinh-te (rconomic Trinh-Sat) They are obargcd with economic affairs (?ad have the duty cf 'rrostirating smumrlinr, garbling, thefts, crires and all und, eaorld activit: The Trinh-Sat have a rreat deal of rower, As seen as they she their credentials to the local authorities, they .re riven all eossiele assistance. Altho 'a the Govern- ment of Vietnam has declared that "Vietnar is a democratic country ane therefore has no Secr't Police", ie rust b- admitted that the activitics of the Tri h.-Sat are always secret, 25X1 CC,TTIT; 'JL -6- Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 , CENTRAL INTKLIGLee2 GROUP -7_ 25X1 The Tu-Vc, althourh they are not directly charg-d with the duty of prevantine the reople from de-meting from the rath of "derocrecy", are exceedingly ueeful, because of their intimate knowledge of local core:iticre and rersonalities, in assisting those 170 arc more directly charged with this duty. (See paragraph 8) The -resent ce?e'nis+retier of Vietnar has a acre ec,ular base than tie- eh:ch existed uWer the French realre hecause of the eurticiratirn of a arer r number of stenta cf the recele The ri(t rirY dorrates this adm'nisirat5cn, The Viet rinh i'-self heccre a very broad Front ecause of the extensila eartici- ration of the dif'ee-nt strata of scelety. Aceordine to the Viet Yinh theme-lves, the 'Mi.,- r'rh Free' is the rrsu.:t of the "fueien of several rolitical rarties ate of elfrcrent le3fare Assoe!;itrnst The General Pirectil ?,orrittee of the Front (Tong ro Viet nh) is coeposee of delegates fror those 11:itical rartiee ane those Aesociatiers. The Directing Corwittee gives orders ed direetiv'n to the Repi(nal Ceerritteee or the Viet Minh, to the local 1.1,icnal lelfer( Asseciat!ons, to the -an-Bo and to the Trinl -Sat of the Gone-p Naturally thee crders -re ccorelnated rith the ver-us riristries of ,;:e Govern. merit , Nitheut the Viet r'nh 3creittees, the lutlic 'selfare Associatic al, the Sete Can-Po and theeTrirh-Sat of the Cone-An the Viet Pia would lose rentrol of the recr)e, -entre' of the arrInistr,tirn and control of rower. 13., The met irTe:tar party of the Vit rrh vas the Indechinese Corrunis Party, and naturally Its delegates hecere mem'ers of the Viet Eleh Tonr-Bo. .L as tl.e Viet t,..:1;:h assumed the miseicr of serving the Fati..n, it has to ser also the (derece-itic) tovernment or that ratirn--the hirhest organ reer(sertEtive of thc ricsna!rose nernblic. 'ecarse of this r seien, ane in a esire tr avoid rerrittire either the Geverneent or the ratien free arpearinc too Cor listic in the e:T:, of tl'r eorld, the Indochirese Ccerunist 1art voluntarily 2-a3olved in reverie. 1945. Imeeeiately after the dissolpticn, this Fatty eac rer3acee by the Assc for rares4 3tl'ei_rs. In tr-carance t' !s Isac-iaticn is col- rSfe of p, wish to study ',le ,h12osoe'leal theory cf rareile? "with( ut the lealt of elYr274,"C 4t 4" rraCtlee." It -rlishes books and ?a newsaaaer whict Corrunit teWerp; for eeerrle, ii ccoo- 211.-That ("mtalth"- cf. Pravd: rlee'r Cee-in'e+ in tone; aled it enjoys ar erivilege than the non-t 244_1 eraan of the Tena-Pe itself.. The Ocveenrent, clai inr to be "Der:? ',le' -no, 'ntira4ee that is entirely natural that tl ere sheu30 be freceor of thought a rrees and thee such lealleatie s sh-uld be eermitted." The Virt r1".1 also Intimate that, hecauee the Aolociatlen is a -rivate meeite eeturel that the public should know cf only onereeresenta assecla.len, rarely rr eHAN van Moe., and that the names of the sheeld -,t aelear rublicly " leaar22 'Viet ir rirectier -orrittee) 15. Put what is not at all natural 'Te that even after the dissolution of ) chinese Cornunlet Party 3te revere reeberc contlnued to remair eember: Viet rinh Tong-Be Per exer:lr, he official spokesman of the Viet Mi is still roryTT ?Ilene an icreelly eel: 'eel= ee a realer cf the Corr better 'neer lee !h( n:chrare f eao-re ("Re:, Oaar"), and affect'onatel Anh-Ca ("Flder rether") +c, ail Can-Pol (1 whew ee is the official ch= more, the Toe--T'o !,e always sereereeed be an a4rostlere of the ereatef public oelnion 'ea- for the Teea-Pc (rether than for the Govererent) a respect -lieh eersines veneration, fear and eeeeeeive consideret'cn. the Tong-Po la officia3le corer-eel -f d'C)A CC (Iele atee, the teal Tcnr of eo-i-!ttee 'ith'r a cc-ritt:e) 's rer:ncee of ahont 1C members 25X1 1.ation rens rho reentien erhibit a is C;entiens of the cae, it is Ire of this ier members e Indo- -! the Tong-no eeist Party, anown as Further- eystery; ling of aehough -'10 (a sort o sufficontly WIEREN,L Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 ki kil Approved ForReleaSiNOMM57,1ClinalliZMEA57R0008TE6008- .8. mysterious to be little known and who are certainly neither members of the Democratic Party nor delegates from any of the Natitral 'Nelfare Associations. They must therefore belong to the Co-munist larty. 16. It is quite well known that the Tonr-ro rives orders and directives t- the Regional Committees of the V.Let rinh, which, sith their Associations, heir State Can-Bo who are members o/ the Viet rinh, and their Trinh-Sat of Cae Conr- An, control the leople's CorrIttees which arE charged with local admilintrtticn. But it is far less well know: that the Tong-Bo the h=ghest orman of Viet rinh, is constantly arprehensive that the Peoples Committees 'Eine?eve A more important--the Regional Committees, of the Viet rinh, may stray "unintnitienalle from the desired path. Fnr this reason they have decided to place Can-Po Viet rtrh or Can-B0 Cuu QV?C (Viet rinh Can-Po or National Welfare Can-o) in each region. 312111:1.1.ezds_sx vatierIllagartjaa:Ru 17. Tho Viet rinh Can-Po must lot be confused with the State Can-Bc? rho relort to their re:Tee-Ivo rinistrins and whose authority is strictly limited to their assigned duties within their a-sirned arras. Although the same Annamese word, Can-Po, is used to 'esirnate these two different categories of men, the mord Can-Bo as applied to the Viet dnh Can-Bo has i.e r,Tlish equivalent; Its French translation is "cadre". The Viet rinh Can-Bo is a norson who can mn"ne decisions on all military, political and economic affairs in :the reri-n to which r3 is anno4nted. The following is an examrle to illurtrete the functirn and authority of the Viet rinh Can-Pc: Chem-Ve is a suburban di-t/ict of Hanoi, ettrndArn for a distnce of nearly 20 kilometers alorm th( right bark of the Red Rix'''. In this district at the ere) of 3945 and thc beginning of 1946 there wero 6 Viet Minh Can-Bo, cf whom ore, by the name of CHU, was tln- most imeortant. He was directly rnsin?31ble to the Tong-Bo of the Viet rint, not to the Government. The rroof of -ft:9 fact 'sat that when, for personal r:asons, be had arrested 22 young girls or v trumped- up charge of Trotskyism without co-sulting or recoivinr The approval of the local Feenle's Committee, he refused to yole.14 to the demands of HOANG PiD* Giam, rinister of the Interior, that they should be released. 18. The Viet Minh Can-Bo not only does pot take orders from the Peopleos C' but hirdelf rives orders tb it. He has the rover to control commerce, portation and corrunication. He can cormand the lwal militia (Tu-Ve) local office of the'Sureze (Conn-An) and the local units of the Army 1 For examrle, in January :.946 the same CHU mentioned above Used 200 sol kill all the 70 members (f a local unit of the Chinese occupsAional fo rossession ef their arms and throw the bodies into the Red River. Thi however, cr.,' rent too far. The result ra that Vie Vietnam Gonnrnment indemnity te the Chinese, nnd Clu was executed as well as the looal mr corrander rho had obeyed his orders. 19, It is clnar thal- the Viet rinh Can-Po is a very ronerful finurn, and r rose "enlightened" viers norrand great r-srect. He is res-onstble on ..bod;' of ten mon wl-Ich constitute thc true inner circle of the Tcrg-'3o Viet rot.' In choosing the Viet rinh Can-Po, therefor, the Tonn-Do t to confine Itself to men rtom they can trust absolutely, in order to least possible risk of buncling the orders of th( Tong-Bo and to mCite carr:ing ck.'t its policy without deviation. Since the true Tong-Pc ir .onsists exclusively of memters of the Co7runist Party of the Third In ,it Inay he lorically deduced that the Viet Minh Canuxo can hardly avoid me7.ber7 of the Communist Party, vwittee trans- the fn)rs to ,T3s, take time, lid an ,ary nnief , to the the tns care n the '.ire of circle) ennatirnal, .ning 20,A The schools, in which are trained the guiding stirits of the Viet Minh Ci their rntential successors, exhibit even mere striking *peculiarities than 7n which ' 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 Approved For ReleasepAR9.81EktaHRF132dpip7R000 s9s. the State Can-no are trained. The very existence of these schools is 8 closely-guarded secret. At these sehools the training is highls sreciolized and Is rure Comsunism. The ilsiortence with which these schools are reserded by the hirh command is indicated by the fact that HO chi Linh himself someti-es gives lectures in them. In these lectures he addresses the students as "Celradeu are they are invited to address him similarly. Occasional lectures are a given by VO nguyen Clap, rHAr van Dons., TRAr van Giau and other leading Cor esists. The regular lectures, or course, are given ,7 instructors of less imp JSance, whose time is not fully occupied with other duties. Courses isclude 'e following: (1) Definitions?liberty, derocrscy, corrunism, etc. (2) History of he Communist Party. (?) Mass ssychclosy--how to lead the masses by flat,ery or control then by fear, etc. (4) Foe to orgenize reasant and workers ements. (5) How to sabotage Trotskyiets and the rationalist Frcnt. (6) How tL rganize hunger strikes In rrisons and ether strikes in French-controlled terr- rys (7) How to terrorize the porUia4len in French-controlled territory. 21. Technically, the lectur,S arr of high suality. The theories expresser and coherent and a wealth of concratc exarrles is giver.. Ssecial invited to se-count personal experiences to illustrate theories, such a hunger strikes in French prisors. Many of the textbooks used are secs the lectures, they are clear and ccncrete. Some are translatisns or E fror the Russian, Exan!les of these include: extracts from thc works and SVIlin, Manifesto of the coPmunist Party at the Third Intcrnationa. new Stalinist theories s fch ev,lored after the expulsion of the Trot the "Death-Struggle of Cap5ta1l3e, The eureose of these textbooks is the Soviet doctrioe'sseeificolls to Indochinese froblcss. Other textb written by Vietnamese--always unier a pseudonym0 22. are clear ners are j that of 2t. Like 'aptations If Lenin (19307), tuistso apply sks are Amearance versus Reality It may therefore be concluded that the ar'nistretien of Vistnaro, with aSs Governnont and its Peorlots Ccerittees, has a deoccr-tic asssaranee; it is Under the control of the Viet rnh; the Viet rioh ?rent, in turn, is under the contra of the Indochinese Cusunist Party, desse1te the fact that the rasty was dissolved in 1945. HISTORY CF VIT rI-11 PUTC ICIaCY---1945-1947 23. O. ing to a flexibllo solicy, the Indochinese Corrunis4 Party, through the Viet Minh?after the laLter had leecomc a broad Front with the rarticisatien o:' broad strata of the people?Imposed to ,olitical control over Vietnam: it ov& came, without toe much difficulty, the so-called Natisnalist Parties (Q.D.D.v hong Minh Hal, etc.) are out uf s determined rosistence first against the demonds of the Chinese Occusaeien troops are leter agesfnst the French. 2,0 The following factors and con tions were fevers:bit to a general insurrection of the Viet Minh at the time when it actually took rlace, in the summer :f 1945: Internal conditIons in Vietnam: (1) War, poverty, fa" me, Orought. -.2) Ruth- less oppressicn by loth F'ench and Japanese. (3) Consicous awakening by in ()Messed people; i difference toward deeth, which often seemed prefer to the u&earable conAirns of life; ecnsequent readiness to join levolut lary ,organizat*ons (4) Esergence of the Viet Vinh Front with, or of, the Jsschinese Communist Party, at the most favorble resent; flexibility of its strut -Ey, which shifted emphasis asay fror Communism to raticnalism,, External conditicsS: (1) Iicrld Sar between Axis and Allies?propase ,'s of rn and of future frefdoe to e ac ordee to these who participat? on the side of the Allies; consciousness of their own strength on the part 0 ' the Teeple in general and of the eeople of small countries in particular. f: Con- flict between Jaranesc and Fr-ech Imperialism; these two oppressive fore: were were =estroying each other and ma!-ins rcrr for a thfrd force?that of rcvoluil )n. CONFID a 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 Approved For ReleaaE1100.310ata5FITCLAWDB821-00457R0008007mq- -10- 2 . In general it was these coeditions whlch favored riots, revel and, atoire all, organized revoluticn. All classes in Vietnam were rrofoundly affecteds The proletariat sere the most exrloited of all, the workers beine kept in subleetii,n Le a lets which -"RS more military than civil, and being red- eed to 'eats of burden rather than human beingsc The reasants, under insreas- inely difficult economic conditions, were deprived of their tiny rror rties and died of farine and disease. The Petite-Bourgeoisie became disloc runcticnaries were poorly raid, small merchants were no longer able t 'ind goods to sell; swell artisans eonld not find the necessary materials :es their handicrafts. The rich rourgeois were turned out of their properties, houses and factories by the military There was only one category of the ref le who rere able to profit by this state of affairs: these who served the .1: ranese, who made profits in the black market, illegal acquisitiens of lard and Porce- ful cerfiscations, 26. The Viet !nh in the face of the general discontent of almost all cles es and with the change ir etraiery of thr Indoetnese Coerunist Party: advoeLtsd coorrratien and thc nler of all classes in a bread Front. There was t) be reither a dtctairrohir of the rroleteriat nor a dictatorship of caritellsts; no one class ra- te doeineie the oilers. Th're ra- to be only a geneaal Front for inderendence, and against ortreesien, Fascism and imperialism. 11( ewer, since the various eLass s had intercets which vere somewhat creosed to one ancther and it was imrossible to evolve a eroraganda which would suit 'tem all, the Viet rIrth advor'tized jt-elf as a Front ccnsistine of several different political rarties 11 'ch eesr-sertee eiffereet classfs and permitted erseth party to issue its cwn reo-aganda on be-1f of the class which it re-resents'. The Communist Party, although clair4ne to be the defender of the Prcletarile was in reality the rartr of the Ietite-nurgeoisle. This class as in decor.' 14 Mon Inat at the same tire remained eetremely numerous; and even in its deers, osition attempted to halt )he bifurceticn of the tele orsoeine currents?the re tively rich and the poor-'an d to unite tter, Thls strstegy of the Viet rinh u remitting diverre,t troraaanda worked smoothly and functioned excellently as long as there ra- a concrete serrene: independence and liberty at the ;creme of a concrete ?nerd.; tho Jarcrese The clesses at both extremss of so.iety wee not strong enc,ugh +0 fight for themselves The Preletnriat was its-efficiently organized and unitee; she Trcts"yss9 for exaerle, had rromisee the Viet Minh to help ther in the ccrIne Insurrectien, while inteneine in due course 4o ruSh tels insurrection 'tether and trite:form it into a rrrletarian rvolutior The earitelistn exhilsieed the Sare realfness as the Frcletariat. If the cc?saratively wealthy oiirg elsie allored itself to 're easily led by the Petite-Bouretsisie, it wae because the former "as net truly e Revelutierary class in Indeseela All the revolts that had taken rlace since the French conquest were revolts by repre- sentatives of the 4"rnfial aristocracy--former Mars'erins and scholars, or - later-- Insurrretif-s of seasnnin and strikes by rrrkere, The Viet Minh's relicts of Uni,n is the exelenation of the success of the Viet Minh in defending ths vague interests of the Petite-Beurgecisie It is also the explanation of the 3trength of the insurrectise of Aueuat 1945, lemediasely after the Japanese suseelder. 27. Ihrediatelr after the fa.7.2 of the Jaranese and irrediatrly after the seizure of power cf the cenprote terroseS Inderordence, collaboratien ef classes beenn to totter, the Viet Y.inh remarted undecided reesrding additional disadvartaees: lack ofSCan-Bc, lack of detailed rformation because of the 28 flavine been sweet leyond ite ancther Vast sebeee In its comrrorise, atteartire to 7,,yt time least danrerees referms. two extremes which had beceee the one bane and the releeivel (disaryearance of the con eete enemy) e by the Viet Minh'(arearent eeainment orty, hatriness), that etreese7y of the At this nee tarning-point it eistery, the strsteay to adost. There were lack ef an adequate entellierece service, general confusicn, and lac ef materials. ntended sebore, the Viet Minh found itse ndecisien, it could only continue its pc through the .easiest, most rreseine and e The ereatsst dancer of decosresition la mor or less astsceed to it: the Prolet er rich on the ether., The Viet Minh trie 25X1 ,10e ' in 4ey of the same - an the rlat on to satisfy REFERENCE CENTER MY' Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 Approved ForRelesiRN/SEL:ITAA,IFRI,457R0008007700 25X1 08-5 the Proletariat by rromises alone, Ovine the wcrkers a rlieree of better living coeditioes for the future, but hastily adding that the most important duty for everyone at pr sent ie to rake sacrifices before makinr derenls, in order that the e7;e:17e-eon iteeleneence rieht be raintaired and firmly setablished. 29. These prorines reee by the Vi(t rfeh ere not entirely successful; a - it continued to be the two extreres (Proletariat anti relatIvelr rich P,o eeisie) which rut to the t-et the Vit reh's rclicy of cerTremise. en the Land, the Proletriat--earticularly the worl-ers--showed riainlr their disc( ent. The rar vas ended, the covntre lieerated, the netien had its ern cov('.nment--and ret eenditieos of life were no different from efore. Tie Ireletert remained poor and unharpy. Discontent, indignation and the,sririt of revolt ipok hold of them. Trotskyist nuclei rere formed and grew apace, Desrite the Teet rinh censorship, clandestine TretskyIst rel-licatiors "'ere distributed in rorkers circles in greater ane greater abunanee. Secret meetinee were held hth rreater and creator frequency. The conflict threatened to becere biee,r and violent. In the 'ace of the threat, the Viet rinh employed its two est power- ful weapons: rreraeanea and terror. TA thu Mau, the most important erotskyist leader was executed; LITC'G duc Thier and a Erect number of ether Trot,'yists rere arrestee ane place in coecentraten camps, Temporarily, at the hegineing of 1946, the threat free the left aTreered to have been averted. 30. On the other hare', even before the leftist threat had been euTeresse other troublesome elements appeared on the right, brought hy the Chir Oceurction Troops: namely the Quoc Dan Dane (qAD) and the Pone Minh parties found adlerents among the Reergeois whe were still in doubt v Viet Minh would eotntain the degree of order necessary for business as had been rromised. The Viet rinh tried to satisfy the relatively Pourgeois by pro:Tieing them that private erelerte would not be touche order would be maintained, These Peergeeis were formerly the lackeys ? French and the Jaiarese_ They had been temrorarfly deprived of the m were necessary for them to maintain their control over the rasses. T worried. Now that the'Clinese had, arrived, they though they saw the araltee meters and hcree to use them as a surport and to erofit by t nese also wished to eeeleit ane rake the rreatest ressile prefit of rich Vietnamese joined the ODD and the Deng VIA Hoi. Their aim le threw the Viet rire- Governeent. Put thie atteret was entirely unsucc the follorine reasons: (1) The Chinese realized that the period of' their se in Indochf limited. They therefore ereovrnrg-r' disorder so ti-et thy mirFt fish waters, rather than attempting to estublIsh t3,,-mselves strongly amore and makinr the leet(r truly ciereedent toen them, This error Lad Its the reakress of the Chinese Central Governrent. (2) The Chinese, having been accustored to such poverty themselve even the smallest inter(ets, without lernim a r(escrale rrefit for Annarese folleeere. It arteal'.ed that tee Chine were too grasping a to seize everything. (3) The Arnallese followers of the rh'nese, cf the qDD and of the Hol, ":ere ineor'7tent. They laclme a concrete organizatien are their as unskillful. Th e rcerpreis geeerle vale:zee that those rm.-ties we rod masters nor eyed fclleeere. In a -ere+, they eere use les an in: Poerecols relicy. 31. Althceeh for a c,--rtein tire both th( TretskyIste ane the 11DID.Dong Le' arried to "relien the Viet the lateerls eolley of corererise to hel/ and to awl(' decisive tests. Trotele-et extremism was suorre the T3oereecie or:esition allfee to the ^5D-Dong reh flci gradually di leevine a bear of embers which -ere eventually eceetered on Menese only occaalcealJ: flared 17 arlr rementerily. 32. Although tee 110 rinh ov(rcere these ar' eati, es with much clear their timeliness, chstp les centinue0. The Vic+, nL policy, eeinr eased ( , two 71: These ether the erosper 'eh tnd that e7 the e'6ers who -- were gerly' el. The A number e to over - e tul for would. be ?- troubled tee masses -Lein In exrloi ted -eeir wanted 00111711Ife7:TIt -11- -1g Minh -oparanda neither rents of ?.,nagr.ed le! and down, and J.: and romyrorise, 25X1 "IT 010 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RD1382-645/Kuu080077 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R0OM0700 ? CINTRbL Ii77.IIITNOE GROUP -12- 08-5 was unale to rid itself of its furdarentel inconsistencies. In the face of tin immediate ateeek by the French in Tonkin, the Viet V1nh was forcen to nigotiate the Pr-liminary Accord of 6 Merch 1946. Conferences and r-eotiations for a final treaty dregred on for months and ended with the Fontaineelcau Modus Vivendi of 14 Seetember 1946. The situation in France was also full :f incon- sistencies, and Frsnee herself need6A settle these inconsistencie 3. Outwardly, in the period between September and the renewal of hosti3 ties in December 1946, there did net appear to be serirns contrenictions in ne internal affairs of Vietnam. The HO chi Minh Government rested solidly on the corpses of Trotskyist and QDD opposition, The Peonle's Cormittees and the ret Minh organizations--ratienall';elfare Associations, Can-Po, Trinh-Sat--took deep root among the merle, and were able to guide them eithout too much difficulty in the desired direction. After the siFninr of the Modus Vivendi there sere indeed evidences of discontent and accusations anainst the Government for h 'ng made too many concessions to the French. Put the Viet Minh was able to r over a clever trick. It wae not the Vietnamese relegation which had sign (e the Modus Vivendi: it was rather HO chi Minh himself. For a long tire clever ropaganda had created about the personality of HO ehi rinh an atmospl-ere of myrtery amounting almost to religious mysticism: it lad made him immensely peerlar; and it had presented hie to the public as a leader who was enlightened i ell matters, a fath(r of wisdorr and a man whJse relieles were infallible It was PO chi rinh hiretlf therefore who supported thr whole weight of ress ibility for this signature, and the Viet rIeh ralained intact and blareless. 34. The annearance of Viet rinh staLilitye:e to bo noted estecially in -1 opinion. After the rarch 194( arreerert, and esnecially after the S rodus Vivendi, there -erre in general te: opesinr currents of oTinice to raha small corcessicns to the French in order tp have seac as lc possible and to avoid e. disastrous conf:Ict. The other one was vere misins: to struggle at all rests as-alert the French and to achieve c unquestioned lenenenderco rather than t( accept a relative :Liberty wl ranch akin to tutelars.. rut this dIffer4nce cf erinien wee not carnal c irreconcilab:el hecause hardly enyeee tolding the locoed c'-inion darcd that those hollirr the fire?, ,T-(Te pro-Plench teeters. Evernoec dec'- self to be anti-French, hut with differnt shades of views, bile i-,ember'1946 One was as scompro- enlete and 11 was too ely 25X1 to say "ed hit- 35. But the absence of eeeicus contradcticre in Vietnam was apparent or the surface the situation val herinnire to holl. The frame of mind Vietnamese people after September 1946 wee in fact very complicated, (I) First th6r-f, wns the class of forner Mandarins, former high and merchants who had grown rieh under the Preneh regime, These pec able at the 7.0mcmt to canoe the French; but a tha latter rrshed Co restoration of their reeler, this class of'AlnamItes saw tore clearly rossibilfty of ore day becee'nn nerpet instluments of the French, wh- a-ermit ther to heild or re-build their forteeeee ? ? (2) There eels the category of new caritslists, who had grown ri saeas_ in +11P rOOPTVE illemal seizure of laz.ln, or in advantageous Peneath the Attionaries were not ,rd to a eould 25X1 h on black e contracts. 25X1 I I The class of newl "rich ourgeois Is not a, with the Ten Par Chu Bang, alllou7h tge lateer contains some element class. The Tan Dan Chu Dang also includes, Sowever, a numter of nee have noesessed fertunes for A long tire, as lell as a number of int: The Tan Dan Chu rang is still a relatively mall organizetior and ec not include all, or even a majority of the ney-rich Pourroeis (lase. These roorlo -ere Smrersely rich in corparlsol with the ere-rat penis invested their future In theyiet rinh Covernnt. Their interest ee eontrary to that of the French caeitalists, wlese former wealth, pro means of nroductien and exeloitatien were now their handse This 25X1. CON?'" ;YE Approved For For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA- CLICE-1, ef this a who ectuals. inly does 'eed here), ', and had e entirely eeties and 'Senors? 25X1 Approved ForRelea N119140?(\n-Lcjtapy8320#457R000800170008 25X1. ?13? -5 was definitely anti-French; comcare for example the questions of the Haiphong Customs and Tariffs, +he Pongay eines, the mines in the mountainous region of Tonkin, imeort and eaecrt withOh;na and the United States. () As to the Petits-Bourgeois, some were on the side of these vho wanted a fight to the finish against the French; others wanted peace at any erice. Consequently, their efforts were confused. This class, being in decceposition, but at the same time very numerous, was incapable of irpesing a clear policy aimed at a specific interest. Thrir efforts--confused but never violent--never- theless demonstrated clearly the uncertainty of the situatien and the lelpossi- bility of statilizine this class cf society. Although there was no epee' warfare at this time between France and Vietnam, there was a scarcity of everething. The small merchant lacked erodecte to sell, and his profits were less than his expenses; the small functionary lived like a soldier, working almost ithout salary; the artisan felt that lie eae working for someone other than hiraelf. (4) On the ether hand, if the tendencies of the Petits-Bourgeois were very vapue, those of the workers were more clear: they had become purely eonscripts. Their conditions of life had becore even more miserable than before, la con- 'tradiction to the promises vnivh the Viet nnh had offcred, their rig t'; were further restricted. Strikes were forbidden (except one strike on the part of workers in a printing-shor whose proprietor had agreed to publish ant Minh tracts for the QDD) and unions Irohlhited (there was only the Nationa lfare Association of nerkers, ihch reduced the worker to the roeitien of a cf.nscrip* The only concession made le the r4nistry of Labor (which was heaoed bz :tta/inistse- at first LE vete Miens, and leter YGUYEr van Tao) was the e-hour day ane u holiday on the first of Inv with pay. Three concession; were certainly insuf 'ient. Gradually the workers beean to re ?_ze that they were being exploited .st as much as before, if not more so. In concert with the peasants (anothe: iroletarian group which was as much exploited !.1 they, but less conscious of the i ,,er of the Proletariat) these workers had sueroeted the Indochinese Comrunist Paa o and bad contributed largely to its advance olone the reed to power. Tneir for r 25X1 comrades claimed to be still their friends?these comrades who were n / all-power- ful Ministers. Feaertheless, in exchange for a few flatteries i the w,e,ers were being asked to work harder and herder for a cause which appeared to ti i to be too noble to become a reality. 36. The thorny eroblere for HO chi MIna, for the Indoehlnese Communist Pa: the domleant fraction in the Goverment, after the September 1946 Meal were as folloes: (1) Ho' to ra-ntain euarnianship over the category of hourgeois wl be inclined to ally themselves with the French, and escape from Viet W (2) Ho- to satisfy the caeegery of newly-rith Bourgeois who nc7bf all the means of production in their hands, and who mieht overthrow ti ment when they saw that it was becoming weak? (3) Ho 4 to areeane the ereat mass of Pet4te-Pourgeois who were st the French co1onia1ists for their present Foes, hut who richt one day accuse the Goverment itself of its inah!lity lac save and defend them? (a) How to coetinue to control the Proletariat, cf whom the Corner alwaye claimed to be the Advance Guard? Hoe' te avoid the disintegra these irrrrtant forces le favor of a regrorpine in, which there might infiltrand,cn of tte elements most feared by the Stalinists, namely the 37. The TO chi Minh Government saw clearly these difficulties. Its equili be lost as a result cf the aeneral disintegratl(n of the different sty society into two opposing categories lukewarm elements who richt bee reactienariee against the Go-ernrent; and extremists who might attempt throw everythieg in order to eseera from the suffocating impasse, wit!. ing themselves about the future an without fn. ring the precipitation anarchy. In order to avoid this disinteeration, and to ward off this danger, the Government could only rut up a screen: namely, propagandt country was still an daneer, 25X1 CONFn", ee, for 4ivendi, might al control? eearly lovern- accusing al and tl.e.s had ?1 of in Y.otskyists? :tum Might of 111 over- et concern- e complete eventual taat the REFERENCE CENTEClial Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 CENTRAL IITELLIGENCE GROU? Approved For Relegse 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R00080077 25X1 0008-5 38., It wee at this eretical moment that the great solution care: the Franco- Vietnamese conflict. Instantly the military question overshadowed all others. With dts own organizaticnn firmly tce. tcgr, Viet Winh found e palpable Samd concrete enemy against whom all possible forces must be concentrateee In the face of the necessity for filling all the pressing needs of wars terrorism was justified and the Viet Minh did not hesitate to abuse it in the name of the sacred motherland. Inconsistencies vanished--to rearpear later. 39. The present conflict was awaited calmly by the HO chi Minh Government. additien to the ieeortant reason that this conflict provided at least solution to the dangerously unstable situation which had existed since the Government he several other reasons to accept this conflict with?, Internal tactors t (1) The aerthistrative racninery was unified--it beer. in March 1946, (2) The Army?both rrgular and irregular?were b oreanized than forrerly. Guerrilla tactics were better understccd and (3) They were able to threaten the French be proposing to adorn, Score tactics. (4) The mo'lt important political factor vas a clearly eefir fighting: people :new why they were forced to fight. Proeneanea was eery; and it ras c:neucted rith skill. External factors (1) rxcept frr superiority in arms and munitions French were extreuely weak from every point of view. (2) Neighboring Siam, nurma9 India *eresyreathetic. In temporary Septembers t, fear; ed not 'ter eflrfected. Earth aim for refore he :.untriesee 40. All these vactors.centributed greatly to the stability _of the Governmey in the pre!:tcht conflict. It was alrost a re-birth of the former favorable fae?rs which contributed te the General Uprising of the Viet Minh immediately enter the Jaranese surrender. Put it must be noted that the present conflie ontains. dangerous germs for the future of Vietnam. As a result of war--bomber( entsn devastating tetles, and Scorrned Earth Policy?production will for a eg time be totally insufficient to satisfy rants. The people will suffer from _!.sery, Poverty and scarcity cf goods. At the termination of this conflict, en situation from this point of view will be far worse than in September re5. 25X1 Note: As an aid in understanding Annemese terminology used r above reeorts the followine list of Annarese terms, Chinese character lents and Wade-Gilee roranization of tYe Chinese characters 10 present( Viet Nam Giai Mang (Illan Yueh Fan ChiiI 1T'ang Chun 2, Dan Chu Dan rin Chu Tang Ad 11 , Viet Tar Thanh Men tang ? Yueh Nan Ch ing ren. Tanc. Viet rar Thanh nien Cach renh Dong Chi .Hei nn n Yueh Nan Ch'ing Nen Ming Tung Chih?Hui Mdt 4,4 ? hg ATM', Doan The Cuu WOC T'uan Tli Chin nuo Tu Ve Cdu Quoc T211 Wei Chiu Kuo 7. Viet Minh ? n Yueh Meng ate 4,4 AA_ '11A. It A 4 CONFLE'rf_EAL 25X1 seal4e, the Approved For For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5 CENTRAL INTSLLIGENCE Motir , Approved For Release 2003/08/05 ? CIA-RDP82-00457R00080077 .8. Tieu To Msiac Thu ijt 9. Khtii,Bo Pu. O. Tinh Bo Shong Pu 4p. 11. Tong Po .Ay Taunt:: Pu 12. Thanh Bo Chteng Pu -f:gr 33. Xu Bo Ch'u Pu ,4j j3 V, Can Bo Ky Thuat Chuyen mon Kan Pu CM Shi Chuan Men 15. Uy Pan Viet 'Minh Wei Pan Yueh Veng 4 /--qc,tJM 16. Cong An sung An 11. Trinh Sat Chen8Ch a Trial Sat Phil,. Tri Chenrhea CI.enc chih ts 19. Trinh Sat Kinh Te Cher4Chta Ching Chi 20. Pao An Pao An 4.1 21, Canh Sat Mar Chea iT 22, Can Po Cuu Quo? Kan Pu Chin Yuo 4,;k 25X1 "itt. 443 4 pI 0008-5 This document contains inr-)rmation affecting the national defame of the United States within the nearing of the Espionage Act, 50, U.S.0 31 and 32 as amended. Its transmis:ion or the revelation of its contens in any manner to an unauthorized pe: :on Is ptohibited by law. 25X1 Approved For For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R000800770008-5