CONFLICT IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R001700120006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 21, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP82-00457R001700120006-8
ll~ 7-
SUBJECT Conflict to Sovict Poltc;r Totrsr?'3 Ger:ny
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF 1
ACQUIRED,
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS IIIFORNilT10N AFFECTING THE NATIONAL OEPEN92
OF THE UNITED STATES Wir0IN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50
U. S, C.. 8/ AND 32. AS AIhENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVCLATIOB
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROS
HIOITED BY LAW. REPCODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED. NOW-
0111111, INFORMATION CONTAIN@D IN DOOT OF THE FORM NAT DE UTILIZED
AS DEEHEO NECESSARY BT THE RECEIVING AGENCY.
a. Thorourrh der.)ocratizai-.ion (without any clear indication of what is
b. A clear reco;nition of Socialist 2)rinciples (with no er-act definition
of what that infers).
It would also be stressed th,a!, the fulfil. gent of these conditions t ?ould He
a matter for the Germans t' e-^ e ves to achieve,
STATE
ARMY
CEN T RAt.Cii
I NFO Al I
many Au3Sia
DATE DISTR. 2:L July 1948
50X1-HUM
NO. OF PAGES 2
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
50X1-HUM
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION FOR THE RESEARCH
USE OF TRAINED INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS 50X1-HU
TMI.
PORT
n continuous str*igile lx_ ben curried on in. the Politburo in `osco a over
the Russian attitude towards re~ermamr and
althou
h
ol
,
g
no s
ution it s vet been
I-M reached, the appointment of new political dp'7u ties to tile
S it strr n then;:
ttte conclusion that the faction which favors a sl;arpor policy' %I As trinmphed?
2. One ?soup in the Politburo is anxious at all costs to enter into rood rely-w
tions grit) Germany. They are convinced that under present coedLt3.one
nett' Ier the Y?PD nor the SED an hone to ri.n a clear majority of the pop-
ulation. Consequently they are faced with two alternatives- e'.ther to
launch a new p,:irtv, friendly towards the USSR., which can secure a na?Iority
bir putting out n.. tionalt:3t pro-xafyanda and givinf' an anpearancr, of ouursu i nr'
an independcnt policyr, or to draw _?ron those parties which were corned
spontaneously and rrew on truly democratic lines elements friendly to the
t;S :R, ..L..d to soc -.rc t1_e zt: cr Sovict tutsltao--e in s'-.chh a way as to ensure
tree c arryinrf out of. a policy rrh'.ch would not rind Gers: any to k e '??este, n
Powers. This }would be the surest wav to rr?n Ger^an%r over to t;,e Soviet s*_r7.':~c
3. mis ?^roup is prop;:red initiall-r to renounce the police: of carr\rin-- out a
t`)orouph communization of the country, for they ta',c the vier; that
corti un .z .tion and sociuliza tion do not constitute an i rdeal basis for
collahor.A'-ion. They also favor free elections to a :J'ational .xssemF v and
their slog an, which is now 'c-in- echoed in "arlshorst, is: ";,c rust take
this rick in order to win Ger:ia.,-I--e. It is not completely out of the ouestioa
that one date proclamation nii:ht he made on these lines whith would deal
a severe tlofr to the "!Esters Powers. The conditions attaches' to such an of-
fer would be:
I'NAVY
AIR
CLA5 IFICAT!Ora ..E ,.?~' I,w'??"
DISTRIBUTION
1I 1
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Cl.ess. 0
0 DECLASSIFIED
Claims, CN#NGED TO: TS S ~C !
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
NAB
.
sth. DDA. REG 77
50X1-HUM
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP82-00457R001700120006-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP82-00457R001700120006-8
COINT TI
Se i T (0.. a OF 1031,4 3 OTMY
The other 'oup in the Politburo reco nizes that the Eastern Zone of
Germany has been.thorouf)uly drained and that economically it is no longer
of ortance. They see, however, the necessity of ohtaininr raw materials
and finished goods, which they urgently need, by sharing, in the control of
the Ruhr, and therefore regard it as their primary and most important task
to obtain a firm economic foothold in Germany, and from these new posi.tion5
thus won In eastern Germany to extend their influence further afield into
western Germany and even beyond.
CONTROL U.S. OFFICIALS ')NLY
C
TIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/03: CIA-RDP82-00457R001700120006-8