Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 4, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 4, 1948
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R002000340010-5.pdf282.42 KB
NO C_ X131: up. Class. Auth: D .i. t' ve Committee of the CTAL, arrived in Bogota.. Colombia, on 4 October 1948. SUBJECT Roberto Morena's Visit 25X1 C 4 November 1948 letter e- , .~:,I t":: t r 1ombia and .Ecuador-- .o NO, OF PAGES 3 Archiv;s: c Q. OF EN-CLS. (LISTED BELOW) 25X1 C 1. Roberto Morena, a member of the Brazilian Communist Party and a member of the to r 12 -00 45 7 R 'ORMATION REPORT This CONFIC?a. ;.:.; Morena had just been expelled from Venezuela and had been en to visit the Venezuelan oil fields.) He contacted Pedro J. Abella, Secretary General of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC), Napoleon Molina, Colombian Representative on the Executive Committee of the CTAL, and other Communist labor leaders, immediately after his arrival. Morenw, was reportedly delivering instructions from Vicente Lombardo Toledano con- cerning the proposed general strike in Colombia, as well as plans for the Congress for Peace and Democracy to be held in Mexico City early in 1949. 2. On the afternoon of 5 October 1948, Morena conferred with various CTC leaders and attended the meeting at which plans were made for the petroleum strike, which had been planned for 6 October , but he did not take an. 25X1A active part in it. That might he attended a secret Communist meeting at the home of Jorge Regueros Peralta. Morena was arrested as he left the house, but was released shortly thereafter with a warning not to participate in Colombian politics. He was also reminded that the country was still under a state of siege. 3. Morena attended a conference in the OTC offices on 6 October, at which the previous evening's petroleum agreement was discussed. He brought up the sub- ject of the labor situation in the Americas and stated that the CTAL was threatened by the imperialistic propaganda of the Inter-American Confederation of Labor. He added that the International Labor Office (ILO) in Montreal was imperialistic and was attempting to disunite the world labor movement. He recommended that the CTC disassociate itself from the ILO. 4. On 7 October Morena went to the airport with Abella to continue his trip to Quito, Ecuador. When he attempted to claim his luggage, which had been left at the airport customs office, he was informed that he could claim it in Quito, where it would be sent by the Colombian authorities. Abellgr protested and advised Morena not to proceed without his baggage, unless he wanted to risk being "robbed" in the same way that Senator Ocampo of Chile and other Communist travellers had been. Morena was then asked to open his baggage for inspection, and when he refused to do Aso, it was opened in spite of his protests. Several documents "of importance to the security of Colombia and the peace of the RVRM 25X1A Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002000340010-5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY to Guayaquil, Ecuador, in'accordance with an order to expel h m row aoiantYy. The order was based on his actions and statements while in Colombia. Subject proceeded to Quito, where he contacted Pedro Saad, Gustavo Becerra, and Enrique Gil Gilbert, Ecuadoran Communist leaders, as well as several members of the National Congress. During a secret meeting with Gil Gilbert, Morena stated that he was a member d h t h h continent" were removed. 5. Morena #d not depart that day, and after he had returned to Bogota from the airport, he could not be found by the Communist leaders. Juan. Francisco Mujica, a Communist lawyer in Bogota, prepared a complaint against the Chief of the National Police, accusing him of arbitrarily arresting Morena,. abusing his arrest, and theft of his personal possessions. The complaint was presented to Sergio Delgado, Judge of the Third Circuit Court of Bogota and a Colmnunist, who attempted to locate Morena. 6. On 9 October, Morena was placed on a plane in Cali, Colombia, which was going i f the a of the Central Committee of the Brazilian Communist Party and t a e been a Communist for over twenty y ded the following concerning his two-fold mission in Latin America omment. This supplements the information contained in- and is from the same source): a, ess for Peace-and Demoerac7. About three hundred delegates will Charlie Chaplin and John uador E f o ll b , m c r e tten. , of these, ten wi Passos will be two of the United States delegates to the Congres ii and D s DD. Antonio Parra Velasco, pro-Soviet former Ecuadoran Minister of Foreign Relations, has been invited by Saad to attend it. The local committees i t each country will not only promote the Congress, but will also. carry on tie "peace propaganda" program after the Congress has adjourned.: The and certain Soviet sources. The committees in some of the tie C`I'AL , larger countries will be provided with printing presses,. but Ecuador is. not one of these. b. zl cum Asitation. Morena anticipated that the Ecuadoran Government would place troops in the oil fields in the event of strikes, so he urged that penetration of the Armed Forces be accelerated.~'f'e ho t the Communist penetration of the Armed Forces would make ea`emeee ess in any Government attempt to control the situation. Morena pointed out that the slogan to be used among the oil workers would be "No oil for the war effort" rather than "No oil for the United States". s#. Gil Gilbert was asked what. would become of the oil workerst jobs. after the wells $ad been blown up, especially in Mexico where they were the real owners. He replied that the workers would serve as guerilla fighters against the !Imperialists" and that the plan involved the deliberate provocation of tncidents which would force the various governments to take steps against the 'workers.. This would arouse sympathy for the workers and would cause more of their fellows to join in the strike. 9. Morena informed Gil Gilbert that he was to have departed from Ecuador earlier, but that information he had received concerning political unrest in Peru had. caused him to remain. He claimed that he had been. mistreated in Venezuela and Cplombia and feared that the same thing might happen in Peru. Unsettled cbndl.tions have left Morena undecided as to whether he should continue his t'ip as planned or return to Mexico, but he said that he preferred to carry out his mission if possible. Although Morena was nervous about having stayed in Quito so long, he was pleased that it had given him an opportunity to devote -eg"ailed to I This 6,?.. r i ? COE}!"`?CC' With the CONFIQ" 6 :cm the ?~- tsr ter' 6 letter s to the 1 Ulicvav,: :E3. Archivsst c.+i Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP82-0045 RQ`02 'b34m,.0-5.~ Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002000340010-5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY more time to the local committee for the Congress for Peace and Democracy and to interview non-Communist prospects for work on it. 10. Pedro Saad proceeded to Ancon and Guayaquil in order to prepare for the arrival of Morena, who wished to hold closed conversations with the oil syndicate leaders. Morena's itinerary was to proceed to Guayaquil from Quite, then to .Anton, and return to Guayaquil. Gil Gilbert offered to accompany Morena to Guayaquil and help him to secure passage on a boat to Puerto Bolivar, - Ecuador. From there he could depart by bus for Peru. 11. The following description of Morena supplements that given Nose: Eyes: Neck: Occupation: Address in Brazil: Passport: Brazilian Cedul e. Straight, narrow-bridged Blue Short and thick Draftsman Rua Morals e Silva. 17, Apt. 102, Rio de Janeiro Brazilian, Not 034063, issued in Rio on 22 March 1948. No. 204129 Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002000340010-5