YUGOSLAV TROOP UNITS BEING FORMED IN USSR, COMINFORM STRENGTH INSIDE YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002100050002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 23, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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eturn to CIA Library
1. Confusion is rampant within the Communist calls in Slovenia; t
`' organizational machine' has collapsed entirely, and the leaders respond
evasively even to important political questions put to them. They excuse the
Tito-Soviet rift by ol&1radng that Communism is identical in Yugoslcvia and
the Soviet Union and that there is only a "minor difference" between the two
a .dons. When these leaders are asked as to why there are so many Communists
imprisoned in Yugoslavia, the answer is that they have been "unfaithful to
Communist principles" and it is necessary to segregate such people and
"purify" them of their past errors. The purifioation can be conducted only
by solect followers of Tito. Actually a purge of undesirables is in effect,
-> .th liquidation the fate of mazy.
Yugoslav Deportees in Russia Foru:ing Troo s
2. Tito now regrets having followed Moscow's suggestions to deport undesirable
Co==sts and "reactionaries" (the latter number more than 10,000) to
forced labor in the Soviet Union. Today, in all Soviet concentration and
labor cups the Yugoslavs are being classified in two distinct groups. The
older Yugoslav Communists, who gained the displeasure of Tito, are placed
in groups "A" and "B". Group "A" is looked upon as an "elite class" and its
members are automatically absolved of all previous offenses. Into group "B"
are placed Communists who have committed crimes which did not necessarily
violate any Communist ideal, as such. Within group "A" cadres of future
officers are organized, while cadres of lower ranking officers are formed in
group `y8".
3. PP?actically,,thin military selection of -former Yugoslav Communists means that
viherreas the Soviets are preparing volunteer aid forces among the German
prisoners of war, the personnel of Groups "A" and "B", mentioned above, will
coriaprise the future officers and non-come for the German troops. Other
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soups are being organized from the Yugoslav."reactionaries" who will then
*:re formed into volunteer brigades.
4, Some escapees who crossed from Rumania into Yugoslavia confirm the above
information regarding the formation of Yugoslav forces in the Soviet Union,
and stated that these forces already number approximately 30,000 and may
eventually reach 50,000.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO
FO IUMANI N REPORT
COUNTRY Yugoslavia
.3U.; BJ ECT
'J...ACE
\CQUIRED
Yugoslav Troop Units Being Formed in USSR;
Gominform Strength Inside Yugoslavia
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burn to (I l t rarV
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tityP 01? INFO None
Hslres
ocu tmis hereb y .r raded lo
C0NFiDEN IA
L in accordance w.t!
letter of 16 October 1973 t')E !
en -e to t,Ic Class
Archivist oft ed Mates.
Date: 0 8 Q7QBy:
DATE DISTR, 23 November 1948
NO, OF PAGES 4
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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Cominform Ranks Gaining
5. It is apparent to visitors to Yugoslavia that Tito is losing followers who
"with foresight" are embracing "Cominformism". The Cominforrmists have
also begun a campaign of fear, and make promises reminieont of those made
in 1941-42 Th ~:atest efforts to influencing the
25X1X IIDB and, have already achieved a high degree
6, Currently it is heard that the present situation in Yugoslavia resembles that
of Czechoslovakia prior to Gottwald's coup d'etat. 25X1X
believos that such pronouncements are drastically exaggerated, but at the
same time he emphasizes that he has witnessed many instances in which the
Cominform has made definite inroads on the police system and armed forces.
On the surface such infiltrations are not perceptible; nevertholess, they
do roach high levels.
7. As indicative of the recent surge of Cominformism,
T
ito's maneuver in-sending Popovie (with a trade delegation to "'oswa. His
M=~
likely mission is primarily to make various offers in order to effect at
least a "losaening of Cominform activities" in Yugoslavia.
Cominformists Sabotaging Eoonor r
8. The Yugoslav Government leadership is completely bewildered by its unusually
critical economic situation. :"Jith skillful tactics Tito may be fortunate
in pacifying the farming class which today is very disgruntled and dangerous.
The forced sale of Farm products had very poor results. Farmers of the
most productive regions openly committed sabotage, not only in neglecting to
plant and cultivate land, but also in refusing to submit to forced sale of
their crops. The farmers campaign against increased farm production is
backed by Cominformists.
9. h leading economist in Slovenia declared that the Cominform action, in this
respect, follows exactly its pattern to sabotage the 1'arshall Plan in
,-.astern Europe. This economist further pointed out that in Srem, Vojvodina,
and Sumadija (Serbia) sabotage is skillfully organized, and has booome
evident, even in the collective organizations. This Cominforrn action differs
in various localities, In some places warped and mouldy seed is mixed with
good seed, thereby decreasing its productive capacity. In others, diseases
such as scarlatina are spread among pigs. Cows suffer from an unusually
high incidence of hoof and mouth disease and salivary gland infections.
10. The same economist asserted that in some sections of Bosnia and Srem they
discovered agents giving live-stock pieces of bread which had previously
been soaked in the saliva of diseased animals. Purther, that in Slovenia
chicken pox is spreading, which according to veternarianns was surreptitiously
imported into the country. The Tito regime is making; every effort to prevent
the propagandizing of such information for it fears panic and gives additional,
grounds for criticism to its enemies.
11. By such means the Cominform hopes to accomplish the follotisring;
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a. Compromise the Tito government and Yugoslav Communist Party leaders,
thereby underline the Cominform claims that the Yugoslav Communist
Party has deserted Marxism and Leninism.
b. Reaffirm the validity of the principle that it is necessary to abolish
the Kulaks, who are causing irreparable damage to the socialist
economy of Yugoslavia.
12. All these problems are increasingly building up for Tito and his officials.
Abnormal nervousness and confusion is apparent both in the government and
in Communist cells and mass organizations. In this manner the Cominform has
achieved success in the "cold war" within Yugoslavia itself, and they hope
yet to accomplish more telling results than could be expected from any
eventual invasion of Yugoslav territory.by Soviet troops.
Tito Followers Look to America
13. The ground under Communism in Yugoslavia is entirely shaken. Tito followers
are "without backbone" and are now boginning to think in terms of qualified
leadership as well as the valuo of individual ideology. World revolution
doesn't interest them since they realize that, with such action, they would
only be "activating destiny in favor or the grc:atost reactionaries". They
place all their hopes on America. Already they believe themselves to be
the most reliable supporters of Amorioan doctrines, and comment, "moo will
bring Yugoslavia to the side of the .;extern Powers, and :vthout us this
would never be possible". pith this in mind they expect the "'extern Powers
to now devote great attention to them and in the end reward them fir their
"service".
14. Consorvativo Yugoslavs expect a decision daily. They are convinced that
the Communism of F"osoow, like that of Belgrade, is duo fora complete
breakdown. The current confusion among Communists has noticeably encouraged
anti-Communists, and has brought about a consolidation of political oloments,
which are prepared for eventual action. This evident movomont has its effect
on Communist cells. They are becoming increasingly less i'"portant, losing
members and failing in party discipline. The general confusion is rapidly
spreading throughout government administration, with a marked ineroaso in
corruption. This is true not only among the loaders, but also among low-
level es'ployoes.
15. Public fear is patently on tLe wane. Priests are gaining the popularity
both of the common man and high level personalities. Denunciations and
suspicions have resulted; nevertheless, a now initiative has arisen to harass
Cominformists and even Tito's faithful, who for any reason are vulnerable to
vindictive attack. Corninformists have also taken advantage of vulnerable
regime followers for thus they "logally" aid the expulsion of some officials
::tho are obstructing the way to Coninform objectives. 'istrust is growing
daily and is said to be particularly evident in Belgrade.
16. As a result of Soviet and satellite sanctions against Yugoslavia and the
general sabotage of Carm production, the food situation has deteriorated
seriously. People fear the approach of winter. Black market prices have
soarod very high, more so -because rationed items are distributed with utter
carelessness.
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17. Unemployment has increased recently, particularly among unspeciali;ed
office workers. This means not only being without income, but also without
food ration cards, which is driving unfortunates to starvation. Employment
cannot be found since the "karaktaristika", itself, usually dons not warrant
it. Published statisticsy however, do not reflect these conditions.
16. In the bureaus thorn is generally a lack of responsibility. People do not
wish to accept responsible or bottor paid positions, because they are very
much aware that, along with such a position, they accept not only responsibility
for production but also for the fulfillment of all directives handed down by
higher headquarters. In Yugoslavia the governing principle is that the
individual is at fault and not the institution or the authorities.
10. For some weeks now a frantic effort to out down trees has been obsorvod.
The country is in urgent need of certain materials; however, these can be
purchased only by exporting the nation's critical resources. Following
the crop failures the regir.a has turned as a last resort to the forest preserves.
Groat c1'zantities of wood ari now appearing in saw mills and other lumber
industries. This is causing considerable dissatisfaction among the farmers
because the woods are being ruined. Furthermore their manpower and'animals
are taken from their fields to aid in cutting down the forests.
20. A great shortage in hay and other fodder is already evident. Fruit crops,
which are principally raised in eastern Slovenia and wore formerly'vory
profitable, are this year considerably below normal in quality and quantity
as a result of heavy, untimely rains. The grape prop was also almost
completely ruined,
21,/ The peoples' hoalth is desperately precarious as a result of a general organic
disintegration and a complete dearth of medical products. Few doctor's
prescriptions can be filled by the nationalized apothecaries.
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