FREE LAO POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002100510006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 8, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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IJNTRY Siam/,Indochina
SUBJECT Free Lao Political and Military De-
velopments
PLACE 25X1A6a
DATE oF
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOWI
SUPPLEMENT TO
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Comment, Reference is made to - concerning the ousting
o 'ri Oon from'the
Free Lao movement by the Free Lao princes in June 19) 8,
,
representing the culmination of a series of personality clashes between
25X1X6 the " plebeian" faction and the princes.)
Comment. It is possible that during 1947 in particular, this
schism was widened by the activities of Mme Germaine Krull in the role of
25X1X7 ~!g t provocateur.)
1,.. Much of the dissatisfaction of the Free Lao Plebeian group centers around
the roles of Prince Souphanavong and his elder brother, Prince Petsarath in
the Free Lao movement,. MemLers of this 'group feel that Prince Petsarath
has become too dictatorial, and that he has assumed too many direct ex-
ecutive functions in the movement. They feel that he sh(y.ld act only as
an advisory "elder statesman", which was his original post in the Lao
government? Phya Kam Mao, who is well liked by all factions and is very
popular within Laos itself, could then exercise his full prerogatives as
the Free Lao Prime ;.finis ter.
2., The Plebeians would like Prince Souphanavong to confine himself to the
duties of Foreign V nister, his original position and one for which he
is adequately qualified. They are in favor of his relinquishing his
his post as "military commander", for which they feel he is ungtalified.
As an example, they cite his early 1.47 strategy of massing the guerrillas
f or attacks rather than keeping them dispersed in seal 1 groups . This re-
sulted in unnecessary slaughters.,
3, In view of the extreme distaste and hatred which the princes now have for
Tao clean, who probably has the nos t extensive military -exp erience of any of their leaders, the Plebeians are willing to compromise with the princes
25X1A6a and have the four "area" military cornrnders within Laos direct military
25X1X6 operations (? Cor rent. 1!o identification of these military
commanders is g ven, a it is not rwinn whether or not the guerrilla
forces would corner under their jzrisdiction. )
/t. The Plebeian guerrillas, formerly under Tao Oon, are now led by his
brother, Kam Suk, who works out of the ?,Tong Khai area. They are based
on a plateau in the vicirpity of 18, lO degrees (the intersection ' a
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tine drawn directly east from Vientiane and north of Thak Hek Their
.:estimated strength is probably approximately several hundred men (.)., 25X1X6
Prince Sou hanavong, who returned to Bangkok from Laos in mid-September
1948 after a six-week stay spent inspecting the guerrillas
under his jurisdiction and planning operations, nov has five well-organized
units. The strength of each unit is believed to be In the viciniiy of
100-200 men M. Comment. An examination of nume m us photo-
graphs of these troops revea tat (a) they were well--clothed and
well-equipped with rifles, semi-automatic weapons, French-type helmets
and knapsacks; (b) they looked well-fed and healthy; (c) they are Laos
and not Vietnamese. This was partially illustrated by one photograph
showing one of the units meeting a unit of Viet Minh troops "at the
Laos Viet Nam border" . )
According to Prince Souphanavong, despite the heavy rains in Laos (which
necessitated his walking, at one time, in water waste high for abort
twelve hours), his guerrillas had managed to kill six Frenchmen during
a seven-day period in early September 19118 M. He states that the
Siamese have given the Laos no aid since the 9 November Coup d'Etat,
but that his men have been receiving supplies and aid from the Viet Minh
for approximately the past three months, This is the result of an
accord reached between Prince Souphanavong and the Viet Minh, the terms
of which are obscure, but are believed almost certainly t o have in~-
eluded Viet Minh "technical advisers" as well as active military assistance
/-JA I AU (M.
7o Viet Minh assistance, previously given to Tao Oon's forces, was cut
off after the accord. Souphanavongfe explanation of this is that Oon's
group had been associated with a group of very extremist Vietnamese in
Laos, of whom HD Chi Minh disapproved, He claims that he can prove
25X1X6 this with a letter outlining HO's position, signed by HO himself.
Comment, In addition, Souphanavong claims that his negotiations
w tCe Viet Minh culminated in the accord, which was,a direct one
between HO and himself. He adds that the agreement was in writing,)
Nguyen Duo Quy, head of the Viet Nam Dele gation in Bangkok, offers the
explanation that the shift in the `list Mirth support of the Free Laos
was simply a matter of expediency on the part of the Viet Nam government.
ztecogniZing tna-t tine r-ree Laos were aiv3.aea ksometn3.ng ror wnicn tine viers
have little patience), the Viet Minh chose to support the princes' group,
25X1X6 as it was better organized and potentially more effective both militarily, 25X1X6
and, to a much greater extent, politically (M. Comment. HO's
frowning on "extremism" seems incongruous'. It seems much more ly
that the Vietnamese, with whom Tao 0on& a group was V0 rking, were non-Viet
Minh, and if not anti Viet Minh, had at least not been successfully 25X1A6a
subordinated to the Viet Minh High Conm>ando) Comment. Prince
Souphanavong, who is married to an Annamese woman, has a ways been more
pro Viet than arq other Free Lao leader. He has been the only one who
apparently does not share in traditional Laotian fear of Annamese and
25X1A2g Vietnamese aggression. reported that Tran Van Giau ingratiated
himself with Souphanavong by helping the Free Laos ab tai. arms and
25X1A2g ammunition, Tao Oon has been highly critical of Souphanavong's pro-
Viet activities. However, - reported that Don stated in Jarmary
19118 that he,.himself, was "getting along better with the Viets".)
8.. A mission from the French-sponsored Lao government is sc h ried to
come to Bangkok to confer with the Free Laos concerning the return of
Lao refugees in Siam to Laos. Part of the mission is now (mid-October 1918)
in Saigon. Both Prince Petsarath and Prince Souphanavong are somewhat
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bmke them off himself.)
Lao movement by the princes was his negotiations with Colonel R c`con?
cerning the possibility of a compromise accord between the French a d
the Free Laos Oon did not commit himself during" the negotiations' and
One of the principal reasons why Tao ton was expelled from tnz n'e'e
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Erptimistic about its possibilities and are prepared to confer with the
gibers of the mission. Coms nt, No report of the arrival
of such a mission in Bsngko " i~zs ee z moved to date.) ~ Comm ent.
CONFIDENTIAL/CONTROL - U,S. 0 ICIALS 0'
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