Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 1, 1998
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 3, 1949
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R002300070003-0.pdf187.36 KB
COUNTRY SU WW1' ?ZSIFICAT1ON 4,1.4.4141 AriAJ Sanitized - Ap1e a4etP82-00IMPETON 25X1A2g IN FOR It% 25X1X6 25X1A2M DATE DISTR. 3 istrib 10. OF PAGES 2 NO. OF ENOS. dAMEDIWON: SUPPLEMENT TO R/TORT NO. 14 President Peron believes that the economic security he desires for Argen- tina can be achieved through access to raw materials in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia which can be used for the fulfillment of his Five-Year Plan. The uninterrvted flow of these raw 'materials can be obtained solely through trade agreements, which in some cases have failed to materialise. Without essential raw materials, Argentina remains soonomically weak. 2. Argentina desires strategic ;retention against an attack by Chas or Brazil or a concerted attack by any coalition of nations. Peron is main- taining a large army and is building army barracks and depots along the country'', borders. Be believes it imperative that Argentina regain mili- tary supremacy in the southern part of Latin America. Argentina's future foreign policy will be determined by the increasing influence of the army. 3. The nationalist elements within the government are crowding out foreign capital and foreign trade. This program, supported by Peron is being effectuated by Miguel Miranda who envisages parts of South Peron, as ex- clusive Argentine markets. Despite the failure of this program as a re- sult of the shortage of dollars, certain nationalists continue to oppose commercial negotiations with the United States and England. Argentine Congressmen believe that economic necessity will force the Argentine government to negotiate with the United States. In view of this, the Argentine government will not circulate any extensive anti-American propa- ganda for the time being. However, the government at= desires, to replace United States interests in South America with Argentine interests. 4. A split exists within the government with regard to its attitude toward the United states. One faction favors closer U.S.-Argentine relations in order that a sounder economy may be established in Argentina, and the other fac- tion desires closer ties with Spain and the Old World. Foreign Minister 01111Wei rirryiNIMI - ?-? ? co: i,ence with the fetter of IS October 1073 from the DirecIorc Centre; ?n?,?0!?:,.v.arroe to the Arohiv,'s of the 6i?ates. 1\iet er9i.ti?Approved me mom= IM111111111111iii Document No. NO CHANGE t5sDECLA S 44iSk. V For Release : CIA-RDF-O' Date: )14Vei log ???1 isiegipsvigittomma Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R0023Q0070003-0 M5X1A2 Juan Pramulilia adherre to the former 6rcp but fears 'Iran( an '1 not ' ;mess for such a policy. 5. Tha United Etateesin its kttv-pt to noisolidi4te its poslci n in ixerica in the ',cold war" a0ainot Cm-Tun1s-4 is makin? tci o plc- in, too much confidence in PProns rho ts extromely unreliAJc and ,n',?ust- rortily and is sl,t to withara- .rur any corrit,nmt on tIle t Uro- txt.. Tho United Ltatos is also rittaken in its rolicy o. eourtt.,, aation- alists, reactionaries And aietatore in Lntin irWriCa ir ordar date its position. This prowrar is called imperialist, Ln :any pi?rts of Latin America. Confidential reports received by del law ironternen throuuhout Sough America show a Oistinct distrust of the nnited t-..-.ttes be- cause of its policy of backin., zovervirents utioh have the suppolt and con- fidence of the Iowa army and navy. Peron is Able to irpress thvse states- nen When he speaks against the United States. Yoonomic sanctions a4ainst ;kr entina would boomerang and weaken the position of any country applyin? them. 7, During 109 Amentina will shift its propaganda from an anti-American to an anti-British line as a result of the need for American products. However, the antii.Amerioan feelin; continues to exiet, especially in the Subsecre- taria do informacicmes y Prensa, where it is believed that the United States is responsible for Arbentinaos economic ills. Peron, his tpanish advisor Jose lignerola, and the army share this latter opinion. 8. The Argentine political situation is far from settled, and the g-vornment is concerned over the mains of the 5 December 108 elections. The Peronista Party, which displayed no added strength, feels it has reached its peak of popularity. The government is also worried about the political **Mons of certain persons now in public office. Peron will be given additional dictatorial parsers as a result of. the new constitutional reforms. The economic situation will worsen in the coming year, and Peron will be forced to avail hirself of these aVed parers to maintain his ?avernmont in power. Del :fazo expects Peron to ?ive Senora Peron increased powers despite army pressure. , 7 10. Peron is rapidlr forgettin, the importance of foreisn relations and iS pri- marily intrrested in enhancing hiS awn prestige at home and furtherin6 his future career by collaborating nore closely with the army. Peron is pri- marily interested in national preparedness and is opposed to the restriction and reduction of armaments in spite of his peace talks. These peace talks are merely designed to conceal his jawing military power and to establish a stronger case for his candidacy for the A!obel peace prize. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP82-00457R002300070003-0