MEETING OF THE LANDESVORSTAND BERLIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002300270007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 3, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

CO 1FJDFNNT! L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/10: CIA-RDP82-00457R002300270007-4
CENTRAL iNTELW{ kFC&PENCY REPORT
IN FOR MATIMFWit PORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Germany (Berlin)
SUBJECT
PLACE
ACQUIRED
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Meeting of the Landesvorstand Berlin - NO.OF PAGES 2
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CLASSIFICATION 3 -
FIDE TIAL
This document is hereby regraded to
'ONFIDENTiAL in accordance with the
Otter of 16 October 1978 from the
lirector of Central Intelligence to the Crr n E
,rchivist of the United States.
.text Review Date: 2008
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
On 12 and 13 Deeenber, 190, 1i1helm Pieck, Franz Dahlen, and Rana Jendretzlc
held a series of conferences with SMA officials on the subject of future
Soviet policy concerning the Berlin problem. The purpose of the discussions
was the adoption of a new "party line", to be announced at the meeting of
the vD Landesvorstand Berlin on Tuesday, 14 December 1948,
the kollo-,ring summarizes; the main political arguments 50X1-HUM
wni.en e bta; leaders brought frcr. Karlahorsti
a. The first point to be considered is that the Soviets are now convinced
that the Western rowers will stay in Berlin under all oircurntances.
The organization of their supply effort is of such scope and based on
such long-range considerations that all of the methods used to date in
an effort to drive them from Berlin must, of necessity, regain unsuc-
cessful. The sentiment against the Western Powers among Vie German popu-
lation has failed. The SED employed methods which might have been sue--
cessful thirty years ago, in an earlier phase of the class strungle.
Today these methods represent an altogether unrealistic policy. The
(agitation and propaganda) preparations in the shops and factories were
totally inadequate, and the populationAblt that something was being
forced upon then. This resulted in a total failure to support the new
city administration and the revolutionary movement supporting it.
b. The SED policy must be based on the above two points. Thus it is abso-
lutely stupid to demand publicly that the Western Powers withdraw when
it is known that -- as a matter of political reality -- the power of the
(working ) class energy has been absolutely stabilized. Plow, that It can
no longer be expected that western Berlin will collapse, two measures
are essential: Despite all economic difficulties in the Soviet Zone,
measures must be adopted in the immediate future which will enable the
Soviet Sector of Berlin to become an enviable example to the western
sectors in all economic and sociologicQ. tla .ds.' Under no circumstances
must one proceed according to dogmati1 principles alone. All auxiliary
weapons, including those of the enery, must be utilized to demonstrate the
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/10: CIA-RDP82-00457R002300270007-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/10: CIA-RDP82-00457R002300270007-4
G: TRAL INTEULIGENCE AGENCY
-z-
coNFtDENTiAL
advantageous position of the Soviet Sector. Hand in hand with this
there must be an intensified cell-or anizing activity in every western
Berlin factory, shop, andapwt ant house. The primary purpose of these
cells is to point out the difference between the Eastern (Berlin) ex-
ample and the Western distress. The difficulties resulting from large-
scale lose of employr!ent -- unavoidable during the coming Weer in West
Berlin -- together with the increasing scarcities will not be pointed
up in mass demonstrations, but by intensified propaganda. Subtle propa-
ganda and exemplary deeds will finally lead the SED to success. But
there is not much time. The weeks until early February are the most im--
portant, because it is then that the difficulties imposed by the blockade
will be most noticeable.
a. Based on these considerations, the now Party line iss No more conspicuous
statements that the Western Powers will soon retire from Berlin but emphasis
on the propagandizing of the advantages to be found in the East. It has
been proved that the Berlin problem cannot be solved by dramatic acts as
long as the Western Powers continue to regard Berlin as a political question
of primary importance. Therefore, a quiet penetration of western Berlin is
more important than noisy action. The Soviets have no interest in creating
disorder, especially while the Berlin problem is still on the UN agenda.
The important thing is to draw the world's attention away from the "drama-
tic" aspects of the Berlin struggle, in order to insure the continued ad-
vancement of "progressive democratization" in all other fields. The task
of the SED is, therefore, more than ever: exemplary routine it in the
Soviet Sector and systematic penetration of-the western sectors.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/10: CIA-RDP82-00457R002300270007-4