Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 11, 1999
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 3, 1949
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R002400330012-0.pdf145.06 KB
2b/-\l A2g CLASgIFICATIW~; 11 fl INFORM . Approved For ReIgFal~ffi A2-0045M33 4W~fftAM IN COUNTRY Chile PLACE AC: QUIRED DATE OF IN 25X1X6 25X1A2g Coammist 1 tfbrts to sus 25X1A6a DATE DISTR. war 110 NO. OF ENCLS. Ws= BELOW) SUPPLEMENT 25X1A2g REPORT NO. bmim The follovtng report oovvrs t*i line of the Cormumist Party of Chile ( Ch) from 31 :am u7 to 6 Fatbrua j '1949. Sul cequent events, as reported in have modified this program. 1. Unificatioc of anti-?gover nt parties was the principal work of the PCCh, and the calls were kept constantly buoy. The policy of keeping the cells occupied was of prim importance in eviiding disturbances in the negotiations betvnen parties. i'bc, regional o:fficos were riven definite tasks, such as the formation of committees, and organizati3n of plane for local economic improvement. These tasks kept the militants occupied, so that they did not lose their training and did not Cain^s difficultio!9 in the negotiations of the Party leaders. Uiations with the Socialists were very difficult, because of the opposition 4. The rr~oet ? effective work me csarried out in the provinces, where efforts to 3nprove conditions were going forward under the direction of local committees - The Convmmist :sponsorship of the work of these committees was concealed, and people par".ies as c matter of vital 1 portance to the PCCh. of saversi of the directors and in particular of Raul Ampuero. Although Eugenio Gonstles is ,earstary, General of the Party, Raul Ampuero Dias has the greatest influence, wnrich he used agalEst attempts at unification. On the other lido, Communist le.sders had difficulty in convincing their Party members that they must not attack the !"ocial.ists, and that they must accept the alliances with various who are antipathetic to the I''*rty were unwittingly working to carry out Conrmmist diroctivee While this work was being carried out among the masses, the national directorate worked with the top Levels, or national heads of the various parties. The Cirim nists figured that if the negotiations were successful, the work *rould be well under tray, and if uuntueccasful, at least the Consvunist Party eler tints would have penetrated other fields, which while less closely directed and with less political e7psrience, would be easily guided by cambers of the Communist Party along Party lines. 5. The Party, endeavored to maintain, its own objectives, without closing the door on people who could aid itV 8 it for the candidacy of Carlos Ibanes del. Campo cams about b:,r following this aoa.. Ibanez has great influence among the military arc? also with the worcers in the provinces. The latter remember him for the many CLASSIFICATION MATE MW FBI ARMY #IAIAIR This ccu?yam- letter n; .. ~lrecto r of fie, Archivr s t of Next Re ~6~NftD?1~fi1'At- . `1 the fr?r t:~e to th, ate: o m or Release the D 1999/09/09 : CIA-RDP82-004 A rati?Gorssamemt Parties NO. OF PAGES 2 9D Class. C ^ TS S C pr 77 763 ? of Approved For Release 1999/09//009 ::CIIA-RRD}P~822-00457R002400330012-0 QON IDEI`I t IAL 25X1A2g C=E T TB.AL' orr, IMICE AG124CI I,a'.,'e he sponsor d w1airh beno d tfzem. if; 'bulTi, bridges, roam, pa bl a:c built - th n, and a-,.used roctn1 i c t : to passed. The Con nmints realized t1 t he had t , ~ e : upport of 1 . a xn ab:-ex-i of lsborisag people, and supported his c i &e Thcy oounted on his td.':i.a*,ncc'o Ath the '{wrier-Laborists to ass= is ~?n cf the 6u p _ t of 'hat pr r 7 C~6NFtBf~FIA1. Approved For Release 1999/09/09 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002400330012-0