COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES DURING NOVEMBER 1948

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002400370011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 10, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

%t%w to c-k uusk,
COUNTRY Peru W
_UBJECT C m mist Activities Din-ing November 1948
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PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF INFO. Uovemb?r 1948
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REPORT NO.
The following report of the activities of the Consiunist Party of Peru (PCP)
for the month of November 1948 includes the activities of the last five days
of October, from the time of the Odria revolutions
CGnsjs
1. The Decree-Law of 1 November 1948 outlawing the PCP drove the Party underground
and brought about a state of tetiporary disorganization that continued during
most of the month. The Party's activity was limited to defensive measures. It
was only at the very end of November that the PCP pulled itself together
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sufficiently to immm its first clandestine pronouncement, a leaflet on the
Divisaa (exchange) dispute. Taking stock at the end of the month, however,
Party leaders found that they had not been persecuted, and they believed that
even if organized Party activity were impossible, individual leaders might well
be able to work themselves into positions of control in the labor field, and
continue the Party's work in that manner for the time being.
Meanwhile, the outlawing of the APRA and the PCP left the labor field open to
the only two remaining; organized groups of any significance. These were the
dissident Cothmunist followers of Juan P. Luna and the Frente do Unidad e
Independencia Sindioal (FUI.S). Both of these ;coups are controlled by exL-
Corimu ists, and it should be emphasized that although breaking at various time
and for various reasons with the orthodox PCP, those individuals have broken
away for reasons of personal rivalry, or jealousy arising from immediate tactical
disputes. The schisms were not caused by long term strategic disagreement, and
these leaders undoubtedly remain what might be described as "good Marxists" even
if no longer bearing the Communist Party name.
3. In order to build popular labor support, the Odria Military Junta is expected
to rely to a large extent on these groups, and it will remain to be seen which
of them will predominate and to what extent they may be able to dictate terms.
In preliminary skirmishes in that struggle, Luna and the FUIS joined fo^cea on
18 November to put on the only substantial labor display of the month in support
of Odria, to the mutual advantage of both,,
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The FUIS, a nuwmerias11y ai is l bat articulate group s been brought back into
prominence through prier collaboration with Odria when he was 24inieter of Government.
This small grow, used and reportedly financed by the Aliansa Naoibnal, appeared to
be duping out of sight with the breakup of the Alianza and the disappearance of
j m nn j, one of its pr Lnoipal propaganda media. It has been restored to a posi-
tion or Importance with the accession of Odria, and it will be treated separately.
5. During the last days of October, the Party succeeded In printing a final edition
of jfiko_Z# the Party news organ, before the lease on the press expired. The
issue in dated I November, the date of the Decree making the Party illegal. The
paper was to have appeared on the newsstands that evening, but all copies were
confiscated at the press by the government and none appeared for sale.
6. This issue contained the Faarty's last legal statement on the Odria government
and its program. The statement was in the form of a communique signed by the
.Central iecretarlat of the PCP and it was drawn up on 31 October. It expressed
the Party's opposition to the Odria regime and again indicated the Party's
approval of the Bustamante program, for even if it could not be completely fulfilled.,
it at least did not exhibit the serious and dangerous defects of Odria's program.
Basing its attack on the Cidria government on the General's statement that he would
apply the Bogota anti-Coeunist agreement and eliminate all germs of Communism, the
communique asks how this government or any other can guarantee democratic con-
stitutiomalism "under the Hitler and Marshall banner of anti-Communism".
7. Particularly disconcerting-,to the Party during the period immediately following
the Odria coup were the editoriall, in It Prensa for 27 October and the articles
in the same paper for 31 October and 1 November which violently attacked the POP.
Party leaders were particularly incensed at these articles because the author,.
Sergio Velez Raygada, was only recently expelled from the PCP* and his information
on Communism would be considered authoritative. Party leaders also believed that
Velez Raygada wrote the JA EMM editorial of !, November, which "unmasked" the
Party's pretense of being a national party and branded it as being directly under
the direction of !bsoow.
8. Protests continued to be received by Party leaders over the Manifesto of 28 October
which subsequently became known among del Prado's critics as "the death warrant
of the Party". Del Prado and riacedo PIendoza, the National Secretaries of Organiza-
tion and Propaganda, were blamed for their lack of political vision in publishing
the !4snifesto and they were censured for departing from the Party line as laid
down at the III National Congress, which provided nowhere for support of Bustamante,
but called for a continued fight against APRA and Yankee imperialism. One bitter
protest came from Vicente ;Mendosa Diaz in Puno, who reminded Party leaders in Lima
that although he had been elected twice as deputy from Ptmo, his election has been
annulled twice by the Bustamante government.. He asked how the Party could defend
a government which had consistently broken its promises to the Communists, in spite
of the support they had given it in the 1945 elections.
9. At a meeting of Party leaders hold on 3 November at Negeiron 568, notice was re-
ceived that Odria had issued orders to imprison all officers of the PCP, who were
to be held until the authors of the N nifesto had been identified. None of the
leaders were arrested in Lima, and there is doubt now whether such orders had ever
been issued.
10. The Party began to plan its future actions as soon as the Decree-.Law of 1 November
was promulgated. They felt that the Odria government could only last a few. months,
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and that even if individual. Party members were apprehended and jailed, it
would only be for a relatively short period. The Party fixture was believed
to lien in the direction of' controlling labor, and it was felt that it would
be necessary to cooperate with Aprista elements. This cooperation with the
APRIi was to be a project for the-futures and present plans were to avoid all
A.prista contacts. The Partly, leaders decided to await further announcements
don?erning Odrin's promised Congraso Obrero (Workers' Congress) to assess
their chances of infiltrating its membership and influencing its decisions.
PSaanwhilee the days following 1 November were ones of difficulty and confusion
for the PCP, and certain Party leaders planned to leave Lima to go south, to
such areas as Arsquipas Cusco or Puno, to ride out the storm in those centers
of Communist stren;th, which might afford them better protection and easier
living condition than Lima. All Party activities, of course, following the
Decree-Law of 2 November# were clandestine in character, and meetings were of
necessity small and oosmznication and even movement difficult, with instructions
being carried always by word of mouth. In spite of these difficulties, members
of the Central Govetitteee who remained in Lima and representatives of the Lima
Departmental Committee still maintained contact and farm lly agreed on instruc-
tions to "lie low" until the situation should be clarified.
12. Jorge del Prado, in spite of his responsibility for the 28 October Manifesto,
remained the Party's outstanding leader during those days, ably assisted by his
brother Julio del Prado as: leg-man. He established himself as the Party's real
leader and moving spirit in that time of Party stress.
3-1. By 9 November, Party security measures were fairly well organized, and all Party
leaders had been assigned numbers and, in addition, a pseudonym to be used in
conjunction with all Party activities. The members of the Central Committee
all took the names of the Inca Emperors as their "none de guerre" and other
famous names from the period of the Conquest were used by other Party leaders.
All written communications and receipts for funds were to be couched in terms
of correspondence regarding office equipment. Thus a receipt for funds, where
indispensable, would appear as a receipt for typewriter repairs. Because of
telephone censorship both of local and long distance calls, use of the telephone
for Party matters has been absolutely prohibited to all members. Calls of any
kind to the residences of well-known Party rscabers and to the bookstore have been
strictly forbidden. -
14. The regular collection of Party dues was reportedly arranged on 9 November, and
they were turned over to the National Secretary of Economy at a different series
of prearranged meeting places on a regular weekly basic. Collections within the
Ministries were made by fellow employees under the cover of ordinary business
contacts during regular' business hours. All possible precautions were ordered
and instituted to keep these funds coming and to protect their source, nature,
and ultimate destination. As of 19 November, it was reported that, unlike the
case of APRA, there had been no purge of Party members from jobs within the govern-
ment offices and public administration. Z?iost of these individuals, the majority
of whom appear to be in the Ministry of Education still held their jobs at the end
of the month.
15. As previously reported** once the success of the Arequipa revolt appeared assured,
steps were immediately taken to remove all Party files and records from PCP
headquarters, Colmena 669. The meeting held there 29 October was the last to
be held on those premises. These provisions were opportune, for Colrnena 669
was reportedly raided by the government the evening of 31 October and formally
closed with a 24-hour police guard the following 'day. The government also planned
to expropriate the headquarters of the Communist-controlled Taxi-drivers' Union
in Cuzco, the largest Communist meeting place in that city.
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16. Party frees
in Santa Clara, on the Chosica road. Other such
n In the houses of little-known Party members
rxb'oidonment of further action against the Koseleffs
,
rtv op''& on th . November was reported to remain opposed to the Junta on
.11 points. Party leaders freely expressed the opinion that the Odria Military
-Th to earnot last, cant the r-mr. A tentative first step toward concerted positive
-i?tion in om?osi.tion was teen in the form of the whispering campaign to die-.
-,eodlt fl-,a Junta,
18- PCP opposition to the Junta was solidified when the Party was notified that all
.+ forte to **in p ant of the Conn unist Deputies a salaries for October had
fi:ailed and that Odri h,.elf had stated that "as far as he was ' concerned, the
s et n'thin from his govern nent." In view of thin decision this
' st pstt!.e- nlAnnncl to leave Lima, where, they said, they were too well
'?` ac 'IjqV
nr7,, Juan Barrio also returned to Andahuaylas on
November, with ingtruetions to keep Party members in the Department of Apurimac
anformed of the mitt atior in Lim.
reanwbile Party leads v continued to meet more or less regularly in Lima, choosing
t different place each tie, utilizing particularly the houses of little.-known
ndividual cell leaders < At one of these meetings hold 12 November it was re-
=,arted that word had been received from Eliceo Garcia in tluancayo that the comrades
n that area were *on guards, awaiting orders from Lima
and that he himself
,
right remain there for some time, for he saw little to be served by his return to
Linc.
204 It was also reported at the same meeting that communications had been received
from the south, inwhi.ch local leaders in the areas of Cuzco, Puno, and Arequipa
='equested Lima approval to act independently on their own account without Lima
clearance in view of the difficulties of the situation. However, they indicated
they would attempt to keep in touch and inform Lima and each other ahead of time
as to local plans and intentions.
21. The meeting was closed. by a report from Jorge del Prado concerning Genaro Camera
Checa, the editor of the weekly magazine . Del Prado stated that Carnero
-Chace had visited him at home and told him that he had been summoned by Odria
and given a warning, because the 1 November issue of had carried the Com-
mimist Manifesto of 28 October. Camera Checa said Odria told him that the
.L-mifesto was the cause of his having declared the POP illegal. Both APRA and
the PCP, Odria reportedly stated, were parties whose organization was clearly
international and for that reason they had been banned from the political life
of Peru. It was to be hoped, said Odria, that would not make such statements
again or he would be ohli.cd to take stronger measures.
22. Del Prado stated to the meeting that he had Grave doubts concerning Carnero Checa's
visit to the Palace and he believed that the real purpose of the visit may have
been to obtain information from Camera on the PCP and its strength, organization
and leaders. It was believed that Odria indeed threatened to take stronger
measures against 19 unless such information were forthcoming. Del Prado sug-
gested that Cameros visit to him was merely to ingratiate himself with the
Party as their defender and propagandist. He warned Party leaders to be on their
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,r *-* broken up further on 9 November and 971 records
to Huanoayo by Elise* Garcia, and secreted in
-ds and accounts were further scattered. and hidden
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guard against Carnero whose marine was still, he pointed out, financed by
r;presentatives of the Aliaaza Naoional. As a result of del Prado's report,
Juan Francisco Castillo, on* of the editors of 1 and a member of the PCP,
was asked to report regularly to the Party on Carnero Cheoa**** and his
activities.
234 4n emergency meeting of Party leaders was called two days later on 14 November
to review the PCP's financial situation. In view of the lack of .funds it was
decided to rent or sell the premises of the Party bookstore at Calls Negmiros
569 and the small back=room apartment they have at the same address, where
Party files and records have been secreted and email clandestine meetings held.
The proceeds will be handled by Sergio Caller, National Secretary of Economy,
and deposited in a Lima bank, in the name of two Party members whose identity
will be kept secret from all except the Secretariat General for security purposes
in order to assure the safekeeping of these last funds.
24. No further meetings were reported until a week later when a truncated "Central
Committee" meeting was held on 21 November to consider certain general matters
of policy. Although it was decided to maintain their decision to refrain from
all leaflet campaigns or other propaganda activity for the moment, two problems
were discussed with a view toward possible action in the future.
25. The first of t?lese was the dispute being waged among factions within the govern-
ent and between Pia and E1 Ccanercio over the foreign exchange control
policy. The meeting was well pleased with this evidence of dissension within
the government. They pointed out that by declaring APRA and the PCP illegal,
Odria has alienated large elements of popular support. Internal dissension
among the Rightists would be to the advantage of the Communists for it would
demonstrate the Conservatives incapacity to govern. They believed the "divisas"
(exchange) dispute could ultimately be used to the advantage of the Communists,
and it subsequently formed the basis of the first Party statement to be issued
since being declared illegal..
26. Party leaders decided to await further clarification of the Junta's labor policy
and a further definition of the Congreso Cbrero before taking a stand. Party
circles in the Cuzco. Puno, and Arequipa areas have suggested that the govern-
ment's labor congress be boycotted completely at PCP orders and an independent
southern labor congress under PCP control be held instead in Arequipa. They
believed that such a move might impress the Odria Junta with the power still
wielded by the PCP amceng labor.
27. News of the arrest in Cuzco of several Party leaders and members of the Cuzco
Departmental Committee as well as Party members of less importance caused great
alarm in Lima. Orders were issued to tighten all security precautions until
the matter was investigated and its significance determined. It subsequently
appeared that the excuse for the arrests was an attempted Party meeting in honor
of the Anniversary of the `'soviet Union on 7 November, although further informa-
tion on the arrests was not obtained until the very end of the month. Among
those arrested were;
Julio Cesar Pastor
O-
Communist Deputy from La Convention.
Secretary General of the Federacion de
Mariano Muicie
-
Trabajadores del Cuzco.
Director of the Cuzco Communist news organ
Emiliano Huamantiea
??
Jo M da and Departmental leader.
Secretary of the "Huascar" Textile Union and a
member of the Central Committee of the PCP.
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Victor Angeles V.
Luis Lovon
Efrain Morote
Sebastian Pinta
Arturo Iturbe
Isidoro Leiva
Enrique Iberioo
Florenoio Aragon
Victor 14triano Salas -
Cesar Grenades
Leader of the Communist-controlled Taxi Drivers'
Union and editor of its newspaper El Volante.
Textile labor leader.
Employee
Communist leader among the local Indian population.
Lmployee.
Typesetter, leader of the Sindicato Grafico.
: 3hoploeper.
Laborer.
Railway worker.
Laborer.
Rosaria Bocangel .- Used of the Communist-front 4ccion Femenina in
1 usco. Not herself a Party militant, she is the
;sister of one of the leading female Party members
in Cusco, Estela Bocangel.
28. Word was also received that Vicente Mendoza Dias had been arrested in Puno at
29.
the same time, but shortly afterward released. Of the above group, Luis Lovon,
accused of Communist agitation in the "Huascar" Textile Mill in Cuzco by the
Lomellinis was brought to Lima on 28 November.
As the Party proceeded to reestablish its communications throughout Peru, the
National Secretary of Economy, Sergio Caller, used these channels to contact
Party members, in addition to friends. and sympathizers in an appeal for further
contributions toward Party friends. He emphasized the Party's serious financial
difficulties since it no longer received its share of the Deputies' salaries.
Toward the end of the month, however, he was still only able to report meagre
results. Particularly disappointing were the reactions of friends and sympathizers,
he said, many of whom now found a hundred excuses why they could not continue
their contributions to Party funds, evidently from fear, which he hoped was only
momentary.
30. An important meeting was held the last week in November between Senator Jose
Antonio Encinas representing friends and advisors of the PCP, and Jorge del Prado,
representing the Party Leadership. Meeting at Encinas' house in Lima, the
Senator informed del Prado that a Croup of senators and Deputies including him,-
self, Deputy Carlos Gonzalez Loll, Senator Luis Galvan, Senator Rafael Aguilar,
Senator Francisco Tamayc and ex-Senator J. Uriel Garcia (the last two now in
Cuzco), all friends and advisors of the PCP, had determined to-approach Odria on
the problem of the Communist Deputies. They were intending to urge the Junta to
follow the example of Chile where even though the POCK was outlawed, the Chilean
Communist Senators and Deputies, freely elected at free elections, continued to
hold their Congressional seats and were only removed by the Congress itself
when further proof against them was submitted to that body.
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31. Encinae also pointed out that the Decree-Law declaring the POP illegal only applied
specifically to the C,Owmnist party of Peru, and made no mention of the Partido
Vanguardia Socialista, the naz under which the Communist Party is registered with
the National Electoral Jury. 12 elections were held in the future, said Encinas,
he saw no reason vhy Uxi now of the Socialist Vanguard Party might not be used
freely by them.
32. Word of the del Prado. Moines conference was reportedly spread throughout the
Party and they were eaac-uragec by these efforts on their behalf by friends and
sympathizers among the independent "e nature ? and Deputies.
33. By the last days of NoV+Eober the PCP had pulled itself together to the point where
it felt capable of taking positive offensive action once more. Utilizing the
schism that existed within the Junta on the question of foreign exchange con-
trol, they mimeographed and distributed a six-page leaflet which, analyzing the
postwar economic crisis according to the "Scientific principles of Marxism-
Leninism", concludes that the struggle for exchange controls is nothing more
thin the struggle against imperialism.
3 .. From the point of view of general overall morale, with the and of November, fear
of prosecution among the PCP had begun to wear off. Although there were scares
during the month, such as the Cusco arrests, for example, on the whole it was
not fearful of future p:roseou'tion. There were a few encouraging items and same
Party leaders even proteaned to be optimistic.
35. gun. A communication from Cuba announcing plans for a projected Youth Congress
has been previously reported. New addresses were reported to have been in pre-
paration at that time for future coaeaunicatiorLs.
36. Peru, victor Zavala and Juan Trelles, Peruvian Labor delegates to the Inter-
national Labor Organization Petroleum Conference at Geneva, were received at
the presidential palace by General Odria on 7 November and left by air that same
day for Geneva.
37.~y ? At the and of the month Jorge del Prado received a communication from
Venezuela which, according to del Prado, was apparently transmitted by open mail
from Gustavo Machado. The letter was addressed to del Prado at Colmena 699, and
delivered to him by Juan Oliva, a member of the POP who keeps.a small tailor
shop directly across the street from former Party headquarters. Oliva has been
charged with accepting and delivering any mail, etc., that might come directed
to the old address. The commtunication from Machado has reportedly aroused great
interest among Party leaders here. According to their information, although the
Venezuela Military Coup exhibits similarities with that of Odria in Peru, the
Communist Party has not been outlawed in Venezuela. They hope that Machado's
experience may afford them guidance in dealing with matters in Pers. There is a
debate among Party leaders as to whether they may denounce the Venezuelan
Revolution as the work of the imperialists who were alarmed at the growing strength
of Communism among the Venezuelan oil workers. They have attempted to communicate
with Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela on this point for further information and direction.
38. xico. Copies of the Boleth & Informacidn de i; E igda de in L_R.G.~I eon-
_ _s
n nnl~- Ali 1M ?.A.... wP
No.
No. 38(240), and 150 copies of No. 39(241) were received during the month.
39. T q gj . Roberto Morena passed through Lima, 13-16 November. Corsino
Duran arrived from Santiago, with Communist propaganda material. Mirtha Silva,
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who had been suspected without confirmation of being a possible Coaermxnist
courier, arrived in Lima 26 November 1948 from Santiago to fulfill a night-
club ea~ ageaoent. No ocntaets between her and the PCP were reported during
November.
GUM
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
The reaction of the L=e group to the Decree-Law of I November has been des-
cribed as one of smug self-satisfaction. Claiming that they foresaw the
illegalisation of the F'CP, they boasted that they brolm with it on purpose
and in consequenoe wager now in the clear. There is very little evidence in
the o uteavorary record, however, to support any such claim,
They renewed their attacks on del Prado, pointing out'that his vaunted leader-
ship had led the Party straight into illegality. They stated that his
strong-willed attitude of acting as be pleased without consulting the rank and
file bad done his followers and the Commmist cause more harm than was ever
done by APRA or any of its other enemies.
Meanwhile the dissidents, untouched by the 1 November Decree-Law, tanned in
terms of forming a Party similar to Lombardo Toledano'e Partido Popular in
Mezioo, that is, a "Coarmnmist" Party which would not be known as such. Organ-
izational plane toward that end were reported to be proceeding among the pro-
Luna membership of the chauffeurs, the civil construction workers, and the port
and maritime workers, where Luna's main labor strength lies.
Luna Identified the Congreso Obrero as the work of Odria's FUIS advisors. He
stated that the FUIS was numerically insignificant in comparison with the group
controlled by him. He indicated that he believed that they could easily be
infiltrated and controlled in spite of the facilities that would undoubtedly be
afforded them by the Junta in view of past cooperation between Odria and FUIS
leaders.
Luna stated early in the month that he and Orbegoso were awaiting development
with few doubts as to their ability to dominate any labor Congress that might
ultimately materialise. He indicated his belief that in attempting to found a
labor organization to support the govermnent9 Odria would soon find Luau, in
control.
45. One of the most important labor groups to pay their respects to Odria during
the month were a delegation from another Luna-controlled union, namely, the
Sindicato de Eatibadores del Cabotaje Mayor del Callao (Stevedores Union) who
were received by the President of the Unitary Junta on 8 November.
46.
That delegation was made up of the following:
Julio Tizon Olaya,
Luis Morcillo Zapata
fttguel tiori Castillo
Pedro Curay r ninario
Rafael Egaez Catalino
Alejandro Cubillas Gomez-
Alejandro, Chavez Pioon
Pedro Espinoza Rosen -
Carlos E. Ruis Perez
Cesar Bricenb
Juan IMayta Patina,
Secretary General
Sub"Seoretary
Secretary for Organization
Secretary of Defense
Interior Secretary
Press and Propaganda Secretary
Secretary of Economy
`secretary of Discipline
Secretary of Control and :statistics
"ecretary of Social Aid
Secretary of Sports and Culture
Four members of the above delegation, including the Secretary-General, are
"Luna-Communists" s Tizon, Morcil.lo,, Curay and Cubillas. Through them the
Sindicato is controlled by A.lipio Orbegoso, of whom Tizon-is a close collaborator.
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A second Luna,-oontroUed group to appear at the Palace during the month was
aw? Sindioato de Pasteleron zstrell.a del Peru, who were received by the
Presidential seoretary and promised their support to Odria on 16 tovember.
99 - dads pia
48. With the accession to power of (Wineral Odria, the FUIS, with which odria had
rorniVUenoe
k into
ht b
.
p
ac
cooperated when he was Minister of Government, was broug
=luau Cerpa'Valdivia catapulted itto a position of importance within the FUIS.
Cerpa is odria's idea-man on the labor union level, and one of those responsible
for the organization of the projected Congreso Obrero.
Carps is reported to have been is close contact with Odria since the first days
of the Junta, and within his own group to have replaced Jose Benites with Lino
Larrea, a Cerpa main, while he hiteelt holds the position of Secretary of Organ-
ization of the FUIS.
The FUIS was the first labor organization to declare its support of the new
regime In a declaration signed by Larrea and published 2 November. Shortly
thereafter, on 8 November, a delegation led by Larrea paid its respects to the
President in person, with the usual laudatory speeches and declarations of
support for Odria's proposed Congreso Obrero Naoional.
11~ In spite of past hostility between the FUIS and the. PCP, Cerpa has stated that
he has advised the Junta not to persecute Communist and pro-Communist labor,
at least for the time being. Should the government do so, it is Cerpa's argu
not that it would inevitably throw the PCP and the APRA into each other's
arts and thereby require the surveillance, imprisonment and. deportation of
labor leaders. This would produce a bad impression among the laboring classes
who would interpret these acts net politically but as directed at them. The
government would gain an anti-labor reputation which it does not wish to acquire
at the moment. Cerpa believes that his advice is being followed on this point.
Whether his desire to bring, this point to the attention of Communist Party
leaders can be interpreted as an overture toward the PCP remains to be seen.
52. By way of positive steps, when L erpa offered to show the Junta what the FUIS
and its affiliates could do, having no control of any substantial m tubers him-
self, he went to Luna as the only labor leader not now outlawed commanding a
substantial following. He proposed to Luna that the latter assist Gerpa in
putting on a labor demonstration at the Palace with the aid of the Sindicato Unico
de Trabajadores en Autobuses (Bus Workers Union - St1TA), of which Luna is
.^tecretary of Organisation. In return, Cerpa promised to use his influence at
the Palace to adjust the S11TA's labor complaint, still pending from the prior
regime, in a manner satisfactory to Luna.
53. Ima agreed, and the manifestation at the Palace on 18 November was the result,
when some two thousand individuals staged the only substantial demonstration
of labor support for the Military Junta that had taken place since the installa-
tion of the new government. Luna and Orbegoso did their work well, and called
out many "ringers" from the port and dock workers and the civil construction
workers as well as legitimate members of the '.SUTA. Francisco Marquez, a Luna-
Communist., Secretary General of the SUTA, made the only speech on behalf of the
group, and the manifestattx= was reported to have been entirely satisfactory to
Cerpa, whose prestige and ;position with the Junta were greatly increased as a
result.
Approved For Release 1999/09/09 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002400370011-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/09 02400370011-7
25X1A2g
C +t RAL Ii~?PELLIGENCE AGENCY
54. Thus Corps obtained his first Triumph and apparently Inapt his promise, for
t;ssre was every imdiaation at the end of the month that the MIA's pending
2ibor complaint would be eatietaotorily settled within a matter of days,
thereby enhancing Luna's prestige as well.
25X1A2g
25X1A6a Genaro Carnero Checa, vas expelled from the PCP during his
exile in %mico. -On hie return to Peru In. 1946, be applied for readmission
to the Party, but was never readmitted.- Jorge del Prado was reported to be
one of the atroxtg~sat opponents of Carnero Cheoa's formal readmission to full
Party membership. )
JUI; R T
Approved For Release 1999/09/09 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002400370011-7