FORMATION OF KKE REGIONAL COUNCIL FOR GOVERNMENT-HELD MACEDONIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002400560005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 15, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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Formation of KKE Regional Council for
Government-held Macedonia
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DATE OF INFO.
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February 1949
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DATE DISTR. 15 AIR 1949
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1.
It is reported that on or about 8 February 1949, Tassos Petrides (member
of the Politburo of KKE and leader of the KKE Reserve Front in Salonika),
was informed by the Politburo that Party organization in Government-held
Macedonia was to be altered immediately. A Regional Council for Government-
held Macedonia with Petrides as its head was now to be formed with head-
quarters in Salonika*
2. The Regional Council would consist of:
Tassos Petrides First Secretary
Anastasios Tsikares Second Secretary and instructor
Orestes Stephanidee Representing Salonika
Colonel Georgios Erythriades Representing Regional combatant
organizations
Katy Tassopoulou Representing womengs organizations
Symeonides (fnu)
Representing the EAM Panhellenic
Youth Organization - Eamike Pan-
hellenike Organosis Neolaias
EPON)
Erythriades and Tsakires were not present in Salonika, but their arrival
was expected in the near future.
3. A Salonika Town Instructional Committee would also be set up, consisting
of:
Orestes Stephanidee
Alexandros Vougias
Maria Demetriadou
Kouvelas (mu)
Vougioukas (Thu)
STATE
ARMY
????
:First Secretary
: Second Secretary
Women's organization
EPON
Finance
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40 Petrides had received a letter from Demetrios Vlandas (member of the
Politburo) written after the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee had
taken place, to the effect that
a. From the time of Varkiza (February 1945) until recent months, KKE had
paid far too little attention to party instruction and the strict
application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This had inevitably re-
sulted in reactionary deviation and defeatism, particularly in the
Rebel Armee of which less than twenty percent of the troops were
estimated to be Party members, and where strict Party discipline was
therefore all the more essential.
b. The growth of defeatism in the Rebel Army could be gathered from the
following figures:
1946: total strength about 8,5,000. Surrenders amounting to about
fifteen percent.
1947: total strength rose to approximately 15,000 through mass re-
cruiting, in apite of losses and surrenders. Surrenders,
however, rose to about twenty percent.
19481 strength rose to over 25,000 and surrenders to about twenty-
five percent of effectives.
To combat this growing defeatism, the Party had decided in the autumn
of 1948 to place trained Communist instructors in all Rebel Army units.
Results were considered satisfactory in that the increasing tendency
towards defeatism had been halted.
d. On the question of policy, Vlandalo noted that in June 1948, before the
Grammos battle began, the Cominfora had recommended that the Party
should continue the struggle only if it were satisfied with, and able
to meet, the following conditions:
1) that the Rebel Army would receive no support from the Soviet
Union and the "popular democracies" beyond the dispatch of supplies
and moral encouragement, there being no possibility that armed
assistance would be given.
2) if the fighting was to continue, it was essential that the Rebel
Army be converted into a well organized "popular revolutionary -
army" with a sound basis in Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
3) that mass uprisings in the towns was an indispensible corollary
to the struggle, since -without this it lacked a proper proletarian
character.
4) that the basis of the struggle must rest on the thorough "en-
lightenment" of Party members and not on mass appeal, which would
result only in defeatism or deviation.
e. If these conditions were felt to be impracticable, the Cominform had
recommended that KKE should endeavor to come to terms with the Athens
Government and resume its place as a lawful political party.
f. The Politburo had exarined the situation carefully in the light of the
above conditions and had cone to the conclusion that they should continue
fighting, at the same time doing their utmost to implement the re-
commendations of the Cominforee The subsequent successes of the Rebel
Army on Vitsie at Karditsa, Naoussa and Karpenision had provided
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justification of their decision, and the morale of the Greek National
Army and people had fallen appreciably during this period. The peace-
feelers put out over the Rebel radio had been successful propaganda
and had contributed to the lowering of the enemy's morale,
Vaandas concluded by forecasting Greek National Army offensives in the
spring in Central Greece, on Vitsi and on Grammos. He said that theee
offensives mould be broken against mountain fortifications now being
prepared, and that the "Rebel Army, with increased fire power, and with
air support, would then swoop forrard in a countereattadk with every
chance of success.
5. By 14 February 1949, Tassos Peteides had laid down the following division
of responsibilities within the Regional Council:
b.
All political matters, ineJuding "instruction" and the supervision of
the "cleansing" of Party eommittees in the towns, would be handled
by a committee consistingef:
Tassos Petrides
Orestes Stephanides
Katy Tassoupoulou
Anastassios Tsikeres
Symeonides (fnu)
An independent recruebine committee would be formed, which in conjunction
with Party committee.; in the towns, would organize recruiting both for
the combatant organleations in the towns and for dispatch to the Rebel
Army. This commitee would coneist of:
Colonel Georgios Lrythriades, representing regional combatant or-
ganizations.
Symeonides (fnu;? representing EFON
Katy Tassopoulou, representing Women s organizations.
c. Lieutenant Coionel Kyros Teakires, who would represent Salonika com-
batant organjeations on the new Regional Council, had been briefed at
the general headquarter:: of the Rebel Army to organize a new series of
sabotage operations in Salonika. He had just visited Salonika and was
on his way to the Khortiates "yiafka" to take over from Lieutenant
Colonel Demetrios Mandelas. His preparations would be made in con-
sultation wilh headquarters of 6 Army Division, whose area included
Salonika. II was the responsibility of the Regional Council to offer
overy moral end material help to groups of saboteurs who entered the
town. This assistanca wnuld be coordinated by Erythriades in con-
sultation with a threa member committee to be appointed by the Regional
Council,
411111C0pp.pnt: By he middle of February, this organizatijn only existed on
paper, although strenuous efforts were being made to bring it into being,
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