ETAX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002700230001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1A2g
CLASSSIF CATION cQ wr tai'avr A r
Approved For Relea l IOR ,(0$W , P_8,tr YR002700 ,. 'tONO?
F FO R 1IT CD NO.
COUNTRY f1x'r ece
SUBJECT ETAX
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE DISTR. 4 LAY 1V49
NO. OF PAGES 2 25X1A2g
SRN T CII
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
DATE OF INFO.. Late 1.948 SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
1. ETAX (Eidikon Tagma Axiomatikon - Special Battalion of officers) has been
formed from about 700 officers and men from Makronisos.
2. Part of this formation remained in Evvia for a while, where it took part
in reconnaissance operations. There the guerrillas carefully avoided all
contact or fighting with the men of ETAX; the impression prevailing among
the men of ETAX is that guerrilla leaders had issued a special order to
follow such tactics.
After Evvia, they were transferred to the Peloponnesus (Nemec Achladokambos-
Tripolis), where the following events took place:
a. Four rebels (One of them an officer)joined them.
b0 Seventeen men and officers were captured in the fight at Piana.
c. Near Tripolis, where they were in formation, a whole platoon (seven
officers and twenty men) deserted or were captured,
The newspapers wrote about b. above. That operation was in reality quite
a success for the guerrillas. The General Staff slightly misrepresented
the facts. It was the guerrillas who got the seventeen captured men, their
weapons, five Bren guns, blankets, et cetera.
The impressions received from the above operation were that;
a. The guerrillas avoided shooting to kill.
b. The guerrillas did not expect that they would be attacked by the men
of ETAX, or that the latter would really offer resistance when attacked,
c. There was no understanding between the guerrillas and groups or in-
dividuals of ETAX (if there had been, at least two companies would have
been captured along with all their supplies).
5. As regards 3.c. above, it is not certain whether the ETAX men deserted or
were actually captured. There was no fighting, the platoon disappeared,
NM'? X NSRS
AIR FBI
This ent Is hereby regraded to
CONFIDERT%ftip accordance with the
letter of 16 Oc 1078 from the
Director of Central irate a to the
Arch;vist of the United States.
Next Fev~tew Date: 2008
DISTRIBUTION
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CONFIbkkTIAL
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 CENTRAL T N 'F' LI iE E' AGENCY
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and it is very likely that there was an understanding, at least between
some of the men of the platoon and the guerrillas.,
In addition to the facts and conclusions expressed above, source formed
the following opinions:
ao An undetermined percentage (10 to 30 percent) of the ETAX men are
anti-Communist,
b? A considerable number of real Communists remain among the ETAX units,
ce The rest of the men in ETAX are devoting their attention to the
problem of how best to get along; if the hardships were not so great,
they would prefer to be with the guerrillas. They are also restrained
by fear of repx'isals against their families?
7. As far as the fighting quality of ETAX is concerned, under the circumstances
related above it is not far behind that of other units, and has shown about
70 to 80 percent superiority in engagements so faro Their losses up to
the start of the year, (dead and wounded) are almost nil. It is thought
that their fighting quality would decrease in the face of greater
difficulties or dangers.
Comment: Although delayed, it is believed that this report
may cast some light on the qualities of the "reformed battalions'".
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Approved For Release 1999/09/09 : CIA-RDP82-00457R002700230001-0
C