ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002900210001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIFICATION-43iiiatatIV=t1CONIROL U.( ,--/OFFICIA.La 0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO:
!INFO MATIO REP* BIT CD NO,
COUNTRY Indochina
SUBJECT Organization of the Army of the Democratic
Republic of Viet Nam
PLACE 25X1A
ACQUIRE
25X1A
DATE OF INFO.
25X1X
This document is hereby regraded to
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the
letter of 16 October 1978 from the
Director of Central Intelligence to the
Archivist of the United States.
25X1A
DATE DISTR. 29 trinle 1949
NO. OF PAGES 7
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
This report is a translation from the original Vietnamese of extracts (pp 59-64)
of the official publication "Lich Cuu Quoc" (1947 Almanac) of the Ho Chi Minh
government.* While it is not a secret document, its circulation has necessarily
been somewhat limited and to our knowledge has not heretofore appeared in English.
While the publication dates from 1967, the fact that it still represents the cur-
rant organizational scheme of the Viet Nam Army has been confirmed by various
sources. The translation has been made as literal as possible in order to
preserve the form of the original text. In many cases the Vietnamese denomina-
tions of units and ranks have been included, as English equivalents are only
approximate at best. Press reports have often used very loose English or
French equivalents, with resulting confusion.
ORGANIZATION OF THE VIETNAM ARMY
I. General Principles.
1. The creation and development of the Army is based on the following
considerations: activation and deployment of military units, and the avail-
ability and use of weapons, equipment, and transportation from one region to
another, etc.
2. The development of the Army must evolve in such a.way as to permit
ready and rapid utilization of the means at hand, and at the same time to
assure a strong chain of command. For example, while we are still faced with
an insufficiency of motor vehicles and heavy artillery, we must use whatever
means are available to render our troops mobile enough to offer effective
resistance to the enemy who is more highly motorized. But when our country
is sufficiently consolidated, we shall provide motorized troops, and the
organizational pattern will necessarily involve some differences.
3. Our Army is at present organized on the "principle of threes." The
types of unit are as follows: **
A. Section (Tieu-doi), consisting of 12 men, as foil 3:**
Section leader
Assistant leader
Machine gunner
1 man
3. n
1 "
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ARMY T X AIR
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(Sction A continued)
Assistant machine gunners
Ammunition carriers
Scouts
Grenade thrower
Total
3 men
3 of
2 n
1 man
=len
B. Platoon (Trung-doi), consisting of 42 men, as follows:
3'combat sections (Tieu-doi), 3 x 12 36 men
Platoon leader 1 man
Assistant platoon leader 1 "
Political instructor. 1
Observer 1 tz
Messenger 1
Grenade thrower 3. ti
Total
C. Company (Dai-doi), 178 men, as follows:
3 combat platoons (Trung-doi), 3 x 42 126 men
Headquarters and Hq Detachment consist-
ing of:
(1) Command and staff)
(2) Supply ) 52 n
(3) Medical )
Total
D. Battalion (Tieu-doan), 676 men, as follows:
3 Companies (Dai-doi), 3 x 178 534 men
Battalion Hq and Hq Dot, consisting of:
(1) Command and staff)
(2) Medical ) 100 "
(3) Supply )
One platoon of engineers (Trung-doi
Cong-birth) 42
Total
E. Regiment (Trung-doan), 2289 men, as follows:
3 battalions (Tieu-doan), 3 x:676 2028
Regimental Hq.. and Hq. pet., consisting of:
(1) Command and staff)
(2) Supply ) 219
(3) Medical )
One platoon of engineers (Trung-doi
Cong-binh) 42
Total
F. Brigade Brigade (Dai-doan), 7115 men, an follows:
3 Regiments (Trung7-doan), 3 x 2289 , 6867
Brigade Hq. and Ike pet, consisting of:
(1) Command Section
(2) Administrative Section
(3) Planning and operations sec.
(h) Political section 70
(5) Supply section
:(6) Courts martial section
(7) Communications and trans-
port section
(8) Engineers section
(9) Medical supply section'
A reserve company (Dai-doi Ve-binh) to be
maintained in readiness at the disposition
of the Brigade Commander to reinforce any
unit which has been temporarily weakened 176'
CONFIDEgja ... Total 7113
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G. Larger units - division, army, etc. (Su-doan, Lien-doan, and
Tap-doan). Depending on the terrain and the requirements of
military strategy's, each Su-doan will consist of 2 or 3 Brigades
(Dai-doan), and will have attached the necessary Tank and
Aviation forces. Each Lien-doan consists of 2 or 3 Su-doan;
each Tap-doan consists of 2 or 3 Lienr-doan.
II. Grades
4. In
Republic of
Army are an
and Ranks.
accordance with the Decree of Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic
Vietnam, signed 20 March 1946, the grades and ranks of the Vietnam
follows;
A. Private (Binh). Two grades: Ordinary Private (Binh-nhi)? and
Private First-Class (Binh-nhat).
B. Non-commissioned officers (Sy). Three grades: Lance Corporal
(Hal-ey); Corporal (Trung-sy); Sergeant (Thuong-sy). "Aspirant"
(Chaan-ay).
C. Company grade officers (Uy). Three ranks: Second lieutenant
(Thieu-Ay); First Lievtenant (Trung-w); Captain (Dai-uy).
D. Field grade officers (Ta). Three ranks: Major (Thieu-ta);
Lieutenant Colonel (Trung-ta); Colonel (Dai-ta).
E. General officers (Tuong). Three ranks: Major General (Thieu-
tuong); Lieutenant General (Trung-tuong); General (Dai-tuong).
S. Promotions of Privates and Privates First-Class (Binh) will be accom-
plished by command of the Commander of the Regiment (Trung-doan); promotions
of Non-Commissioned Officers (Sy) by the Brigade (Dai-doan) Commander; pro-
motions of Company Grade Officers (Uy) by the High Command of the Arm.;
promotions of Field Grade Officers (Ta) by the Minister of National Defense;
and promotions of General Officers (Tuong) by the Prime Minister.
6. Leadership and command of the various units is as follows:
A. Section (Tieurdoi) Leader:
Assistant Section Leader:
B. Platoon (Trung-doi) Leader:
"Aspirant" (Chuan-Ay)
Assistant Platoon Leader:
(Thaong-sy)
'C. Company (Dai-doi) Commander: Captain (Dai-uy)
Assistant Company Commander: First Lieutenant (Trung-uv)
Corporal (Trung-ay)
Lance Corporal (Ila-sy)
Second Lieutenant (Thieuay) or
,I.Aspirant? (ChaareAry) or Sergeant
D. Battalion (Tieu-doan) Commander:
Assistant Battalion Commander:
E. Regiment (Tring-doan) Commander:
Assistant Regimental Commander:
F. Brigade (Dai-doan) Commander:
Assistant Brigade Commander:
G. Division (Su-doan) Commander;
Assistant Division Commander:
H. Lien-doan Commander:
Assistant Lien-dean Commander:
CONF1DENTIA
Major (Thieu-ta)
Captain (Dal-ay)
Lieutenant Colonel (Trung-ta)
Major (Thieu-ta)
Colone14)ai-ta)
Lieut. Colonel (Trang-ta)
Major General (Thieu-tuong)
Colonel (Dat-ta)
Lieut. General (Trung-tuong)
Major General (Thieurtuong)
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I. Tap-doan Commander: General (Dai-tuong)
Assistant Tapedoan Commander: Lieut. General (Trung-tuong)
7. Promotions are based on the character and capacity of the officer or
soldier concerned. A Non-commissioned officer (Sy), in order to be promoted
to Company Grade Officer (Uy)1 must pass an examination of a sort provided by
the Minister of National Defense. A soldier or officer must ordinarily remain
in grade for the following minimum periods before receiving a promotion to the
next higher grade:
From Private or Pfc (Binh) to Lance Corporal (Ha-sy): 6 months
From Lance Corporal to Corporal (Trung-sy): 1 year
From Corporal to Sergeant (Thuong-sy): (lacking in text)
From Sergeant to 'Aspirant " (Chuan-ey): 1 year
From nAspirant" to Second Lieutenant (Thieueuy): 6 months
From Second Lieutenant to First Lieutenant (Trung-uy): 2 years
From First Lieutenant to Captain (111-uy): 2 years
From Captain to Major (Thieu-ta): 2 years
From Major to Lt. Colonel (Trung4a): 2 years
From Lt. Colonel to Colonel (Dai-ta): 2 years
From Colonel to Major General (Thieu-tuong): 3 years
From Major General to Lieutenant General (Trung-tuong): 3 yea=
From Lt. General to General (Dai-tuong): 3 years
8. But in special cases, where soldiers or officers have displayed unusual
merit, exceptions to the above rules may be made. In any case, after 6 years
service in grade, a soldier or officer is automatically promoted to the next
higher grade. The promotion from Private to Private First Class is the reward
of devotion and capacity on the part of the soldier, and may take place at any
time without any fixed minimum of service; the position of Private First Class
is not a position carrying any command function.
III. Authority and Command.
A. Command function.
9. Except in unusual cases (when there are special orders to the contrary,
or in the circumstances defined in Article 30 Decree #37), ordinarily whenthe
Commanding Officer of a.unit is absent because of an accident or for other
reasons, the command over that unit passes to the officer who has the next
highest rank; in case there are two officers with the same rank, then the command
passes to that one who has been in grade the longer time.
10. In case two such officers have been in grade for exactly the same
length of time, then command passes to the one who has served the longer time
in the army.
U. lathe case of a. detachment in, libieh there are neither officers nor
non-commissioned officers for the time being, the authority over the detachment
will be assumed by the soldier who is the bravest and most resourceful.
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12 When two or more units are temporarily consolidated for a special
missionl command will be assumed by the officer holding the highest rank; if
there be two or more such officers, then the one who has been longest in grade
mill assume command.
B. Political Commissars (Chinh-tri-vien) in the various headquarters.****
13. The British, American, and French Armies have no Political Commissars
attached. Only the Chinese and Russian Armies have than. At every level, the
Political Commissar attached to a given unit is charged with the responsibility
of assisting the commander of that unit and of discussing all matters with him,
but without participating directly in the function of command and without assum-
ing responsibility for purely military matters. In all questions concerning
political matters, the Commanding Officer must accept the opinion of the
Political Commissar.
14. In matters of supply, culture, and discipline, it is the duty of the
Political Commissar to enlighten the Army and the civilian population, in order
that the commands from higher levels may be executed, the morale of the Army may
be heightened, and a spirit of cooperation between the Army and the civilian
population may be instilled.
15. In cate the Commander of a given unit is absent, the Assistant
Commander will assume command of the unit, and the Political Commissar will
help the Assistant Commander to execute the decisions made. In case both the
Commander and the Assistant Commander of a given unit are absent, the Political
Commissar may designate an individual to assume command of that unit temporar-
ily ; or in case of necessity the Political Commissar himself may assume command,
but without assuming personal responsibility for that unit in purely military
matters.
C. Powers and Limitations of Attached Technical Personnel.
16. Military personnel attached to the technical services (such as Radice,
Mimic, Arsenals, and Military Factories) is given military rank, and may re-
ceive promotions as high as the rank of colonel (Dai-ta).
17. Engineer officers may have any rank from First Lieutenant (Trung-Ay)
to 'lieutenant General (rrung-tuong). The same is true of Medical Officers.
Persons acting as liaison officers from the VN Army to foreign military units
may be given temporary rank in the VN Army, valid only for the duration of the
liaison mission.
18. The Commanding Officer of a given unit has no power to interfere in
the work of technical personnel attached to that unit. If a unit commander
observes that any members of such Technical Staff are not performing their
duties properly, he may complain to a higher Committee consisting of both
Military and Technical officers. The latter Committee will then investigate
the case and take appropriate action. In case of emergency, the Commanding
Officer of the unit may temporarily suspend the activities of technical
personnel attached to that unit, but in that case must immediately notify
the higher Committee.
IV. Exploits of the Vietnam Army
190 Even before the Vietnamilaw-was named "Army of National Defense,"
that Army existed under other names, and had already distinguished itself
with glorious exploits. In the firet period, the Vietnam Army was composed
of "little nests" (Tieu-to) of guerrillas, hiding in the jungle and using
"bit and run" tactics against the French and the Japanese. In the country
there were "Self-Defense Unite" (Pu-ye), training themselves in secret and
protecting the secret organization of the Viet Minh. Even under the greatest
difficulties, these Tieu-to and Tu-ve distinguished themselves for their
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exploits. The guerrillas of Bac-Son (Tonkin) defended themselves against the
French for 8 months. The Tu-ve of the (Tonkin) Delta distributed pamphlets,
hoisted flags, and took the necessary steps to protect the Can-Bo and the
(Viet Minh) organization.
20, During the period of the great Revolutionary Tide (l945), guerrilla
bands in combat zones took the name of "Liberation Army of Vietnam," and fought
gloriously against the Japanese in battles at Thai-Nguyen, TuyeneQuang, and
Yen-Bay (all in Tonkin). In the Delta, the Tu-ve advanced even more, and
organized many Tieu-to of guerrillas, which destroyed Japanese ripe supplies,
killed Vietnamese traitors, and boldly spread propaganda.
21. During the period of the Uprising (Aug.-Sept. 1945), the Vietnam
Liberation Army seized the camps and towns occupied by the Japanese. The
Tu-ve and guerrilla forces united with the forces of the people to seize
power.
22. In the early days, the Vietnam Liberation Arroy took the name of
"Army of National Welfare" (Cuu-quoc-quan). When the Provisional Government
was officially established, the Army took the name of "Army of National Defense."
23. Before the General Insurrection, the whole arnee was under the command
of the Viet Minh Front. Since the establishment of the Govereeent, the Viet
Minh Front placed this arge under the command of the Government of National
Coalition. Today the command of the Army is in the hands of the Ministry of
National Defense and of the Military High Command (Quan-uy-hoi).
(a) The Ministry of National Defense is responsible for the organieation
and administration of the Argy. For example, the Ministry of National
Defense is in charge of recruiting, the manufacture of arms, the pay of
officers and soldiers, and matters of supply.
(b) The Military High Command is responsible for the movements of the
Army, and for its combat Strategy.
V. Conclusion
24. The Amy of National Defense was born from the struggle led by the
Viet Minh against the Japanese. This Army was forged on the field of battle.
Because of its past experiences, we are sure that the future of the Army will
be glorious.
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Comment. The principle of Threes: Each unit consists of three units
next ower level.
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MillE4mment. It is not clear whether reference is made to machine guns or
su ne guns. The Vietnamese word is "Sung-may" (literally machine gun).
Previous reports have indicated the VNArnyos large reliance on small arms,
and the paucity of machine guns - Which suggests that reference is made to
BMWs or even to rifles. In this case, the "Assistant Machine Gunners" might
or might not be separately armed with individual SMGgs or rifles - presumably
depending on the availability of weapons. The most probable explanation is
that the word "Sung-may" is flexibly used, and may in, awe cases mean machine
guns, in other MO's, etc.
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Comment. Chinh-tri-vien may be translated "Iblitical Agents," Political
'C'erts; or in various other ways. However, sine() the text frankly draws
attention to the parallel of Political Commissars in the Russian. Armee, we have
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theaght it clearest to use the term most femiliar in connection with that arew.
From the text, it appears to us that the parallel with the Russian Army in this
respect is a very close one. In practice, in the VN Army, the Political Commis-
sar is a Can-Bo designated by the Comunist Party. ithin the unit to which he
is attached, he is all-pavverful, being in the position of having authority
without &tuivalent responsibility. For the Army as a whole, the Chief Political
Conanissar is Tran-Huy-Lieu. The Chief Political Coramisaar for the VN Army in
Siam is Hong. It will be noted that the last (third) paragraph of this secticn
(15) appears to be in partial conflict with the first two paragraphs of III A
(9 and 10). In previous reports similar instances of vagueness or contra-
diction have been noted in official VN Government texts, particularly when it
is a question of reserving extraordinary powers for persons who (behind the
scenes) will inevitably be designated by the Communist Party, outside the
official channels.
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