ANALYSIS OF PRO-ARGENTINE BIAS OF CHILEAN MILITARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R004100540010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 26, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

CLASSIFICATION Li. 25X1A
Approve or ReldYMN 981~O8L160A -004578 0Q?4
O FO AT6O REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Cl-dle`Argentina
CONFIDENTIAL.
SUBJECT Analysis of Pr Argentine Dias of
Chilean Military
PLACE 25X1A
ACQUIRED
DATE OF
INFO. 1935-1950
particularly interesting because it serves to elucidate the paradox which finds
the Chilean armed forces and anti-United States nationalists pro Argentine while
the general populace is bitterly anti-Argentine and even fearful of Argentina.
This document is for the most part considered very reliable and surprisingly ob-
jective for a Chilean army officer.
3. It is believod that this'report will help to clarify the activities of Carlos
Ibanez del Canpo and anon Vorgara llontero, who have been the subject of numerous
reports covering this subject in the past.
DATE DISTR. 26 JAN 50
NO. OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO. 25X1 X
The attached document is a translation from Spanish of a study prepared by an
unidentified Chilean army officer in the Kinistry of National Defense for
President Gabriel Gonzales Videla and for the guidance of the Director General
of Investigaciones
Although the docent is of a historical nature, it is believed that it is of
value in view of the subject matter and since the historical information in
question may not otherwise be lzaown or available. This study is considered
"America First" and "The Silver Star Group"
Activities of i.ilitarists.. Poronistas and Ibanistas
a. To understand the conspiratorial activities of high-ranking officers of the
armed forces of Chile, it is necessary to turn back to 1935 When this move-
rent was born during the course of a series of lectures on the subject
"Chile in Americall hold in the ,-far Ac adermy. These lectures were given in
June 1935 by Chilean intellectuals of certain local renown and the first
of the series was by Jar, Joselin do la ::am- , a lawyer who later became Sub-
rocretary of the 'Unistry of Foreign R>olations.
hm In the first lecture, the geographic and topographic situation of Chile was
discussed. Do la lbrza pointed out that, because of its long coast-line and
limited arable land, Chile should become an essentially maritirlo nation.
The mineral wealth of Chile, the military tradition of the people, and the
ethnic composition of the population care hold up as advantageous factors in
converting; Chile into a loader in South America and the raster of the western
CLASSIFICATION
STATEt
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Deoumsnt No.
Na Chang Iw ctiis.
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This document is hereby regraded to
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the
f 16 October 1978 from the
letter o
Director of Central Intelligence to the
Archivist of the United States.
XQ 9A4W4'W&640 010-0_
 CONFIDEN t
Approved For Release 1999/09/09 : CIA-RDP82-00 457R0D4? 0540010-0
25X1A
CENTRAL IT7TELLI CE AGENCY
seaboard of this continent. Close friendship and collaboration with Argentina
was stressed as a necessity and it was pointed out that, between them,
Argentina and Chile could exercise a dominating influence over South America
and its sea approaches. Do In Rasa also stressed that the time was ripe for
iuplementing this geopolitical plan since C-ernary,in the West, and Japan, in
the East, were preparing for their inevitable war against the Alo--Araearican
bloc.
a. This now, bold, and chauvinistic thesis was enthusiastically accepted by the
officers present because of its emotional appeal and impact. Do la I1aza sub=-
sequently gave three more lectures of the same general type in the War Academy,
d. The ideas of de la TM eaza, as frequently happens with such concepts, did not
fall on barren ground and he was soon besieged by officers of the Azfied Forces
who were anxious to hoar more about his "Wean political policy", De la Naza
subsequently prepared a series of brief memoranda which were distributed among
the new converts to this Anoricanistic doctrine which advocated a romantically
sentimental typo of South American unity of a basically anti-Yankee and anti-
imperialistic nature. The motto adopted by de la Ihza was: "A South America
politically and militarily united against rapacious and imperialistic North
America"? Do la thza also stressed that civilian governments, composed of
demagogic, self seeking; political parties, could not carry out this plan and,
therefore, it would be necessary for the military to overthrow the civilian gover-n-
monts and seize power.
o, The proselyting campaign in favor of these ideas was spearheaded by Ramon
Vergara Montoro, Colonel Ramon Alvarez Goldeack, and Aristides Vasquez ravinot,;
now a general and the commander of the Third Division. A series of lectures on
this subject were also given in the different T sonic lodges which feverishly
supported these Ideas. Even after the Masonic schism of 1938, caused by purely
internal differences, a great number of influential Masons continued working to
implement the ideas of do is Fuze,.
As early as 1936, Colonel (now General) Juan Domingo Peron received copies of
the memoranda prepared by do 2% Mazs, and enthusiastically accepted the latter'`
ideas0
With the election of Pedro Aguirre Cords to the Presidency of Chile, Alvarez
Goidsack again took an active part in propagating the ideas of do la Taz?a and$
subsequent to the election of President Juan Antonio Zios Morales, he formed
the secret military lodge lmotm as Grupo de Oficiales Selector (GOS) G This
lodge was nationalist, pro-411azi, and pro-Argentine in nature
h:. President Dios :orates, meanwhile, appointed de is l ,za as Sub-Secretary of the
Ministry of Foreign Relations and, fromn. thus position, the latter continued to
prepare memoranda explaining his geopolitical vieus4 These memoranda wore sent
to Peron through the intermediary of (fnu) Sepulveda and Fernando Orrego wwho,,
at that time, were attached to the Chilean Embassy in Buenos Aires., Peron,
enthusiastic over these concepts, wrote several congratulatory letters to do la
M3za and stated that he, an Araricanist and an Argentine, had long shared such
beliefs
i. Though the GX was subsequently scuttled by President Rios Morales and though
de la Mass died in 1945, these geopolitical concepts continued to have wide
acceptance among the younger officorsa These officers, now of higher rank, con-
tinue to favor those concepts and have form: sd a grouip with the name and motto
of "Chile First" (Chile'Primero). Their counterpart group in the Navy is the
"Silver Star Group" (Grupo do las Estrellas do Plata - the five pointed stars
signifying the five possibilities of obtaining the desired victory for Chile and
America).
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/09 : CIA-RDP82-00457R004100540010-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/06ONFI T-$h57R004100540010-0
25X1A
CENTRAL I;3TELLIGENCE AGENCY
These groups in the Armed Forces Loop informed of all political activit.ias and
every act of Congress is held up as an exar, le of the failure of the present
government. There is much talk about the submission of Chile to North, American
domination while the Peron government o~' Argentina is held up as honest,,
patriotic, and sovereign. Those officers maintain that only a militar
overn-
y g
meat is capable of ending the economic misery of Chile and its subrrervience to
the United States. General Humberto Luce, iisza, who is on good ter is with
General Ibanez del Campo, is mentioned as being the type of man needed to preside
over such a government.
Ik. A pamphlet titled l'he iL'lg ion of a "Fria" a was recently circulated
throughout the Armed Forces and referred to the gross and insolent attitude of
President Truman's envoy, YMr. L. Miller, tiho,, during a cabinet meeting, allegedly
demanded that the Chilean peso be devaluated to between 65 and 75 pesos par
dollar because, he stated, this was the c,niy way in which the United States could
maintain favorable trade with Chile. T o pamphlet in question also criticized the
manner in which President Gonzalez Videlz and his P nistere accepted diller's
insolence. It makes no difference whetter or not the charges made in the pamphlet
are true but a trustworthy source asserts that this neurw spread like wildfire
throughout the army, navy, air force, -md even reached a small group of the
Carabinoros.
1. All this, however, is not only the work of that group which desires an under-
standing with Argontinao The supporters of General Carlos Ibanez del Campo are
also conspiring while Jair:tG Larrain Garcia Moreno and Ibanez del Campo visit the
north and south of the country. Thy, opposition political parties claim that
the government will collapse by itself within a short time. They boast of know--
ing all that occurs in government circles and of having tapped the telephone of
the President himself. Just ?:oaa much truth there is in all -,;his is hard to say
but an atmosphere favorable to revolutionary conspiracy is c:Learly evident.
Advantage is taken of the prevuilinv unrest by the opposition parties, by the
Communists, and by those groups in the armed forces which, Dept wolf-informed
from Buenos Aires by Ramon Verg tra 1bntero and retired General Jorge Berguno
Menesoo and under the pretext of bulling the statesmanship of Peron, are prepay--
ing the overthrow of the present Chilean government.
ras Perhaps this report is unduly pess'iraistic but it is the result of unprejudiced
observations of these conspiratorial activities. lcreovur, the recent events
in Bolivia, in Bogota, and in Peru demonstrate the reality of the motto "America
First" which can only be implemented through the establishment cf military
governments.
23 December 1949 Observer
(Unsigned)
CONFtDENTIAt
Approved For Release 1999/09/09 : CIA-RDP82-00457R004100540010-0