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December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 23, 2003
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Publication Date: 
January 26, 1950
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PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R004200020001-6.pdf275.87 KB
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/ 1 . CIA-RDP82-00457R004 CLASSIFICATION CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT (,0 DEN COUNTRY Poland SUBJECT Observations on the Appointment of Rokossovsky as Commander-in- o the Polish Ar DATED1STR. 26 Jan, 1950 NO.OFFAGES 3 25X1 25X1 ITHIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION in forcing the Polish Government to appoint a Russian marshal as Gommander-in-Chief of the Polish "rmed Forces and Ainis- ter of National Defense, the eolitburo has taii:fsa a step of quite unusual temerity. One of the 4remlin's guiding prin- ciples in governing its satellites has boon to maintain the appearance of home rule. No hussian marshal or high ogficial has heretofore been shifted from a high administra- tive or military post in the Soviet Union to one in a satel- lite country. Though ROKOSSOVSKY is of Polish descent, he in thoroughly 4usstanized3 an0 is considered no more of a Pole than TUKHACREVSKII DZ4JZIIINSKI OR VYSILLISKI. 2. Under ordinary circumstances, military reasons would not have brought about an appointment which will recall- Czarist governor generals who ruled with a mailed fist. Poland was rnIsd by obedient servants of the uominform lihe President BIERUT, so that any measures conflicting aith the policy of the i?remlin could be, and were, suppressed immei4 diately. The Polish Army was under especially strict con- trol, with "ussian officers in all key positions. .jehe Polish .h.ir 1..erce, the wartime 'llsviet 6th "ir hrmye was com- manded by .soviet Colonel Lfeneral POLYNIN until l947.,_ and is now under General RWAYKO, a former 'ioviet air division comaander. Poland is surrounded by AuSsian troops. Any insubordination would have been suicidal, and would hays been crushed by ROKOSSOVSKY's headquarters (Liegnitz in Silesia). 3, The Politburo must also be fully aware that it has dealt a hsrd blow to Polish national pride, an outstandins Polish. ? characteristic. A.measure which might be tolerated in Czechoslovakia or nuinania will be intolerable to eoland, aurthermore salt 13 rubbed into the rolieh wouhda by the coNr obfil CLASS i FICATI N STATE ARMY NAVY 7 NSRB AIR 4. FBI REVERSE FOR DErr.tqqTwriii 25X1 ION ACTIO4 DISI Itli3U [ION 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/11 : CIA-RDP82-00457R004200020001-6 Approved For Rele CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CON-fluENTIAL- fact that it is ROKOSSOVSKY who pill be their boss. He is identified with the betrayal of the WARSAW insurrection, since he comelanded the Soviet 2nd Belorussian iron t which halted at PRAGA, just across the Vistula River from VSA, until the Polish insureents surrendered to the Germans. The books of the Polish General ANDERS and former Premier '1,1401JAJUZ.Le seetbewith hate and rage at their betrayal by the Soviet Army, 4. 117e may be concluded that reasons of paramount importance must have ipelled the Soviet Goverhment to an action which can .have very serious consequences. 5, The appointment of ROKOSOVSKY is a preventive measure against further spread of National Communism ("Titoism") in Poland. Weight is added to this conclusion by the recent appointment of Marshal ROKOSSOVSKY as full menber of the Polish Polit- buro. =SCOW was determined to avoid a repetition of the BELGRADE debacle. Next to the Yugoiavs, the Poles are the proudest and most nationalist minded of the satellites of AOSCOW. Nationalist tendencies in Poland had previously to be suppressed several times: Vice Premier GOMULKA and his followers had to be removed, and three. under-secretaries of state were forced to realm a few weeks ago. Even Marshal ZnIERSKI, ROKOSSOVSkYts predecessor, seems to have been recalcitrant. According to a REUTER telegram he opposed a proposal of the Russian high Uomana to train Polish troops forservice with the Greek ,suerillas. It is almost certain, therefore, that the Soviet Government , wanted to avoid any risk of another satellite mutiny and did so by appointins a Russian general to command the Polish Army. 6. Strategic considerations helped to bring about this appoint- ment. The Politburo may have considered it necessary to have direct and complete conriand of the Polish army. The indirect command throu7h Soviet officers in advisory posi- tions, under Polish generals who possibly were not wholly reliable, may have been thoueht insufficient. Xhis does not necessarily ietply any intention to start a war in the near future. The !.eneral attitude of MOSCOW regarding war does not seem to have changed, and no offensive by the Red Army is likely during the neat two years. 7. Another consideration may have been that after evacuation of Germany, by the Soviet Occupation xerces, bland will be- come the cornerstone of the satellite system in Eastern Europe. In the event of evacuation of Germany, the Soviet Union would also withdraw her troops from Eland, since there would be no communications to Germany to protect. It is of the ereatest :.portance, therefore, that the relish Army remain an absolutely reliable weapon in the hands of the "remlin, since this army would have to put pressure on Eastern Germany in the event of any anti-MOSCOW develop- ments. Should Poland succeed in following TITO's example and free herself from MOSCOW's domination, the immediate result would be the loss, not only of Eastern Germany, but of Czechoslovakia and probably Hungary. ROKOSSOVSKY's ? appointment is meant to insure MOSCOW's rule over this part of Europe. 1 This docutnent Is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 14 October 1978 from the Director of Ciwitral IntelligenCe to the Archivist 414 ll UnitIMPMfed For Next Review flats: 2008 Si4434dpFel7 lease It n e -Wa VW/147 Doh: 25X1 Approved For Release 821=1 2003/08/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R004200020001-6 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY- .3. CONFIDE 25X1 8. Important political reasons may also have entered into the Politburo's decision. The German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line.now incorporated. into Poland will certainly play tin important role in theStta.,ping of policy toward the Eastern ()omen State. or the time beine, the Soviet Government does not seem inclined to continue the policy of concessions with which the formation ofits newest satellite was inaugurated. PK had to announce :ehat no pace treaty would be concluded. General CHUIKOV heads the liunsian Control Commission, the ruthless PUSHKIN has been appointed ambassador, and the concilhtory SEITYONOV has vanished into the background. This attitude may be just as quickly reversed when it seems appropriate for the Politburo to dangle the hope of the return of the eastern territories before the eyes of Eastern and Western Germany. In such a situation Ii10SCOW must have a government 111 WARSAW which obeys its orders, which cannot be expected of any Pole, even though Communist and MOSCOW-trained. 'Obedience can only be forced upon BIERUT and his colleagues by a Russian proconsul. 9. Inportant conclusions can be drawn regarding the situation created by the appointment of ROKOSSOVSKY. It is certain. theft losing the last of their self-government will exasper- ate the Poles and cause hatril for their foreign oppressors. The underground movement will certainly receive new impetus. The Pole, a natural conspirator, will be willing to take still greater risks to injure his oppressor and to organize for fihtinp; at the opportune time. &Mina? Approved For Release 2003/08/11 : CIA-RDPgai7PgN1041-6 25X1