OBSERVATIONS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF ROKOSSOVSKY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE POLISH ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R004200020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 26, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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Approved For Release 2003/08/ 1 . CIA-RDP82-00457R004
CLASSIFICATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
(,0 DEN
COUNTRY Poland
SUBJECT Observations on the Appointment
of Rokossovsky as Commander-in-
o the Polish Ar
DATED1STR. 26 Jan, 1950
NO.OFFAGES 3
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ITHIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
in forcing the Polish Government to appoint a Russian marshal
as Gommander-in-Chief of the Polish "rmed Forces and Ainis-
ter of National Defense, the eolitburo has taii:fsa a step of
quite unusual temerity. One of the 4remlin's guiding prin-
ciples in governing its satellites has boon to maintain
the appearance of home rule. No hussian marshal or high
ogficial has heretofore been shifted from a high administra-
tive or military post in the Soviet Union to one in a satel-
lite country. Though ROKOSSOVSKY is of Polish descent,
he in thoroughly 4usstanized3 an0 is considered no more
of a Pole than TUKHACREVSKII DZ4JZIIINSKI OR VYSILLISKI.
2. Under ordinary circumstances, military reasons would not
have brought about an appointment which will recall- Czarist
governor generals who ruled with a mailed fist. Poland
was rnIsd by obedient servants of the uominform lihe
President BIERUT, so that any measures conflicting aith the
policy of the i?remlin could be, and were, suppressed immei4
diately. The Polish Army was under especially strict con-
trol, with "ussian officers in all key positions. .jehe
Polish .h.ir 1..erce, the wartime 'llsviet 6th "ir hrmye was com-
manded by .soviet Colonel Lfeneral POLYNIN until l947.,_ and
is now under General RWAYKO, a former 'ioviet air division
comaander. Poland is surrounded by AuSsian troops. Any
insubordination would have been suicidal, and would hays
been crushed by ROKOSSOVSKY's headquarters (Liegnitz in
Silesia).
3, The Politburo must also be fully aware that it has dealt
a hsrd blow to Polish national pride, an outstandins Polish.
? characteristic. A.measure which might be tolerated in
Czechoslovakia or nuinania will be intolerable to eoland,
aurthermore salt 13 rubbed into the rolieh wouhda by the
coNr obfil
CLASS i FICATI N
STATE
ARMY
NAVY 7 NSRB
AIR 4. FBI
REVERSE FOR DErr.tqqTwriii
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CON-fluENTIAL-
fact that it is ROKOSSOVSKY who pill be their boss. He
is identified with the betrayal of the WARSAW insurrection,
since he comelanded the Soviet 2nd Belorussian iron t which
halted at PRAGA, just across the Vistula River from VSA,
until the Polish insureents surrendered to the Germans.
The books of the Polish General ANDERS and former Premier
'1,1401JAJUZ.Le seetbewith hate and rage at their betrayal by
the Soviet Army,
4. 117e may be concluded that reasons of paramount importance
must have ipelled the Soviet Goverhment to an action
which can .have very serious consequences.
5, The appointment of ROKOSOVSKY is a preventive measure against
further spread of National Communism ("Titoism") in Poland.
Weight is added to this conclusion by the recent appointment
of Marshal ROKOSSOVSKY as full menber of the Polish Polit-
buro. =SCOW was determined to avoid a repetition of the
BELGRADE debacle. Next to the Yugoiavs, the Poles are the
proudest and most nationalist minded of the satellites of
AOSCOW. Nationalist tendencies in Poland had previously to
be suppressed several times: Vice Premier GOMULKA and his
followers had to be removed, and three. under-secretaries
of state were forced to realm a few weeks ago. Even
Marshal ZnIERSKI, ROKOSSOVSkYts predecessor, seems to have
been recalcitrant. According to a REUTER telegram he
opposed a proposal of the Russian high Uomana to train
Polish troops forservice with the Greek ,suerillas. It is
almost certain, therefore, that the Soviet Government ,
wanted to avoid any risk of another satellite mutiny and
did so by appointins a Russian general to command the Polish
Army.
6. Strategic considerations helped to bring about this appoint-
ment. The Politburo may have considered it necessary to
have direct and complete conriand of the Polish army. The
indirect command throu7h Soviet officers in advisory posi-
tions, under Polish generals who possibly were not wholly
reliable, may have been thoueht insufficient. Xhis does
not necessarily ietply any intention to start a war in the
near future. The !.eneral attitude of MOSCOW regarding war
does not seem to have changed, and no offensive by the Red
Army is likely during the neat two years.
7. Another consideration may have been that after evacuation
of Germany, by the Soviet Occupation xerces, bland will be-
come the cornerstone of the satellite system in Eastern
Europe. In the event of evacuation of Germany, the Soviet
Union would also withdraw her troops from Eland, since
there would be no communications to Germany to protect. It
is of the ereatest :.portance, therefore, that the relish
Army remain an absolutely reliable weapon in the hands of
the "remlin, since this army would have to put pressure
on Eastern Germany in the event of any anti-MOSCOW develop-
ments. Should Poland succeed in following TITO's example
and free herself from MOSCOW's domination, the immediate
result would be the loss, not only of Eastern Germany, but
of Czechoslovakia and probably Hungary. ROKOSSOVSKY's ?
appointment is meant to insure MOSCOW's rule over this
part of Europe.
1
This docutnent Is hereby regraded to
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the
letter of 14 October 1978 from the
Director of Ciwitral IntelligenCe to the
Archivist 414 ll UnitIMPMfed For
Next Review flats: 2008
Si4434dpFel7
lease
It
n e
-Wa VW/147
Doh:
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8. Important political reasons may also have entered into
the Politburo's decision. The German territories east
of the Oder-Neisse line.now incorporated. into Poland will
certainly play tin important role in theStta.,ping of policy
toward the Eastern ()omen State. or the time beine, the
Soviet Government does not seem inclined to continue the
policy of concessions with which the formation ofits
newest satellite was inaugurated. PK had to announce
:ehat no pace treaty would be concluded. General CHUIKOV
heads the liunsian Control Commission, the ruthless PUSHKIN
has been appointed ambassador, and the concilhtory SEITYONOV
has vanished into the background. This attitude may be
just as quickly reversed when it seems appropriate for the
Politburo to dangle the hope of the return of the eastern
territories before the eyes of Eastern and Western Germany.
In such a situation Ii10SCOW must have a government 111 WARSAW
which obeys its orders, which cannot be expected of any
Pole, even though Communist and MOSCOW-trained. 'Obedience
can only be forced upon BIERUT and his colleagues by a
Russian proconsul.
9. Inportant conclusions can be drawn regarding the situation
created by the appointment of ROKOSSOVSKY. It is certain.
theft losing the last of their self-government will exasper-
ate the Poles and cause hatril for their foreign oppressors.
The underground movement will certainly receive new impetus.
The Pole, a natural conspirator, will be willing to take
still greater risks to injure his oppressor and to organize
for fihtinp; at the opportune time.
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