CRITIQUE OF HVA TRAINING METHODS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R004800230001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 3, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

ere.: Si CLASSI FiChi ION rairavnOL ? 11.f), OITIOLW;
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SFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Germany (Russian Zone) CONFIDENT!i.DATEDISTR.
1140:0FPAGES
a. my 50
SUBJECT Critique of HVA Training Methods
5
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PLACE
.NOOFENCLS.
ACQUIRED
(LISTED DELOM
DATE OF
SUPPLEMENT TO
INFO.
REPORT NO.
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TIM DIXOCUDIT CORTARO, WM:NATION APITCTI110 TUC RATIONAL CRITITAlt
OP 'mt. C/111CD GTATCD VITNIO ma LICAIIIM OR no criatincet.cT SO
C.S. C.. Si Lilt 2. M AIM:1301. TM TRAMOISTRON OR 1116 MITC1.01011
C.7 ITO CONTORT" III ART r.P.IIRCII TO AN WIMITOCCIIIIC PtIMON IC clic',
1:17.ITRO Cl um. antoracnon TINS 0011111., vronitnren.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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1. For. setting up new VP-Schools and VP-Bereitschaften in September
and October 19491 Members of the Bereitschaften already organized
in the various Laender were utilized as cadre personnel and unit
Instructors. In most cases the status of training and political
orientation of the personnel so chosen were such that they could
hardly be looked upon as proper instructors for younger men.
Naturally there were great differences between individuals. These
partly or badly trained men were then Assigned to the new schools
and Bereitschaften as instructors and unit commanders, receiving
after a short time (sometimes at once) nevi recruits to be trained.
All this did not work out well during this early periods as the
training could not be carried out at once in a precise manner.
2. It would have been better if, when the new schools and Bereits- 2.
chaften were first set up and received their full complement of
instructors and cadre personnel, they had waited at least four
weeks in order'to train and prepare for their future mission before
accepting new racruits. It would have been most advantageous to
have. had an overall training program for the officers and NCOs of
these units in order to guarantee uniform instruction of recrUits.
As it happened, the early stages of instruction required a great
deal of improvisation as a number of new recruits were assigned
'before the units had received their full quota of instructors.
This made the proper carrying out of Initial training most diffi-
cult.
Conclusion: In judging the level of training reached by the old
Bereifichitten, they supposed it to have been mueh higher than it
actually was. The assigning of new recruits four weeks later
would have enabled the instructors to have been.properly prepared
to carry out their mission. Plans were made apparently vithout
any thought for the future.
3. The VP-Schools are to train new officers while the VP-Bereitschaften
are to train new NCOs. This called for first judging the leader-
ship qualities of the new recruits before determining which should
be sent to the schools and which to the Bereitschaften.
CLASSIFICATION E.3! (CONN D.ENTIAVALG 011217
STATE 4
?71?,1 NAVY
NSREI
DISTRIBUTION
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ARMY
FBI
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I
This document is hmey reg a'rei to
CONFIDENTIAL in a:eofdanca w.th Ins
letter of 16 October 1;73 from lie
Director of Central Intecence to the
Archivist of the United Staiec,
Next Review Date: 2008
Doo cu,ment
N hangs
Declassai
? IS. Chans
11,1a1111:
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3.aace$1/6OUTROL u.i. 2F1CierC ONLY
C:NTRLI, INTrLLICMCd: aGaNCY
As the courses of the schools are aimed at a higher level, as-
signment of less qualified recreits results in both loss of time
and waste of training capacity as they cannot reach the goals
required of them. On the other hand, there are recruits in the
Bereitschaften whose carabilitier are such that they could grasp
ths material preseuted en the schools.
The training plans for the first two months contained material
and subjects for traJaees who should havc had the benefit of six
months training. Th? instruction level was that of officers'
schools which berm with trainees whose basic training has been
thorough and complete.
Po room wes provided for any basic training of the individual.
The tactical conrses began at once with material which can only
be introduced aa unit trainina,
For example: The attack out of an as3emb1y area. This is actually
a tactical problem wishin the compass of unit training of an un-
attached platoon or oC a company.
When those in charge hed enough tactical background, such sub-
jects were completely reorganized and the necessary basic and
individual treining added to the curriculum. Lt other schools,
tacticel exercises were begun at once, for thieh the necessary
.background vas lacking for a number of the trainees. The result
of the latter course .as an unprofitable use of time resulting
in no practical advantage ii training.
These two methods of Initiating the instruction were folloaed
through in every other tactical subject. The existence of such
technisai subjects in the teginhing months of the training plan
was as follows:
Armored, Arlialery and Engineer training was mottly taught in
theory, and then only incorrectly and incompletely handled. Often
the necessary technioal personnel were lacking and there were no
ilstructions or manuals available. In these.sub2ects cven more
time should be spent on basic training and tactical training of
? the individual soldier. Oaly in the third trainir.g month was this
state of affairs recognizei and the piens reorganized. They had
to practically start over again from scratch.
The lack of all training aids such as manuals, training direc-
tives and instruction outlnes, among other things, for the initi-
ation of training- was notcceably disadvantageous. Fiat every
officer and instructor was able to draw on his earlier technical
knowledge and baCkgroundr As time passed, instructions were iss-
ued to the schocris and Bercitschaften as training aids. These
instructions gave only a rough outline of the training desired and
had to be worked out in detail before being of any value. Each
instructor in doing this weris had different views and opinions,
making a uniform program for the trainees impossible, All these
conditions explain why the goals set for the first 3, or 4 months
of the training program colld not be attained. There were too
many difficulties and aspects of the initial phase to be overcome,
6. In 'haat light does the training program appear today? It can be
said that in general there has been a great deal of improvement0
hhet has been the basis foi this improvement?
ca) In the leadership of the Administraticn and in the Main Ad-
ministration for training itself.
Their personnel has been supylemented and strengthened by
recruiting a number of competent VI- officers and mbn from
the schools and Bereitsehaften. The structure of the Lain
Aduinistration has been expanded and better staffed so that
more systematic and better wor'a can be accomplished.
It has thus been possible to issue a number of basic instruc-
tions. servfice directives and orders in the last 4 to .6 weelas.
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'en CENTRee, INTLLIGTINCIC itGeNCY
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To be sure, these new instructions had also to. he partly
re-worked, since the initial stages had preduced many needs
and snowed up many deficiencies. However, the experience which
has been gained to date has been evaluated and incorporated
into these new orders.
The progress Which has ben achieved in methods of planning
and the accomplishments resulting therefrom are in great
measure due to the capability of the Chief of Staff who under-
stand& clearly and fully the means of echieving a goal system-
atically.
Meanwhile, a great number of useful manuals have been pre-
pared in the Training Pivision for purposes of instruction;
these have been divided into various branches of trainine and
form a useful basis for instruction.
(b) In the schools and Bereitschaften. There has been a fairly
complete weeding out of attached personnel, in which the good
and useful elements have come to the fore and have been joined
in part by elements of the trainees who have taken over the
junior positions. At the same time many who havE proved them-
selves of no value have either been trrnsferred or mOstered
out.
Cc)
Through large-scale construction projects, they have been able
to provide better installations from the point of view of
space. The overcrowding of almost every Objekt at the beginning
has been almost entirely eliminated by the construction program.
With progressive training and consolidation of discipline by
means of extremely intensive polf.tical schooling which has re-
cently been. introduced, it can be expected .that the morale
value, the further addition of technical knowledge, and the
political consciousness of all VP members will be raised as
time passes.
The bettering of material provisions for successful training
and instruction has been achieved recently throughout the
organization, so that it. is now merely a question of suitable
planning and intensive work to come closer to the goal which
they have set themselves.
7O What great deficiencies can still be pointed out? That things have
made a change necessary in order that they can work even more suc-
cessfully?
(a) In the Hauptverwaltung far Ausbildeng in Berlin:
a. In Training:
As a fundamental provision for the accomplishing of a real
basis for every phase of the training program% there 15 a,
lack in quantity and in quality of training manuals for all
branches of instruction. The manuals which have been is-
sued up to the present time can only be described as make-
shift and in time must be supplemented or replaced,
For the provision of such manuals a "Vorschriftenstelle"
should be set up as another section or "Relent" In such
a section several technically trained VP officers should
be assigned, separated among the various branches, e.g., for
Infantry, for Artillery, for Armor, etc. These officers
would combine present exiting material together with
evaluations of experience up to the present time into new
manuals. They should of ceurse yore: in close cooperation
with the Inspection end Training Sictions.
b. In Organization:
The strong concentratior of the entire work Within tee
scope of all schools, Bereitschaften7 and other headquarters
within the ;:lain Administration% creates a general overload-
ing of the small number of personnel assigned, which re- . .
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SECIirm
_ U.S. 02:FICIALS ONeY
C-7 HAL INT-ELLIGeiNCE AGENCY
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matters. Those assigned to the Nauptverwaltung must
occupy themselves with all too many small details of
daily administration, and therefore do not have time
for more important matters which require concentra-
tion and correct working conditions. It makes work-
ing on oif-duty time and at night obligatory; this :an
be done in initial phases but is impossible in the
long _run.
They must stop this condition of continuing Improvisa-
tion and gradually take up far.-sighted methods of won;.
They would therebytright from the start, avoid many mis-
takes, which in turn would lead to the strengthening
of confidence in. the overall leadership.
c. It is necessary thot all sections be better courdinated
in regard to work methods. There should be no cases of
4n.;14:-.4 orders being issued or similar actions which
cause lover echelons to consider that those in Eerlin
do not know what the score is. The new regulation con-
cerning administration.affecting all Main Administra-
tions will cause wide-spread changes in this condition.
(b) In the Schools and Bereitschaften:
? a. In Training:
There is too much paper work, which does not alloy the
superior officers enough time to concern themselves.
with practical espects of' the service. The reason for
this can be found in the system of mutual mistrust,
which requires that every hour be accounted for, which
acoount must then be checked.
. _
LLey g?IP the sueerior officers concrete missions
to accomplish within -kserl-sin tjt.. iet'er,,elst.atthe erd
. of which the result of his work should be '.ested by a
check.and inspection of ;practical performance or execu-
tion of the assigned mission.
This would raise the self-respect end feeling of responsi-
bility of the junior VP officers, would give a better
chance to judge them by their actual ability, and would
save paper. As it is now, the officers have nnly forms
to fill Out and Alst producerenelessiplans. Correct gontrol
can only be found in the pracLical performance of any
given task.
In brief, it can be shown thus: The time available for
training is divided into five periods (e.g., during one
year)r
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Period
II
CI
CI
CI
- Training of the individual soldier
Training of the section
- Training of the platoon
Training of the company
. Training in combined arms in fairly large
scale exercises.
.For even training period, a certain time is decided upon
and a final L2a1 assigned. A training plan sets the snb-
jects, using estimates of the time necessary for them, but
these must be kept flexible and at the discretion of the
commanders of the Schools or Beneitschaften.
(For some subjects more time is necessary than has been
planned for, while for others less time, depere2ing cn the
capability of the trainees for absorbing the material).
The carrying out of a:L1 planning in detail as regards
break-down of subjects and setting-u: of classes 13 then
the rp.crnnsihillty :Y" the Snhnni or Rpreisphpft_
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SECRni/
OFFICI!_LO ONLY
CINTRAI '.GENCY
In making out reports it would not be necessary to account
for each hour and each man, rather only a survey of actual
accomplishment. The actual results must be determined by
an inspection of practical execution of each branch of in-
struction.
These inspections must be carried out by capable superior
VP officers from the hauptverwaltung and other higher head-
quarters, officers who can exercise good judgment.
b. The arming of personnel with small arms is not sufficient.
Every man must have his own piece. The constant necessity-.
of transferring weapons for training purposes causes ad-
ditional work for the organization, and has an adverse ef-
fect on the individual soldier as well as making maintenance
of such weapons difficult.
One can only demand good and capable work when one supplies
the necessary means for its accomplishment.
c* In many Schools and Bereitschaften there is not enough ter-
rain made available for carrying out adequate tactical
training. The provision of such terrain is difficult,
especially in such Laender as Saxony and Thuringia where
all farm land must be used for agricultural purposes.
Objekts such as those at Eittow, Frankenberg, Lbbau,
Langensalza and Leipzig are examples.
In order to bring the training of these schools and Bereits-
chaften up to date as regards terrain exercises, it will
soon be necessary to take over former maneuver areas.
The technical and political training status of the superior
officers of the schools and Bereitschaften still valies to a
large degree. The reason for this lies in their varied
background. One has had experience as a former general,
another as a regimental commander, others as company com-
manders? sergeants, corporals, or even only as priVates.
Some have been assigned on the strength of their political
background, so that their technical background is weak,
while the opposite is true of others.
A certain amount of time spent on regular training and
schooling of the commanding officers would be beneficial,
and this in turn would be very much to the advantage of
the schools and Bereitschaften.
F-----1qomment: Strictures aimed at the leadership of the Haupt-
verwa tung fi.kr Ausbildung and its policy decisions had to be soft-
pedalled, inasmuch as they also reflect on the judgment exercised
by the Soviet control element.
SEICT1E!
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