1. REACTIONS IN INDONESIA TO THE KOREAN CRISIS 2. INCREASE IN STRENGTH OF SJAHRIR AND HIS PARTY 3. POSSIBLE POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R005200030011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 29, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000C9NF At005200030011-3
CLASSIFICATION'''TRt:L - U.S. OFFICI;:LS ONLY 25X1A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY
Indonesia
SUBJECT
1.
Reactions in Indonesia to the Korean Crisis
2.
Increase in Strength of Sjahrir and his Party
3.
Possible Political Alignments
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES 1
NO. OF ENCI_S.
(LISTED BELOW)
1. Communists in Indonesia have not yet reacted to the Korean crisis. They
are quiet and awaiting developments. Some reaction in this quarter is
expected the beginning of next week
Most Indonesian political leaders such as Natsir and Sjahrir, and such
observers as the editor of the Keng Po and the free lance correspondent
Carl Tobing feel that a Communist victory in Korea would cause almost
immediate repercussions in Indonesia and other Southeast Asia countries,
while strong American action in this crisis will do much to negate neutral
groups in this area.
3. Natsir and Sjahrir feel that Indonesia has no military defense whatsoever
against aggression, but that in view of public opinion at the moment, an
open offer of military assistance by the US to Indonesia would not be
advisable. however, both of them feel that if the United States made an
offer secretly and informally to various Indonesian leaders it would do
much to bolster their spirits. It is their opinion that such an offer
should take the form of "the United States will extend military assistance
whenever the Indonesian Government desires such."
4. Since Sjahrir's visit to various areas outside of Djakarta, the strength
of his Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) has increased about 25 percent in
the past creek. 8atta's physical condition is considered very poor, and
Sjahrir is believed to be a likely candidate to succeed him if he steps
out of the picture. The bulk of the Tentera Republik Indonesia Serikat
(TRIS) and active youth groups are solidly behind Sjahrir.
5o A political union involving Sjahrir's group, the Masjumi, and the oonserva-
tivee in the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) appears to be likely. The
Sultan of Jogjakarta would also go along with Sjahrir.
CONFIDENTIAL
STATES!' X I NA)'
ARMY X AIR
Ap
CLASSIFICATION T/C)NTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
'8 CIA-RDP -OO 7R0Q,520
This document Is hereby regraded to
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the
letter of 16 October 1978 from the
Director of Central Intelligence to Cie
Archivist of the United States.
00130004)w Date: 2008