SUGGESTIONS FOR LIBERATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM COMMUNISM AND THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R006500830010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 23, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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COUNTRY Czechoslovakia
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SOURCE
CONFIDENTIAL
Suggestions for Liberation of
sechoslovakia from Covmunisn and they USSR
appears that although the Krerii in is mare of this .fact, no defence has
been devised by it, and thus the 'Jest could r>alm use of these vulnerabilities.
Soviet irTerialism, ?.$iich is based on an effective and easily understood
ideology, is avare that it is far from realizing? such ideolonr. It builds
. every'uhintt on :: aterial ?stron!?th but for the good of the state rnthor than
t'.aat of the peor+le. The itrerslin is con antly postponing attainzgent of that
part of the prograrl which trould materially help the standard of living of
the foviot citizen until it (th3 XCzvmlin) has conquered -roestern capitalism
and taken charge of the oorld. Thus the tcremlin is Wilding on a lon' -term
provi aorinn (sic, posiibly program). Thr? i.rnorance, nisinfoxxn tion and back
of froedon of the Soviet ?raeople and of the satellites aid the ICronlin, which
believes that if it continues its present -practices, it -41l not encounter
25X1 A any dangerous competition.
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1. The Coxwiunist g ar y presents to the public matters vtaich usually do
not contradict the truth or the in-itontions of the party but whose real
purpose is intentionally conceals d by tactical, declarations or acts even
from the loyal Comunist official.. The latter is merely a pawn in a game
which he does not understand. A policy directed from the core of the
Party is carefully controlled so that per- forr-erc of tasks will not know
more than is absolutely necessary nor realize the true purpose of their
activities. This is a clever measure as othortrise these people would
real i.ze prematurely that they are carrying out acts which are a;; .i.nst
their t-rill or which will make them the victins. They are actors who
are not allowed to understand the whole play, and severe measures are
taken to ensure that one actor will not road the other's script,b There
aft Very fet.r who remain until the end of the scene, and the. entire play
is kno?m pe:rhar only to the directors or even perhaps only to the author.
The best way of ;Judg.ing their aim, is by observing who in assigned to the
various parts and who is the assistant director, and then by ferreting out
the truth from the nascdaerade of lies and contradictions. This is a road
of many but waell-planned cures, for which one cannot find any miles or,
from the short-tern view, any law. If the [?Jest is seeking an example from
history, it errs. This situation is entirely new and the rant cannot be
used. This it haprens that the methods of the 'Test somctimos ae?'.ieve the
opposite of *,-shat man intended, to the advantage of the East.
2. The political methods of the East, ho-sever, have their veaknies ses. It
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4 The task of the opponents of the U "R is to disparage the r1erx Lenin plailescThg
before the entire =toorld by utilizing the period when the U R is busy' with
its imperialistic aimo and not able to *amko its people happy. It is time
that the Co mists were prevented from parsing an their ideology to the
doraocratic sectors of the isorld and that steps be talc on to de stxroy Corrmietic
"monopoly" in its present spheres, not only outside the MM t and its satellites,
but even in the "internal Soviet m arI:et", and to repudiate it as being deceitfu'
This is the most vulnerable aspect of Krorily_n policy, and the time is ripe for
i.nitiati.np an attack. It is a question of a new revolution which ,.,nuld lead to
real democracy of the tyro k norm as sfasaryk z a democracy. Of course, this
assumes a Masaryk whose democratic concept to fully understood and is recog-
nized to be a f?rc3 bringing together societies and rorallsr obillzinn the
v,'arl d in the broadest sense u
5. It 'is believed that an opportunity to Initiate this action will present it-a
,, pelf during disagreement, which possibly will occur soon, bettrean the MOM.,
Pol.rand and Czechoolo a?:ia, during which time both surpressed nations trill.
rid themselves of the soviet influence at al ..L cos u l iws u e i a,~ l tally
trill emerge from the Soviet aim to win over the Germans, at the o cpense of
the satellites a In this connection it is reconnended that the C,;echa, as
political necessity and on their oust initiative, begin to solver the problem
of the return of the Sudeten Gersaans. To live in Czechoslovakia lator on with Gti
mans who returned to the border areas against the will of the Czechs-for eple
upon iust actions of the U ql. or of ilea EJest^- would be more difficult than
if the Czechs presented their oim solution,, thus f5 ilehi.s?r, o&' of that?
good will to overcome all obstacles to a lasting peace and a future united
Europe.. It to believed that as a last resort, CzeohoslovEakia would accept
a solution if it came f on the 'costa The Poles would probably react in the
saris nanner because it 'would also b( :a more acceptable and safer for them to
accept a correction of the Polish-German border based on their otm propose 'al
than on the dictate of the Russians.
G. Of course it is important that the Czechs sutra Icnbtm their offer in time,
A late proposal could be Jud!!eei as an escape from difficulties and encourage
the Germans to ,ter up their dernauds. If the Czechs began to solve the Sudeten-
Gem. an problem, they would ''help the nest win the support of the Germns sooner
than would the US ,13P, in the same v ay,, and the Ger ns would always remember
who had made thin gesture.
7. After the rnificstion of Germany by the 'Test, the USSR would find itself on
the defensive and would mace a solid and genuine fort 'which is eager for a
just settlement of the morld and against which the Marx-,T.,enin theory 'would
be helpless o And in Czechonlovakia the Hasaryk democracy would certainly
7 find to tray which would enable not only different classes to live together
peacefully,, but also different nationalities,
8? It is believed that the US, can be defeated without a mar only by the fulfill-5
rent of a program nobler than that pre coated by the Har%%-t+nin theory This
means a decisive and comprehensive realization of llaearyk9 s principles of
humanitarian democracy.
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