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November 16, 2016
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April 14, 2000
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May 2, 1951
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PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R007600320006-1.pdf727.71 KB
y jjii6 3 ed ForCRC ylaQQQ/N05/2 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. l1`' FORMATION REPORT CD NO. COUNTRY Yugoslavia SUBJECT Yugoslav Defense Plans 25X1A ?LACE ACQUIRED DATE OF INFO. DATE DISTR. 2 May 1951 NO. OF PAGES 6 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 1. When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1918, the Yugoslav General Staff was faced with the problem of preparing a strategic plan for the defense of Yugoslavia against and armed invasion from the east,p particularly from Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria0 2. This plan had to take into consideration four main factors; morale, man- power, material and.terrains . This report describes how these factors have been treated.in the development of the strategic pattern of the Yugoslav military defense plans over the past two years. Morale With regard to the problem of how to create and maintain the discipline and spirit necessary for the successful execution of'. the plan, the Central. Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Yugoslav General Staff made the following decisions: Convince the members of the Yugoslav Communist Party of the justice of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav. Communist Party case against the Cominfox'm and: the USSR. This necessitated proof by the Centra]. Committee that it, -and not Stalin and the Cominform bureau, was following the path of true socialism. This the Central, Committee succeeded in doing through: 1) Aggressive propaganda, in which all, the reactionary, imperialist and anti- tarxist features of USSR and Cominform policy were clearly revealed and contrasted with the progressive and democratic policy of the Yugoslav Government. Marxist legislation, such as the laws providing for the creation of workers' councils in the factories and the development of democratic centralization in the administration of the country, which aimed, perhaps a little too theoretically, at. withering away the powervof the state, and which contrasted forcibly with the anti-Marxist laws in the USSR which aimed at reinforcing the centralized bureaucratic powers of the state. NSRB tE, 4?e tvAVW We STA7 W4W ARA9'W .M~ --- M MI )I- IV I PAP u'VeIr "0 ' O aClG 81 Class. 0~~1fl55sF'~0 CIassChamae T : IS Asst .: HR 70-2 Approved For Release 2000/05/22: CIA-RDP82-00457R00 69 0@1 r 70UFI 25X ONLY Nu , pi SECRET/CONTROL -A U.S. OFF.CCIALS ONLY Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP82-00457R00760032 06-1 C121TRAL IMELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1A b. Convince the members of the Yugoslav Communist Party that economic relations with the capitalist West were necessary, and that they did not, in any way, compromise the political and economic integrity of the Yugoslav socialist state. This the Central. Committee succeeded in doing by: 1) Refusing to admit Western interference in the socialist control of Yugoslavia's economy, or in the administration of Western loans and the distribution of Western economic aid. 2) Refusing to enter into any political or military agreements with the West. c. Convince the masses that it lay in their interests to support the Central Committee against the Cominform and the USSR. This the Central Committee succeeded in doing by: 1) Persuading the masses that their choice lay between Russian and Yugoslav Communist rule; that the latter was preferable, and that the West was not prepared to supply a democratic or liberal alternative. 2) Appealing to nationalist and patriotic sentiments against Russian imperialism and ruthlessness. d. Destroy or neutralize all Cominformiet sympathizers. How successful the Central Committee has been in doing this may be Judged by the followings 1) No Cominformiets have succeeded in removing the Central Committee from power. 2) The number of persons arrested during the last five months as Cominformists has been negligible. 3) Tito, in his speech to Party members of the Guards Division in Belgrade on 17 February 1951, felt so confident that the Comin_ formist danger in the country had passed that he ordered the Party to be more democratic , and urged Party ambers not to hesitate to criticize the goverr=ent provided they did not allow their vi to influence them to such an extent that they refused to execute the decisions of the majority. The significance of Tito's speech lies in the fact that until recently Party members were terrified of criticizing the government. Nov that the Central Committee has satisfied itself that the internal Cominformist danger has passed, it can afford to be more liberal and suffer criticism. The Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party may be said to have succeeded in creating the psychological conditions vitally needed for the successful development and execution of the defense program. It is true that some orthodox Marxist members of the Yugoslav Communist Party still complain about Yugoslavia's trade and financial relations with the West, the modifications made in the Five Year Plan, the vast sum allocated to the armament industries, the shortage of raw materials for industries unconnected with the defense program. It is also true, that the masses complain bitterly of the rise in the cost of living, and the shortage of food and consumer goods. To all these critics, the Central Committee has one very simple,,ready and effective answer -- the danger from the East. As the international political situation deteriorated and the rhythm of the defense program increased, the cry of danger from the East grew louder until, in December 1950, it reached its climax at the extraordinary meeting of the National Assembly during the debate on the military budget and the need to extend the Five Year Plan by one year. A few weeks later, Tito realized that the price he had paid for this magic answer was to throw the whole country into a state of war hysteria, and so, on 17 February, he told a meeting of Party members of the Guards Division that there was no immediate danger of war and that he did not consider it necessary-to accept Western military aid and equipment. Approved For Release 8~'h`3;RD8, 0~,03'iY 06-1 SECkthT/C0 0L - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Approved For Release 22 ~WWAM~M0N4W7600320006-125X1A " 3w Vie' 5. With regard to the problem of how best to use Yugoslavia's manpower, the Central Committee and the Yugoslav General. Staff have formulated and implemented the following policy: a. Maintenance of the r,m number of men under arms consistent with the manpower requirnts of industry and agriculture. b. Employment of the Yugoslav Army in the most efficient manner possible. c. Mobilization of the civilian population, 6 All males up to the age of 27 are liable for military service. Recruits are called up every six months. Conscripts serve from one to three years. Those with higher school certificates serve one year with infantry units; those without higher school certificates serve two years with infantry units; those drafted to armored and other specialist units serve three years. University students may defer service until they are 31 years of age. High school students liable for conscription may also defer service.; about 20,0000 students fall into this category. Partisans with over 12 months war service are exempt from military service. Persons who served for over 18 months with foreign or enemy armed forces during the war are only liable for six months military service. `i. So far the 1921 - 1932 classes have been called upd Definitely no secret mobilization has taken place, although in the autumn of 1950 conscripts, due for release were retained for an extra two months. No extensions of service have been ordered since then, 3. Although mobilization has not yet been ordered, the Yugoslav General Staff is proceeding swiftly with the task of perfecting its mobilization plans. Most regular and reserve officers have already received sealed orders concerning what they should do when mobilization is announced. At present the administrative organs of the state are carrying out a very secret census of all factories not engaged on vital defense work and where thirty percent or more of the man employed are fit for military service. The object of this census is to ensure that these men will be called up in the event of mobilization and substituted by female labor. It sub- stitution is impossible then the factories will be closed down. 9. The influence of Red Arm- strategy, tactics and discipline was dominant in the Yugoslav Army until 1948. In June of that year, the Army suddenly found itself cut off from its main sources of military equipment and supply and obliged to reverse its strategic plane and interests. Faced with a very serious shortage of heavy equipment and prospect of fighting alone against enemy forces, the Yugoslav General Staff gradually modified the Russian inspired tactical and disciplinary training program of the Army. How far modification ' hays gone may be judged by Ivan Goaan ja k' s address to the Yugoslav General. Staff and senior Party functionaries at the Ministry of National Defense on 19 February 1951. He laid down the following directives s All officers must pay much more attention to the strategy and tactics of partisan warfare and avoid accepting any rigid principles of strategy and tactics. b? Training in the army must be directed towards developing the personal initiative of every officer and man, so that, in the event of regular formations and units being broken up by the enemy, every officer and m9m can carry on the fight as a partisan. c. Closer and more friendly relations must be established between junior officers and soldiers. Re3}ationa should not be too intimate nor too distant. Every junior officer must take. a me L closer interest in the welfare of every single soldier under his command, and subordinate his personal interests to those of his mono Bearing in mind that dis- cipline in partisan unitail unlike that in the regular a -, is not based on military law, it is only by gaining the genuine respect and affection of his man that the junior officer can retain the leadership and loyalty of his men when the fortunes of war oblige him to become a partisan,, Approved For Releas ?,fpff9 X2[ 2-Q a7 0006-1 C01~1~1.OL - U'S' OMCLUS Approved For Release 200 10/05/22 : CIA-R DP82-004578007 20006-1 Sra= CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 10. Mobilization of the civil population will be considered under three subjects: preliminary military training, military training outside the army and civil defense. Preliminary military training U. Already in 1918, preliminary military training was obligatory for all male and female university students and students of the fifth and higher forms of gymnasiums. Severe penalties are imposed on students who fail to present themselves for training. Instructors on the courses are invariably regular officers from'the ranks of captain to colonel. The courses cover theoretical and practical military training. Theoretical training includes garrison duties, organization of the army., balli?tics, description of weapons, recognition of army ranks and badges, the rights and duties of officers and enlisted men, and martial law. Practical training includes rifle training, issue of orders, route marches and parade drill. Militar r rainiffi outside the arir (VVO) 12. The fundamental object of VVO is to train the whole civil population to become efficient partisans in the event of war. When VVO began early in 1950, it was not taken very seriously, but in October 1;,50, the Central ',Committee ordered all mass organizations to give VVO priority over all other activitieso Under the command of the ex partisans association, the National Front, youth organizations, rifle clubs, and sports associations mobilized their members and the trade unions mobilized their members through their factory committees. 13. Mobilized members were then organized on partisan military lines into sections, platoons, companies, battalions, brigades and divisions. Command of most of these units was given to reserve officers or members of the ex-partisan association, though command of the higher formation was entrusted to regular army.offioes. VVO training includes theoretical instruction on partisan warfare and tactics and political instruction on the necessity and'glory of partisan warfare. 144 The population as a whole is taking VVO seriously, and, in view of the fact that civilians are not punished in any way if they do not take part in VVO, the number of civilians who do take part is susTrisingly high. Civil defense 15. Civi1 defense includes, among other organizations, Red Cross, fire services, salvage units and PAZ (anti-aircraft defense). With the exception of the Red Cross,, all these organizations are directly controlled by the Ministry of Interior. 16a PAZ was founded in 1949 but only began to take shape in 1950. PAZ centers have now been organized in all, cities, towns, large villages, and industrial and mining centers. They maintain a smell permanent staff of civil defense instructors, engineeres, chemists and police officers, all carefully selected by the UDB. 17. PAZ centers are responsible for organizing air raid defenses in their respective areas, and for training a corps of PAZ personnel which, in an eMergency, could be instantly called up for permanent duty. Most persons selected for duty with PAZ are unfit for military service, though some young students are sometimes recruited. 18. PAZ training is modern and based, for the most part, on German experience in World War Ila It does not, however, cover atomic warfare. Theoretical PAZ training includes high explosive and sulphur bombs, in- cendiary and napalm air raids, as well as bacteriological and chemical warfare. Practical training is carried out in conjunction with the air force and covers air raid exercises. Such exercises have, during the last three months., 'taken place throughout Yugoslavia, especially in the Hungarian and Rumanian border areas. 19. One of the main problems confronting 1'AZ is the acute shortage of air Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP82-00457R007600320006-1 qr,.r: :ry/rrmm i'1nT. - TT_L- nlrv17rTATS OW.Y SECRET/C? ?1, - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Approved For Release 200C~: I I RDP82-00457R007600320006-1 ENCE AGENCY 25X1A ?5- raid shelters. Most of the shelters built daring the war were demolished in 1945 and 1946, and, because of a shortage of building materials and labor, no new shelters are being constructed. Material 20. With regard to the problem of how best to equip and supply the Yugoslav armed forces, the Central Committee and the Yugoslav General Staff have based their policy one ao No requests for help from the Vesta bo Development of indigenous armament industries. 21. Hel.p from the West: For internal political reasons the Yugoslav Govern- could not and cannot afford to compromise its socialist integrity by entering into military agreements with the 'least providing for the supply of war materiel, since that might disrupt the unity of the Yugoslav Communist Party and drive many members into the Cominform camp. For external political reasons, the Yugoslav Government could not and cannot afford to compromise its armed neutrality by accepting Western war materiel and thereby providing the USSR and the Cominforsn with an excuse to attack her. 22. Obviously enough if, in spite of this, the USSR clearly showed signs of mounting an attack against Yugoslavia then the government would modify its policy and ask for western military equipment. But, for the present, the government does not think the situation quite so dangerous. Proof of this lies in Titotss speech of 17 February when he asserted that there was no imma iate danger of war. Two days later, Ivan Gosnjak repeated Tito's views at the conference in Zagreb of the Communist Party of Croatia. 23. Develo sent of indigenous armament industries: Suddenly out off in 1948 from its main source of m lwy equipmetaand anxious not to accept western equipment, the Yugoslav Government had obviously to develop its own armament industry if it intended to remain in power and protect the country against Russian and satellite aggression. Since 1948, develop- ment of the armament industry has been given priority over all other industries, and to this end the whole Five Year Plan has been modified and subordinated. Because the Five Year Plan had not been modified sufficiently and because the capital equipment requirements of the armament industries had been raised so high and those of the other industries in- sufficiently lowered., the Yugoslav Government found itself obliged: a. To export more and more food and raw materials in order to buy more capital equipment-formore non-productive armament factories, b. To reduce imports of capital equipment for industries unconnected with the defense program, and reduce production in these industries. c. To ask for western credits. This has resulted in a reduction of the standard of living for the masses and widespread economic discontent. 24. One of the benefits of developing the indigenous armament industry is that the Yugoslav General Staff now has a chance of standardizing the equipment and munitions. The Yugoslav armed forced are well supplied with light infantry weapons and the replacement of the extremely heterogeneous collection of guns with which the army is equipped is pro- ceeding slowly. The Tito tank is being produced at the rate of one tank a day, but the progress with the construction of fighter aircraft is very slow. Terrain 25. With regard to the problem of how best to defend Yugoslav territory, the Central Committee and Yugoslav General Staff decided not to attempt any serious defense of the eastern plains, but to concentrate the main defense effort of the regular armed forces in the mountainous areas of Approved For Release 2 .OQ4DPBTI=6049MO.'AD 30BD96-1 Approved For Relea*&Cft-lA-F?RB?~N761120006-1 southern Serbia., ,Macedonia, Montenegro and western Yugoslavia behind a line running roughly along the south bank of the Sava Rivera 26. The reasons for this policy are clear: the Yugoslav Army, inferior in numbers and equipment, would be destroyed if it attempted to oppose a determined Russian and satellite advance in the eastern plains by presenting a continuous front and operating in mass. On the other hand, it would be able to fight almost indefinitely if it: a. Dispersed in ill, independent, mobile formations in the mountainous areas west of the Sava River and avoided presenting the enemy with a large, slow moving targets b. Maintained contact with the West on the Adriatic. Hence the vital necessity of occupying Albania and controlling the eastern entry of the Adriatic. c. Succeeded in defending the heavy industries and lines of communications in Bosnia. 27. In accordance with the requirements of the strategic defense plan do- scribed above, the Yugoslav Government decideds a. To transfer, where and as quickly as possible, as many heavy in- dustries - vital defense plants, munition, food and equipment dumps as possible, from east to west. b. To concentrate construction of now heavy industries, defense plants, iron and steel plants, et cetera, in western Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia,, c. To develop railway communications in Bosnia. d. To develop Adriatic port facilities. e. That partisan forces should be used to harass, attack and destroy the .enemy in enemy-occupied territory, particularly the lines of communications, rear headquarters, supply and munition dumps and other logistic facilities. Approved For Release!! d?W.kli --RI?P%2-W' Da768U8Y0006-1