HIGH-LEVEL CHINESE COMMUNIST DECISIONS FOLLOWING MACARTHUR DISMISSAL AND FOLLOWING RETURN OF MAO TSE-TUNG FROM MOSCOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R007700440003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 9, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/26: CIA-RDP82-00457R007700440003-3
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CENTRAL%1'!ELIGENCE AGENCY REPORT
INFORMATt4N REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY China
SUBJECT ''i&-level Chinese Communist cisions
4ollowing 2 acArthrr Dismissal anri Following
T?etttrn of MAO Tse.tunr from Maccw
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF
INFO.
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DATE DISTR.
9 May 1951
NO. OF PAGES 1
NO. OF ENCLS
SUPPLEMENT TO 25X1
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
1. After the Chinese Communist learned of the dismissal of MacArthur, Goverment
1e aders were called into an emerr.enmr meetin This meeting was
tjnrer the chairman-lip, of I,IU Sh,ao--ch 7 i and included ministers and CHU To
who returned from Mukdsn. At the meet-Ing i.t tress decided that the United
States recalled MacArthur in orler to seek peace, and that the Chinese must
aptly high nressure so as to achieve the most nearly ideal way to end the
'Korean war.
Pnipir_g; this meeting was attended try the commander of the International
Volunteer Array, of which the headquarters are in tikden, the comet nder of
the Soviet forces in Dairen, P'FNG Te-huai and LIN Piao. These four people
misled to Peiping by plane for the meeting. The following decisions were
reached:
1A0 Tse-tung returned from !oscow. he
called a meeting of. Communist leaders at his re rea at sang an, west of
b. One-third of the Chinese Communist troops to be allotted for the first
stage of the offensive.* These troops to carry the fighting to the
capture of Seoul. Another third to carry the offensive to it line between
Andong (128-44, 36-34) and Taejon (127-26, 36-20). For the drive to
Pusan the entire force to be committed.
c. If the Chinese are unable to carry out this plan according to schedule
LComrnent. According to information available to office
the Chinese Communists had 553,000 troops in Korea
293,000 were committed to the spring offensive.
A
Claw.1~a3~ - S S
truth.: 1I8 70.2
Date; __- AUG 191~__ r
25X1
25X1
BYCA
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/26: CIA-RDP82-00457R007700440003-3