EFFORTS OF THE PRO-SOVIET NORTH KOREAN FACTION TO CONTROL THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00457R007900370009-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 27, 2001
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 17, 1951
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R007900370009-0.pdf297.04 KB
Body: 
k;LW,)1VK,A1 VJ!"i 0oi'd ID;7d14` T-2.i Approved F9~l~ CGR 12-00457~3Q INFORMATION REPORT CD NO., COUNTRY Korea ill DATE DISTR, 17 AU "t SUBJECT Efforts of the Pro==Soviet North Korean Faction NO. OF PAGES to Control the Government and the Army PLACE ACQUIRED DATE OF tNFO. June 1950 to January 1953? NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. l e In August 1950 WOE O: Tong-kox then Norti' lco, a wi I A ni, ster of Nations` Deft xsfk, insisted that North Koreas troops should tie c thd^ t to tb 33th, parallels; it view of the international situation and the military potent.~al of the North Korean army. He was violently opposed by T-111 Iltisdhg and K:I4 Waeks then ra member of the North Korean Military Comlmi t tme and co ande- of the troops in the field, As a result of advocating this policy? CH8:IE Vau given only the minor post of Rear Serrioes commander in the North Korean a=te general head- quarters, and KI?M Ch' ask took over actual direction of the armed forcas, al- though he had had no, militm7 experience since his service as a guerrilla with the Chinese Coammist forces in Manchur laa b4 ore 1945? There was a rumor cur- rent that CH OE had a dispute with KIN I1.scng end had trk eL to Shoot him buv was Stopped by KIM P?ta@pong, who happened to be pa?esentG0 2? Finally, in mid-November 1950, CHa OE accused KIN Il-r ig KIM Ch'aak of ignorance concerning military matters, and CTPOE wee replaced by G MG Si-u as rear serrice commander. KlaTG Kong who had been a: :KIM 11-s4_1 mark in Maul' churi sag was awed front line commander. Other KIM' al-sing stppoTte: a who were already in important positi$ne inc.u~ded 24-Z Hon i.1, deputy Minister of Internal Affairs; i' Or K,yongmtok p `) ? o jen de r of the Not th Korean force which occupied Seoul; and C BC on former crass ender of the 3Cth - 20 Parallel Constabulary aand later com~mathe `North Korean 2. Corps. 'fhusa soon after the beginning of the war, the higher etsif members of the North Korean any were KIM Il-songs s men, and the removal of GHI OE Yong-kon comoletod KIM, s domination of the military command. 3o By mid-Novemberg however, KIM Il-song was faced with a shortage of trained military commanders. K IG Ikon was dead, and CH:"OE Kyong tokg who had been sent to Manchuria in late October to reorganize the retreating North Korea troops, was assassinated by an unidentified subordinate in early November, WANG Si-u was inexperienced. At this point, the possible r+- smergenee of KIM Ift-chong au a political as well as military threat to KING a leadership'' added a new difficulty. Although he had been for .od to disband the Korean Vol-ant0er Arm which he had brought bask from China, KIM Mu-chong was named deputy Minister of National i Pease and ccw ,;:. ;coy ,;f t':._; .' ? vy when the )N1!rDE1'ta'I'IAL STATE tNAW NSRE3 DISTRIBUTION t ; .0F ' F C 1 AIR ~ t G IAVPI COMN ARMY Document tie. ------a ------------- t o Clangs IS Clam. Clays. Cnr ;T;d To: TS S C 70 Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RD at 00 09-0_.--- CLASSIFICATION Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP82-00457R007900370009-0 :.`07+~?IT `rTI.1:L CENTRAL IN'a ,1IGE 1CE AGENCY 25X1A North Koreas' government was set up, and he b -sW7Te co n mdex r.sf the North Korean 4 Corps when thf, war began. ka In the rst:eat frorl the j.-irimoter, KIfl j`.? tao-ch.a'arT t 'i in ciie ',r'. o:i? r ouOing North Koren forces but f .sled to keep order, N cv. t aek ooxarnaaale of c;usrxilla fox es -In South Korc.a, e1:' fyriled' to use hid tonne effectivc,ly,, . 'these ttso opp' tunities to pi.ace twl resa~o islbility for miliw= tart' reverses an men not* diz et1y associated ; ?th the pro,-Soviet clique in .the Nort=h Koreaum mernmaeat a:;ad more nartic .ar1;F "Co ',;h(, forth Korean Labor party wc: seized by KII?i 11.-s&t to insure that Kiii Mvv- one w. would not become .a cente:c? for Chinese Comrrru i.s?, political pr ;c:a;are. A conference of the Cen- tral Co.nmittee of the North Kccaan Labor 1,arty wa. ca 1i