SITUATION IN PO CHI MINH-CONTROLLED ZONES OF SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R008600340008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 17, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

' liggiogiorRelease2000/06/26:CIA-RDP82-00457R008600
? CLASSIFICATION C(roixr"ft1-kr,itrr-Tr. OF C 'SAW
CENTRAL IINTLLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Indochina
SUBJECT Siteation in Po Chi VInh-Controlled Zones
of South Vietnam
2
PLACE5X1 C
ACQUIRED
DATE OF
FE 0
25X1 A
DATE DISTR. L Sept. 1951
NO. OF PAGES 4
OF ENCLS.
ED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
25X1X
POLITICAL SITUATION
Administrative Reorganization
Declassified
Class. Changed To: TS S C
Auth.: HR 7q-2
Date: 0 I By: i.
1. Prom June to August 1951 many changes were mrde in the eolitieerl, minter.),
and economic administration of the three Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(DRV) Intersectors of South Vietnam. Unquestionably the most significant
of these was the unIon of tle three provinces of Long Xuyen Chau Doc and
Sadec into Long-Chau-Sa Province. The peieary !actor behind this reorgani-
zation was the widespread lack of technical cadres and the need to redis-
tribute them more effectively throughout the area. Because many unskilled
or unqualified cadres constituted a burden on the already deficit budgets
these were recalled as subordinate cadres of village adninistrative sections
and were forced to nrovide their on sources of Income. The reorgrnization
thus served also to free additional subsidies for DRV troops.
2, TI,e creation of the Long-Chau-Sa Province also pereitted t'e perging of
officials who the DRV felt could not remain faithful to tIle ideal of
"bolshevization" during the difficult period ahead, aggravated by the
French-imnosed economic blockade end Franco-Vietnamese military operatiens.
Among those ousted from administrative positions were the three inter-
sector chiefs, who were considered potentially disloyal as members of the
small capitalist class. The majority of oriciels who were not members of
the agrarian Communiet Party of Indochina (PCI) were replaced by long-time
PCI members of South Vietnam. Duong Van Tha, former heed of the Adminis-
trative and Resistance Comeittee of Sadec, for example, is now only an
overseer in charge of local production. Democratic Parte -embers formerly
employed In the adninistrative eosts of the DRV Surete were also expelled.
Von-PCI members who have remained in office are only figureheads.
IMP ?
Influence or rrane_ose EattmL......, Pressure
3. Continued rranco-Vietnamese attacks on DRV-controlled territory almost
caused the disintegration of the rovernnent administrative bureaus. The
centralization ,of _administrative centrel through the formation of the
Tong-Chau-Se inter-province and the retreat of adminietrative heedquerters
to remote and inaccessible villaeee was rode in an effort to erevent this
collapse.
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4.? The suecese of 7'ranco-V3etnarose operatiens hta also resulted in
the demeralizatien of the norelation livdng in DRV-controlled areas, becaure
of the high number of arm troop defections4 in adliteon, the attaes have
forced the people to disperse throughort the coentrysile, neeing it almoet
leposeible to distribute government circulars or to unite the people for
any purpose. DRV circulars often do not even eeve the bends of governmert
cadres, who are themselves demoralized and carry out the orders of teeir
superiors only under compulsion. .
ESASI123.1.-ILIP.2-1g2R11g?11 to DrIV P?1 1-47q
5. The nonelatien has reacted extreeely unfavorably to tele policy of redis-
tribution of farm land among the peasants. This policy her been inple-
nented since 1949 and while the nroeram has -roved sucoessPe' in certain
pleces, in general it has not produced the anticinated resulta. The
majority or the Peasants are more concerned with :alleediate renults tean
with fetere nrofits from long-term exnloitatien of waste land. Invectirs-
tion of agrarian areas has nroved Vat most of the eeasente actual:1y posoees
adequate lard to meet their own needs end often enough to provide an incoes.
rhile only about one-third or one-half of their own land _In -ow under
cultivation, the peasants are reluctant to accept uncultivated :land to le
irrigated at their awn expense.
6. The reasants complain that the new land allotted to them generally iE
inferior to their own land. They are nevertheless forced to accept the new
tract to folic*, at least in form, the government elan; they are then
permitted to abandon it. Because the DTV needs the support of' the leree
mass of the Peasants, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the
agrarian eroblem, hut thus far without satisfactory results.
P.
A large portion of the fertile Fele rroductive land has remained In the
eands of the landed proerietors and seall landowners. About two-thirds
of them, however, discouraged by the 111V dictatorehip, have fled to the
urban oenters in search of other means of levelitood. Their lands belie
been teenorarily confiscated and included in the land to be redistribetect
The error of such authoritarian methods has been roven hy the wave of
discontent among the farmers and among the relatives of fanners Idthose land
has been confiscated.
Political Parties
a. Communist Party of Indochina. There is a great deal of internal
!strife in the ranks of the PCI. Members are jealous of one
another and resentful of inequalities in the standard of liv!ng
in various areas; relatioes between superiors and subordimetes
are extremely poor, Because of the large amount of time consumed
in settling internal quarrels, It is not eurnrIsine that the PCT
finds little time to devote to the vell-being of the population
living under its control.-
. Demoeratic.Party. Althoueh outwardly the PCT has al eays professed
a PCT-Democratic Party union toward a common ideal, it has been
unable to conceal its deliberate efforts to sabotage the activities
of the Democratic Party, PCT propaganda accuses the Democratic
Party of being pro-Amerlean and anti-Communist and of working
against the interests of the proletarian Classes because its
members include intellectuals, proprietors and small landownerse
An incident which rrovoked strong reaction mem the peonle was
the purge of' individuals suspected of belonging to the Vietnam
Quoc Pan Deng in the village of Tan Thuan Deng, Sade c Province.
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oca1istThe Propaganda, etatutes? ideals az-ti
of t ocia1ist Party conform to te Corruniot ine The
was created under C.'crintr4st aerri.s to unite the miority of. licters
fron the rant.-s of anti-Co-runist oarties and rrouns ,Lnd to kntooll.
ind.lviduals hesitant to join t.e CI
? Religious nrouys., Adepts of oboups such us (',1.?:x., DsJ:. and. aic,
Catholics live under a great dirad.vanta.ge in f.Y.r.V- zwes;
officials .have stated that Whfle norr-religious
may become affil.V-ted with the PCI? religious groups ,?,..1rni a
natural. opoosition to tt.e realization of the Corminist
Actually they rematn in DRV arras only 1)ec3usu of their
and occupations. Tf they support or aid POT partfinns,
rei.untantly In order to remain on good t errIS lett ti1
The 11 n imn & trip for the p,eneral offensive has gradually fall en out of usc
became of its constant repetttion without implementation? It has berm
reol aced by a new slogan calling for courageous r,!s!i.stance urtil the on orturte
morent to stage the peneral or'enstve. This slogan toe w-121 soon bo
1, 0155
1TTtR1 ITUATT
10. 77e maloritv of the DPI ror'Ional troops are equi..N)ed only WIth grenades ?
dangers r`Til carbines, end are inedeourtely armed for combat egatnst
','-anco-Vietnemese fnrces. As a result, it was .-lecided at a meetinr: of the
Ceners1 "tta.'"f? of Thtersectors vu, VITT anfl, 3K to send a nortIon of ti'e
regulPr forces of the thrre intersectors to the Provinces to 'brm orovira;lai
hatt Ions commanded br a chief of brigade. These new Uri tS would differ
from the former regional forces only in smerior armarent.
11.7.1.3 al:Attiz. in the South
11. Combat fronts, opened throughout South Vietnam, have failed to produce the
an+ icipated results. DV proptvrandai, -oresenting these defeats as glorious
victories, is no "l'7.ngter accepted by the oecTle who have be,t.ore increasi.nety
aware of the defeats suf'fered by DTI forces.
:12. The nPY has now substituted !urr1l1a-tactics for pitched battles ';n the
south. The tactic of nitched battles was used primarily as a propag,fincia
weanon to raise civilian morale through a ow of force. Brt becauFe of
the time consumed n asserbling and TrieVing troops and the lack of materiel
s nd manual labor? thl. atratei failed, The present f.'"oramun!i.st stratepz.'
designed to preserve the rrincipal forces for use following the -entrance
of Chinese Oommuni.st _forces into Indochina. The people have expresred
stron.p' protest against tl.* possibility of Chinese Communist Intrirention,,
Decrease in r.2ja.qty:Zmno-
11. In the rapt, the reople in Iftli zones were obliged to provide food for the
troops stationed -7n their area :7 and 4-o ray a tax of 50 piastErs per 7erson
for the support of the fully". 'They have new begun to react aminst theoe
- hardships, ?howeve:r, a.rd 5n certain villages of Fe.dec are refusing to
nro,vide bil.lets for tl.e troops. !light sentries are often as7ialle.-7 vith
clods of earth arvi are .forced to keep constantly on the alert. Although
the T*0111(1 11:5 not hesitate to praise outstaniing troops, in general they
feel. that -Fhe oresence of troops In their area brings only 1.ac!,7 of food
and discomfort.,
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Union of Intersetagalp and IX
14. The recent annexation of Intersector-VIII to Intersector VII was effected
to protect the sa.7.t mareeles of Intersector IX, a source of large revenue
'which ittrind the betels of the DRV economy in South Vietnam. At present,
the French economic blockade has destroyed the paddy revenues of Intersector
VIII and cut the liaison routes to Intersector IX. The blockade also
effects Intersector IX and were the Franco-Vietnamese forces sufficiently
strong to surrollnd the sone, the loss of salt used to preserve fish would
Produce certair famine in the 11R9 7,0220110
ECONOMIC SITUATION
15. In spite of the propaganda efforts of the central government to increase
confidence in the Ho Chi Minh piaster, the lel:elation still considers it
dependent cn the Indochinese piaster lee:kluge it is not protected by gold
reserves. The lack of small bills, which hampers the flaw of eommeree
and exchange, is particularly hard on the peasants. A peasant who receives
his salary in ELAM-plaster bill is thus forced to use the entire amount
for the Nrchase of me corrodity and is unable, for example, to purchase
only a few liters of rice.
16. As example of the current inflated prices, particularly in the Plaine des
Jones area, is the rise in the price of one picul (40 liters) of rise from
14 or 15 piasters to 100 and 150 piasters in the last few months. The
price in urban areas is only 20 piasters per picul. This decrease in
-purchasing power in caused by the low rate of production in DRV zones?
17. As a result of the devaluation of the Ho Chi Minh piaster, the people
are forced to emerge their produce into French-controlled zones in
exchange for the Indochinese piaster. This hoarding of the Indochinese
planter only results in greater devaluation of the Ho Chi Minh currency.
The unsound DRV currency also affects the operation of government offices,
which are unable to purchase sufficient equipment for the army or medicines
for the hospitals without incurring a large deficit?
18. The "Season of Patriotic Emulation", ordered by Ho Chi Minh and conducted
in conjunationvith an extensive propaganda campaign, failed to produce the
expected results. Although the people applied themselves diligently to
the camnaign the herdships under which they worked did not favor a rise in
production. The high duties and taxes of all kinds, imposed on rerchants
passing from to French-controlled zones, have forced a large number
of them to atandon opmmwroe in search of other mans of sUbsistence.
In addition to these taxes, the people are forced to contribute in other
ways, such as the purchase of government bonds, to the DRV treasury?
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