DISSENSION AMONG THE NORTH KOREAN, SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS OVER POLICY IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R008600570002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 26, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT
CONFIDZNTIAT4
Approved VRSI"ase 200 "/'0_inTcTA RDP
CLASSIFICATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COUNTRY Korea
SUBJECT Dissension among the North Korean, Soviet and
Chinese Communists over Policy in Korea
PLACE 25X1 A
ACQUIRED _
DATE OF
MIFO.
25X1X
ION NUMBERED
25X1X
1. Pro-Soviet North Korean Communists are attempting to get Korean policy under
Soviet control. They queried the Soviets on the status of the Chinese
Communists in Korea, wanting to know whether the Chinese Co. irrunists were
volunteers or regulars, since the Chinese Communist I"Volunteers" in Korea
were supposedly under North Korean Army jurisdiction. According to public
opinion in North Korea, the entry of European troops is a step nearer Soviet
intervention and World War IZI. North Korean Labor Party officials have
openly stated that the Co.imunists should make peace among themselves before
holding peace talks with the United Nations. This feeling is strongly
supported. Anti-Soviet Communists in Korea may make an attempt to contact
the United Nations for the peaceful unification of Korea. This act wauld
be genuine so far as anti-Soviet Koreans are concerned.
2. The Chinese Communists are displeased with the entry of European volunteers in
North Korea. The reason for their displeasure is that the Soviet and North
Korean Communist parties without Chinese Co:.rmunist consent requested the
assistance of the European Cominform countries with the objective of placing
North Korea under the control of Soviet-trained Koreans. By this act the
Soviets were trying to block the Chinese Communists from monopolizing the
Korean conflict for Chinese Co,munist benefit. If European troops take part
in the fighting, the Soviets believe the problem will be partially solved.
The Soviets and North Koreans both feel that the entrance of the Europeans
is sufficient reason for setting up an international joint command in Korea,
thus depriving the Chinese Communists of the authority to make or dictate
decisions in North Korea. The establishment of this international command
was under discussion in late August. I,ussian arxi.y officers are to be in commando
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3. The Chinese Communists assert that the problem in Korea is lack of equipment,
not manpower. The Chinese Go nunists fear that the Soviets will use the
above tactics every here in Asia to thwart the advancement of the Chinese
Communists.
Aoderate North. Korean Communists are disgusted with the establishment of the
joint Soviet-Chinese Go,;z mist political. mission on the truce talks, from
which the North Korean delegates take orders; the moderates view this as
evidence of Soviet and Chinese Communist domination, and blame KT f-sung
for selling out, saying he agreed to the joint mission at a Communist meeting
at Peiping. K3V answers that this is a new step for organizing collective
security forces in Asia and that the joint commission was part of a decision
made at a general meeting of the Asian Cominform.
y. The North Koreans are not willing to resume peace negotiations at Kaesong,
and insist that the North Korean Communists should have the deciding voice
in the Korean theater and in political talks. The North Korean Labor Party
held a special meeting in late August on this question and decided to open
separate negotiations with the Soviets in koscow and with the Chinese
Communists in Peiping.
.CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP82-00457R008600570002-7