CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT, PERSONNEL AND HISTORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R008700150005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 22, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CilaWiCATION 3, "CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONIT.25X1A
CENTRA[ TELLIGENCI: AGENCY REPORT NO.
11rORkITON
COUNTRY china
SUBJECT Chinese Cemmunist Political Establishment,
Pereoneel and Hiseory
25X1A DE' L
EE
25X1A n
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF
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C P
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DATE DISTR, 22 Sept. 1951
NO._ OF PAGES 7
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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
25X1X
Observaticae_on the_Chinesee Communist Politicrl Establishment
1. The powers of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party are those
specified en. Articles 32 reed 34 of its Constitution (passed by the Seventh
Centres 3 01 Party Representetives, July 1945). and the authority of the Cen-
tral COI lrai ttee to act on lehalf of the Congrees of Party Representatives., by
virtue of the provision of Article 17 is specified in paragraphs (1) and (3)
of Artielee 30, In actual practice, the powers of the Central Committee are
exercised en its name by the Politburo, the Party Secretariat, and the Chair-
man of he Central Committee. The Central Committee normally is only a symt.
bol of eukteme eathority. When it is in session, the major functions of the
Central Coomittee are to receive reports mede by the Politburo, decide on
important matters ef policy, and. elect the members of the Politburo, the
Secretaey of the S3creteriat, the ministers of the important departmente, and
the Chaf.rmer of the Central Committee. Any member of the Central Committee
or any eesponsible personnel of the Central Party Headquarters or of any
locelity hes, of course, tee right to ma known his views to the Politburo,
or may he vlimmoned to its meetings to express his views. Actually, the
Politbueo es able to keep ender its control the plenary sessions of the Cen-
tral Coemietee. Defferences of o,oinion are to be ironed out in the Polit-
buro. t 1ou1d be an indieetion of a serious split among the leaders of
the IhiLeso Ammanest Parv (CCP) if the individual members of the Central
Committie bring up direct:; to the plenary session of the ommittee diffeie-
ent elms. if there happen to be two different political reports, or if tee
diffarert vievsar contaieed in one and the same political report. The
politicel :report is inveriably prepared by the Politburo to which the plenary
sesseon of the Central Committee never issues any instruction or makes any
soggestione ezide ?rom paseingsreeolution to accept the report and have it
made pullie. The minutes of the sessions of the Central Committee are often
circulated to the local paoty headquarters, bur rarely mede known to the
geneeal putlic.
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2. Unhealthy factors grafted on differences of opinion that developed in the
past or are still existing, on provincialist affiliations, or oe sentimental
ties among the members of the Central Committee are still to be found. But
these have not developed into factions. Most of the members of the Central
Committee have been assigned with heavy duties and very few have been left
idle. The question is whether they have been able to bear the load satis-
factorily, than& the feeling of individual comparative importaace does ex-
ist. Communist Party activities are, however, centered in VtriGUS localit-
ies, *II& have become too powerful for the Central Authorities to exercise
control very effectively. The Chinese Commurist coutral authors- ties have
already adopted measures leading towards centralization of power, particu-
larly in the field of economic affairs. Members of the Central Committee
have become too powerful in various localities. PEG Tehehuei In the North-
west; LIU Poecheng, TNG Heim-ping, and HO Lung in the Southweet; and LIN
Pim and PING T211-lutt in Central and South China are outstandine examples.
3. The assignment of duties to the members of the Central Committeo is nor-
mally decided by the Politburo, of which the Chairmen of the Oraanization
Committee of the Party is a member. Because of his being an important
member of the Politburo and his knowledge of the actual conditions, he is,
therefore, in a position to exert a decisive influence over the decisions.
The appointment or transfer of any member of the Central Committee to or from
any poet must be accompanied by actual necessity grounded on soend reasons..
In order to prevent the congregation of possible opposition fieeres at any
one place and to prevent the development of any factor of distrust, this
must he constantly watched by those in charge of the Party orgasization.
40 The election of the members of the Central Committee, and that cf the
members of the Politburo, of the Secretary of the Secretariat, end of the
Chairman of the Central,Committee are always preceded by coneultation a-
mong the most important members of the Committee who would then prepare
a roster of candidates, which, once agreed upon, is rarely chanced. It
cannot be called a free election. Election campaigns and mareeveering are not
tolerated by the Chinese Communists, It is in fact the result cf an a-
greement reached between the leading members. If differences of opinion
arise in connection with the nomination of candidates, it means that there
is &split among the Chinese Comnunists.
5. I have no concrete, detailed information on hand in regard to the organ,
isation of the CCP central authority. According to what has been inferred,
the important members of the Politburo are WO Tse-tung, CHU Te, LIU Shaoechli,
CHOU Enelai, and CHEN Tina MAO is Chairman and LIU Shao-chi le a member
of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and also Chairman ot the Organ-
ization Committee of the Party. LU Tingel is Vice Chairman of the Committee
of Culture and Education. LI Li-san, TENG Wen-pin, TSAI Sherg, CHEN Tun, and
NIEH Jungechen are chairmen or secretaries of various committeee of Labor,
Youth, Womens Affairs, Economics, and Military Affairs, All leportant in-
structions are given via the Party Secretariat to subordinate perty headquar-
ters. The various departments or committees of Central Party Headquarters
do not give any instructions to a lower-grade organization under the depart-
ment or committee concerned. They can only give inetructions of a supple-
mentary nature, and most of these have to go through the seereteriat of a
subordinate party committee.
6. The Politburo normally has two types of meetings; one it a political-discus-
sion meeting and the other is a meeting on daily routine and on matters of an
organizational nature. The politidelediscusslon meeting deals with discus-
sions on matters of policy, and sometimes with the passing of previously
prepared resolutions. Sometimes, reports Imre had to be submitted, with
relevant supplementary reports, for discussioes, and eventually for forming
resolutions. Important personnel changes have to be discussed. Meetings
of an organizational nature deal with matters of daily routtnee requiring
deliberation or further instructions. They aeso deal with reports on matters
for record or those the implementation of which dells for study, end per-
sonnel assignments. Normally, the heads of departments or committees are
responsible for resolutions of secondary importance and the exeeution of
resolutions, to which the Politburo would inmaty grane les ,t-p-prctral or enuorme-
ment with confidence. The form of the execution of a resolateoe or of the
transmission of the same are often left to the option of the Secretariat,
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the various departments or commtttees or their responsible needs. The
Politburo normally issues no concrete and detailed orders, nor dee it
give public instructions. In most caste, CCP members holding responsible
positions in the Government shell draw up laws end orders according to
policies already decided on. The CCP merely directs its members or organ-
isations In the Government, but it would not directly send orders to
Government organimationst
The Secretariat is the main executive orgen of. the Chinese Commuaist central
authorities. It executes resolutions passed by the Congress of narty
Representatives, the Central Committee, and. the Politburo, and handles mat-
ters which arise from time to time. Normally? the ministers and heads of the
various departments, committees, and the Secretariat alonn era responsible
personally for the management of various matters of theitaresnective organs.
At the same time, the Secretariat and the various departments or committees
have their own intra-office meetings to study measures to be followed and
proper coordination to be maintained. The various departments and commit-
tees and the Secretariat are headed by Politburo members or by important
members of the Central Committee. Therefore, the Chinese Comeunist central
authorAties form a complete whole, the weaknees being that the important
personalties are much too busy and thnt there is such a number of meetings
that mast be attended.
8 The. National Committee, as mentioned. in Article 36, is merely a meeting
temporary in nature, composed of members of the Provincial Party Commit-
tees, members of Border Region Party Committemin and a portion of the mem-
bers of other Party committees under the direct control of the Central
authorities. It 14 equivalent to a preparatory meeting of the Meeting of
Party Representatives, and would in most cases be held before the Meeting
of the Party Representatives.
9. If the Politburo convened a Meeting of Party nepresentativec at a time when
the Congress of Party Representatives could not be brought together end matters
relating to current policies of the COY were called for discussien, a portion
on the members of the Central Committee would heve to be elected anew, in
order to strengthen the solidarity of the CCP,
IO. Regarding the organisation of the Chinese Comennist supervisory orgen, I
neve little knowledge of it, and in general, at least a portion of the mem-
bers of the Supervisory Committee would attend regularly to its duties, end
there ateeorganieatiens for such work.
11. I have slight knowledge as to whether a system has been sat un for the fi-
nancial administration and auditing of the CCP, However, the CC? so fax
has had no budget. Normally, existing budgets may be adjusted, or funds raised
to meet work requirements. Although the methods of administration and au-
diting are not perfect, no major blunders have been experienced.
12. The Central Bureau or Central Sub-Bureeu of certain regions on the CCP was
formed during the period when underground activities prevailed. Its organ-
ization was temporary in nature, and the establishment and the ampointment
of the personnel were decided by the Politburo. Normally, membess of the
Central Committee in the region concerned, important politican aed military
personnel who were also CCP members, and important local responsible per-
sonnel were Appointed members of the bureau. The secretary and various de-
partment heads and committee chairmen of such bureaus were also appointed by
the Politburo. These bureaus or sub-bureaus are branches of the Chinese
Commanist central authorities, and sometimes their cowers are vary great.
On condition that they would not contradict decisions of the Ohlmese Commu-
nist central authorities, they may issue all sorts of directtvee, and may
even submit or recommend different views and eequest amendment to decisions
of the Chinese Communist central authorities. Their secretertes or import-
ant department heads may participate in the deliberations. ofthe Politburo
dealing with matters relating to such rngions. These regional central
bureaus have regular meetings and regular worning organizations. Among
these regional central bureaus there is normally no coordinaelom or con-
tent, All Provincial Party Committees, and District Party Conmittees are
regular organs under the Party Central Authority, and they all have elec-
ttre executive committees, and elective standing committees. The regional
central bureaus, however, do not have such oreans.
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13. Standing committeee of provincial, municipAl or district petty eeadquarters
are composed of members of provincial, municipal, or district Party commit-
tees who are charged with important responsiblities of military) adminis-
trative end civilian bodies. Stnnding committees shell be in the eame of
the provincial, municipal or district Party committees and will formulate
decisions and exercise authorities geetified be the Party Constetution.
14. The Chinese Communiet Public Security Department has been reorgenizing
the existing police force and training public security personnel in Order
to form a comeletely relieble eublic security force, At present, in most
areas, the Chinese Comamnists are still relying on the despateh of regular
troops and militia to underteke border defame, and nothing is known re-
gerding the formation of epecial border police, or al.:octal petrol unite.
. There seems to have been no revision made in the reietion of military
commander and political commissars of the OFTIP rank. In the mejority of
cases, military commanders enjoy wee powers, and political couatissars are
equivalent to political Advisers of the military commanders. In a few
cases, they run parallel; it is very rare for the military commender to be the
military adviser of a eolitical commissar. There is usually a distinction
on the part of the soldiers in their admiration or like of thee military
commanders or politionl commissars.
16. There seems to be differences in the relations of the commaneert of the var-
imus provincial military districts and other military comnsnaere therein
and the local party committee secretaries. Flowerer, in general, the provin-
cial military district commanders and commaneers of tht armed forces do
reepect the supervision of Party heedquartern secretaries tete decisions of
local Party oommittees on local issues.
Notes on Chinese Communist Personalities and Party History
17. In 1926-7, the USSR gave PENG Yu-hziang a military advisory parey and es-
tablished e political department erking In his armies, but roteing hre been
heard of the offer to despatch Mongelien And Soviet troops tc occupy Peiping.
lg. Before 193S, MAO Tne-tung had not been to the USSR so the atetrent that MAO
wee trained in Russia Around 1930 Is not true.
19. During the Long March, 1934-5, the USSR mnde no promise or hint that aey
help would. 0 given to the Chine' Communists, beoaase at tet time, 71.0 con-
tacts were maintained.
20. The statement that Stelin would give fall support to the Chinese Communists!'
during the Sino-Japanese conflict after 1935 wad not hgve been the hope
cheriehed by the Chinese Communist leaders, according to py pervonal know-
ledge.
The preparations for, and the calling of, the Congrese of Party Representa-
tives are really a very heavy end complicated task. The Chereee Communists
here been in A tense state of war, end so the Eighth Cogre as of' Party
Representatives ha n not it yet. At tha pretant time, as there be been
no major difference of opinion among the Chinese Commueists, there is no
pretsing need for the call of such ft Congress, In case the Korean war ends,
and in case the land reform could be conplete, when the Chine Communists
could have a moment of respite and when they vent to more furthmr on to the
left to purge the democratic clique and parties in the Governert or when
there Is internal difference of opirdoe, it rteht then be neceeerry to call
the Eighth Congrees of Party Representatives,
22. Before 1927, MAO Tee-tuna war, a/so takente or of the advocetos of the CHEN
Tuehsiu Doctrine. In the period of the Savints and of gnoreille waefare,
MAO Tteetung wee often regarded as a riahtist by the Chinese Communist den,
tral authorities, Mdscow not only refused to support MAO, bet claw levelled
some criticism at him. In 1936-7, LIU Sheo-chi blamed the Chinese Communists
for having committed !A the past mistakes of extreme :leftist tordeneies but
no errors of extrema rightism, showing more or less hia disapproval of the
Communist International. MAO mostly eupported the opinions that LIU had
eepressed.
f:s7
[-Jo
The present Chinese Commt Government caneet compare with the Soviet
Government- in the days of 192S to 1931 ehen tee latter ea* prosecattng
its anti-Trotsky end antt-Bhkharin c . lei nee the so-caned celleettl arm
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Korean war. Because of this, they mugt ssuppeess the counterereeolutione
lets*. Todny, the Chinese Communist Gonernmeet still possesses many traits of the
Nationalist Government, including the separation of the Revolationary Mil-
itary Council from the State Administration Council, the impoeition of a
Political Consultative Conference on top of the State Ministration Coun-
cil. And the introduction of the Central People's Government of the People's
Republic of China, and the various comeattees, Its economic meesures ere
comparable to those of the USSR daring the period of New Econemie Policy.
24. The aim of the present campaign to "suppress nounter-revolutioniste of the
Chinese Communists centers in the consolidation of Governmentel authority
and in the preparation for war. The extermination of guerrillas, the erad-
icetion of Nationalist remnants, the suppression of landowners, the shat-
tering of the influence of foreign missions aed schools, and that of the
underworld gangs., and the mass massacre, all :teed toward this one object-
ive; The land reform and the suppression of ;he counter-revolutionists
hare already affected in very great extent the Democratic Parties end groups
and there bare been numerous reactions among the Chinese Communists them-
selves. However, large-scale purge within the Party does not seem to hare come
as yet. Incessant purge and struggle will intensify from day to day.
25. Between the years 1935 and 19756, there was a split within the Chenese
Communist Party, MAO Tseetung and CHOU Enelei led the major portions of
the First Front Army and went into North Shenei, CHANG Kuo-tao and others
led the Fourth Front Army and remained in Si-kiang regions. At that time,
CHU Tess Command Headquarters followed the Fourth ?rent Army. At that per-
iod a portion of the members of the CCP Centrel Committee and the majority
of the important military end administrative endres supported CHANG Huo-tao.
CHU Te expressed his willingness to follow the majority. Whee ia 1936 the
Second Front Army entered Sieklamg regions, HO.,losng was then Commander of
the said Army e end JEN Pi-shih was its Political Commissar During the
time when the Chinese Comnunists were working to bring about internal
cooperation, CHU Te and JEN Pieshih mode it hnown that, as far as military
operations were concerned, they would accept elle IeMerohip el* CAANO Kuo-tao,
Chief Political Commissar, and the Central Authorities that he represented.
As to the internal friction* of the Party, thly wonld try their best to pro-
mote cooperatlon. It was true that at the time. CRU To was deteined and that
JEN Pieshih rescued him.
*TEN Pieshih was then the Secretary of the Comiunist Youth Corps. The
quarrels between the Stalinist Clique and the Trotsky Clique were going
*n within the Soviet Communist Party, aid then, were also differences. of
opinion among the personnel of the Communist 7nternational in Hankov. TA
Lin ), a representative of the Communielt Touthe Internationel,
Aft a sympathizer of Trotsky, and JEN 14t-shih, being wider his influence,
had expressed his dissatisfaction over the policy of the Chinese Communist
Central Authorities. However, none supported hive and his views were even
taken as childish and laugheble. At the Asgult 7 Meeting, JEN Pieshih
was, however, regarded as a hero for opposing the CHEN Ta-hsin Deetrine.
27. .At the present time, the Chinese Communist Central Politburo e led by 1W)
Tse-tung, lau Sheeeohi, CHU Toe CHOU Etelai, UMMF The, Eta.,wita MAO Tse-tung
and LIU Shalt-chi enjoying power greater than 'he *there.
28. Both MAO Tse-tung and CHANG Iheetao did ot partioipate in the 7th Congress
of the Ceemuniet International, CHIN Sheetya, OBEN Yen, RENG Sheng, and law
Taneaug, who ware then In Moscow, represented the Chinese Comemnists in the
Congress, and none had been sent from China ta participate.
29. In 1928-31, CHIU Chuepal and CHANG leo-140 were elected Chinese Communist
representatives to stay in Moscow. CRT Chu-pat was elected a 1,isber of
the Presidium of the Communist International 8nd one of the secretaries of
the Secretariat of the same organization. CHANG Kuo-tao was elated one of
the alternate members of the presidium and one of the alternate eeeretaries.
However, WU Cheeapi was regarded es the repeesentative of the tlindfold
Doctrine. CHANG Ituo-tao was taken as the representative figure of the Left-
ist Opportunism. 'Besides, TENG Chungehsia twee YU Fei were repreeentatives
accredited to the Red Labor International. Prom the point of Ifi3W of the
Communist International, the reasons for 011,U Chu-pa i and CHANG leuo-tao to
remain in Moscow were ot the one haul, it meat to find a solutien to the
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internal' conflict of the CCP, and on the other, to give them chances to correct
any previous mistekes they committed.
O. LIN Yu-yin wns one of the leaders of the Htnkow Labor Movement. He was born
and bred in a poor Denny, and received middle school educatiore He joined
the CCP early in life, His younger brother, LIN Tu-nan, was ote of the lead-
ing figures of the Communist Party in Hankow They are both on good term
with CHANG. LIN Ta-nen was killed by the Kuomintang Since 1937, nothing
hos been heard of LIN Teeying, and he wns probably killed too.
31. LI Ta is still Alive, end now is Preoldent of Hunan University. It was mis-
taken to say that he was killed, as revealed by NAG The-tune in his talks with
Mr. Snow. LI Ta left the Chinese Communiste because he objected to the pol-
icy of 1924 thet CCP members should join the Kuomintane.
32. Of the biographical record of AN Tsu-wen, I heve no knowledge. He mipht have
changed his name.
33. On 20 May 1938, CHANG Ato-tao made public his letter to his countrymen, in
which he expressed the points of difference in opinion between him and the
Chinese Communist Central Aathorities, a- well es his own views at the time.
Later, up to 1947, he was a member of the People's Political Council. Ho
subsequently becene disillusioned, because he failed in 193S to realize his
rublication plan, and because his numerous sugpeatione and propels to
Chiang Kai-Shek's Government were not accepted. In Spring of 1946, hp was
appointed Director, Kiang:a Regional Office, Chinese Netional Helief end
Rehabilitktion Administration, but resigned after serving for terse months.
Iv Inly, 1945, he started "The Chang Tsin Weekly" in Shanghai welch stopped
rublications in December. In November of the same year,, he left Shanghai
for Taipei. On 15 May, 1949, he arrived in Hong Kong from Taipei.
34. During the period when the LI L1-nn line wes in fashion, CHOU En-lei was
leader of the Chineae Communist Centre/ Authorities. Re avoided conflicts
with the Comnunist International, and admitted his mistakes. For this re-
son
-
son he was not "liqpidated".
35. In 1920, the Chinese Communists sent to the USSR a groue of Socialist Touthe
Corp members who formed a separete China canes in the Eastern University in
Moscow. LIU Shao-chi was one of the eerliest Soviet-returned student., U
to 1924, all students proceeding to Nome., for further studies were all sent
to the Eastern University by the Chinese Comeunists, In 1925, the Sun Tat-sen
University w-s established in Moscow.' Over a thousand students were sent
there both by the Kuomintang and by the Chinese Communists, CHEN Shao-yu,
CHANG Wen-tien, and WANG Chlaehsiang were among those sent. These Chinese
Comnunist students were mostly selected from among the young Party members
by the various Provincial Party Committees. CHEN Tun, HSI Tai-yuan, and
/MING Sheng were all returned students from Resole. LIN Teu-han, TUNG PI-wu,
HSU T'e-lih, mad YEH Chien-ying attended special classes in the Sun Tat-sen
University in Moscow. As they had done some sort of work for the CCP before
they went to Moscow for further studies, the Chinese Commeasts did not take
them as members of the Soviet-returned-students clique. However, CHIN Shao-yu,
CHANG Wen-tien, and WANG Chia-Wane started their careers by being returned
students from Moscow. CHANG Ta-lei perticipated In the Third Congress of the
Communist International, and CHEN Tu-haiu repreeented the Chinese Communists
in the Fourth Congress. TAN Ping-shan end others were represent7tives to the
Fifth Congress, CH'U Chbu-pal, CHOU Eu-lei, CHANG Eno-tao, nA.1 Ch'ang, end
others, totalling about twenty, were members of the Chinese Comrunist Dele-
gation to the Sixth Congress. CHEN Sheo-yn, CHEN Yun, EENG Shang, LIN Tu-ying,
and others represented the Chinese Commnnists at the Seventh Coegress.
? During the period of cooperation between the Xuomintang and the CCP, MAO Tse-tune:
did not bear any important responsibility, and therefore, did not share the
bleme given for "CHEN Ta-hsta Doctrine", In the Soviet guerrilla warfare
period, MAO Tse-tuxg persieted in his endeavours from the beginning to the
end, and the army he led was also the greatest single force. During the Sino-
Japanese conflict, MAO Tse-tung scored success for his Anti-Japsaose Unified
Front Strategy. On the other hadd, the Kuomietang's mistekes were endless,
thus making it possible for MAO to grow stronger. The success of MAO during
the Sino-Japanese Conflict was the greatest factor for the building up and
consolidation of his leadership.
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Au important development of the Chinese Communists after its long march was
the winning over of a good many patriotic educated youths. These youths
were dissatisfied with the Kuomintang rule, and being slighted and suppressed
by the Kuomintang, they were really patriotic to their country, though they
did not know much about Communism. Youths by hundreds of thous-nde entered
the military and political training schools of the Chinese Communists, one
after the other. These youths who have gone through the CCP training and
underground activities, and have now become the important military and
political cadres of the Chinese Communists, as well as the backbone of the
various grades of pPrty ?mane of the CM,
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