SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R008700370009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 26, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIi=IcATION - L - J.>. -- .1 -'TT y
CENT LLiGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
8 F M TIO REPORT CD No.
COUNTRY Gzechoslova'ci.a
SUBJECT Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakian
Political and Economic Affairs
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PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF 25X1A
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DATE DISTR. 26 Sept. 1951
NO. Of PAGES 14
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LUSTMD BELOW)
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25X1 X SUPPLEMENT TO
INFO. REPORT NO.
1. Soviet intervention in the internal political and economic life, the security
apparatus, and the aroma of the Czcchoslovak 2epu'blic has its le-{;al basis
in the broad formulation of Soviet-uCzechoslovak alliance, mutual aid and
cooperation contained in the treaty of 193, xrhich was slr=d in '. oscow by
Dr. Eduard :3cns. Supplementary agreements and treaties have been concluded
since 19?15 and appended to this treaty., so that today Czechoslovakia is:
under the direct control of the Soviet Union.
2. Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia is directed at four main sectors:
organization and control of the security apparatus; control and co manages nt
of the main branches of industry; control and participation in the nation's
internal and foreign policies accomplished to a considerable extent. through
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; control and co - manaf eni nt of the arr r,
which has been adapted to Soviet specifications. Soviet intervention in
the army and industry is legal?i zed by supple entary a; ree~-ontc to the 1915
treaty, and the presence and activities of Soviet technicians in individual
sectors of industry are exprcuced as a form of aid Waich the Ozcchoslova;c
government ronuested of the Soviet Union. Those lc al formalities are
maintained oven In oxtrenes, and in cases where the facts arc not kept in
strict secrecy, they are used for propaganda purposes to cbm. onstrate the
necessity of follorcrin the great e.;anplc of the USSfl, ,ill as to point
out the untie l f ishi ss of the aid of the T,7533.
3. Absolute secrecy is uaii tainod on the subject of Soviet control of. the
Czech security apparatus. There is no written ai reemont covering it.; one
oral a;-rcc-iontc have been mac 'c between the leasers or the do eoantr_cu.
trot oven the Czech gove:rniient is infor,;ied of the preselvc of Soviet security
agents in Prague or of their indirect co-snana nrnt and organization of the
Czeohoolov4lk security apparatus. The group of Soviet security s o etc tior?.,s
Docn6'sent Na.
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entirely independent of Czech gove:rr,?:.?ntal af,cncies, a Tact which is not
true of the other sectors. `:ts headqua::,ters are in the villa quarter of
Tuber c and contact with the Ministry of 1ational Security is mairr>
tained directly through Minister Ladislav Kopriva, his cabinet, and. his
personal Russian secretary, Iecaskova,q who is the wife of Ik casek,, the
Director of the Cultural $ec?,ion of the Office of the President of the
Republic. Necaskova is orig nally from Moscow,, where she was a functionary
of the Komsomol. Her presence makes liaison easier for Kopriva, since all
correspondence is conducted in Russian and all working programs, orders,
and directives are translated into and from Russian. She is also able to
r?caintain direct control of events through Kopriva4 Contacts are also main-
tained through several specis.:.ly selected members of the SUB (Sbor Narodni
13ezpecnosti -, National Securl.-.y Corps) who have been approved by the Russians.
One of these is G.,erciadi.j Vetcx 1 (sic),
Soviet ants visit the Minis/ ry of !National Security only rarely, and on
the pretext of other bus ' ne s s -. The ;e visits are made only for important
conferences with the leaders ,f the Ministry of Nat` onal Security., and even
in this case with leaders of )nly one section of the Ministry. No direct
contact . a .sts between the cl-ieTs of the in:'ividual seetirrns of the Ministry
of National Security and the Soviet agents, or with the Soviet security
mission in Praf-uc. They are inf or-ed of the decisions of the Soviet mission
through a s in,^-lc scctt.on,9 ant all the work of the "inistry is adapted to
this purpose. The individual sections of the '?.inistry of National Security
do not iron, on their =i aut Yority, and that of the section ch_.c.fs is sta: is tly
limited. The individual sections of the 11inictry cannot take any important
steps without previously iny`orming the Minister,
5. The main interet of the jc?,ri?t security mission is in the organization of
the inter:ial security sere. ce - the 31113 and Stfl (Statni 3ezpecnost -- State
Security). Soviet methods are being introduced into the organization, and
training of both these uni se The entire security apparatus is directed
centrally fron the :14% wh ch is also the headquarters of the SNB., Until
recently the supreme seen ial.der of the SNB was at the sane time the Derraty
Minister -f National Sccur.ty; both positions were held by 3115 General
Josef Pavel until his arr st In January 1951. Now the Suprene Commar icr
of the SNI is Colonel Leopold Ilofmann, who was for.:jerly the leader
of President Gott.:aldas loo yVuard, Because of his relationship with Gottwald,
I1ofnann is one of the few -olunteers with the Czech forces in the Spanish
Civil ;jar who survived the latent purge
6? The 31113 and the StB are or .,an` zed according to the Soviet system on the
county (kr a j ), district (o n-c s ), and regional. (obvod) levels, The 'lira and
the supreme command of the S;113 and StB also have direct contact with invidual
units at a loner leve:la 1i addition to this vertical s tracture there is a
horizontal control t .aroagh the National Committees and their security referents,
also on the county, dictri:t, and regional livcls, _''.r:cently, according to
the Sovl t exam: ie, r-ian nt district security services were installed.
and made responsible for cc.astant control over a snail area o" a fcw houses
in the eltics 0 The securi t;r' a,,rn t,e are in or is d on all the inhabitants of
their region and stea.`:ly : u')plicd with information by their :o--called '"home
coax":idants", who are organ. -ed ca^:fic .ally from amoni: the local Co uunist
Party mc::abers., At the sari tine there is anow:aer, unofficial group of
inform. crs who are un'.no~rn . ithc r to the inhabitants or to the member: of
the Comiun.tst Party; most . f' t horn arc not even ;,V..-mbcrs of the Par~ty0 The
"okrsek" referent of the ';I3 and Sts is in all cases a member of the Comauni,st
Party and cis rcliabil..jtt: Is specially checked on. He is entitled to have
direct contact with nigh c security organs _ without having to go through
channels or report to hi' ire:aediate superior, This system of operative units
in the security appara-L:., has resulted in the complete orgaraizaatiort , adapta-
tion of the Czecthosloval security system to that of the Soviet militia anz
the MM.
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7o The Soviet mission also has an interest in the organization and training
of the factory workers' militias. These are theoretically subordinate to
the factory councils and factory committees of the C , ,unit party, but
in fact they are direct coriponents of the state security apparatus and are
centrally directed by the :1003 mid by the SNIT conmande The factory security
referents are direct liaison agents,,, recruited either from among IJS. and
SIn3 employees, or from workers who have been given special political and
technical training by the Llinistry of Rational Security and practical training
by the SID. So far the factory militia has not satisfied the requirements
of the security leaders, nor has it conformed to the Soviet form and function
of factory militias, For this reason a new reorganization is in progress,,
particularly as concerns the selection of militia members on the basis of
political reliability ("cadre selection"). It is intended that each -member
of the factory militia should be placed on the same level as an SIB member
in regards to political reliability., training, and practice. The result
mill. be that these trro organizations grill combine in all but formal distinction.
The position of security referent in an industrial plant vd.li corr:spond
to that of regional (obvod) commander of the SITE. The factory militias have
already been structurally reorganized and joined to the central security
apparatus. The members of the factory militias have sworn the same oaths
as SNI3 members and they train with units of the STNB. Where the reorganization
has been completed factory militias are beginning- to be used for internal
security tasks. The members of the factory militias have the position of
so-called security agents and are the security referent's main inform rso
In addition, however, the security referent has his own network of informers,,
'who are not Party members. Even outside the factory a militia member has
the right to carry arms, and in case of need to take public security measures
with the same rights as a member of the SNB6 Among the special secret sections of the Ministry of National Security, the
attention of the Soviet mission is concentrated on the defensive sections.
Here the -methods of the Soviet secret service have also been introduced
and the work of the Czechoslovak secret security agencies is directly con-
nected with the Soviet services,, This is manifest in the fact that a number
of the tasks of the secret defensive service are carried out more in the
interest of the IVD than in that of Czechoslovakia. A similar situation
exists in the activities of the offensive section., whose activities are
adapted primarily to the interests of Soviet esnionage, and which works for
this service on a number of individual tasks 0 The director of the intelligence
section was forrmerly Deputy TIinicter Karel Swab,, the brother of :iarie uvcrnova.
Before he transferred to the Ministrj of Rational Security he Bras director
of the security section of the central secretariat of the Communist Party,,
which has political surervision over the entire Ministry of Iational Security.
At )resent this security section is directed by Hoda 3ynl:ova9 the widow of
the prewar Communist leader Deputy Oyncko After Svab eras arrested no w w
director was narled to the intelligence section to the time Source left the
country. The job was temporarily given to Run, Who was the cadre deputy
of the Ministry of National Security,
94 Until his arrest in January 1%1, the director of the defensive intelligence
section was Osvald Zavodssky,, who had previously worked in the security section
of the central secretariat of the MG (Co nunist Party) under Svab 0 Zavodsky
was reponsible for the entire apparatus of the defensive section with the
exception of the Frontier Guard. In the latter organization he also had
the right to share decisions. More recently the Frontier Guard has been
completely reorganized to coincide with the Soviet pattern. Oswald Zavodsky
did not show much fervor or readine,;s to follow Soviet orders, and his
attitude concerning cooperation with the Soviet security mission was not
without reservations. In this matter he had differences with some of his
own employees and liaison agents with the Soviet mission,, including a conflict
with Gennac?i j 71oteng:l9 Who wa liaison a, c at of the defensive section of
the 'UM- Vctcngl, who resigned from the I2Ut3 as a result of this dif'iculty,
considered Zavodsky an anti-Soviet element and played a considerable part
in the cave against Zavods'cy after his arrest. Vetengi was then rehired
I7y the Ministry of Rational Security.
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104 Another person with whom Zavodsky had difficulties was Jarin Itosck, a captain
in the security service, c+ho is also said to have left the Ministry of National
Security because of differences with Zavodsly and who worked for Vie Ministry
of Foreign AAffairn until Zavodsky was arrested, r&en he was rehired by the
L2I3. It ryas said of Zavoda y that he was anti-: ovict, and that he was trying
to drive all pro-,Soviet personnel out of the MM to make impossible coopera-
tion with the Soviet mission. The Soviet mission, through Vetengl and Hosek,
played the main role in getting rid of Zavodsky4 Along with Zavodsky, Major
Smolka, the director of the counterespionage section of the Ministry of
National Security, his deputy, Captain Kroupa, and others were removed for
more or le:;s the same reasons.* They were further accused of espionage
for a foreign power. Smolka was replaced by the referent of the section,
a Captain Pica,, who belonged to the so-called pro-Soviet group, and who was
promoted to Major.' His deputy was another member of the same section and
of the pro-Soviet group, Captain Sulc. In this manner this part of the
defensive intelligence section was placed firmly under the influence of the
Soviet mission, and was occupied by men who, if they were less qualified,.,
more at least more pliable than those they replaced,
114 Similar changes were made in the passport and visa section of the Ministry
of National Security, which was also under Zavodskyras defensive section.
Here the interests of the Soviet mission were particularly great., especially
as concerns the visa program. The right to issue visas is today exclusively
under the Ministry of National Security., as is the right to issue passports
and exit per,its0 A basic change has been made here since the arrests of
Arthur. London of the flinistry of Foreign Af:"aira and Uedrich icicin of the
Linistry of National Defense. These men had t'he riplit until that time to
decide, within the limits of their offices, en the issuance of passports
(London issued diplomatic passports) and c;.t visas (London had the special
right to. issue his o.i ty for them, in
the. military field as substantially different from that of the other areas.,
since -the army was not completely in the hands of the Commwii:st Pariy of
Czechoslovakia. The development of this.interventton should be'divided
into three stages: prior to February 1948; i ebruary 1948 to April 1950;
the contemporary situation, Before 194?3' although it was publicly proclaimed
that the Soviet armor was the model for the Czechoslovak armed forces., it
was not possible to put this slogan into practice because the loading positions
in the arj were occupied by. persons who,, although behaving in a Loyal manrer9
were non-Commurdsts and whose own orientation was different, in spite of
their apparent collaboration. This group included Chief of Staff I3ocek,
his deputy Pika and most of the leading generals and officers from the west
or from the prewar armor. Liaison with the Soviet authorities at that tinm
was handled exclusively through the armed forces department of the .I5SC9
wh1eh was under Svab,, or through the then Colonel Reicin, the so-called
Soviet man in the army.
34. After February 1948 the situation substantially chanted, but direct coopera-
tion and intervention did not yet ensue, although collaboration was considerably
expanded. Several c"anders such as Drgac, Who did not enjoy complete con-
fidence, followed one another as chief of staff. Reioin conducted .a' purge
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in the argrs but even then Vie composition of the officers t corps did not
correspond to Soviet demandr. The situation changed completely after the
replacement of Svoboda as li_nister of National Defense by Dr, Alexej Cepicka,p
a man for nhon Gottwald personally gave full guarantee to the USSR? Cepicka
immediately proceeded to wike drastic changes in the army; he replaced a
major part of the officers t corps and adapted the army completely to the
Soviet system, Prochazka became chief of the general staff with the approval
of the Soviets; the new ceputy minister was Bohuslav Lastovickaa, also a
Gottwald roan and forri r Czechoslovak ambassador in :loscovr. These men
am the main contacts fcr collaboration with the Soviet military mission
in Czechoslovalia.
The activity of the Sov- at military mission in Czechoslovakia is to a con-
siderable extent coordi hated with that of the Soviet commercial and economic
mission. It is contra'ized in the official military mission at the Soviet
Embassy in Prague, and Soviet military experts work directly: in the Czech
general staff and in tcre Ministry of National Defense. The military experts
come here quite open'`!, and most of them wear their awn Soviet uniforms,
although some -o about in civilian clothing, The actual center of the
mission,, howe?:er, is in Bubenecs Na Tisine, According to information not
completely confirmed but considered trustworthy, the former insane asylum
in Bohnice ii to be wade the permanent headquarters of the Soviet military
mission and the Czechoslovak axvr personnel attached to its This report
is believer' to be ? cue for a number of reasons: the asylum is in a con-
venient lot ation a:oaf from the center of the city and thus secluded,yet still
in Prague; it is possible to approach it by three different routes; it is in
a beautif-il, neighz-arhood; and it is a building hermetically scaled from
the outside vrorld., The entire area has been taken over by the iiinistry of
Nation&. Defense. The activity of the mission is divided into .four main
aectorst reorgari.zation of the army according to the Soviet system; political
education; milittry training; and war industry and armament. The responsible
Soviet authorit; in the military sector is Marsha] Konev who, with his staff
y
cooper ates persmnally with Certeka. His deputise, mombers of the permnriont
micsicns are personal advisers to Cepicka in matters of roorganization of
the ar'v and a ,nament, They also world at the Ministry of National Defense
directly besid. Cepicka,
36, The second mot important person for the reorganization of the armor and
mIli.tU7 traL' _i )r, 3.s Ckriof of Staff General daroslav Prochazica, In charge
of po':.itica&1 education is the comrmder of the military political adxni,nistrra-
tio:nf General Ceiek Iiruska, a member of the Red Army, who withdrew from the
Czecl-od1dV,rak Leg_ ons in Russia during the Russian !Revolution. The .lain
authtirtty for quf-stions of war industry and armament is General B, Lastovicka.
All '%ese persons work under the direct supervision of the Soviet mission,
who,,o leaders do tot appear publicly and who have no official functions or
ricks in the Czecl army, However, a number of Russian oxperts` work in all
J.,oier positions at the side of Czech officers itio officially have a leading
role, In the late;- purges a number of Spanish volunteers were removed from
leading positions; -their :re .recently replaced by the party apparatus with
Svoboda, liromadko, .tekvasil, and others.
37. An obvious, sign of Vie new orientation of the army was the recent introduction
of designations and ;Iistinctions according to the Soviet pattern. There was
a dispute in the arr.-r over this reforsa. Reicin opposed it holding the correct
view that this i asuce, Which publicly emphasizes subordination to the Soviet
army, wo*i1d provoke iisplcaoure, would be harmful, and would complicate future
170rk, He considered it a superfluous formality. The powerful pressure of
Cepicka to strcngtacm the position of the army was further apparent in the
new legal provisions to the advantage of the army which he pushed throw, 4,
These provisionb involved the right of the army to requisition dviellings for
military officials and to requisition entire installations and schools for
barracks, as well as, the introduction of the new system of r sling, v doh
dealt a heavy blow, to the entire economy, Moreover, the army-has taken over
athletic stadiums, theaters, and even some of the film studios, which are
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now at the exclusive disposal of a new institution, the so-called "Army Vilm",
an educational component of the main political administration of the army.
Here educational films are made under the supervision and assistance of
Soviet technicians. Much attention is paid to the political content. The
political administration is placing no less emphasis today on the military
press; it is compylsory to read the military daily Obrana Lidu, the weekly
Nase V sko., and literature of the array prsss, vhi.ch supplement political
education, Army theater groups make trips to military training camps and
garrisons,
38. The armed forces are completely isolated from normal. life by conditions
newly introduced in the. anzSyr, under which soldiers' freedom is restricted,
and during free time departure from the barracks is very difficult. The
soldiers' leaves are similarly restricted, and granted only to so-called
model soldiers. The purpose is to control the viewpoint of the soldier
and to create an atmosphere in which he will be more susceptible to the
spirit and effectiveness of the newly introduced political education,
lighting discipline is being instilled according to the Soviet pattern;
the soldier is told that he must fight to the last ditch and then fall but
never surrender.
39. The training camps, located mostly in the border regions, especially in the
Ces?-y Les (Bohemian Forest) and Sumava areas!, represent a new form of military
training from the Soviet pattern. The training is exceedingly hard, long,
and exhausting. Discipline is ruthlessly strict; in the camps there is a
general 4 tmosphere of combat oond-'.tiona. On the other hand, the camps are
fully and expensively equipped with club-douses, motion picture t:eaters,
libraries, baths, and so forth. The fare is very substantial.. New equip-
ment is gradually being installed for the whole army. In the training
camps there is special training by Soviet exports, members of the mission.
The maneuvers serve at the sar,e time as a test of neyr combat methods.
Great emphasis is placed on partisan combat, and special training is given
by Soviet speciai_intS. In combat training, on the Soviet pattern, losses
of both men and materiel are permitted, This type of training was strictly
forbidden until 1950.
40, One of the chief groups of Soviet specialists is the part of the mission
charged with cooperation with, or rather, administration of, war production
and armament. In this sector the Ministry of National Defense is in direct
contact with the Planning Office and the appropriate departments of industry,
and they have the right to check the special sections in the plants,nich
with rare exceptions are exclusively for munitions. Lastovicka,with his
own Soviet advisers
y is in charge. The Soviet military experts vrork in these
special sections either a s . a part of the Soviet technical missions or inde-
pendently with representatives of the Czech army in cases where the armor
is directly and officially represented and itself checks and directs the
production sector concerned,
41. The Soviet military mission in Czechoslovakia maintains formal official
relations with the S!intstry of National Defense and the other Czechoslovak
authorities through so-called army protocol, of which I.Tajor Dorsky is In
charge. Besides t.iis, it has Czech liaison officers at its disposal.
Relations with the office of the President of the, 11aepublic are maintained
through the President's personal military adviser? General Satorie. Satorle
has direct contact with Cepickae and v arks rrith his personal advisers and
the mission loaders. Slanalcr is personally responsible in the C st
Party for army matters, and he has assumed the function of chairman of the
Parliamentary Arms Committee,**
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.2d The Soviet military mission has entered into the whole reorganization of
the Ministry of National Defense and the Czechoslovak air, Due to the
influence of very high Soviet officials there were changes in high Czecho-
slovak positions, including the removal of General Svoboda, The mission
was persuaded of the necessity of removing Reicin directly by Gottwald (sic),
Its influence in the, argr today is almost unlimited, as it has the multiple
power of checki,nfg., direct contact, and the potential power of intervention
in the case of persons Who do not convince it of their reliability or
tractability. Moreover, the top posts in the army today are held and will
continue to be held by persons who guarantee cooperation without reservation
and who agree to check on each other,
43, A special section of the army, which is completely under Soviet direction.,
is the special military school for field officers, where military science
and tactics are studied directly from Soviet sources and whore Soviet exports
personally give lectures. Students for this school are chosen through an
especially complicated personnel procedure, and are almost completely separated
from the outside world. One course of this school is conducted in the USSR.
These officers are being trained as commanders of certain combat units in
the event of war or as liaison officers with Soviet headquarters, Soviet
training today is Introduced even into the lover levels of military training
by officers who are military experts and by political cormnissars, experts,
on political work and education in the army who are given military ranks,
25X1A
Comment: 5mollca and Kroupa had laid the groundwork in the case against
William Oatis and were responsible for his residence visa being renewed.,
After Smollca's arrest in February 1951 and Kroupa's transfer to regular
25X1 A SlIB police duty, the Oatis case was handled by Pixa and Suic,
Comments The personalities concerned have been changed since
25X1 A t "NeMoverngental shake-nip of ? Sep tember, This was dealt i~ith by Source
2
5X1A
4W1-* Cor nts There is a Pavel .leksandrovich Iudi.n,, who is known
o 'Nave eenMnister of the Building Materials Industry as late as 1950,
It is believed that t:iese men are not the same,
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