ESTIMATE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN THROUGHOUT FEDERATION

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00457R008800090009-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 12, 2000
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 3, 1951
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R008800090009-1.pdf209.84 KB
Body: 
gip.:.:9~4A roved For Release 2000/06/08 : CAA-R P82-00457R0088 09-1CJ CLASSIFICATION an!'T.^IDrFPTAs,/Cc' nWL - IT. ,`% OFFICIALS ONLY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. INFORMATION REPORT CD NO. /c/1 O COUNTI"~oa_ SUBJECT Est to of Efractiv?eness of Government 25X1A Anti-Co munst Campaign Throughout Federation DATE DISTR. - r Nit 0 1951 NO. OF PAGES 2 lPFiLEMENT TO 25X1X REPORT. NO. The following report is based on an estimate of the effectiveness of various elements of the Government campaign against t layan Coummtst bands terrorism throughout the Federation 25X1 A v1' ich The observations contained in this summary appear o represen an accurate analysis of conditions in the %deratinn which is believed to be of value in connection with recent Government efforts to revise the campaign as directed by retiring General B rlgr s . 1. khlavan Pecurity Forces recently have had greater success in their campaign against Communist guerrillas than at any time since the start of the Federationnergency. As a consequence of these successful repressive efforts, Com unist g+'!errillas h^ve assigned larger forces to terrorist activities, and attacks on civilians have become more effective as a result of the greater daring and cruelty which have been demonstrated in their execution, 2. Because of their isolation, rubber estates and tin mines h^.ve become the targets of these augmented terrorist activities, and they have been sub- jected to 'ore frequent attacks than ever before. European and senior Asiatic employees of these estates and mines are becoming extremely dis- couraged with the Government for the failure of various protective measures and for the lack of efficiency of Government offensive operations. 3. The Government squatter resettlement program which was designed to isolate Communist guerrillas ?rom sources of supply apparently has been inefficiently directed. Fxcept for .Tohore, the program appears to have reached a v rtual stal eite. 4. In Johore, where the Government has Viarie its greatest effort to carry out resettlement,,- the program has exceededby at least three ties the total amount that should have been expended. Construction c-sntracts have been mishandled, and the . c:orbitant wages which have bean raid to laborers have set an unfortunate 'recedent for future resettlement construction and for the local labor market. STATE afi.4 V-, RAW NSRS _ DISTRIBUTION _ C1 J L ARMY AIR FB! No Change In Class. Approved For Release 2000/06/08 : CIA-R CLASSIFICATION CaiDE9TTAIC^ TBOL 0 Derlassilied 664WA 8 1C-d1~09b069-1 Autk.: Kin Date~ 2_4_ AUG 19 3-- gl-i --24 ---- Approved For Release 2000/06/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R008800090009-1 CO? IDENTIAL/Cf!1YROL ,. U.S. Oi''ICIAL" OI' CENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY r 2 25X1A 5. The Government's belated rea?.izatiryn that the coasts of the resettlement c3rogram had become prohibitively h4gh has resulted in a poligr of making every, short-nut nossible in an effort to complete the project. 71-is policy has carried the elimination of essential features of the program which would have determined its over-an effectiveness. These eliminated features have included ee^entiel elements of the administrative organization of the COMPOW 6. As an e>le of these ill-advised economies, it is noteworthy that there are now Insufficient personnel provided for a administraation and policing of the camps, and existing staffs are unable to do an adequate job with available facilities. 7. The resettlement camps now provide the guerrillas with certain advantagee wMeh they have not had previously. Squatters now are centrally 1ocatedf a a,nd since guerrillas and members of the Cornnuniat Win Yuen rmaveraent are able to enter and leave the vamps, the food supply probl eri has been eased considerably, and extortion of the 4quatters has been made less difficult. 8. Squatter resettlement comps may in fact provide safe havens for C auunist guerrillas, since the ecwrity ybrces assume that no Ca nists have entered the camps. "ecurity Forces moreover are already oven-extended in their r atrols of Jungle areas. 9. The Government is experimenting in Kedah with a new method of deploying Po! ion, forces. ?1 is new method is based on a system of concentrating available farces in trouble spots, leaving minimal forces in quiescent stenos. The state has been divided into districts which are classified according to current trends of guerrilla nativity. Special constables in relatively peaceful areas have been reduced to the minimcmi required to Ord the hnrnes of Europeans, leaving rubber factories and smoke houses unguarded, but eprnviding additional men for service with Police Jungle squads. 10. Although this system has certain obvious weakneeesee which may further reduce rubber production, It racy give greater assistance to the Security Forces in their efforts to dislodge the guerrillas from Jungle strongholds. 25X1A 25X1A Cormnent. Recent reports from other sources v' 1ch have contained inforraaaation on the progress of the squatter resettlement program throughout the Federation have Included all of which have indicated ONT, a ease program t less successful than had been indicated previously. MOMMOM contained 25X1 A asi;gni ficant information on recent C,oxxanist terrorist activities in rubber- producing areas of the Federation. CONFIDENTIAL/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY Approved For Release 2000/06/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R008800090009-1