NORTH KOREAN STATE SECURITY BUREAU OPERATIONS IN THE ROK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R010100430002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 2, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

A\
SEC
Approved For S 0457R0h(~~N82
INFORMATION REPORT CO NO.
CLASSIFICATION' CONFInENTI4L
COUNTRY Korea
SUBJECT North Korean State Security Bureau
25X1 C Operations in the ROK
25X1X
25X1A
DATE DISTR. 2 FEB 1952
NO. OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, and operated independently from
the North Korean Labor Party, which had an intelligence section in its organi-
zation department, and from the Reconnaissance Bureau of the North Korean army.
The State Security nets which.erated,, before the war, in the 0K, such as those
di ect d . ' CHONG Kwan-s (3 ' r
i 'L-t , - ! ) HAN In-elk 4 4-- _~
( - o' ( ): yang-ta_t
), and SO Won-sok ( ) stare tin eow nmf na+A nn w4+11
25X1-A
o guerr
a units in the ROB. and furnish the Information necessary to the guer-
illas. The Security Bureau itself, beginning in 1951, relied less and less on
hi
-V __ r----- % A
an
,;
HWANG Yong
( ). There was probably some coordinatio or liaison between the opera-
ti s a the highest governmental level, but in the field even the top agents
were not known to each other, or were not supposed to be.
2. Most of the net chiefs of the State Security Bureau in the ROK before the war
were chosen from among those who were violently opposed to the policies of the
ROK government, and thus frequently the bureau became interested in insurrection
and sabotage and often neglected the intelligence functions of its nets. An ex-
ample of this was the use of HAN In-sik, known to the ROK.goverment as CH tOE Kum-
gy~ong, and his organization. After the war began in Jane 1950, however, guerrilla
and sabotage operations were handled by tie Labor Party organization in North and
South Korea.i The Labor Party also dropped all work connected with the expansion
of the party organization in the ROK and with general espionage activities to
concentrate on. the,establishment of an organization that would assure supplies
+ 11
i
s w
ch olved CQ Uitcat ours difficulties, and concentrated on nu-
.
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457RO10100430002-4
d
#
)
 }OK police officials, members of the observation eection of the
ie informants? and others connected with intel igencs or counter-
_ 4'4":.. . . ter. ? -~______'1____i_~~4~1_ _.~4t 1rw~?~Mi; '~'~nCS
25X1A
When the North Korean armies first occupied ROK areas :az&, end .- Ix
: #e Security Bureau had occupation authorities make an official aar ounce-
within ten days., the scheduled period for the operation. The arrival of United
States troops-and the failure of the North Koreans to complete the occupation on
schedule caused a shift in the plans of the SSB, as.well as of other North Korean
government agencies, all of which hstd completely worked out programs of action.
i
t
i
as sources of information or iiere.~ unwilling to cooperate. The headquarters of
the "SSB was ostablis'hed in Chokson-long' Chongno-Ii " Seoul and consisted of four
offices, each-of which was further divided into twelve sections.
The North Korean government did not expect the.United States would or could effec-
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457RO10100430002-4
fiON IPENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
f'FNTR.AL INTELLIGENCE fiCENCY
MA ioe+ 4ve eras .}A make use of all who were of any value by guaranteeing
r safety- and extending'- economic aid, eliminating the others who were useless
I ,o v t 1 1 = t a r 1l y s a r r e n d . e r e d a n d agreed to work f o r the 531x1. T e eta
pn operat a, to newly recruited South ocean agents a gen from
ons,
ie
ss
it step taken by the SSB was to avoid the assigY-mmt of aW over
so that these agents cold be used in the event that the North
north of the p0*1 a).. Tine fie nd step taken was to ixa ' e
ileetuala ar- ? Pfi ,-.:te].s who refused to eoopera=-to.
25X1A
25X1
C..
I after the war began the North
orean Labor Party turned over its nets to the State Security Bureau. This
procedure and the practice of recruiting SSB agents when possible, from the
Labor Party or associated front organizations probably explain why some of
the persons mentioned. in this report appear to have been connected inrorgani-
zational activity with both the Labor Party and the SSB, in spite of the source's
statement that the nets were entirely separate.
Approved For Release 2002/08/08: CIA-RDP8~
Document Non __01 -"______________
Na Change In Class. F
Declassified 25X1
Class. Changed To: IS S C
Di e. _- a 02_4 By=