NORTH KOREAN MILITARY INSTRUCTIONS TO FRONT-LINE UNITS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R010400380009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 21, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1 ataff melting which was to be attended by L2 chieE's of staff of front-line
Anits Tat to which only seven could come because of transportation difficulties,
arm held in Pyongyang from 7 to 10 Jua.y. 1951, At this meeting the North Korean
aray eller of stafflave the following instructions:
a. Colstract embankment defense positions and make preparations for anti-tank
ani anti-aircraft operations; these are immediate problems. Establish a
cointer-intelLigence area in each combat zone.
b. Realove al) United Nations guerrillas from areas back of your lines. Re-
posts from the Ministry of Social Security indicate there are about 19,000
United Nations gaerrillas operating in fair areas, and that many of them
ar3 deserters from the North Korean army. Although these guerrillas are
not organized as a single unit., their capacity for becoming active suddenly
shauld be borne in mind, Operations whica 3ncourage their surrender, rather
than mere military expeditions against them, are recommended.
c. Civilians should not be harmed ntentionallf or consciously. The good
will or the civilian mass population must be retained by the army if any
future political campaign by the government is to succeed.
d. Conbat operatpons using mere weight of numbers should be avoided; employ
smail-scale attacks on enemy rear echelons instead.
a. As3ist North :aorean guerrillas in ROK areas spiritually and materially.
Inriltrate agents into hostile lines to eecore information.
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SUBJECT Dissension beteeen North Korean Factions regarding
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25X1 1, There was disarnsion in late July in the North Korean government between the 'linen,
or pro-Chinesf Communist group, and the pro-Soviet group. The former Opposed the
proposal for the negotiation of a Korean truce while the latter supported the
proposal in iccordance with instructions from Moscow)- The Soviet group supports
the propose? on the basis of these arguments: North Korea cannot be independent
of Soviet support, cannot risk losing that support, and can seek no aid from
other nations of the *democratic" bloc and ceetainly not from the United Nations.
This groep also realizes that they can assure their political life only if they
have the support of their Soviet friends, and therefore support the truce
eroposee for selfish reasons if for no other.
The vannm group, which probably mirrors the views of the Chinese Communists
the selves, holds to the idea that it is necessary to? control all of Korea before
th. conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty, since the greatest threat to the
Cesnese Ccmmunists is the rearmament of the Japanese. The Yenan group maintains
is neceesary to secure a firm foothold in Korea, and therefore the present
Jpportunity must be used to avoid heavier casualties in the future. The Yellen
group also argues that China is a closer and more practical ally than Soviet
Russia, and her assistance and cooperation are more desirable than the alternative
of becoming a Soviet satellite. Furthermore, help from the Chinese Communists
is also more underetanding and more concrete than the Soviets' elaborate but
conditional promises: it was not Soviet tanks or trucks which drove the United
Nations back from the Yalu, but the skill and experience of the Chinese Communist
troops. So long as the southern part of Korea remains in United States hands and
so long as the Japanese decision will be affected by United States influence, there
is always the possibility that Japan will enter the war after the signing of the
peace treaty. The separation of Korea into two parts will not brine a lasting
peace, and the success of the truce negotiations means only another period of
preparation for war) Another war between the Koreans will occur, and this will
invite the mobilization of the Japanese army and Japan's participation in the fight.
The Chinese fear that the Japanese army could easily reach the Manchurian border
with their exnerienced troops, and the Chinese losses would be heavier and more
serious than they have been up to now. Therefore, runs the Yenan argument, all
American influence has to be eliminated from South Korea to prevent an excuse for
Japanese intervention: South Korea must be "liberated.*
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In this struggles neither party intends to surrender, While the Yerian group
has great power in the militaryt, having about 70 percent of tIts di7is1ona1
i..otiarandars in forward areas s the Soviet supporters have more to direct
o,ctivity of government officials and have used threats against their opponent
While outwardly the Yenan group has had to give .support to the truce proposalss
it has been attempting to spread its ideas among military units* Because of
this,, a shift in military corgnitnders will shortly be carried out by the Soviet
group as a preventive measure04
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I, At a luncheon marking the first anniversary at the Korean ,war, given during a
25X1' Je83101! of the North Korean army staff conference in Piyongyang 25 June 1,951e,.
Cenarae NAM Ti North Korean chief of staff), addressed the meeting on the status
or the Korean war, NM first repeated the usUal claims that inefficiency -and
corruption were ee prevalent in the ROK army that it had no prospect of improve-
ment, and that its soldiers, being of the people, would come over to the North
Koreane at every opportunity. n'ompetition for money and position by the officers,
disseneion between the officers and men, and the inability of the young officers,,
the baekbone of any army, to put their ideas into effect? NAY ?claimed, were
responeibIe for falling mcrale in the ROK army, in contrast to the growing spirit
In' the Communist armies. .de pointed to the fnequent changeS made in ROK army,
persomLei as prcof of confusion, and said that except for United Nations
intervention complete victory would have been secured by the North Korean armies
14i-1:bout Chinese Communist help. Noting that the real enemy was therefore the
United States, NAM ended by eayingt ,IThe United States, however, will, be obliged
to eitndraw her troops :from Korea. World opinion will force her to take action
-in the near iuture, When this move is made, the final victory rests with us and
the Konean people, We must unite firmly toward this goal,n
.2, In a memorandum issued by the Organization Deeertarient of the North Korean Labor .
Centraf,. Comittee on 10 July 1951 and circulated to the chief of the Pyongyang
. Pecnle,s Committee, the following policy lines were among those stressede
a, The United Nations forces in Korea are, disgusted with the stupidity and
inefficiency shown by the RUA officials.
TAnen the United Nations influence has disappeared from the ROK, that country
will lapse further into a state of corruption, and it will be simple for the
Noeth Korean government te sures back into South Korea for ehe liberation
without assistance from the Chinese,,
c. in case a general election it Korea is held under the supervision of the
United Nations, the Soviet Union and other democratic (sic) nations will
25X1 petioipate in the election. and will be able to carry it out properVo
25X1 Th7ough the sJngle candidate system, the Aorth Korean gov?rniroent will obtain
R -y;aiority votet voters in. south Korea will cooperate if a free election is
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Another nix months of hardship must be endured before the final victoryo
eo Fifth column orga4zations will be strengthened to discover reactionary
*lemeats and desertAws fltom the armyo
ao aged persons or children will be mobilized for Labor servieso
will XI Limited to eligible men and.womeno
Each city block should study preventive measures to protect agai
hymembers of the Chinese Volunteer,forceso
Mobilization
robbery
25X1 Comkent, Most reports indicate that wroryone able to workg, regardless
pc g , or Sexj ha been pressed into service by the North Korean army and
glvernm t;lhislorder may be an attempt to soften that Policy,
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as Site of the Truce Nemtiations
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of the three reasons why the Communists
insisted that Kaesong be the site of the truce negotiations, the fact that
Communist control of the area would make the defection of any of the Communist
negotiations staff difficult was perhaps the most important. Since the de-
fection of even one minor official of the Communists' conference staff would
have been a serious security and propaganda loss, all delegations gave great
consideration to this problem. The other reasons the Communists insisted on
Kacsong were, first, that it was one of the few cities in the ROK held by the
Communists and therefore had propaganda value; and, second, that the Communists
wanted to be consistent in maintaining the idea that they had initiated the
peace proposals and therefore held that their suggestion on the site of the
talks should be accepted.
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