ACTIVITIES OF THE NORTH KOREAN 526 ARMY UNIT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 11, 2011
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 7, 1952
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4.pdf803.63 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 11-1 -1 FEe'195i b1--"A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION INFORMATION REPORT REPORT CD NO. COUNTRY Korea SUBJECT Activities of the North Korean 526 ArLky, Unit DATE OF INFO. PLACE ACQUIRE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794,. OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE- LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED. Objectives of the 526 Unit DATE DISTR. 7 April x.952 NO. OF. PAGES NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 50X1-H U THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 1. Before the Korean war, in the North Korean army there was a Cultural Depart- ment (Munhwa Pu) which directed or participated in foreign-and domestic political activities, propaganda, and Labor Party organization. Sometime after the beginning of the war, the unit was renamed the Political General Bureau (Ch&gch' . Ch'ong.Kuk), and PAK IIon-yongl was made head. By the end of 1951 the bureau had established several schools to give special training and instruction to Labor Party members who had been members of the South Korean Labor Party so that they could reconstruct the influence of the SKLP. Two of these schools were the Seoul Political School in Sinch'on-gun (125-25, 38-18) (YC-11)+1) and the Kyonggi Province Party School in Kumch'on-gun (126-29) 38-13) (BT-8032).2 2. The 526 Unit of the Political General Bureau includes a Guerrilla Command Division (Yukyak Chi'hwi Ch'fl), the principal objectives of which are the [ARMY X AIR X FBI Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 CONVID ?TIA.L 1 Guerrilla Command of the 52U Unit -L3, kz ull } c:tivit in the ROK . Chief of the y _ M 3, The 526 unit in late 1951 was attempting to rebuild the South Korean Labor Party in the ROK in order to effect the wide-scale recruitment of 'pro-North Korean guerrillas. As part of this plan, the 526 Unit planned to organize a guerrilla force of about 500 men, to be dispatched to South Korea in teams of five to six men each. The teams were to set up safehouses in the ROK and station two liaison officers at each housed Operational funds in the form of ROK won, gold, opium, and other easily convertible items of exchange were furnished the teams. Team captains received 200,000 ROK wont' and team members were given about 100,000 ROK won each. 4. Headquarters of the North Korean 526 AXT.~sT Unit in late 1951 was in a suburb of P'yongyang about 12 kilometers northeast of the city. Leader of the Labor Party division of the headquarters was Yl Sur-g 8p,3 Minister of Justice, and the military commander of the unit was PAE Ch "011 ( ),3 formerly chair- man of the North Kyongsang Province Labor Party. The 526 Unit, which was is attached to North Korean army general head- 1951 established in January ,quarters, and is the directing agency for all North Korean guerrilla activitie __ . - --,.,___4_ +'" ~ din and a i snatch of g - - - in Zne 10./11.. Ili t7 t cnlrws+..,r ---- - guerrillas to the various teams in the^ROK. its missions include the dispatch TT_414_ nd n-p the Pnllt LC9.1 a t s into the ROK of agc n Operations Unit, political agents5 of the North Korean Labor Party, and agents ____.-,.-_.., ,. of the hPnr1rmP.rters is The 01 _Ulrlt- 1V1,L11.LrjU1_Y --L the rebuilding of Labor Party influence in the ROK. To carry out these tasks, blished two t t , es a the 526 Army Unit, also known as the Guerrilla Guidance Uni subordinate headquarters, one the Eastern Liaison Office, and the other the Western Liaison Headquarters 50X1- 5. In late 1951 headquarters of the 526 Army Unit was at Kongji-ri, Siehong-myon Kangdong-gun (possibly 12559, 39-00) YO-5821). There were about 20 officers at the headquarters. Thirty wireless operator8 maintained constant contact with the Western and Eastern Liaison Offices of the unit. Western Liaison Office 6. In late 1951 the headquarters of the Western Liaison Office was in Sibyon-ni (126-4+2, 38-18) (BT-994.1) 50X1- 7. In November 1951 the Western L,ia:i.son Off ice was at Tusc~k-ni in Soch'on-rayon (126-h6 38-19) (CT-053 and was condanded. by YI UUn-yong,3 aged 30. His I deputy was KIM Yong.-sik, There were six sections in the. office. The Liaison sec ion, ortant, h had hi c handled security and communications, and included a Scout Company, w ed along the front lines forward of the headquarters. de lo it t p y s s n six scou The Training Section included a Training Sub-Section with five numbered educa tion t Se c tional units. Other sections were the Defense Section, the Suppor and the Medical Section. 8. The Western Liaison Off ice in November 1951 was devoting much time to training o hours t i w ven troops in the command. In the early morning the troops were g of indoctrination on the Korean war and the strengthening of the Labor Party d the remaining hours of the day were spent In military training, Discipl u a was very strict in the unit, and even a minor infraction of regulations or in- efficiency in such work as sentry duty was the cause for three days of im- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2g01C1T1//001q~/1~ r1 : CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 C?itll''.~..v eL LET "~ 50X1-HUM . _ prison-went of the offender a Because of the location and work of the unit, it was not feasible to supply the headquarters by truck, and 20 oxcarts were used daily to-transport needed supplies to them. The Western Liaison Office in late 1951 was training recruits for guerrilla units to be infiltrated into the ROK. When instruction was completed, they were being transferred to the Eastern Liaison Office, which was responsible for actually launching the teas across the battle lines, Other agents the Western Liaison Office was train. ; included graduates of the Seoul Political Academy; the Kyonggi Frovince Party School, and the Seoul Party School. The Western Liaison Office itself usually guided through the lines special agents from various organizations, including the Ministry of Social Security. Eastern Liaison Office 10. The Eastern Liaison Office in late 1951. was at Pongbyon-ni (127-57, 38-30) (DT 0861) in Naegh ang. u , and was headed by B6 Chungmil,3 aged. 40, a graduate of the Ka: gwon Political Academy. Deputy chief of the office was Yl Ch'ang-hi, aged 60, a native of South Kyongsang,Province. The organization of the Eastern Liaison Office was similar to that of the Western Liaison Office, but the Eastern Liaison Office had a large independent Communications Section which was responsible for traogTY.d4ting orders to the six Guerrilla Branch Units in the ROK and which handled ill. other communication activities. The Communications Section was Composed of a Communications Company, which had under it six Communications Units and a Scout Unit. The Education Section was connected with a military training school, and together they were responsible for training-officers for guerrilla units in South Korea; the trainees here organized into five companies. Support, Defense, Organization, and Medical Sections completed the organization of the Eastern Liaison Office The office also gave special training to students from the Kangwon Province Party School and the Labor Union Academy, dispatching them through the front line units of the office. 50X1-HUM 11. In late July 1951 a fifty.: m group from the Korean. Tibor Party headquarters in P ?y~angy g, led by SONG HAk and SO Yam, officers from the 4th Guerrilla Unit in the . ROK at Chirimsan, left for the Eastern Liaison Office, arriving 30 July. The group consisted, of stsients from the Seoul Political Academy. After their arrival at the Eastern Liaison Office, the students were placed into one of two groups according to their assignments: some were to engage in guerrilla activity and others in espionage. 12. Between July and September 1951 about 400 men were being trained at the Eastern Liaison Office for guerrilla duty with to 5 Guerrilla Branch Unit. In September 1951 this group was transferred to Yangdak (126-38, 39.13) (BU?96 3) for more training. From June to September 1951 another group of 400 men was being trained at the Eastern Liaison Office for. duty wit the 1 Branch Unit and in September this second group was transferred to Ich'on (126-53, 38-30) (CT-1563) for more training, Both groups were to be sent into the ROK at a time when the North Korean ar was again on the offensive. In late 1951 the groups were still in. North Korea. 13. There were six Guerrilla Braneb. Units6 under the command of the 526 Army Unit, and in late 1951 a seventh branch unit was being organized. In that year, however, the six Guerrilla }ranch Units net with little success in their operations. The 1 Branch Unit, in Kyonggi Province, suffered high casualties in fighting near Yongw11 early in 1951, and late the same year was being reorganized and retrained in the CORVIENyT , Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 ? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 50X1-HUM -5- Armed communication Unit 18. The Armed Communication Unit sends small groups of four or five men, usually rifles, and hand grenades, through the lines to transmit istols d-ith , p arme orders and instructions from the 526 Army Unit to the Guerrilla Branch Units. The groups are usually dispatched from the Eastern Liaison Office, which is more concerned with the direction of the branch units than is the Western Liaison Office, but may sometimes be dispatched from the Western Liaison Office. Frequently two groups bearing the same instructions will be sent within a short interval to assure that at least some of the members will be able to carry out the mission. Officers 2r_91 1R 19. Small squads of officers from the Officers Group are sent to the ROK to reinforce and direct activities of the Guerrilla Branch Units, and they are usually dispatched through the Eastern Liaison Office. There are about ten persons in each squad., and they are sometimes very heavily (sic) armed with pistols and rifles. The persons so dispatched become members of the branch unit staff and frequently are dispatched at the request of the branch unit, in which case they may be accompanied through the lines by a messenger previously sent to the Eastern Liaison Office to make the request for additional persons. 20. About 20 November 1951 a five-man team called the SIN Yong-sik Unit was scheduled to leave the Eastern Liaison Office for the Guerrilla Branch Unit in the ROK. Four of the men were SIN Yong-sik, leader of the group and a former student at the Party School in Y' yaagjrang; YI Yong-man, SHIM (fnu); and KIM Central Labor ~ an agent from the Ministry of Social Security assigned to carry 1 an g-i , Ny out espionage activity in the Taegu area. 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM Political Operations Unit 21. Graduates of the Seoul Political Academy provide the majority of the members for the Political Operations teams, which are composed of from five to ten persons who are sent to the ROK on various political missions, chiefly the rebuilding of the Labor Party in the ROK. The teams are usually trained and briefed at the Western Liaison Office, and they travel without escort to the Eastern Liaison Office, from where they are dispatched through the lines. Each agent carries two or three hand grenades, a suit of civilian clothes, a Seoul citizens identification card for Kyonggi Province or a refugee identification card, and other counterfeited certi- ficates such as a document certifying failure in the ROK army physical exam- nation and an inoculation certificate. Each agent also usually carries from 7,000 to 15,000 ROK won and sufficient rice and rice flour to last seven or eight days. Once across the lines, the agents change into civilian clothing and use their ROK documentation. Special Operations limit 22. Teams from the Special Operations Unit are assigned to gather intelligence, conmit acts of sabotage, instigate riots, and, in November 1951, were told to be prepared to establish a "second front" in the ROK should the cease-fire negotiations fail and the Communist armies again make a general attack and push southward. These teams include from five to ten men, who may carry two or three. hand grenades each. Before leaving, they receive orders which name the destination, and they are instructed to rendezvous at that point in order to establish a base from which they can proceed on their missions. 23. Between 1 August and 10 September 1951 a Special Operations Unit was at Songgo-ri (128-13, 38-08) (DT.3120). The unit was composed of 30 members, who were studying CONFIDENTIAL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 map read3;ng. The a;~ L wa a?sig ~c r miseion of 3y ilt ?ating ROTS a d other T sited Nations Installatio?ir3, e crossed the l TM-es into United Nations territory aboiu.t, 15 September 195]- 24. patch -oi? agent C,~?o?~.p Before the agent ?oups are d'i .5pa' ,~v'r" -d to the ROK, through their scout co .es the liaison off Ices i ~ ~e t g t ? t?e sections of the f~?ont ]uses which appear to ge, are t r -,I gu i d.ed. to the point and through the lines be most open.; and the S-466 Le- by two or three scou.'ts - The scouts accompany the agents until they :eel certain t h e group has succe ' , u .~.: i?r'.t .1trated into United Nations territory, and then return to their w nits in late 19 n1 the eas'te ?n front was most often used, but occasionally age '.its were a15o be . .g Lo filtrated through western sectors of the front Sometimes t se follcwL-_,g rote was used by agent groups who started from the Western Liaison Office for dispatch from the Eastern Liaison Office: Naesan-dung (125-58, 38-38) 8i , e 38-30) (BT-8564), Ichton (126-53, 38-30) (C2'-~15 i3) Ch r g, -,,,o the F.,astern Liaison Office at Ponghy Sn-ni (127 t57, 38-30) yan (DT.-0861) in Vaeg' a.,r aVvM_P ~ ova where they were dispatched through he lines in the area. Usual points of- L iltration for scouts of the Eastern Liaison 38.20) (DT- 043) and K k-san (1A 14 N ) Office were ~ngro bong (128-19, ossib in the eastern sector near the coast, and 6orak-san ( ~~ ) (P lY 127-19, 37-5^3, and Yon 3n san (21_521,7_5I; 38-29 (DT-0060) in the central sector. 50X1-HUM 25 The principal ac tivc missio . of the Western Liaison Office of the 526 Army' Unit was the dispatch of me: ere of the opera.tio sns sections to the ROK. This was done by three separate -pat7rol.s of 30 men each from the patrol section. The first patrol p moved throe- -,r,ie t~.aesc~_-3g r~r~ea, ~..e second tr ~ o..~;gh the small village of Podul-gol (12650, 38-21) (CT-11'4.6); and. the third throe, gh- the Y..onch?..on (127-05, 38-06) (CT-3218) area-u A typical procedure was t1at followed by the, lst Patrol, which divided into three squads of 10 men each. The let "Squad was at Karnak-san (126-582 37-5 ) ( !, ) s the ~ 0T 2 00 ~. 2y vi at t?,~~.o.~oyig (~.~?6 -56, 3"~ -58) (CT-18o4),, and T the-3rd at ;j0-1 .~i (peass:z:51.y 1.-J0, 38-023., 38-023., Cl'-2411)a These patrols watched for spots - in -t lie line w _?ac h were tI,lnly cave: red by United Nations forces, and reported to their patrol chief, w a .forwaryied the information to the unit commander. Ike in tun ass ed members of the operations sections, who were to be dispatched to the ROK, to the vxio~m> pay roio for guidance through the lines at the places previously determined, by t h e s q u a d members. 26.. In November 1.951 some of the men ~~ a the 2 Platoon., 2 Company of the Western Liaison Office were the following: CI-TO 1:n-song (n J.. 0) squad, leader 50X1-HUM CHONO `Ia-cho In charge of the platoon, a native of the ICyong, sae- g-Provinces in the RO KIM Ki.myong ( r) a scout, from Kyonggi Province ahl, 0 Tae-yong ( KW_ ), scout, from Kyonggi Provinces he o ma u h d r -__ _ p nc PAX Kwan-yong ( , 'F ` #,9 _ I from I ' V,: ^ , l j and in charge of special missions %0 SN (feu),, a platoon leader, from the Ttyongsa g Pro aces in the ROTC. U Chong-in (1k A It- from Seoul., a squad member. CONE DETIA J Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 50X1-HUM Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R011200440009-4 Co a r t. - 1 1,, EAK R;'o-a-yortg was chief of the Political Bureau of Abln- e orth :ore- army 3 Naora ?, which also describes to 50X1-HUM Com~aer t p The e. yste