LOCATION OF POLISH DIVISIONS; SOVIET STRATEGIC PLANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R012300020003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 29, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457RO12300020003-4
CC NtIDENT1AL
, . r . ; v.
FE? 1952 51-W
S. RET/COYMOL - UL S. ` ICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION
INFORMATION REPORT REPORT NO.
COUNTRY Polazn.d/Czechoslovakia
25X1 SUBJECT Location of Polish Divisions;
Soviet Strategic Plans
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
29 May 1952
NO,OF FENCLS. 1 (sketch map)
It K~Trri
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
1. The enclosed map shows the disposition of the 16 Polish divisions (four
of them mechanized). It indicates that Central and Eastern Poland are
largely denuded of Polish- troops. The 1 Division is in. Warsaw and the 18
in Bialystok, but as far west as Miedzyrzecz (Meseritz) near the Polish-.
German.'border, the central area of Poland is being kept free of Polish
troops to facilitate the eventual, transport of Soviet troops toward the
west.
2. The major concentrations of Polish divisions are in the north, including
the 15, 16 Mechanized, 8 Mechanized, 127 14, and 5 Divisions; and in the
south, including the 11 Mechanized, 10 Ieebanized, 4, 71 6, 2, 9, and 3
Divisions. The Soviet Army plans to use all available rail and road
connections from east to west across Poland in the case of an emergency.
3. The ;USSR: railroad net can. transport more Soviet divisions to the Polish frontier
than can be transported by the Polish railroad network to the Polish-German
fontier. The proportion is about 75 percent; therefore the rest must be
transported through Poland by, road.
The .distribution of the Polish forces is determined by two major factors
a. The Polish Army must be taken out of the way, to free the transport
lines across Poland for Soviet transports.
A revoa.t,i.n the Polish Army could become extremely dangerous. To avoid
united action, the Soviets had to divide the Polish forces into two
separate groups,, giving them different missions. in the north, to defend
the Baltic coast; in the south, to assist the Czechoslovak Army, or to
defend the Czechoslovak-Polish border against a successful Western intrusion
into Czechoslovakia.
'CON Document No. ii--------------------
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 Approved For Release 2006/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457RO12300020003-4
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Thus, for logistic and security reasons as well as for operational
reasons, the Polish Army was divided as tadicated on the attached map.
This explains why three quarters of the peacetime units have been. placed
on. the southern mountains and on the northern sea frontiers which are
the least exposed to attack.
Recent speeches of Czechoslovak Premier Antonin Zapotocky and Defense Minister
Alexej Cepicka confirm tha,L the Czechoslovak Arqy's strategic task is to
defend the Sumava and Cesky .,es (:Boehmeiwald) far'tified zone so as to protect
the concentration of the S (yvi.et armies ves t of the Carpathians.
6. The Soviet Army, already faced with a transport bottleneck on the Polish
frontier.,, would, have to solve even worse rail 'transport difficulties in
Eastern Germany, where no more than two-thirds of the rail transports coming
from Poland could be taken care of. T h*, use of motor transport to male. up
for this deficiency would not prove sufficient. Therefore, the Soviet Army
must exploit the Tra:n.scarpathiaan railroad connections leading from the
western. Ukraine through Slovakia and l3ur.gary.
The, Soviet Occupation Army in Austria heirg' weak, and western Bohemia being
directly exposed to an. attar