BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R012400230005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 19, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

?awn ov ? Iti.NAA
FEB 1952
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R012400230005-8
?NTELLOFAX 21
CLASSIFICATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
INFORMATION REPORT
REPORT NO.
CD NO.
COUNTRY China/Korea
DATE DISTR.
19 June 1952
SUBJECT Bac1groimd Information on. the Jilinese Communist
NO. OF PAGES
2
Intervention in the Korean Conflict
DATE OF
NO. OF ENCLS.
INFO.
(LISTED BELOW)
25X1C
PLACE
SUPPLEMENT TO
ACQUIRED
REPORT NO.
25X1X
1. The Chinese Communist government had made plans to intervene in the Korean
conflict at the opening of hostilities.
2. In May 1950 the Chinece Communist Army dispatched approximately 2,000 Korean
veterans) who fOrmerly served in the Communist army against't7aa Chinese National
ists, to the NOrth-Zoutd Korean border. In May 1950 the unit Was based at
Ky6m1plo (125.37) 38-45) (fC-2792), and when the signal to attack was given on
25 June 1950 the unit moved. south with the North Kbrear. Division.
3. In. July 1950-thi4i unit was divided into three battalions at Seoul. One battaliOn
was sent to the pastern fron, one to the western front, and one to the central
front. The battalion on the western front was known as the 18 Regiment, 4 North
Korean Division.: This unit vas to be allowed to camunicate with the Chinese
CommUnist army. headquarters in Manchuria at Antung, by.4Passing North Korean
military. channe10. The military success enjoyed by the North Korean army in the
early stages of the war prompted. KIM I1..s6ng to disregard this agreement, .and at
his order .the unit was integrated. into the North Korean army with North Korean
officers in canmami, .
4. The eointnanding Officer of the original Chinese Communist-sponsored unit related
to a friend. in the North Korean 4 Corps, that the Chinese Communist army was dis-
pleased. with the actions of -KIM in this. matter. A rift 'between KIM Il..s6ng and
MA0 Tse-tung f011owed the integration of the Chinese CoMmunist-trained unit into
the North Korean army, and pro-Chin.ese Communist generals in the North Xbrean
took advantage of the situation to criticize the policies of KIM Il-s6ng. This
incident dampened the desire of the Chinese Communist army to dispatch troops to
Korea. However, heavy Soviet political pressure, follOwing the Inchon landing,
caused. MA0 to commit large C-riinese Communist units to the support of the North
Korean army,
ma To REMS WM
MUUMUU WIER USE
4 ofkipL65,s1 F I CAT I ON
SECRET
25X1A
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Approved For Release 2002/ROPOWCIA-RDP82-00457R012400230005 8
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5 In August 1950 the Chinese Communist 4 Field Army was alerted for action.
The 14. Field Army had. three armies massed. on the Manchurian border as early
as August.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R012400230005-8
25X1A