"1. EF-TYPE AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT AT ZAVOD NO. 1 IN PODBEREZHE 2. OBSERVATIONS AT MOSCOW/RAMENSKOYE, MOSCOW/SALAREVO, AND BORKI AIRFIELDS"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R013400180010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 6, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

v
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
25
X1
25X1
INFORMATION REPORT REPORT NO.
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793
AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
CD NO.
COUNTRY USSR (Klinin Oblast)
25X1 SUBJECT 1, EF?Type Aircraft Development at Zavod No, 1
25X1 in Podberezhe
2, Observations at Moscow/Ramenskoye9 Moscow/
Salareva and Borki Airfields
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25X1 25X1
DATE DISTR. 6 February 1953
NO. OF PAGES 21 25X1
NO. OF ENCLSa2 (of 24 pages)
(LISTED BELOW)
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
ORGANIZATIONAL SETUP OF
To nnun
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE - -?. 1
CLASS IF I CATION
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1,. The position of Lt, General Mikhail Vasilevich Khrunichev, Soviet Minister
for the Aviation Industry, was similar to that of the former German chief of
technical air armament, This assumption was based on the observation that.,
in conversations with General Khrunichev, members of the air armament in-
dustry adhered to strict military discipline, while air force officers
talked to him in an informal manner, General Khrunichev9 a typical Party
protege with limited technical knowledge, was. directly subordinate to
Marshal N Bulganin, a reserved and realistic person with'extensive aeronautical
knowledge. The most important deputy assigned to General Khrunichev was Major
General Makar Mikhailovich Lukin, a former chief constructor at an aircraft
engine plant who was in charge of the mass production of aircraft engines and
of the deported. German engineers, General Lukin was also responsible for
particularly important projects such as the EFml O, Massalov (fnu) held the
influential position of a chief secretary of General Lukin, Deputy Minister
for the Aviation Industry Professor Ma or e ergey Nikolayevich Shishkin
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was chief of the Scientific Department at the Ministry) Professor Shishkin
was simultaneously chief of the TsAGI Institute, which was subordinate to the
Scientific Department. The branch institute for practical flight tests, desig-
nated ntnyy Isyytatelnyy Institut 11 or LII, was also subordinate to Pro-
fessor Shishkin. The TsAGI Institute was located near Stakhanovo - Zhukovskiy
(55-33N, 38-08E) airfield,which housed the LII Institute. This airfield, also
referred to by the names LII or Ramenskoye, was the official test field of the
Ministry for Aviation Industry. The TsIAM Institute (Central Aero - Engine
Institute) for aircraft engines was probably directly assigned to General Lukin.
Opytnyy Zavod No 1, the experimental plant for airframes in Podberezhe (56-45N,
37-09E.), was subordinate to Department 7 of the Minist . Gulei (fnu), chief
T)p-partment 7. was ater re laced by N. N. Vlassov. 25X1
25X1 Department 7 was the intelligence section. The
VIAM Institute engaged in research in lubrications, hydraulic oils, and
probably also of fuel p. The Batchta Laboratory, named after its chief, Pro-
fessor Batchta (fnu)3iwas assigned to the Ministry for the Aviation Industry.
This institute was engaged in the copying and construction of hydraulic
systems and hydraulic pumps, fuel pumps, and fuel governors. The instruments
constructed by this institute were mass-produced in a plant in Moscow.3
The TsAGI Institute (Central Aero - Hydrodynamics Institute)
2. The major projects assigned to the TsAGI Institute included:
a. Basic research,which was partially based on information obtained by
espionage and from foreign technical literature.
b. The designing of high speed profiles on the basis of 9calculation system
established by Professor Shishkin. (For project EF150, for instance,
only profiles of the TsAGI Institute were to be used instead of inter-
national standard profiles.)
c, Wind tunnel experiments. There was one tunnel for speeds up to 240 1n/h
for actual size aircraft models and one or two high speed wind tunnels
available at the institute. Aircraft projects forwarded to the insti-
tute., were analyzed and breaking point tests were performed. Construction
directives and testing terms were worked out at TsAGI and were published
in 1949 as Construction Directives for the Aircraft Industry of the Red (sic)
Air Fleet. TsAG Institute also either recommended or advised against mass
production of individual types of, aircraft. The institute had about 1,000
employees. Its equipment included the former Heinkel test stand for
ejector seats.and a measuring stand for acceleration,which was converted
so that it could be driven by its own engine. in 197. Professor Guenther
Bock formerly the leading expert in the field of aerodynamics of the
DVL (Deutsche Versuchssanstalt fuer.Luftfahrt),worked on calculations
of Mach .npmbers and on the recalculation of profiles for TsAGI in 197
and 1948.
LII Institute
3. Major General Petrov (fnu) was the commander in charge of the LII test air-
field and the Institute. Professor Ostaslavskiy (fnu), a former assistant
of Zhukovskiy, was scientific chief of LII. Repkov (fnu) was chief pilot,
but was arrested and replaced by Sossim (fnu).
Opytnyy Zavod,No 1
a. Opytnyy Zavod No l was located in the former plant area of Zavod No. 30.
Organized like an average Soviet plant, it represented an experiment in
an independent development plant. Other development plants were in-
tended to be established on the same system. The leading directors in
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order of importance were Major General Abramov (fnu), Chief Engineer
Sergey Sergeyevich Rebenkog Alek'seyev (fnu), and Vasil Vasilevich Smirnov.
The first director was superior to the chief engineer of the designing
and construction offices; to the chief engineer in charge of the pro-
duction department; to the chief technician for calculations; to the
chief engineer for power supply, heating,, etc.; and to the chief of the
procurement department.
b. The business manager, P.P. Smirnov, was not identical 14th .director ..rnov,
He was subordinate to the plant director; however, with regard to basic
financial problems, he was directly responsible to the Finance Minister.
c, Department 17, the flight test section of OPN 1, was directly subordinate
to the Minister of the Aviation Industry; the chief of this depart ant and
the chief pilot were permitted to report directly to the Minister.
The technical control section; Otdel Tekhnicheskogo
Kontrolya (OTK),was comparable to the Bauaufsicht Luft (BAL) (Supervision
Department for the Construction of Aircraft). This governmental control
section at the plant was subordinate to the testing department of the
Ministry for Aviation Industry.
e. From 19)6 to September 1950 Graduate Engineer Brunlof Charley-(Wilhelm).
Baade was the chief engineer of OKB I, and Engineer Hans-Heinz. Roessing
was chief engineer of OKB II. The chief engineers were permitted to
report directly to Minister Khrunichev and also to the T remlin. Baade
frequently reported to or was consulted by the Kremlin. 9 I was
composed of personnel from the Junkers Plant, while OKB II included per-
sonnel from the Siebel and Heinkel Plants and a composite chemical and
rocket department. Fedor Pa'flovich Voznesenskiy was chief Soviet engineer.
f, OPN No 1 had a work force of about 600 German experts and about 3,500
Soviets. This number included the work force of the collective farms.
The German group with dependents included about 1,500 persons. Although
it was planned that Soviet experts should gradually replace their German
colleagues, this was accomplished only in the production department,where
the Soviets were assigned to the positions of section chiefs,, while the
designing departments remained under German management, although there
were Soviet deputies assigned to every department. II doubted that 25X1
the Soviets would be able to compete with the German engineers and carry
on their construction activities without German assistance.
Development Methods
The leading Soviet chief engineers had their own design and construction
offices;, Most of them were located in or near Moscow. The designers
Mikoyan, Ilyushin, and Lavochkin had their offices northeast of Leningrad.
Street in the vicinity of the central airfield. Gurevich had worked since
1949 or 1950 at OPN 1 in the special field of wing construction with air
suction devices (Absaugfluegel).7
6. Orders for the construction of new types of aircraft were given by the Ministry
for Aviation Industry. The directives for the design and construction were
more strictly outlined than in the former German air-industry. The various
chief engineers forwarded their design plans, models, or model parts to TsAGI
for inspection and, if required, for modification. TsAGI then returned the
plans to the designers, and one or two construction models and structural
.parts for breaking point tests were built. These breaking point tests were
again performed by the TsAGI Institute, Aircraft prototypes were first test
flown by test pilots who were assigned to the designers; the aircraft were
then forwarded to LIT for further tests. After the major modifications were
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accomplished on the model., a commission composed of the representatives from
the TsAGI Institute, the chief engineers, and representatives of the highest
Soviet authorities decided whether or not to place this type into mass prom-
duction. The professional rivalry between the designere.and TsAGI was in-
tensive. The Ilyushin team even attempted sabotage on the EF-140 by sawing
at the rudder control shafts., when.in 198 the EF-131 performed better test
flights than the four-jet Ilyushin bomber.
ACTIVITIES AT 0KB I
Research Equipment
7. The complete equipment from the Dessau Junkers Plant was available at 0KB 1.
This equipment included a wind tunnel for speeds up to about Mach No 0.9,
which was previously driven with steam.: and was now powered by one Jumo-
001 engine. A library was also available. Furthermore, the experimental
plant was furnished specifications sheets available from TsAGI and mock-up
models of the instruments to be installed. Most of the Soviet technical
literature was outdated.
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Various Types of Aircraft
8. Aircraft of the type Me-263, which was the last type mass produced at the
Dessau Junkers Plant .during 1944 and 1945, were not developed further at
25X1 0KB I. However, an aircraft powered with a Salbei (con-
centrated nitric acid) (HNO3) Hfueled engine in June and July'l947. This
aircraft seemed to have been manufactured in mass production. Three air-
craft models of the type EF-126 were brought from Germany to the USSR and
were being fitted with a newly constructed pulse jet unit with a thrust of
600 to 800 kg and a life endurance of five hours for the flap valve unit
and of 15 hours for the tube. The maximum altitude of the EF-l26 was about
4,000 meters. Ludwig Hoffmann was to pilot the aircraft during the test
flights, but the project was given up because of the lack of funds,9 German
fighters of the type EF-137 were of no interest to the Soviets and were not
further developed in the USSR,33 A Ju-88 which was brought to the USSR for
testing purposes was renamed EF-1 .5. After a crash landing., the aircraft
was salvaged. The EF-l55 is the Soviet copy of a British Meteor aircraft
powered by original Derwent engines. This rather poor construction failed
during the flight tests and was forwarded to OKB'.I as a test plane for ex-
periments with tandem landing gear for'the EF-150. There is no information
available on the EF-132, which was probably worked on at various places.
25X1 I Ia dummy model of this type which was designed for a. range
o 5,000 , e wings were swept-back in the first'third, swept-forward
in the second third.., and straight in the outer third. Five different pro-
files were designed for the wings. this aircraft was 25X1
!ran insane idea created during the postwar confusion'. Ju-287 was the
designation for a model constructed in 1944 and 1945. The aircraft had wings
with asweep back of 24 degrees.,, a He-177 type'fuselage, the cockpit of the
Ju-188, and a rudder assembly of the Ju-388. The aircraft was salvaged.
Aircraft of the Type EF-131 (P-131)
9. There were three experimental models constructed of the type EF-131.,of which
test model No 2 was intended for breaking point tests, Construction model
No 1 was sent to Ramenskoye airfield on 5 May 1947,where it was test flown
until October 19.7, and then forwarded to TeplyyStan for further test flights
Later, test model No 1 was converted to the EF-140 B., and test model No 3
was remodeled to an EF-110. The long range reconnaissance version of the
EF-1 .0 was designated EF-140 R.
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10. Following are the technical specifications on construction model No 1 of the
EF-131:.
a. Power plant: sicJuM-004s, with 880 kgp each.
h. Wing length: 19.6 meters
ce Wing area: 54.2 sqm
d. Wing span: about 21 meters
e; Wing load area: 450 or 521 kg/sqm
f. Net weight: about 15,200 kg
g. Nose wheel load: 1,800 kg
h. Maximum fuel load: 9,800 liters
i. Maximum bomb load: 2,400 kg
J. Standard flying weight: 24,800 kg
k. Service ceiling: 12,000 m
1. Maximum flying weight with rocket-assisted take-off: 27,200 kg-
M. Maximum speed at a flying weight of about 17,500 kg at an altitude
of 8,000 meters: 864 km/h
n. Theoretical range with full tanks and a 2,400 kg bomb load: 2,400 km12
o. Take-off speed at a weight of 19,500 kg: about 262 km/h
p. Landing speed at a weight of about 15,400 kg: 212 km/h
q, The theoretical location of the center of gravity was calcul ed at 20
to 28 percent; test flights revealed it at 16 to 29 percent.
r. The wings were swept forward at an angle of 28 degrees and had a
dihedral angle of eight degrees.
a. The landing gear was designed for a maximum speed of descent of 5.9 m/sec.
These design data were obtained according to a new calculating system
which was probably based on the American system.
All versions of the El'-131 and EF-14.0 were to be equipped with powder-fueled
Rato units at the fuselage. The units were not installed yet. A so-called
fuel jettisoning device emptied the fuel tanks within about nine minutes.
Once, it almost caused a crash landing when an engine failed. The tail gun
position, equipped with two German 20 mm guns, was remote-controlled by
means of a periscope. The instruments were of German origin and included
bombing equipment with German instruments and German bomb shackles. The
three-axis directional control devices were copies of the American auto-
pilots which, for the lack of individual parts, were not yet operational.
Experimental Model No 1 of the EF-140 and the EF-140 R Model
11. The Soviets requested the construction of the EF-140, its models, and of the
EF-150, with the projected basic layout but with improved speed and range.14
This request, having the character of a military order, had to be carried
out under any circumstances and, since the technical basis for these im-
provements was not given, the requested performance specifications were
achieved by means of "mathematical tricks" (sic). These orders were ex-
tremely difficult to carry out, as the Soviets frequently changed the data
of the engines to be installed in these aircraft. The specifications
given in this report.were, as far as possible, thoroughly checked. Test
flights with the aircraft started in June 1948, and on 5 March 1949 the
Soviets took over the aircraft.
12. The EF-140 deviated from construction model No 3 of the EF-131 with regard
to the engines, the armament, the.reinf?rced landing gear, and the slightly
decreased net weight. It was powered by two AMTKRD-2 (A.Mikulin Turbo-
Kompressornyy Reaktivnyy Dvigatel) engines with a thrust of 2,800 kg each,
which were also referred to by the designation M-2. The dimensions were to
be the same as the ones of test model No 1 of the EF-131. A crew of four-
the pilot, the observer, the radio operator and aerial gunner. and the
mechanic and aerial gunnerwere stationed in a pressurized, cabin. The pro-
jected data included the following:
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ILLEGIB
a. Maximum flying weight with Rato units-. 27,100 kg
b.- Maximum bomb load-. 2,400 kg
c. Dimensions of the bomb bay. 4.8 m long, 1.7 m wide, and 0.95 m high
The bombs were to be suspended horizontally. The bomb load could be re-
placed by a 4,800 liter load of fuel which was to be carried in jettisonable
tanks. The standard fuel tanks,?with a capacity of 9,200 liters,were in-
stalled above the bomb bay. The 140 -R version was equipped with two wing tip
tanks, each with a capacity of 1,400 liters, in addition to the standard fuel
containers and the jettisonable tanks in the bomb bay. It was requested that
the EF-140 have a range of 2,400 km with bomb load and a range'of 3,600 km
with fuel . tanks. instead of bombs in the bomb bay. A thorough.
check of these performance data revealed that the EF-140R would have a range
of 3,000 km to.3,080 km,including a reserve for a scramble takeoff. The
performance data of the EF=,140 were correspondingly lower. The following
listed maximum speeds were achieved during test flights with a flying weight
of about 17,000 kg.
km h
Altitude
International
Mach No.
Soviet
Mach No.
895
7.8 km
0.798
0.82
905
7.6 km
0.819
0.84
920
7.8 km
0.821
0.846
Remarks
below zero.
flown at a temp-
erature of 520 C
The landing distance at a coefficient-of friction of 0.04 was 1,800 meters
without brakes and parachute; atp.0.16 with parachute it was 1,400 meters,
and at x,0.2 with.a brake power of 40 percent and parachute it was 480 meters.
The armament included two turrets, each with two Soviet 23 mm guns. The
turret behind the cockpit traversed about 275 degrees, and its guns could
search about 80 degrees upward. The other turret below the fuselage aft of
the bomb bay traversed about 360 degrees, and the guns could search from
74, to 80 degrees. The aiming device was a Zeiss-made periscope. The electro-
hydraulic control devices were designed after German models, while the tur-
.rets were copied from American designs. The periscope had no computers.
Tracer ammunition was fired.15 A dummy of the Norden type bomb sight was
installed. No radar equipment was planned for the aircraft. The air-to-
ground interphone was a Soviet duplication of an American model. Two jet-
tisonable Rato units were to be attached to either side of the rear of the
fuselage.
Specifications of the AMTKKD:32 (M-2)
13. The M-2 was s.milar in shape to the Jumo-012, but shorter and somewhat larger
in diameter. The jet engine was designed with an eight-stage axial flow
compressor with a compression ratio of 1 to 4.4 and a single-stage turbine.
The fourth compressor stage was fitted with. an additional valve. The
governor used with the unit was copied from the Jumo-004 and, as was sug-
gested by the German experts, remodeled by the Batchta Institute. Diffi-
culties arising with the governor at speeds between 5,000 rpm and 6,200 rpm
were herewith eliminated.. The fuel consumption was 1.2 kg per kgp/h. The
following output data of the M-2 were recorded in test flights with the
engine:
Turbine
Temperature
-
Oil Pressure
in Atmospheres
Thrust, Obtained
Theoretically
6,200
700
degrees
C
7.5
2,800 kgp
6,050
620
degrees
C
6.5
to 6.8
2,500 kgp
4,500
450
degrees
C
4.5
to 4.7
800 kgp
2,400
580 degrees
C
2.5
180 kg idling thrust
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The maximum idling speed for the engine was 4,200 rpm at flying altitude and
2,400 rpm at sea level.
14. The M-2 was started by a compressed air ground starting device. A small con-
tainer for compressed air was installed in the cabin. This starter system
was only temporarily used for the tests. 25X1
electric starters,.developed on the basis of US models,were to be used in
Soviet Air Force units with the turbojet power plants. The M-2 was to be
started as follows:
a. Open the air pressure valve to fill the container in the cabin with com-
pressed air.
b. Open the compressed air reduction valve; the pneumatic starter unit is
operating.
c. Switch on the ignition with the engine turning at 400 rpm until the rpm
are accelerated (sic).
d. Shift the throttle lever from "stop" to "idling speed, ground" and ac-
celerate to 2,400 rpm. The gas temperature forward of the turbine is
not to exceed 820 degrees C. Temperatures up to 900 degrees C would not
harm the turbine, according to the'Soviets. At this stage, the oil pressure
is about 2.5 atmospheres.
e. Open the safety cock.
f. Shift the throttle lever slowly to "idling speed, air", while the
temperature is to drop from 540 degrees to 480 degrees C, and the
engine is to run at 4,500 ? 50 rpm at an oil pressure of 4.5 atmospheres.
g. Have the engine dry out (warm up) for a period of 30 seconds.
h. Pull the throttle to full power and accelerate speedily up to 5,200 rpm,
with the gas temperature being 560 degrees C and the oil pressure 6 to
6.5 atmospheres.
Pull the throttle to full power (sic), accelerating the speed about
an additional 2,400 rpm. The standard period required for this ac-
celeration is 12 seconds.
The gas temperatures and the temperatures forward of the turbine corres-
pond to the German "T3" temperature terms. The M-2 engine was tested in
flights with experimental model No 1 of the EF-140. After preliminary
difficulties were eliminated., the engine operated satisfactorily. The last
engine to be tested had a plate indicating that the unit would need a. check
after 15 hours of operation and an overhauling after 50 hours of operation.
The life endurance of the engines was designed for 150 hours. During the
first period, the compressor frequently operated irregularly.,
EF-140B (P-140 B)
15. The EF-140 B was developed on the basis of test model No 1 of the EF-131.
The aircraft was powered with two Soviet duplications of the Nene engine.
The cabin was designed in a form which was later also given to the cabin
of the EF-150. All other dimensions and data were those of the basic
EF-131. The standard fuel capacity was 9,200 liters. The bomb bay was to
hold either a 2,400 kg load of bombs or 4,800 liters of fuel. The theore-
tical range for the bomber version of the EF--140 was calculated at 2,000 km,
which would correspond to the actual performance of the aircraft. The re-
designing was finished in the summer of 1950, and by September 1950, the
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aircraft was ready for transportation to the Borki testing field,
on the EF-140
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16. With the EF-131 and the EF-140, the new versions of the Jum287, all diffi-
culties anticipated in flight performance were eliminated. High speed tests
revealed the excellent effect of the swept-back wings. The manufacture of
spars met with difficulties. The German plant suitable for this production
was allegedly dismantled and shipped to the USSR, and rumors indicated that
the Soviets had failed to reconstruct the plant or to
,methods for spars. 125X1
the F was being mass produced in Stalingrad and in a plant
located. east of Stalingrad.
EF-150 (P7,1S01
17. The EF-150 was designed between 1948 and mid-1949. General Lukin personally
urged the construction of the first two test models, which was started by the
end of 1949. The German work force at the plant "unanimously" determined to
work 12 to 16 hours per day. It was believed that the EF-150 was to be mass.
produced, as B.C. Baade frequently had meetings with leading Soviets, in-
cluding Marshal N. Bulganin. By September 1950 the first test model was 60
to 70 percent complete. There are no details available about the second
test model constructed for breaking point tests. Conferences on the con-
struction of the third test model were not completed by September 1950. Unlike
the EF?140, the EF-150 was constructed in accordance to the standard Soviet
system from the very beginning.
Since the technical specifications of the EF-150 were still being discussed in
September 1950, they cannot be considered final. The most important specifi-
cations included the following; The engines were to be two Mikulin turbojet
engines, each with a thrust of 4,500 kg or two Lyulka (Lyulkov) turbojet
engines, each with a thrust of 5,200 kg. The Lyulka engines had an estimated
fuel consumption of 1.18 kg/kgp/h. It was not known which of the engines
would be available. According to rumors, the engines were being constructed
in Moscow. Installation models indicated that the EF-150 would be equipped
with single turbojet units, rather than with two twin turbojet engines.17
The cabin for a crew of four and the tail gunner's station were pressurized.
The aircraft was about 28 meters long, had a wing span of about 30 meters,
and a height of 8 to 8.5 meters.18 The wing area was about 128 sqm with a
wing load of about 435 kg/sqm. The bomb load capacity was not determined.
One of the versions, the bomber or the re-
connaissance version, was to take 36,000 liters of fuel. The take-off weight
was about 56,000 kg. The maximum speed was given as 1,050 km/h. The German
engineers, however, estimated that only 950 km/h to approximately 1,000 km/h
could actually be achieved. The service ceiling was given as 12,000 meters
for the Mikulin engines and as about 14,500 meters for the Lyulka engines.
The Soviets requested a maximum range of 3,600 kilometers for the bomber
version and a range of 5,400 kilometers for the reconnaissance version at a
flying time of five and a half hours. Even with the Soviet flying method,
i.e., the aircraft climbs gradually in accordance with the decrease of
flying weight, and performs a spot landing with idling speed from an altitude
of 12,000 meters, these ranges could not be achieved practically or theoreti-
cally. The actual range of the reconnaissance aircraft in individual flights
under favorable conditions was calculated to be 4,500 km with a flying time
of about five hours. Another version of the EF-150 was designed as a fast
auxiliary passenger plane,
19. Essential construction specifications of the EF-150 included the following:
a. The monocoque wings with corrugated meta), reinforcements of the outer
skin were constructed on the basis of American design. Hot air for the
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deicing of the leading edges was to be led from the compressor by means of
a tube. The problem of deicing the rudder assembly was still being dis-
cussed. The outer skin of the fuselage was of duraluminum four milli-
meters thick and was supported by four longerons. The densely riveted
upper section of the fuselage was designed as a torque tube and was to
be utilized as fuel tank. Two lines of rivets fastened the outer skin to
the bulkheads in the tank and to the longerons. This design caused ob-
jections, expecially as it was feared that the tanks would leak after the
aircraft was in air force operational units for some time. As a protection
against leakage, the tank was eventually to be provided with rubber bags.
The Soviets approved?this design because of the material saved. To protect
the fuel tank against bullets, it was subdivided by bulkheads and fitted
with many vertical light metal tubes, about 8 cm in diameter and about
0.4 mm thick, standing side by side. These tubes were fitted with nonce
return valves at the bottom. Firing tests with explosive ammunition re-
vealed that, even though many tubes were damaged, not much fuel was lost.
Steel core ammunition., however, caused a higher, loss of fuel,.because of
the fact that the impact was stronger. The tank could be emptied only
by numerous bullet holes in the sides. The fuel between the tubes was
lost in all tests, while only the fuel above the bullet holes ran out
from inside the tubes. The non-return valves never failed in any of the
experiments.
b. The bomb bay was about 6.5 meters long. The bomb doors were retracted
like venetian blinds into the sides of the fuselage. A horizontal bomb
suspension was probably intended for the aircraft.
The stick control system was copied from the FW?190. Transmission was by
hydraulic servo control with built-in feel.18 A German system was used
for the electro-hydraulic operation of the landing gear and the landing
flaps and for the adjustment of the horizontal stabilizer. As with the
EF-131 and the EF-140, this system could be substituted in emergency cases
by a manually operated. pump for the landing gear and the landing flaps and
by an additional electric generator. Kerosene could be pumped into the
hydraulic system to replace lost hydraulic oil.
25X1
d. The ejector seats were to be jettisoned upward with a speed of 18 G by
powder rockets. However, as the Soviets were incapable of constructing
powder-fueled rockets with a small operational tolerance, the ejecting
speed had to be set at 16 G, which did not guarantee that the crew would
get away from the rudder assembly. The bombardier was jettisoned down-
ward with a speed of 3.5 G.
e. The cabin was protected at the rear by an armored bulkhead, the floor
was provided with a splinterproof protection of 10 mm duraluminum, and
the seats of the pilot and of the radio operator were fitted with armor
against fire from 105 degrees to 255 degrees in flight direction. The
cabin was to be heated by a new heating system developed at OKB 1. If
this system should fail, the crew was to be warmed by electric heatin
combinations which were. to be fed from the 2)-volt power system. 25X1
one model of these heating'combinations which was very similar to
the ones used in Germany.
f. The armament included one turret behind the cabin with two 23 mm guns,
a tail gun position with the same armament, and two 23 mm guns in the
nose. The extendable tower aft of the cabin was constructed on the
basis of American design. The guns were of Soviet origin, and the aiming
device was a Zeiss-made periscope with crossed threads without a cal-
culating machine. Transmission was by an electro-hydraulic system. The
tail guns were directly operated by the gunner, who sat on a elevated
seat over the guns. In order to bail out, he had to open the hatch,
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which lowered and tilted the seat automatically. The rotable aiming de-
vice for the nose guns was above the instrument board and-included a re-
flector sight with cross hairs.
25X1
g. The air-ground interphone was a Soviet copy of an American model. The
dummy of the faired rotary antenna of the all-around search apparatus
was fitted under the fuselage forward of the front landing gear. The
dummy of the apparatus was installed between the pilot's seat and the
radio aperator0s seat.
the aircraft was equipped with a radio compass.
h. During the take-off performance, the rear unit of the tandem landing gear
was slightly retracted at a speed of 150 to 180 km/h, so as to enlarge the
angle of incidence about 1.8 degree. The front wheels of the landing gear
were synchronized with the operation of the rudder control at a ratio
three to one. Thus, the aircraft could easily be taxied in spite of the
tandem landing gear.
i. Two jettisonable Rato units were to be attached to both sides of the rear
fuselage. Details were not available.
j. Dive brakes were still being discussed, but
would be installed in the aircraft.
25X1
they 25X1
k. At first, original Liberator tires were used on the aircraft. Later those
tires were reproduced in a Yaroslavl plant. Tests with the EF-140 re-
vealed that the quality of the new tires was about 60 percent below the
quality of the originals.
1. Most of the instruments were Soviet copies of German models. They were
mass produced in the USSR. The three-dimensional autopilots and the
landing direction indicator were developed from American originals. The
oxygen apparatus with masks and the 02 automatic controller, radio helmet,
and the throat type microphone were German models in mass production in
the USSR. The signal equipment was copied from American models.
Fire Extinguisher
20. A new type of fire extinguisher was being developed by a group of experts
under Boris. von Schlippe.19 With a propellant powder charge acting as
catalyzer, carbon tetrachloride was to be heated and forced with high ve-
locity into the fire, blowing out the flames. This device was designed for
the engines and fuel tanks of the EP-150.
21. Between the fall of 1949 and the summer of 1950 an experimental series of
25 V-l missiles powered by two 180 kgp pulse jet units wear being constructed
at OPN 1. As the Leningrad plant, originally charged with this project, had
allegedly failed, OPN I was assigned the construction of the experimental
missiles. The V-1 was equipped with a pre-set automatic flight control, but
certain installations indicated that remote control was also planned for the
missile. Further information was not available.20
Helicopter
22. A small single-seat helicopter constructed at a plant in Leningrad was re-
assembled at OPN 1 during the summer of 1950. No .details could be obtained.
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Fuels
. Kerosene with a specific weight of 0.86 was the standard fuel used with the
turbojet power plants. Tests under cold temperatures revealed that at a,
temperature of -47 degrees C the kerosene turned cloudy and that saponifi-
cation started at a temperature of 54 degrees 0 below zero. This indicated
a sufficient degree of purity. The hydraulic oil, MVP-60, was a Soviet post-
war development. In quality it was below the German hydraulic oils, but it
was considerably improved during the period` reported on.
24. The duraluminum used at the plant was designated D 16 T. The T was said to be
the nomenclature for the plating. There was a bottleneck in the supply of
light metal, alloys of high stability. Even though there was a sufficient
quantity of duraluminum plates measuring I x 2 meters, at thicknesees of.0.8 >.m,
1 mm, 1.4 mm, 1.6 mm, and 4 min, a definite cutting was ordered. 25X1
25X1 German engineers were requested 'to 'produce metal plated
plywood. Steels of the Soviet types Kh G S A 30 and Kh GSA 40 (Xf CA or
XI'3 A) were available. Because these steels were very hard but albv very
brittle, they were not as well suited for aircraft construction as the less
rigid German steels. Other sorts of steel could not be suppled, even though
it was continuously requested by the German scientists. Steel was also under
strict economic controls.21 There was also a shortage of bronze alloys. There-
fore, bronze was frequently collected by Komsomol members. The supply of ball
bearings was sufficient. They were allegedly manufactured in Moscow. Compared with
Gsr*man -mada ')all bearings, the tolerances were unbelievably highs furthermore,
most of the balls were not evenly round. The quality of the bearings was not
improved during the period reported on. Copper wire with rubber insulation
and textile fabric cover wa&.__used for the oabliag of the aircraft. It filled
tie requirements set by an obsolete US standard. Pl glass, too, seemed to be
a bottleneck.. As the supply of new Soviet plexiglass was insufficient, old
German stocks had to be repressed. an engineer of the 25X1
Mikulin experimental team that experiments for the production of ceramic turbine
blades were still being continued in the Soviet Zone of Germany in July 1950.22
25X1
LII Airfield near Ramenskoye
25X1
25X1
25. The airfield between 1946 and the fall of 1947. It had two con-
crete runways which crossed. The TsAGI Institute was located about two kilo-,
meters northwest of the airfield. The LII Institute was housed in a former
tuberculosis sanatorium at the northeastern border of the f4.eld.23 The air-
field installations included two radar sets, one of which was probably P.
Dumbo set, the other one being an American lend-lease radar set on several
big trucks.
26. There were about 300 aircraft stationed at the field. 25X1
MIG=15s were observed for the first time .n 25X1
June 1947. The unit stationed at Teplyy Stan airfield was re-equipped with
jet aircraft by March 1949, and by mid?-'1949 all fighter units in the Moscow
area were obviously re-equipped with MIG-15s, since this was almost the only
type of fighter aircraft observed. The first Tu-10 was observed during
February 1947. The Tu-10 was similar to the Tum9 and was a version of the
conventional Tu?2, but was powered by two turbojet engines under the wings
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and one Nene jet engine in the fuselage, The Nene engine was installed in a
slanting position with the air intake opening in the upper section of the
fuselage, and the exhaust was under the fuselage at the place of the ventral
gun position. This type proved unusable, and the development was cancelled.
Main reason for this was the fact that the Nene, which was projected as an
auxiliary booster engine, could not be started during the flight. A four-
engine Ilyushin bomber, similar to the Type 10, and powered by four Jumo-004
turbojet engines fitted close to the underside of the wings, wab also un-
usable because the bending fatigue resistance of the fuselage ceased at a
speEd.of about 720 km/h, This project was given up in the fall of 194.7. The:e
were other versions of four jet Ilyu.shin bombers with the engines carried by
pylons and other types of engine mountings. Two Soviet duplications of the
Met-262 were subjected to test flights during 1947. Because of insufficient
flying characteristics this type was not placed into mass production. The
first Tu-4s with double-row radial engines, each fitted with two superchargers,
were observed, during May 1947. the airframe was a true 25X1
copy of the American B-29. Later was IearnecL that the production was
cancelled after about 600 aircraft were completed, because of frequent cases
of damage to the gears (sic).35 only 60 to 80 aircraft of the type Tu-v70
were allegedly constructed. Type 7, identified.as I1-17 was 25X1
flown until unserviceable and then not developed further, RIG-ys, powered
by two Jumo-004 engines and fitted with a nose wheel, and Yak-15s, powered
by one Jumo-004 and fitted with a tail wheel, were observed at the field.
Type 16 aircraft were designated. Lami6. There were also
two-seater versions of Type 16 which were allegedly being mass produced in
Tbilisi. Type 4 was said to be a MIG model which was test flown but was not
placed into large-scale production. There were two Type 5 aircraft available.
This aircraft,too,was allegedly not being mass produced. There were two or
three aircraft of the type designated"23 August 19471'stationed at the field.
These aircraft were used for various experimental purposes. Aircraft of the
US designation Type 15 were identified as La--17s They were not 25X1
being mass produced. In 1947 and in 1948,test flights were performed with the
Omega helicopter. There were three DE'S-346 type aircraft at the field. The
DFS-346s were parallel developments to the ones worked on by German. scien-
tists at OKB 2 of Zavod No 1. These aircraft were powered by one Walther
engine. The pilot flew in a sitting position. The aircraft were flown until
they were unserviceable. Type 23, an aircraft larger than the FW-199, was
remodeled and several versions existed. It was stated that this aircraft,
powered by two small double-row radial engines with superchargers, should
have reached an altitude of 13,000 meters. There was a cargo glider for
about 16 men stationed at III airfield. The glider was a high-wing mono-
plane with a small tricycle landin ear under the fuselage, very similar to
the Cybin model. At a laterda-be, two of these cargo gliders 25X1
at an airfield nea.~? Dmitrov.24 The Yak-9 was being tested for service as a
rocket carrier having six rockets, 60 cm long and about eight cm in dia
meter, mounted under the wings. Several dropable units were observed be-
tween October 1946 and October 19470 the remote cone 2 5X1
trolled bomb Fritz X which was being tested in ai,r-to -round launching and
control experiments. Various drop glide models with Mach No-gauge and
straight or swept back wings were used for experiments in supersonic regions.
During the period reported on, these experimental units had no power plants
and were merely dropped. E_ I 25X1
One of the drop glide models was painted
red and resembled very much a fighter aircraft. 25X1
I pulse jet engines and the Jumo=003
were test flown with the Tu-2. Several conventional planes were observed
carrying aerodynamic measuring devices as wing parts and parts of rudder
assemblies, eta, the 1'sAGI Institute for breaking point tests
with the EP-140 and a German remote-controlled missile with a come
putor in one of the rooms. V-1 missiles and 25X1
non-serviceable parts of V.ls were observed at the salvage dump.
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34.
25X1
flying activity when a fresh snow layer of one meter was
on the ground. The runway and a taxiway were cleared by a snow plow. The
snow walls at the side of the cleared runway and taxiway were marked, with fir
twigs 9 so the airfield was very easy to make out from above. The remaining
snow layer of about 1.0 cm was rolled with standard fi.eli,d rc l.ling machines to
a layer of about five centimeters. This clearing operation took about 3C hours
and was also continued during the night. In warmer weather or during ea;_rtly
thawIng periods, the runways and taxiways were dusted so as to permit simulated
combat flight activities at the field. During the real thawing periods, Teplyy-
Stan airfield, which had no taxiways and a loamy surface9 was un;-er^viceable for
three to six weeks due to the condition of the field. Conditions at Bork?`r air-
field were much more favorable, because the gravel-Alike subsoil qu.io;kly absorbed
the ice water.
Landing directives to the pilots were transmitted by panels at the larLd', rig T.
r -ordered the pilot to land right of the runway, 7directed him to the left of
th 4~runway9 and X signified "no landing". A yellow T indicated "no landing for
aircraft not stationed at the fieldO. The marks were laid out by the unit
flight administration.
Borki Airfield
36. Starting in raid-1949,,Borki airfield, located about five, kilometer,,,; south of
Kimry 6-52ND 3'17-20-E), was to be used as a test airfield for the e~q)sr?imental
plant:. The new airfield measured 1,500 x ?9000 meters and had an east west
runway, 1,200 meters long; covered with steel grids. The runway could easily
be extended about another 19200 meters. The subsoil of the field Was grave`.
Local flights with MIG--15e were observed is 1949 and 1950. Unconfirmed Soviet
statements indicated that some of the MIG.45s were already powered by 1Ma2
engines. 27
Vnukovo kt3.rfield
38.
d'h. S vlet lsrsaf scan _ .Induatr
25X1
39.
In 1948 and. 1949 the new commercial airfield, of Moscow., located in Vnuko-iro
(55?36119 37-1rE) 9 was to be extended to 4.5 kilometers in an east' went
direction. A. new runway, in approximately the same direction, was to be 3 to
3.2 kilometers long.
71Ya kcavt~ . 7hn ,t.r c V...., is f ie1 d
The airfield aa.t Dyatkovr. (56.-a28N, '37-26E) . was occuried by a unit equipped
with. Tu.=2s. There were about 200 I1L-2;s or Il40s9 covered with tarpaulins,
parked at the field.
..Ly-)U urieb of zne FUU-_L rxac. a maximum speed of 860 Inn/h to 880 Inn/h.
1,000 km/h was being designed or tested. the 7.949 and 09yi
The Soviets intended to have their fighter units re-equipped with jet air-
craft by 1951, and by the end of 1950 about 15,000 to 20D000 MIG-15s were
completed. No other type of jet fighter was produced at that time. It was
said in 1950 that a, Eavochkln type jet fighter with a maximum rased of
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25X1 4c. A bomber on the basis of sketches identified as 25X1
the Type 27 was being mass produced. This type was observed since about
early 1950 in the Podberezhe area. According to statements made by Hero of
the Soviet Union Colonel Pedor.ov9 the bomber was designed by Ilyushin and
was being quantity-produced in Plant in Moscow/Fili and in other plants.' 25X1
The bomber had a maximum speed of 820 km h to 850 km/h. On a visit to Plant
25X1 in 1947 or 19489 the plant was not engaged in mass
25X1 pro action, probably because it was being converted for the production of this
type of bomber.
41. There was a heavy bomber of the same category as the EP?=1.50. It was said that
this bomber was not in large-scale productiont which was probably the reason
why the Soviets urged the completion of the EP-l50. Engineers of the Tupolev
testing team stated that the production of such bombers was chiefly handi-
capped because of the lack of a suitable plant. These engineers respected
American bomber plants, which they know from pictures, 25X1
the production of the Tu-4 was rather primitive and seriously amper
lack of space.
142. Whether or not there was another type of bomber being mass-produced in
addition to the Type 27 was questionable. a formation
25X1
of eighteen twin-engine turbojet aircraft, possibly Type 279 with slightly
swept-back wings and full-view cockpit. A detailed description could not be
given9 but the aircraft was definitely not Type 17.t about the same time
25X1 a twin-engine Ilyushin et bomber, powered by two 29500
k ;p Mika.lin engines, was being tested9 25X1
25X1 There were small jet aircraft similar to the
MIG-99 the Yak-15, and the Type 26 in mass production. The large-scale pro-
duc-tion of conventional La and, Yak fighters and of Tu-2 and Pe-2 bombers
was brought to an end in 1947 and 1948. ~goduction of I1-2s and Il-lOs was
allegedly stopped at about the same time,
43. The following additional types of aircraft were observed over, the Moscow
area; Large numbers of Il-l2s and a few Li-2s (DC-3) flew in civilian air
traffic. Il-18s and T'u-70s were occasionally observed. The GST flying
boat,which was said to be still mass-produced in Taganrog,flew on scheduled
flights. Aircraft of the types MDR-69 MBR-29 and Pe-8 were never seen,
25X1 A-7 cargo gliders being towed by Li-2s and Tu-2s.
G-11 and KZ-20 cargo gliders were not seen. Ju-52s were sometimes observed
during 1950.-
44. Jet fighters for aircraft carriers were said to be constructed in Leningrad.
25X1
produced in Leningrad. There was no aircraft plant in Kimry. Captive
balloons were beizig constructed in Dolgoprudnaya. The chief plant for
aircraft tires was located in Yaroslavl. Double-row radial engines for
the La-9 and I1-12, and the duplications of a conventional Rolls-Royce
engine were allegedly mass-produced at the aircraft engine plant in Molo-
the designation XB-2 or another number. Flying boats were also said to be
engines of the Jumo-012 type were in large-scale pro ction in Ufa. Nene
and Derwent engines were mass produced in Leningrad.
25X1 45? the Soviet method of storing aircraft consisted of
s of aircraft parked out-
l
in
the preserving and the covering with taxa
Additional measures were n,ot required. Stocks of old engines
ors
d
.
o
were partially given to the satellites, particularly to Poland9 and China.
The remaining stocks were used for training purposes. Units equipped
with MIG-15s did not fly the jet aircraft often after their pilots were
retrained, but rather flew older t es of aircraft for their routine
25X1 flying practice. E__ 12 flying with MIG-15s was curtailed
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D
because of the shortage of turbojet engines, of the bottlenecks in the pro-
duction of blades, and because of the shortage of fuel. He was inclined to
believe that there was a shortage of fuel, rather than that large quantities
of fuel were being stocked,30
The Podberezhe Area
25X1
46. There was a radar station on top of the operational building on the lock of
the Volga dam. This station was equipped with a horizontally turning grid.
antenna, six meter's long, fitted with dipoles. Various radar sets with rigged
basket reflector were also there. Li-2 and Tu-4 aircraft generally repre-
sented the targets. the instrument was directed at
gun boats of the Volga flotilla and at sailing yachts on the Volga reservoir.
The yachts were communicating with the radar station via voice radio and
practiced measuring the field intensity. E_ I the radar sta- 25X1
tion was part of the Moscow air defense system and for the protection of the
reservoir located in the north. It was also possible that a radar school or
a testing station was located there.31
47.. A new plant was under construction on the Volga River near the r.eservoi.
The construction site extended about 1,500 meters along the Volga and was
about 1,000 meters wide. The work was done rapidly and wooden ramps were
constructed on the bank of the river, the railroad line to Dm.itrov was put
into operation again and extended into the plant area. The road to Dmitrov
was also extended into the plant area. Former SS members and about 4,500
German women worked on the construction of the plant, the road, and the rail-,
road line. The construction of the plant was started in May 1948 with a
work force of about 22,000 laborers, and by May 1949, two eight-to eleven-
story plant buildings were completed and in operation. Rumors indicated
that the plant was producing guided missiles.32
Partisans
48. Groups of partisans appeared in the Podberazhe area, but not as often as in
25X1 the Ukraine. frequent alarms because of these partisans.
49. During 1943 people in the Kimry area wore striken by a sickness causing
25X1
the Soviets made ex;,?eriments, dropping mice from air-
craft flying at altitudes up to 3a500 meters without doing any harm to the
mice. In case of war, mice were to be infected with cholera and typhoid.
Su~rmarY
50. Being aware of the fact that they were behind in. the field of technical
developments, the Soviets attempted to compete by large-scale production..
All their hopes to create a modern and superior air force were concentrated
on the development of jet en ines. Development and testing methods appeared
rather primitive,. and the work procedure of Soviet engineers was not system-
atized a New projects were started with much effort, but the prescribed
system was soon neglected, and the project was started anew in a different
fever and a loss of woight. It was called the Tula sickness by the Germans,
being merely a translation from the Russian. 25X1
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way. As there were no exact testing records being kept, much time and effort
was wasted until the result could finally be achieved. It is characteristic
of the Soviet mentality that they learn fast, but are not persistent enough
to get fully familiar with a problem. This was the reason for the failure
of many engineers at OKB I. However, in the field of duplicating foreign models,
the Soviets were extremely skillful. At the LII Institute 1
Soviets working on the reproduction of the B-29 the shrewd ?)(
and systematic manner in which these activities were performed. The constant
shortage of funds seriously hampered all processes considerably. It was not
clear whether these funds were actually available. The funds for each =project
were reduced in order to prevent embezzlements; hence, shortages of all sorts of
material occurred daily. One project which was carefully calculated by the
German experts and necessitated an expenditure of 150 millions rubles was re-
duced to 45 millions rubles after it was checked by all Soviet offices con-
cerned. It took weeks to convince the Soviets that 150 millions would actually
be required for the project. It was not determined whether the many bottle-
necks were caused. by shortages or by embezzlements and misplanning. These
critical conditions, being more of a general nature, were immediately elimi-
nated as soon as any higher government personalities became interested and
used their influence to further the projects. All difficulties were then
overcome, and within a short time, the Soviet engineers attained.a high degree
of efficiency. These conditions were characterized by the statement of a very
capable engineer of OKB I who, being asked why he did not become chief manager
at a plant, answered. "In the USSR the first director assigned to a plant has
to start with nothing and, since he cannot fulfill the high production quota,
he will. be replaced. The second director who can point out the critical con-
ditions under his predecessor is able to fill about 50 percent of the quota.
The third director can fill about 95 percent of the requested output, but he
has to go, because the fourth director finally has all the required authori-
zations from the government and is really able to run the plant. Therefore,
it does not pay to become plant director at a new plant, unless four or five
managers had previously been assigned to this job".
Comments.
1. During the war Major General M.M. Lukin was director of Aircraft Engine Plant
in Kazan.
2. This tends to confirm LII as designation for the experimental institute which
was previously referred to by the names of LOI, LY, and LIE, and which was
reported as the test stand for rocket power plants of Plant in Moscow- 25X1
Khimki.
3. See Attachment No. 12 for a chart of the probable organization of the Soviet
Aviation Industry.
This is contradictory to previous information indicating that aircraft models
were constructed at the TsAGI Institute.
5. See Attachment No. 1 for an. organizational chart of the Soviet Aviation In-
dustry. See Attachment No. 2 for an organizational chart of OPN 1. See
Attachment No. 3 for a list of personnel working at OPN 1.
6. Baade probably reported to Marshal Bulganin who, being a member of the
Politburo, had his off ice in the Kremlin.
7, The following construction bureaus are known by their location: Construction
bureau,Polikar-ov, located in Plant in Moscow, southwest of the central 25X1
airport, Construction office Kostyakov,for rocket engines,
located in Plant n Moscow. Construction office Yakovlev, located in
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the central airport. Construction office Tupolev, located in Plant 25X1
in Moscow, between Yausa River and Radio Street, in the same area as the
TsAGI Institute, Constru :ti Gn office Ilyu:shin, located in Plant No 240 at the
northeastern side of the Leningrad Road., opposite of the central. airport admin-
istrative bu.ildi ;, Construction office havochk~in, located in Plax~.t~ in 25X1
25X1
Mikoyan - Gurevich., located in Plant 0 In Moscow, opposite MAI near 25X1
Plant in Moscow, northeast of Leningrad road, about 1,5 kilometers
northwes or the Frunze administrative building. Construction office
Gorl i,
8. This confirms variousElinformation indicating that four-engine jet bombers
were observed at various places during 1948. If correct, the present Infor-
mation indicates that the four-engine Ilyushin bomber probably never went into
mass production.
The 1F-126 Lilly was a further development of a piloted Vm1 constructed at
Dessau. Merely a dummy of this missile was completed by 1945, and a wooden
model was constricted. in Dessau under Soviet supervision, After several
successful test flights,the aircraft crashed during a spot landing; and the
pilot, Mathias, was killed. The improved version of the Argus==Schmidt pulse
jet unit Jumo-2 26 had a thruat of 500 1;9.
10. The EP l32 was probably related to the EF-125, a Junkers design, A wooden
model was tested in the wind tunnels in 1945. It is believed that the Soviet
model was a rather close copy of the German original, as the wind tunnel in
Dessau was completely destroyed and the development could be continued only
on the basis of the exact data available. The.EF-125 was designed as a long-
range plane fitted with two turbojet engines at the side of the fuselage and
a pressurized cabin,
11. See Attachment No, 4 for a sketch of experimental model No 1 of the EF 1.
25X1
12. The theoretical range of 2,400 km is doubted., The maximum wing load at e,
take-off weight of 27,200, kg was 500 kg/sqm,
13. The center of gravity of 16 to 29 percent wou.ld have guaranteed a good sta-
bility of the lateral axis,
14. See Attachment No. 6 for a sketch of the EFyl40,
15. During the war the Soviets had no tracer ammunition for their larger caliber
aerial guns, and 7,6 mm Shkass MGs firing tracer ammunition were mounted on
the large guns for target adjustment.
16, The M-2 is probably a Mikul.in cony of the Jumo-012, This might explain
previous information, according to which the Jumo-012 project was no longer
worked on since the summer of 1948,
17,. This confirms the output data previously reported for the engines, but
contradicts the assumption of a previous report that the EY-'150 was to be
powered by Soviet versions of the Jumo-022 turboprop engines
18. There are discrepancies with regard to the height of the aircraft which,
according to the present report, is 8 to 8.5 meters, In previous reports
it was given as 7.5 meters. See Attachment No. 6 for a sketch of the stick
control of the EF-150. See Attachment No. 7 for a reproduction of the EF-150
instrument board. See Attachment No. 8 for a sketch of the EF-150,
19. Doris von Schlippe is known as an expert in fire prevention. He was d.e-
ported to the USSR in that capacity.
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I
20, It is doubted that this Soviet version of the V-1 should have been powered by
two 180 kgp pulse jet units, Another Soviet version of the pulse jet had a
thrust of 500 kg. Since this unit has probably failed, the Soviets might
have chosen two standard pulse jet units with a thrust of 300 kg each.
21. D 16 T is presumably similar to the American -aluminum alloy 24 S. The T
probably stands for the Russian word tv~(hard). It is possible that the
Soviet chromium-nickel and chromium-nickel-molybdenum steel alloys 30 X H 3 A
(30 Kh N ZA) and 40 X H M A (40 Kh N M A) are concerned.
22. This again indicates that the'Soviets are working on ceramic turbine blades.
It is assumed, however, that only steel allay blades are still being manu-
factured in large scale.
.23. See Attachment No. 9 for a location sketch of the TsAGI and LII Institutes.
24. These cargo gliders are probably Type 24.
25. See Attachment No. 10 for a sketch of the Teplyy Stan airfield (Moscow/Salarevo)
26. Borki airfield (52-27N, 39-=10E) is located near Lipetsk,north of Voronezh.
Since the airfield of Kletina, about five kilometers south of Kimry, is lot,
cated near the village Gorkiy, it is believed that source mistook Gorkiy for
Borki. See Attachment No. 11 for a location sketch of the airfield located
south of Kimry.
27, The MIG-15 is known to be equipped with two types of engines, a Soviet-built
Nene with a thrust of 5,000 lbs and an improved version of the Soviet Nene
copy with a thrust of 6,000 lbs. Nene engines have radial flow compressors,
while M-2s are axial flow engines. It is assumed that the improved version of
the Soviet Nene is referred to, as both engines, the improved version of the
Nene and the M-2, have a static thrust of about 6,000 lbs.
28. The information corresponds with conclusions drawn from various PT;Ws'infor-
mation,accord.ing to which the mass production of conventional fighter and
ground attack aircraft ended in 1948. Large-scale production of swept back
fighters and, Type 27 aircraft was started in early 1949. The construction
of various prototypes was also stopped in late 1948.
29. Possibly the M-29 because this engine was probably developed on the basis
of the Jumo?012.
30, The reference to storage methods for aircraft is probably true. The shortage
of jet engines, etc., as reason for the reduction flight hours is also
believable? however, it is pointed out that the Soviets tend to cut down. the
flight hours of their combat aircraft in war and peace.
31. This station is believed to be a sky observation set for experimental
purposes or for local air defense. A radar school or testing institute are
not known at the reported location. See Attachment No. 11 for a location
sketch of the radar station.
32. For a location sketch of this plant see Attachment No, 11.
33. comment, According to previous information,the EF-137 was a
single pulsejet without a pilot. The total weight of the airframe was
150 kg. The plane was reported to have a maximum speed of 1,000 km/hr
and a ceiling of 15 km.
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34. Comment: Type 27 has been identified as the IL-28.
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35. Comment: A similar statement on the r ted cancellation of Tu-4
procuc ion was made 1 21 These statements are 25X1
considered to be false; owever, they may indicate that the production of Tu-4s
was temporarily interrupted.
36. F- I Not identified. Probably should be spelled Bachtaa
Attachments: 12
1. Organizational setup of Opytnyy Zavod No 1.
2. Organizational setup of the group of chief constructors at Zavod No. 1.
3. List of personalities at Zavod No. 1.
4.. Sketch of experimental model No. 1 of the EF-131.
5. Sketch of construction model No. 1 of the EF-1440.
6. Sketch of the control stick of the EF-150.
7. Sketch of the instrument panel of the EF-150.
8. . Sketch of construction model No. 1 of the EF?150.
Location sketch of the TsAGI and LII institutes.
10. Location and layout sketch of Moscow/Salarevo.(Teplyy Stan) airfield.
11. Location and layout sketch of a new plant under construction.
12. Sketch of the partial organizational setup of the Soviet aviation industry.
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I :A
Organizational Setup of Opytnyy Zavo d Noo I
Finance
Minster
First Director
Ministry for Aviation Industry
Minister Testing Departmers
Flight Tests
Economics Manager
Chief Engineer
Kolkhoz fam, etc.
Acceptance
Department(OTK
Projecting and
construction offic
roduction dept. subp
;divided into workshop
Chief Technologist
and Calculator
Chief Engineer for
power supply and
heating
- - -- - Under the technical control of
-?-- Entitled to report directly to
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H
-4
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Organizational Setup of the Group of Chief Constructors
at Zavod Noe 1 in Podberezhe
Under the control of
Depending on close cooperation with
27
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SECRET
-2- Attachment 2
Legend for Attachment No. 2:
1. First Director.
2, OKB 2; Chiefs Roessing.
3. Central plant laboratory; Chief,, Eitner.
4. OKB 19 Chief, B.C. Baade.
5. Office Baade.
6. Chemical department.
7. Group '"" (Rockets).
8. Special office: radio equipment.
9. Measuring techniques,
10. Fire extinguishing department.
11. Breaking point testing department.
.12. Main department- statics
13. Main department,, fuselage construction.
Sub-departments: Fuel systems., power plant installation, radio equipment,
armament equipment., hydreu31c systems.. and miscelleanous
equipment.
14. Main department for wing construction.
15. Main department for servo equipment., remote controls., and hydraulic equipment.
16. Special office for aerodynamics and flight characteristics.
17. Projecting office.
18. Wind tunnel group.
19. Workshop No. 4: laboratory for hydraulic equipment.
20. Bid section.
21. Translation section.
22. Flutter test section.
23. Technical liaison section,.
24. Material procurement.
25. Scaling department.
26. Jig and fixtures construction section.
27. Type guidance.
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Personnel Workin At Zavod. No 1 in Ivankovo Podberezh?**
1. Special Office for Radio and Radar Eguirment
Chief: Dr. Wehde (Wede) (fnu)
Soviet assistant: Rabinovich (fnu.)
Engineer Mantay (fnu)
Engineer Ernst May
Physicist Kurt Schell
Foreman Lapiral.la (fnu)
Foreman Tschappert (fnu)
.2. Office for Measuring Techniques
Chief: Graduate Engineer Arno Geertz
Engineer Karl Gerasch *
Engineer Kraemer (fnu)
Foreman Karl Leonhardt *
3. Central Plant Laboratory
Chief: Graduate Engineer Heinz Eitner
Engineer Ernst Haeberle
Graduate Engineer Kurt Maedebach
Engineer Thiele (fnu) *
Engineer Askar Klein
Miss Anneliese Knoll
Engineer Rolf Schroeder
4. Group R. Rocket Engines
Chief:
6.
Chief:
Chief Engineer Fritz Werner
Graduate Engineer Harold Michaelis
Chief Engineer Kurt Schell
Graduate Engineer Herbert
Engineer Richard Stahl
(also
.Depatment for Fire Extinguishers
of the test stands)
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in charge of the test stand)
Graduate Engineer Richard Kahofer (theoretical expert for breaking
point tests)
Ludwig Hoffmann(also worked in the flight testing group)
Foreman Cassius Johnen (simultaneously chief of the pattern making
shop)
Graduate Engineer Walter Ballerstedt
Helmut Stegbeck
Aircraft Mechanic Paul Heerling (temporarily
Graduate Engineer Boris von Schlippe
Department for Breaking Point Tests
Chief: Graduate Engineer Justus Muttray
7. Chemical Department
Dr, Heinz Dunken
Dr. von Hilpert (fnu)
Dr. Sander (fnu)
Dr. Willi Burmeister
Dr. Phil. Walter Daniel
Chief: Hubert Emmerich, who was replaced by
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lAttachment 3
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Attachment 3
Dr. Walter Hahn *
Chemist Karl Rudat
Dr. Jahnke (fnu)
Chemist Steffens (fnu)
Gustov Kniestedt
Mechanic Henke (fnu)
8. Otdel Tekhnichesko~ntrolya_ (OTK)
(directly subordinate to the Ministry for Aviation Industry)
Soviet Chief; Filimanchuk (fnu)
Kovrin (fnu) )
N. V. Vinogradov
Otto Herzog
Perschk (fnu)
Engineer Otto Richter
Graduate Engineer Erich Werner
Personnel of OKB
andother Deartmenta with former Junkers Personnel
Engineer Baadens Office
Chief of OKB I:
Deputy:
Assistant;
Master mechanic:
Graduate Engineer Brunolf Charley
Engineer Fritz Freytag
Graduate Engineer Boris
Walter Schoenemann
Helga Bohm
Soviet deputy: Engineer N.N. Obrubov
10. Main. Department for Fuselage Construction
Mindach
Engineer Johann Haseloff
Bonse (fnu)
Paul Damann
Engineer Hermann Esther
Engineer Foerisch (fnu)
Engineer Heinrich Hadamczyk
Engineer Hans Leu
Engineer Franz Schubert
11. Subsection for the Installation of Fuel Systems and Engines in Fuselages
Chief: Graduate Engineer Georg Du Bois
Deputy: . Max Busse
Soviet deputy:
Kondratyev (fnu)
Engineer Walter Haas
Engineer Richard Kuehne
Chief Engineer Weiche (fnu)
12. Subsection for the Installation of Radio Equipment in the Fuselage
Engineer Otto Nagel
Soviet deputy: Simkin (fnu)
Engineer Wendolin Zindel
Fridolin Rinke
Martin Pansegrau
Engineer Bruno Lehmann
Engineer Alfred Keck
Erich Steeck
Eitel Steeck, brother of Erich
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I :A
Attachment 3
13. Subsection for the Installation of Guns in Fuselages
Chief: Graduate Engineer Gustav Steuerlein
Deputy: Engineer Franz Gremser.
Soviet deputy: Kulavzev (fnu)
14. Subsection for Land.in~ Gears
Chief: Fritz Reuss (his staff was composed of Soviet personnel only)
.15. Subsection for Miscellaneous Installations
Chief: Engineer Herbert Scheller
Schmidt (fnu)
Kraemer (fnu)
Engineer Scholz (fnu), installation of photographic equipment
16. Subsection for the installation of Hydraulic Systems
Chief: Engineer Jakob Antoni
Engineer Ernst Boettgez?
17. Main Department for Statics.
Chief:. Graduate Engineer Waldemar Guenther
Deputy: Graduate Engineer Edward Walzel
Soviet deputy: Feofanov (fnu)
Graduate Engineer Karl Aikele
Engineer Willy Bergmann
Engineer Bernhard (fnu)
Engineer Franz Josef Besinger
Graduate Engineer Kurt Boehme
Engineer Peter Bonin
Engineer, Alfred. Borgmann
Engineer Siegfried Gottschalk
Engineer Dietrich Har44'
Engineer Hil_lenbrandt (ffiu)
Assistant Master at School Kurt Koeppen
Engineer Guenther Koscielny
Engineer Otto Mattern *
Engineer Herbert Nebel*
Engineer Fritz Paasch
Graduate Engineer Herman Schmidt-Stiebitz
Graduate Engineer Hans Steinhardt
Engineer Wolff (fnu)
Graduate Engineer Wolff (fnu)
Graduate Engineer. Fritz Wolff'*
18. Main Department for Wig Construction
Chief:
Deputy:
Graduate Engineer Fritz Freundel
Engineer Goretzke (fnu)
Engineer Karl Heineck *
Engineer Hermann Kleinschmidt
Engineer Kramer (fnu)
Graduate Engineer (?) Schreuer (fnu)
Engineer Erich Schurz *
Engineer Franz Strobel
(a total of about 20 persons)
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Attachment 3
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19. Main Department for the Construction of Servo and Remote Controls and for
Hydraulic Equipment
Chief: Graduate Engineer Erwin Handke,an expert for servo and remote controls
Deputy: Graduate Engineer Johannes (Hans) Mueller,an expert for hydraulic pumps
Graduate Engineer Josef Heisig
Engineer Alfred Wenzlau, and other engineers
20. 4. Laboratofor Hydraulic Equipment
(works in close cooperation with the main department for hydraulic equipment)
Chief: Graduate Engineer Paul Keller
Deputy: Graduate Engineer Fritz Kramer
Engineer Alfred Bormann
Mechanic Franz Diener
Mechanic Gerhard Heinze
Pilot Fritz Horn
Heinz Albert Kube *
Josef Kunze
Engineer Willi Lehmann
Foreman Meissner (fnu)
Aircraft Mechanic Walter Moses
Engineer. Guenther Schroeter
Engineer Rudolf Ulrich
Fritz Tuchel, a precision mechanic
This laboratory also did the target adjustment on the armament'of the EF-150.
21. Special Office for Aerodynamics and Flight Characteristics
Chief: Dr. Backhaus (fnu), an expert in the field of aerodynamics
Soviet deputy: Alekseyev (fnu)
Graduate Engineer Hans Kornmueller
Graduate Engineer Walter Lehmann
German deputy: Dr. Engineer Hans Georg Schuhmann, an expert, for flight
characteristics
Graduate Engineer Hans Mix
Graduate Engineer Martin (fnu)
Graduate Engineer Martin Schrecker
Engineer Walter Schreiber
Busse. (Junior) (fnu)
Engineer Edgar Dannecker
Dreusch (fnu)
Engineer Paul Jaensch
Miss Irmgard Riedel
Engineer Walter Ternka
22. Office of the Chief Projector
(worked in close cooperation with the special office,for aero am'ics and
with the wind tunnel section.)
Chief: Graduate Engineer Hans Wocke
Deputy: Graduate Engineer Rudolf Renteln
The names of the staff were not remembered,
23. Wind Tunnel Group
Chief; Dr. Engineer Kuno Strauss
Deputy: Graduate Engineer Werner Hempel
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a
Attachment 3
_S_
Engineer Hans Dominik
Erich Naumann, foreman for turbojet engines
Graduate Engineer Werner Richter
Engineer Hilmar Stottmeister
24.
Section for Flutter Tests
Chief: Graduate Engineer Theo Schmidt
Mathematician Reck (fnu)
Mathematician Siegfried Schilling
Engineer Rolf Wild
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25. Group in Charge of Individual Types of Aircraft
An "escorting" engineer from this group was assigned to each type in construction.
Chief: Engineer Erich Wolf
Soviet deputy: Koslov (fnu)
Engineer Jakob Theobald
Engineer Erich Wessel
26. Flight Test Group for 01B I
Chief Pilot: Paul Juelge
Pilots: -Ludwig Hoffmann
Heinz Schreiber
Chief Pilot: Graduate Engineer
Pilots: Karl Treuter
Graduate Engineer
Hans Motsch,who never flew
Wolfgang Ziese
27. Procurement Section
Chief: Graduate Engineer Lothar Kindler
Soviet deputy: Zava Vlassov
Georg Steib, a draftsman
28. Translation Section
Chief translator: Engineer Bruno Marx
Miss Nelly Heissler
Miss Ingeborg Scheller
Mrs. Xenia von Schlippe
29. Office in.Charge of Technical Connections
This office established connections between the construction offices and the
workshops. .
Chief: Engineer Heinz Uhl *
Engineer Karl Cottin, probably succeeded Uhl
30.
Engineer Fritz Winkler
Engineer Karl Lange
Foreman Erich Richter
Procurement Section
Chief: Engineer Paul Beyer, died
Engineer Karl Butter
Engineer Werner Lueneburg,
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O
Attachment 3
Miss Edith Nickel
Miss Erika Thiel, who was arrested but then.releaeed to Germany
31. Technological Section
Soviet chief: Lasarev (fnu)
Heinrich Barnewald
Engineer Fischer (fnu)
Foreman Erich Koelling
Engineer Erhardt Russeck *
Engineer Theo Walkenbach *
. Loft Department
Engineer Paul: Zimmermann *
33. Department for the Construction of Jigs and Fixtures
Chief: Engineer Gerd Stollberg
Engineer Paul.Zuehlke
Naval Engineer Warndt (friu)
Graduate Engineer Goerasch (fnu)
34. Personnel of OKB I, whose positions are not known.
Albert (fnu)
Wilhelm.Grambaw
.Engineer Grieshaber (fnu)
Aircraft Mechanic Otto Horn
Engineer Otto Huth *
Engineer Albert Kempf
Graduate Engineer Loesch (fnu)
Willi Markwardt
Engineer Neffin (fnu)
Engineer' Riedel (fnu)
Willi,. Riess
Engineer Paul Roehr
Engineer Roessner (fnu)
Foreman Paul Ruschka
Engineer Schumacher (fnu)
Foreman Walter Seidel
Engineer Anton Steidtle
Engineer Herbert Stephan *
Engineer Paul Szyszka (Zscyska)
Foreman Teichmann. (fnu)
Assistant Master at School Josef Wacht,
Engineer Ludwig Wagenblas
Engineer Ernst Westerhellweg
Engineer Ferdinand Wieners *.
Engineer Robert Zang.*
Engineer Anton Zerressen *
35? Personnel of OKB II, whose positions are not known..
Engineer Helmut Balluff
Erich Bo.elkau,.*
Paul Cornelius
Engineer Helimut.Froehlich
Chief Engineer Philipp Graeff *
Graduate Engineer Otto Fauber *
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Engineer Hauel (fnu) *
Engineer Hans Hellrie?el *,
Foreman Jahn (fnu)
Engineer Jakob (fnu)
Engineer Jensen (fnu)
Karsten (fnu)
Fritz Keller
Aircraft Mechanic Heinz Klocke
Engineer Gerhard Koehn
Engineer Krieger (fnu) *
Foreman Georg Kuenzler *
Graduate Engineer Limbach (fnu)
Graduate Engineer Hans Machill
Engineer Karl Michel
Engineer Herbert Neumann
Engineer Hans Rudolf
Graduate Engineer Erich Siebert
Engineer Erhard Szucka (Sczuka) #
Engineer Otto Weileb
* Germans who have been released.
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Attachment 3
+~~/ vj/V~~++..~j Vi V=+/ ii[wuapP Vi VLJG 111LL.LV.LU.UF7,1D 1UV1LU1ULLVLL 1LL ULLLb a-nYvr109 CUILU. 1u
many cases their position, does not always agree with the information supplied
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Attachment 4
eximental Model No. 1 of the IW-131
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Attachment 5
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Construction Model No, 1 of the Soviet Jet Bomber EF=iLo
.c,
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SE/R.ET
Control Stick of the EF-150
Legend
1, Wheel brake lever.
2. Safety catch.
3. Firing control.
4. Thumb-operated control for tail plane.
5. Control button for landing gear.
6. Control button for voice radio and tuning device.
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Attachment 6
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 Approved For Release 2006/04/18 CIA-RDP82-00457R013400180010-7
SJRET
Instrument Panel of the EF-150
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Attachment
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 Approved For Release 2006/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457RO13400180010-7
1. Reflex sight with rigged cross wires, no computor
2. Mach meter, unusable Soviet make with conversion table
3. Air speed indicator, Soviet copy of a German model
4. Variometer, Soviet copy of a German model
5. Telecompass, Patin system
6. Emergency compass, Soviet model
7. Revolution indicator for left engine, Soviet copy of a German model
8.. Revolution indicator for right engine, Soviet copy of a German model
Gas pressure indicator, dual device for both engines, Soviet copy of German
model
10. Clock with electric heater, type Kirova, Soviet model produced in the Kirov
clock factory
11. Turn and bank indicator combined with artificial horizon, Soviet copy of a
German model
12. Combined altitude indicator with a thousand-meter scale in window opening,
Soviet duplication of a German model
13. Landing sight and glide indicator, Soviet copy of a US instrument,
14. Gyro-half-compass, Soviet copy of a US instrument
15- Gas temperature. indicator for right and left engine, Soviet copy of a German
16. model
17. Indicator for the bearing temperature at both engines,.,Sovie.t copy of a
German model
18. Automatic controller for the oxygen apparatus, Soviet'cony of a German device
19. External temperature indicator, Soviet copy of a German model
20. Electric bank and turn indicator, Soviet copy. of a German model
21. Altimeter of type ruG 101, with precision measuring up, to 600 meters and
rough measuring up to 2,000 meters, Soviet copy of'German instrument..
22. Radio.compass, Soviet copy of a US model
23. Course indicator with radio direction finder or three=axis contro,l,Soviet.
copy of a US instrument
24- Combined indicators for the kerosene and oil pressure at each engine,.Soviet
25. copy of a German model
26. Combined instrument measuring the external pressure and the pressure within
the cabin, Soviet copy of a German model
27. Switch for cabin illumination and infra-red illumination for instrument
board, Soviet copy of a German instrument
28. Lamp for the de-icing heater
SECRET
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_3_
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29. Alert switch for Rato units; the starting of the units will be effected by
the control stick.
30. Fire extinguisher for automatic operation with thermostats, or for manual
operation
31. Indicator for oil temperature at the air intake and exhaust opening
32. Indicator for oil temperature at the air intake and exhaust opening, Soviet
copies of German models
33. Indicator for hydraulic pressure of the hydraulic system and the tank, Soviet
copy of a German model
34. Auto pilot control; the auto pilot was copied from US models.
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Construction Model No. 1 of the EF--15O
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Attachment 8
Legend
1. Splinter protection of 10 mm duraluminum plate
2. Armored bulkhead of steel
3. Rotatable antenna of radar landscape scanner
4. Pr6tective cap for rotatable antenna
5. Suspension for Rato units
6. Brake
7, Window for rear gunner
8. Aerodynamic device to decrease vorticity
9. `Nose guns
10. Outrigger landing gear turns and folds into engine nacelle
Section of fuel tank
11. Fhiraluminum plates, 4.mm thick
12. Spars
13. Tubes of duraluminum, 0.4 mm thick, about 8 cm in diameter
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Attachment
Location Sketch of the TsAGI and LII Institutes
Kratovo Railroad Station
Ramenskoye Railroad Station
Scale - about l: 50,000
Legend:
1. Runway,, about 1,000 meters long, being extended to 2,500 m, and 75 m wide,.
2. Runway, 1,600 meters long and 60 meters wide.
3. Taxiway.
4. Hangars.
5. Church on a hill.
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 SECRET
Attachment 10
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Sketch No. 1
Location and Layout Sketch of Moscow/Salarevo (Tep1y Stan)
Airfield
Scale: About 1:10,000
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Legend to Sketch No. 2
1. Concrete runway, 800 meters long and 45 meters wide.
2. Runway with steel grid surface, 600 meters long
3. Concrete parking area for aircraft.
4. Instrument workshop in a bunker, 5 x 6 meters.
5. Armament workshop in a bunker, 5 x 6 meters.
6. Workshop in a bunker, 5 x 6 meters.
7. Fuel dump.
S. Fire department, 4 x 5 meters.
9. Meterologicalstation, 4 x 5 meters.
10. Hangar, 40 x 60 meters.
li a Collective farm.
Attachment 10
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I
location Sketch of OPN I and the New Plant der Construction
Plant Layout of the New Plant Under Construction
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Attachment 11
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Attachment 11
Legend
Sketch A Location sketch of OPN 1 and the New Plant under construction
1.
Airfield
2.
Experimental Plant No 1
4.
Road with a tunnel under the Volga River and connection to the road to
hrmitrov.
Lock with radar istation
New plant under construction
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Sketch B:- Plant layout of new plant under construction
Labor camp, which is surrounded by a fence
Twelve-story plant building
Eight-to.ten-story plant building
Labor camp
Three-story apartment houses
Construction site
Approved For Release 2006/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457RO13400180010-7
 25X1.
Approved For Release 2006/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457R013400180010-7
SBJ RET
Attacbment,
Pax tial Cr a i at~ona~ Sets 2 of the Soviet
Aviation Tnqg
Approved For Release 2006/04/18 : CIA-RDP82-00457RO13400180010-7