JPRS ID: 8197 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

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3 JANUARY i979 ~ i OF i
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" I-OH 01-i-1 C1NL US~ UNLY
JPRB L/ 819 7
~ 3 January 1979
~
TRANSlATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
CFOU~ 1/79)
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATI4NS RESEARCW SERVICE
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NU'TE
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BIDLIOGRAPHIC DATA ~epore No. JP~ L/ 8~97 2. Necipient'~ Acce~einn No.
SHEET
, u r rn , u tit e epott ~te
' TRANSLATION5 ON USSR MILITARY AF~AIR5, (FOUO 1/79) ,~y~~
6.
7. Auchor(.1 e. Nor(ormin6 Ors~ni:~tion Repe.
9. Petlamine Ora~nis~tion Nrme ~nd Addre~~ 10. Pro~ect/T~~~/pork Unit No.
- JoirC Pubiication~ Reeearch Sarvice
1000 North Clebe ROad 11. Cootnet Gnnt No.
Arlington, Virginia 22201 -
12. Sponrorin` OrR~ni:~tion N~me ~nd Addte~� 13. Type of Nepat k Period
Covered
A� above
t~.
iS. Supplementuy Nae�
16. Ab~tacts
The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense
eatabliahmente, leadership, doctrine~ policy~ planning, political affaire,
organization. and equipm~ent.
. Key xor s~nd Ooeumeac Awlr~i~. w De~cripton
USSR
Military Organi~ations
Military Facilities
Military PersonnPl
17`. IdencJ~ers/0pen-Endcd Teras
17t. COSATI ~ield/Gtoup 15C
1~. Ar~~l~bil~cr Seneecat crritr I~is ( i~ I1. o. of P~jes
fOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Limited Number of . a`~�~`~ ~ 41
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. TH6 FORM MAY BE IIEPRODUCED
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JPRS L/8~.97
3 January ].9 79
TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
cFOVO ~/79)
CONT~NTS PAGE
Development of Soviet Civil Defense System Analyzed
(Erich Ferdiaand Pruck; OSTEUROPA, Dec 77) 1
Encyclopedia Entry: Testiag of Military Equipment
(N. N. Alekseyev; ~SOVETSKAYA VOYENN.IYA ENTSIIt~.OPEDIA,
_
Vol 3, 1977) 15 ~
Civil Defense Fon~atious Coping With Natural Calamitiee
(FORKIROV~NIYA GRAZBDANSKOY OBORQNY V BOR'BE SO
STII~iI~fNYI~iI BEDSTVIYAI~R, 1978 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO)
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AEVELOPI~NT 0~ SOVIET CIVTL DEk'ENSE 3YSTEM ANALYZED
Stuttgart OSTEUROPA in Germa~n Vol 21 No 12, Dec 77 pp 1057-1068
' [Article by Erich Ferdinaad Pruck (born 1897} Colonel (ret), military
- acience wri.ter, lecturer, tranelator; Goslar, FRG: "Civil Defense ~n
the Soviet Union"~
[Text] In the autuma of 1972, Col Gen A. Altunin, who today is aCill the
head of the Main Administration for Civil Defenae in the Defense Minietrq
of the Soviet Union, wrote an article in the army organ entitled "An Com-
bat Alert" (KZv,., 4 OcCober 1972). [Please see appendix for abbreviations.]
Yn thst article he referred to the decree "On Air Defense In The Territory
Ot The USSR," which ~as iesued ou 4 October 1932, 40 years earlier, by the
Council of People's Commiaeara (Sovnarkom), as the birthdate of "civil de-
fense." This term, of couree, has existed as such only since 1961; until
thea, this institution Was called PVO, meaning "air defease." In a sub-
~ sequeat azticle, eatitled "Maia Phases and Tendeacies in Civil Defense"
(VIZh, Nove~miber 1976, pp 39-47), Altunia weat all the way back to Lenin
~ho, euppoaedlq as long ago as in 1905, noted that "the peoples are now
making ~?ar" and wfio in 1918 a].ready pointed up the "significance of the ~
hinterlaad as far as modern warfare is concerned." The population re-
portedly aas mobilized for defensive precautions whenever enesp aircraPt
approached Petrograd during World War I. Duriag Civil War (1918-1921),
cities thre~tened by enemq aircraft took local protective measures. The
historian Col of Reaerve A. Belyayev reported that Petrograd had a perma-
nent air defense ayetem ia an article entitled "The Development of the
~ Country's PVO, 1918-1941" (VIZh, No 8, 1973, pp 89-94). At that time the
idea vas to provide protection against TNT and poison ga8 bombs dropped
from aircraft. Fear of gas attacke during thoae years seized the people
- no lees thaa fear of ato~mic war to~aq, maintaias Werner A. Fischer ia
"Doraorge in Rot" (l~uaich, 1966, p 19), making reference to aa articla
publiehed in VOYENNIY VESTNIIC (Defease Herald), No 17. 1932. _
Air defease measures from the very beginning ~ere takea in terms of tvo
different defease categories:
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1. The armed forces engage in active air defenae (PVO)~ ueing special
~ units and the correeponding weapona syetems.
2. Local civil d~fense (1IPV0) handlea paesive defense, in other worda,
the pro~ect~~n of the population and targets.
Both categories depend on the same air observation, w~rning, and reporting
sysCem (VNOS). SO~VETSKAYA VOYENNAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIYA (SVE), Moscow~ 1976,
Vol II, pp 163ff., reports on the development of this VNOS network which ~
emerged from rather primitiive beginninge and which is today highly recog--
nized and spread over the e~tire territory of. Lhe War~aw Pact countries. -
The possibilltiea for info~mation procureme:~t in keeping with time and
situation requirementa ae we11 as tha rapid forwarding of data received
were ia~proved considerably due tio the auComation of the telecommunicatiions
syetem which extensively relies ~n radio electronica (SVE, Vol I, p 76f.).
The Soviet Un~.on .conCinuea to ~vork in this fieY.d and k~eepe up with, devel- ~
opments in the Weet. A bo~k authored by V. A. Baranyuk and V. I. Vorobyev,
enC3tled "AvtomaCizirovannyye sistemy upravleniya shtabov i voyennykh utares~-
hdeniy" (E+utomated Guidance Systems), Moscow, 1974, in a special chapter in-
vestigates "The Automated Systeme of PVO direction in the Uaited States"
and in the NATO area. Knowledge derived from such analyses is used aa ~
foundation fox work oa the problems of "scientific prediction in war"
which M~oecow gives careful consideration (Yu. V. Chuyev, Yu. B. Mikhaylov,
_ "Prognoairovaniye v voyeunom dele," Moscow, 1975; see also OSTEUROPA, No 5,
1975, pp A 547ff). Marshal of the Soviet Unioa Sokolovakiy wrote the
following in his boak "Mi].itaer-5trategie" [Military Strategy] (3rd Editioa,
German, Cologne, 19!69, p 438): ~
"Because the supreme air defense command has the most comprehensive da~a
on the air aituation and because it therefore also caa best ~udge the dar~-
ger of an attack on a particularly important point, it must inform the
correepon~ing civil defense agencies which in turn ~aill inform the popula-
t 10t1.
Development of Paesive Air Defense
The pasaive air defenae measures, taken during World War I, during the
Civil War, and during the year thereafter, iavolved actions by self-
protection aesociations which sprang up locally in a epontaneous maaaer
or which have beea set up by eager party organs. The issue of gas masks
to the population in threatened parts of the country began in 1920.
Techaicians begnn to look iato the problem of ahe~ter construction. The -
author remembers having read an illustrated article on air raid shelters
in urban reaidential blocks ia a military-technical ~ournal of the USSR
duriag the middle of the tweatiea. The article recoamended that a shePt-
metal pipeline be extended from air-tight rooms over the roof aad that
freah air be pumped manually through that pipeliae into the basement.
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The I~VO complex received itap~atus and more epecific form from 1927 on
Chrough ~he "socieCy for tha Prrnnotion of Defenae and Aero-chemical Devel- '
opment" (Osoaviakhim) whose gGtivitias are promoted from Cha Cop dawn aad ~
which ie organized throughour national territory. ;
~ternatioaal teneion, setting in during the thirties, c~used the Soviet ;
govarnment--advieed by military leadera auch 8s Tukhachevskiy acd othera--
to boos~ ixs defenses. AB par~ of thia undertaking, the entire territory
of acCive and passive air defens,e--by decree of the Council of P~ople's
Commiesare (Sovnarkom) of 5 ApriX 1932--was transferred to the People's ~
Commiesariat of Army and Navy Affnirs which on 20 July 1934 was converted
into tha People'e Commiseariat of Aefense. A"PVO adminieCration of RKKA"
(Rabochye-Kreatyanskaya Krasnaya Armiya--~Red Workcr and Peasaat Army) was
eet up in Che People's Crnnmiseariat for Army and Navy Affairs. Only +~he
4 October 1937 Sovnarkom decree led to the adequate clarification of the
areas of competenue and the missions. The Swiet administrative machiaery ~
still works buseaucrgtically and in a rather cumberaome manner also in the .
defeuse sector. It coastantly needa new impetus to remain in motion.
> The modernization of the weapona syatema, which had become neceasary, was
also intended to raise the PVO and the technical facilities of the VNOS
network to a lavel in keeping with Che requirements of the timea. Pre-
c$utione wer~~ taken for the employment of 1~V0 in case of war in those
border regione which were particularly aeriously threatened. The party
and Komsomol (~fouag Communist League] organizatione, Che labor unions,
and the ether mase organizationa, especially Osoaviakhim, the Red Cros~s,
and the Red Crescent were also involved in this effort. 'I':~e PVO head-
quartere ~a the pertineat border defense district took care of management
and aesumed reaponsibility. The program iavolved the following: `
Preveative aaeaeurea to keep the national economy going ia case of war;
Coping with the effects of bombing raida as well as the employment of
chemical aad bacteriological (biological) warfare agenta;
Eatabliahment of inedical, rescue, aud damage control aervice in wartime
bui: alao in disaster zaees;
Preparatiaa of an air raid warden aervice which would go into action ia
caee of panic, disturbancsa, destruction, and law violat~ons aaci which,
for example, would have to see to it that uncontrolled streams of refug-
eea would not interfere arith the mobiliz::tion or movemeat of troops and
with intended asaiat~ace operationa (see NATO-Brief, No 1-2, 1971, p 13j;
Propaganda and political-ideological indoctrination and instructioa of
tH~ populatioa as to rules of behavior in wartime;
Traxniag of personnel earmarked for MPVO duty ia their operational areas,
PVO practice alerts and exerciaes.
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~ The planned establi~tunent of "civilian self~protection gYOUpe" (druzhiny)
' wae begun ~i the reeidential districta of ma~ox citiee or in industrial p
pla~nte and other places of work locatRd in presumably threatened areas;
i,n caee of an air raid a1er~, theae groups wera immadiately to go inCo
act3,oa ~.n accordanGe with ~t?a ineeructione conCained in ttre operatione
program. 1'rotective cloChing and equipmen~ were readied. In the rest of
~he aation'e Cerritory, the effort was confined nearly to informative pro-
paganda. Miscellaneoue precautionary meaeures were left up to local init-
iative. According to Che hietorian A. Belyayev (loc. cit.), obligatory ~
MPVO training courses for members of the "civilian self-pro~ection group"
~ were instituted by the Soviet authoritiea in 1935.
Civi1 Air Defanse in World War II ~
At the beginning of Wor1d War II~ direction of passive air defense ~1~V0)
was transferred to ~he NKVD (People's Commiseariat of the Interior), to
relleve the burden on the People's Commiesariat of Uefense; ehe NKVD for
this purpoee ~stabliehed a"MPVO main gdminietration."
Aft+~r the iavaeion of the Soviet Union by German troops, Sovnarkom decree
No 1812 was iseued on 2 July 1941; it was entitled "On the General Duty `
to Train the Populatioa for Air Defense" (Zakonodatel'stvo voyennogo vre-
meni, Moscow, 1941, p 22). All men not serving in the armed forces or
oChexwiae exempt from wartime duty, between the a~,es af 16 ana 60 aad
women between the ages of 18 and 50, had Co participate in 1~V0 activitiea
according to that directive. The I~VQ maia admiaistration of the NKVD
saw to it that the neceasary meaeurea were taken. By 1942, more th-an 6 ~
taillion people were in the 1~V0 formationa (A. B~lyayev, VI2h, 1, 1975, '
pp73-77, see also fu~ther statistica there). Professor R. S. Teltukhovskiy ~
d~acribes MPVO duty as follaws iu his historical work entitled "Velikaya ~
Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" ("The Great Fatherland
War, 1941-1945"), Moscow, 1959, p 67:
"During the fi.ra~ days of the ~ar, the Moecaw regional party co~mittee and
the regional soviet [counci.l] of wor.ker deputies took urgent measurea to
ozganize the protectioa of factories, eZectric pow~er plants, telegraph
and telephoae comm~unications, and to prepare the population for air de-
fense. In Moscoti.~ aad in other citiea near the border, the Soviet people,
under the directioa of the local party organizationa, placed industrial
~~nterprieee and goverament officea under their protectioa and created a ~
"lxal air defense" ('1~V0). The Muecovitea established 1~10 facilitq
uaitaz self-protection groups, as well a~ air defense and chemical defenae ~
posta (PVI~C) iu everq eaterprise, iu every government agencq, and in all .
~ reeidential buildiage. According to a resolutioa by the Mosco~ citq cam- '
mittee, a epecial regiment vas organized for fire-fightiag purposea. The :
varioue borough fire-fighting companies ~ere reinforcad." +
?~'V0, ~hi~h wae directed by the NKVD during World War II, according to
Swiet information during those yeara certainiq proved itaelf--for example,
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in Stalingxad, duxing the fighting for the city, and in Leningrad (Belyayev,
VIZh, No 1, 1975, A1,~unin, VIZh, 11, 1976).
Air De~enee in tt?e Atomic Age
A.~Cer the ~~rminaCion of combat opaxaCiona in World War II, the Soviet Union--
which had been ahocked by Che effect of American atomic bombs dropped on
Japaneae cities--imwediately began Co put the pxactical lessona learned
through MPVO in wartime to use in order �urther to expand the air defenae
syatem. So long as Moecow was indetsrminably behind on the development of
_ nuclear weapons and delivery vehiclea, it kept assarting that atomic war,
with its catastrophic ~��ecCs, could no longer be a means of policy. After
Sputnik and Che TCBM, the concep~ was changed. In propaganda terms, we
, first witneased a phase ~f pooh-poohing the effective nuclear weapons strikes.
Theu the thesis was put out to the effect thae the vastness of Soviet ter-
ritory, the decentratization of personnel and material, r~nd the political-
mo=~al euperiori~y of the better-disciplined and more class-conscious Soviet
people added up to Che Sovie~ Union's superiority over any potential foe
(see OSTEUROPA, 8-9, 1965, p 590; 2, 1964, p 120).
The MVA (Interior Miniatry), which sprang from the NKVD, remained the over-
a11 ci-~1 ~~efense coamiand authority. From 1955 onward, defensive measures
taken ao �ar againat the threat from the air w~ere extended to protection
against effecta c~f nuclear mi5sile employment. That ia when the authorities
began to make evacua~ion plans. These related to organizationa, government
agencies, enterprises, and finally all papulatian aegments not locally em-
ployed or nsed~d, in other words, moatly children and older people. The
problem ae to how the national economy could be kept going was contemplated
on a larger 3cale. The DOSAAF (All Union Voluntary Society for the Pramo-
tion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy)--which had been established in 1948 as
~ the succesaor organization to Osoaviakhim and which was compleCely organized
~ by 1951--from 1955 on again, together with Red Cross and Che Red Creacent,
i ave iaasa trainin caursea
8 g ~,mparting basic knowledge on I~VO taeks (see
"Civil Defense qgainat NBC Weapona in the USSR," OST-PROBLEME, No 8, 1960,
PP 226-232).
By the end of the fifties and the beginning of the s3xties--"when imper- -
i.aliat circlea in the United Sta:es and NATO pursued the adventurous pol-
icy af balancing on the brink of war and of a crash anas race and when
their output of nuclear weapons increased," as Altunin put it in VIZh
(Military-Historical Journal), ~io 11, 1976, p 44--active and passive air
defense were further boosted. At that time, the "Strategic Rocket Forces"
appeared ae a new armed forces componenr in the national defense structure.
Becauae of the tremendous range and destructive power of its long-range
a:td intercontinental nuclear missiles, they ushered in a new epoch in ~
weapons technology, in the theory of warfare, and in combat operationa
aince they ~ere auitable for employment on both o~fensive and defensive
combat missions, including direct defense agaiast enemy missiles. On top
- of th$t we have their political-propaganda value as a means of deterrence,
threat, an.d blacl~sil.
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We will only brief~.y re~er here ~o the futuxe-oriented space stratagy which ~
hae already been included in m~,liCary planni.ng (aee OSTEUROPA, No 7, 1976,
p 567) and whi,ch operates with killer sat~llites; we might also briefly ,
men~i,on hera the euD~ec~ o~ laser technology which is currently being pur- -
~ued emphaticAlly in sc:ienCiPic research and with whoae help cosmic or '
other flying attack ob~ecta are to be destroyed. Thia kind of ovarview
showe how things ~it in~o place and how every attack weapon which happens
Co come out (or which ie onl~y indicated in outline) immediately cauaes
counCermeasurea and new defenaive devices. ~
The "Revolution in Warfare" (OSTEUROPA, No 8, 1965, p 528f.), broughC about
by the develapment o� nuclear weapona and noteworthy technicsl advances in
the area of convent3anal arms, provided fresh impe~us for defenee thinking
in the Sovi.et Union in several reapects. In July 1961, for example, as part
of the switch to changed combat conditiona r~nd security requiremenCs, as
we11 ae the deteriorating military-political aituation and the ob~ectives,
Che pasaive MPVO complex was organized as "main administration for civil
defenae" and placed with3n the Defense Ministry; guided air defense systeaas
weze also taken over thus and gradually inte~raCed here. The main admin-
istra~ion was taken over by a"chief of USSR civil defense." Next came
the establishment of aubordinate administration and departmenta which init-
ia11y handled the integration work. The DOSAAF inagazine VOYENt~`.'YE ZNANIYA
(Defense Science) was deaignated as the civil defense h~ulletin. It has now
become important for all organizations and persons active in this aector
as a resulC of the expaiision and growing aignificance of ~his apecial field.
To stimulate ~he duty performance enthuaiasm of asaigned p;~rsonnel, rheir
work reaults are included in the ayatem of socialist competitian and the
PVO decoration in the form of a clasp has been awarded for particularly
outstanding achievements.
We can read the follawing passage in a book wr~tten in Mqscow in 1964 by
S. N. Koslov and othera, entitled "0 swetskoy voyennoy nauke" (On Soviet
Mili.tary Science), Moscow, 1964, p 390f:
"The establisluaent o~ so-called civil defense must be tez~ur:d a new and
important phenomenon in war today. In modern war, the div~ding lines be-
tween the front lines and the hinterland disappear more and more. Combat
operations can develop along the fronC lines and deep in rear areas. Mi.s-
sile units and the air force can carry out nuclear missile strikes against
targets in the hinterland. Air forces however can also carry out conven- ,
tional bombing raids. The er~emy can drop airborne tra~ps far behind the
fighting forces. Sometimes strong groups of enemy armored or mechanized
~ormatione maaage to achieve deep penetration. This is why the hinter-
land must be armed and in a position to beat off attacks by sirborne ~
troops and divereionary units and engage enemy tanks, which have broken
through, with its awn reaources.
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~~i.vi~l Defense P:xpana~,on
At the end oE ~964, Marehal of the Soviet Union V. T. Chuikov took over
ci,vi,1 defen~ee afrer he h~d loet ~he poaition of auprema commander of the
ground forces in OcCober~oP ~ha~ year followin~Ch.rushchev's ouster. He
held that poei~iom unCi1 1971. Hia successor is Cul Gen A. Altunin who was
p~omoted to army general on 16 February 1977 (KZv., 17 Fabruary 1977).
When military r.~eforms became poesible after Khruehchev's departura ac head
of govarnment (eee OST~UROPA, il 197~, p A-543), a new dri?ft law was passed
tn October 1967 (KZv., 13 October 1967). T.ts Areicle 18 spec3fiea that
genexal civil defenae eervice training must be included in the program of
the nswly-iYttroduced 2-year oblfgatory premilitary training for youth. In
a pamphle~ wriCten by him and enCitled "Grazhdanakaya oborona v rakeCno-
yadernoy voyne" ("Civil defense in nuclear rocket war"), Moacow, 1968,
Chuilcov liete tha individual defenae posaibilitiea exiating in addition to
the collactive one. Correcit individual behavior in any siCuation pre- -
auppoaes fami,liari~y with the individual threats. It is suppoaed to be
the task of ineaniagful propaganda and training to impart these defens:Lve
skills and knowledga. On that poinC, the marshal has this to eay:
"It is the duty of radio and television, the presa, the moviea, the cul-
tural enlight..~~ent services and the social organizations to preaent civil
defenee knowledge to the masses and conatantly to expose ths aggreasive
sssence and i,nsidioua intentions as well se actioas of the imperialist
zobbers and to malce it clear to the peopla what kind of a situation has
axisen."
He furthez atates that special attention must be devoted to the ideolog-
ical and ecieatific level of progaganda aad trai�ning matexials. Agitation
must be made more impreasive through practical iastruction. Civil defense
exhibits ia ind~uetrial and agricultural enterprises, houaea of culture,
cluba, aad in recreational areae could aerve as ia.formation and advieoscy
agencie$. Tn his pamphlet (pp 13ff.), Chuikov divic3~s the primary mis-
siona of ci,vil defense into three gr.oupe. Altunin took that arrangement
over and aupplemented it in keeping with current developments (VIZh, No
11, 1976, pp 44-45).
Accordi.ngly, the firat group iacludea all precautions to be taken for col-
lective aad individual protect3on of the population againat mass destruc- ~
- tian weapons and other warfare agents, along ~ith shelter cAnstruction,
evacuat~an aad decentralization in heavily populatec~, threatened regiona,
the procurement o� gas masks, oxygen equipment for respiration, protective
clo~:hing, medical measures, and the eatire traiaing and information com-
plex in the cities and in ~the rural areas. Altunia probably does not apec-
ifically mention chemical and bacteriAlogical (biological) warfare ageats
becauee an international agreement, signed in April 1972, bans ths prodec-
tion, develupment, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and
toxic chemical warfare agenta and calls for ths destruction of existing
stockpilee (KZv., 11 April 1972). The danger of radioactive contamination
7
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conti.nues to exiet. The negotiationa on the elimination of Che abuae of
naturai forcea and the development of new and more dangerous warfare agents,
e~uggeeCed in 1975 (SOW'JETUNTON KEUTE, No 18, 1975, pp 14 and 29), revea].
that work eon~inuea to be done ~.n this field and that one muet expect Che
poeeib~,l3ty of ~ha employment of such Wax~gre ggente. Treaty concepts fra-
quent],y can De intierpre~ed in d3tferent waye, as paet experience has ehown.
, The meaeures in the aecond group relate to the protecCion of tihe national
~conomy in wartime. The most important thing is to keep induatrial and
agricultuxal production goi.ng. 'rhe resolu~ions later on adopted in Chis
connection by the 25th Party Cangreas, as Altunin wriCea, call for gen-
er~l governmen~ organization changes and regional. disconnections in this
aector and ara menCioned emphatically although no details are given.
The third group includea everything relaxing to the repair o� damage
caused, as we11 as the allocaCion of suitable manpower and Che guarantee
of amooth operation. This ia obviously aimed at the employ~?ent of the
police unite and their auxiliary organs which are not included in the
listing of these poi~ta.
Actfve participati.on by nonmilitary formations (factory detachments or
druzhiny, medical and xechnf.cal garsonnel, Komaomol groups, etc.) in
fighting local forest, peatbog, or other big fires, as well as employment
in caae o~ natural disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, flooda) and their
aequels, in Altunin's epinion, gives peraonnel concern practical experience,
' increases the action readiness, and mor~over helpa in obtaining better
technicai equipment. ~
~ Defuaing w~rtime duda is another civil defense exarcise sub~ect. The
army press from time to time r~ports on exercises which w~re ataged by
civil defenae agencies in enterprises and "at other installatiuns" (Col
F. Nikoforov, Y,Zv., 5 May 1976, and others). A radio report from the
"Kommunarskuemelter (Voroshilovgrad region) ~ontains the follawing passage ,
(KZv., 15 July 1976):
"Now the plant protection detachment consists o� specialized sections and
groups. The 1aw-aad-order section runs patrols together with the militia
forces. As a result of thie activity we n~te that, since the beginning
of this year alone, the number of violations agai.nst law and order in the
district 3ronped to less than half."
Col of the xteserve V,Arkhipov rath~r illustratively reports on the eatab-
lishment and employment of volunteer female medical detachmenta at an -
~ electric po~er plant in Vladimir (KZv., 5 February 1976).
Additional exercise areas and buildings are being provided continually fcr
the practical training of nonmilitary civil defenae formations which account
for by far the largest percentage of civil defense and rescue personnel.
Courses are being given for management personnel in theory, practical
.
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~xp~r~,eace? nnd tr~i.nis~g coux~~ ~~~ignm~anta (A].tunin, Vlzh No 1i.~ 1976~
p 46). In additioa tio th~ above-~oaention~d mase arge~icaCion~, ethletic
aeeociatioa~ ara baiua !s?cresningly uead ~or the ~r+~l~ing progtiam and that
l.ncluda~ ~~pncially OTO ~Gotov k~rudu i oboroa~--Ready !or D4lanaa aad
'~ork) a~ Ma11 a~ ~h~ Znaniye (Kaariadga) �oci~ty.
, Cotq~ad Machar~i~as
The i~ntegr~~ion of the civilian e~if-protection aasociaCton~ throuAhouC
the countzy~ which apr+u?g lrom indivtduai Lii~iaetv~~~ ~ito a gsner~i
govarnmantetl civilian MPYO sye~am Wa~ a di!licuit dav4lopm~ne proc~rs
rich in fric~ions ia whosa courts it aas ~aceaeary to reduce a w~alth of
difP~ring inCereats to a comm~ou denominatior. Sevarai paopla'� commis~ar-
istr (lat~r on convarted into mini~tries) mQ othar~ paraliai-acting admin-
3strativa ageaci~~ advaacecl th~ir ~aparate ciaim~ for iatiuanca. In ad-
dition tn party and mii~~ary concerna~ th4re aere the ~oncerne of the -
naCional aconomy branchea~ aci~nce aad reaearch~ the public haaith a~rvice~
the talacommunicaeiona syat~m~ ehe con~truction ana transportation ladus-
tirl.ea, the eecurity aervica and the polic~ (militia), ~ust to mention thu
woat fmportant. The up-aad-down line in the chain-of-command managoment
and supervisory atructure eccordiugiy alao ran along a muititrack and maay-
a.ayered (p.artly aiso riWal) pattarn. The contradictions that ~a~n be noted
in Soviet liCeratura ahoa horr difficult it ia even for the iaitiat~ad to
daecribe thie developmenta'1 procesd. Belyayev, for exampie, (Vi2h~ No 9~
1973, p 90) reports that the direcCion of activa aad passiva air dafena4
wa~ placad ia the haods o~ tha Peopie"s Commissariat for Army aad Iia~ry
Aftairs already on 14 May 1927 on the basia o! a decree issuad by the STO
(Sovet truda ~ oborony--Co~wcii for Labor ead Detanse). The contradiction
ia the statem~nte by Altunin and Belyayev caa be expLiaed ta the light of
rhe double track aetup of the military aad politicai leadership ~+hich at
ihat time waa more pronouaced iu the Red Army (RKKA [Noricera' and Yeaaants'
Red A=my~) thaa it is today ia the Soviet armed force,r. Osoaviakhim vmt
into action in 1927 and became decisively iavolved in the t~VO system.
According to Balyayev (1oc. cit., p 91), "the ~olitical admini,rtration
o~ the RKKA hsd takea over the geaeral direcCion of the dies~ent eociati~s
back in 1924." Initially we vere thue dealing t?~re only aith indir~ce
military inf_3uence. not diYect management of 1~V0. Apart from that, coo-
mon features bet~+~een active aad paasive air defease resulted already from
, the fact that both of them were depeadeat upon the VNO sy~tem and both of
them were supervised by the party. The :VO maia admi.~aistration--regard-
lese of Whether it may have beea under the People'e Commiesariat of Defanae. '
the NKVD, the MVD, or the Defecwe ldinistry--coordinated primarily along
- a horizontal liae `?ith the ataffs set up uader ite d~:ty statiaa. l~st of
the practical 1~V0 activitiea and most of the reaponsibilities were re- �
taiaed by the chairmea of the ezecutive co~mittee of vorker deputy couacils.
This viev is eupported by an essay by Col Gea Grekuv~ the hea~d of the poli-
ticai admial.stration under civil defease, in an Aesay eatitled "Civil
Defea~e is a Matter for the Whole Nation," in ahich he aays the folla+io.g:
9
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"Civii d~�~rt in r,ha 8oviat Uaion ir oxganized ~cco~rdiu~ ro t~rritoria~ -
aad producti~on principiar. Thi~ m4ano that tha pisnalag a~d oxacution of
all meaeuru a~ra accowpll,stwd both by tha councils of workat oaputido aad
by the minl.~eriae~ buruu~~ aad govaramane agaaeias which p~rlo~ ~ cor-
swpondin~ antarptii~a o~c acono~ic ~uactioa. The ~dict~ o~ etu Prui~diue o! -
tha 8uprama 8ovia~ UB~R~ datad 19 atarch 1971, ou tt~ ba~ic ri~?to ~ad dutiQs
o! th~ di~rricti and city ~ouacii� of aorlur daputi4r apaci~y ehat tluy
ouet aao to it that eha Qoa?erdi silieary duty 1~v ia Qropdtily impieo~at~
and that tluy ara xa~poiuibia ~or tha dirtct vana~~au~ of civii dalana~
in tha uYbca or district araar. Tiu oonagar~ o~ anedrprisa~~ govarns~at
~,raci~as, instituetoeu o! lurning~ collactivQ fAr~s~ oad �tatt fan~ ore
ra~ponaibi~ !or tha praparaeion of Q~fuue ag4iaar mva� da~truction vaa-
pon~. Thay ara divLdad aith ~ct~asiva right~ and viii faii back oa soclsi
�aas org~aiaatiau for aa~istaoca Sto!!s have baa~ sat up to ~a-
a~a civii dalansa par~onoai aod r~~outcsai thay ,rwt we tha ~xpari~nces
of milituy cadra~ and national aconomy �pacialist� ia thQ caursa o! efuir
activl.ti4~. lsaay awobar~ of ths s~litary ~r~ aarignad to thora otaffs
Tha civii dalaua �t~~f o! cieiai~ di~tticts~ and oa~or io~tailationa of
ibe natlronal aconomy ara ~uppiuenta~ mo~tiy by an~inurc ~a~d tachnicians
u~ali u ~opioyau froet tha enttrprises~ duty rtatiaaa~ and or~anisationa.
R~e~erva olf.icar� or ratireQ o!licar~ u a~.:'~ .:ra ta charga o! thosa st~~fs~
tspacial~.y on tha diatrict laval.
"it i~ kaown ttut USSR c3vi1 d~gsasa araauraa ara so roa~pr~hea~ivQ ttut it
ia lapossibla to carry th~ out vithout LhQ guidin~ activitr o! tha party
and it~ agenciea in t6osa placas whara tLay are supposad to ba acco~pliah~d.
In thia contaxt it swt ba notad that tha putr as~nci~es !a tt~a rapublic ~
at~ttu ~ ra~i~ous, aad diatricts u~reii u the prisasy p~rty or~isatiooa
conataatir try to atreagth~a civil delensa C1~VS. Mo 19, 1972, p 21).
A nav~papar diapatch fraa the Turk,estaa ~ilitarp district ahow ~uat hav
t~tr puti;ipatio~ ta civil dal~ase, aa a r~a~or ~o~reraient pro~rt~ goea.
"A w~eating o! the ~ilitary disttiat'� ailitarp council tus b~w bal,d lure�
Tha rwuit~ o! ncarciau so far hald in tha ar~a o~ civii daf~asa v~ra ~ia-
cu~~d; pro~rea� aad tsperience vera rsport~d oo and the tulu ior the ccsias
rur'a ~carcias progra~ ~rsra �psliad out. Col G~ S. B~lo~oahk,o delivarrd
a lactura. Tha ~ilitas~? council'a rorlcioS sustoo vas att~ad~d bp th~ foi-
lavin~s !1. l~hud~pberdptv. ctisir~sn, Couocil of Kiaiatsrs~ Usbek SSR; S.
~ Yaaiwliyw~ cbair~aa, Cous~cil oi Miaist~r~. Turk~miaa SSR; C. Ark~tLkiy.
6~sad o! a Gntrai Co~ittu dspartamt. Usbtkiatan C~uniat P~rtyi u wll
as ~iaistsr~ o! the Gntral l~iaa Un~.oo sapubiics, chtis~tn of tha rs~tooal
~cuti~s co~aitt~a, aad tha chlaf~ o~ tba civil dal~nsa �taff~ !n tha ~ia-
=atrLea and ~a~nrn~ent ag~nciap (KZr. ~ 15 D~c~bsr 1976) .
At t4e ~ad o! hi~ article (VIZh. Uo 11. 1976. p 46f.). Alt~nin Pru~at~d
a~hort ovsrri~r o! tlLS davsLopiwnul historp oi Soviat Pf1r0 dhi~c6 he sub-
di~rl+d~d into liva plusu. lls ~he last point, he utabiishu tbt nqsirr
~mt !or conse~nely e~cp~ndia~. Pasl~~~. aod strsasthsniai the t~mical
10
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baaa o! rivii da~on~o. Na coupia4 choc ~cich o aarnia~ ~o tha Offncc ctue
~rowio~ a~~nf,~iaanc~ ~u~t ba a~~~a~d to cla4 aooparaei~ ~atwat cl~vii
4e~oa~a and eha ar~ad ~orcu.
Civ31 D4lw~ Troopr
Na cao ~E3ad inEon~a~inn oa tha ~i~e~nca o~ "~paniai civii daE~aad troop~
ia Sokolov~kiy'� 'h~ilitary Serat~~rp (loc cit.~ pp 439tf.):
"BQCau~ w Mut axpact t~oMndow dutruaeiow ~ad cuwlti~a u a raouie
o~ cta ea~?'� ttunionuc~ear ~trika ~ w mu~t utabiiah a i~r~e o~b~r o!
�p~clai civil da~~asa lotsrt:ioa to copa vieh tt~ conssqu~nc~o o~ aa ~r
�~eack a~aioae eM hiorarLaad. T6is ~ar i~woiv~ dae.ch.a~c� o! tha rucw~
rapair, ~nd rdiasi ~arhica aod iotor whiaid ~.oavopa. Th~p wat bs so
aquipped thaa thsy viii be !n a po~itioQ to co~rar ~rsa~er distaoe~a with .
t~ir own ~ahiciu.
"To aak,s wrd that civii dalea~e troops viii b~ in a position to acca~plish ~
th~i~ ai~~l~oo, tt~y ~ust bs statl,oned at ruitdbl4 di~tanca lraa bi~ citta
oad iaawerial co~pisua~."
Savi~~ ~ilitiarr litdraeur4 giwa ~0 3afor~tion on th~ oeree~~h. ~1c~uPr
aad ~l.orimt oE th~ea~ ~pac3~1 uoits . Accordia~lr ~ tha anaraliy w~i-
ia~o~ Nuatrian l~Lldrich Ni~nar ("Dl~a Ar~a~a dQr Warachw~r-pakt-
, Staat~" (Tha Araiea of taa N~rsav pcct Cow?tria~~~ lMmich, 197~) and "~4a
Nilitatp salaaca 1976~1977" (Loodon, 1976)~ lilcavir~ l~avt no aata~ ~or
e~a~pla, on tha nu~ast,cal �tse~th o~ tba coastruceio4 uni~t~, tba lira-
~isheia= ra~~ts~ and otlwr spaclal for~ioos af that klad. Oolr L~o~n
Coun~ in his hi~hiy infou~atiw bo~lc "itar 8~urriral 3a SovLat stratap"
itai Qabl~s 1976 ~ p 74; iee aiao O~'P6tt~At~, Mo S~ 1977. p 4S4) .~p~atu
o! the ~rowia~ sersasth of th~ ailitar~r ciirii da~~oss nnit~ r6i~? Ls~raa
ba~n ut~att~d at i0,000 rn. CitiaE Soko~vi?~kl,y~ h~ ~nt3+ootd, ar t6tir
prlsarp aiastooa~ tha ~aiat~aanat ot c.o~uni~eatioo~ ea~at~eatl~o~ ~ooitoria~.
xaelioaatiw ~ abraiaal co~se~iioatlron t~ooitotiag, aod di!!lanit ~iaurtas
tuka u ~o~e of tha wb~ect~ to bs tak~n up in tba conr~s ot r~scw ~ad
rapair activiti,si nquir~d sfter an ~ta~ic strilc~e.
Tha~a unita ~ra alao to ba w~d to d~tws duds ~d ~or disaaur assiatmct.
T6ap hars th~ir aw co~wnlcattoo~ ottvorfc, thair oan traasportation--~otor
whicia ~ ~hiQ~, aad aircraft (t~alicoptars)--~or obsa~rati{on aod Nplorw~at
00 laa~d, oo ths v~tas, ~d tro~ cha ~ir. Aftar an ~Loatc �ttika, it ii
l~portant to ba abla to racoa~witar t6a tsrritorp hit tro~ tha air. Ia
~ri~v o! tha ta~t arw ducribeA md t6a ~as~ ~3s~ ot ~.ba So~riat tlnion ~
e4a ot6~er tact conntsiea ~ tha persoonal stt+~m=th ~iwn b~? Qoara swr to ba
too wall. tt v~o~nLd app~~as triat tc 6as bun iarr~as~ caa~l+~atab>> a~ part
o! ths dewiop~~t pro~ca~ aarriid oat ~laca 6a rcot~ his booic. '
?ba s~cistrus of a"lio~cov Militarr Schoci for Civil D~l~" (~Zv~, 7 Marcb
1973) coo~titutu nllabL ~li~atioo o! tba ~cist~c~ ~nd furtl~ar
ii
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lrolt 0l~1+ICtAL ttA~ AlfLY
�xpaa~~on of aivil $~four4 uni~u. Th3r tea~hini i~a~Ei~ution, ioc~t~ in
Sitlsahikh~t, =ivu 3-ra~x coursa~ ~mdar condi~ion~ cu~eaaty !~n ~ilitary
~choois ~~as OSTRtJAA4A~ !to 7~ i9�, p 141) ~ lutnring ~i~ddia-larr~i
�piaial3.e~d silitaty er~ial,e~, iaedlx~ eo ca~a~~~ia.tiag u 2I tiaut~nant,
+~nd a a~rtifiaa~a u~ctr~ic-~~~tmici~n ~or rond runrrruaeion, construc-
tian ~quipwt, radio aorueiaatiaea~ or eaalyRical che~istry. Aoure re-
, po~re� (lon. nie., p 74) etue eh~ f~r�e gr~duatu la~r eh~s t~uhla~ i~ci-
tutioa in 1969. Obrri,owir, ~h~ ie~lux wai too huvp--orha~viaa ehQ inasei-
~ued wou~a wtro lraqu~neir t~r ~o racruie �tudeee~. It eaa ba o~cp~ct~d
' <