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JPRS ID: 8199 AUTOMATION OF TROOP CONTROL

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FOR OH-ICIML USE ONLY JPRB L/8199 4 January 1979 AUtOMATION OF TROOP CONTROL U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - ELEAz: i nursday, June 18, _.9: NOTE JPRS pub1icati’-.- cortain information primarily from foreign newspapers, pr’rindicals and books, but also from news agency transmLssions arid broadcasts. Materials from foreign-1nguagc sources are translated; chose from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrcir and other characteristics retained. ileadlines, editcrta1 reports, and material enclosed in brackets - )Lud by .JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] .r .xcerptj in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted. l’nfamll.tar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. the poli AWS AD EGULATIJSS GOVERNING OWRSIIIP OF • c RF.P.EODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION ‘ 1CION SE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE OY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 L,aar OXUU(NTATION IIIPO? NO JPRS L/8199 I’ ),Ip1.M’iAc•ilonNe. a. AL7FOKATION OP TROOP CONTROL S. 4 January 1979 . 7. Ai,(.) V. N. Bondarenko I. Pormffig O,p.I,.tIon R.pt. No. ö. P.n.rmwq O,IeeIaM4ie N1m I* Au Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201 ID. Pij.ct/TaH/W.tk thilt No. II. Cotrd(C) or Gr.M(O) No. (C) (G) It. eqparti Oiiuii e.m.. ‘4 Ads As above I). 1y010# po’t a PvIod Cov.r.d 14. IS. wp$inii.uy N AVTOI1ATIZATSIYA UPRAVLENIYA VOYSK, Moseov, 1977 17. cumI **I1I I. IC Automation Optimization Troop Control Efficiency Methodology Leadership b. ILJm.jiOpe.,.ced Ti.m 98, 150 II fLsIL1IWI ._-M I”. “‘-• s”” - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Limited nmiber I UNCLASSIFIED 22__ $ecy dee. (TN P...) of Copies Available Froai JPRS [ NCIASSIPIED Z1 Pr*c. PTNAL N Vt 0-77) (FI.-..f 17 ITIS-fl) 0i4m.M t A I I nfl I,,a A f1 II. Alelisel (Um4C 200 wdI) This report contains information on the prerequisites and scientific baBes of automation; troop control and cand in combat as an object of automation; the posibi1ities of development and the real state of automation; methods of automating troop coauand; the role of the hijnan .oldier in ASUV [automated system of troop cca,aand and controll; the effect of automation on the development of military affairs, the styles and methods of troop leaderihip. ;1] J J 1IVA 1T ..i i1iit FT III iT i.’iiIiI.i V .1 .1 vAiTiTJi.i .iTiTii. ..1iIiTiIiT;0] 1i MJ.4U.* ii. Rivn APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AUTOMATION OF TROOP CONTROL Mo8cow AVTOMATIZATSIYA UPRAVLENIYA VOYSK in to press 28 Sep 77 pp 1—302 JPRS L/8199 4 January 1979 RuBsian 1977 sigi,ed (Book edited, by V.M. Bondarenko, Voyenizdat, 22,000 copies] CONTENTS PAGE 1 1 2 ;1] _.:iii9 .f!i1 :IN i Iiiri [H1Th I. i.riTi1 v.JLvi’Yi’hi.ii1 :liTiTih 11,YitTiTiTiT1—.;0] Brief Annotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Author Collective . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • • • • • • • CHAPTEfl 1: The Objective Necessity and Scientific Bases of Automating Troop Control . . . . . . . . . . 1. Automation as a Natural Stage in Developing Systems of the “Man——Equipment” Type . . 2. Automation as an Expression of the Historical Development of Troop Control . . . . . . 3. Scientific Bases of Automating Troop Control CHAPTER 2: Troop Control as a Specific Object of Automation 1. Particular Features of Troop Contrci. Systems as ObjectsotAutomation . . . . . . . . . . 2. Modern Views on the Essence and Content of the 1’roop Control Process . . . . . . . . . . —a — FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5 5 13 23 36 36 CIII - USSR — 4 FOUOJ (II - USSR — FOUOI A I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: ciA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 CHAPTER 3: CHAPTER : CHAPTER 5: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Potential and Real Possibilities for Automating Troop Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Structure, Functions and Principles of Creating Automated Troop Control System, . . . . . . . . . 2. The Present state and Prospects for the Development of Automated Troop Control Systems . . 3. Potential Ponsibilities for Improving Automated Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Specific MethodB for Automating and Optimizing Troop Control Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. The Mode1in Method and Its Role in the Automation and Optimization of Troop Control . . . . . . . . 2. The Necessity and Possibility of Mathematical Logical Formalization of the Troop Control Process. 3. Mathematical Logical Formalization as a Stage in the Optimizing and Automating of Troop Control. The Place and Role of Man in Automated Troop Control Systcims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 60 70 87 • 101 • 101 • 1i8 • 127 • 1)41 1. The Problem of the Optimum Coordination of Man and Equipment in the ASUV . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 2)41 2. The Influence of Individual Qualities of the Servicemen on the Reliability and Efficiency of ASUV 155 3. The Creativity of the Conunander and the Automation ofProopControl ...•...... ... .....165 The Effect of Automating Troop Control on the Further Development of Military Affairs . . . . . . . . . . • • . 176 1. The Effect of Control Automation on the Nature of Combat and Troop Organization . . . . . . . . . . . • 176 2. The Content and Style of Work of Commanders and Staff Under the Conditions of Using ASUV . . . • . . 187 3. Criteria and Methods for Evaluating the Efficiency of Automating Troop Control . . . . . . . . . . . . • 202 ;1] i J J .. .i . . . —— I.i.i -. rrnY i.ifrIiTiT ,i,dNiTh.veiTi.i4i1 :iIiIi IiIiTi _________________________;0] CHAPTER 6: Conclusion . . . . . • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 219 b FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 Eng1th title Rueinn title Author (a) editor (s) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PUBLICATION DATA Aur(*IATI0N OF TROOP CONTROL AVTOMATIZATSIYA Pfl.F1’3!Y VOYSK V. M. Bondarenko a A ;1] ! .1 J :•kv .Ji11 .1 • lull I• FP FFI1T i.i.iTiE v .i ii ITIII..i,i .iiIiTiHiTii.. iIiTiI;0] Publishing HouBe Place of Publication Date of Publication Signed to press Copies COPYRIGHT Voyenizdat : : 1977 28 Sep 77 22,000 Voyenizdat, 1977 —C- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 [Brief Annotation :i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [Text] The book examines the following pertinent methodological questions: The prercquisites and scientific bases of automation; troop cor.trol and commani in combat as ax object of automation; the possibilities of development and the real state of automation; methods of automating troop coimnand; the role of the human soldier in ASUV [automated system of troo,p conunand and control]; the effect of automation on the development of military at— rairs, the styles and methods of troop leadership. These problems are exmi’ed on tie basis of Marxist—Leninist methodo1or using materials from research in cybernetics, mathematics, psychoior and military science, using foreign and hypothetical ASUV as the examples. The book is designed for qfficers, generals and other readers interested in the problems of automating troop command. [Author Collective] ;1] _,.1JI1Ti p ,1 ______;0] The hook ha9 been prepared by a group of authors consisting of: Doctor of Military Sciences, Engr—Maj Gen I. I. Anureyev (Section 2 of Chapter 3); Doctor of Philosophical Sciences,Engr-Col V. A. Boknrev [posthumous] (Section 3 of Chapter 1); Candidate of Philosophical. Scienres, Col V. M. Bondarenko (Sections 1 nd 2 of Chapter 1 and the Conclusion); Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Engr-Col A. F. Volkov (Section 3 of Chapter 3, sections 2 and 3 of Chapter ), and the Introduction); Candidate of MilitarySciences, Maj Gen P. V. Grabovskiy (Section 1 of Chapter 3 and Section 2 of Chapter 6); Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Col A. P. Dmitriyev (Chapter 2 and Section 1 of Chapter k); Doctor of Military Sciences, Col N. A. Zubkov (Sections 1 and 3 o( Chapter 6); Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Engr— Lt Col A. B. Pupko (Section 1 of Chapter 5); Doctor of Philosophical Sci— ences,Col N. D. Tabunov (Section 2 of Chapter 5); Candidate of Military Sciences, P. V. Shemanskiy (Chapter 2); Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Maj Gen 14. I. Yasyukov (Section 3 of Chapter 5). The book is under the general edItorship of Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Col V. M. Bondarenko and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Engr-Col A. F Volkov. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I’ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 INTflODUCTI ON F, I A nr• FOR OFFICIAL flSE ONLY ;1] JJI.1v1 — . •nr iirixit .111 J:1’PiTiT..i,i ;0] Tho cie.tion of a modern and most rational system for organizing and controlling all spheres of lire in a socialist society occupies a prominent place in the activities of the CPSU. In it practical work the CPSU is guided by the Leninist requirements of scientificness of control, the ability to correctly determine the prospects and sequence of the tasks to be carried out, orientation toward the newest scientific and technical achievements, advanced experience, flexibility, and the ability to respond quickly and precisely to changing conditicn8. V. I. Lenin repeatedly stressed that it is impos1ible to nianage (ffective1y without a knowledge of the science o:’ management. He steadfa3t1y demanded that the administrative and scientific aspects be combined in management. “...In order to manage,” he wrote, “it it; essential to be competent, it is essential to know all the production conitions com1ete1y and down to the fine points, it is essential to know the equipment of thia production at its present—day level, and it is essential to hcve a certain scientific education.”1 The Leninist methodo1o of scientific management has been reflected in the party documents and in the decisions of the congresses and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. “The dynamic nature of the development of Soviet society,” coninented L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th Party Congress, “the growing scale of communist construction and our activities on the international scene urgently require a continuous rise in the level of party leadership over economic and cultural development, over the indoctrination ot people, as veil as an improvement in the organizational and political work in the masses.”2 The task posed by the 25th Party Congress of further improving the scientific level of managemert applies fully to miii— tary affairs. Leadership over the defense of the socialist fatherland is most closely tied to a range of problems related to economic development, to strengthening the ociopo1itica1 system, and to raising the ideological— political and cultural-technical level of the working masses. The Soviet Armed Forces, has an integrated, compi!cated and dynamic system, are a part of the socialist state. Consequently, the provisions elaborated by the party on the scientiric management of socialist society relate directly and innnediately to the sphere of troop command and control. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The question of elaborating and using optimum methods and means of troop control has always been and remains one of the basic questions of mi1itarr science. The experience of the Great Patriotic War, all military history as well as. present—day military science and practice indicate that a loss or weakening of control cn become the cause of failures and defeats. The revolution in military affuirs has placed new, higher demands upon the efficiency and effectiveness of control, and consequently, a1o on the level of operational and tactical thinking, and on the ideological- political, moral—psychological and volitional qualities of the commanders and officers of the connand level. As the theory and practice of control have shown, the integrated automation of the control process Is the most pronising, making it possible to bring the system of troop control into accord with those requirements which have been placed on it by the increased combat capabilities of all the branches of forces and services of the armed forces. Under the conditions of a modern war, if the imperialists start it, the task of mastering the scientific methods f troop conunand on a basis of new technical means assumes exceptional urgency. Troop conmiand should be improved in keeping with the achievements of scientific and technical progress. Military science must in every way contribute to improving control equipment and the communications system, and should aid in further introducing computers and other automation in the staffs and their skillful use. Consequently, the realization o the combat capabilities of the troops depends substantially upon effectiveness and efficiency of control, and automation is the most effective means for improving this. The process oC working out and introducing various automation facilities into the practice of troop control at present is entering a qualitatively new phase of its development, the stage of full automation of control. In this stage, “large systems” are being developed and these include human collectives, automatic control complexes and servomechanisms which have a hierarchical structure that encompasses all levels of the military organization from the primary troop collectives to the superior conunand of the armed forces. Naturally, the creation of such systems entails the achieving of a certain level of economic, scientific—technical and certainly military potential, and necessitates the solving of a whole series of theoretical and technical questions. A1onp with this the methodological problems of the automation ot control are assuming ever greater, and in certain regards, determining ignificanco. In the age of the rapid development of science, the elaboration of the philosophical problems of modern natural science on the basis of dialectical materialism, as a consistently scientific method of cognition, is assuming ever greater urgency. The solving of methodological problems is assuming particular urgency in a period of qualitative changes, dialecti— rnl 1nnr and transitional stages in the development of science and 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AID APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OF’FIC [AL USE ONLY ftI flfl technology. Automating troop command and the entire complex of related ncientific and technical problems are also subject to such stages. Methodoiojica1 analysis oC the posibi1ities, ways and goals of automating troop eonnand should consider social factors. Certainly a person on any level of ASUV (automated system of troop command and control) acts as a ocia1 being. Inherent to him are creative thought, c1as awareness, national feelings, emotional experiences, intuition, as veil as economic, political and ideological motives of ictivity. If in automating the control systems for weapons, tactical units and military equipment, it is possible to partially disregard the social essence of man, in automating troop control systems in which man is a most important object and the main subject of control, it is virtually imposib1e to do this. Methodological analysis makes it possible to isolate and pose for the spe— c1fc sciences the most importaflt and urgent problems, to establish the general conditions tor solving them, and, to outline the direction of’ the corresponding research. It helps answer the questions of the essence, the degree of possibility rd the aim of automating troop control. The given work is devoted to a scientific analysis of all these problems. It examines the ba3ic general theoretical provisions stemming from the dialectical materialistic notion of the laws of nature, society and thought, the Marxist—Leninist understanding of the patterns of scientific and technical progress and armed strug1e and determining tI’e necessity, possibility and direction of automating troop control. Since the problem of automating control has an interdisciplinary nature, the research on this problem requires a systems approach. Proceeding from this the authors have set for theme1ves the task of examining as thoroughly as possible the methodological problems of automating troop control. The book employs the achievements of Soviet military, military engineering and military philosophical thought. In working on the book, the authors have been guided by the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet government and the USSR Minister of Defense for improving the principles of scientific control, employing progressive methods of control, and introducing electronic computers and automated systems. ;1] 4i .liiiii.i. t]_ji .iit,.irii eirJiT+iTTT.iii :IèTi! ..Ii1IiIiIiJ________________________;0] FOOTNOTES 1. Lenin, V. I., “Poin. Sobr. Soch.” [Complete Collected Works], Vo. )40, p 215. 2. “Materialy XXV S”yezda KPSS” (Materials of the 25th CPSIJ Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 65. )4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006..3 A PRfl\IFfl FOR RFI FASF Thiircdv .Iiinp IR 2flfl• IA-RflPR2-AflRSflRflflfl1flflfl1flAflR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CHAPTER 1: THE OBJECTIVE NECESSITY AND SCIENTIFIC BASES OF AUTOMATING TROOP CONTROL 1. Automation as a Natural Stage in Developing Systems of the “Man—— Equipment” rpe The full automation of control is an offspring of our times, the second half of the 20th century. It was engendered by the present-dar scientific and technical revolution, and at the same time expresses its essence. Any process or phenomenon in social life experiences the impact of the scientific and technical revolution. It opens up for mankind new horizons in understanding the secrets of nature and in a profound comprehension o’ the objective patterns of social development. Each phenomenon possesses an essence which determines its further development. Research on the essence of the present—dar scientifi.’ s.nd technical revolution is an important and complicated theoretical problem, the solution to which is possible only on a basis of applying the rnevhodological principle elaborated by K. Marx and F. Engels in analyzing the industrial revolution at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. The founders ‘f Marxism shoved that the development of production, like any other sphere of social activity, is based upon an improvement of the system which links man as the principal of any type of activity and the technical means. It is a question of a system of the “man——equipment” type which is a united mechanism of labor. In it the equipment is simultaneously a certain antipode of man and his continuation. In the opinion of K. Marx, equipment represents the artificial organs of a social man and these complement arid strengthen his natural organs.’ Such an analogy provides an opportunity to view the history of the development of techno1or not in isolation from man, but rather as an improvement of his artificial organs. The development of techno1or represents the process of the creation by man of those devices which in an ever greater volume perform man’s own functions. The production process can be represented in the form of a definite relationship of live and embodied labor. The former is carried out direct— ly by the principal [man] with the aid of’ its natura]. organs. Being in 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY origin also human, the second type of labor is performed by people using the technico.i means which they have created. While live labor can be termed directly hurwin, the embodied labor is the mediated and previous labor of man. Live labor is the basis of embodied labor. The volume of embodied labor is increased by reducing the volume of live labor. The rep1acin of humin strength by the forces of nature, the gradual broadening of the volume of embodied labor and the replacing of live, directly human labor by it compri3e the basic principle in the inner development logic of systems of the “man——equipment” type. “There is nothing ‘incongruous’ in the replacing of manual labor by machine labor; on the contrary, all progressive work of human technology consists in this,”2 wrote V. I. Lenin. Externally the impression may be formed that man is being squeezed out of diverse arec of 8.ctivity, including from the sphere of armed combat. However, the term “squeezing out” is still applicable. V. I. Lenin wrote: “The higher technology develops, the more the manual labor of man is squeezed out, in being replaced by a series of ever more complicated machines....”3 V. I. Lenin emphasized that not man is being eliminated but rather the manual, routine, machine—like and unproductive labor. Consequently, it is not a question of expelling man or not an antagonistic competition between man and technology, but rather a constant redistribution of functions between them. In turning over unproductive operations to equipment, man gains an opportunity to concentrate his activities on the performance of more complicated duties which require the mobilizing of all his creative possibilities. Expanding the volume of embodied labor in all spheres of human activity ipnificant1y increases the productivity of live labor and the efficiency of all production. The change in the volume of live and embodied labor does not occur spontaneously, but rather in a definite direction. Here the qualitative shifts in the “man——equipment” system occur in the creation of a technical device which helps man more effectively perform one of his basic functions in the production process or a.ctivity. Such basic functions are: The function of a source of energy, an engine, a transfer mechanism, and a direct effect on the subject of labor and control. In terms of the nature of execution, all of these differ from one another. The functions of the direct processing of the subject of labor and control require from man a def’iite mastery, skill and ability. The remainder are based upon simple physical strength. At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries, only the functions of the direct processing of the subject of labor and control were carried out by man, while the others had been taken over by eruiprnent. For this reason, there was t1ie valid assertion by K. Marx that “the indus-. trial revolution starts by the use of a mechaism where man due to the very nature of things does not act from the very outset merely as a sinp1 strength.’”’ In the first industrial revolution, this was a function of 6 ;1] !J .11•IVA 1I piii.Iiviiii iT i, f7i1IL...J’h .i.i..t,ve,i,r,i.ii1 :liIiIiHiIiIiiii.i.YiT1,. ______________________________;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVFfl FOR RFI FASF Thiircdav Jiin IR flfl IA-RflPR?-flARflRAflA1flflfl1flflflR- FOR OPPICtAL USE ONLY the direct proce1ng of the subject of labor. The working machine replaced the hunian hnnd tirrned with i 1mp1e tool. Prec1e1y th1 led to the trnr;1t1on f’rom ftrtlsrln production to machine production. Any type of’ rnswh1n corir1sfted of’ three 1ementi: The engine, the trftnmi1on mchniBm nd the lftbor for.5 ‘L1ie qua1itttive chtnpei In the “man——equipment” ytem could not occur in v.nd of theme1ven, In isc5lfttion from the socioeconomic conditionG. Thus, the rite of machine production led to the nece1ty of breaking up the nc1oeconom1c re1at1on of reudft11m and to the etb1ihing of the new, ca,1ta1ist socioeconomic fortntion. The next itcp In Improving yntemn of the “man--equipment” type was in the technologizing or the materializing of the control function. In our times there h been trnnsit1on from the machine as the technical basis of production to the automaton. The control device become9 the fourth Component of the lnrAchlne which i now turned into an automaton. The creation cf automatic machine too1 and automatic lines iG only the trting point for the automation of production. Along with the development of automatic production cells (machine tools, lines, plants, and in the future, groups of plants), the automation of production is a1o ex— pressed in the rise of automated systems for the accounting and control at production. such ryitern make it possible to automate the process of the colicetion, tranzmirsion, and rtorage of production information, as well as Its procesinp, iccord1ng to i preprepared program. Being a historically determined phenomenon, automation develops gradually, on the basis of the exit1ng production equipment and methods. The introduction of automated equipment 1eath to the necesGity of transforming the production equipment and methodi. At present automated systems for collecting and proceing information for tcounting, planning and management have gained great development. They encompass the work of not only the individual enterprises, but also entire industrial complexes and even production sectors. In the nation there are around three automated sy9tems for the management of enterprises and organ— 1zation in industry, igricu1ture, coiuizunications, transport and trade. On the baMi of a pltinned ocia1ist ecMnon’, a fundwienta1 opportunity appears of creating n ttcwide automated sys’.em for collecting nd process— lnp data related to rtccountin, planning and mah,aging the national econou. The encc of the present—day scientific and tecinica1 revolution is dir’t17 linked with the automation of productien, and with the transition from m&.h1n production to fully automated. Automation, on the one hand, n.n indicrLtor or the ucccc of science and techno1or, and on the othcr, the ro:;t promIin area for the application of their achieveuients. An anayi- or th development of production sytew.s of the “man—equiprwnt” type ir.dicate that automation is a natural and hirtorically necessary tie of thcir Improvement. The given trend is also inherent to such a .ipeclt’Lc c1rir of ytørn n. “mnn——military equipment.” The 3imilarity 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 P0K OPPICIAI. IJSI ONlY between th production nrd mi1iarj twt1v1tie of man Id obvious. On this iue K. Mtkrx at one time wrote: “War reached developed forms previou1y than prace . tnetho4 by which in wir ,ind armie and o forth certain economic re1t1onh1p tt hired Thbor the un of machines and o rorth de— ve1opd before than within civil society. A1o the re1ationhip between thc producti’ie “orcei and thc re1t1onh1ps of lntercourne 1 pirtIcu1ar1y tapprent in the The de1nited i1m11ar4ty, in ptrt1ci1ar, derlvcu from the biological pe— c1fl fcaturns of man ard hi phyica1 and inentnl pab11itie. Tn1tit11y human production rict{vlty wai imu1taneou1y a trugg1e for exitnce. Thtm, even the hunting ot wild tir1lmaln by 1t nature In virtually no vy differed from thc, irrned c1n.hc between tribes. Only in the cnure of h1toricai development did the fundamental oppoilt1on between the purpone ot an army atd productri ma)e a pec1f1c imprint on the tunctttn performed by nan itt combat. At the cwie time this did nat violate the general pattern inhea’ent to all c1atme ot’ ytctn ot’ thi’“man——equipment” type. Tha fun”tiôn pørfor4 b, man In the process of combat cnn be c1asified in is groups. Thote ih1cn ar related to great ener expenditures coin— prlsc the first group. These 1n1te the functions of the source of enrt, the engine, the direct dcfeat of the enen, the delivery of the weapon to the target, and so forth. The second group Is rande up of control funct1on. t1though they also reruire certain eflergy expenditures for carrying them out, th/ are bcd on the use of hum,.’i ment1 features vhich determine the posibt1ity of proc in informatii and controlling the troops. 1nc thc phyica1 capTthi11tie of man are immeaurab1y more limited than the mentttl ones, the proeei o mater.a1iza.1on or objectification started preche1y with then, and above all vi’)i the increase in the energy :apacity of the “man-—mi1it.ry equipment” system. rcr a long time animals (horGe, rilephants, iieis and o forth) w’re used ftr these purposes. Then tesm powcr hen to be used In military affairs and this led to a qualitative trnnfortion of the navy, the developcient of a steam treta1—hu11ed fleet. The use of internal combut1on engLne led to the motorization of all £wrvice of the armed t’orces, nd altered the nature of rlilitRry labor (Itz tchno1o,y). The appearance ot electric pover end its extensive use In all %rea of military nffairG were of enormous Binif1cance. While the enert bac detennineD the nature and level of ieve1opment of the weRponry, it becomes the dec1i1ve force In t’e deve1opnt of rii11tnry ffnirs, al— thow’h In principle other vepons can be used, for example chemical and bftctvrIolo,ic’1 wcaponi uatnst th enemy. ThQ imperialist 3tate are ptent1y dve1opIrq such weaponn, and for th1 reason the threat of their unø cannot be considered completely eliminated. However, t.ne history of wars does not knov the broad use of these vapons. For thiz reason it ii Importnnt to tocu attention on the inner devc1opment’ logic of iL1itny affairs under the condltloru of uin •‘nerpj—bnsed weapons. 8 FOR OFHCIAL USE ONLY - ihursday, June 18, 2009: I•)R OPI’ I ( I Al. IJSK ONIS The energy capabi11tie available to an arnt tind navy a1o determine the development 01’ the delivery ytem which have undergone a hiBtoric path of’ development Crom the bow to modern min11es. The important turning points on thin path were the appeararne of rifled weapons, artillery, tanks and vitt1on. The object1f1cation In equipment of those functiont of the activities of t o1d1er on a battlefield which nre based on large expenditures of phyi— c1 enerr 1 termed mechanization. tt first tge can be termed partial mechnn1at1on. Th1t Involved only individual operationn, while a larger portion wa carried out by human muscle power. At this ntge even the erv1cing of the equipment required great phyicaI. strength and endurance from a person. Herc the o1dier performed only narrow, pecia1 operations. Mechanization in the armed forces remained prtia1 right up to the end of World War TI. Gradually partial mechiiation developed Into full. MechanlBm9 replaced human muc1e power not in individual operations but in the complete cycle of the combat activities of the Goldier or troop collective. To a Gig— nificant degree full mechanization reduced the out1ars of human muc1e pover, and In a number of areas reduced human activity to a series of monotonoun and latigufng opcration. Full mechanization in c1oe1y linked to the process of the automation of control. In literature, automation i sometimes understood as the general process of objectification in techno1o’ of human functions in various spheres of tocia1 activity. In this Instance the concept of automation, in eence, i con1dered Identical with technical progress gene’ally. The risc of f1rctrms, the motorization of an army and other important stige in the devclopment of military affairs, proceeding from such an underntanding, can be represented in the form of the early stages of automation. tn thh instance, mechanization operates as the initial period of automation, tnd at the rnme time embod1e it qualitative ehnnge and complication. We fe1 thrjt such an approach is incorrect, for in this concept two processes which dlfter in their quality——mechanization and automation—-arc arbitrnrily considered identical. A pccif1c feature o automation is the transferring ot the functions of data proceing ‘ind control to special controlling technical systems. The pos1bi1It1er or automation have existed in all stages of the develop— rv’nt or technolopy. However the process of automation, nnd prticu1ar1y full. wt.omat1on, actually bea.n with the rise of electronic computers, ind with the’ pos1bi11ty ot not only transmitting rind storing but also proce:;r;inj the Informrktlon. On thi3 level, autoir.tin is a conp1ete1y (lcfinItc hhtorlcal ttgc in the development of prociuction and any other cqu1prn4nt. It embod1er the present—day scientific and technical revolu— t Ion. loner, autorniUtn (In contrast to mechanization) representB a process of objrrtLfirmtIon or materialization of control functionx In technical devices. ;1] a;0] Q FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 IOR OFrICtAL. USE ONLY The controlling technical deviceii and systems replace man in the control processes and thereby improve the efficiency of human activity. Automation crowns present-day technical progress and represents its apex in our times. In terms of troop control, automation is the process of creating and introducing Into staff work the electronic computer and various related highly productive technical. ckiices with the corresponding softwear for the purpose of raining the combat readiness of the troops and the efficiency of their control.’ In differentiating mechanization and automation, one must ee their close relationship. On the one hand, mechanization becomes more effective, it develops in breadth and dt!pth and approaches its completion only in a period of developed automation of troop control. On the other hand, mation could arise and gain extensive development only on a basis of .ufficiently developed mechanization of the troop labor processes. The qualitative transformations in the “man——military equipment” system do not occur in isolation from the other aspects 3f military affairs. They are linked to its general development in the enti... complexity-of its sociopolitical, military—technical and specifically military aspets. Revolutions in military affairs can occur both on the basis orfunds— mental changes in equipment (weapons) as well as on the basis of fundamental changes in the social quality of a war. For example, revolutionary changes in military affairs on a level of the qualitative changes in human material were characteristic for the period of the Napoleonic wars. They became possible due to the emancipation of man and to the appearance of the free French citizen.8 Although the present—day revolution in military affairs is based upon a fundamental transformation of the military technical base, it does not end with this. The fundamental changes in weapons of necessity lead to a change in all other areas of military atfairE. The inevitability of such a process was profoundly elucidated by F. Engels in the example of analyzing the revolution in military affairs related to the appearance of firearms. The mechanism of the present—day revolution in military affairs is also based on fundamental changes in the weapons system which consists of three basic components (see Figure 1). S auto- the Fig. 1 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -- i nursday, June 18, - - - PRO\JFfl FflR RFI FAF Thiircdiu limp IR 2flA IA-RflPR2-nnRcflROflfl1flAfl1flAflR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY r’t:ent—dry revolution Ir :nllltriry rirfnlrr (or thc iiUitary technicrd rtvo1.uLIotj tL it. tchn1erLI btw and m:Lt.erthl roundatlon) ep,an with the rundamentftl trariiI’ormnt1on of wmponi, that i, with the appearance of nuclear wetpon. such a start is completely natural, for he development ot weapons determines the level or efficiency in the entire t’mancombat weapons” ytern. In terms of the type of energy used to defeat the enenv, hIstory knows three wapon systems: cold steel, firetwm and nuclear. In the first, a meonanical blow of a sword, pear or arrcw was used for causing defct; in the second, an explosion of conventioral explo9ives; in the third, a nuclear explosion. In nuclear weapons there has been an increase in the number of’ destructive factors. These tire the shockwnve, the thermal and light radiation, penetrating radiation and the radio act..ve contaminttion of the terrain. Nuclear veapon have sinificant1y broadened the destruct1,c posibi1ities of the modern trmed f’orces. The qualitative change in weaponry has upset the established equilibrium between the elements of the weapons system. In this regard a lag was discovered in the delivery systems and this was eliminated only after the creation of a developed system of various types of missiles. The combining of the enormous fire power of nuclear weapons with the miti1c delivery systems comprised the system of nuclear misi1e weapons. Its appearance disclosed the insufficiency of the traditional methods and means of troop control. The need arose of a cjualitative change In the control of troop combat as well. Thus, the present—day revolution in military affairs is undergoing three basic logical stages of it development. The pp’rance of nuclear weapons and their fundamentally new capabilities and new destructive properties have forced a revision in the reviews on the conduct of combat. There arore such a fundamentally new method of conducting combat as the nuclear misi1e itrike. The tactical and operational views on the conduct of combat continued to be improved. The demands were increased on the maneuverability of the formations and units and the views were altered on the offensive and dcfen1ve. The balance between tactical, operational and tratcic operations was fundamentally altered. The nuclear missile weapons, n cence, became the first neans of strategic action. They make it poih1c to achieve ntrategic success directly, and create favorable condltiom for the other types of forces to develop this success. The introduction of nuclear missile veapons in the tr’ops led to a change of their organizational structure. A new service of the armed forces arose, the Stratcgic Missile Troops. Nuclear weapons also appeared as part of the other rcrvices of the armed forces. Missile subunits became compon’nt c1emcnt in the motorized rifle formations. 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FUR oI?Fll:LA[. U81 ONLY New demands were alIo made on man. Under the conditions of nuclear missile warfare, surpriw cqu1red particularly important significance. The trengthenirig of the ornbrt readine of the troops and greater re— nponstbility tor each erv1ceman for carrying out his duty became a corn— mtrnd of the times. Military activit1es became more intensive ar4 taut. In their nature Lhey approached !nthistrial labor. The intellectual level of military labor rose nd the number of military professions increased. The development of nuclear mii1e weapons brought about a fundamental reorganization in troop command. The enormous speed of the missiles, the extreme fluIdity ot combti.t under the conditions of modern combat, the increase in the amount of information, the complicating of the methods of transmitting it, the reduction in the data processing times and the sharp increase in the deinand made upon the soundness of’ the decision being taken-—all of this forced a revision in the traditional system of troop control. The capahi1it.1e of man as the controlling link in the “man-- military equipment” system began to impede the development o’ the entire system, and thereby military affairs. The way out could be found only in a qwilitative improvement in the process of controlling troop actions. The development of automated control devices became the technical basis ror such a tranforrnati.on. There was a new redistribution of functions between the human and the technical components within the unified “man-— military equipment” system. Automation solved the most important problems in the development of military affairs. Being a necessary element in the inner logic of developing the “man—— military equipment” system, automation is a natural stage in the improve— rncnt of the latter. The given notion is valid only bj considering two circumstances as well. In the first place, it i essential to abandon the rigid correlation which upposed1y exists between automation and the nuclear missile weapon. Certainly the broadening of the scale of armed combat, the greater fluidity of combat, the increase in the number of factors which must be considered in decision taking, the decisiveness olb the goals and missions of troop combat stemming from the irreconcilability of the socioeconomic and class contradictions resolved in modern wars—-all these factors during the years of World War )1 showed the lag of traditional command and control and required a fundamental revision of this. The appearance of nuclear missile weapons disclosed the fundamental unsuitability of the old means and methods of contro1Iin troop combat under the conditions of modern warfare. At the same time, these weapons arose because the possibility of automating their control had become a reality. Secondly, the inner development logic of systems of the “man-—military equipment” type I realized under specific historical conditions on the basis of a definite centuries—long evolution of the very process of troop control. ;1] J J T•kv iIjj .1h .....i1IT!11V FHiT l.4II ,[1A .i.I 3:1’iTiT.!ii1 1iT.i , (ililiHilili i, ______________________________;0] 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 2. Control FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Automation ui an ExpreiIon of the Ititorica1 Development of Troop ;1] IJ lilYA ii iT .i • 11111 ii-ijr i.IiTi1iI , .IiTFj.,, I.M.-1I1 1iTiTili iTiTiHiTiTii. ______________;0] Durirg the first tge of the exl.stenco of the rined forces, control was dispersed among the other functions of people in armed combat. The commander or militrwy leader not only directed combat, but a1o himse1’ took tin ctie ti.nd required part in it. During thc period of a slave owning ytem and in the early stages of the feudal system, the fate of an en— gagernent w determined on a ma11 area (junt several kilometers along the t’ront), and by relatively small armies which were homogeneous in their composition. The military 1ader had a complete view of the battlefield rind he gavc conrand by voice or by s{gna1. Under these conditions there was no need for a complex system of troop command. The f’urther development or military affairs led to a complicating of the processes of controlling the troop conlbRt. First of all with the rise of the abo1utist monarchies the size of armies increased. They began to nurn— ber in the hundreds of thousn.nds. All of this led to the necessity of having a more diversifled structure of the armed I’orces consisting of armies, corps, d1vision and tactical units. The complicating of the orgftnizational structure presupposes the assigning of independent missions to each of the e1ement ot’ the combat organization, the development of a definite hierarchy, and the establishing of the levels of centralization, the rules and standards of subordination between them, and so forth. The complicating of’ control was also caused by the significant development of the military equipment and weapons. The appearance of firearms and subsequently the artillery harp1y inere’i.sed the combat capabilities of the troops, it broadened the zone of combat, and raised the importance of camout’lage and field works for the troop battle formation. The involve-. ment of new weapons increased the number of factors which would determine the course and outcome of combat. In taking a decision for combat, the commander of any level shouJ.d nov specially think through the methods of using firearms, and particularly the artillery. In this regard the function of control became separate and was turned into an independent process of’ combat activity. The military leaders of all ranks were released from direct participation in combat. Their functions now came down to troop control or command, ftnd this accelerated the process of improving the control system. However, under such conditions a person would find it impossible to handle the entire volume of control activ1tie. Gradually a group of persons grew up around the military leader and they helped him carry out control. Initially their task was merely to transmit the orders of the military leader to subordinate commanders. In essence they were liaison. In time their duties grew morc complex. As advisers they began taking part in working out the dispositions for combat, to draw up the required documents, and carried out the preliminary processing of information received from the troops. They were granted rather extensive powers to organize combat on the spot where they arrived with orders from the commander, and so forth. 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 YOR OPFtCIAL USE ONLY The broidenin of the amount of work and the complicating of missions in troop command led to the rise of a ipecialized command bodr, the staff, which t first performed r itrict1y auxiliary role in the conunand process. Even in the ariiw of Ntpoieon, the role of the staff was seonthiry. The chief of staff, Marshal Berthier, for example, wa virtually without any rights. H1i thities came dcwn baElically to the writing out of the orders of the emperor The psive role of’ the staffs wn determined by objective and subjective factorii. The former were explained by the relative simplicity of command a the commander could independently solve all the basim questions. But the subjective ractors consisted in a certain ls.ck of confidence in the Btaff ‘n the part of the military leader. Moreover stafT work was considered secondary and not haviri sufflcient moral prestige. The estab1ihing ot the stat’f , a rully empowered body of the conunander for troop eonunand va caused by new changes in the armed forcer.1. At the start of the 20th century a rapid process of greater complexity of weaponry in the ari and navy commenced, and all the services and branches of arms were motorized. The appearance of aviation, tanks, an armored naval fleet and the motor1zatin of the infantry not only changed the appearance of the armed force3 but also harp1y expanded the limits of their combat capabilitieii. In spatial terms not only the surface of the land and the sea but also the air ocean became the sphere of armed combat. The motorization o the armr and navy altered the nature of combat which became more fluid and mobile. While World War I had a clearly expressed positional nature (firing in it c1er1y predominated over movement), in World War II maneuvering predominated. Troop coniniand assumed a continuous nature. The scale of combat and the size of the armies also grew significantly. The armed forces became multimilliori. There was a sharp change in the qualitative composition of the arny and navy which were also no longer a homogeneous aggregate. Special knowledge was needed for controlling the troop collectives consisting of persons with a high level of general educational and professional training. In taking a decision for combat, moral and political factors assumed important significance. The decisiveness of the aims of a war, its protracted and exhausting nature required a mobiliz— 1n’ of the mor1 torces of man. For this reason in the process of his command activity, the military leader was obliged to consider the spiritual potential of’ a soldier. With the complicating or military affairs, the staff becane an authoritative command body granted extensive powers. At the same time, this led to the complicating of its work. The staff bodies began to have a developed structure ot services responsible for the activities of the branches of forces and 5upport subunits. The staff now collected information and processed It, it prepared the data necessary for decision taking, and on a day to day basis it controlled the troops, and so forth. 1k FOR OFFICIAL USE ONlY ‘,June 18, 2009: ..OVEDFOR.. o-00& 0001 0001 0006-3 i-. — nn ni—I r A III FOR OFFICIAl4 USE ONLY During the yearn of World War TI troop command experienced new dificul— tLci. Due to the’ Increased amount of control functions, the staff found It difficult to handle the fulfillment of its tasks. The situation in postwar times has not changed. Under the conditions of the present—day scientific and technical revolution, there has been a new further complicating of military affairs. This. certainly, has caused corresponding difficulties in the control level. A whole series of contradicions has arisen between the fundamentally new features of military affairs and the traditional means and rethodn of troop control in combat. The present stage in the development of military affairs is characterized by a sharp increase in the data important in decision taking. In addition to the information which the commander needed previously, now it is essential to have information on the enemy’s weapons of mass destruction, their condition and position, as well as information on the radiation, chemical and bacteriological situation, and data on radar equipment, operatiDnal and tactical landing forces. At present, a divisional staff under combat conditions will receive significantly more information than was received by an analogous formation during the years of World War TI. It must also be pointed out that circulating information is extremely dynamic and rapidly goes out of date. At the same time, the commander needs information which precisely reflects the real situation for making a decision. Moreover, he should receive extensive data on the situation more frequently tlvLn before. The rate of advance of the troops in the period of the Great Pat ‘iotic War made it possible to prepare a summary for the army commander virtually twice a day, and for a divisional commander five or eight times. Under the conditions of modern combat any level of commander, even up to the superior level, will need to continuously study the situation and evalu—• ate the importance of tie changing information. These particular features (the increased amount of information and its extreme dynamism) of the data needed for decision taking have necessitated an increase in the time given for analyzing the incoming information. At the same time, as never before, it is now important to take decisions in the shortest possible time and in individual instances, instantaneously. This is one of the contradictions in the command of troop combat under the conditions of modern combat. A commander has always experienced a lack of information about the enemy. The incompleteness of’ data on the enemy is a traditional featurc in the command activities of a.i officer at present. However, under today’s conditions, particularly with the threat of the use of nuclear missile weapons, the absence of the necessary data on the enemy leads to ambiguity in the decision to be taken and to mistakes in this. Although the commander presently possesses a large number of technical reconnaissance devices, nevertheless it is no easier but rather more difficult than before to obtain exhaustive data on the enemy. This is explained by the special measures undertaken by the enemy to conceal its true intentions, as well as by the extreme mobility of the troops and the fluidity of their combat. ;1] III .LWI.wa.i iur. FP] iiT it IiTiL___1d1 ii !I.vc[iTIEI.iil iiiiiiiiTiTii . .iiTiT1;0] 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP2-00850R0001 00010006-3 )PROVFfl FOR RFI FASF Thiircdav .Iiin IR 2rn)g: CIA-RflPR2-flflRSOROflfl1flflfl1flAflR- I)I( flVI L( I Al. (ISK 0N11’? At present the area rrom which reconnaiance information must be s— Belflbled has increased significantly. For this reason the information hn a probable ntuie, and in a majority of intance will not contain all of the inforinition needed for the taking of a decision by the coin— inander. Thus, under precnt—day concU.tion the contradiction ha3 been ubtant11iy ggrevated between the 1ncomp1etenes of’ data on the enemy, the hypothetical nature of the twailable data and the vital neces1ty of exceptional accuracy and oundneB in the decisions to be taken. The inten1ve growth oC the cn1e of combat, the broadening of the expanse of combat and the inereae in the distances at which a fire duel between opponents is posih1e hn.ve led to a significant increase in control corn— munication trnd to a bro&dening of the entire control system. It has now come to encompass such i large number of elements that it has been nwned a “large ystcm.” On the one hand, the broadening of the scale and distance at vhich troop command is carried out has led to an increase in the probability of a breakdown of individual elements in the system and a distorting of the signal tn the conunand channels. On the other hand, modern armed combat places 1ncreaied demands on the reliability of the control system. Even a brief failure 1 f’raught with irrecoverable consequences. In addition to the indicated ones there are also other contradictions. Among them we could mention the contradiction between the necessity of rigid centralization over troop control and the requirement of granting greater initiative to the subordinate connanders, that is, to a certain decentralization o command. In line with the increase in the factors which hou.1d be considered by a military leader in his decision, the contradiction has been aggrevated between the terse form of the order and the content which must reflect the entire complexity of the situation and explain the combat missions to subordinates. Here it is essential to remember that an expectation of complete exclusion of mistakes from control activity of man in general and the commander in ptrticu1ar cannot be considered justified. It is essential to work for the creating of conditions under vhich the probability of mist8kes would be below the acceptable 11mit. However, considering the lack of information on the enemy, the incomplete reflecting of th objective processes of modern warfare in military theory, the possibility of gaps in the personal professional training and experience of the commander, as well as the action ot factors related to a change in the physiological, mental and moral state of a person under combat conditions, It is impossible to completely exclude mistakes trom the process of the taking of a combat decision by the commander. The aggregate of the abovernentioned circumstances has caused certain difficulties in providing optimum and effective control over troop combat. The given contradicttom have been resolved in several says. One of them 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY consisted in improving the work of all levels of staffs without a fundamental and qualitative change in their technical base. In the given in— stance it would have been possible to achieve real results by increasing the nuznbez’ of staff workers. In precisely this way the control activities of the staffs were Improved for a rather long time4 However an increase in the number of staff workers leads at a certain moment to the complicat-. ing of their leadership. The staff becomes overgrown with services, departments, subdepartments and other subdivisions. It becomes cumbersome, Immobile and inefficient. Under the conditions of modern armed combat, by such a method it is impossible to achieve a resolving of the arising command contradictions. The other way also has tangible limits, that is, improving the professional training of the staff workers. The problem is that a person possesses completely definite and for certain indicators, very low psychophysical characteristics which impose natural constraints on the intenifying of human activity in the control area. Human reason, In possessing colossal creative capabilities such as surprising flexibility, dynamism and enormous analytical and logical abilities, at the same time is not marked by great speed and is subject to rapid exhaustion. The capacity of the human memory is not great. A sel of increased emo— tionality which is so characteristic for human activity on the battlefield, as a rule, has a negative influence on the use of human mental capacity in the process of troop command. Historical experience indicates that it is impossible to resolve the contradictions in troop command under the conditions of the present revolution in military affairs by intensifying command activities of a person with the old methods and traditional equipment of command. This has become particularly apparent after the introduction into the troops of missile weapons which possess enormous speed and the capacity for crossing distances of tens of thousands of kilometers in scores of minutes. Naturally, with any level of professional training, a person would be unable to meet the task of’ controlling such objects. Moreover, the outfitting of the troops with nuclear missile weapons has led to a sharp complicating of the very processes of controlling troop combat. Of course, under these conditions an improvement in the professional training of staff officers remains an important means for raising the effectiveness of his work. However, in and of itself this cannot resolve the sharp contradictions which characterize the present processes of troop control. This must be combined with a new method of resolving the very complicated control problems. And t,his method is the full automwion of control. The introduction of equipment into control processes has an ancient history. Initially technical devices appeared as means for detecting the enemy. Optical observation instruments for a long time were virtually the only technical control devices. These underwent a significant evolution from primitive observation instruments up to a developed system of advanced optical Instruments used both for observing the battlefield as welt a’ for controLlng artillery fire, navigation, bombing, aircraft control and other purposes. 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY irsday, June 1, --RDP82-OC___.. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY On the eve and in the course of World War II there was an abrupt jump in the development of’ technic1 detection devices. Sound ranging appeared and ws developed nd this wa employed in combating enenr artillery a well as in nlr defense for increasing the effectiveness of antiaircraft trtt11ery rire. However the Hml.ted capabl.].1.tieB of sound ranging were soon pprent. ‘1’h d1coveved ihorteorning in the optical and sound ranging detection ckvice caused the search for new equipment. Radar became the basic technical rnens of detection. On the basis of radar instruments for controlling ftrtillery fire were designed. 1adar became the basic means for detecting the enniy in air defense and antimissile defense. It ha been widely uned in the navy as well. It would be hard to imagine modern military equipment or the process of controlling troop actions without radar. At present the prospects of its development ar linked abroad to the use 01’ 1.er equipment for uperwcurate locat’Lng. Along wth t.he detection ecjuiprnent, there was also ‘active development in the data transmission means (the means of connunications). The complicating of militftry affairs and the conunand of troop combat reuirea new means of communications. As is known, for a long time optical means ot conmuni— rationri were used for this purpose including smoke signals, all sorts of semaphores., flag signaling systems, and so forth. However the real introduction ot equipment into this sphere of control started with wire communications. The development of the telephone, telegraph and radio became an important stage in the development of communications equipment. At present armed Corces have at their disposal powerful means of coinmunica— t1on makinç it posib1e at any distance to ensure effectiveness and concealment of troop command. It is Impossible to imagine the modern process of troop control on any level without coununications. While the area of obtaining information on the enemy, its troops, the terrain, the meteorological conditions and also the transi1iQsion of irifor— ination became rather quickly- technologized, in the sphere of data processing this process occurred significantly more slowly. Initially rather primitive instruments which tacilitated calculations were used for tMs such as slide rules, scales and so forth. Then calculators and navigation instruments appeared. For aviation and the air defense troops, automatic control devices were designed such as automatic pilots and AFCE (antiaircraft fire control equipment). The first models of the AFCE were not automatic. They were designed considering the use of a large crew of servicemen the duties of whom had been maximally simplified and consisted of lining up numerous scales, dials and so forth. In the postwar period, electromechanical and later electronic AFCE appeared and these operated without Ihe interference of man. Subsequently automatic control devices appeared in other areas of military- affairs. However1 these devices involved control over Just solitary technical elements such as an aircraft or gun (battery). At the same time the control over large technical complexes and the combat of troops largely remained traditional. ;1] Ji ii i1 l l . i. TITZ1. ii iT ....i’ 1iTi....i.i . ii ..t.vAiIiIIJi1 liTiTi1 IiTiTi IiTiTiT;0] 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR (WFICIAI. I1SI ONLY The decisIve technical prerequisite for the automation of troop control hci.n been the ernation and rapid development of high—speed electronic computers, both digital and ansilog, Their appearance is usually linked with the development of’ automation. The first digital caleulating nlachineB wore designed in the 17th century by the French scientist B. Pascal, and later by the famous German sciri— tist and philosopher G. W. Leibnitz. In 18Th, the arithmometer of V. G. Odner was developed and this was widely used and has existed up to the present. The development history of universal computers is interesting and instructive. The idea of creating them was proposed by the English mathematiciein C. Babbage. In 1883 he designed a gigantic arithmometer with progr.m control (an arithmetical and storage device). The version of the macitinc presented by him was close to a modern one. However the ideas of the scientists were so ahead of their time that his contenipo— raries could not appreciate their merit. Attention to his work was shown only a century later. The development of computers became a remarkable phenomenon in the development of technology. In l9lik, a digital computer operating on electromagnetic relays was designed in the United rtates, and in 196, the first ENIAC electronic computer was introduced. In the USSI, the first computer was built ir 1950. Since then computers in our nation have undergone three stages of development. The first generation of computers was developed in the period from 1955 through 1960. They used electron tubes as th9 basic element. The second generation (1960—1965) was based on the use of semiconductor tech— no1or including transistors, diodes, and so forth. The method of printed circuitry, block EI.rrangement and other progressive methods were widely used then. The third generation is the stage of microelectronics. At present our nation is producing computers of this generation in the form of a unified system of machines which have valuable qualities such as small size, an increased volume of the operational and external memory, increased reliability, high speed of the central processor, the capacity for parallel operation of’ the devices, and the possibility of connecting the machine to peripheral points. The last two qualities are of particularly important significance, for they make it possible for one machine to solve many prob— lems asked bj various control points a great distance apart. In this re— card the possibility has appeared of creating large data systems (LIDS) which couj.d serve a large number of users on the basis of several large computer centers connected by an automated communications system with the peripheral pointr. The third lleneration oC computers has enormous speed on the order of several tens of millions of oprrations per second, and a memory capacity up to 16 million bytes (a byte is a unit of operation equal to eight binary digits, or two bytes 8 bits). At present the speed of the machines no longer impedes their development. Th input and output systems as w11 as the lag of the operational and external memory have become the bottleneck. ;1] — I Tfl{. kI! FHiT i. IiTi...i,i , .ThEJ.v. ,.1Ji1 liii iii irili.1—;0] 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A D —. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 0001 0006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY it .i expected that the rourth generation of computers will be characterized by a significantly higher degree of integration in the circuitry in comparison with the third. Over the long run the use of fundamentally new princip1e for electronic computer design is posib1e tn the form of laser elements. The imperative need of our times ‘or increasing the memory of the machines will be realized in developing external memories for lO bytes of information. Of course, the sharp Increase in the capacity of the external memory should be accompanied by progress in the methods end means of using it Computer techno1or during the short history of its development has been able to prove it importance as an important basis for automating control. The given notion cai be seen with particular clarity in the rapid increase of digital computer. The first such machine was developed in 19146. In 1955 there were a fe\? 1t’ve than 1,000 diita1 computers throughout the world. In 1963, they numbered arc’und 23,000, in 1964, 32,000, and in 1965, over ?45,000. By 1967, 50,000 digital computers were functioning in the world. The number of machines has been growing particularly rapidly in the United States. In 1965, there were more than 22,000 of them, 32,000 in 1967, and 70,000 in 1970. The increase of capital investments into the area of computer production in the United States, for example, has continued to grow. While in 1962, around 2 percent of all industrial expenditures were invested into this sphere of production, in 1966, the figure was already 6 percent, and in 1970, 10 percent. According to a statement in the foreign press, in 1975, the number of computers inthe United States has risen up to 100,000 Electronic computer techno1o cannot be identified with automation, although it is the basis of automation. Without computers it would be impossible to automate the control of troop combat. Thus., the technical prerequi5ite for full automation in the form of a computer was not only an important one but also the conclusive one. After it the automation of control began to develop rapidly The rise of computers made it possible to move from partial to fully automated troop control. Partial automation encompassed the control of small troop units, that is, small weapons complexes (an aircraft, antiaircraft artillery battery, an antiaircraft guided missile complex, and so forth). Often it made it possible to control combat units under the quietest working conditions and in the absence of an abrupt change in the situation. The operation of an automatic pilot is an example of this The 1oc1 nature of the operation of automatic control devices in a number of iristences has not facilitated but rather impeded the leadership of large troop collectives, since the problem of maintaining integrity and the monolithic nature of the entire troop control process has become more complex. Certainly man provided such integrity. Without his participation only individual, most often initial combat operations were carried out. At this stage mtn was better than automatic devices in performing the 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED F i hursday, June 18, -00850R0001 OOO1 - - - FOR OFICtAL USE ONLY oritroi funtLon In virtually Its entire range, Only in the rnot acute nd intense areai (for example, twiation, air defense, nd so forth), be— ctwrc ut’ thc tneren.cd speed of the equipment, did conntraints imponed on the control proce by man begin to be felt. Prtia1 automation was fnt,roducd prccirwiy in tJiie ireii, Troop control in combrtt, on1t of two difftrent procenies. The first 1 the control or the equipment. Any technical device or y9tem or them rather rigid prorrrtm or operation. This feature rnakei it pon1b1e to dewilop an automatic control device which controin it within th3 cornplute range of the i’ntlrc iccepted program for the activity of the technical system. such control syt#m3 are called automntic (BAli). They organically combine a high and comprhens1v level for mechanizing a certain military tction with the complete utontation of 1t control. The automati: mllitftry control ntems do not require the direct participation of man. The acting principal of control is outside such systems. He intervenes In their work only in the event of emergency situations, the failure of the equipment, for carrying out adjustments, and in the period of setting up the system. Uaturally a man creates automatic systems, he designs them, he works out the program of their operation, and so forth. For a certain time In the literature on the problems of nutomating control, there prewillci n overly optlmlntic notion of the posibiiities of de— ve1op1nr automatic control systems. Thus, in particular, proposaTh were made on the po1bi1ity of creating automatic control ytems for not only 1are complexes of military weapons but also for troop combat. However, It very quickly became apparent that t,he second type of control is sig— nificrintly more complicated than the first. Certainly it is the control of people, the troop co11ecttve, and includes consideration of such processes a the mora].—psychological state, the level of re3ponsibility, profe1on1 training, and so forth. or this rcaon the cortplcte isolation of man outnide the troop control yrtrn is an Impors[ble matter for many reasons. In the first p1ce, re— ‘rirch on the fundtunental possibilities of automation showed the unsound— it or omp1cte1y eliminating the acting principal from the control sys— ri. S’icondly, cven in assuming the probability of developing such ny-s— tr-, t1iy must hi’ i1von up due to their complexity and unrelinbility In 1ratinn. From ril1 viewpoints It wa significantly better with a gIvQn icv’-’l c,r ttat.ornatlon to introduce man into the control nystem, and h %tould :urie tti carryiru: out of the not crucial tasks requiring creative e”— 1rt rinrl hi,’h ki11 in troop command. Such systems, In contrast to auto— ri’itir oner, ‘ire t’rmed automated. Their appearance was the result of tolvinr th nbovtrncntjoned contradictions arising due to the complicating of t.hc procerri or cont.rolling troop combat, on the one hand, and the dif— ficu1ti’ of c1Pv(1opin1 nutomritic yterns, on the other. A1tho’iph hc frv,1oprncnt. of automatic weapons control system3 ha great prorni’, the poibi1itIe of It are not the for the various types of’ riiitnry cquiprnent. Thoe typr which are directly erp1oyed In combat, 21 a ;1] A i1iii1T .1 • i ... ITITtiv FH1Ti l.4II 11i1 .i .fkthTiTJ.f ii hTiTi1i ii IiTiTiTt.. _________________;0] FOR OFFTC’I. USE ONLY - DD APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 — I t - - . ri... _I___ •-- OR OTICIAL USE 1NLY -‘A in direct. contact with the enemy, rerluire direct articulation with man and form a slnplt’ -yrtrm w1,h him. Thee are tankti, guns, direct support artilJF’ry, naval hlt,:, a majority of combat aircraft, and no forth, Here man ha: iitd and ll1 rtrunio direct part In control, being here the main ‘1ernent of th’ rnnlrol ytr’m and thw nctlng principal of the control prnc?sf;. The necesity of 1neorporatint man as n direct element in the control system is dictated not only by the specific features of one or another type of weapon but also by the scale of combat. While on a level of the actions of Individual weapons units or small weapons complexes it is possible to create closed automatic control systems, with en increase in the scale of combat, they more and more express their social nature in acting as a specific area of the activIties of human masses and troop collectives. It is no longer a question of c-ntrolling equipment but rather controlling people and troop collectivet. Thin in why the automated troop control systems (Ashy) have been developed. Precisely such systerni for the control of troop combat make it possible to achive full automation of control. Full automatioi of troop control is a stage of automation whereby all the elements in the procesa of troop control (the collecting, processing and antlysis of data on the situation, the working out of variations of optimum decisions, the issuing of orders and instructions to the troops, as well as control over their fulfillment) In all the control elements should be carried out using universal algorithms and programs. Full automation is characterized by a systems approach in solving the problens of troop control. This cannot be reduced merely to the introduction of automatic and automated equipment. If full automation is conceived of’ as the simple technologization of the control process with the maintaining of the old style, methods and ways of control, then such an iriprovement in control has outlived itehf’. Automatic and automated control equipment bring an effect only in the event of the optimization of control, an Improvement in the structure if the controlling organs, and the careful thinking out of their coordination and subordination. Full automation should lead to a fundamental revision of control over troop combat. A the same time it is the expresser of this reorganization. Consequently, Cull nutow.atlon of control over troop combat is a compli— cated procsn the occurrence of which La brought about by many factors. .orne of them derive from the difficulties and complexities In the development of military affairs. Others are caused by social needs which encompass a broader area than military affairs. However, the need for a positive change in control still does not mean an improver.ent in It. There must be thr scientific and technical prerequIsites for solving this prob— l”m. The complex Intertwining of the Internal factors and the external prerequisites for the rise of full automation in the control of troop combat. is an example of the relationship of science and social practice and their dialectical interdependence. ;1] ... .iis. ;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001000100063 P0k OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3. ScientIfic Baiei of Automating Troop Control The quciition of the w1entiftc ba9e for utomting troop control has been nntl 1 porcd mr ricitt1y in other iphcrc!r,. Thus, the denignern or UhC r[rr,t. utnrnrit.1 wk.vlcerj relied i1mot excltmively on their inventive— ner, common tenre nnd inpirica1 choice. ven In the age of cyber— net1ci, In the vrrioui phere oC automation, the degree of scientificnes depends upon the complexity of the yBtetn which are to be automated and upon the level of reipons1b11ity of the denign deciion. Tn the areFi of trntomating troop control, the neceity of a high level of cientificnezi i dictated by the particular complexity of the structure, by the diversity of the tunctiori nd conditions in the activity of the systems, by the fundamental newne and their high cost, and mainly by the ever increasing dependence of th combat capabilities and readiness of the troops upon the advanced nature and reliability of the control systems. In automating rehtive1y simple systems, the essence of the processes 1 often disclosed by an empirical study, and a ucceu1 solution 19 sought out by choice. Tn syterns of such a level of complexity as the ASUV, the seeking out of solutions Is posib1e only on a basis of a scientific ap— proach to automating troop control. The given question would not require special discussion if there were not a number of methodo1og1c1 difficulties which arise in solving it. As was already pointed out, ASUV is systems which without fail include a principal of’ control. For this reason the research is not restricted to analyzing one or two relatively simple forms of the movement of matter, but rather encompares their entire spectrum, including biological and social aspects of the processes. Thus, the scientil’ic bases of automating troop control CRnnot be restricted to a relatively narrow range of military technical dicip1ne. For analyzing the functioning of the ASUV, the physio1or of sense organs, human factors engineering and the psycho1or of thought, pedaogic, logic, semiotics, linguistics and so forth are involved. However rnnny of these areag of knowledge themselves have not yet achieved the necesrj level of methodological maturity. Certain provisions of the desintLted disciplines themselves need a further philosophical-methodological and 1o1ca1—gnoseo1ogica1 bai5. All of this requires clarity and pro— Coundn in r methodological analy3is of the scientific bases for auto— rivitn troop control. First of all Lt 1r centta1 to bring out what a scientific approach to riutomriting control i, what 1r its difference from an empirical approach, rind whrtt irc the 1e’,e1r of th required and actually existing scientific oundnc at’ the design and organizational decisions in the various stages of automating dirferent control systems. The problem is that in recent years, In line with the greater role of science in improving control, th&t control which In 1t scale and methods is the traditional empirical type is often defined as “scientific.” In this Instance, science becomes, in the expre3sion of V. 1. LenIn, “a dead letter or a fa3hionable phrase,” ;1] i J JIIYA .1 •i . . . ii I.i.i -ie iv FH1T i.ikIiTi!. .111 ..i.vAiTiU.iil :Til,i lb 1111111 i ii.fiT _________________________;0] 23 FOR (WPICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 1 A - I•’()R ()IV [(:1 Al, USI ONLY ;1] i . 51.Tr ivi,TT,.JiT,L :4iI3’IIiI.f.1.. . .T Ti’EiiiiTi1 fiTiTiT;0] but ij not. t.urned into “sin clement of everyday life completely and truly.” For this reason It hi ao Important to di1ose the dintinguishing featureG and traits of truly eient1fic approach to autointing control sytem generally and troop ytittn, in particular. With ctch pabing year he elzthoration of the theorien and dicip1ine comprising the scientil’lc bai of automation i extended. 1i accord with this, the boundary between theoretical and empirical knowledge, cInt1ftc and trnditiorial activities in thio area in ihifteda Being hiitorict11y determ1nd, the notion of’“scientific be of automation” chftnge along with th development of its theoreticel base, with the introduction and development of new techno1o, and with a rise in the level of training ot the specin1tts operating It. However, regard1c nf thin re1fttivenes of the 8cientific and empirical principles of control, they can be delimited rather clearly. The making of automata began 1on before the appearance or the theory describing them. Over the centuries this has been based on common sense, experience and practical skills. Even vhen a theory of automatic control had been created by the works of Maxwell, Chebyshev, Vyshnegradskiy and others, automation did not cain a completely sound ba9is. At the outSE of its development science took more from practice than it gave it. In - tially c1ence merely explained the practical achievements and performed the function of instruction. Science began to outstrip practice only when t learned how to forecast the processes and to predict and foresee the specific trends and patterns. Only from this moment could the use of the methods, conclusions and recommendations of science make a substantial 1rnr1nt on practice and a1Eio make the expressions “scientific approach” and “scientific bises” valid. Moreover, along with a profound relationship, there i a substantial difference which exists between the manufacturing of Individual automata and the process of fun automation which emcompasses a rather extensive sphere of industry or mIlitary affairs. For this reaa’ 4i qt’øvtjfi bases are also iomewhat different. For an analysis and synthesis of the mdi— vidual automata, the theory of automatic control is used as the basis along with the theory of discrete automata and technical cybernatics. But the cienttfic baiis of automation i founded primarily on the theory of opera— tionG research, military and economic efficiency, queueing theory, the methods of systern analysis, linear and dynamic programming, and so forth. At the same time, for automating such complex systems a troop command, thcre must be the aggrejate knowledge of all sciences which comprise the theoretical toundation of automation. That is, they should have a uniform conceptual fund, a conon apparatus and similar methods. According to certain scientists, in automating “Thrge systems,” intuition and search t111 prevail over theory and calculation. The basic reason for this re— ide in the locnl or “patchwork” approach of the modern science n control to dccribing systems and processes and to their mathenatical tretitw.ent. 21i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR 0P1’ICIAL USE ONLY What deternttne thc graduti1nesi of the transition from empiricism to nclentirlc niethothi of nUys1s and iynthesis of various automated systeni? Tn the first pThce, the obje’tive complexity or the systems to be automated and the conditions of their functioning. Secondly, by the development level ot science in a given period, that is, by the availability of the corresponding meann and methods which ensure the study of the systems nd the procesc of certain c’omplexlty. Thirdly, by the degree of prac-. tical ncceiuity of’ automating systems of the studied c1as, by the concen— tratIon of’ the forces and meani of science in the given area. In any cotwretc sytenis, It is not hard to isolate the elements for which the degree of the e1entirIcne of the approach to automation vrie. The history of automation ihow that the technical, logical-mathematical and economic! problems of designing the ASU have reached the necessary level of cient1f1cnes far rrom imu1taneous1y. In automating troop control, the primary role is played by the particular reatures of the development of military art. Initially the military researchers, as is known, did not epartte the processes of troop control in the course ‘ 9olving a tactic1 prob1erm from its content. The question of “how to control?” was not separate from the question of “what to control?” and a differentiation of the means and goal wag also lacking. Since the goal positing In the control element a1wys prevails over the means and methods, the goal content of control became subject of rcientific research before the techno1or of control activity. Thus, troop control initially became scientific in terms of 1t goti]. content and only later in terms of methods and means.9 since automation in the designated area is not an end in itself but rather the meant; for improving the efficiency of troop control, it gains a firm cicntif Ic basis rrom the moment of turning management activity itself into an object of research, when the formal—apparatus and structural aspect of control begins to be specially analyzed. The degree of the cientificnc of troop control and the automation of this process is directly dependent upon the entire system of modern scien.tific knowledge on control. For example, a major contribution to elaborating the problems ot troop control was made by military scientists before the appearance of cybernetics. However in the research founded on a military be per rc and on si conceptual apparatus of just the theory of miii— trwy art, the -enera1 wa often subordinate to the specific and the essence or thc proces3e wa riot fully dic1osed. For this reason the scientific t’orce, knowledp,c rrnd funds were frequently spent on the discovery of’ patterns rLlready known in other areas of control. Cybernetics created a common basis for tranfrring the Ideas, It disclosed their reciprocal influ— r’nce and intcrcau3ality, it avoided the primitive methods and exclusiveness, nnd provided a strong conceptual and logical—mathematical apparatus. All of this helped to ra1e the level of’ i.he scientifieness of the approach to im— provin,: the ytems of troop control. The dcgree o” c1ntificnes or the approach to automation depends sub— tantia11y upon whether or not automatable processes are being studied only 25 ;1] ____________________________;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I’ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP32-00350R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ;1] i _1 J :I•1i u •i . .131. II [EkTh i.ivIiTiIi1 v .1.1 3.viTT. ii .JiIiTi IITIII’h ii1iTil’_________________________;0] in a qualitative form or whether their strict quantitative relations are being defined. In a number of instances, for creating the ASUV it may be sufficient to have only the qualitative characteristics of the controlled process. However, in designing an optimum (in the tactical, technical and economic sense), it is essential to know the quantitative dependences. The scientific establishing of tie principles of automating troop control requires not only scientific cognition of the systems and processes of control, but also scientific procedures and methods of human activities in all stages of working out and designing the ASUV as well as in the course of its exploitation and combat use. At the same time, it is essential to distinguish scientifieness in the narrow, specifically military and military technical manifestation and on the broad, general theoretical and philosophical methodological level. The first level with the abencc of the second can provide an effect only in solving particular problems on the military technical and tactical level. And often only the appearance of scientificness occurs. In actuality, the incorrect solution to the question of the balance of the objective and the subjective in a war, the relationship of man and equipment, and the dialectics of creative and algorithmic (reproductive) thinking will scarcely make it possible to talk seriously of a scientific approach to the studied problems, although here an advanced logical and mathematical apparatus can be employed and a high level of electronic machine building technology can be ensured. Thus, automating troop control can have a truly scientific character under the condition of basing its principles on the dialectical materialistic ideology and methodology, and on the theory of scientific control of the socialist society and the Marxist—Leninist teachings of war and thó arz. These, in our conviction, are the basic traits of a scientific approach to the automating of troop control. It is possible to isolate a number of specific traits which are characteristic for the process of automating troop control in the armies of the most advanced nations of the world. 1) The theoretical basis for the analysis and synthesis of automata and systems is changing. Cybernetics and its related disciplines have made it possible to commence a transition from the use of very simple automata (program, tracking and stabilizing) to adaptive, self—adjusting, self— instructing and self—organizing. In acquiring a reliable theoretical base in a systems—cybernetic approach, automation is becoming a conmon scientific— methodological approach to solving the problems of raising the effectiveness of weapon and troop control. All of this makes it possible to avoid primitive inventiveness in solving each particular question. 2) The technical base of automation is changing. The pneumatic, hydraulic and electromechenical devices have been replaced by electronic automata, 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 —. Inititilly vtcuwn tube, and and ioiid—rLate circuitrj. automata htwe rIcn, while FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY then semiconductor, inicromodule, printed, film As a reLiult the speed and reliability of the their size nd required power have declined. 3) The range of’ procesoes which can be automated have been substntia11y broadened. While previously mainly the processes of the conver1on of matter and enerr wore utorn.ted, at present baBic attention ha begun to be paid to automatin inrorniation processing. A characteristic trait of this new phase is the Introduction of control automata. For them the v€ry control InVorrnation Is the objec of control. Among such automata one would put cEllculatitlg, information—logical, information retrieval, modeling and other dovtcei. Any automaton provides control by the receiving, processing, transmitting ard toraje of information. Control automata differ from the servome1ianisnv3 in the object of control which for them is 4he control in— Cormation. The appearance of control &utomata has led to the creation of an hlern.rchy cf automated devices which predetermine the conjugation and coordination of the work of the automatic servodevices and, consequently, have made possible the transition to full autoniation. I) The sphere or uie ot automata has broadened. To the only previous area of techncti1 devices, two new ones have been added: the “man——machine” system arid the “collective——machine” system. The components of the former are man, the control and actuator utornata and the object of control. The second includes collectives of people, complexes of control and actuator automati and complex objects of control. Automation encompasses not only weapons and individual models of military equipment, but also entire tacti— Ca]. units (ships, aircraft and combat complexes), as well as systems of troop control. Here precisely the creation of ASUV becomes one of the most char’terItic nd specific traits in the period of automation in the armed forces. since the syGtems of troop control are systems of the open type. In literature a distinction is drawn between open nd closed control systems. A systems is termed c1rsed when the choice of the questions to be solved in the process of its functioning remains fixed. The data which are not developed in the process of the functioning of the system are realized as a result of a ing1e elaboration, for example, an antiaircraft missile complex, and so forth. A sysem is termed open if it develops with a set of’ basic problems which changes in the process of functioning. Such systems cannot he created a once and ror all complete. By their very essence they hou1d he coru;trintiy c1r—improving in the process of their functioning. Undertandab1y it i signi[’icantly more complicated to automate such sys— tem. But yrtemr of military-political leadership and troop control should be precic1y or this type. 5) The cloce tie or automation with other methods and measures related to optimizin( thc syztems and processes of control, and namely with the use of the methods or ope’itionr research and combat efficiency, the scientific orjanization of labor [NOT], human factors engineering, industrial design, arid o forth. Automation ct as an element of the system of measures to raic the combrtt capabi1itie of the troops. And this link is particularly apparent in siutomating troop control. 27 ;1] _,......T•ITA ]öTL. ;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A ODD I, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 13, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 •fl fD DtI — - - - r1... I_ — FOR (WVTCIAb 1ll$l ONLY All these particular fentures ot the pre9ent stage of automation in the armed forces are vividly apparent in the course ot automating troop control, they mark an ununrn1 hrodenin of t.he scientific base of utomation, and they are the source and impelling motive for the further development of its scientific nd technical bae. Sometimes the problem of the ciont±fic bases of automating troop control is io1ved from extreme pooltions: either only military cybernetics iz viewed a such, or nearly all the presently existing scientific disciplines and theories are put among the sciences comprising thiB base. In our opinion, the problem of troop control nd the principles of creating ASUV can be worked out only on the baii of the dialectical materialistic understanding of the general, the particular and the individual. The patterns which determine the structure of the systems and the nature of the processes of troop cntro1 can be divided according to the degree of their conunonness into several levels. First of all it is essential to iso- late the general patterns of the material world which are not specific precisely for control systems but appear in them. Among such patterns are the primacy of the material In relation to the spiritual, the determinacy cf processes and phenomena, anI the objectivity of the development sources. In analyzing the specific systems, the universal patterns must be considered. Otherwise this analysis can be abstract or one—sided, since the individual and particular will be viewed without the general. Marxist—Leninist philosophy——dialectl.cal and historical materialism——is the 3cientific basis for examining the universal patterns which are apparent In the systems of troop control. It is also esentia1 to isolate a group of patterns which are conunon to all systems, regardless of their specifics. AS is known, the term system i given to sets of specifically related elements which possess a relatively stable unity and a latent integrity. And the internal ties of the system are noticeably more numerous and important than the external ones. All of this gives rise to the so—called integrative or syrtem properties which are not identical to the total of the properties of the elements of the system. Although the des1rtated features are Inherent to all systems, however a consideration of them he1p to more fully imagine the structure of the systems of troop control. The scientific basis for examining the given range of patterns 1 the presently developing general theory of systems, within which a systems approach to studyint complex objects is being established. With the aid of this method, the correlation is disclosed between the corn— ponent of an integrated system. The dialectical materialistic principle of the relationship of the phenomena and processes of the material world ir the methodological base of a systems approach. The next group of patternc which are apparent in systems of troop control Is macic up of the general laws of control which are inherent to all control 28 ;1] !1th.1TI1V. ________________________;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY rytems, without exceptIon, for they are linked to the protound essence of control ti t procrn; oC the oa1—d1.rectod effect of the control organ on the controlled object nnd carried out by the transmission, processing and tornge of information. The wientific bani which provides for the ntudy oC such patternn in troop control nystems ii theoretical cybernetici which exmine the rtenin and prceser of control of any material nature and complexity. EqualJ.y important are the general patterns inherent to all social systems, including control rtems. The theory of the scientific control of society operates as the theoretical basis for optimizing and automating troop control ystem, and this theory has its own scientific bases related to the materialistic understanding of history, the interpretation of historical determinirnn, the development patterns of the given socioeconomic formation, and so forth. A truly scientific theory of control or Bociety has formed on the basis of historical materialism, the theory of scientific conununism and Marxist socio1or. Its provisions, principles and theoretical bases are the scientific basis for studying and improving all the troop control Bystems in the USSR Armed Forces and in the armies of the other socialist countries. The common patterns of troop control determine the structure of the systems and the nature of the processes occurring in them outside a dependence on the service or the armed force9 and the branch of forces, the rank of the given command level, as well as the presence or absence of automation and equipment for employing logical and mathematical methods. All troop control systems are designed to function under the conditions of conflict cituations related to the opposition from the enemy, a shortage of time and the encniy’s desire to anticipate a control effect, to the increased responsibility of the decisions to be taken, the incomplete and partially false information, to the presence of intentional interference and the enenty’s desire to knock out the controlled objects and the very control system. For this reason, uccessfu1 automation of such systems is possible only on tcientific basis of the general theory of troop control and this, in turn, is guided by the methodological principles of the Marxist—Leninist teachings on the war and the army, by the tenets of military science, the theory of mi1tary art, military pedagogics, military psychology, military legal and other sciences, that is, the entire system of military knowledge which directly or indirectly is used in studying and improving the troop Dontrol rtems. A specifically separate iroup is made up of the patterns inherent to the given service of the armed forces, branch of forces, &nd the specific level ot’ control and type of combat. They, respectively, are studied by the t.heory of operational art and by the tactics of the given services of the armed forces and branches of forces, and by the theory of the types of combat (oPfeisive and defensive operations and combat). Any attempt to create Lfl ASUV without considering these specifically concrete data of the theory or military art will be unsuccessful, for the individual is richer than the common. 29 FOR OFFIC tAT. USE ONLY .,ELEASE: Thursday, June 18, PROVFfl FOR RFI PAF Thiirdiv Jiin IR 2flfl IA-RflPR2-flflRSflRAflA1flflfl1flflflR- 1OR OVPICtAL I1E ONLY Such are the dia1ectie of the common, the particular and the Individual and, respectively, the subordination and coordination tie of the patterns which determiri th ictuie and functioning of any control 9ytems. A most important feature of the ASUV i that these are ftutomated aystems. In turn, autoinat1n t, •‘u haL 1t wn patterns which require con— I3ideration and study. Only having elucidated the link of automation with the entire history o the development of techno1or and its genetic dependence on meehaniztion, an one solve many cardinal questions on a methodologically correct banii. For example, the relationship of man and equipment in the ASUV, the problem of the “replacing” of man by an automaton, the relationship of mental and phyica1, creative routine 1bor in such oystems, or the prospects for automation and the dynamics of military professions. Th general theory of automation is becominL the scientific basis for studying the patterns on this level.10 Consequently, the scientific founation for the automation ot troop control is made up of theories which study the patterns of a specifically military, general social and technical order. Attempts to ignore any of these can cause undesirable consequences. Thus, in American mi11try technical literature of recent years, quite legitimate complaints have appeared that certain ASUV which have been put into effect did not justify their hopeB. In the opinion of the specialists, the approach to their designing was “too technical,” and did not consider other aspects. A comprehensive consideration of the patterns of all the above—listed levels is one of the important methodological principles in the approach to automating troop control. Military cybernetics is the direct scientific basis for the automation of troop control. This arose as a section or offshoot of the science of cybernetics. As is known, due to the works of N. Weiner and other scientists, at the end of the 19)40’s a special science developed on the laws concerning the structural organization and functioning of control systems of any material nature and complexity. Cybernetics has as its task the analysis, synthesis and automation of such systems for the purpose of their optimization. Initially it was an area of knowledge on the general lays of control. At that time it would have been premature to speak of military cybernetics as an indepenent area of knowledge. It was merely a question of the use of cybernetics in military’ affairs. Later on a division vas noted into theoretical, technical and applied crbernetics. Theoretical cybernetics is marked by a maximal conunonness ot problems and In any control systems examines only the isomorphic and nonspecific phenomena. Military specifics had not yet been manifested to the point where the differences began to prevail over the similarity. Certainly in terms of theoretical cybernetics even now it is proper to speak only of its use in military affairs. Technical cybernetics examines the problem of the engineering realization of control, information, modeling and computation&1 systems of any (includ-. ing military) purpose. Naturally, the specifics of armed combat tell on 30 FOR OFFICtAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the demtnd made upon the military cybernetic devices, as they require high speed, reisttnce •to jamming, reliabJilty, low weight and small size. The quetion or econonj should be solved dl.f’ferently, and here the coordi— ntIng of’ the equipment and man is carried out considering the mental ntrLte of the o1dier under the conditiorni of increased danger, responsibility and a lack oC time. Nevertheless, all these particular features tire considered mainly In the posing of the problems and in formulating he tactical and technical requirements for these ytems. But the methods of the analysis and yntheir of 3yten13 do not undergo any essential chnpes. The orclinal7 methods of technical cybernetics, humn.n factors in engineering and o forth re to be employed, For this reason, in these Instances one also speaks not of military cybernetics but rather of the pp1ication of cybernetics in military affairs. Applied cybernetics i a specific control. systems of effective methods for spheres. different question. in rpecific areas of employing cybernetic It task includes examining activity and the elaboration means and methods in these ;1] -‘ J J T•kVA ii •1 . — — - JrkKVIHiTl. liii _.d r±d1iT,vii.r.ii1 liIiTiHiIiT. iiiiiil;0] A clar3sification of the areas of applied cybernetics (economic cybernetics, biocybernetics, nd so forth) is determined by the specific features of the subject of examination, by the alteration caused by it in the methods, means and tasks of study, as well as by the particular deniands on training research personnel. The specific features of military control systems hwe caused the separating of military cybernetics as an independent offshoot of applied cybernetics. Military cybernetics has redistributed the proportional amount of research methods and tasks, it has hypertrophied some of them and shifted others to the background. For example, game theory which was developed by J. von Neumann and 0. Morenstern, being one of the many disciplines of general cybernetics, in the military area has moved into a situation of the leading area of’ knowledge. This theory was specially created for solving problems containing conflict situation. With its aid it is possible to create models for the behavior of the enemy under various circumstances. The basis of the arguments in game theory is the supposition of the enerr is a rational opposing side which can upset our plans and prevent us from achieving the set goal. Thus the specific features of armed combat are manifested. Undoubtedly it is possible to represent the actions of a shop foreman in a production process as a “game.” Such models are valid but they are not neceary. But for disclosing the specific features of military control, game theory represents the most suitable mathematical apparatus. This offshoot of cybernetics also solves problems concerning the elaboration of pecia1 niethodr or decision taking under the conditions of incom— plet.e or even partially raise information, the problems of evaluating reliability, the promptncs and completeness of combat information, as well as a numbcr of other specific military problems. 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A DtI “C. Thi APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 ‘PRflVFfl FflR RFI FASF Thiircdv .Iiinp IR 2flfl IA-RflPR2-flflRflRflflA1Aflfl1flflflR- FOR 0 ICtAL USE ONLY Thus, military cybernetics is n offprin f appil.ed cybernetics which ihou1d o1ve speclrtcmlly mlii .ary prob1ems Since specific military r.tiirei are moi. cirar1.y ipp ent in the ytemn nd processes of control— troopi, combat. complext nd tcticai unitn on the battlefield, in the literature a trndit.ion hat; developed of localizing the term “military cybernetics” chiefly in this ea of military affairs. But in terms of the weapons control systems, t e “man——military equipment” ByBtelns and in the control systems f’or troop upply and the military economy, the problems of military cybernetics consis% in working out the tactical and technical requirements and specification4, of “linking” these to the ztrategic, operational—tactical or tactic1 background, the formulating ot the specifically military characteristicsl of the control objectB in the language of cybernetics and the military interpretation of’ the results of their cybernetic examination. All these pob1ems require special military knowledge, and cannot be solved on the basis of just the general provisions of cybernetics. In structural terms, military cybernetics is divided into a number of independent areas of knowledge: information theory (the theorr of milital7 information, the military applications of information theory-, and so forth); operations research (the theory zf operations research, the theory- of study— Ing combat, the theory oC applying mathematical methods for solving military problems); the theory of the algorithznization of military problems (the elaboration of algorithmic descriptions of combat and the processes of its control); the theory of military—purpose control systems; the theory of automating troop control; the theory of the military application of electronic computers, and so forth. Modern military cybernetics is a most important element or the scientific foundation on which the automation of troop control is developed. Obviously its role can be noticeably increased if its structure is organized not by the “apparatus” principle but rather according to the specific functional one. At present, the sections of military cybernetics unify an apparatus of a single type: information theory, algorithmic, and so forth. Each of theni can exist independently of military cybernetics. For this reason at present much work in operations research, the use 0±’ SPU [network planning and management], and the automation of troop control contains no reference to military cybernetics. To put it figuratively, in the present structure of military cybernetics, the research apparatus for the systems and processes of troop control. is represented in a march formation and not in deployed battle orders. Possibly, such a structuring of the theory is more economical in the sense of studying the logical and mathematical apparatus used in military cybernetics. But the goals, tasks, objects and the comprehensiie approach to their exaiiination remain undisclosed. Obviously in the future there must be a reorganization of military cybernetics precisely by the specific function principle. Then in one section it will be possible to asemb1e everything that serves the purposes of analysis, synthesis, optimization and automation of the control body, and in another, the necesriary information for examining the characteristics of the object of control, and so Corth. 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVFfl FOR RFI PASF Thiirgdiy Jiinp IR 2flfl (IA-RflPR2-flflRflRflflfl1flflfl1flflflR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The designated structure of military cybernetics is characteristic only for its present state. It will be altered, on the one hand, depending upon what theories and scientific disciplines in the future will be more effective for solving control problems in the military area, and on the other, upon the direction and development pace of the areas of mil!tary science which come into contact with military cybernetics. For example, even now modern statistical information theory successfully solves problems for improving the resistance to jamming in coniunications, optimum coding, reducing redundancy, and so forth. At the seine time, it is not sufficiently effective in determining the value, significance, reliability or promptness of the information, that is, the parameters which are particularly important for military affairs. With the rise of a theory which solves the designated problems, it can be incorporated as part of military cybernetics, without reducing the importance of statistical information theory. Military cybernetics, has the scientific basis for creating the ASUV, as a whole depends upon the further development of military science generally and each of its sections. In their aggregate they study the laws of armed combat on the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and they elaborate the principles, means, methods and forms of conducting combat, the scientific bases of their planning, support and the organization of troop control. Ultimately, the theory of military art and military science as a whole must answer the practicu. question of “how must the troops be controlled in all the stages of their activities in order to be victorious over the enemy?” Consequently-, not only military cybernetics is concerned with the problems of troop control. Certainly there is a crucial difference between the mentioned areas of knowledge. Military science studies armed combat and the armed forces completely, that is, from military, political, moral-psychological, economic, scientific—technical and other positions. including from the viewpoint of the “techno1or” of troop control. Military cybernetics examines the same problems, but on the level of control systems and processes with the aid of specific logical and mathematical means. While military science, proceeding from the policy of the state and its military doctrine, determines the aims of combat and sets the criteria for evaluating its military results, military cybernetics accepts these views as given from the outset, and studies the troop control systems and the processes occurring in them with the task of seeking out the most advantageous ways for the practical implementation of the set decisions. Military cybernetics examines the laws of armed combat as a mathernatica). science, that is.1 from the viewpoint of their structure, fornis and quantitative re1ationhips. It translates the semantic operational—tactical, strategic and military economic problems into the language of algorithris, information theory and nnchine programs, and solves them in an abstract quantitative torm, lie the obtained knowledge becomes available for the theory of military art. The given sector of science carries out the assignments of tacticr, operational art r.nd strater, and serves them like the other military technical sciences. 33 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 ‘PRflVFfl FOR RFI FASF Thiircdv Jiinp IR 2flfl cIA-RflPR2-AflRSflRflflfl1flflfl1flAflR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In recent years the theory of troop control has been consistently worked out and organizationally shaped as part of military science. This theory in terms of its problems and the range of studied phenomena overlaps and incorporates military cybernetics, and serves as the next stage of its development. This theory, bin an organic part of military science, studies the problem of troop control as a whole. Here a sound analysis is made not only of specifically military but also methodological, sociological, legal, moral—ethical, psychological, pedagogical and physiological aspects of organizing control systems, their automation, the recruitment arid training of personnel, and so forth. Obviously new areas will appear along with the development in the theory of troop control. For exmp1e, these will be: The principles for the algo— rithmization of troop control processes; studying the means and methods of automating the receiving, transmission and processing of military information; full automat-Ion of troop control systems; the organization of inforzna— tion and computer centers and communications systems; studying the methods ror carrying out opezational calculations; the use of SPU methods, mechanization end NOT in control systems; the use of the methods of human factors engineering, ergonomics and psychointellectualistics in ASUV, and others. The common traits of the dialectics of the cognitive process are manifested in the process of understanding the patterns of troop control. Cognition moves from an undifferentiated approach, when the control problem has still not become a. distinct one, to an abstract cybernetic one which separates the form of control from its operational or tactical content, and then to the synthesis of a formal control and concrete military ana].rsis which is achieved in the modern theory of’ troop control. In turn, the synthesizing theory oI’ troop control reflects the general patterns of the differentiation arid integration of scientific knowledge. Thus, the theory of troop control is genetically linked not only with military cybernetics but also to other areas of military science. It can be viewed as an unique result from the development of certain areas of tactics, operational art and strategy. Being a substa.ntive theory, it examines its own systems and processes in the entire completeness of the general, particular and individual, and thereby fills in the missing links in the scientific foundation of automating troop control. The troop control systems and the processes occurring in them are the most complex objects of automation. They possess tra..ts which are co!mnon to all control systems and processes, and at the same time have essential features which must be considered in solving the problems of the possible limits and ways of automation. Proceeding from this it is essential to elucidate the general and particular features of troop control systems as objects of automation, and to characterize the content and essence of the troop control process for defining the conditions and limits of its automa— t ion. 3k FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OPFtCIAL USE ONLY OOThOTES 1. F’ee K1 Marx and P. Engels, “Boch.” tWorknj, Vol 23, p 383. 2. V. 1. Lenin, “Poin. Sobr. Boch.,” Vol 1, p 100. 3. IbId. k. K. Marx and F. nge1s, “Soch.,” Vol 30, p 26I. 5. Ibid., Vol 23, p 381k. t. Ibid., Vol 12, p 735. . ee SOVETSKAYA VOYENNAYA ENTSIKLOPEDTYA, Moscow, 1976, Vol 1, p 75. 8. See K. Marx and F. Enge1, “Soch.,” Vol 20, pp 170—178. 9. tt Is not difficult to be convinced of this in examining regulation9, order3 rd manuals in a chronological order. An analogous sequence can be ob. rved In the development of thq theories of control of social procenie, conom.tcs and technical devices. 10. It must be pointed out that the general theory of automation ha not yet developed as an 1ndepenent dicip1ine. However one can definitely point to a number of works on the methodo1o, history, the economic (and military) effect.iveness of automation, as veil as on the forecasting of it pro3pect, and on technical cybernetics and these corn— prlnc the bnsi of this theory. 35 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY June 18, 2 I CIIAPTF2 2: POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ThOOP CONTROL A A SPECIFIC OEJECT OF AUTOMATION ;1] _,iI,(1VA ii •1 l 1 !1 Ii1TI1i V [HiT I,’4,rII.1 , . T.vdiTiI;f ii hTiTiii 1.YitTiTiTiTW—.;0] 1. Particular 1’eature9 of Troop Control Systems a Objects of Automation The que8tion of improving the syntenrn for controlling sociqi processes occupy an Important place in the theoretical and practical activities of the CPSU, and the party has indicated the basic areas and methods for solving thiG problem. One nuch area is the creating of sectorial automated control yteni, and over the long run, a ntatevide system for the collection and procening of information. The materlain of the 2kth and 25th CPSU congresses particularly emphasized that thiG work should be based upon an analy9is and improving of the organizational structure of control and on the etab1ishing a!ld clarification of the functions of the individual bodies. All of this appliec fully to troop practices. The provinions formulated by the party are the initial principles for ex— aminin and improving the control 9ystems for the Armed Forces of the Soviet state. tn viewing them as objects of automation, it is essential to fornh a clear notion of’ the material nubstrate, the external ties, the inte’na1 otructure and the functions performed as integral systems and as individual o1ement and bodieB. Here it is important to disclose the specific features of troop control systems (SUv) along vith the coninon ones. Cybernetics has defined the most general laws for the structure and functioning of all systems. On this level the SUV is a related aggregate of control cireuit which ensure the proper functioning of such complex and dynn.’iic syntems as troop formations are. Each circuit includes the control body, the controlled object and the direct linkage and feeãback channels which connect them. In the process of the functioning of the system, the control body receives and procesoes information, it generates programs of action arid Lsnues the corresponding ccqnmands. The object of control by a method specitic to it alone carries out these commands. Here over the direct 1inke channel command information is sent out from the control body to the abject, and over the feedback channel initial information is returnec b 1.he state or the object and the surrounding medium (including the object cf inediate action), as well as the monitoring izitormation on the results of carrying out the received conmiands. Ths is the general picture for the tunctioning of a SW! from the vievpoint at cybernetics. 36 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: ciA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 r. i—ni FOk OPIC tAb USE ONLY - In ;1] —‘ .(•1V ii •1 .i — _,..i ... Iii,i . ivj._.ii i1pTiMi1 ;liIiTi ;0] To thin nchemo It. t pc,nnib1 to add only evera1 refinementi. As ic known, in any developed cont.rol yritem, ontro1 body and the controlled object themiielven rr complex iyttem tind nt the iiame time frequently operate s i1omentti (componentn) of otlwr, oven more complex iiyntem. Ordinarily the control body in connected with evera1 controlled objectn among which exists a div1iion ot flit Itt turn, th’ nntro1 body itseir operateD an a controlled object for the nuperior control body’ of’ the given sy9tem. A wa already pointed out, among the various controlled objects, some carry out predominantly a mtrIa1—ener’ interaction of the system with the medium and other objects, others realize mainly informational interactions, and provide for the collection and transmission of initial, command and monitoring information. Regardless of the clone interaction and even the interpenetration of both types of functiong, it is essential to dlstingui8h them for correctly posing the question of automating their controL Certainly the automatdon of control must encompass the information cycles and elements of the system which in one way or another are related to the receiving, 8torage, tranformation and transmis8ion of inforntion. The further penetration into the problem of automating the SUV requires a thorough structural and functional analysis of these elements in the control body and the controlled objects. However, these demando lead us beyond the limits of a general cybernetics approach, and direct us along the path of the ever nre complete consideration of the specific features or troop control ystenu. The social nature of the systems is of fundamental significance for solving the problems of automating the SIJV. Being subEystems of the larger control system, the Soviet state, tñey embody the corresponding socioeconomic, political and ideological traits of our system and the socialist way of life. A number of Important consequences ensue from this particular feature of the troop control systems. Since the material substrate of the SUV is people and the equipment created by them, control in the systems is realized through interhumari relationships as well as relationships between humans and equipment. And man is the chief element of the social control system and the interpersonal, group and class relations are the leading ones. They’ express the production relationships which have come to be in a society. Each Individual is given an awareness and viii. He is motivated by material and spiritual needs which have accumulated in the aims and means of achieving them. For this reason, in describing the specifics of the SUV, it is essential to particularly emphasize the role of the subjective factor, the moral—political and military qualities, the mental capacities, knowledge and experience, the purposefulness and will, self—discipline and organization of all the personnel. The science of controlling social processes to a significant degree is human science which requires consideration of the social and psychological makeup of people, as well as the observation in 37 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . r’ ri APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY their relatiórrnhipa of the legally established standards, rules of hwnan Intercourse and moral princip1e. The most important tasks of control in this regard are the training and indoctrination of the person”e1, the uniting of them into a close-knit military collective capable of c8rrying out a combat miBsion under a oituation of any complexity, and the creation of a healthy psychological climate in it. All of thii must not be forgotten for even en instant in setting the tasks of automating troop cor.trol and in the process of their practical realization. Another proof of the ocia1 nature of SUV is that, in addition to the sub-. Jective factors, in the SIJV there is a complex intertwining of objective ones. These are influenced by the natural phenomena (geographic, meteorological, and so forth). At the same time, the SUV find themselves in a complicated intersecting of social factors including: economic, political, ideological and pycho1ogica1 which are not only different in terms of their nature but also frequently operate in different directions. In their aggregate they- form the objective conditions for the existence and functioniYAP of the SUV. Only a correct understanding and consideration of the 1istec’ ta’e ke it posib1e to mentally pose the question of the nece— city and po6stb14y of automating troop control. The a’3signated traits are specific and at the same time they- are conunon to all nociai. control systems. We, certainly, are interested in those specific features which distinguish Buy precisely.as military control systems. This has been analyzed in detail in the work by the collective of authors “Principles of Troop Control.”1 Without taking up the generally known facts, we would like to treat those notions which are of essential significance for solving automation problems. Military control systems are designed for functioning in a typical conflict situation, in that specific variety of this which is armed combat. The specific focus of the SW is aimed at providing the constant and high combat readiness of the troops in peacetime, and in the event the aggressor starts a war, to carry out the combat missions, to achieve victory, and to defeat the enemy in the minimally short time, with the least losses and material expenditures for one’s troops. However the ener pursues the same goal in relation to our troops. Any battle or operation in this regard is a very complicated two—sided process in which each of the sides endeavors to destroy’ the enemy not only by the force of arms but also by the force of human reason, and impose one’s viii on the other side. As a result an unique control system arises in which there are tvo subsystems at work which endeavor to extend the control effect to the enemy and thereby to the entire process of armed combat. This particular feature of the control of combat was precisely pointed out by M. N. Pukhachevskiy. “...Only that side,” he wrote, “actually directs its actions which achieves the development of them in accord with its own plan, and this means the actual control of combat should be control over the 38 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .hursday, June 18, _--J. I — I. PflR OPVICIAL USE ONLY - -n 4 nfl entire combat process, that is, not only over one’s own actions, but also to some degree to the enemy actions imposed on it by our actions.... The art of contro11in c’>rnbat requ1re an understanding of this complex contradictory procean. IL The use of weepcnni b:f Lti Hidn gives ri9e to a situation of danger in which not only controlled objects operate but alBo the control bodies. This complicates the work of the latter, it disrupts the connnunications channels, it sharply alters the state of the controlled objects, it causes both poBitive and negative emotions in the personnel, and so forth. Under the given experimental conditions fic1 a particu1r straining of physical and piritua1 forces is necessitated from all the personnel in order to correctly carry out the entire aggregate of control operations. The respon— ib11ity or the commanders and staffs is increased not only for carrying out the combat mis1.on but also for the life of subordinates, for the fate of the civilian popu1tion, and on a strategic scale, for the fate of the motherland a whole. The nature of the tasks and conditions of troop control poses sharply the problem of the optimization (raising the efficiency and soundness) of the decisions being taken, since mistakes in them can lead to severe, at times irreprab1e consequences. The taking of the most effective and sound decisions under these conditions is a very complicated task. This is caused by a number of circumstances: a) by the incompleteness and unreliability of a number ot’ initial data concerning the situation, snd particularly on the enemy which wifl endeavor by all means to conceal its grouping, the plan of action, and confuse us; b) by the complexity andlimited possibilities of mathematical description of combat since it is difficult to give many data a precise quantitative measurement; c) by the limited possibilities for varyfying the degree of optim1ity of the decision prior to combat in line with the essential incompleteness or any models by which the forthcoming combat could be reproduced and played out. AU the listed factors in a definite manner influence the solving of the problems of automating SUV. On the one hand, the resistance of’ the enemy, the situation of d8.nger, the intense nature of control work, and the complexity of working out a purposeful and sound decision under these conditions necessitate the automating of mental operations of an evaluation or calculation nature and requiring methodical work in a calm situation. On the other hand the ensuing problem of social responsibility of the coimnander and control bod—s and the complexity of the mental problems being solved, place certain etnstraints on the process of automation. The taking of a decision to a definite degree always remains an area of creativity and art requiring an interaction of mind and viii, logic and intuition, strict calculation and risk. Another specific feature of military control systems is their high internal and extern1dynmicness. No other social control system possesses such flexibility, mobility’ and monolithicness as a troop control system. This ;1] ,q1iT.viTi}.i .JiIiriHiIiIij..iiTc A ______________________;0] 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVFfl FoR RFI FAF Thiircdw .Iiinp IR 2Afl• (IA-RflPR2-AflR!flRflflO1flflfl1flflflR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY )Eirt1eu1,1r rcrtur(? or rnfl.itary tyritenm wrn pointed out by V. I. Lenin. ‘1.et ur tkr n. rnc,derr, swtny,” hc wrote. “llerc is one of the best examples oP orjan{zation. And thin or(’nnlzfttion i good only becau9e It is flexible hc1n b1c ti thc inm time to impose single will on millions of people.” By internal dynsinioness one understands the mobility and variability of the specific SUV structureg. This particular feature is determined br a number of circumstances. In the first place, the organization of the subunits, units and formations of the armed forces is changed periodically. The structure is brought into accord with the developing weapons, military equipa ment, with the new methods of using them and with the new views on military art. Secondly, an organization used at a given moment is changed in the curse of combat—-and in a rather broad range——in accord to the set combat mission by the varying organization of the battle formation, by changing the number of attached (supporting) means, by organizing temporary groups such as forward detachments, vangii’ds, artillery groups, and so forth. Under various conditions the seine control body can unite the actions of a varying number of controlled objects. The problem of control can be effectively solved only by a system which possesses the necessary structural flexibility and can easily reorganize itself for various specific variations of the organization of control. The external dy-nainicness of SUV is manifested in the fact that its tactical and operational elements possess high mibility and maneuverability caused by the nature of modern combined suns combat (peration) and by the new means of locomotion. Certainly in solving the problems of automation, the given circumstance is the determining one, for the control systems which are unable to reflect and embody such dynamicness, that is, those which do not possess sufficiently portable and mobile equipment, cannot effectively carry out their missions. The conditions of armed combat, the opposition of the enemy the use of poierfu1 weapons, and the high dynamicness of combat place increased demnds on the SUV. In our opinion, the most important of them are the following: 1) Constant combat readiness of the control systems which is equal to the readiness of the troops themselves and making it possible to engage in action in the event of the outbreak of war; 2) The reliability (survivability) of the systems in work, the ability to provide continuous troop control under any conditions of a situation, including the launching of nuclear strikes by the enenr against its elements, in creating strong Jamming by- the enemy, with a shortage of initial data, as well as with great physical stresses; 3) Efficiency in work providing the prompt carrying out of control tasks; Ii) The conformity of the control system’s structure to the organizational structure of the troops, to the weapons, to the nature of combat and the existing technical control devices; 1O FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PRfl\IEfl FOR RELEASE: Thiircdv June 1 2flflg: CIA-RflPR2-Afl5ARAflfl1AAfl1flAflR- FOR OVFICIAL USE ONLY 5) The mobility of control systems conforming to the noM1ity of the troopD, the ability of the control bodieo to rapidly shift their positions, nd to control troops in motion; 6) Universality in organization and flexibility in action making it p08- sible, without complex reorganizations, to control the troops under changing conditions, in various types of combat (offensive, defensive and so forth) carried out with the use of any weapons; 7) Concealment in work ensuring that the contents of the information circu— lating in the system and the locations of the SUV elements are kept secret from the enelv. Moreover it is important that the control systems be comparatively simple and not too expensive. It is rather difficult to reconcile all of this in an 1&a1 manner and obviou1y there is no such single universal men by which the carrying out of all the listed requirements could be ensured. Automation is also no such universal means. Under the conditions of the dia1ectic1 development of military affairs, a portion o the mentioned requirements can be carried out only by full automation of the contra]. processes. However, for carrying out another portion of the requirments, it is essential to combine automation with other measures. These are: the correct choice of personnel, thorough ideological—political, special military and moral. .psychological training of the personnel of the control bodies; improving the structure and methods of work of the control bodies; diverse mechanization and technologization of the control labor, the further development of communications equipment, scientific organization of labor; improving th command posts and the correct combination of man and equipment. The particular features of the SUV are clearly apparent in their unique internal structure and in the different relationships àf subordination and coordination between the interrelated elements of the STJV. Certainly the structure of the control systems in the armies of various states has its specific features. It m&nifests the different and even directly opposing class—political, economic, national and other relationships. Within the armed forces of one country it is possible to detect specific features in the organization of the control systems in the various services of the armed forces and branches of forces, since they differ in terms of organization, technical equipping, and means of action. However, in all the SLJV there are also common elements, the elucidation of which in methodological terms will help to solve the problems of automation. As the basic object let us take the control system which exists in the ground forces of i majority of modern armien. The hierarc?iy of control systems which has been widely developed in them makes it possible to establish an order of subordination of the inferior control bodies and officials to the superior ones. Thus in the present—day organization of many armies these are: the soldier——squad (crev)——platoon-— FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 IOK (WP I (I AL IJSI ONLY company (battery )——batt1ion__regjment__formatjon__fje force——ground forces as a whole. The two adjacent intermediate levels (for example, p1atoon——quad, company-— platoon) form a c1oed control circuit which is a subsystem in the broader syctem of control (in t1 first instance, in the company, and in the second, in the battalion). A number of control circuits corresponding to the number of subordinate units is formed by the control body of each ele-. ment. As a consequence of the division of functions and combat missions between the elements and subsystems of control, they are interconnected. On the level of coordination these are links of interaction. They do not correspond to classical control circuits, since there are not relations of subordination between the adjacent units, the various echelons and the basic and supporting means. However, between them communications channels are established and over these there is reciprocal information on the combat situation and their actions. A circuit of interaction when necessary can be turned (under combat conditions such a possibility is envisaged) into one of the control circuits. The initial element of the troop control system is the servic’man (soldier, sergeant or officer) who controls the weapon, technical device or machine. He sees to the work of the mechanisms, he fires, he controls the movement of the weapons and equipment, he deploys them in a battle situation and strikes them in a march formation, he provides cmouf1age, and so forth. Here control can be carried out manually, semiautomatically or automatically. In more complicated “man——weapons” and “man——machine” systems, control is carried out by a collective or persons, a crew, team or group of operators. In such systems, as in a primary tactical subunit (rifle squad), the problem arises of controlling the coordinated actions of the men, that is a specific feature arises which Is characteristic for the SUV. A control circuit is created which includes the coannander and subordinates linked by visual, sound or radio and telephone direct and feedback channels. Such a control system is part of the superior subunit, the p].atoot, the wing of aircraft and so forth. Here the control function is also exercised by the commander, but his controlling effect is focused directly not on the soldier (the operators) armed with weapons and equipment, but rather at the persons whose specific duty is the control of persons, that is, the commanders of the squads (crews or teams). For the platoon commander they are the inunediate objects of control. The “conunander-—subordjnate soldiers” link even more clearly expresses the specific features of the troop control systems. For fully describing its particular features just one eloment is lacking, the group control body, the staff, which arises and is developed in the last stages of the hierarchical ladder. ;1] Al ::J 111V1 iii Iii h.IIIdIIIII..iII.4,1,IIHIIIIih Iw1ILil________________;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 The principic of unity of command velopment of the armed Corces and wartime. Its essence consists In hands of one individusi who takes sibility for the combat readiness is a basic one in the organizational de— in the connriand or troops in peacetime and the concentrating of all power in the the decisions and bears personal respon— of the subordinate troops and for their C _I___ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The last, evermore complicated control e1ement are: company——platoon (and the subunits correBpondin to them); battalion——company; regiment—— battalion, and so forth. The structure of these subsystems and elements htii a number of particular features. In a majority of modern t.rrntes, starting from such subunits as the company and the battalion, the commander leads the subordinate troops not only personally but rilso with the help of specially created command bodies and various equipment. Thus, in the U.S. Army, the company commander already ha a command section consisting of an assistant compny coimnander, a supply sergeant with nn assistant, a communications sergeant, a company clerk smd three radiotelephone operators. In addition to the conunander, the control system of a battalion in the U.S. Army also includes such a body as a staff connisting of a chief of stafT and officers for personnel, reconnaissance, operational questions and military training, for the rear and communications, as well as a chemical officer, and others. For creating direct and feedback channels as well as for other support functions on the stal’f company of a battalion, there are special subunits (a section for staff and ground observation, a signals platoon, reconnaissance platoon, and others). Starting from the regiment, Lhe basic conunand body is considered to be the combined arms staff which has a rather complicated structure and under the leadership of the commander carries out the entire aggregate of command and control measures. The combined arms staffs usually consist of officials or of departments (sections) created by the principle of the specialization of labor and division of functions. For exa1nple, on a majority of the farina— tion and field force staffs of modern armies in the capitalist states, there are such divisions and departments as reconnaissance, operations, personnel, oommunictions, administrative, and so forth. Moreover, on these levels there are also the chiets of the corresponding branches of forces, special troops and service3 who are responsible for the state and correct use of the subunits and units of their own branch of forces, and they ensure concrete and skilled leadership of them. Ordinarily- they exercise control and command through their subordinate officers, sergeants and soldiers. Some of the chiefs of the branches of forces can have their own staffs. The hierarchical ladder in this manner is tie— veloped not only along the vertical but also along the horizontal, forming additional control subsystems for the branches of forces and special troops. In solving automation problems, consideration is given to the principles which underlie the structure and functioning of SUV. The most important of them are unity of command and centralization. ;1] 42i .iv ii .i ..,_I1irim. r iv ii v.. V .111 k.ViTiT.ji’I lITiftL1 ITITil IITITèT________________________ 1;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001000100063 D DLI ni n nnnr IOk ()IF1 C I Al4 (ISK ON[.Y successful execution of combat missions. The commander (troop commander) i this person in each control element. V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed to the objective necessity of unity of corn— manci in controlling large indutria1 and technical complexes. “No railroads, nor transport, nor large machines and enterprise9,” he wrote, “can function correctly at all if there Is no unity of will which links all the available workers into a ing1e economic organ working with the exactness of a clock mecha..ism.” V. I. Lenin considered the observance of this principle particularly important in the organizational development of the armed forces and in troop control. “Irresponsibility covered up by references to col— lectivism,” he stressed, “is the most dangerous evil which...in military affairs leads constantly to catastrophe, chaos, panic, divided rule and defeat.”5 The principle of unity of command has an opposite class—political nature, content and focus in the armed forces of the imperialist and socialist states. In bourgeois armies this expresses re1ationshiis of social inequality, exploitation and suppression, and serves the reactionary and aggressive aspirations of monopolistic groupings. In the socialist armies it embodies the moral and political unity and cooperation of the working classes and is aimed at achieving just, progressive aims. In the. USSR• Armed Forces unity of command is exercised on a party base and presupposes the high political awareness of each officer, his constant execution of the policy of the Communist Part and the Soviet government, and a reliance on the party organizations in carrying out specific missions. The principle of unity of command in no vay means that the commander can ignore the results of work or the opinion of the collective of a control body. Such a practice would cause harm and would lead to subjectivism and an abuse of power. Truly scientific leadership consists in the skillful combination of strictest unity of command in taking a decision and carrying it out with the fullest utilization of the experience, initiative and creativity of the off’icers of the control body (in operational elements, persons who are a member of the military council), the party and Komsomol organizations and all the personnel. Under the conditions of a further differentiation in the functions of the officers of control bodies it is particularly important that the commander correctly use the knowledge and experience of the specialists and the opinion of the chiefs of the branches of’ forces, the officers of the corresponding departments and services. V. I. Lenin cautioned leaders: “Eeally isn’t it shameful to correct of fhandecfly the work of hundreds of the best specialists, to resort to noisy jokes and to boast of one’s right ‘not to approve’?”6 The inztructions of V. I. Lenin have maintained their timeliness even now. They focus on the correct use of collective reason in working out and estab— 1.ishing decisions and in planning combat. r fi. ;1] ! J :ii .I!i ._ . — — _i i.uiii. iiiijr ,± .i .j ,3’iIiMh1 .,1iTèIIiIiIiL .TiIiI;0] 1’4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -t r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICTAT4 USE ONLY ;1] .1 • . rr I.1’4I1I’ ii .i .iI’iIiT!f ii hIiTi i,i.Ii IiIiIiI ______________________________;0] The principle of unity of command is supplemented arid organizationally supported by the principle of he centralization of leadership. Its essence consisti in th eonsiistent and Btrlct subordination of the inferior level3 to the superior ones, and in the unifying of the actions of subordi— nnte troops accordinp to Fl 1ng1e plan for achieving the overall goal of combat (an OperEtt.Ofl). This principle also requires skillful and flexible application, and in particular, an understanding that centralization under certain conditions of modern armed combat can be combined with decentralization of control, and include the latter a a particular aspect. This means that in special circumstances the independence of certain units and formations can rise, particularly when they operate away from the remaining troops, in the absence of contact with a. senior chief, as well as with acutely limited time ror preparing combat. It i also essential to bear in mind that too rigid centri1ization can lead to n informational overloading of the superior 1eve1i and to the thwarting of the initiative and creativity of subordinates. Excessive Interference has a harmful psychological effect. It teaches the ubordinate to wait in all instances for instructions from a senior chief. In emphasizing the danger of these tendencies, L. I. Brezhnev formulated the following demand: “...A very important element in improving economic leadership is an improving in the organizational structure and methods of management. We must simultaneousi,y strengthen both principles or democratic centralism. On the one hand, it is essential to develop centralism thereby creating an obstacle for departw2ntal and local trends. On the other, it i essential to develop the democratic principles, initiative on the spot, to free the upper ).eadership echelons of unimportant matters, and ensure efficiency and flexibility in decision taking.”1 The principles o! centralism and unity of command have been considered in working out the overall structure of the ASUV, in disclo3ing the links between its elements, in determining the control functions which can be automated, the degree of automation of the hierarchically linked elements of the control system, in establishing the nature and volume of information re ceived by each control element, and so forth, The solving of automation problems is also influenced by the specific featm’ es of organizing command posts. They can be stationary or mobile, located on armored personnel carriers, motor vehicles, airplanes, helicopters and ships. For ensuring the survival and continuous operation under conditions of modern war, in foreign armies, in each element of the control system several command posts are organized and these are capable of taking over for one another in the event of the knocking out of one of them. One of these posts is the basic one. For example, in the U.S. and West German divisions, corps and armies, a basic command post is created along with a reserve or forward of rear command post. In addition, for the same purpose provision is made for the shifting of contrql in the event of the knocking out of the basic and FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A fl flfl APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY reserve commahd posts to the command posts of the chiefs and subordinate commanders of the formations. For ensuring the work of the command posts and for, maintaining uninterrupted communications, the control bodies have at their 4sposai. the corresponding equipment for reconnaissance, communications, as well as for collecting, processing and displaying information. In all armis basic attention is given to developing such an element of the control systems as the direct and feedback channels between the control bodies and the controlled objects. Here an effort is made to ensure their uninterrupted work considering the requirements of reliability of operation with the necessary range and capacity, accuracy, speed and secrecy in transmitting information and sufficient resistance to jamming. For meeting these requirements, it has been recommended that various types and methods of communications be used together, including: radio, radio relay, wire, telegraph with letter printing, signal, high speed, and so forth. In the opinion of foreign specialists, the recent achievements of science and technolor in the near future will make it possible to supply the control bodies with fundamentally new equipment. This generally is a description of modern troop control systems, their nature and purpose, the structure and functions, the design principles and the operating conditions. From this total evaluation it is possible to draw the following tentative conclusions on the automation of SUV. In the first place, the very conditions and particular features of its functioning predetermine the further development and deepeni.ig of full automation of troop control processes. Secondly, the socioclas: nature, the complexity, multiplicity, and dynamicness of the SUV not only give rise to difficulties on this path, but also impose definite limitations on the process of auto— .mation, and demand that it be combined with other directions for improving the troop control systems and methods. The cor.cretization of this conclusion and a clarification of the possibilities, ways, stages and depth of the automating of control require a more detailed examination of the very process of troop control, as well as its essence and content. 2. Modern Views on the Essence and Content of the Troop Control Process The content of control in its cybernetic understanding was briefly examined tn the first section of the current chapter. In starting from this general description, it is essential to bring out the specific features inherent to the processes of troop control and thereby create additional prerequisites ror the specific conclusions on the fundamental and real opportunities for ri.utomatin control. 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR F. hursday, June 18, 2.j: PROVED FOR RELEASE: Thiirdiv Jiin 1R 200g: CIA-RflPR2-OflR5flRflflA1AAA1AAAR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY For solving this problem, a mere cybernetic description of the elements in the inrormational cycle of control is not sufficient. There must be a thorough evaluation of the contn of the troop control process considering it aims, means and the sequence or sages. Going beyond the confines o’ the informationni aspect or the review makes it possible to consider the sociopolitical, the mi11try—technica1, moral—psychological and logical— gnoseological aspecto of the troop control process. A correct definition of the essence of troop control is not a simple matter. As tn example, several definitions can be given. One of them, for example, states: “Troop control (the control of combat and an operation) is the preparation, conduct and support of the combat by the commander with the aid of the staff and other comand bodies.”8 But combat is not directly carried out by the comander or the staff but rather by the troops they control. Another well known definition is also not without shortcomings. It states: “Troop control is constant leadership by the commanders and staffs of all levels over the activities of the subordinate troops (aviation or navy) and aimed at carrying out the set missions.9 Here there Is indication of a definite purposefulness in the control process, however its content is transmitted by the words “constant leadership.” The reasonable question arises: what must be understood as leadership? Are not the concepts of “leadership” and “control” identical? If this is the case, then the defini— t.ion will be logically incorrect. Tn our view, basic attention should be focused not on a comparison and criticism of the various definitions, but rather on examining and describing the very process of troop control. For this purpose it is essential to isolate the control activities from the general activities of the troops. As is known the latter are permeated by control, they comprise the basic spheres of its application, and characterize the trpes of control problems. Nevertheless, control does not coincide with all troop activities, it does not exhaust them, but rather comprises its inner core, it systematizes and links these activities into a single whole. Control is an active process, and it always in one way or another invades a natural or spontaneous course of things. Its primary aim is to maintain a given system, its integrity and the capacity to function. However, under the constant changing conditions of the environment it is impossible to maintain the system without altering its structure and functions within certain limits. And these changes should not reduce but rather increase the efTi— cient tunctioning of the system and its interaction with the environment. A correspondingly secondary and more profound aim of control is to improve the system and to ensure the development of its structure and functions. Proceeding from this overall description of the essence of control, it can be asserted that the sense and aim of troop control consists in those changes of their organizational structure, state, battle formations and methods of combat which provide for the maintaining and improvement of their 147 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PRO’JFD FOR RELEASF: Thiirthw Jiin 1R 20Ag: cIA-RflPg2-flpR5pRflflA1flAA1flAAR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY combat capability and readiness, and the carrying out of the combat missions (the defeat of the enemy) in the shortest time and with the least 1oses andnateri&1. expenditures. Thus, the preparation, execution and support of combat in their aggregate comprise the sphere of control. Control itseifconsi5ts in optimizing these processes, directing the efforts of the troops at carrying out the corresponding missions, coordinating their actions and giving them purposefulness, planning and organization. In its content, troop control includes a significant number of measures and forms of activity which differ in their nature. If it is viewed in the various stages of troop activities, then it is possible to isolate the preparationof troop combat and troop leadership in the course of combat. With such a division the measures to support combat are not isolated in a separate group, for they are part of the content o’ both the tirst and second stage. The latter also are not always completely separated trom one another. In contrast to the past, under present-dear conditions the troops which carry out a previously received mission can simultaneously prepare to carry out a new mission, since there will be no long pauses between periods of combat. However, for analyzing the content of the troop control pr_ess, the division made is completely acceptable and advisable. During the period of preparing for combat, the commanders, the staffs, the chiefs of the branches of troops (services) and the party political apparatus 10 carry out measures aimed at implementing the following missions: Maintaining constant combat readiness, including a high political and moral state of the troops; the collecting and evaluating of situation data, the taking of decisions and planning of combat; the issuing of missions to the troops and the organizing of their cooperation; the nii).itary and po1itca1 preparing of the personnel to carry out the forthcoming combat mission; the organizing of all-round support for combat and the control process itself; inspection of the readiness of the units and subunits to carry out their missions with the providing of the necessary help for them. The core of all this work is the maintaining of constant combat readiness of the troops. This is the most important task of the conmianders and control bodies of all levels both in peacetime and in wartime. The level of troop combat readiness is the basic criterion for the efficiency of control in o:tch o’ the designated periods. IIih combat readiness under present—day conditions is a very vast concept. It cannot be reduced merely to the rapid assembly of troops upon a combat alert, although this is an important indicator. As Mar SU A. A. Grechko has written, combat readiness “is that st,ate of the Armed Forces whereby they are ready at any moment and under the most difficult conditions to repel and stop aggression, from wherever it might arise and whatever means and methods be used, including nuclear weapons.”1’ The second group i made up of’ the measures for troop leadership in the course of combat. In terms of their general content, at first glance they may appear little different from the measures related to the preparation of FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVFfl FOR RPI PASF Thiircdav Jiinp IR 2flflq• IA-RflPR2-flflRSflRflflfl1flflfl1flflflR- FOR OF’PtCIAL USE ONLY combat. Certa{nly in the courrie of combat, for example, th tank of maintaining readiness of the troop and thtr tigh political and moral state remains in force. Only here itn fulfillment will be related primarily to protecting the troops from mann 1osse and to restoring their combat capability in the event the enemy uen veaponii of ma destruction. The neces— Ity also remint of th afl-round support of combat. Only here great flexibility and mobility are required In implementing the corrcponding meauren. Th basic content of the control proce in the cour of combat iti made up of: The continuru coL1EctIon and study of current data on the changing iituation; the taking or particulftr decis{on which ensure the fulfillment or adJustment and even fundamental alteration of a previously taken general decinlon; the potn of new (sdjuted) mision for subordinate tr3op and the mnlntaining of their cooperation; nuporvision over the course oi combat nnd the fulfillment of the 1ven miBsions by the troops. A general description of the essence and purpose of troop control an well ar the list of the basic measures comprising the content of the control process in the period of preparing the troops for combat and in the course oC It make it pon1b1e to provide the following definition. Troop control is the activLtie of conunander and control bodies based on objective laws and principles of military art and aimed at maintaining the high combat readiness of the tcoop and directing their efforts at the successful execution of’ the combatmission in the course of combat. The process of troop control is carried out by the continuous 8ecuring and ev.1uation of situational data, the taking of decisions, the i3suing of tasks to executors, and nil-round organization and control of their fulfillment. The jtven approach correnponds to the cybernetic underGtanding of control, and at the saii time makeG it posib1e rher fully to reflect the specificJ of troop control. Here we have defined: who, on the basis of what and ror what purpose exercl9es control of whom. At the same time, the specific content of the control proces3, Its elements awl sequence of actions are dis— cloGed and these form a clo9ed and constantly renewed cycle. Before de’rib1ng the other aspects of the control process, it is essential to mention the basic demands made on it and which stem from the particular conditions or the functioning of troop control systems. Airong them we must mention first of all the firmnes3 of control, that is, the ability of the commanders wid control bodies to constantly carry out the taken decision, to re’aln in thriir hands the leadership ot men in a difficult situation, to prevent an1c and a mood of doom when being exposed to weapons of mass de— rtructlon, to restore the battleworthinesL of’ the troops and ensure the c7lrrylng out of the combat mission. Anot.hcr demnnd is the riexibility of control, that is, a rapid response to a chanic in the 1tuation, a prompt adjustment, and when necessary, a tundk— r.nta1 change in the taken decisions, the elaborated conbat plan and the very system of control. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 P0k OFFICIAL USK ONLY The great dynamicncn of modern combat p1ace on control the demand of high efriciency, pced in Implementing each element of the control cycle and in io1vin control problems an a whole. The basic criterion of efficiency is the time spent by the commander and the staff on the collection and process— Ing or itutio1 data, on the taking ef sound decision and the iuin of tuign,nentn to executors. Th1 time nhould make it poIb1e to anticipate the eneny in making the strike. Tn the course of modern combat, more complicated conditions arise for carrying out such requirementti a continuity and secrecy of control, the ability to maintftjn unlnt@rrupted contact with the troops, and to keep the plan of one’s act1on nd the order of carrying them out a eoret from the enemy. The particular urgency of’ this requirement is caused by the increased ability of the enemy to reconnoiter and destroy our command pot using nuclear strlkcn, to dirirupt comniunication by jamming, a well as increase the diB— tance between comznind posts and their extended remaining in motidn. An elucidation of the tanks and measures related to troop control in the preparatory stages and in the course of combat i also needed for a correct approach t the problem of the automation of control. However, such analy— Is not uffic1et for solving this problem. It does not make it possible to clearly isolate the rorms of control activity which to a varying degree require and allow their automation. For this reason, for a further analysis of’ the content of the control process there must be a different basis for Isolating and describing 1t certain aspects and sides. Such a basis can be the difference in the material (practical) and ideal (mental or creative) activity of people. It is essential to bear in mind that this difference is absolute only in the gnoseological term. Certainly the practic’ai actions of people are also permeated with awareness, and mental activity occurs on the bazis of practice and at each step is checked by it. Neverthe1eis, such a division is objectively- caused and is method— oloctcni1y jut1fied. Proce€ ding from the accepted basis, it is possible to break down the control process having isolated the two forms (types) of activity inherent to the nolving of any ontro1 problem. One type (form) of activity is comprised of ideal, mental activity, related to the understanding of the combat situation, the taking of a decision and the., planning of combat. This makes it possible to define it as a cognitive p1nnnin activity of the commanders and control bodies. This comprises an lrireparable element of any control process and itself consists of a number of ptrt1cu1ar components. rt initial bric h; the procesi of cognition as a reflection of objective reality In the conscience of ptop1e. The elements of the cognitive activity of it cornimder are: The obtaining of initial data on the combat situation and the combat miion from a 3enior chief; elucidating the received combat mL1on; ncqu1r1np rdd1tiona1 (1ackIn) data on the situation, their ;1] _,.1.JZ•1;0] 50 FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 II POP. (1)F1CtAL USE ONLY ;1] i .J .1 l•l J ii i . — ii • iii ir i .i.I ‘iTiTJ.1.i .l’IIITIIIITIT,b 1iTiTiTi_________________________;0] enera1tztftn n.n(1 depiction on charts, in documents and so forth; analyBis rind synthest oV thc obriined dFltti. on empirteni and theoretical levels, bht is, i thorough evn.1 wit] on of the oituation. The other part of’ thIs iictlv{ty disc1oe the constructive and creative abi1it1e of our thIn1dii wIiih tntroduce into reality something unique and not havl.ng a direct prtot,rpe. The ba9ic sphere of the productive thinking of the commander i the elaboration of a decision, above ail the formulating of the aim and plan of the forthcoming battle (operation) Rnd Its thorough and detailed p1annin. This activity is similar to scientific diB— coveries, invention and derigning. It includes aspects of intuition, reli— iince on acquired c?xpertence and the ue of the most recent scientific plan— nine methods, including niatheinatical modeling of combat and the utilization of computers and network chedu1os. The particular featares of the corl3tructive and creative thinking of a coin— mnder have been aptly described by Gen P. I. Batov: “Like any creation of the hands and will of people, combat is carried out twice——initially in thouht and later in reality. If the chief of staff is the mathematician of the operation, this is not enough for the commander. Re should by the strength of imagination, in focusing his foresight, live through this first, mental battle the details of which are imprinted in ones memory like frames on a film.”12 This description is presently being complemented by new aspects related to the constructing of special mathematicological. models of combat and the use of the mathematical methods of operations research and computers in the process of planning them. Cognition and planning are two organically related processes. They accompany one another in all stages of solving control problems. Thus the obtaining and elucidation of a combat mission are accompanied by the tentative formulation of one’s own mission and plan for the forthcoming actions. This aim directs the f’urther process of securing information on the situation, as well as the grouping find generalization of information. In turn, such work makes it possible to clarify the initial plan and in general terms outline the deciilon for combat (an operation). From the viewpoint of the adjusted plan and a sketch of the decision, an empirical and theoretical anyii of the situation, its thorough evaluation and the elaboration of a Clnal decision are carried out. But from the very moment of’ formulating the Initial combat plan, the planning of combat also starts. In planning a detailed program of troop operations to carry out the set decision is developed and establishccl step by step from the general aims. This i a general description of’ the cogn1t1ve iind planning activities of the conunanderr nd cor.trol bodies. On the hacis of them another form (type) of’ control activity is carried out and this could be termed the practical organizsitional activities of the coziunanders and control bodies. This includes a number of measures aimed at Implementing the taken decision. They include: The giving of mftsiori to the troops, the organization of their cooperation and suppcrt, the carrying out of the necessary political work, and the overseeing of the readiness of the troops and their fulfillment of the given missions. 51 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A F Fr APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY In the practical and organizational activities of the commanders and control bodies one can also io1ate tvo aapect. The firnt involves the ape— cit1 rn11it.ry or technical aspect and encompassei the carrying out of a multiplicity of tak, Btnrtlng from the staffing of the combat units, the siigning of personnel to them and ending with the all—round support of eomh. The range of these activities includes t11 questions related to th orga1zaion of combat. The other aspect i related to controlling the spiritual rorces of the men, to the ideological and psychological preparation ot the peronne1 to carry out the combat missions, and to maintaining a high political and moral state of the troopl in the course of combat. Even V. I. Lenin pointed to the importance and necessity of stressing this a9pect. “In any war,” he Btresed, “victory ultimately Is determined by the morale of those masters who shed their blood on the battlefield.”13 Military historical experience indicates that it is posib1e to take a correct decision to prepare for its practical implementation properly in special military terms, but neverthe— less be defeated if the personnel is not properly prepared in ideological and moral-psychological terms. tn describing the problem of the style of leadership, L. I. Brezhnev in the Accountability Report to the 25th Party Congress noted: “A modern leader should organically combine party loyalty with profound competence, discipline with initiative and a creative approach to the 3ob. At the same time, in any area a leader must also consider the sociopolitical and indoc— trinational aspects, he must be sensitive to other people, to their needs and requesti, and serve as an example in work and everyday 1ife.” The given statement applies fully to the sphere of troop control. Organizational and indoctrinational work is an inseparable element of control. In relying on the party and Komsomol organizations, this is carried out by the commanders, the political bodies and all the officers. In structural terms it is formed from the aggregate of the constantly carried out measures to maintain a high political and moral state and a complex of measures related to the special training of the personnel in line with a specific combat mission. The cognitilre_planning and practical organizational activities are closely interrelated. Cognition and planning in various forms permeate all practical and organizational activities. In turn, they themselves need a definite organization and practical actions. However, the distinguishing of these forms of activity reflects one of the real cross—sections of the control process; it is particularly important for evaluating the possibilities of automation. The cognitive planning and practical organizational activities in control to a varyi’g degree require and permit automation. And to a varying degree the Individual elements of these activities are automatable: cognition of the existing situation, the taking of a decision and planning future actions as a whole; the carrying out of measures of a special military nature nd the ideo1o,icn1 and psychological preparation of the personnel. This ;1] — .. I Tfl{. F1! ITIiT i...thTi...i.i v .ThEJ.v. ..1jj1TiTiiiiiriTiT1—;0] 52 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A D —. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVFfl FOR RPI PASP Thiirgdav Jiin IR 2flfl (IA-RflPR2-flflRSflRflflfl1flflfl1flflflR- I’OR OF1’1C1AL USK ONLY is seen from a general aomparion of them, but an analysis of the content of each particular element of troop control gives even greater convincing— ness to this conclirnion. For detcribing the cognitive activities of a commander it is important to define their initiiil niomcnt. In each specific instance the receiving of the initial datt and the combat miion from the senior chief can be considered an this. This is powerful impetus for activating the process of tudy1ng the situation. However it cognition actually begins before this moment. The collecting of data on •the ituation i an uninterrupted process, and the commander usually possesses a certain supply of information on it even before the receiving of the combat mission. This information has been acquired in preceding combat, in the process of the preliminary studr of the enenw end the terrain, and so forth. Moreover the cognition of the situation starts even in the course of the general theoretical and practical training or convnand personnel. The knowledge acquired by them represents an unique information model of armed combat in the given theater of operations. It also acts as the most general initial aspect in understanding the actual combat situation, in 1ogica11r directing the elucidation of the mission, the collecting of lacking information on the combat situation, a thorough evaluation, the forming of a plan for forthcoming combat (an operation), the taking of a decision and the planning of combat as a whole. It is important to consider all of this in defining the posibi1ities, tasks and limits of automating the process ot cognition and planning. The potential objects of automation in one way or another are the following: The three designated initial aspects——the general (the information model of armed combat), the particular (the preliminary store of information on the situation) and the specific (the mission and the initial data obtained from the senior chief), as well as those elements from which the subsequent cognitive and planning activities are formed. Let us briefly examine their content. The obtaining and analysis of the combat mission are a cognitive process in which the commander receives and assimilates intormation on the state and trends in the change of the situation on the scale of the superior level; on the plan of the superior chief, his intentions to use weapons and particularly nuclear weapons; on the procedure and order of combat; on the role assigned to his unit or subunit and the given combat missions. Here the brain of the commander performs in no way passive functions of a receiver or a living display device. His mental work does not have a formal logical nature. Even in this stage there begins the countermovement of the commander’s thought, the shaping of his own plan and an understanding of the essence oC the pending combat which is possible only- on the basis of dialectical thought. The collection of lacking information on the actual situation existing at the moment of receiving the combat mission is an objectively necessary condition for the working out of a sound decision by the coimnander. This clement in cognitive activity enrompasses not only the securing of 53 FOR OFI’ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY inrorrnation but tdno it tranmiion over the communications chnne1s to the superior control hodie and tn required tranformation, generalization and systeinntiztIon of military information and the display of the obtained inrdrmatlon using 6ign syGtems (documents and charts) a well a pec1a1 equipment (screens, boards and so forth). The commander and the control hodie study the fo11owin elements of the situation: The enenw, their own troops, adjacent units, the terrain, the radiation, chemical and biological situation, the hydrometeorological con— dit1on, the season and the time of day, as well as the economic condition or the combat area, the socioc1as composition of the population and its attitude toward our troops. The volume and content of information on each of these situation e1ement will differ depending upon the type of combat, the nature of the obtained combat mission and the objective conditions for securing this information. We would point out that some of them depend upon the decision and actions of the commander in the preparatory period (the position and moving of his troops, their political and moral condition, material—technical and other supply). But other indicators (the enenr grouping, the position of adjacent units, the nature of the terrain, and so forth) before the start of combat do not depend upon the decision taken by the commander. All the designated processes require significant outlays of labor and time. Certa1n1y many operations which are carried out here are repeated, they are standard and contain more formal than creative aspects. For this reason here there is a 3ignificant area for technologization and automation. The evaluation of the situation and a thorough analysis of the information obtained on its elements comprise the cognitive foundation of the commander’s decision. The essence of this work consists in the f’act that the commander reasons out the conditions for carrying out the combat mission and the factors which determine the possible development of combat and thereby influence the nature of the decision to be taken. Here the shaping of the plan of action can occur predominantly by analytical means with the subsequent reasoning out oC each element in the situation. In other instancer; a generalized synthetic approach can prevail when a series of e1’iment in the situation or even all of them are considered simultaneously from the viewpoint of their influence on selecting the direction of the main str.ke, on determining the battle formation of the troops, on the distribution of combat missions between them, and so forth. Such an approach is particu.Iarly effective when the commander possesses great experience, he knows the changes in the situation even before receiving the mission, and possesses limited time for working out a decision. The overajj. evaluation of’ the situation is made by the commander and the chief’ of staff who always should be ready to report their conclusions on any element and on the situation as a whole. The remaining, staff officers 5k FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY j, June 13, A - KOR O1’PICIAL usi•: ONLY d the chiefs of the branches or forces (services) evaluatc he situation from the viewpoint or ctrrying out their own functional cIutiei, 1fr1uaticfl of a ituat,ion is a complicated creativ- process. Ii i c4$. to Iorma1ize it comp1ete1’. I’ ic44e peL vi. y the 1ogic z c@clllrnFl of thought (tmiyi: and synthesis, induction and deductrnn, abstraction and ,enera1ization, tnd o forth) in their dialectica.1. unity, but also imagination and crotive intuition. Since the conunander evaluates the elements of the aituation in their unity and reciprocal inrluence from the viewpoint of the conclusions made by him in analyzing the combat mission, the same factors of the situation can be given a differing evaluation in a dirrerent context. Moreover, some data can be incomplete, f’ragmentary, ac— ci.dental or even false and fabricated by the enenrj. For this reason it is eentia1 to fill In the missing elements, to synthesize the contradictory tipects, to weed out fi1ie ones, and so forth. Moreover, in evaluating the situation a commander is forced to consider many factors which at times go beyond the limits of the immediately arising combat mission. He proceeds from the general political situation, and considers the effect both on our troops and on the enenr troops of the 8ociopolitical f’actor, economic conditions, ideological phenomena, the individual and social psychology of people, and the social consequences of the forthcoming combat (operation). The dialectical nature of the evaluation process does not exclude uniform and repeating formal logic operations. The preliminary material for a thorough evaluation of the situation can often be obtained by formal and relatively inäependent qualitative and quantitative comparisons for certain parameters. The answers to the questions of who, where, when, how much, what balance of forces, and what is the radiation level? and the logical conclusions trom them must be considered under any circumstances. The analysis o’ nuch parameters and the elaboration of the criteria and algorithms for eva1uatIn them can become a basis for automating certain operations related to an analysis and evaluation of the situation. The choice of the most effective Iind sound variation of a decision and the planning of combat comprise th’ Cofluding, most complicated and responsible stage in the work of the commander and the staff. Since all the measures ted to the cortro1 and actions of one’s troops are carried out in r4t accord with the decision made by the conunander, thifl l rIhr considered the basis of ne entire control process. The chief” f3jc1 determines the aim of te actions, the forces, means, methods and .4ies of achieyjyij it. It ecomes the basis and a component part of the entire prccecz of p1annin combat. Certainly the aim of plan— nIna consists in eekIn out the best ways for carrying out the combat mission. Its content includes a determining of the sequence, times and methods for the troops to carry out the received mission considering the expected results of the use of weapons, the esta1ishing of a firm order 55 ;1] I;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - 1D APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY of cooperation between the troop8 in terms of the to.rget (objectives), the time and place, as well as the organizing of all-round support for combat and troop control. But precisely these questions are reflected primarily tn the commander’s decision, and for this. reason it is also the basis of 1anning. In accord with the commander’s decision and under his personal 1edership, the staff and the chiefs of the branches of forces (services) detail and concretize the individual questions of organizing combat, they seek out the optimum variations and mathod for carrying out the combat miE1ton and back them up with the needed calaulations. The results of the planning work are usually given a rap)ic depiction on maps, as a brief explanatory note find in other documents. In their aggregate decision taking and the planning of combat are a creative process in which the cognitive and constructive activities of man are closely intertwined with his volitional efforts, and they require not only know— 1ede, reason, developed intuition, imagination and military guile, but also courage, boldness and the readiness to assume the entire burden of responsibility. In the aim of achieving surprise, a conunander may consciously take a risk and make a decision which mathematically cannot always be backed up. This particularly applies to selecting the direction of the main strike, the forms of maneuver, the tinie of actions and so forth. Such decisions are often taken seemingly against the demands of the objective conditions and established views. This is done counting on the fact that the actions of our troops would be a surprise for the eneny. The characteristic historical examples of such “illogical” actions were the choosing of the direction of the main thrust of our troops in the Belorussian Operation, the nighttime attack on the defenses of the Nazi troops in the Berlin Operation, and so forth. All of them were marked by surprise and high combat effectiveness. The creative nature of the process of decision taking and planning of combat does not exclude the possibility of automating them. The constructing of the elements of the decision and the plan ifl several variations and a cornparisori of them in the present stage of scientific development can fully be an object of algorithmization, planning, and consc4uently, automation. There are particularly broad opportunities for this in carrying out various calculations and playing through (varifying) the mathematical models of forthcoming actions or certain episodes of them on a computer. From the viewpoint of automation let us examine the pr,ctica1 organizational activities of the commander and control bodies. These begin by the issuing of combat miionG to subordinates, by instructions on cooperation and the support of troop combat. The transmission of the corresponding information can be carried out by the commander, through the staff officers, in writing and us1np equipment and communications. We must particularly take up the issuing of misstons to subordinates with personal contact between them and the cozmnarider and staff of’ficers. The practice of wars has showed the exceptional importance of this. No equipment ;1] IIIir:I. ;0] 56 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFtCIAL USE ONLY can rep1ace the vital word of a commander. On the spot he i able to make certain that. hi uborthnte correctly understand the combat mistdon, he can have the neceary moral nd psychological impact on them, instill confidence in victory and 1.rspire them to feat. The basic criteria in ieieLiri one or noIher method of issuiri a combat order are speed, concealment rind accuracy. In all instances the ubordi— ratc,ofticer should receive m1ion within a time which would allow him to prepare the personnel srnd the equipment ror combat and anticipate the enemy in mtking the strike. Even before taking a decision the conunander gives preliminary orders, tnd informr his 8ubordinate o the forthcoming actions and the procedure for preparing for them in parallel with the superior level. The issuing of a decision to the executors is merely the start of the practical organizational activities of control. One of its important e1ement is the manning and arming of the troops with personnel, weapons and equipment, the strengthening of command personnel, and the uniting and rallying of the units and subunits. Of course, these questions are solved continuously even before the giving of the combat mission. However, such work is carried out right until the start of combat, and sometimes these measures can become necessary and possible precisely with the obtaining of the combat mission in line with its special nature and importance. Troop leadership includes the organizing and maintaining of cooperation and these are carried out by the cormnander and the staff during all of combat. Here special attention is given to coordinating the actions of the troops to eftectively use weapons of mass destruction, air strikes and artillery fire. ;1] .J J :I•VA .. . a . • •Th • iii i.1iTiTi V .1 .f4iIiT.1i1 TiIiTi1i i,[iIiHiTiTiTi_________________________;0] An Important area of control is the organization of the all—round support of troop combat. Usually the following basic types of support for troop combat are distinguished: Reconnaissance, protection against nuclear weapons, radioelectronic countermeasures, camouflage, security, engineer, rear (rnteria1, technical and medical), topogeodetic and hydrometoro1ogica1 support and the organization of the commandant service. In solving problems related to the organization of all—round support, the commander gives particular attention to the key- questions. The details of th! work are planned and organized by the staff, the deputy commanders and the corresponding chiefs of the branches of forces and services. A number of practical measures relates to the organization of the very control process. The commander, tI.e chief of staff, the chiefs of the branches of forces (services) and the chiefs of departments set up, disassemble and move the command posts, they coordinate their work and provide continuous communications with the troops, and they organize and ensure the smooth work of the control bodies. The demands placed upon control as a whole will be carried out to the degree to which the work of the control bodies has been organized. 57 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Finally, aznohg the measures of practica1 oranizationa1 nature are the supervising of preparations to carry out a combat mission and the course o Lin ‘VI.1ment. The given element completes the control oycle in uolving any problem. In exercising supervision, the commanders and the ofCicers of the control bodies study the state of affalrB in the troops, they given instructions to eliminate the detected shortcomings, and provide the needed help for subordinates. Here also an important role is played by the direct contcict of the commanders and the officers of the control bodies with subordinates. This i a general estimate of the special, military—technical a8pect of the practical organizational activities of control. The following can be said on the ideological and psychological sphere. This Includes the carrying out of a nurber of tasks and specific measures aimed at strengthening the morale of the personnel snd their readiness to carry out the combat mission under diftieult conditions. The carrying out of these measures comprises the area of party political work which must be viewed as an essential and important element of control as a whole. Party political work in the troops is related to indoctrinating them in a spirit of total loyalty to the socialist motherland and to the cause of the Communist Party. In a combat situation this must ensure a prol’ound understanding by the personnel of the policy of the party and the government, the aims and nature of the war, the tasks confronting the Armed Forces, and it must instill a loyalty of the men to the oath and high moral and psychological qualities. With the receiving of a specific combat mission, this work is aimed at a correct conception of the mission by each soldier, sergeant and officer, and at instilling in them combat drive, boldness and valor, and a feeling of collectivism and mutual help. These goa1 can be achieved only by the vital and creative activities of the commander the political workers, and all the otficers of the control bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations directly in the troops, in the mass of soldiers. Thus, in the general process of armed combat, along with the actions of the troops themselves, activities related to their control are also carried out. These are a goal—directed, creative process in which the cognitive planning and practical organizational work of the commanders and control bodies is inseparably linked. Its content is the complex of measures to prepare for battle (an operation) and to direct the efforts of the troops at carrying out the received combat mission in the course of combat. Among the multiplicity of measures, it is possible to isolate core and constantly repeating ones. These are related to the collection and tudy-ing of data on the situation, the taking of a decision, the issuing of orderr to executors, the practical organization of their execution ind overseeing the actions of subordinates. Even a preliminary description of these shows that some of these measures require automation or have already been automated. At the same time one ;1] _J J 1•1Vi i1 •1 . .1 • Iii.i LI. FTWflTT’ i.i...LTit?I....i,i .iij viTiI1fiI .4.f ITIHITITITI i i[iTiTci______________________________;0] 58 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 - - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY cannot. help but iee that in the practical oranizationa1 activities, particularly in party political work, there must be a personal, vital contact of the comnlander3 polItical workers with the personnel. This must be considered in solving automation problems. However, In order to draw a completely sound conclusion on this question, it is esentia1 to examine in detail the potential and real possibilities of automating each of the deiignated elements of the control process, the princip1e for setting up ASTJV, the real cheracterietics of modern ASUV and the potential opportunities of developing them in the tuture. The materials have been given using the views of specia1its in foreign armies. FOOTNOTES 1. See D. A. Ivanov, V. P. Savel’yev and P. V. Shemanskiy, “Osnovy tJpravleniya Voyskami” [Principles or Troop Control], Moscow, 1971. 2. VOYENNO—ISTORICHESKIY ZWJRNAL, No 2, 1962, p 73. 3. V. I. Lenin, “Poin. Sobr. Soch.,” Vol 26, p 258. . Ibid., Vol 36, p 2.57. 5. Ibid., Vol 39, p k6. 6. Ibid., Vol 42, p 3i. at In ;1] t. J I•1VA . .JdI. ..41 F FPFI1ir I. 11111.. ,i p’ ..i .j. il,r.11I1 liTi!iHiTiTiI 11[iTiT;0] 7. “Materlaly XXV S”yezda KPSS,” p 60. 8. See “Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya” [Small Soviet Encyclopedia), Vol 9, Moscow, 1960, p 7Th. 9. See “Slovar’ Osnovnykh Voyennykh Terminov” [Dictionary of Basic Military Terms), Moscow, 1965. 10. In the remaining text, instead of listing all the officials and bodies, the term “commander and control bodies” will be employed. 11. A. A. Grechko, “Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva” [The Armed Forces of the Soviet State 1, Moscow, 1975, pp ilO—lil. 12. P. I Batov, “V Pokhodakh 1. Boyakh” [On Campaign and In Combat], Moscow, 1962, p 52. 13. V. I. Lenin, “Poin. Sobr. Soch.,” Vol ki, p 121. i). “Materialy SSV S”yezda KPSS,” p 70. 59 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 DROVFfl FOR RFI PASF Thiircdu Jiinp IR 2flfl• IA-RflPR2-flflRflRflflfl1flflfl1flflflR- FOR OKI IC I AI IISK ONI,Y CHAPTER 3: POTENTIAL AND REAL POSSIBILITIES IOR AUTOMATING TROOP CONTROL 1. Structure, Functions end Principles of Creating Automated Troop Control Systems The automating of troop control presupposes the integrated use of automated arid automatic devices and systems, as well as modern scientific methods making it possible to sharply increase the efficiency of control in the aim of optimizing the use ot the forces and means and freeing the commanders and staff officerq from uncreative work. Troop control is always carried out in a system which represents an aggregate ot interrelated direct links and feedback between the controlling and controlled bodies with their command posts and technical equipping, and must provide the attaining of the goals posed for the troops or the carrying out of combat missions with the greatest efficiency. By control bodies one understands a system of officials, the corresponding troop formations, the neceásary materiel used in the interests of troop leadership. Proceeding from this it can be considered that an automated troop control system (Asuv) represents an aggregate of interrelated control bodies (points) equipped with modern highly productive control equipment which ensures the optimum and intercoordinated use 6t the possibilities of man and the automatic devices in the aim of achieving maximum effectiveness of combat. The ASUV can include subsystems for controlling subordinate troop formations with their weapons, and equipment. Moreover, the ASUV and the subsystems comprising them can include as their elements automated and automatic weapons control systems. Automated weapons control systems (ASUBS) are complexes of the “man—— technical device——weapon” type which are used for achieving an optimum mode of action and the most effective use of’ the weapons and military equipment. Among them, ror example, one could put the antitank guided missile units. The automatic control systems (SAU) consists of controlling 6o FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR Ofl?ICTAL USE ONLY nnd controlled devices which operate in accord with a previously elaborated and set program, for exmp1e, the SAU or an antiaircraft missile complex. The designated systems are set up considering the nature of armed combat, the organizational 5tructure of the troops, the development level of the weapons and the technical control devices. The structure of the ASUV is a dialectical unity of staff organizational, functional and technical elements which ensure the effective execution of the given missions. The stafl’ organizational elements of the structure are the hierarchical command elements. The functional elements are represented in the structure by clearly defined rights and duties of the officials, by the type and number of conmiand posts, by the work methods of the commanders and staffs in the area of troop control. The diverse types o control equipment act as the technical elements. Thus, the forces and means of control comprise the basis of the automated control systems. They ean be divided into two basic groups: the control personnel end the control equipment. The control personnel is the personnel of the control bodies (points), and above all the connanders and staff officers. The quality and level of control depends upon the level of their training, their creative approach to solving questions, firmness, courage and resourcefulness. In the ASUV the following can be used as control equipment: ;1] (iIEi .II1VI .. . . _ ii ii ir i.iiTi1iI v .IiI.vi I,E.tfI1 TiIiTi1IiTiTiHiTiT.i_________________________;0] 1) The equipment for securing and collecting inforniation: aircraft, radios, radar and other reconnaissance equipment; 2) Machines which fix information: punches, typewriters, signaling equipment, tape recorders, dictaphones, as well as equipment for reproducing and copying documents; 3) Machines for data processing: electronic computers, keyed calculators and tabulators; k) Equipment which converts information: readers and coders, devices for transcribing from puch cards to punch tape and back, microfilrning and microfilm reading equipment; 5) Devices for putting out information: automatic printers and machines, electronic displays, screens and automatic drawing and graphic devices; 6) Information retrieval and storage equipment: file sorters, machines for document retrieval, special data and multipurpose electronic machines which possess a large volume of accumulators; 7) Comznunictions equipment which transmits information: telegraph, telephone, radio, radio relay and telecode equipment, switchboards, selectors, document transmission equipment, and equipment for locating (summoning) officials. 61 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 Electronic óömputers are the most important technical device of automation. They provide the con1ex processing of data by arithmetical and certain logical operations using number codes, and they also fulfill the functions of automatic correcting devices. Their use makes it possible to split the operating time of the individual parts of complicated ASUV. This provides an opportunity to use the same elements for performing several functions (see Figure 2). Key: 1——Altimeter; 2-—Target illuminating radar; 3——Target tracking radar; *—-Computer (computer complex): identification, calculation, generating and preparation of firing commands; 5-—Missile guidance radar; 6——Missile The proposed diagram provides a visual notion of the tasic technie1 con— tro]. devices in terms of a system for the automated control of’ e.tr defense weapons. Full mechanization of troop control accompanies the mechanization of control work and this presupposes the introduction and autonomous (separate) use of equipment which facilitates the manual labor of a person in control processes. The mathematical logical methods are employed here in the form of particular procedures which do not comprise a single complex of interrelated data processing problems. The high level of mechanization presupposes the complete or almost complete replacement of mechanical (manual) labor. The most important functions of the ASUV are: A further rise in the combat readiness and capability of the troops; an increase in the efficiency of control and the effectiveness of using the forces and means in combat arid an operation; reducing the volume of manual labor of the officials in the control bodies and freeing the convnanders and staffs from unproductive technical work for creative activity in the area of troop control. For 62 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I’ nfl A FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Fig. 2 ;1] J .1 :IIIY.i .i • ti i . .uii. FflTT i.i..friTiTà._,i r±.1iTEi.v4iTiTI.!i1 1riTiTriTiTir1;0] APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 — en flel a PcR OYFICIAL USE ONLY raioing the combat readine and capabi1iy of the troops, in using automation, it is posib1e to employ modern mathematical logical methods and computer equipment in working out optimum plarni and schedules using keyed calculators, punch ca1cu1tor3 nd digital computers for carrring out the necessary operational and tactical calculations and for improving the syn— tern for collecting, processing and inuing inforniaton on the b9iG of digital computers. The rapid development of weaponry and the increased mot,orization of the troops have given combat high mobility, speed, surprise and decisiveness. An acute need ha arisen for reducing the time of handling information, for raising effectiveness of control and increasing the efficient use of the forces and means. Reducing the time for handling information in the ASUV provides the prompt attacking of the niost. important enemy objectives, and contributes to the rapid shifting of efforts f’rom one sector to another, the making of changes, when necessary, in already taken deciGions, the adjusting of combat missions for the subordinate troops, the maintaining of close interaction between the subunit3 o11 the various branches of forces, and the rapid coordinating of their efforts. The obtaining of inforr.iation on the situation, the state an nature of the operations of cooperating troops at the needed time provides for the rapid and more rational determining of the volume and content of measures carried out by each of these troop organisms, and increases the effective use of their posibi1ities under the specific conditions of the situation. An important function of the ASUV is to increase the efficient use of weapons, to reduce the probabi1itr of their use against positions already abandoned by the eneny, and to increase the accuracy of the attacks made against the planned targets. For increasing the accuracy ot hitting the targets, there must be complete consideration of many iactors, precise information about the location of the target, the location of one’s own troops and on other conditions for carrying out the mission. Automation makes it possible to extend weapons more economically. This i achieved both by increasing the accuracy of fire as well as by selecting the most eft’ectlve weapons and the methods of their use on the battlefield. The possibility of rapidly analyzing different variations for hitting the planned target ensures the selection of the most economic of them with the set. strike efficiency. The problem of ensuring the most reliable defense of one’s own troops against enezrr weapons and a maximum reduction of losses in personnel and materiel L closely related to the problem of increasing efficient control and the effectiveness of using the weapons. ;1] -‘ .i . . . 311i, ri1 i .mr .1 1 ‘iIiE.ii1 :Tiii, iTiIi1IiIiJi_________________________;0] 63 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A fl APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 Automation makes it possible to increase the effectiveness of combat against weapons of mass destruction, to ensure the rapid collection of information on the radiation and chemical situation, and in a shorter time to take the necessary measures to maintain the battleworthiness of the troops. At the same time automation provides an opportunity to carry out calculations for forecasting the radioactive and chemical contamination and to ensure the prompt and even the selective warning of the troops which are threatened with the danger of attack. The use of automation makes it possible to quickly nd rapidly evaluate the battleworthiness of the troops in strike areas, and to take sound decisions to eliminate the consequences. Another function of the AStJV is to improve the efficiency of creative tivities by all levels of commanders and staff officers by automating nical work. The efficiency of their activities is increased by using modern automation equipment and methods in a number of troop control processes. The ratio of th’ participation of a man in troop control and the use of equipment is a fundamental problem in automating this complex process. First of all automation is needed to ensure control over the types of weapons and for countering those weapons which possess high speed. A most important function of ASUV is to with information on the situation using tional and tactical calculations in the control. provide the commanders and staffs the resultb of carrying out opera— various hierarchical levels of The system of technical automation makes it possible to rea).ize on the computers of each level a large number of previously elaborated informational and calculation procedures which differ in the nature of collecting and processing the information in the process of solving them. The informa.. tional methods are related to the securing, collection, processing, accumulation, allocation and issuing of basic information on the situation arid the conditions for carrying out combat. The solviflg of the informational procedures increases the effectiveness of control. The exchange of information on one’s own troops and the enenr forces is accelerated between the subordinate, adjacent, cooperating and senior levels of control. Ao a result of solving the informational procedures, it is possible to et up a unified data field (bank) which frees the officials from the labor intensive duty of inputting all the necessary initial data before solving each computational procedure on the computers of the ASUV systems and sub— systems Automating the proce’s of the exchange of information between control bodies as well as within them c.n make it possible with minimum expenditures of manual labor and time to solve one of the most important problems of control, the problem of interaction. The information process in the ASLJV should be organized considering the needs of each level of control. A larger amount of information is concentrated and proccsed in the superior level than in the inferior one. iy, June 18,2 6 FOR OFFICtAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY actech— -OO85OROOO1 r. I- ;1] - .J :t•1VA .. Lii.. .1 • . i .iir r.ii1. ,i,±dETi1ElveiTiJ.i.ijj .4.11111 1111111 FiIiTiT._________________________ A;0] A FOR OFFtCIAL USE ONLY In the general instance automatic and automated sensors and specialized computers can be the prime nource of information in the ASUV, The automatic enor and computers determine the neceary information without human involvement while the automated ones do thiB with the participation of man. The above—indicated primary sources of information, in keeping with the occurring changes in the situation, either by the established times or upon requst, can trannmlt to the computers of the superior control levels the information on the situation, nature and direction of actions, the state and missions of one’s own trops and enenr forces, a veil as on the weapons and meteorological situatiofl and the engineering work on the terrain. The inf’orination obtained trom the primary sources is processed (enera1ized, compared, analyzed arAd systematized) br the computers of the superior staffs. The necessary Information on tie results of enenr reconnaissance, on the position of cooperating troc’-s and the nature of actions can be transmitted from the superior cr,ntrol 1eve1 to the subordinate ones. Moreover, the basic data from a coriander’s decision can be transmitted to them, mainly in the form cf’ aissions given to the subordinate level. Schematically this procesb .1i shown in the diagram (see Figure 3). Subsystem B Fig.3 Key: 1——Inferior ASUV level; 2——Intermediate ASUV level; 3—-Superior ASUV level; k——Automated (automatic) data sensor; 5——Automated (automatic) receiver—transmitter; 6——Multipurpose or specialized computer; 7——Multipurpose and specialized computers Along with this, using the corresponding machine prograiris, information can also be exchanged between the computers of adjacent units and the sub-. systems of’ the ASUV. 65 FOR OF1’ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVFfl FOR RFI FASF Thiircdv .Iiinp IR 2flfl• CIARflPR2-flflRSflRflflfl1flflfl1flflflR- FOR OF’FICIAL USE ONLY The frequency of receiving inornrntion obviou1y depends upon its semantic content and varies for each control level. The degre of detailing of the information should alBo be set depending upon the level of control and correspond9 to the ru1e employed In the troopo. Automation can be carried out: In the direction of the autonomous use of the automation on the staffs; by creating individual systems of the different troop formations; in the direction of the integrated (8ystems) approach in creating the ASUV. The autonomous use c.f automation on the st’affs can accelerate :the carrying out of operational and tactical calculations and other control work. However it does not properly increase the speed of handling the operation&1 nd tactia1 information. The individual ASUV, when isolated from one another, also do not solve the problems. The automation of control of individual forces and means, even those playing an exceptionally important role in the achieving of success in combat (an operation), does not produce the desired results for raising the e’ficiency of control as a whole, since control over the individual forces and means to a significant degree is based upon the data of the general situation. Only a comprehensive approach in creating the ASUV provides an encompassing of afl levels from the interior to the superior, with the simultaneous meeting of the needs at all the troops and the use of the equipment which differs in purpose and capability. Full automation presupposes a reciprocal link and interaction of the different equipment with the efficient use of the advantages of each of them in the control process. This also envisages a reliable connection not only between the individual elements of one level but also all levels ot command. The necessity of comprehensive automation is dictated by the fact that the collection, processing and generating of information and above all the taking of a decision, the issuing of combat missions to the troops and the maintaining or their uninterrupted interaction represent a sng1e and unbroken process. The results of the collection and processing of data are the initial data for making the calculations, the result of which, in turn, operate as the initial data for adjusting the decisions. The integrated use of diverse automation equipment can permit the simultaneous solving of both numerous individual operational—tactical machine procedures a well as a general mathematical model ot combat (an operation), and provides a rapid transition from centralized control to decentralized, and vice versa. 66 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR (WPTC IAI USK ONLY Proceeding from the practice of the designing of automated systems for the needs of the national econonw and considering the specific features of military affairs, it can be considered that the conntructing of the ASUV should be based upon general (operationa1—tetice1) principles, the principles for elaborating the software system, ond the technical principles of creating the ASUV. The first group of principleB. 1) The development of AStJV connidering the decinive role of man in troop control. The succesfu1 functioning of the ASUV depends upon the reliability of a multiplicity of diverse and extremely complex devices designed for the accjuisition and accumulation of information, the transmitting of it over connunications channels, the processing and generating of the results. However, regardleBs of the abundance of equipment, man p1ajs the main role In the processes ot troop control even with a very high level of autoinfttion; he evaluates the situation and takes the decision. 2) A combination of centralized and decentralized troop control requires the designing of the ASUV considering the providing of control functions on each level for the directly subordinate elements and when necessary, one or two levels below. For this purose, for each level it is essential to use a definite degree of detailing the information in providing for the processing, generalization and aggregating of operation&l—tactica1 inforina— tion as it is transmitted to the superior control levels. When it is necessary to obtain more detailed information on subordinates, an opportunity is provided for summoning such information from a subordinate level. In the subsystems and in each control level comprising the ASUV, their own information fields are created and these provide control within the subsystem. These make it possible, on the basis of initial data ted once into the computer, to solve various machine procedures using many programs. There are a link and intercausality between the information fields of the various levels, subsystems and systems. Such an organization of the information process, along with the possibility of switching the automation equipment across one or several levels and the autonomous solving of prob— lems in each control level, should provide an opportunity of both centralized as veil as decentralized troop leadership. 3) The principle of mobility means that the ASUV should ensure a possi— bi1itr of controlling ftll types of troop combat characterized by a high pace of advance. The actual realization of this condition is achieved by mounting the automation equipment on a highly mobile transport base which at the same time provides work areas for the personnel. On the tactical level it is desirable that the automation and communications complexes exercise control while the means of transport are in motion I) The principle of ensuring flexibility, stability, secrecy and continuity of control in the ASUV proceeds from a consideration of the nature of modern combat under the conditions of the massed use of nuclear missile weapons and other powerful weapons. 67 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .OVED FOR REL ...rsday, June 18, 2009: CIA- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5) The principle of an optimum combination of the possibilities of man and automation recjuires, in designing the ASUV, a rational assigning of functions to each element of the zystem considering the particular fea-. turee of the equipment and the psychophysiological characteristics of man. The u1timate aim of such an allocation consists in creating an efficient ASUV which provides efficiency and convenient work for the commanders and staff officers. For realizing this principle in creating ASUV, in our opinion, it viii be necessary: a) To determine those parts of the control process which can be entrusted to the automation and work out the corresponding machine procedures for 8olvIng then on a computer; ) To envisage automated work areas for personnel on the corresponding highly reliable transport base which possesses gcod cross—country capabilities; c) To ensure the giving of the results of computer data processing to the officials in the conventional visual form using the most rational equipment and methods for putting ott the information; d) To maintain contact for the officials with the unautomated control areas and levels by eq1ipping the work areas also with conventional means of control and conununications ensuring a transition from automated control to conventional in the event of a breakdown of individual sections and levels of the ASUV; e) To maintain a succession in he work methods of the commanders and staffs ensuring a gradual transition to the new work methods of the ASIJV without any decline in the combat readiness of the troops and the quality of work done by the control bodies. 6) The principle of successive stages of work in developing the ASUV proceeds from the importance of the problems solved by the systems, the presence of theoretical and technical studies and the possibilities of organizational decisions, including the elaboration of a software system for the AS(JV and the training of special personnel for•operating the equipment of the system and usinp it as avhole. The second group of principles. , nfl A Anne 1) The creation ahead of time of the algorithmic languages and translators for the purpose of accelerating the elaboration of the machine procedures (programs) and ensuring data compatibility- for the various computer models. 68 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 — fl_I a a i • - FOR OVP1CIM1 USE ONLY 2) Determining the list and sequence of working out the individual machine procedures (programs) arid groups of programs up to mathematical models, inclusively, ensuring the most efficient use ot the ASUV as a whole and the computer in particular. 3) The creation of data fields (files), the rules for their transforma.tion and use. ConBideration of the particular features of the software. ) The development of an operations system en5uririg the control of the computer processes in the ASUV, and providing a link between the program3 and data files. 5) The elaboration of serviee progrnms which control the work ot individual elements of the system, including the peripheral one5, as veil as the AS(JV as a whole. 6) Giving definite priority to the software. In line intensiveness and significant cost of this work, up to the cost of developing snd introducing the ASUV occurs software. The third group of principles. with the great labor 70—80 percent of in the area of ;1] .T11Y1 .. . . . i .rr ,.i.1iIiV , .IiT.vii.t.irii :1iIiIi1 1111111 IiIiIii.i=__________________________;0] 1) Elaboration of the system’s elements on a modern technical base. The high effectiveness of ASUV can be achieved only on the basis of applying the most recent scientific and technical achievements. 2) The maximum posib1e standardization of the system’s elements. This principle is of exceptionally important significance from the viewpoint of both organizing the production of automation equipment, its operation and repair under field conditions, as well as ensuring the stability, flexibility and reliability of the system’s functioning under the conditions of enemy action. The realization of this principle can also facilitate the linking of the individual subsystems. With a desire for maximum standardization of the system’s elements, one must also consider the specific requirements of the various troop formations, as a consequence of which standardization cannot be absolute and is applied in optimum 1imits 3) The prospects of the nystem. In working out the structural system of the ASIJV and automation equipment, it is essential to provide an increase in the equipment and the capabilities or the system without a fundamental change in the structural system and the principles for organizing the information process in the system. New automation and communications equipment should fit into the structural scheme of the AStJV and this, in turn, must provide for the connecting of new automated ontro1 elements and the extending of the degree of automation by increasing the list of solvable machine procedures. 69 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A ,- I- APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 14) The combining of the preparation of primary documents with putting into the computer. The ersence of this principle comes down to revising the document processing and to establishing uniform standard (formalized) samples for nutting in the information. This m8kes it possible to achieve uniformity in the systems of accounting carried out by man and the computer, and when neceary to move from automated data processing to conventional, nd ,rice versa. 5) Observing the principle of precise work by the automation equipment should not complicate their design and operation. The number of equipment types in automation and mechanization must be restricted within advisable limits; the equipment which directly connect the commanders and staff off.Lcers should be particularly simple to use. This can permit a reduction in the number of service personnel and thereby a s±mplifying of the control system. Simplicity and standardization of design for automation equipment have a direct influence on the speed for training the personnel of the units and subunit’s. They are of great importance also for connecting the various elements of the control system. The simplier the devices for connecting the vartous types of equipment, the more rapidly it is possible to bring the control system to a state of combat readiness and disassemble it for moving its individual elements. This is of important significance for increasing stability and continuity of control, particularly with the high pace of the advance of the troops and the rapid changing of command posts. The automation equipment should also ensure maxiinwn convenience for the locating, transferring and working of officials in all the control bodies. 6) One of the most important principles is econonw. The introduction of automation should ultimately lead to a reduction in the cost of the control system as a. whole with an overall rise in the efficiency of its operation. In our opinion, the principle of economy can necessitate conside:ing the existing organizational staff structure of the troops and the stafT in working out, introducing and operating the ASUV equipment. The structure, functions and priicip1es for organizing bhe ASUV are realized in the specific systems in accord with the development level of science and echno1or and the requirements of military affairs. Naturally, the methods and forms of this realization are not the same in the various stages. Equally different are the levels of the possible and necessary automation. For this reason it is particularly important to analyze the present state and prospects for the developnient ot ASUV. 2. The Present State and Prospects for the Development of Automated Troop Control Systems1 In the U.S. Armed Forces, starting approximately in 1965, there has been the development of automated tactical and strategic control systems. The TO ;1] J .1 :I•VA ii .i • FH1T i,1iIik,i ,d11i ..t.viTiI;J.,1i1 iTiTiHiIiIi i.[iTiT__________________________;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP32-00350R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ;1] _‘I J J T•1TA p. ,j n—ni • , • 1! i .FT ii IiTiEt I F! .4 v Iii tIii .4 iTiIiHiIiIi IiIiT,i_________________________;0] tactical ASUV are designed for controlling the combit of units, f’ormations and field fortes within a theater of operations. The measures to work out automated control systems for the U.S. around forces were carried out in three stages. In the first otage (1951s—1961), scientific research was carried out and work was done under the Fleiddata Program. Under this program there were p1an to develop models of computers, programming devices, data transmission equipment, input and output devices, as well as studying the procedure for utilizing all of this equipment in the troops. The carrying out of the Fleiddata Program continued up to 1966 and ended with the ceve1opment of the prototypes of individual automation devices wuch as the Moby Dick, Basicpac, Compac and Fadac computers. The second stage (1960—1965) involved the carrying out of the Arnydata Program according to which there was to be thorough field and troop testing of equipment developed under the Fieldata Program, a generalization of the results obtained in the testing process, the introduction of necessary changes in the design of the individual automation models, as well as the development of new types of equipuent. However the given ptogram was not fully carried out. In the testing process serious design shortcomings were detected in it. The third stage (since 1965) started with work on the new Adsaf Program. The system provided for three subsystems: The control of combst, the control of field artillery tire and the control of niaterial. and techn.ca1 supply. Around 1 billion dollars were spent on carrying out this program. An ASUV for a field army often consists of three subsystems: Tactical, artillery and rear. The first subsystem of the TOS is designed tor collecting, processing and displaying the information needed by the coimnand of a field army, corps and division for decision taking. The tactical subsystem will consist of automated control centers for the divisions, corps and the field ariry and a complex of technical devices located in the units. These technical devices which are the sources of primary information are designed tor obtaining data on the situation from subordinate units. The TOS system envisages the automating of a significant number of troop control processes. Among the tasks which should be carried out in the automated system, the following are mentioned: Collection and evaluation of data on the situation, composition and nature of the operations of one’s own troops and enenr troops; collection, analysis and generalization of data received from strategic, air and field reconnaissance; the planning of troop operations (the use of nuclear weapons, the eliminating of the consequences of an enen nuclear attack, tactical air support, air defense 71 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVED FOR RELEASE: Thiirdv Jiin 1R 2flflg: CIA-RflPR2-AflR5ARflAfl1flAA1flflAR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY for the trodp and rear installations, the organization of communications and the carrying out of radio electronic countermeasures, engineering support for combat and calculating the tire interaction lines); calculations relatedto conducting special trpes of warfare (chemical and biological contan1nation, operations in the enew rear, psychological warfare); various calculations to support troop combat. As a total the automated system is to solve 30 operational-tactical prob— lems which will make it possible more effectively to evaluate the situational data and prepare sound proposals needed by the commander for deci— aion taking. The structural scheme of the automated TOS system includes a network of computer centers and terminals for the inputting and outputting of information. The basis of the system is the main computer center of the field army connected by communications channels to the local computer centers of the subordinate corps and divisions; the latter centers are located at conunnd posts. Each local computer center, in turn, Is connected by communications channels with the terminals; it is also equipped with technical data pickups which are located in the brigades and battalions. The scheme for the receipt of data at the main computer center of a field army is as follows. Information from the forward observation points, the reconnaissance patrols and combat subunits is sent to the terminals of the battalion and brigade control points located on armored personnel carriers. After this the generalized information is transmitted to the local computer center of a division the equipment of which is located on two 2.5—ton vehicles. From the local computer centers the information is transmitted to the main computer center both in the rough form and also partiaily processed. The structure of the system makes it possible to exchange information betveen any computer complexes of the field arny. Through the main computer center there is the possibility of exchanging information with other armies and conmiands of the ground forces in theaters of operations and in the continental United States. At the end of 1967, an experimental model of the automated system was developed. Its structure included the main computer center, 1 locaa computer centers and 18 terminals located on 21 carriers. The prototype was delivered to the staff of the Seventh Field Army in Europe where the system underwent testing. in 1969, the equipment of the computer centers and terminals was distributed between the staffs of the American ground forces in Europe for carrying out field testing and this is still going on. The main computer center is located in four trailers (one 12 meters long and the other three 10.5 meters each). The c.omputer center has a Control Data CDC—3300 computer. It has a speed of kOO,000 operations per second and an operational memory of 65,536 21—digit words. It is housed in four units. The external magnetic disc storage has a capacity of’ 100 million binary cigits. A special device provides for the connecting of the computer wIth 13 duplex conmiunications channels. The local computer center 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 ‘PROVED FOR RELEASE: Thiirgdv. Jiin IR. 2009: CIA-RDP82-fl0S5flROfl01Oflfl1OOfl-3 F(W OFFICIAL USE ONLY is carried on two vehicles. It is equipped with a CDC-1700 computer with a speed of 152,000 operations a second and an external storage of 590,000 binary unite. A tpec11 device links the computer by connunications channels with eight terminals. In the terminals two type3 of equipment are used: ai individual display unit and an electric typewriter. The individual display unit hs a cathode ray tube with a screen 15x20 cm in size making it possible to display up to 1,000 aiphanumerical signs (20 lines of 50 signs each). The data is fed in by keyboard in the following manner. The operetor tye in a command by which the format of a coded message is displayed on the screen with the required working tag. Then, in using the keyboard, he fills in the text of the message in the free areas. After checking the correctness of the text and correcting the detected errors, the operator presses the “Send” key. The niesage Is automatically transmitted over the communications channel to the local computer center. The same device is used for receiving short coded messages. Electric !typevriteri are used for receiving the basic bulk of coded messages. They operate at a. speed of 150 lines a minute and print text in a standard format of 120 signs per line. When necessary the required number of copies of the received messages can be produced. The basic equipment of the automated system has been developed on the bacis of integrated circuits. This makes it possible to make the equipment corn—. pact, to achieve high reliability in work, and due to this the average accrued working time per failure of the entire system is not less than 150 hours, and the average time for correcting the malfunction is 30 minutes. The exchange of data between the computer centers arid the terminals can be carried out also by special control programs. Any of the users connected to the system has an opportunity to turn to the computer center and receive the data of interest to him, indicating in his requests the nature of the required information, the period of time and the region of combat. In finding the reauired information in the storage units, the computer forms the reply coded message and sends it otf to the user. For the continuous receipt of current information, an official can send an instruction request which gives the time for the delivery of the needed information. After receIving the instruction, this information is sent out to him automatically. In addition to requests from the terminals, data coded messages will be received continuously and these contain new information on the situation. The data files of the computer centers are renewed by them. American 3pecialists feel that the achievements in the area of coniznunica— tions systems and ratio electronics viii make it possible by- the time the TOS system is put into service (by- the middle of the 1970’s) to carry out an exchange of data between computer centers at a speed of 38,1400 bauds and permit not more than one mist&ke per million transmitted signs. 73 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PRVFfl FOR RFI FASF Thiircdv .Iiin IR 2flA IARflPR2-flflRflRflflfl1flAfl1flAflR- FOR ()FFTCTAI USE ONLY Th t’acfire artillery fire control subsystem is designed to automate the processei of controlling artillery units starting from the command of the divisional artillery and ending with the forward artillery spotters. Such a system will make it pàssible to solve 2 different problems in the artil— lery battalions. The main ones are: the processing of reconnaissance data on the targets as received from the forward spotters and from other elements of command; the carrying out of ballistics calculations for the three coordinates and the preparing or fire control commands; the collecting of data on the state of the fire subunits (the nuin1’er of personnel, position, combat capabilities, availability of weapons, ammunition supply, and so forth). It is felt that with the availability of data on the position of one’s troops, isolated targets, the contents of the missions and the available ammunition, the subsystem makes it possible to draw up a firing plan in 15 minutes. The Tacfire Subsystem has been developed by the Layton firm, using the experience of developing and using in the troops analogous— purpose equipment with a Fadac computer which in artillery battalions automates the processes of fire preparations and its correcting (the Fadac computer was developed under the Fieldata Program). In December 1967, the command of the U.S. Ground Forces allocated 122 million dollars for manufacturing the equipment of the Tacfire Subsystem for for the fire control centers of the artillery battalions and the command posts of the divisional artillery. In addition to developing this, the Larton firm has developed a family of computers with progrsuning devices which in the future could be used in other subsystems, in particular in the combat control subsystem of the TOS. Before the troops had received the Tacfire Subsystem, the command of the U.S. Ground Forces planned to use equipment with the Fadac computer which began to be received by the troops in 1961. In 1965, the American troops had already 1148 such machines which after repeated irprovements received high praise in the troops. The Tacfire Subsystem includes computers and peripheral equipment used in artillery battalions and at the command posts of divisional artillery, as well as the battery console and a data input device from the forward spotters. The peripheral equipment includes: The fire control console, a data display device, a printer, a mechanism for storing and feeding in programs and data output terminals. The L—3050M electronic computer was developed on the basis of the 3050F aircraft integrated circuit computer. Its basic data are the following: Binary number system, digit configuration——32 signs plus parity check sign, speed——220,000 operations per second, and mean time between failures ——1,000 hours. The operational storage is on magnetic cores and the capacity of each of its four blocks is 8,192 words. The design of the machine uses up to 6,000 integrated circuits. The logical elements are made using circuits of the transistor——transistor type having a speed of 5—6 nanoseconds (1 nanosecond——i billionth of a second). FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 _I___ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ;1] 42i .iv ii .i ..,_I1irim. r iv ii v.. V .111 k.ViTiT.ji’I lITiftL1 ITITil IITITèT________________________;0] The high operating itabi1ity of the computers in the Tacfire Subsystem is achieved by uoing high reliable interatec1 circuits and other components ai well as by the poswlbtlity of duplicating their work. It is proposed that the fire control centers of the artillery battalions would have one computer each. In the event of the failure of a computer at any fire control center, the solving of the basic problems would automatically be transferred to one of the machines at the divisional artillery conniiand post. The divisional artillery command post should have two computers which could function both simultaneously or one operating and the second in reserve. Along with the computer there are also plans to use a magnetic drum external storage with a capacity of around 10 million binary signs. The fire control panel is used for the work of the operator in controlling all the equipment of the system and for feeding the necessary data into the computer. Moreover from the board there is the assigning of targets among the batteries and data are issued needed by each battery for firing. The control board has two cathode ray tubes (one for recording the input data and the other for displaying the output parameters in an aiphanuinerical form) and a standard keyboard. As the data display devices in the Tacfire Subsystem, electromechanical plotting boards are used (for displaying the tactical situation in the entire area of troop operations) and a CRT display (for disp1arin the situation in individual combat areas). On a plotting board with an area of 0.37 m2 against a background of a topographical map using symbols the sector boundaries, the engagement zones, the location of targets and so forth are displayed. All the data or parts of them are renewed using the computer and the fire control panel. The individual elements of the tactical situation are shown on the display using lines and 250 various syin— bols. The control of the CRT d1sp1sr with a diameter of o.6 cm is carried out only by the computer. It is assumed that the electronic plotting board will be used at the command post of the divisional artillery and in the fire control centers of the artillery bata1ions; the CBT display will be used only at the command post of the divisional arti11ery. The development of a large—screen display using integrated circuits is considered promising. The printer of the Tacfire Subsystem is o the noncontact (photoelectronic) type, with a speed of 600 times per second. It employs a cathode ray tube and fiber optics. The data are generated in an alphariuinerical form by photoprinting on paper. Among the peripheral equipment which is not part of the basic equipment one would mention the progr&’i storage and input device, the data output terminals and the monitoring and testing equipment. In the fire control centers of the artillery battalions and at the divisional artillery command post, several magnetic tape units are used for storing and feeding 75 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001000100063 PROVEfl FOR RELEASE: Thiirdiv June IR 2flflg: CIA-RflPR2-flA5ARflAA1AAfl1AflAR- FOR OIFICIAL USE ONLY various programs into the computer and four terminal semtduplex data tiansinission devices which transmit the data over the artillery communications 1ine at a rate of 600 and 1,200 bauds. The device for feeding in data from the forward observers is designed for drawing up standard requests for opening fire and their subsequent transmission to the fire control centers over the wire communications lines or using the arnr radios. The device has 25 switches by which the observer compiles a Standard message and a shift register which has two circuits with a high level of integration, Each of them uses up to 100 components. The instrument weighs 2.3 kg. The approximate operating scheme for the Tacfjre equipment is as follows. The forward observers over the wire connuunications channels or by radio transmit their messages to the fire control center and approximately 2 seconds later receive an audio response signal which affirms the reception of the mescage. The standard request for opening fire received from the forward observer includes a call code which will be periodically changed for maintaining secrecy. The information signs contain data on the target such as its location, altitude, type and dimensions. The forward observers can also transmit cert,in recommendations. For example, what type of projectile or type of explosion (air or ground—level) would be better for destroying the detected target. In the fire control centers the requests coming in from the forward observers are received by the terminal and fed into the computer where the necessary calculations are made and the fire control commands are generated. Then these commands are sent to the control board and are shown on its display while the target coordinates are entered on the plotting board. When necessary, the operator from the fire control board at any time can make changes or additions in the initial data, after which the computer recalculates and puts out new control commands. After the taking of the decision, the control comnands are transmitted to each battery- over the communications lines where they are received by the board and shown on its display. All of the equipment of the Tacfire Subsystem designed for use in the artil— lery battalions and at a divisional artillery command post can be carried in truck trailers or a staff armored vehicle. The subsystem for the control of material and technical supply is designed for controlling the rear troop services. It provides the following: Calculations for material and technical supply, technical supply of the troops, accounting for personnel, weapons and equipment, and calculations for financial and medical support. In 1967, three experimental models of the subsystems were manufactured. In 1968, one of these was delivered to the U.S. Seventh Field Army for 76 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PRflVFfl FflR RFI FASF Thiircdiv Jiin IR Aflq. )‘OR OFI IC I AL, IJS K ONI,Y field tet1ng. The Eit11iystem Included: ati TBM—3O/O electronic’ computer, a maneti di3c storage ernd equipment for the data transmission lines. All tht equipment ww to he 1cated in Cour trailers. The tirt trailer, nlong with the computer, wtw Uto to ctrry the auxiliart equipment (thc pr1nter, the equipment for redin data tnd punch cards, and 90 tborth). The magnetic diw toro.ge wa to be In the econI trailer. tt would hAVe a capacity of 233.14 million bytes (1 byte——a unit of information in t machine corresponding to one letter, one symbol of the alphabet or two decimal f’igurs; it correLipond to eight binary signs). The retrieval and selection of the data from the memory is niadc t a speed of 312,000 bytes a second. Arid dditiona1 itorage consists of several magnetic tape units. The equipment of the data tranm1ss ion lines i housed in the third trailer. It provides two—way com!nunicatiorLs with the terminals used for the remote digital data input and output n well as for connecting with other subsystems by wire and radlio. The terminals are located on 2.5-ton army trucks. The auxiliary equipment Is carried in the fourth trailer. Also there are the spare units and devices. In the opinion of American spe— cialiGtS, the CS—3 subsystem viii make it possible to n.utornate a larger portion of the processes involved in troop material arid technical supply. However, the most important functions, for example, the taking of deci3ions or the canceling of’ requests will remain for the commanders. In the assertion of competent U.S. bodies, the development of a unified automated system for controlling the ground forces not only entails great outlays of money and time, but also requires definite experience both in the development of technical devices and in seeking out effective methods for using them. A particularly important and complicated problem is the softvnre of the automated Bystem. The l85L automaed tactical aviation control system is designed for automating the procestes of controlling the operations of tactical air formations in a theater of operations. The system consists of the following subsysteTn. The subsystem for controlling and guiding the tactical air— craft should ensure the solving of problems related to the automated detection, identification and tracking of aircraft in the zone or operations. It includes the following control eiement: The tactical air control center (the basic control body), the warning and control center (the main body), the ir obervat1on point and the air traffic control center; two warning posts and four rorward guidance posts which provide direct gu5a— ance of the aircraft to ground targets in carrying out air troop sup’irt. The direct air support subsystem is designed for solving the prb1ems of thc cooperation of tactical aviation with the ground forces% In struc— turrd tcrnu, it combines: The direct air support center which is located together with the operations center of an army carps; the tactical ar control p,roup and the control points for the formations and units of the ground forces; an air traffic control sub3ystem whic1 is des1gnd for controlling and rronitoring air traffic in the area of’ airCields. 77 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY According to the development program of the system, there is to ).e the devei.cpment of mobile radio conununications and radar equipment for outfitting thëtactical air conunand bodies. This ecjuipment includes: Equipment for the warning and control centers, the direct air support cLnters, radars, ing1e sideband shortwave radios, switching equipment and other equipment. Basic attention has been paid to the compatibility of the new equipment irith the equipment for the tactical automated control systems for ground forcc and the navy. Subequent1y, a the system iB gradu11y developed, there are plans to carry out work in raising the level of its automation. According to information from the American military bodies, the full automation of the system will be reached in the 1980’s. The system will be based on a central processor connected by data tranmissic lines with small computers located at the conmiand posts of the forward 4r units. In carrying out the basic work of data processing, the electronic computers free the central processor for carrying out more complicated tasks such as drawing up the drafts of combat orders, analyzing posBible variationB of aviation operations, generalizing reports and correcting ti ilans of air operations with a change in the combat situation. American military specialists estimate (from the experience of the war in Vietnam) that the time for planning operations in a number of instances was reduced from 10 hours to 10 minutes, while the cycle for planning transport flignts (1,200 sorties per day) was reduced from j)4 to 4 hours. The IBM-360/50 computer which is part of operations per second, a capacity of the lion binary units, and a capacity of the lion binary unlt3. the system has a speed of 250,000 operational storage up to i6 mu— external storages of several bil— ;1] !11 J•1Y . ui I .iiii. tWfl1TTi.i..r1iTit ,i,.1viTi.-fi1 liIiIi1iiiiii(1TiTiT;0] The automated ontro1 system for a formation of NTDS ships isdesigned to control combat of .n operational—tactical formation of U.S.Navy ships. This system makes .t possible to automate the most labor intensive processes of ship control. These include: The collecting and processing of data on the situation, the carrying out of operational—tactical calculations needed by the commander for decision taking. The automated system solves the following problems: Controlling the landing of carrier—based aviation; controlling the operatiomj of launches; making misrile and artil— lery- strikes against shore targets; air and ASW defense of the ships; the i!’ltercepttng of air targets. It has been poposed that the system include ree comput.ers and displays. In the system they plan to use a computer with a speed of around 700,000 operations per second and a capn.city’ of the operational. itorage of 32,000 words. The automated MTACS system is designed for controlling Marine operations on the level “expeditionary orp..—division——air wing.” 78 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAl. L1SI ONLY ;1] J J :I•kv iIii . .1h .....1TIT 1IV FIIiT l.4II 1L 1A .i.I 3:1’iTiTJ..ii1 1iT,i i (ililiHilili i ______________________________;0] The system which thou1d be in operation by the end of the 1970’s will include a network 01’ niobilv cIrita proccsing centerB and automated work areas of the control bodiei. The structure of the automated Marine control 9yS— tern representn a combirnition of e1ement from the structure of the automated ground forces and tactical aviation ytems. The small computers and automated operator work areas are i1o among the automation equipment of the systems. The basic tasks carried out by the MTACS system are: Collection, processing ‘md na1ysis of data on the eneur, on the state and nature of the op— erati.on3 of the Marine formations and units; displaying the sea and ground situation for the purposes of quickly taking decisions on the rational use o the Marine forces and means; the carrying out ot calculations related to the planning and execution of combat as weil as to the organizing of cooperation and all types of support. At present the United States has et up a global automated armed forces control yitem. According to a statement of American military specialists, it provides the higher U.S. military political leadership with an pportunity to dependably and flexibly control the armed forces on broad scale in peacetime and wartime. Its main component is a national armed forces control system which includes a complex of stationary nd mobile cormnand conters and posts linked into a system by communications. The basic centers of this system are: The national command center, the emergency national coinniand center, the emergency floating couunand post and the emergency air command post, as well as the command posts of the armed forces in the zones and special commands of the United States. The National Command Center located at the Pentagon is staffed by representatives from all the services of the armed forces. It receives information from all the centers and posts, from civilian institutions, and this is depicted on large vail maps and light screens. The data received from the cornmnd poets of the Strategic Air Command and from the automated NORAD air defense system are automatically reproduced by the Iconorama system. These include igna1s from the BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System and the SPADATS Space Detection and Tracking System. The electronic computers of the center make it possible to carry- out rapid data processing and put out the data on a printing and disp].ay unit. As was stated by the American press, the National c’onunand Center receives over 1,000 messages daily. The emergency command centers and posts are designed for providing uninterrupted control of the armed forces in a nuclear missile war. The trateic contro:1 ships “Northampton” and “Wright” are used a an enter— gency floating conixnand post. For example, the ship “Northampton” has a large couununications center which includes 60 transmitters and 150 receivers. The capacity of the conmiuncations center is up to 3,000 telegrams day. It provides radio telephone, teletype and pht*ote1egraph communications, as well as the exchange of computer data with all regions of the world. The ship carries a tropospheric conununicationr radio station which provides mu.Itichannel telephone conimunciations and data transmission 79 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OPPICtAL tJS’l ONLY for computers (over a distance of up to 8o0 km), as well as a space communications station. The ship has several cctnputers for solving information and computational problems. The emergency air command post of the U.S. Armed Forces has been set up on five EC-135 aircraft. One of them is constantly on a 15—minute alert at a base near Washington or in the air. The cruising speed of the EC—135 turboprop aircraft is 850 km per hour, the range without refueling Is 10,000 km. The aircraft is equipped with an AW/APc-89 radio operating in a band of 225_21O megahertz, as well as shortwave transmitters. On board there are a total of seven-nine transrnltters with a power up to 1 kilowatt, a number of receivers and up to 30 special antennas. The AW/APS-89 radio provides an opportunity for simultaneous conversations over 51 telephone channels both with ground centers as well as with the other air command posts cvor a distance of direct line of sight. On shortwaves communications is possible at a dis— tance up to 6,000 km. The command posts of the services of the armed forces have automated equipment for the collection, processing and transmission cf data. The command post of the ground forces is equipped with the DACC automatic control system which provides the arnw leadership with the information necessary for taking decisions and transmits orders and instructions to the executors. At the command post of the naval forces is located an information center with three computers and automatic and semiautomatic situation display equipment. The center receives information on the location of U.S. naval ships and merchant vessels as well as those of other nations. The continuous updating of these data makes it possible at any moment to obtain information on the ships and vessels located in given area. The control elements of the joint commands are in touch with all the leading points of the subordinate units and themselves are part of the global armed forces control system. According to the data of the foreign press, the most equipped is the NORAD command post which since January 1966 hai. been located in underground quarters near Colorado Springs. The basic sources of information for the NORAD operational command center for the questions of antiaircraft and antimissile defense are the following automated systems: The stations of the BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System located in England, Greenland and Alaska; the stations of the DEW Aircraft Early Warning System located somewhat to the north of the Arctic Circle, along the northern coast of Canada and Alaska (the length of the line Is over 8,000 kin), while its flanks are guarded by aircraft and ship radar pickets in the Atlantic and Pacific; the stations of the Mid-Canada Subsystem in the central part of Canada; the stations located along the northern U.S. boundary, the Pinetree System; the stations located along the eastern, southern and western frontiers of the United States. fl_n i 4 fn ;1] .J.1IIL-.JK!IIIITl. IiTiT ;0] 80 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A - DtI r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAl, USE ONLY In addition to the given autonrn.ted systems, the NORAD Operational Command Center is supplied with Information from the SAGE System which has been in operation since 1961 rrnd monitorG the air space over the North Aierican continent. The creation of such t complicated warning system, information ecjuipment and active defense cannot he done in a short period of time. For this reason foreign military specia1ist have felt it necessary to deploy the warning systems in peacetime nd to maintain them in a high state of readiness. tftus, as is seen from foreign materials, modern ASIJV make it posib1e to automate a significant nber of troop control processes, to carry out coni— plex operational and tactical calculations for the use of forces and means in operations, and to receive and process large amounts of information. As was already mentioned, the third generation of computers has presently been created and is being actively introduced. According to statements in te foreign press, the electronic computers of the fourth generation will be in practical use in the 1976—1978 period. Already their first models ore based on large integrated circuits, a large capacity semiconductor memory, and large systems modules. In the machines of this generation, the large integrated circu{ts will perform the functions of entire sub— systems. The speed of these machines wiil approach a billion operations per second. The hardware is to be realized according to the principle “what is to be doneZt and not “how is it to be done?” The use of natural languages will be characteristic. In recent years abroad there has been a stronger tendency toward the development and introduction of small machines. Foreign specialists estimate that the small and minicomputers together with large computers are completely essential elements in an automated troop control system. The many computers differ from the small, medium—sized and large ones in the shortened length of the machine word, in smaller size, more limited computational capabilities and lower cost. Undoubtedly the automated control systems will incorporate a significant number of small computers, particularly as peripheral components at automated work areas of control bodies. The further development oC the computers and the other automation equipment and the improvement of’ their software will mzike it possible to more widely apply ASUV in peacetime and wartime. Considering what has been given above, the future development of computers can be predicted. The most important problems which must be solved in developing the future electronic computers are a rise in speed and greater storage’capacity. 81 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - 1D A - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006-3 PRflVFfl FOR RFI FASF Thiirgdiv Jiin IR OR OFPICIAL USE ONLY II. r Uiu (II 1u( L piiLh (OU not. LLlwayLI leu.d to the de ired re8ults . Many dtfficultles have been encountered in moving on to a nanosecond mode in the instance of carrying out numerous operations and also in interconnecting the Individual components of electronic circuitry. No matter how quickly the rnicroprocesses ocur they still have a finite limit. In using conventional dtta processing methods, the limit is approximately 1010 logical opertion per recond. The given operating speed is not absolute. It can be increased by using parallel operations with images (machines with a “picture logic”). As is known, in modern computers each svitching device at a given moment of time remembers one element (bit) of information. However the speed can be increased if the data are processed in whole fi1ei or “pictures” of information. In cthers words, the computer system must be created in such a manner that each switching component simultaneously translated a “picture” consisting of lO8_1O bits of information. Thus, the principle of “picture logic” makes it possible to Increase the computer speed approximate1r by 10 magnitudes (by 1010 times). An increase in the computer memory capacity is achiev’d by employing various storage units with a high data recording density. In using coherent light sources, for example lasers, in a small crystal volume it is possible to record as “pictures” an extremely large amount of information, find then reproduce it with minimum distortions. In this instance the density of the data recording tentatively reaches an amount of 1012_1o13 bits per cm3. Thus in each cm3 of crystal it would be possible to contain information found in a library of 5 million volumes of 200 pages each. The problems of using coherent light sources for the purpose of obtaining hree—dimensiona1 images are the concern of the young science of holography (from the Greek “holos”——full, and “grapho”——I write; literally——”fu].l notation”). Holography is most widely used in computers. The density of data recording in holograms (in a thick—layered emulsion) will reach astronomical amounts of 1012_1013 bits per cm3 a in crystals. This is three—four magnitudes higher than the density of information recording in biological neurons. Ho1oraphy opens up broad opportunities for constructing a new class of torage units. The use of associative memory in a computer will make it possible to reduce by manyfo1d the volume of the program in comparison with the ordinary presently used memory, where each word has a fixed address recorded in the machine program. On a hologram it is possible to record not only an Image of’ objects, but also any other information given, for example, in the form of tables, graphs, printed text and so forth. It would be hard to overestimate the advantage of feeding information into a machine in such a form. In this instance the cumbersome and extended proccrs of recording the information on a punch tape with the subsequent feeding of it into the machine wouJd be excluded. Here the information could be recorded in the form of interference “pictures.” 82 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLI APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVFfl FflR RFI FASF Thiirgdiu iiin IR 9flflq• POR (WYLCiAI USE ONLY IItI)11 I•II ‘V I III I niiiiitI. I Ull UiII.LI id II 1L hUI.Ogr[)hi.C it,ur’ wc)uI.I h (rIrr i c•d nut. vi rI,un..[ ly :i I mul I, neou ly ror I b: ent I r (‘bid, rc— tLrdi(nJn or how çreLL or ,nu:Lt.Idirnen1oriai it would be. Since interference “pictures” created by lasers of other frequencies can be Btored in the same volume, the crystals as by their very nature would be used for creating issociaLive memory in the computer with an enormous volume of information. According to data in the foreign press, a number of firms are already developing holography—based storage units. The practic1 realization of industrial models of holographic storage units will depend upon the solution to a nwnber or problemz, and in particular, upon finding a material which would provide for the rapid recording and destruction of •the holograms. Thin magnetic films with bismuthrnanganese composition would be one such material. Their use along with high output lasers (on the order of 100 kilowatts) would make it possible to actually realize a holographic memory. The Honeywell firm has built an experimental holographic storage unit on bismuthmanganese film with a data recording density of 20 million bits per cm2. The information is recorded by the beam of a helium—neon laser (a pulse of microsecond duration and a power of several milliwatts), and readout is with the same laser. In design terms such a memory is a rotating disc 15 cm in diameter with strips of the carrier material applied to it 2.5 cm long. The French firm Thomsa-CSF has developed a storage device in which one hologram 1 mm in diameter will store 10,000 bits of information. One of, the Japanese firms, Hitachi, has designed a holographic device on multilayered ceramics with a data storage density of 20,000 bits on an area 0.5 nm in diameter (this corresponds to a density of 2O bits square per cm). The given examples show that the scientists of many nations are intensely developing fifth generation computers and the scientific prospects are being determined for creating super high—speed computers with enormous memory capability. The communications channels wiii the connecting devices are an important element of any ASUV. Without high quality communications channels linking the computers to the peripheral sources, there can be no question of an autc,mated system. Of course, autonomous use of computers is possible and Justified, particularly in the area of scientific research. However, in the process of troop control, automation provides a great impact in close interaction with all the means of communications. The output devices from the computers are the work areas of the control bodies (usually at coimnand posts), the equipment of which makes it possible to communicate with the con!puters. 83 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The bove—1ndicated equipment includes: Data input arid request devices, an arithmetic digital printer, a data visual display device, equiDlnent for documenting information and reproducing the documents. The data input device8 are used for inputting data related to the competence of the specific control body. In accord with the changing situ— tion, particularly in the course of cbat, a large portIon of the information i continuously hanged, some data grow out of date, and because of’ this they must be replaced. The basic portion of irformation on the situation will come from below, from the subordinate automated systems. From the automated work areas it is possible to feed in Information relating to major changes in the tactical and technical data, the methods of employing weapons and military equipment, as well as operational and tao-. tical standards related to one or another branch of forces. The request devices are designed for putting into the machine a coded request for solving informational and computational problems and providing the obtained decisions to the automated work area. The results of the solution are directly emp1oye1 by the control bodies for analyzing and evaluating data on the particular situation and for preparing proposals for the taking of a decision by the commander. The arithmetic digital center is a terminal element in any electronic computer. It may also be located a distance away, at an automated work area. In ths instance it is used to gie the results of solving informational and computational problems directly to the work area, and in the form of printed documents which can be used directly by the officers of the control bodies. According to foreign data, modern arithmetic digital printers operate at a speed of 3OO 1ines a minute (the length of the standard line is 60 signs). The further development of’ computers will make it possibic to increase the speed of generating information from the machine. The visual displays of the foreign ASUV are a complex of .reens, boards, and eiectrif’.ad plotting boards on which the necessary information can be produced in the form of graphic images of the situation on screens with a cartographic situation, various reference tables, schedules, and so forth. tfl0 visud displays are an important technical means for carrying out troop control under the conditions of a rapidly changing situation. Certin1y such significance of the data visual display devices becomes poib1e only with technically advanced sources of primary information whi.’. quickly secure and transmit the situational data to the computcrs. Foreign specialtstr feel that regardless of the fundamental possibil5ty of the graphic display of the situation concerning the erienj and one’s own troops on automated screens with a cartographic base, the map as the most ;1] I.i,i&-i.frivi.. i,iir.,...fr7iTit ,i,i.ve.i.r.iitii:JiIiii1ii.iiTiHiiiTir _____________________________ ‘1;0] 314 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 — DtI — - - - —I, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONlY ;1] 1,fiTiT _______________________;0] important working document of the commander and staff will maintain its significance. On it are plotted the variations of solutions, and it is one of the basic documents used by the staff in planning operations and combat, in giving missions to subordinate troops and in exercising control over the course of the carrying out of the given missions by the troops. For this reason, simultaneously with the development and improvement of the automated control systems, it is considered essential to increase staff efficiency, and in particular to improve in every possible way the methods by which the officials work with a map. The display devices are an important element in the automated control system and can be used In control bodies in the form of collectively used screens or individual situation display devices. In the foreign ASUV, for obtaining images on a large screen, four methods can be used: Direct projecting from the screen of’ the cathode ray tube, projecting using an intermediate recording of the image, and an image based on discrete or laser equipment. Thermoplastic, photopla.stio, ph3tochromic, discrete and laser technologies are promising ones which may find use in display units abroad. Thermoplastic technology consists in recording information by an electron beam on a thermoplastic film. This provides a sufficiently high resolution and a short time’ for holding the information on the screen (up to O.5.second). Obviously this technology will be used on collective—use screens of medium size with an area up to 2—3 m2. Photoplwtic technology uses a combination of the photoconducting and thermoplastic properties of substances. The obtaining of a potential relief is achieved by recording the image with a light beam, and the role of the converter of light energy into electric is played by a photocon— duting layer. This technology can be used most in individual display devices for graphic and letter printing information on the staffs of format ions and units. Photochromy uses the property of substances to change color and transparency when exposed to ratUant energy of different areas of the speetrun. The photochromic films excel in high clarity and good operating proper— tics. This technology will obviously be used most in developing large collectively used screens on the higher staffs. Discrete technology is based upon the use of individual miniature elements (modules) ordinarily reproducing one data symbol for its set on set—sized screens. Abroad it is felt that the modules can be developed on the basis of light- emitting diodes, liquid crystals, plasma films and other elements. Light- emitting diodes are semiconductor devices which use the phenomenon of injection electroluminescence. The first examples developed in 1968 emitted only red light. At present, a broad range of the spectrum has 85 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001000100063 I. a nfl FOR O1?FICTAL USE ONLY been developed, and for this reason it is posib1e to create elements of various colors. The light—emitting diodes are made in the form of sep— rte modu1e which are capable of displaying one sign. The set of individual modu1e provides an opportunity to create a screen of the necessary size. The light—emitting diode screens will possess high reliability, good clarity and resolution (up to three elements per mm), and a low data display lag time (an inertia on the order of 1O_8 seconds). The light— omitting diodes will be widely used in display devices for both collective and individual use on the staffs. Liquid crystals can be used in display devices on the principle of a change in their transparency under the effect of electric voltage. These are placed in a thin layer 10 microns thick, between transparent plates and electrodes to which a current is delivered with a power of several watts. The change in the transparency of a liquid crystal is such that in illuminating the plates a high contrast is achieved on the order of 20:1. The chief merit of the liquid crystal displays is the insignificant ener consumption (fractions of a milliwatt per displayed sign), and this makes it possible to power them using small batteries. Among the drawbacks are a certain de1y in displaying the information (around 100 microseconds). The resolution of the liquid crystals is two elements per nun. Liquid crystals may also be used not only on large screens but also on individual I nfl - - ;1] - iir i. 4PhIII! .1.1tJ3’!iIiEMi1 liTi!i. ii1TiTiT;0] Plasma panels are based on •the glowing of inert gases with their ionization. Such a panel consists of three transpa!ent plates. The inner plate has openings which are filled with a mixture of neon and nitrogen, and e1ectrode have been applied to the external plates. The total voltage formed in the area of’ •the intersection of the electrodes causes a process of the ionization of the as mixture or a halting of it. A merit of the p1asnt panels is the great clarity and the significant service life. The resolution ir two—three elements per mm, anc over the long run can be increased by several—fold. Brightness reaches 3,000 nits and the data display lag time is tenths of a microsecond. The designated technologies can be applied both for developing large zereens a well as for individual displays. The displ8.ying of information in a graphic form and in a printed f...rm will make it possible for the connander to be constantly up on the occurring events, to respond promptly to all changes in the situation and to control the troops efficiently. An analysis of the present state of ASUV indicates that tI’:,r have achieved a high level of development. According to the assertion roreign specia1its, the armed forces in the developed capitalist could not function without t,he automated control systems. Great for their development and use are to be opened up in the future. reason a methodological analysis of the question of the potential bilities of man and machine in the process of troop control is so 86 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY already of states prospects For this possi— important. PLO — nI eA r1... disp1ay. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIARDP82-O0850ROOO10OOlOOO6-3 FOR OVFICIAL USl ONLY ;1] ___________________________;0] 3. 1’otentia1 Puiibiiitiei for Improving Automated Systems One of the central trnd most complicated methodological problems in the full automation of troop control ysteins is to determine the degree of the posibi1ity and necessity of automated the functions carried out br them considering the achievements in the economy, science, techno1o and military affairs. A solution to this question is related primarily to a methodological ana1yis of the potential possibilities of improving cybernetic systenu. For a clearer notion of this i it possible to examine the following operational cnd tactical example. In the course of in exercise or maneuvers held at night on 1 January, a commander responsible for providing cover for a set area had to solve the problem of intercepting encuty airborne targets approaching the defended area. The targets had been detected, their coordinates, speed, altitude, course and other parameters were knwri, and these were fed into the calcu— lator. According to the calculations made squadron No 1 was in the best situation for repelling the enemy attack. However, the regimental commander taking the de1sion knows that in the squadron a month previously- the commander had fallen 111, and his deputy had not yet fully mastered the position held. The 3iscip1ine of the personnel had somewhat weakened. Moreover it was New Yr’s Eve. The squadron consisted basically of young pilots who had recently masmred the new equipment. Would they be able under such conditions to carry out a combat mission? Wouldn’t it be better to alert squadron No 27 In terms of time it would carry out the mission, and it was significantly better prepared in material and moral terms. In truth, if this squadron was alerted, the area covered by it would be correspondingly stripped. A risk? Yes, but a justified one. As was known from ana1yz.ng the situation and certain other sources, an attack in the dirction covered by squadron No 2 was improbable at present. Thus, the decision was taken. Could the machine have recommended this or a similar choice? Certainly the cormnander took the decision considering additional information which the machine had not received. For this reason he was under better conditions. Let us endeavor to put them in circuinst’nces which are relatively equal for solving the given prob1m. For thi purpose it is essential to put into the electronic memory of the machine additional information which was described above. However, in this instance, the researcher must overcome an entire series of difficulties. First of’ all, on the various levels of the development of science and techno1or, any cybernetic system, like man, will possess finite oppor-. tunities in terms of the receiv1ng storage and processing ot’ information. It 1 essential to clarify Just what these possibilities are, and whether they can be equal to or even surpass the capabilities of man. The broadening of these possibilities always entails a complicating of the cybernetic system, an increase in its size and, consequently, a reduction 8T FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A fl APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY in the reliability of its work. The time for processing the additional information is also increased. The time factor, as is known, is one of the most important ones in solving any problem, and particularly a military one. Thus, on any previously set level of science and technology, in solving a whole series of complicated problems, it is essential to consider the con— straits determined by the amount of information which must be fed into the cybernetic system, by the time needed for processing it, and by the reliability in the functioning of the ASU. In this regard there must be a special and thorough examination of the question of how quickly and accurately can a person carry out these missions. As is known, computers solve a large class of problems significantly faster and more accurately than man. Ordinarily, these are termed uncreative tasks. Along with them, there are also so—called creative tasks which for one reason or another are inaccessible for machine solving but are success ful solvable by man. The above-examined example could be classified among the creative tasks. However, the decision taken by the commander was based on additional information. If this had been fed into the electronic memory of the machine, it also could solve the problem, and in this manner the problem would then be in the area of the uncreative ones. Here, however, another difficulty arises. The machine solving of the problem presupposes a formalization of it, that is, the expressing of it in the form of a system of strict formal rules which exclude multiple interpretation. In terms of our problem, it is essential on a strictly uniform basis to “explain” to the machine what New Year’s Eve is and what is its relationship or possible relationship to the carrying out of the combat mission, how the command qualities of the deputy regimental commander influence the level of military training and discipline among the personnel, and so forth. Furthermore, the commander, in taking the decision to alert squadron No 2 and not squadron No 1, consciously takes a risk and thereby assumes all the responsibility for the decision taken. A person who does not possess definite moral qualities in such a situation would possibly prefer not to take the risk. And having chosen the first variation, the commander would provide insurance against possible accusations of stupidity or adventurism. Consequently, it is a question of the possibility of representing in a formalized form a whole series of qualities of a military leader acquired in the process of social evolution. It is not difficult to note that in the above—given example, fundamentally different possibilities are at work. Consequently, an analysis of the questions of the possibilities of improving cybernetic systems must be made 88 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 )PROVFfl FOR RFI FASP ThiirccIv Jiinp IR 2flfl• IA-RflPR2-flflRSflRflflfl1flflfl1flflfl- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY considering the varying magnitude of these possibilities. In the first place, it can be a question of formal or abstract possibilities, the assumption of which, while not contradictory to the development patterns of nature and society, do not have real bases. Secondly, it is essential to examine the real possibilities where the con— ditionB for realizing them already exist or can appear in a strictly historically designated stage in the development of science and technology. The re1ationhip of the designated possibilities has a dialectical nature. The boundaries between them are fluid. At a certain stage in the development of society, a formal possibility can become an impossibility or a real possibility and then reality. However the mixing up of these philosophical categories inevitably leads to confusion, and does not make it possible to solve the question of the possibilities of improving cybernetic systems with sufficient clarity. The result of such confusion is both the excessive optimism instilled of the successes of theoretical cybernetics as veil as the extremely- pessimistic viewi sometimes voiced in assessing the real technical difficulties confronting practical workers in the attempts to design rather complicated cybernetic systems. The successful theoretical solution to a whole series of fundamental prob— lems in cybernetics is tied to the extensive use of certain abstractions (idealizations) possessing a rather high degree of commonness. Their incorporation makes it possible to successfully examine the potential possibilities of cybernetic machines. However, the transition from ideal models to real machines requires a weakening of certain abstractions, a reduction in the degree of their conimoriness or an abandoning of them. All of this gives rise to certain limitations in carrying out the corresponding possibilities. The concretization of the philosophical concept of formal possibility is the abstraction introduced by A. A. Markov of potentia]. feasibility which “consists in an abstraction from the real limits of our constructive possibilities caused by the limitation of our life in space and time....”2 On the basis of using this abstraction, the ideal Turing machine was designed. “In the Turing machine, a portion of memory...i.s displayed in the form of a strip unlimited on both sides and broken up into cells. Obiiously, in no real machine could there be an infinite memory (an infinite strip), and ir this sense the Turing machine is merely an idealized scheme reflecting the potential possibility of increasing the volume of memory.”3 Certainly, it would be impossible to actually design a Turing machine. However, formally, from the viewpoint of the abstraction of potential feasibility, it is possible, for the patterns of its functioning do not contradict the laws of nature. 89 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR O1”PtCIAI (ISK ONIY In distinguishing the real and formal possibilities for improving cybernetic systems, it is advisable to examine first of all the arguments in favor of the constraints of the latter. At present it i possible to consider the skepticism of certain specialists caused by the technical imperfection of automata in comparison with the human brain as overcome. The indications of the purely quantitative aspects of the problem, in being unconvincing on the philosophical level, are contradictory to the technical achievements of today. Undoubtedly as yet it would be very difficult to develop and provide reliability in an electronic machine consisting of’ 1010_1012 elements with sufficiently flexible and complete links between them arid with input arid output dev’ces the capaeity of which would be comparable with the possibilities of human sensory organs. However, many technical difficulties at present are already resolved or are in the stage of being resolved. For this reason, it is possible to boldly assert that the designated differences, in being purely quantitative, at a certain stage in the development of science and technology will be overcome. However there are not only quantitative but also qualitative differences between the processes occurring in a technical system and the functioning of the brain. Consequently, the solution to the problem of the potential possibilities of cybernetic systems to reproduce various aspects of thought activity is possible only on the basis of the fundain€ntal notions of dia— lectical rnateria]J.sm on the essence of conscience. The idea of the suf— ficientj.y complete modeling of the living, and particularly thought processes, has caused a number of arruments in certain philosophers, and the essence of these questions can be reduced to the following theses. The physical form of the motion of matter is simpler and inferior in re— lation to the biological. The latter is characteristic for qualitatively different state of matter which is defined as living. Thinking is possible only within the limits of the biological form of the movement of matter under the condition of its achieving a sufficiently high level of organi-. zation. Moreover, it is not only a function of matter organized in a particular manner but also the product of the sociohistorical development of society. For this reason the attempts at a more or less complete modeling of thought on a nonproteir level should be qualified as a mechanism, for they clearly represent a reduction of the higher form of the movement of matter to an inferior one. A logical consequence from si1ch a viewpoint is the conclusion of the impossibility of modeling by technical means any proc2sses whatsoever occurring in the brain and being a property of organic highly organized matter. However the given assertions are not valid since they contradict practice. The simplest digital machine to some degree models one of the mechanisms of the human memory which is a property of organic highly organized matter. 90 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY :: Thursday, June 1, z..J:CI FOI( orrt(: IAI. L1E ONLY Moreoer, It cannot be ns;erted c.tegoriea1ly that the process of a qualitative transition from one form of the movement of matter to another and a corresponding rtu ir, 2w level of its organization are ponible only on the paths of the natural. ‘VO1UtiOn known to us. Obviously tranitions from one form of motion to asothr can be qualitatlvey different. Natural evolution brings mnter cn the limits of the physical form of motion through c enistry iri1 tioIo. However, from this it in no way follows that there is no other porslbillty for such a development1 It can be as— surned that one of them 1 realiaed in technical systems created by man. By this path matter can attain a ‘.tery high level of organization characterized by no less complexity, diverity and richness of internal relationships than in biology. Certainly, the substantive bnsi of the carriers of the forms of motion exsriine’i by u differs. However, an assumption of the possibility o modeling the processes occurring in form of motiofl in a substratum which is the carrier of another form of motion (under the condition of the same mag— ntude of the degree o their organization) will not contain any mechanism. ueh an approach makes it possible to look differently at the possibil4ties of modeliw thought. To the degree that It is ossible to achieve a high level in t!ie oranizaItion of matter on a different substratum bails than the hrin, the real mod€-ls of the brain and its mental functions are real and ufficient1y corplete. In r)ther words, in ho1din the viewpoint that thougIt, like life, occurs only on a protein basis,4 and vithout resurrct— ing the poorly formulat4 problem of the “thinkng of machines,” nevertheless it is valid to speak of the modeling of thought processes on a different substrata basis. However, in charaeterizlng conscience as a property of highly organized matter, only one aspect of’ its essence Is touched upon. The social causality of conscience operates as the other aspect, and thIs “from the very outset is a social product and remains thIs as long as people exist.”5 The fcoders of arxlsn—Leninism repeatedly emphasized that conscience is a prod.ict of sociohistorical development, and that the brain does not think t:, itceif, but rather it s social man with the aid of the brain. A cyternetic r’achine of any complexity is not a social beIng. tt remains merely an unique Implement in the hands of the conscious and purposefully actlnP soCIal being, man. The ‘iven concepts of dialectical materialism, although elimInating the problem of creating a “thinking automaton” by the forces of cyberneticn, hovever do not exclude the fundamental tossib,Llity of nodding thinking. Its social nature can be understood and corresond— 1n,ly depicted ifl the program of a cybernetic machine. On this level, in our opinion, the statement of L. B. Bazhcnov l valid. “i machine in no b’concs a social being, but man, having understood and progranned the o1’il caura1lty of thought, reproduces t In the machine,” noted the ov1”t cIcntst. “If the social nature of thinking is natural and understandable, then in principle It can be artificially reproduce’ like th. other aspects of i..” 91 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED P - hursday, June CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010 FOR OIP1CIM2 USI ONLY Thus, oti the philosophical level the questioii of the formal poibi1ities of automation merges with the gnoneological problem of the cognizability of the world, and these very poibi1ities ultimately are determined by the uccene of cognition nd the precise nthmatica1—1ogicil cxpresion of the soci11y determined patterns in the t’unctioning of the huran brain. On the natural scientific level, arguinent in favor of the limiting of the formal poibi1it1e of cyb2rnetic nyteInn ar often linked to the pre— ence of o—c11ed algorithmically uno1vabie irob1em. An it known there are entire c1asen of probiem for which no iiingle algorithm exitG for their 8olution. Th not the trict1y mthematiea11y proven imposGibillty of a1gorithmiing certain c1ae of prob1em that funk.niEnta1 limit vhih determInes the area for the action of cybernetic machinen? First or all, the fundamental imposibi1ity of eekir out an algorithm for the given c1a of problems can mean the bnence ,.t’ a certain type of re1tions between certain set conditionB and the sought reu1t. In such an instance, the given c1aG of problems cannot be oved by singular methods either by man or . machine. Furthermore, the absence of a ing1e algorithm does not exclude the posi— blilty of o1vng ny pcif1c problem of the given c1a. Human intellect finds partiuiar instances of solving tnaa problems which are insoluble a1gorithriifly. However this can also be done by a sufficiently powerful cybernetic tiaciilne. Recently attenLion of researchers has been attract’d to heuristic program— rnin based on the study and uze for progrnwiing of the methods and proced— urea uied by nan for solving prob1en the ‘1gorithm of which is tinknovn to him. tn the opinion of certain authors, the heuristic procedures can be vi eyed as approximate methods for o1ving algorithmically unsovable prob1 s • 8 The simultaneous us of heurt1cs is caused by the fact that many algorithrnieally o1vb1e problens remsin virtually unsol:able due to the actual impossibility of carrymn ut the volume of ca1cu1ation. For this reason the theory of heurit1c p graiining to a certain degree can help to cver— cote th”se diff1cu1tie. At present only fw heurit1c programs can be mentioned which nake it pozib1e to so1v’ a certain limited class of relatively imp1e problems which r” renotc frot broad practical use. However, even now ii.. i clear that the heuri3tlc enrch provides r.n enorius cain In time in comperion with thc syternatic checking o variations. At the s’iz tire the assertion that “an a1gorithx does no exist” can r..n only the 1rposIbi1ity of seeking it out in the giv’’; logicsil system or knowl”dge, that I, on ‘i certain level of the de,elopment of science, in u3in drn intheinatic. IC I: USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 AD ,- C C I—I I A r I— - FOR iFFtctAL uSE ONLY -Dr- -nfl It may be proposed that with the corresponding broadening of the designated logical system of knowledge the previously “nonexistent”algorithm will be found.9 If a machine is rapable or itself broadening the logical system in which it functions at the given moment, the absence of a single algorithm for solving a certain c1asi ci’ problems in not an insuperable obstacle for it. In broadening the area of formalized knowledge, the machine can find previously unknown relationships (if these exist at all) and on the basis of them make up the necessary algorithm. For clarity it is possible to give the example of how a machine can “dis— cover” Maxwell’s eque4ions independently of man. For this it is merely a question of putting into the electronic memory a description of a series of experiments on electrodynamics and the corresponding class of differential equations. After this the machine itself will select those which best ccnform to the results of’ the experiments. In precisely the sane manner, with a rather complex system of hierarchically organized self— instructing programs, it is possible to detect the relationships and patterns previously unknown to man. On the basis of them, a coriputer will supplement and correct its programs and draw up new ones. All of this applies fully not only to the algorithmically unsolvable but also to the algorithmically solvable problems or to the creative problems the a3s’orithm of which, although existing, is however unknown to man. “In complicating the program by utilizing methods already found by the machine in the process of searching for a new method, it is possible to successfully model creative activity on an ever higher order,” writes Academician V. N. Olushkov on this question. “In the process of such modeling, it is possible to force the machine automatically to pose new problems for itself and to find their solution.”1° It Is frequently said the.t the “world of the machine,” its “universe,” and the “horizons of its vision” are determined by an algorithm and by a program. This of cour3e is true enough. However, these notions must not, be understood in a sialified manner by identifying algoritbmization merely with a rigidly determined once and for all set and unchanged line of behavior. Any machine (including a heuristic one) requires a definite mathematical support for its operation. The necessity of ever more complete formalization is cased precisely and primarily by the development and introduction of arious computers into control practices. However, is this requiremen.. fundamental for solv2ng the question of the limited nature of the f’rmal possibilities for improving cybernetic systems? The analysis made convinces one that a machine, in possessing & certain program, can extend the limits of formalization and find previously unknown algorithms. In accord with this it is capable of changing and correcting the program used in the machine. Consequently, being limited in its actions by the sphere of normative formalization, the machine itself broadens it. ;1] _J .T.IYA . ill... . — ..5Irrr. i. i.i’IiIiIeI ...TITI L...fi1IiTiTi1”;0] 93 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I’ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006-3 FOR OPPICIAL USE ONLY Thus, neither in phi1oophy nor in natural scientific research at present are there uffiaient1y sound arguments in defense of the notion of restricting the formal possibilitieB for ii’proving cybernetic systems. Bearing in mind the formal possibilities of improving cybernetic devices, on the level of the abtration of potential feaibi1ity it i valid to raise the question of modeling such clearly complex phenomena of conscience, including the creative processes of thinking using technical GyGtems which correspond to the human brain in terms of their conmlexity, the diversity of functions carried out nnd problem8 solved. Certainly we are nore concerned with the trnoition from formal to real poibilitieG which can be turned into reality at any but not infinitely distant utage of development. A review of the real possibilities for improving cybernetic systems should be started br analyzing the dialectics of the relationship: runction—-structure——8ubstratum . There are two interrelated end at the same time in a definite sense opposite directions in modeling the mind. One of them is characterized by attempts to reproduce definite functions analogous to the brain mechanisms. The other direction is aimed solely at reproducing the functions regardless of the mechanism of their realization. A researcher of the second direction viii be satisfied if the machine will effectively perform one or another complex problem of data processing. An experimenter iho prefers the first direction viii be satisfied if the machine solves the problem by the same method as man. For tae former, the identicalness of the re- suite is of grea4 significance, while for the latter, the nature of the 5rocess is equally important. The first direction which is related predominantly to th functional approach can be defined as the cybernetic or functional modeling, and repre. sents the cybernetic aspect of elaborating the problem of an “artificial intellect.” The second direction is based main1r on the data of psychological And neurophysiological research and to a greater degree uses the structural analogies considering the known structural characteristics of the nxdeled systems. Regard1er. of the designated difference, both approaches are interrelated. In actuality, if the method is knov!1 by which the brain solves a certain data proiessing problem, then an opportunity is provided for creating a program with the same logic ma’ing it possible for the machine to solve this problem analogously to mai. At the same tire, the presence of a progre.m for solving certain problems may suigest the method of solving similar problems by man. In this regard there is particular interest in the assertion of special— Into that there is an isomorphic nature of the work or machixie and man In solving the problems of image recognition. At the same time, a series 9k FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I’ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 r. — -.—.—--t. —— I__ I-, FOR OFFICIAL (JSE ONLY a p ;1] _S•J •ii . . .TW p..4IiTiL• F : .1 JI’piTj.{j] :IthTIHITIIIL IITITIT;0] of psychological research has experimentally shown that the nature of the processes of seeking the solution to one or another problem by a cybernetic system and man, rc’gardless of a definite similarity as a whole, significantly differs.2 All that has been said characterizes the unique manifestation of the di].ectical relationships between structure and function in complicated dynamic systems. The possibility and necessity of a functional approach to their examination are caused by the fact that functions possess a certain independence in relationship to structure, they are linked to it indirectly, and this very relationship is not rigid and uniform. Nevertheless, “a definite function is performed not by any structure generally, but only by any structure taken from a certain limited ‘class of structures’ all the elements of which contain certain necessary common properties “13 Structural analogies can be very distant in modeling one or several functions. Here, along with the limiting of some ‘unctions, others which are very important and even crucial in one or another area of ectivity can be sharply strengthened. The history of human progress knows many examples when the best results were achieved precisely due to the abandoning of precise structural analogies with living organisms. And in a similar manner the operations carried out in a computer differ from those occurring in the human mind. The structures of the systems carrying out these operations differ substantially. Precisely because of this modern coinputrs greatly surpass the human brain in terms of the speed and accuracy of calculations. In principle it is possible to create a program which imitates the customary method of arithmetical calculations for mar, but it is extremely ineffective. However, an increase in the rumber of modeled functions or their complicating imposes ever more rigii constraints on the structure of the systems modeling these functions. Obviously the greater the number of functions of one system which is repr’ducei simultaneously by another system, the more complete their similarJt of structures should be. A disconformity of structures entails functional constraints. In any event it is indisputed that the modeling of a certain set of functions necessitates a corresponding level of complexity in the structure ? the modeling system. Here it is a question not so much of physiological structures as It is of informational struetures. Precisely this aspect of the question has been pointed up by the well known Soviet scientist P. K. Anolthin, in noting that in terms of individual parameters of the human brain and its activity it i possible to develop more advanced machines, however the accent must be put not on individual capabilities, but ratneron the interaction of these abilities and the moves from one to another.L At the same time, since the relationship between the structure and substratum of any system is a concrete expression of a dialectical relationship between form and content, to this degree structure has only a relative independence. Consequently, the difference of the substrata to one degree or another is also reflected in the nonidenticaliess of the structures. 95 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP20O85OROOO1OOOIOOO63 A len Cflfl ni—I — j FOR OVPICIAL USE ONLY The question arises whether it is always possible to etab1ish a definite congruity of structures with a differing Bubstantive base, that is, to detect or design those e1ement (substrata) of the system which would make it poioib1e to provide the isomorphizm (or in the general instance, homomorphism) of the modeled and modeling structures on a level sufficient for the reproduced function? It must be pointed out that modern science ii t111 very far from solving this problem not only on the practical level but also on the theoretical one. For this reason, a further thorough investigation or the phenomena of life precisely from the aspect of it subtratuin ny provide a negative answer to this question. Thas It may seem that certain structures and thereby the entire group of living functions cuinot be reproduced in any way but on a protein level. That is, at a, certain stage the corresponding constraints viii be discovered. Nevertheless the atternpt at relatively complete modeling of thinking using various cybernetic systems are not only valid but also essential, for in the process of experimental search alone can any limiting patterns be discovered if such exist at all. Thus, the first difficulty in moving from formal possibilities for modeling thought to real possibilities is related to the necessity of artificial— ly creating that material formation the structural organization of which would be comparable with a biological one in terms of the richness of internal ties and relationships. And the question of the fundamental pos— iibi1ity of achieving such a high 1evc1 in the organization of matter on any other subtratwn basis than the brain itself is far from resolved. The second and equally complex problem on the path of realizing the potential possibilities of modeling thought is related to the discovery and accurate description of’ the patterns of the functioning of the brain eonzidering the social causality of these patterns. The solution to this requires efforts from the entire aggregate of the sciences studying the essence of thought, the structure and organization of the brain, its functions in the process of processing information as veil as the development of the corresponding mathematical logical apparatus which would be capable of reflecting with suff.icient completeness and accuracy the patterns of brain functioning in a formalized torm making it possible to create a1go rithms and programs. Dialectical rnateriaiim views conscience as a definite property of highly orgarized matter and a product of sociohistorical development. “...Our conscience nd thinki:rig,” wrote S. Engels or. this question, “however super— sensitive they may seem, are the product of a physical, corporeal organ, the brain.”16 Conscicnce does not entail anything supernatural, incompre— hcnib1e or in prircip1e inaccessible for study. The Marxist—Leninist methodological notions of the fundamental cognizability of’ the world provide reason to assert that in certain stages of the development of science and social practice this property of highly organized matter has been rather fully studied. The patterns of the functioning of the brain, including the social causality of thinking, will be understandable and ;1] - J .J I•1 . n—ni • • lv ii iW ii ..2iTiT?L , , .1 . iTiIiHiIiTi IiTiT.i_________________________;0] 96 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 AC’1 - - FOR OFFI(:IAI. USE ONLY If’ describable to an ever greater degree of accuracy, and in accord with this the possibilities for modeling thinking on each historIcal level will be broadened. Hovever, one must not forget the following. In the first place, ndern science is only on the distant approaches to solving these problems, and secondly, in the course of the corresponding research (as in an attempt to achiev-e t. r.ih organization of matter on a nonprotein base), certain limiting patterns may be discovered. For example, it may turn out that the number of rules for processing information by the human brain is infinite. Moreover, for creating systems of machines the functional efficiency of which in all regards cou.ld be compared with the efficiency of human activity, it is essential to formalize and turn over to the cybernetic system all information acquired by mankind as a result of the millions of years of biological and social, sociohisto’ical development. To the degree that this information is incomplete, the real process of thinking will differ from its model not only structurally but also functionally. The comment made by Academician A. N. Kolmogorov in a joking form of “possibly an automaton capable of writing verses on a level of the great poets cannot be constructed more simply than having modeled all the development of the cultural life of a society in which the poets actually developed,”17 thus acquires profound meaning. In analyzing this statement, B. V. Biryukov and Ye. S. Geller correctly emphasize that “for this it is essential to model the ‘logic of history,’ to model the historical heritage in the area of the content and methods of thinking which are assimilated by an individual entering life. And this means to model the path of development of a modern individual and to ‘supply’ the corresponding ‘mçdel’ with the needs of real social individuals, including ethical, aesthetic requirements with their biological prerequisites and social content.”18 At any historically determined stage in the development of cognition, there exist an area of formalized knowledge and an area of unformalized knowledge which encompasses it. Both these areas are being constantly transformed. The boundaries between them are mobile and historically changeable. In precisely the same manner that in the objective world there is nothing that is in principle incomprehensible but merely not understood, in the process of the cognition of this world there is nothing in principle that is unformalizable but merely unformalized. However, the sphere of formalized knowledge always lies within the unformalized. The real pos— sibtlities of improving cybernetic systems at any specific stage of development are rather strictly confined by the limits of the area of formalized knowledge. These limits over time can be extended, but a cozrput.er in principle cannot go beyond them. But a person not only extends the sphere of formalized knowledge (including by the aid of machines) but also goes beyond its limits. He functions efficiently in the unforinalized sphere, using the intuitively informative possibilities of thinking. And ;1] J J Il!A — .i i .ib. . rm.... iTT t.i.JiIi1iI fr :i ii ! i1iTL1i1 JITIIII ..IiTiTiTiTiI’;0] 97 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 1 Fr r I I I FOR OFFIC TAT, USE ONLY - nfl, - - thin, in particular, in one or the fundmenta1 advantages of man over cybernetic iystems of any complexity. At any, however distant stage in the development of a society its scientific, technical and economic possibilities are not unlimited. And correspondingly the real possibilities tor improving cybernetic machines, their technical, informational and material support are limited by definite specific historical 1imit. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the mental abilities of man are constantly developing, including by using cybernetic equipment. Consequently, there will always exist a rather broad class of problems the machine solution to which is impossible or inefTective. Under the same conditions, a person, in using unformalized knowledge, in making reasonable asswnptions arid in using less strict methods, can solve these problems comparatively simply and with sufficient accuracy. Thus, at any stage in the improving of cybernetic systems, tne dominant and leading position of man in relation to them will be maintained. The methodological analysis given above makes it possible to conclude that along with progress in science, techno1or and military affairs, the real possibilities for automating troop control will constantly grow. At the same time the functions of the personnel which in one wj or ax.other is involved with automated control systems will be broadened and enriched. In actuality, the achievements of the present—day scientific and technical revolution and the revolution in military affairs even now make it posib1e to algorithmize and prepare a number of control problems for machine solution. At present the automation of the control process encompasses not only the sphere of mathematical calculations, but also such functions of control organs as the selection and classification of information, its display, a comparison of the existing combat situation with a previously known one, and the exchange of information within the controlling body. Certainly the carrying out of these functions in part does not require a creative approach and is comparatively simple, ionosy11abic and already technologized in the human brain. For this reason all these operations can be precisely described and realized using automatic devices. Along with them, the process of troop control includes such procedures as evaluating information, discovering the plan of the enemy and a final selection of the variation of the decision. The carrying out of these requires a creative approach, a dialectical flexibility of thinking, social stimuli, and an emotional uplift, that is, qualities in herent only to the human intellect. As was pointed out above, their precise I’ormalization can be recognized as only potentially possible. For this reason, the aim of automation is not to replace nan by a machine, but rather to bring about a maximum rise in the efficiency of control activities and the combat possibilities of the troops. Such a complicated problem is solved by setting up control bodies which include collectives ;1] .J.1I•1V ,,. . rTI i ITIT.I1.4IIIfI1IITITIb i i____________________________;0] 98 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Ar APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006-3 FOR OLT1CIM USF ONLY Such systems Irnve been named “large systems” of the “co11ective——mchine” type. In automated iytern the short.cornlngs of man and cybernetic machines are reciprocally coinpansated for, and their merits are maximally divulged and oinphaized. They in the best manner combine speed, accuracy and preci— zion of’ automata with t.ht flexibility and diversity of the mental, physlo— 1ogic1 and social qualities of man. Thiz becomes possible only with a rational allocFlt.ion of control functions between the machine and man. In our opinion, the embodying of the real posibi1ities of full automation in re1ity in any interval of time requires the ornia1ization of the investigated ares of troop control and certain processes of mental activity related to the procesIng of information, a well as the availability of the technical devices for realizing the formalized moments of creative activity. Cortidering these general niethodological concepts it is esentia1 to approach the analysis of the present state and development prospects of automated troop control systems. FOOTNOTES 1. The research on the questions of the given section has been .arried out using the examples oC the development and organization of automated troop control 3y3tems in the United States. Here use has been made of materials published in open foreign sources. 2. A. A. Markov, “The Theory of Algorithms,”“Trudy Matematicheskogo Instituta imeni V. A. Stekiova” [Works of the Mathematical Institute imeni V. A. Steklov], Vol 12, Moscow—Leningrad, 1959, p 15. 3. V. P. Trakhtenberg, “A1goritnr I Mashinnoye Resheniye Zadach” [Algorithms and the Machine Solving of Prob1ems, Moscow, 1957, pp 60—61. . At present there are hrpotheses on the possibility of life and thought on a different substratum basis. For example, Yu. V. Orfeyev feels that “dialectical materialism cannot help but recognize the fundam2n— tal possibility of the existence of life on a nonprotein substratum.t’ See Yu. V. Orfeyev, “Mental Labor of Man and Machine Thinking,”“Nauchnoye Upravleniye Obshchestvornt’ [Scientific Management of Society], Moscow, 197O,p 336. 5. K. Marx and F. Engels, “Soch.,’t Vol 3, p 29. 6. The authors of the present work agree with the viewpoint of a number of Soviet and foreign Marxist philosophers according to which: “Only all sciences taken in their dialectical unity and in the closest tie to social and tcientific experimental practice can lead human thought to the greatest victory, that is, to the creation of’ not simply a protein or other similar substance, but a living, thinking and purposefully acting being.” (“Leninskaya Teoriya Otrazheniya i Sovreennost” [The Leninist Theory of Reflection and Modern Times], Moscow—Sofia, 1969, p 20.) 99 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LEASE: Thursday, June 18, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 7. “Fi1oofiya Yestestvoznanlya” [The Philosophy of Natural Science], No 1, Moscow, 1966, p 378. 8. Yu. V. Orfeyev, “Heuristic Progranuning and Certain Aspects of Control Theory,”“Nauchnoye Upravleniye Obshchestvom,” No 1, Moscow, 1967, p 276. 9. This supposition is based, in particular, on Ht5clel’s theorem, the essence of which is as follows: within any sufficiently deve1opd formal system it is posib1e to formulate e thesis not proven in it as well as it negation. Here it is possible to broaden the system of I’ormalism axioms in such a manner that the sought proof will be found. Then at least one supposition not presently proven in the extended formal cystem viii be discovered without fail, and so forth. 10. V. N. Glushkov, “Thinking and Cybernetics,”“Dialektika V Naukaich o Nezhivoy Prirode” [Dialectics in the Sciences on Inanimate Nature), Moscow, 19614, p 517. 11. N. S. Sutherland, “Human—Like Machines,”“Chelovecheskiye Sposobnosti Mashin” [Human Abilities of Machines], Moscow, 1971, p 25. 12. 0. K. Tikhomirov, “The Heuristics of Man and Machine,” VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 4, 1968. 13. B. A. Glinskiy, et al., “Mode].irovaniye kak Metod Nauchnogo Issledovaniya” [Modeling as a Method of Scientific Research], Moscow, 1965, p 138. 14. See B. V. Biryukov and Ye. S. Geller, “Icibernetika v Gumanitarnykh Naukakh” [Cybernetics in the Humanities], Moscow, 1973, p 132. 15. See P. K. Anokhin, “Problems of Modeling Living Processes and the Physio1or of the Brain,”“0 Sushchnosti Zhizni” [On the Essence of Life], Moscow, 19614, p 206. 16. K. Marx and F. Engels, “Soch.,” Veil 21, pp 285—286. ;1] II I•1VJ ii. iT :i • .ii-r. v iii .r- ii JITi r . .1AiTiTtb .IiTiTiHiTiI,i I1TiTiT _____________;0] 17. A. N. Kolmogorov, “Life and Thought as Particular Forms of the Existence of Matter,”“0 Suchchnosti Zhizni,” p 57 18. B. V. Biryukov p 113. and Ye. S. Ge].ler, “Kibernetik v Gwnanitarnykh Naukakh,” 100 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 P()K OI?PI( I Al, IISK ONlY SPECIFIC MPHODS FOR AUTOMATING PROCESSES 1. The Modeling Method and Its Role in the Prcrp Control AND OPTIMIZING TROOP CONTROL Automation and Optimization of ;1] .1 •!1 • .Tl...I1iTitL....[g r!t.1IJ.J.vAiTiI.iI1 lI1IIIb ‘iTiT1 ii,[iT ______________________________;0] The theoretical examination and pr.ctiea1 solution to the problems arising in the area of troop control necessitates the use of an entire armamen— tarlum of scientific methods. Moreover, the complex nature of the ontro1 systems and processes necessitates the use of a systems approach to their study and the integrated application of diverse methods. The principles of materialistic dialectics hold the fundamental role in the system of employed methods. They demand the consideration of the diverse ties and processes in developing troop control systems, objective, concrete and thorough research, the elucidation of the internal and external contradictions, unified analysis and synthesis, infor&tive and formal, quantitative and qualitative approaches in solving the scientific and practical problems In the sphere of troop control. However, the general methodological principles do not exhaust the cognitive means needed for solving such a con1icated problem. Within these means it is essential to include the genera). scientific methods or imperical and theoretical cognition. The defined forms of observation, experimentation, and sociological investigation 9.re organically linked with logical opera-. tions of analysis, synthesis, abstraction, formalization, idealization, and so forth. They are applied on the basis of the natural and model, quantitative and qualitative approaches. The systems approach and systems analysis of troop control processes are the unique collecting link which determines the specific method of using all these means. In its content, systems analysis links the universal method of dialectics with the methods of special sciences. A systems approach has two aspects. Its, essence is expressed, in the first place, in a definite understanding of the very object precisely as a whole system interacting with other systems, and secondly, in the interpretation of the research process as a systems one in terms of its logic and the applied means. It in a way 10]. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CHAPTER 1: APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OEFICIAI. USE ONLY concretizes in terms of the particular tasks the initial concepts of dialectics on the necessity of viewing any object as a unified developing whole consisting of interrelated parts and interacting with other objects and with all objective reality. It realizes the dialectical principles of. objective, thorough and concrete research, the unity of analysis and synthesis, and the unity of all empirical and theoretical means of research. The use of modeling, formalization, the mathematical methods of operations research in the process of automating and optimizing troop control must also be viewed from this standpoint. The improving of the systems and processes of troop control includes the solution to two fundamental problems. In the first place, the creation of the necessary conditions and technical means which ensure high efficiency of control processes, particularly the working out of a decision and the planning of combat as the most difficult and requiring great outlays of time. In the second place, a rise in the efficiency of control actions, and above all in the soundness and accuracy of the decision taken. The basic ways for solving these problems lie in the automting of control processes, the elaboration and application of scientific bases and quantitative and qualitative methods for optimizing control actions. Automation and optimization are profoundly interrelated processes, for it is obvious that a rapidly taken but incorrect or ineffective decision is just as undesirable as a correct, even optimum decision but one not promptly taken. The solution to either problem both separately and in their unity is inconceivable without using modeling in its various forms and varieties. In examining the role of this research approach which is widely used in modern science and practice, it is essential to elaborate definite views on at least the following questions 1) Why is it essential to use modeling in the various stages of research and development of automated control systems and in the different stages of working out and optimizing combat decisions? 2) What processes should and could become an object of modeling and what are the possibilities for constructing their models? 3) What types of models can be used in solving automation problems and in the interests of optimizing control? The answers to these questions depend the essence of the method of models. first of all to clarify the notion in irig” are used. upon one or another understanding of For this reason, it is essential which the concept “model” and “model— Recently the greatest atterion has been given to the modeling method both in the sphere of elaborating its special theory and applications, as well as on the level of philosophical and methodological analysis. The essence of modeling, its objective prerequisites, the classification of models and their gnoseologica. functions have been examined in a number of works. 102 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED I- , June 13, 2 1 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The overall evaluation of many views is that a model is an analogue or imitation ot reality, that is, an object (process) similar in certain regards to other objects (procescs). The similarity (homomorphism, iso— morphism Ur iofunctionaiism) of two phenomena is a necessary prerequisite in order that one of them can become the model of the other. Actual combat and troop exercises, a topographic map and a portion of the terrain, field f!ring and •a system of equations describing this, the brain and the computer posseis an objective similarity in certain regards. Under certain conditions this makes it possible for them to act as models of one another. However, the similarity of two objects (processes) i not sufficient for one to actually become the model of the other. On the theoretical and cognitive 1eve1 one of two similar systems can be viewed as the model of the other only when: a) it actually assumes the functions of the replacement of the other system; b) as such it becomes an object of direct invest!— gation or practical operation; c) is used as the principal of cognition and action (of a third, modeling system)1 as an implement for systematizing known information on anothex system and for gaining new information. For example, combat and troop exercises, regardless of the similarity in a number of features, do not operate automaticé11y as the original and the model. The independent processes in the given instance can also be examined independently of one another. Horever, exercises become models with their conscious use as an analogue of a certain type of combat, and operate as a means f’or systematizing the knoin information about this and for gaining new information. On the other hnd, real combat (the most typical instances) can serve as a model in working out the overall concept and plan of the corresponding exercises. Considering what has been said, a model can be defined as a systems object A having a similarity in certain definite regards to the systems object B and serving for the principal of cognition (the modeling system) as a means for fixing known information about object B or for obtaining and transforming new information about this. Correspondingly, modeling is the reproduction of one object or process (the original) using another (a model) or the constructing (finding), examination and use of models. The subject of modeling “can be concrete as well as abstract objects, both actually existing systems as well as systems which are merely to ,e esigned....”2 As a rule, with the aid of models, complicated, inaccessible or expensive bjects and processes are reproduced and studied indirectly. Other objects which exist or are specially created and which may be physical or conceptual or symtolic may act as their models. Being a scientific method, modeling incorporates a series of sequential operations: The selection from existing objects or the artificial constructing of an object capable of performing the functions of a model; theoretical investigation or practical testing of the model for the purpose ;1] ._J :11V ii i1 . .1 • _5IiTF1vA...dI, iFr i [IIIII .i .f4’iIiE.1i1 1i1111L iiiii• IiIiIiT._________________________;0] 103 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY a p of disclosing the fullest possible inf’ormation on its properties; the transferr1 of the obtained inI’ormation from the model to the original on the basis of’ certain methodological concepts and logical rules. The stated understanding of a model and modeling makes it possible to answer the question of what the necessity of them is in solving the prob-. lems ot automating and optimizing troop contro1. This is determined by those connnon firnotions vhih models can perform and actuafly do perform as a means of scientific research. At the empirical stage of research, a model (or a model e.Teriment), on the one hand, serves a one of the sources of the initial fac4ua1 data and as a means for the preliminary processing or sytematizIrag of these data, and on the other, acts as an instrument for the intermediate or indirect tet1.ng of the results of theoretical research, that is, within definite limits perforrns a criterial function. In the theoretca1 stage, the use of models makes it possible to. describe strictly the exemined phenomenon, to depict it in a generalized, schematic or symbolic form. Here the phenomenon can be explained, having represented the complex by- the simple and the unknown by the known. It is possible to go on to a quantitative analysis and to forecasting possible changes in the studied phenomenon with the influence of various Iactors on it, as well as determine the necessary changes in the studied phenoine— non, that is, to prepare and ensure its control. All these general functions are concretized in analyzing the methods for applying models in the interests of automating troop control. First of all it is essential to point out that in principle modeling triakes it possible in a more correct, economic and relatively faster manner to solve the involved problems of studying and working out automated control systems. Often it is necessary to develop fundamentally new technical systems with an insuffiient1y developed theory ftr the processes to be reproduced and very limited experience in designing such systems. The newness or the problem and the presence of undetermined factors also cause definite difficulties. The use of models to some degree makes it possible to surmount these difficulties, to have a clearer otion of the problem being solved, to feel out a correct direction of work, to obtain and test certain data, and at the same time to acquire the necessary experience in designing, and to generalize the theory for constructing and the functioning of control systems. Since it is a question of developing not only coTnpiicated but also ‘very expensive systems) the search for the best variations of these systems by the trial and error method in a f’uil-scale experiment is completely unacceptable. The use of models increases the economy of development for both individual technical devices as veil as an automated system as a whole. The obtaining aI testing of intermediate results urdng models ;1] , J !J I•’V4 ii •1 1 .i• 4:j IJI.rt.’1ayaL.W&i, ________________________;0] APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006.3 Q14 , FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY A r S I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY make it posib1e to diicard certain unprorniiing d1rection of work nd to shorten the dittance from the 1de to it complete realization Finally, modeling makes it por1b1e to 1o respond to the time factor. The exacerbation of contradictions in the Gphere of troop control under the effect of the preent—dty m±1itry nd technical revolution a well a the necessity of constant nd high troop combat readiness necaitate an acce1ertion of work in the ares of automating control. The rational utilization of modeling procedures reduces the time of 11 the tge in the research nd development of automated yntems. On a more specific level, modeiG, in the first place, create the n.sry prereciui1tes for thorough ana1ysi of complex ytems. For exwnple, as is clear from foreign Bources, the development of utomatd ccntrol systems of the Fieldata, Arntdata arid other types could not be carried out as .n isolated tak. In the given in8tance it vas essential to corniider the oa1s, otructure and functions of both the more general, superior control system as. well as the individual ubsyGtems and elements of the systems being designed. It is essential to consider a multiplicity of Interrelated factors. Consequently, even the first step of ana1yi pre— supposes an integrated and if poesible visual notion of the problem arid the system ite1f, if, schematization and within acceptable limitn, 1so simplification. The aggregate of the designated operations is achieved using mode1 which in the form of a description, block diagram or scenario reproduce the system on various levels arid in different aspects, and interrelate the goals of the system, the mearm of achieving them, the external conditions for the functioning of the syste’ and the expenditures on It development. Secondly, mode1 a1o operate as a direct implement or instrument of’ anr3,y— 1s itself. As is knoirri, a model can be developed and detailed. From informative, qualitative and schernaticized descriptions of t) system as a whole it is possible to move on to a strictly formal, quantitative na1y— sis of individual subsystems, e1ennts, and processes of the troop control system. Models in the forms of tables, schedules, control systems and algorithms open up the way to solving problems using mathematics. Thirdly, in all the intermediate stages as well as at the end of the entire ASTJV research and development process, node1s are a necessary means for checking the resultz of testing of both the individual, elements as well the entire ytern as a whole. At the sai,’ time, the mode1 (in the given intancc it i a quet1on ot physical models) provide additional data for poG1nI new tasks aimed at the further development and improvement or the ASUV. The nccei1ty of using models for the purposes of optimizing control and etab1Ithin th decisions taken is caused by these same cir— cumtances. The basic aim of optimization is to em’ure the elaboration of riot only n correct but iLo the most effective decision or effective plan making it poib1c to carry out a combat mission in the best nianner, that is, within the r;hortezt time and with the least expenditures of forces ;1] Ji ii i1 l l . i. TITZ1. ii iT ....i’ 1iTi....i.i . ii ..t.vAiIiIIJi1 liTiTi1 IiTiTi IiTiTiT;0] 105 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 III IAI• I’ ii”r IA?. i:; ONI,Y ;1] 1 •1 . — ii • iii ir v .i.I t.3’ITIM. liTiTiHiTiT.. E1TiTiT’;0] and For thi: it i inioentlai, on the one hand, to evaluate the varint1onJ o th 4e:1or’’, ‘rn mthemtica1 methods, and on the other, when iioiih1r to r’i1””$ trr n prritminrv prctic1 test. Hovever, the p1i4v ‘,f tl ittiat1on and the miion to be car— rifld mit, t’ t’ty r 1’titiy cbarateriRtic of combat prevent the direct app1iatir ,f quntittive inethod, The need ario for such qnticipt1m oprrt1on a th hmatition of the object, a precise and if poib1e v1iiuI ørphic r rnithematica1 logic depiction of it, the formalization of the very problem, the defining of the criterion of ef— fectivene, the parmeters inf1uncing thi8 criterion, the basic con jtrint, nd so f’orth. All of this requires the constructing and examination of the corresponding models of combat. It is desirable t tgL th ),jc irnr1tion of the decision and the p1n by practice. wecr, 1iir c’rnpai’in ftncl e1ect1on in the course of combat itself are virtually impoLsible. Thiø circumstance also forces one to follow the path of nodeling and to carry out the corresponding foris of a model experiment. But wuit objects (proceeB) hou1d be modeled in cclv— Ing the pr’b1em of titomatng and optimizing troop c’ntro1 and what are the poLbi1ities for constructing their models? The very aim or automation which is to increase the efficiency or troop control by having technical devices carry out the mo8t labor intensive operations in the control proess which require great ime expe1itures indicatcs the basic objects of modeling. These are the operations of the eontrol process, that is, the specific and primarily mental actiorn of people (colTunanders, offlcers or control bodies) related to the vognition and reflection of the combat. situation, the elaborating of a decision 8nd. the p1enning of combat. U1titnate,y in solving this probLem, the organs of perception and the brain, the organs of npeech and hizan hands in one way or another become the object3 of the modeling. Since a’nong th control cperations the most important are the working out and optimizing of a decision which presuppose an ev1uation of the situation and deteritdning the methods of action in it, to this degree (both within the line of automation and independently of it), the most important objects of niodellng are the combat situation, the course of combat, and the processes related to their preparation, execution and support. If it is a question o just scientific research on the designated objects or an understanding of the enera1, esentia1 or natural in them, then their re1atIonthip with the cr,rrespondin models appears as follows. The objct of mdeling Is tre alreadj existing reality or the original prototype; the model is .n n:ialogue secondary in relationship to it, a mental or material depiction, or a reproduction of the prototype for the purpose of understandinç certain unknovn characteristico of it. But when research Is combined with cre9tivity, with the designing of new objevt and the reprodtion oC processes or with the p1nning of own 106 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-OO85oR000l 00010006-3 PPflVFfl FflR RFI FASF Thiircdai, iiin IR flfl FOR OFPIC tAT, 1JI ()NI,Y actions, then the re1ationhip of “original—-model” becomes more complex. Not only exiGting but aTho ruture reality i the object of modeling, and thio, in ouropinion, could be defined a the original teleotype (from the Greek ‘te1eos”——reu1t, concIuion or aim) which embodies the goal of creative activity (the designed technical device or the planned course of combat). In relation to uQh an object, the model opernte an the prototype making it poib1e to forecast it char&cteriztics, to optimize them or control them. However the primacy of such mode1 in re1ationhip to the original iB a relative one. A model is an intermediary between two types of originals. In reproducing the most esentia1 or typical features of a certain o1as of known phenomena (prototypes), it anticipates the creation or a certain new variety ot this c1as of phenomena (the teleotype). Mere the model whi depicts the prototype an the model which is the prototype of thE teleotype can not only coincide but also differ. Most often the inter— medhry is the series of models which in a varying way combine the features of th depicted and de8igned phenomena. Moreover, through a series of transfc.rinations they approach the original teieotype and in individual instances change into it as n the working model of the prototype original. The prototype original has the primary determining influence on the formation of the model. It acts as its objective prerequisite. A model should tirBt of all embody information on the previously existing (presently existing) objects and processes, and serve as a mens for broadening knowledge about them. Only on this basis can the model also embody the traits of the original te1eotrpe. The latter has a formative influence on the model, as a goal to which the model should strive, and as an image of de— sired future reality. In the process of’ automating troop control, the necessity arises of the multistage modeling of future technical devices which should carry out certain operations of the control cycle. For this it is essential first of all to consider and embody in the models the traits of real control operations and the activities of people carrying out the designated operations. Among the basic operations of the control cycle one could put: 1) The collection and seeking out f nitiai. and monitoring information on the elements of a combat situation and the processes of its change; 2) The transforming of the information into a form suitable for transmis— sion and rece1vin over communications channels, for its storage and use; 3) Transmission, receiving, storage and the putting out of initial, command and control information on th changes in the combat situation; 14) The visual display of this infornation in a written, graphic, physical or symbolic form; 107 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 I fl1 A !OF ())1” J.(: I A (I ONI.? ;1] - J :TikYJ •Ji1. . — 1i i ____________________________ V;0] 5) Ana1ysi, genera1iation nd evaluation of the information (an evaluation of the situation) using qimlitative and quantitative methods; 6) The .‘or .‘ilating Qf a r.an of action, hypothetical variations of actions in the exitin situtttion, ‘nd their visual displny; 7) A1ialysis nd eornparin ol’ these variations, the forecasting or their efficiency, end the carrying out of operational and tactical calculation; 8) The taking of the firtal decision and the detailed planning of combat; 9) The execution of conro1 twtion9, thee supervision of their fulfillm.nt, and the correcting ot’ the taRen decision and plan of action. What are the possibii1tic for niodeling such processes? Analysis indicates that in trns oL t.iie cbat.ci.er nd Ur’e of complexity, these processes can be divided at least into three groups. The processez of the first group do not have a specifically mental character. They t.re subordinate to physic1 laws which are common to axiy informational process. For exaniple, these are the receiving and collecting of information, the receiving and transmitting of it over conununications channels, and in part its transformation in the form of coding, decoding and a visual display in a sign or symbolic form. majority of these processes can be modeled and is technically embodied in the work of the corresponding devices, including: Information sources, photographic and movie equipment, meArn of communications, coding, copying and display systems. The third group of processes includes thinking operations which express mainly a formal logical, machine—like aspect of it. These include: Comparison, generalization, the transformation of information according to trict1y determined formal rules; the 3olving of logical and computational prob1em, operational—tactical calculations needed for evaluating the situation ‘md decision taking. The models of such operations are created in the form o algorithms and programs for solving the corresponding problems, and are technically embodied in the work of universal computers using these programs. The modeling of tormolcq,ical operations is being developed and Is becoming more and more coztilet and diverse along with the improving of computers, machine languages and the programming equipment and methods. The third group of processes is related to the area of th higher abilities of thought, to its heuristic and creative acts. These processes are determined by the 1aw of not Just logic but also psychology of thought and the 1aw of heuristics. Among these processes are: The very evaluation of the situation, the forming of the plan of actions, the taking of the decision and the planning of actions, and the correcting of the taken de— ciion In the course of combat. These are ineparab1y linked with conceptual perception of reality, to the work of memory and imagination, to intuition and to constructive—creative, product!e thinking. The po.si— bi1itie of modeling such processes a1.o determine the possibiliticz 108 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (degree or completeness) of automating control ictivities. At the same time, the modeling oil precie1y these processes is of particular interest for phi1osophr, since it touchc upon the question of the essence and functions of conscience. The final solution to the problem of creating working models for the higher functions of conscience i possible only in the course of attempts to solve it. and in the process of disco’ering the laws for the functioning of the brain and the constructing oP ever more complex models oi it. The complexity of the full modeling of the higher functions of conscience requires the conBtruction of their partial models and the reproduction, for example, of the heuristic abilities of thinking and the process of creativity in its various manifestations. Such models are being crested and it is even possible to speak or certain advances on this level. For example, in automating certain processes of control activity, the necessity arises of modeling the image perception of information and the identification of images. On].y under this condition can a machine isolate information directly from the tables or diagrams proposed to it or from written and oral speech. As it has been leacned, it is not only difficult but in a number of instances still impossible to teach a machine to recognize an object from different distances and aspects, to distinguish one printed or handwritten sign from another, or to determine the meaning of a word placed in differing context. Even here the heuristic, creative possibilities of thought are apparent. Nevertheless the models for the partial solution to such problems at present have been created and the possibilities of improving them are gradually becoming apparent. Image recognition and many other mental problems are detcrmined by the specific features of the human memory. For example, the retrieval and reproduction of required information by ordinary computer programs are done by the method of running through all the memory cells until the needed information is retrieved. At the same time, man dees this work different1, more economically, considering the semantic relationships between the elements of know1ede, and utilizing the associations of perception and heuristic methods for retrieving the information. Ultimately both image perception and memory are aspects of a single process of’ creative thoup,ht. In line with the necessity of automating the labor intensive preliminary work of eva1uotin the situation and working out a decision, the task ha3 been raised of modeling the process of situation eva1ution, forocatin t’e changes in the situation, working out varia-. tionr of deci1ons, their comparison and the determining of the optimum. The procesze3 of creativity and the heuristic search for the best solution i a problem rituation are now the subject of study of both gnceo1ogy, psycho1or, logic and cybernetics. A promising area of research has appeared: heuristics and heuristic pregraiiviing. Game theory methods, the nethods of the theory of decision taking and deductive heur1tics are being worked out and employed for research and modeling creative th1nkin. 109 FOR OFFTCIAL UE ONLY .IED FOR.. ihursday, June 18, 2. 1D DI FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - flDC - - - ;1] !1 J J löXh. -— . . — — _r.i Ti • rTl ,IiT ii .1iT.vsjTiM.1.. ..iiii iiTiTi iiiii...________________________;0] In line with automation and independently- of it (since the necessity arises of optimizing decisions taken by the ordinary method), important objects of modeling are: 1) The combat situation arid the change in t (the course of combat); 2) The ideas and plans of the sides underlying the existing combat situation and its possible future changes. Their models, in embodying the typical traits of combat or an operation at the present historical stage of their development and the specific characteristics of the existing combat situation (the prototype original), make it possible to look ahead, to evaluate and in a certain sense determine the possible course of future combat (the teleotype original). Since it is a question of modeling material and physical processes, this can be more diverse and less complicated to carry out at least in its individual varieties. Certain forms for the models of these processes were used at the dawn of the development of military art. Since the conscious E.ctions of people and the control activities of the enemies are organically incorporated in these processes, their correct and sufficiently complete embodiment in the technical models encounters the same difficulties as in modeling mental control activity itself. What types of models could be used in solving the problems of automation and in the interests of optimizing control? For answering this question it is essential to describe the basic types of models used in scientific research and to classify them. As is known, the most important functions of models are related to the obtaining and use of information. For this reason, as the basis of classification it is possible to propose, in the first place, the dif— ferencé in the content and nature of information on the original, and secondly, the diversity- of forms in which this information is represented in the model. The first basis makes it possible to establish primarily the substrative, structural and functional models. Substrative models must reproduce the material of the original, and provide knowledge on its particular features and properties. Thus, the plasma obtained under laboratory conditions can serve as a model in studying the properties of stellar matter. However, in a pure form this type of model is rarely used. It least discloses the specific fes.tures of the modeling method. Structural models reproduce not the material of the original but rather its structure. Typical examples of structural models are diverse mockups, topographic maps, diagrams, and so forth. They can be made from any material or constructed on paper, but without fail they should fix the inner or external form of the original, and the aggregate of relationships between its element. A functional model should reproduce the actions or behavior of the original, that is, its functions. Thus, while models of the first and 110 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY second types can be sttic, the latter must be working models (for example, computer—realized models). Modeling practices Indicate that the designated types of mo2e1s, as a rule, are employed in various combinations. This makes it possible to ditingu1sh between: a) Models of a unidimensiorial analogy, when the substratum, structure or functions of the original are reproduced individually; b) models of a two-dimensional ana1or making it possible to create substrative—structural, substrative—functional or structural— ftnctlonal models; c) models of multidimensional or complete analogy which reproduce simultaneously both the substratum, the structure and functions with more or less completenes3 and detail. A classification by form in which the information of the original is embodied in a model presupposes two basic types of models: physical and mental or symbolic. These two trunks produce iot only a multiplicity of branches but also show a tendency toward a certain intertwining or interpenetration. This is observed particularly clearly in modeling using universal computers. Physical models are divided into natural models which are true, natural objects and processes perrorrning the role of models because they operate as typical examples of a certain class of phenomenai seminatural models which combine natural and artificially created elements, for example, experimental troop exercises, research militarr games, and so forth); artificial, technical models represented b3r physically and geometrically similar devices, by electric equivalent circuits and by analogue end digital computers. Conceptual. or symbolic models include two basic varieties: the descriptive logical models which are an aggregate of visual ideas, concepts and Judients from which a generalized, schematic or hypothetical image of the studied object is formed (the given ima€e can be objectified in the form of a description, drawing, diagram, map nd so forth) and the uiathematica]. logical models which are a further development of the descriptive logical ones. These, as a rule, are formular dependences, systems or equations, and diagrams reflecting not only the qualitative but also the quantitative aspect of the examined processes. These would include also the algorithms and programs by which the physical and conceptual processes are reproduced on computers. Cybernetics has given rise to and actively uses a special form of modeling, the cybernetic models which embody certain traits of the above— mentioned types of models. A general description of cybernetic modeling has been given in the works of the founders of cybernetics N. Wiener and W. R. Ashby. It has also been developed in the works of the Soviet scientists V. M. Glushkov, A. I. Berg, I. B. Novik and others. ft A fl ;1] _,__J•1Vi1•1L. ;0] 111 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ADOD DI APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 1 r. fl. A flP ONLY ;1] - J J .iVA . — . F i...i .rni.i IiTitoi i .Jil 3. IM;ffl.liTiTih nhi!iLhTiJn;0] When cybernetic mcdi.i ng is established as a particular form, then in some instances tho acort in puts on the nature of the reproduced processes, and in others, on the ‘, i:’Iio it :‘Je1ir. Obviously, in the given instance i lo 1i;enia to om;der both these aspects equally. Cybernetic modeling is employed primarily frr reproducing “large systems,” arid particu11y conto1 Lh ç.ca1 iitributes for them: Complexity, dynamicneia, rolative tabi1ity, purpoefu1ness of functioning, and the presence of an information procesa, direct links and feedback between the subysterns. At the same time, cybernetic modeling is a speciel method for reproducing the above—named ystem. Cybernetics as far as is possible bitracts itself from the substratum of the modeling Bystems and within the limits of the necesery and possible reproduces their structure, but pays basic attention to the functions, in endeavorini to repro1uce in the models the behavior of th system (outputE) depercting upon the various effects on it (inputs). Predominantly a functional approach is one of the specific characteristics of cybernetic nxdeling. Cybernetics ue various types of physical and conceptual, symbolic modeling, but the specific features of its approach are most of all apparenc In the creating of artificial, technical models, that is, cybernetic devices, and particularly electronic conputers by which the f’unct ions of living or social systems are reproduced. Finally, cybernetic modeling is mainly information modeling which includes a strict description of the studied systems, the construction of algorithms and progrnms, and the processing of information on the studied object3 (processes) using these programs and a computer. In processing information on the original using the laws of its functioning, a computer within certain limits is likened to the original, and in informa-. tional terms reproduces its functions and the results of functioning. A general description of cybernetic modeling makes it posaible to assert that precisely the given form of modeling should play the decisive role in the automation and optimization of troop control. In actuality, it is impossible and even abrurd to copy the physical substratum of the human brain and sense organs which carry out control actions. There is also no zed to have an obligatory structural similarity of the technical devices to the organs of the hwnan body or the staff departments. Of significance primarily is the reproduction of control functions and various operations related to information processing; the creation of technical devices capaole of achieving in the process of functioning the seine results as could be achieved by a man solving control problems. Here, naturally, a major role s played by modeling in its information form. Its essence is that the individual functions of people engaged in a control system are described in ever greater detail, they are sub-. jected to formalization, they are broken down into their component elements, into the elements of these elements and so forth, that is, they 112 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY are transformed into an algorithm, into a program of consecutive actions. These programs also form the “soul” of a cybernetic device and a universal computer. The operation of’ a computer using such a program represents the infoñlatlon modeling of the corresponding human functions. tn this manner the automation of the latter is carried out. The automation of troop control is a complicated and many-sided process. In its various stages all or many of the above-mentioned varieties of modeling viii be employed. Within systems analysis this notion operates a compulsory demand. In modern 1ierature it has been noted that the elaboration of complicated systems assumes: 1) The determining of the goals which should be achieved by the given system and which determine the sense of its functioning; 2) The defining of alternatives (variations) by which the proposed goals can be attained; 3) The determining of the criterion by which the alternative variations are compared and one of then is selected; It) The determining of the resources (means and expenditures) necessary for creating and using one or another variation of the system; 5) The constructing of a model which schematicall3r depicts the given system which links the goals, the alternatives and the resources together. The designated elements are the initial reference points in systems analysis. From the list of then it can be seen that modeling acts as a necessary and fundamental operation. If the essence of this operation is brought out more widely and in greater detail, it can be seen that actually it consists of a number of operations: the consistent construction of the 1Kde1s with the differing volume of an information content. In the process of solving the problems of automation, it is essential first of all to construct an initial conceptual model, that is, to elucidate and generalize the existing scientific notions on such systems, and to elaborate a viewpoint on their essence, on the laws of their construction and functioning, and on the possible ways for their elaboration and use. Then the necessity arises for models of a higher level and for a schemati— cized information which characterizes the goals and means, the structure and functions of si broader, more complicated system. Such a model makes it possible to ccrrect1y determine the place and role in it of the investigated and planned system, and to express its goals and functions more accurately. ;1] _.1JI•1Ti _____ I ________________________;0] 113 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I’ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 r KOk OlV t(; I Al, U4l ONLY ;1] I.i1 I!]__..._._.___ m1I1:IiriTiIjTjfj1IjriIT;0] The next step is the constructing of middle—level models which would reflect the alternative varintions of the very examined system and its basic general cha’ateristies (erficiency, cost, dynamicness, reliability, and so forth). On this level it is important to work out the parametric models which determine the haic indicators of the system and which direct the collecti.on arid prccsbing of the necessary factual data. Pinally, the transition to more concrete and detailed research requires the constructing of inferior—level submodels which reproduce the individual subsystems and elements, their structures and functions, their place and role in the designed system. If one encompasses not only the theoretical but also the empirical level and considers all the stages in the development of automated control systems, then the role and diversity of the employed models becomes even more amazing. In foreign sources, four basic stages have been established in the elaboration of any ASU: Scientific research in a broad and special area, the designing of the system, its constructing, and, finally, production, testing and adjustment of the system. All the known types of models are employed in the stage of wide area scientific research. The main thing here is a precise positing of the problems, an elucidation of the conditions and the ways for solving them. Understandably, this requires first of all a constructing and analysis of conceptual and symbolic models. Here not only the existing scientific information on the modeled object is employed, but also intuitive guesses, analogies and hypotheses. The constructing of such models makes it pobsible to clarify and systematize the information on the object, to disclose gaps in the knowledge about it and to a certain degree fill them, and at the same time, to recognize the degree of complexity of the problem and the possible ways for solving it. The elaboration and detailing of these models make it possible to move on to a mathematical logical modeling of individual elements and operations. In the stage of special scientific research, and particularly in the stage of designing a specific system, mathematical logical modeling assumes decisive significance. A strict mathematical description of the individual processes in the form of systems of equations, matrices and schedules makes it possible to clarify and optimize the indicators of both the individual assemblies and processes as well as the device or system as a whole. At the same time, in the designing stage physical modeling is also used in addition to the creation and testing of physically similar, physically analogous and particularly cybernetic models realized on universal computers. In the stage of constructing automatic devices, physical, technical and particularly cybernetic modeling assumes the basic weight. Here begins the material embodiment of the design. Naturally, some of its ideas which may seem correct on the level of theoretical development may be in conflict with practice and for this reason require checking out and llI FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY D APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR O’P IC I Al, IISK ()NI.Y correction. The modeling on analogue and digital computers makes itposible to clarify many specifications, and to test out intermediate results viti’ibut waiting for the completion of construction. It is essential to pØnt out one particular feature of a universal computer. The problem is that within its intrinsic structure it is possible to create and test an information model of any other technical device, including another computer. Such a possibility is of exceptional significance since in tIe process of automation the crucial role is played by the elaboration of different specialized informational, logical and computational devices Finally, in the stage of production, testing and adjustment,. the technical embodiment of the design in life occurs. The modeling process ends with the creation of a technically working model, an example of the designed device. The testing and adjustment of the example in turn are related to the use of certain varieties of physical modeling. For example, the model can replace an object with which the developed sample directly interacts or a system of which it is a part as a component element, and it may also replace the medium and conditions in which it functions. Such a model or semimodel experiment with a sample can be carried out in the form of stand testing, testing on analogue and digital computers, and, finally, in the form of military games and military exercises through which combat and the real conditions for the functioning of the created devices are modeled. In solving the problems of optimizing control, the same varieties of models are employed, but in specific forms and in an unique sequence. The constructing of a conceptual model (a model concept) of a combat situation or the course of combat is the a tart of optimizing a combat decision and its initial condition. In the early stages of the development of military art, the constructing of such conceptual models and their playing out in one’s mind was generi1y the sole means for determining the suitable method of action. However, with the development of military art, the use of such models with intuitive evaluations of possibilities became insu:’ficient. For this reason more complex forms arose for modeling combat as well as special procedures for optimizing decisions. On the basis of the primary model concept, it is possible to construct a symbolic or graphic model of the existing situation and a plan of actions in it. In the leth and 19th centuries, such models were constructed in the form of the disposition of the engagement. Later on these were replaced by a working map with the situation and variation of decision, a diagram or schedule with the accompanying descriptions. These made it possible for an experienced commander or staff to make a quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the decision variation and when necessary to correct it. However, an evaluation of a decision variation on the basis of a symbolic or graphic model was incomplete and to a very limited degree permitted the use of mathematics. For this reason, the staffs resorted, on the one hand, to military games, and on the other, to pecia1 mathematical logical models making it possible to widaly use the mathematical methods of operations research. 115 ;1] ! _J .1 1ö1!A .u i1 .i . i mir i.LiIiV,i ,1ii .t.viIiII..1i1 liTiIiHiIiIi ,iiTiT__________________________;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 r,,—. IAI F’OR OPFICIAL USE ONLY Game models are the physical, seminatural reproduction of combat, an operation or any conflict situation generally. These include: troop exercises and maneuvers, headquarters exercises, and military games on maps. Troop exercises and maneuvers are too complex and cumbersome a method for optimizing decisions and planning in the course of combat. In this regard, headquarters exercises and particularly military games on maps possess significantly greater opportunities under the conditions of organizing them on a modern scientific and technical basis. In literature it is possible to encounter many examples of using military games on maps precisely for the purpose of optimizing decisions and planning combat. Mar SU G. K. Zhukov described a military strategic game conducted for these purposes at the end of l91O, and as a whole highly praised the role of military games in raising the operational— strategic level of the superior command.3 In the U.S. military literature examples are given of the strategic games held in the autumn of 19141 by Japan for the purpost of working out the plan for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The effectiveness of these games was affirmed by the subsequent course of action. Along with the game modeling of the course of combat for the purposes of optimizing decisions and planning, ever greater significance is being assumed by the constructing and analysis of mathematical logical models using operations research methods. As was already pointed out, a graphic or symbolic model of a combat situation creates the necessary prerequisites for operational and tactical calculations. However, for a more complete and thorough application of mathematics, different models are needed which schematically depict certain traits of the most characteristic situations which are repeated in different combat. For example, in many instances it is essential to solve the problem of locating and detecting the enemy, the allocating of targets among weapons, the attacking of the enemy in a certain order and sequence, the choice of a method of action considering the ener’s counteractions, and so forth. The conunonness and similarity of such ‘ituations and tasks make it possible to construct abstract standard ‘odels which reproduce entire classes of events, and to rk out the mathmatica]. apparatus corresponding to these models. In Sov&et and foreign literature, several score such models have been described and the mathematical methods of their analysis given. Among the mathematical logical models, one must isolate two varieties which are of fundamental difference: analytical and stochastic models. The former are mathematical descriptions of reality (systems of equations, matrices and so forth) which are examined by theoretical analysis and the necessary calculations. The latter are a logical copy of game models. These are logical descriptions of studied situations with their subsequent playing through using the method of statistical testing. Both varieties of models complement one another and are often employed in different combinations. ;1] i .J :i1I .. iT .1 — 1TFI7. hV.1 iii i.’JiTiLiI V .1iT.vTiTf.1iT7iTiTii IITIII1IITIIIT I I;0] ii6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-u0850R000100010006..3 PROVEfl FOR RELEASE: Thiircdiv Jiinc IR 2flflg: CIA-RflPR2-flflR5flRflflfl1AAfl1flOflR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The improving of seminatural game modeling, on the one hand, and the mathematical logical of the mentioned varieties, on the other, makes it possib1e to approach t. nolution to the problem of the complete modeling of combat on electronic computers. The computers open up the way to constructing and examining analytical models of high complexity. With them it is possible to realize statistical models which rather complete3.y reflect reality, and here to play through each of the variations of a decision in as many times as is needed for obtaining reliable statistical estimates. Finally, the computers open up the way to an organic synthesis of analytical and stochastic modeling, to reproducing combat in its dynamics, and this, in turn, makes it possible to prepare the quantitative grounds for taking a decision in a time acceptable under the conditions of modern high—speed confbst. Thus, the basic stagei in the development and use of models in the interests of optimizing a decision and automating this process are: The forming of intuitive model concepts on a combat situation and its changes; the constructing and analysis of formalized graphic or symbolic models; the carrying out on their basis of seniinatural, game and special mathematical logical models; on the basis of synthesizing these procedures, the elaboration of progrnms for modeling combat in its dynamics using a computer. In any modeling it is important to solve the question of the advisable completeness of the model, the level of its complexity, and the degree of its conformity to the original. Two trends can be observed in the solving of such a complicated question. One is in the desire to bring the model as close as possible to reality, to consider in it as many factors as possible which characterize the process. However, this can lead to undesirable results, such as: the main patterns are lost behind the random form of their manifestation; the approximateness or probability nature of the estimates of many factors lead to an ambiguity of the overall result. The other trend is in the maximum simplification of the model, and this facilitates the applicatioii of the mathematical apparatus to it and the obtaining of sufficiently definite conclusions. But at times this path leads to negative phenomena such as the accepted assumptions on a certain level begin to distort the wry essence of the examined phenomenon or the nature of the patterns operating in it. For this reason the choice of the necessary degree of approximation of the phenomenon and the advisable complexity of a model requires a concrete approach, special methodological analysis and certain experience in solving such problems. The development of modern forms of modeling and the ever fuller use of mathematical methods for describing the crucial aspects and characteristics of examined phenomena is impossible without their formalization. In essence, such a necessary stage of any modeling has the constructing of conceptual, symbolic or graphic models of an object already represents the process and result of formalization. In this regard there must be more profound analysis ot the method of formalization generally, and 117 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 II IACI FoR OFVTCtAL uSE ONLY particular attention paict to the potential and real possibilities of formalizing the procesei of armed combat and the controlling activities of commanders. 2. The Necessity and Posibi1ity of Mathematical Logical Formalization of the Troop Control ircss The optimization and full automation of a control process make it possible to bring the troop control system into accord with the increased demands upon the spe’d and accuracy of its functioning. At present fundamental rise in the productivity of the command labor of a commander and staff officers is being cqrried out precisely on basis of the extensive use of modern technical devices and mathematical methods. However neither the optimization nor the au+omation of control processes is possible outside their mathematical logical formalization. The opportunities of optimization and autoniatin are decermined by the broad use of mathematical logi— ccii methods and by the degree of formalization in the corresponding areas. The questions of the mathematia1 logical f’orma1izior and the use of’ mathematical logical methods for describing the processes of armed combat and troop control have been widely taken up in our military theoretical literature. What has caused such a broad penetr&.,ion of mathematical logical methods into the sphere of troop control? What is the tie between automating the control process and its mathematical logical formalization? Under present-day conditions, one of the most essential features of troop control is the circulation of an enormous flow of information in the system, and this flow is constantly rising because of the increase in the scope of the operations conducted, the rise in the pace of armed combat and the use of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, under the conditions of the extreme high speed of combat, the process of the rapid aging of information occurs. Hence the need arises of a rational organization for the flows of information, for reducing the time spent on its collection, receiving, transmission, display and processing, an increase in the accuracy of processing, the excluding of possible errors as a consequence of random or organized interference, and so torth. These demands can be formulated more precisely as problems of synthesizing the systems of information processing, coding and decoding, the providing of the greatest throughput capacity of the communications channels, the finding of an optimum number of these channels for each specific control system, and finally, providing the necessary resistance to jamming in the system. The correct solution to the designated problern.s is possible only on the basis of the extensive use of quantitative methods which have been worked within information theory and are e2cpressed in a whole series of mathematical concepts and strictly proven theorems. Their practical ue understands a simultaneous formalization of the descriptive relations of the corresponding area, or more accurately the very proce ;1] J .1 — ... ii,i . rt,i.u ii rt.i.rJTit, ,±.1Ii_±J., iii .1i]:liTiT,iuif,H,J,J,r;0] 118 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY of applying the8e method expresses one of the poiiib1e forms of mathematical lo€ical formalization. However, he une of mathematical methods for the purpose of finding the optimum values for parainter of data collection, procenning and trans— mlnnlon ystem ii far from limited to the aret of their une in the troop control procea. The central operation of control generally and the basis of troop control, in particular, ii the taking of a decision. While an optimum choice, the prompt tranmision and efficient recoding of information play an important role in increftsing the accuracy and reducing the time of the complete control cycle, of even greater significancc i the ue of 4hiB information for the purpose of’ optimizing the very decision to be taken by the conrander. It is tilvays desirable that the corn— rnander’ decision be an optimum one in relation to the specific conditions and requirements of the combat situation. In what manner can one be convinced that a decision taken i an optimum one? Certainly in the same situation different decis4ons could be formu— lated and the per8on who has made them is confident that precisely hi variation i the optimum one. Moreover, each person points to definite reasons for the choice made and gives the corresponding line of argument on its behalf. Certainly, under the conditions of the sharp complicating of’ the troop control process, the greater reponsibi11ty for the decision tnken and the shortening of time for making it, such traditional bases an collective and personal experience, intuition, and logical arguments, while being esentia1 as before, are no longer BUfficient. In this situation, along with a qualitative evaluation of the posib1e plans of action, quartitative eAtimates also assume decisive 1gniticance. Although attempts at obtaining quantitative estimates for basing q deciaion occurred in the past, however the truly broad and 8ufficiently effective use of mathematical logical methods for this purpose have beer, related to the present—day revolution it military affairs. This has been brought about by the development of military science an a whole, by the high level of elaboration for the corresponding formal apparatus, and by the objective denands of’ troop control practice. At present one clearly feels the very close tie between control, optimization and autorration, on the one hand, and mathematical logi’:al tormalization, on the other. In a certain sense the aim of control consists in optimizing the process. At the same time, optimization can be carried out only by a quantitative comparison of different,. control variations, and this, in turn, requires the most complete formalization posib1e. Certainly for solving the problezn by quantitative rnethodz, its conditions must be expressed in the 1anguae of mathe— riatics, that 1r, formalized. Thus, the problem3 of optimizing the data processing and decision taking processes determine the broad use of formal mathematical logical methods. ;1] 1 J J :I.1i •i . .i • i1TF1iv [H1T v .1.1 .vTi)ui . iIi!iHiIiTi IiTiT,i c _________________________;0] 119 FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 (1R WPTCIAI. II.’I ONt’? Mathematical J.ogical fornalization Is closely tied not only to optimization, hut l’3 t1it iit’1or1 of’ cont’i, Understandably, definite difficulties of a theoretical, technical and practical naturc’ nr1n’ i’n i-hp rr1h of iitomqtin the individual elements of troop controi nntt pri-.!citlarIy l’ui.l automation. However, with other conditions being equal, it is possible to automate only those control operations which at the given moment permit formalization and can be described by logical aM mathematical means. The functioning of any automated control system requires a definite mathematical logical do— ecription, algorithm and program, that in, a system of formal rules the fulfillment of which mnke it possible to solve the problem without elucidating its content. For thin reason, the possibilities of automating the troop control pror’s t ‘ach specific stage are determined ultimately by the nuccesr’ 1r thn f 14a’rn of one or another of its component parts. It ee.n be saId that the degree and depth of automating control are directly determined by the development level of the mathematical description of the processes of armed combat. At the some time, the tendency toward forr1 t4ir h’is been substantially strengthened precisely because of the development of’ automation which creates the prerequisites for the extensive use of’ mathematical methods for solving control problems, it presupposes their development and is based on them. All of this points to the necessity of introducing mathematical logical meth3ds into the theory and practice of the troop control process for the purpose of its optimization and automation. As for the possibility of such an introduction, its realization requires the presence of a number of conditions. Widely known are the remarkable words of’ K. Marx that science will reach perfection when it succeeds in using mathematics. At the same time, science can use mathematics only when it reaches a certain perfection, when it penetrates deeply into its own subject, when it isolates and fixes the fundamental relationships and ties of the studied phenomena, and creates a sufficiently clear and developed conceptual apparatus. In linking the possibility of the mathematization with the approximation of the corresponding science to simple, uniform elements of matter, V. I. Lenin, for example, pointed out: “The unity of nature is disclosed in the ‘striking analog’ of differential equations...” and further: “the uniformity of matter’ is not a postulate but rather the result of the experience and development of’ science and the ‘unformity of the object of physics’ this is the condition for the applicability of measurements and mathematical calculations.”6 Accuracy and the greatest possible uniformity of definitions, the aggregate of which makes it possible with sufficient fullness to express the content of concepts and terms, are indispensable conditions for mathematical processing. 120 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FC hursday, June CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 C FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY “Naturally,” writes the German Marxint phi1oopher 0. Klaus on thiu quetion, “mathematics can be ftpplied in a certain area of science only in the instance that the posings of the problems and the ytems of concepts in this area of ience have been formulated no clearly an to allow mathematical proceaing. A representative of a specific cience or a philosopher who hao ti11 a very hazy notion of one or another subject and who clearly doe8 not know what he, in eoence, wants to say should not hope that this ntill undigested product of his thinking could be treated by the preciGe instrument of mathematic. And of course, he hou1d not criticize mathematic for the fact that in the given instance it cannot help him.”7 Conequent1y, the use of.mathematical logical methods in studying the Hphere of troop control is possible in the instance when this sphere itself has been sufficiently well studied and defined in the concepts and terms of the military science studying it. Soviet military science ever more profoundly and completely is examining the patterns of the processes of armed combat generally and troop control, in particular. At present a number of lays of military science nd principles of mi1itry art have been formulated. Essential ties have been disclosed between the course and outcome of a var and the economic, political, moral and other factors. Attempts have been made to consider chance in war. The basic provisions have been worked out for the theory for troop control. A profound informative analysis, strictness and accuracy in operational-tactical descriptions, and the development of the corresponding conceptual apparatus within the theory of control and military cybernetics make it pcssible to build that inforlnfttional foundation which is the basis for the use of mathematical logical methods. Another iiortant condition which determines the possibility of a mathematical description of the processes of armed combat and troop control is the presence of a corresponding formftl apparatus which is capable of depicting the studied descriptive ties in an adequate mathematical form. The rapid development and definite advances in social sciences generally and the various areas of military science and the theory of troop control in particular have placed new demands on the mathematical disciplines, and have demanded the improvement of the old formal apparatus and the creation of a new one capable of most fully reflecting the content and specifics of the corresponding areas in a mathematical logical form. However, regardless of certain advances in the area of mathematization, even now there are frequent arguments against the broad and systematic use of mathematical logical methods in the sciences which study the higher forms of the movement of matter. Doubts are voiced particularly often on the possibility of a mathematical logical formalization of processes occurring in the social sphere (this includes the area oi troop control). ;1] -‘ -‘ ii ii .i . . ii ..i.v,iit.ifii liIiIi1IiIflii iiTiIiT._________________________;0] 121 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 I _I___ •-- FOI f)IVICTAL tSI ONLY ;1] {J.1ö1Y1 .J’i1:1T — —---, ...LJIiTIri. i, ii i.IiTit Wi4 Irk. 1 II !IM1 :IiTiTiUiTT.. 1TiTiTh._____________________;0] Here it in ordinarily pointeJ out that the essence of mathematical logical formalization conninti in on uhtrnction from the content and qualitative specifics of the s1.idicd -iuhjects and phenomena. Supposedly only quantitative relationships and spatial forms of subjects, phenomena and processes can be studied in an .bstract mathematical logical form, while their essence remains undisclc’d. tn this regard, one must particularly point out the fact that the fundamental gnoseological possibilities of mathematical logical. forrnalizatior. are determined by such underlying postulates of dialectical materialism as the thesiof the unity of the world, the unity of quantity and quality, form and content, phenomenon and essence, and abstract and concrete. The broadening of the possibilities of a mathematical logical description, and consequently, the automating of the troop control process, as was already pointed out, is mrst closely tied to the extending of the boundaries of mathematics itself ann mathematical logic, and above all, to a change in the very subject of mathematics. Fundamental for an understanding of the essence of mathematics is the classical of its subject given at one time by F. Engels. “Pure mathematics,” wrote Engels, “has as its object the spatial forms and quantitative relationships of the real world....”8 However, the rapid development of mathematics over the last century makes it possible at present to say that its subject is not only the spatial forms and quantitative relationships, but also similar relationships, forms and structures taken in abstraction from their content. An analysis of the process of the enrichment of the content and the ever greater separation of the very concept of quantity and quantitative relationship in mathematics leads one to this conclusion. Modern mathematics is moving from relationships characteristic for numbers and amounts to any abstract relations between any conditional objects, to an abstract relation generally.9 In other words, any relations abstracted from content ore related to the area of quantity and quantitative relationships. The laws of the interconnection of’ relationships like the forms abstracted from content are characterized sufficiently adequately by abstract structures. Thus, we approach an understanding of modern mathematics as a science dealing with abstract structures and the laws of their functioning. From this directly follows the conclusion that the structures of the weapons and troop control systems and the laws of their functioning on a certain level of abstraction can be described sufficiently fully using one or another mathematical logical apparatus. Let us now turn to the characteristics of quality. In the most general sense, quality is the internal definiteness of a thing identical to its being. At the sources of theoretical cognition, quality acts as the primary, simplest and rather content.—poor logical expression of sensory experience. “Sensation is the foremost and most initial, and qualIty is inevitable in it...,” noted V. I. Lenin.10 122 FOR OFFtCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR (WFICIAI. 11H1 ONLY The attempt to concretize the concept of quality, that is, to move from quality generally to itudyin quality or qualities of a given thing for specific phenomenon presupposes an elucidation of a number of questions: What makes it possible for us to identify or distinguish these phenomena, what lies at the basis of their specifics, integrity or stability, and what makes it possible for a thing to act in a given quality? While at the initial stages of cognition quality acts in the form of an aggregate of sensorily perceived data, in then growing into an ordered system of essential properties, a further deepening of cognition leads to an understanding of quality as the integrated characteristics of a ting, phenomenon or process. But such characteristics can be given only with a sufficiently complete description of the internal order and external relationships of objects and phenomena. In others words, the qualitative definiteness of a given object is most completely disclosed in the characteristics of its organization, structure, internal and external relationships and ties. The category of quality precisely reflects the difference and similarity of corresponding structures. Consequently, a sufficiently complete and integral description of quality is impossible without using formal, quantitative methods, and without using the language of mathematics and mathematical logic as a science dealing with abstract structures. In this instance the mathematical logical methods not only make it possible for us to investigate the various structures of troop control systems, but also provide an opportunity to a definite degree of judging the quality of control, to evaluate this quality and improve it. Thus, any qualitative certainties with known conditions, with a certain degree of accuracy can be expressed in a mathematical form. At the basis of this possibility lies an objectively existing inseparable unity of quantity and quality. Mathematics and mathematical logic are the providers of the most diverse mathematical logical abstract structures for the various areas of natural and social sciences and theories, including for a number of areas of military science and troop control theory. However, for the sciences and theories which use formal methods, it is very important precisely what mathematical logical structures must be employed in each specific instance. Here one can no longer speak of any abstraction from quality. On.the contrary, the commonness or specificness of quantitative relationships is determined precisely by the commonness or specificness of the qualitative certainties or certain properties of the examined processes and phenomena. In other words, the isomorphicness of quantitative relation— ships is to some degree the result of the similarity of qualitative certainties. For example, the following fact is an unique reflection of the unity of quantity and quality: the mathematical apparatus which serves one area of knowledge well is in no way necessarily acceptable in another sphere. Previously mention was made of the necessity of working out and 123 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY ;1] i J J I•1VA IIiTi .i . i 1TIF1v iiiir i.’JiTiI gi .i if 4’AITIT1f ii hli i. iiTiTi IiTiTiT ______________________________;0] developing a mathematical logical apparatus which would adequately reflect the peeific patterns characteristic for the area of armed combat and troop control. An analogous conc1uion {s inevit&ble in analyzing the given problem in a iomewhat different aspect, and namely on a level of’ the unity of form and content. Being an aggregate of elements, objects and processes, content expresses ite1f in a certain specific form: an organization, system or structure. However, the broadening of the sphere of use of artificial languages has entailed a definite separation of the formal aspect of knowledge from its content aspect. As is known, the same mathematical logical structure can be a form for expressing a different content. It can be used for the adequate description of phenomena belonging to different areas of knowledge, and on the contrary, the same phenomena can be reflected by different abstract structures. Nevertheless, the abstraction from content is never absolute. In emphasizing this fact, Academician A. AJ.eksanclrov has written: “An indifference of pure forms to content merely means that they are encountered with a completely different content (in the same manner that the same formula can express the laws of phenomena which differ in their nature). But this in no var means that these forms always have an external or purely quantitative nature.”11 The presence, of content ultimately is manifested within any formalism. Any logical form is based on content and, in being constructed, returns to the area of content relationships. An abstracting from content occurs only in the process of constructing mathematical and mathematical logical systems. When necessary it is possible to operate with signs or symbols, without thinking of their sense, and considering only the preset rules for using them, that is, formally. But when the necessity- arises of interpreting a system of signs, it turns out that the relationships between them are a reflection of the ties between the content of the concepts, they operate as a mathematical logical form for the expression or these ties, and consequently, assume the sense of content. The place which the aggregate of signs occupy in one or another system, their relationships and ties reflect the content ties and relationsips of objects and phenomena, or more accurate1 their nienta.1 and sensory images. Thus, a study of symbol forms encompasses a definite area of content and specific aspects of content relationships. Since the particu— lar feature of formalization consists In elucidating and clarifying content by the elucidation and fixation of form, to this degree the thesis on the unity of form and content is a theoretical base for mathematical logical formalization. Thus, mathematical logical methods make it possible not only to examine quantitative relationships and forms of phenomena, but also to a. definite degree to express their content and qualitative specifics. 121k FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The cognition of quantitatively determined quality and the content forms of phenomena belonging to a certain actual area using mathematical logical methods provides an opportunity to isolate and study the essential links, relationships and patterns inherent to a given area. The mathematical logical form for expressing laws represents a necessary stage in the cognition of essence. Consequently, the indications of the narrowness of the sphere of using the methods of mathematical logical formalization are unconvincing. On the contrary, precisely the above—named general fundamental theses of dialectical materialism are the theoretical basis for very broad opportunities of using these methods as well as for their future development. In relying on this, it can be asserted that at a certain stage in the development of cognition, a number of areas of military science will be so thoroughly and soundly formalized as, for example, certain military technical disciplines presently are. In these areas and in military science as a whole new directions and scientific theories will arise and at the given stage they as yet will not be sufficiently widely used by mathematical logical methods. What has been said applies fully to the mathematical apparatus used for the optimization and automation of the troop control process. At present the corresponding apparatus is being intensely developed in such areas of mathematical disciplines as information theory, the theory of algorithms, game theory, queueing theory, linear and dynamic programming, and the theory of statistical decisions which are widely used within a single scientific direction, operations research theory. The use of the ideas in operations research theory foc the purpose of optimizing and automating the troop control process through a strict quantitative establishing of the taken decisions was a qualitatively new stage in the application of mathematical methods in military a’fairs. The theory of operations research acts as a concrete expression of the method of mathematical logical formalization for a specific sphere of cognition of purposeful and organizable processes, including primarily the process of troop control. It is concerned not so much with the elaboration of the mathematical methods for describing and optimizing the decision taking process, for these methocs are developed basically within the corresponding mathematical disciplines as it is with the question of using these methods in a specific situation. It is important to point out that within the application of operations research theory and decision taking theory which derives from it, in military affairs the entire complex of mathematical methods is developed considering the specific features of the processes of armed combat and troop control. 125 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, 1 00010006-3 FOR OFFICtAL USE ONLY The mass random phenomena of armed combat can be investigated and described ust.ng the mathe.c1 nppr’J; or probbi1ity theory and mathematical statistics. For ex!rnpis, probability theory is widely u8ed in evaluating the effectiveness of new types of weapons and weapon control systems, in solving the problems of ccntc1ii tactcal units, and so forth. The specifics of troop control in combat is most clearly manifested in the fact that the cleciston must be taken in situations when the eneur endeavors to disrupt our control system or to cause maximum damage to it. In such instances it is desirable to find and realize a model of actions which would leRd to the most favorable outcome for us. Here it is essential to consider the fact that the enemy will seek out the least favorable method of action for us. The described conflict situations can be evaluated quantitatively with the mathematical apparatus of game theory, and this makes it pr’- f!d the t’visable methods of controlling one’s forces and means on a basis of detailed consideration of the possible variations for the enenr response actions. Along with gene theory, for solving a whole series of specific control problems related to assessing the quality of the created systems and modeling combat, the rather fully elaborated mathematical apparatus of cjueueing theory can be successfully applied. The linear programming method is used for taking a decision wider conditions where the situation is known and the efficiency criterion represents a linear function of independent variables. This apparatus is most widely used in solving the problems of allocating targets, objectives, as well as one’s own forces and means. However the specific features of troop control require, as a rule, a detailed consideration of the continuously received additional data on the changing situation. In such instances control is optimized each time only for an immediate time interval, but in such a manner that at the concluding stage the greatest effect of obtained. Such problems are solved by the dynamic programming method. When a decision is taken under the conditions of a definite ambiguity and the random nature of the situation must be considered, statistical methods are used. At present the mathematical apparatus of information theory, the applied theory of algorithms, algorithmic and informational languages and so forth are assuming a particularly important role for formalizing the control process generally and troop control, in particular. Thus, the complexity of the ties and relationships disclosed and studied by military science and the necessity of optimizing and autcmating troo control processes have necessitated the use of mathematical logical methods. At the same time, the depth of penetration of military science (and in 126 FOR OFFICIAL US ONLY - - _LEASE: Thursday, June 18, -- J0100010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY particular, troop control theory) into it own opportunjr for iuch use, and the mathemat:Ict1 in being intensely developed even now rnakei it a certtn degree into a reality. subject creates a real logical apparatus which possible to turn this to Since the question of the possibilities, ways of development, basic directions and qéquence in realizing automation and optimization can be solved only in its relation to formalization, to this degree the disclosure of the essence and content of the very method of mathematical logical formalization assumes particularly important significance. The corresponding general methodological ana1yis win make it possible to correctly define the role and place of the method of mathemaitcal logical formalization in the process of optimizing and automating troop control. 3. Mathematical Logical Formalization as a Stage in the Optimizing and Automating of Troop Control The method of formalization was recognized as indepenlent and gained its most complete development within mathematics and mathematical logic. The formation and development of this method was also greatly developed by traditional formologic, and in our times, by theoretical cybernetics. The definite traits which are already characteristic for traditional form— ologic of a formal approach to investigating the forms of thought, in being developed and assuming an ever more apparent nature, grew up in relation to the rise and development of mathematical logic into an unique, specific and at first special method of research, the method of formaliza— tion. The further development of this method led to a situation where a rather complete and consistent formalization of entire areas of knowledge or sections of sciences b’came possible by constructing completely or partially formalized symbolic systems which operate with signs and symbols according to previously determined rules. In a most general form, formalization is a precise description of a studied phenomenon, process or object in a certain fixed or specified (or even natural) language. In emphasizing this significance of the term “formalization,” V. M. Glushkov has written: “The task of scientific cognition consists precisely in converting informal things into formal ones, that is, to put it simply, into precisely described ones.”12 The level of formalization, depending upon the employed mathematical logical means and its end result, can vary. While the rise of language, the imparting of a name to an object, the appearance of writing and the rise of counting are the initial stage of formalization, the mathemati— zation and algorithmization of’ various areas of knowledge can be considered the following, higher level. The constructing of symbolic systems in a calculation must be put among the third, most developed level of formalization. ;1] J J :l.1Y _[iT1.i • iiiir ii... 11 ,i .i .1 iIiTJ.Ii1 hIiIiI IiIii. i.IiIiL;0] 127 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY n APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 D r i. - - FOR OVF[CTAL USE ONI.Y Thus, in accord with the varying completeness of the formal transformations of studied phenomena, it is possible to speak of three relatively independent levels of formalization. Acting as the delimiters of these levels are the description of the studied phenomena by the means of the fixed or specified natural language, the mathematization and algorithmization of the studied areas and processes and, finally, the constructing of symbolic systems and calculations.’3 The particular, concrete mathematical logical methods act as specific forms for the manifestation of the unified method of formalization. In such an understanding, formalization represents a general scientific method of cognition standing in the same line with such methods as analysis and synthesis, abstraction and the ascent from the abstract to the concrete and which are used with equal success in all areas of human activity and on any levels of cognition. In the given instance of particular interest is the niathematization and algorithmization by which the partially formalized theories oriented at use in various natural, technical and social sciences are created. On precisely this level, mathematical logical formalization penetrates broadly into military theory and practice, and is used for describing troop control processes for the purpose of their optimization and automation. Mathematics operates with numbers, vectors, operators and other mathematical objects which are the result of abstraction and idealization. The attempt to bring such a purely mathematical theory or its elements into accord with certain relationships and objects of the real world or another theoretical system can be classified as a partial formalization of• the studied area. The partially formalized theory obtained in this manner is no longer -purely mathematical. It represents a portion of theoretical natural science. Characteristic for the designated level of formalization is the use of a mat!iematical apparatus in accord with and in close relation to the definitions, concepts and assumptions of the given descriptive scientific theory. Consequently in the area of the optimization and automation of troop control, it should be a question of the relationship of the mathematical apparatus to the concepts and propositions of tactics, operational art, the theory of troop control, and so forth. Since the mathematical apparatus can be applied only to well defined abstract objects, in automating the various elements of the troop control process it is essential to isolate these abstract objects within the examined area. Then they must be represented in the form of a certain integrated system, and the i.uiderlying time, space, causal and other ties and relationships inherent to them must be detected and fixed, that is, the general abstract structure of the studied area of control or the descriptive theory reflecting it must be determined. The isolating of such elements and structures is the first step in the formalization process. ;1] A jyjj ‘iL_.. __ I.1_.l rzm.iii I.&1i1it.ivA!,, .i .reTJ.ffl .liIiMri1iTii1’jTj?j13.,_______________________;0] APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 128 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY For obtaining practically signficant rsu1ts, certain variables, functionals, operators and other objects of the selected mathematical lan— guse are rought into direct accord with the previously isolated abstract objects. The established ties and relationships between the e1ementr, in characterizing the structure of the given system, are expressed in the form of functional and probability dependences, logical rules, schedules, tables, nd so forth. A system is formed of’ certain parameters which subequent1y figure as the initial, basic premises (factors) of the investigated (designed) control theorr or specific problem being solved. The aggregate of the described operations can be considered the second step c,f formalization. The next step in the process of formalization consists in the following: he previously isolated elements and structures of the investigated processes and phenomena or the system of parameters reflecting them are brought into adequate accord to certain mathematical structures relating to definite areas of mathematics. Thus, any formal (axiomatic, analytical, algorithmic, and so forth) de— 3cliption can act as a definite means for formalizing the phenomena of armed combat and the troop control processes, and serves as the starting point of their ftrther optimization and automation. The role and place of mathematical logical formalization becomes understandable In the process of optimizing and automating troop control. In actuality, in solving any problems of optimizing and algorithmizing troop control, the following stages can be isolated: The posing of the mission, the selecting of the efficiency criteria, the determining of the parameters of the operation and their relationships, the designing and investigation of the formalized mathematical model of the operation, the interpretation and testing of the theoretical conclusions in practice. In each of these stages, with the exception of the last one, along with a descriptive anelysis, extensive use is made of the formalization method which u1timte1y provides anopportunity of solving the problem by matheniaticel means. Even in the process of posing the problem, a clear and sufficiently accurate exposition of the initial data, the conditions of fulfillment and the required results of the decision makes it possible to disclose its abstract, logical structure. This disclosure provides an opportunity to use one of the previously exsmined mathematical models for solving a broad range of uniform specific problems. Let us Illustrate this from the examples of a number of specific particular problems solved by the nieans of operations research theory. 1. For example, a certain group of specialists is servicing the combat of an ai fighter regiment. Its task includes the inspection and repairing of the aircraft arriving at the airfield in order in the shortest time ;1] -, J J :Ti1. — ..3ii :.. — I .ui. FKT Ill .T I. IiTiIh’ .iiTi.vi iTiTI-h1 .4,EIM IITI ,JiTiTiT;0] 129 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -t r DtI — - - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 - t. _.___ I FOR OFFICIAl.. USE ONLY 111 to ready them for the next sortie. The insufficient size of the group or lacking number of Bpecia1ist in the individual services can lead to an inacceptable delay of the aircraft in the parking area; an irrational increase in this number 1ead to the irrational use of the personnel. The question arises of an optimum composition and size of such a group. 2. A certain sector of an air defense system as a fixed number of forces and means (antiaircraft missile units, interceptors, and so forth) for repelling a bomber raid. It is essential to disclose how the defense system can be organizect so that the greatest number of bombers in the raid would fall under the action of the air defense I’orce. 3. Information from the site of combat is received at a conmiand post via the conununication8 system. The time 1or the traveling of individual messages depends upon the number of communications channels. Considering that the promptness of decision taking by the commander depends upon the time required for the messages to pass through the communications channel, to determine the number ot chnne1s which ensure the given speed. The use of mathematical methods requires, as we have seen, the isolating of certain conmion traits which characterize the abstract structure of those processes to an analysis of’ which they are attempting to be applied, particularly when it is a question of an attempt to solve a group of prob— lems by ne mathematical method. In all three problems one can note a certain coimnon element which can be termed a serving system. In tIe first inance this is a group of specialists, in the se.,ora1 the air defense weapons, and in the third the communications ohannels. In isolating this element, we disregard the concrete forms of service, the characteristics of the very servicing equipment and in whose interest the bervicing is carried out. Another element which is inevitably present in all the given problems is the flow of demands or the flow of clients coming in to the input or the servicing system. In the first instance the aircraft arriving for servicing must be considered the client, and in the second the bombers which break through the air defense system, and in the third, the messages passed through the communications channels. Here also it is or no importance from whom the demands originate or who is interested in their satisfaction. The term “client” or “demand” generalize all the possible types ot requests for service received from any- object even the most dir-. ferent in their nature. Finally, it is not difficult to notice the similarity in the very logical structure of the processes described in the given problems. This simi— larity consists in the fact that in all the instances the input of the 3ervicing system receives a flow of demands or clients which either are satisfied iimedIate1y or form a line or leave the system. The similarity of structures makes it possible to solve such a problem by uniftrm inathe— matical methods which are grouped together under the conunon naiue of 130 ;1] .1..iIiVI3. I iTI ![U IiTflTh1 I”.r,.JIaL.& AJ Il. iTä,,dTjjijiIL 1iTmTe FiTiTiI;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-OO85OR0001000I0006.3 A I- ‘PRflVFfl FflR RFI FASF Thiircdv iiin IR 2flA• (IA-RflPR2-flflRSflRflflfl1flAfl1flflflR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY queueing 4.heory. Clearly the number of problems similar to the ones examined is virtually unlimited, while the sphere of application of the general methods foi’ solving them is extremely broad. Let us examine one other example. It is essential to organize an air defense system for a certain installation. Here it is assumed that the enenr possesses a whole series of possibilities for organizing an air raid on the defended installation. In precisely the same way the defending side has types of defensive weapons which differ in terms of their tactical thid technical specifications. It is essential to resolve the question of the best cn”ination of these types of weapons under any enemy actions. The following situation is present. There are two sides, “players,” which pursue the opposite interests. The winning of one side or tIpyment is at the same time the losing of the other. Both sides have the possibility to a certain degree of influencing the course of events, in choosing one or another way of action, a strater. For example, the attacking side can use various types of aircraft, and vary the type of formation and the method of approaching the target. The defending side uses various air defense weapons and creates different groupings of them. Finally, there is a number of factors which do not depend upon the procedure of the sides. In the designated instances, for example, the meteorological conditions can be put among these. Each side considers the reasonability of enemy actions and endeavors to choose that strater which would ensure the maximum possible average winnings under any of the most unfavorable actions of the opponent. Understandably In actual reality, and particularly in armed combat, it would be possible to discover an enormous number of situations the structure of which was generally similar to the one described above. Moreover, it can be said that the troop control process, both in its various parts as veil as on the whole, consists precisely of such situations. Since the logical structure of all such problems is generally similar, to this degree they are solvable within one mathematical method, game theory. The situation is precisely the same in the event of using such niathemati— cal methods as linear programming, dynamic programming, statistical de— cisons theory, and so forth. For example in order to use the linear programming method, it is essential to reduce the examined real situation to a form permitting its description as an aggregate of linear equalities and inequalities. Thus, precisely the dismembering of similar abstract structures makes it possible to employ uniform mathematical methods for solving an entire series of seemingly very distant specific problems, and this is the theoretical foundation for optimizing and automating their solution. 131 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 iOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The next major stage upon which eoentially depends the entire further course and end result of •the optimization and automation of any control process is the selecting of the efficiency criterion. The question of finding an optimum solution makes sense only in the instance that an opti— mality criterion is established. The choice of an optimum solution implies the necessity of a comparison between several variations using a principle which is determined in turn by the aims and tasks of each specific operation. For example, the success of’ offensive operations by troop group in a certain sector of a theater of’ operations can be judged from the rate of advance and the amoun of losses of the enenw and our troops. The mathematical apparatus makes it possible to find an optimum solution for any of these indicators, however the choice of the criterion is made on the basis of a descriptive analysis of the specific conditions for, carrying out the operation in accord with its aims. For example, during World War II, the Allies were confronted with the question of the advisability of arming submarines with homing Lorpedoes. The maneuvering of eneniy subs sharply reduced the probability of a torpedo hit. However, this also impeded the operations of the subchasers. When the percentage of subchaser losses was used as the efficiency criterion, it turned out that the use of torpedoes was ill advised. But when the ratio of sub losses before and after the arming of them with homing torpedoes was used as such a criterion, it turned out that the use of the new weapons reduced sub losses by 3—fold. An analogous situation was created in solving the question of the required number of transports in a convoy. If the absolute losses of transports were used as the efficiency criterion, then it might be concluded that the number of transports in a convoy was of no significance. However, if one considers the ratio of transport losses to the total number of escorted vessels, then the essential advantages of large convoys immediately become apparent. Thus, the optimum solution is directly dependent upon the aims of the operations. For this reason for solving the problems of the optimization and automation of various elemenbs in the control process, it is essential to incorporate these goals in the conditions of the problems. For this they should be represented in a formalized form. The efficiency criterion precisely represents a formalized expression of the goals of an operation, and in the broader sense, a formalized expression of a practical need. Consequently, without a formalized expression of the efficiency criterion it is impossible to solve the problem of the optimization and automation of control. An equally important stage in the constructing of a formalized system is the formalization of the factors which influence the occurrence of the studied process and the incorporation of them in the form of quantitatively determined parameters into the condition of the problem. It is essential to disclose the space—tine, cause-and—effect and other relationships between the parameters and to fix them in the form of definite rules, 132 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ay, June 18, FOR OI’VICIAI, IJI ONLY mathematical formu1n, functional dependenoes of chedu1es, tab1ei, rind so forth. 3ince the number of factors and their ratios can e extremely great, it It esnential to uclect the most important of them which sub— tantia11y influence the reu1t of the golution. Here ye disregard a whole seri 01’ lesn enentia1, 3econdary factorG. Such a description ditfer8 advantageou1y rro,n actual reality in its viewability and in the clear tixin of the individual element9 and their re1ationhips. Finally, i 1 esent1a1 to define the general ruie on the bani of which the parainetern and particular constraints of ouch a transformation can formally be trannformed in the ftture for each Gpecific problem or f’or a limited number of control problems. The general ruleB are determined by estab1ihing the inomorphism (hoiiomorphism or model relationship) of the previously inolated structures with cert&ln mathematical structures. For example, in game theory the general rules of the gwne can be conidered the sytein of conditionB which includes posib1e variations for the actions of the sides, the amount of Information of’ each side on the behavior of the enenr, the sequence of moves, the result or outcome of’ the game to which the given aggregate of moves leads. The particular ansumptioris are determined for each specific problem considering its conditions and the posLlibllities of the employed mathematical apparatus. The examined constraintG, as a rule, distort the real conditions of the problem. With the acccpting ot them we remove ourselves from the examined subject area and move from the study of the original to an examination of an integral model. Consequently, the process of formalization begins by isolating the similar, uniform and abstract structures of different phenomena and ends by the constructing and investigating of formalized mathematical models. It is a necessary and very essential aspect which determines the possibility of optimizing and automating the troop control process. Here mathematical logical forma]ization acts as the theoretical basis and essential stage of automation. While the analysis of the basic stages in solving th problems of the optimization and algorithmization of the troop contr,1 process indicates the possibility and necessity of a mathematical logical formalization, the question of the degree of formalization in each specific control problem is determined by practice. The use of tormal methods for the purpose of a quantitative basing, optimization and algorlthmtzation of a decision being made by a comander is preceded by . profoand descriptive analysis of the studied situation which 1 ?ased completely on practice. Only on this basis is it possible to rt out a. correct posing or the problem, 1t operationa1—tactice.1 description, and the dividing of factors Into essential and nonessential, ac well as to determine the rieceosary accuracy of the deci8ion. ;1] . . .1 • . .ii,iiii Liii TiIiIi iii.ril IiIiIiI._________________________;0] 133 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR (WPfCtM. (JSK ONLY All of th1 terver tn th informtktional foundation for conGtructing the correGponding mat)iematAcnJ logical formalized nyntem, nd deterntine the wayn for optimizing and the mathemutict1 means for automating tha solving of varioun control problcnnt. An esentia1 condition of formalization is, for example, the dividing of factors into esentia1 and noneentia1. The same factor can be etientia.1 for somc cases and nonenentia1 for others. There are no ensential parameters generally or Indepndent1y of a specific problem. Thus the question of whether the objoct of an attack i a point or an area and what iti di-. mennions are 1t extretne1r important in evaluating the posniblities of a strike by conventionsil weipons. However, in the event of1 using nuclear weapons this parameter i secondary. Thus, precisely practical need cie— termines what factorG hou1d be subjected to formalization in each spe— ciTic prob1#m. And praciice alno o1ves the question of the number of these factoro. Consideration of a large number of factors causes a more adequate reflection of the bnic, esentia1 properties of the studied proceso in a mathematical logical form. Obviously in thiG instance one might ecpect the obtaining of more accurate results. However, in practice frequently such accuracy is simply not needed, and the attempt to consider a larger number of parameters merely leads to a purposeless complicating of the problem and the used mathematical apparatus. For example, while f’or tactical troop control elements it i essential to consider the location of the enenv targetc with very great accuracy, for the operational and strategic elements such accuracy is superfluous. Consequently, the level of t1c deciiori, like the number of formalizable factors, Is determined by practical need. The success oC solving various control problems, like the automating of thiG solution, to an essential degree depends upon how completely practical needs will be reflected in one or another formalized criterion. An un— provemerit in the formal methods makes it possible to consider these requirements with ever greeter completeness. At the same time, it is perfectly obvious that the entire dialectical process or the development of prsictical needn cannot in any satisfactory manner be expressed in a single form1im. Moreover, even ‘within a single problem, practical needs cannot be completely considered by any formalized criteria. The latter always are of a relative nature. The given circumstance forces one to ieek out solutions which are acceptable for a whole series of criteria, considering the more coumion aims of conducting the operation. The exist— trig mathematical methods do not provide an opportunit’ for fully considering these alrr.s and for choosing the corresponding compromise solution which remains the privilege of the coimnander. Thus, formalization I based upon descriptive analysis, on experimentation and practice, and a1o has descriptive analysis as its final point, and through it prtctice. Control practices ,aot only’ solve the question of the impossibility of complete and absolute fornia1iz.tion of control problems, but also dctermine the level and degree ot necessary and possible formalization for cach pectfic problem. It must .1ways be remembered that rormalization 13i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - Thursday, June 13, 2 ): CIA-RDP82-’ I — I. FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY r14 is merely a portion oC the work in establishing a decision, and one of the aspectø of thio basing, and does not claim independent signiticance for exhaustive an1ysis of the control process. In light of what ha been naid, it is esnential to exin1ne the problem of the ratio and correct combination of the unformalized and formalized knowledge in mi1itry science and control theory, as well as the question of the way and specific conditions for realizing the possibi1itie of mathematical logical methods in the theory and practice of troop control, and in particular, in solving optimization and automation problems. The analysis made indicftte that precisely proceeding from general methodological considerations one must not restrict the fundamental possibilities of mathematical logical formalization. The real opportunities for each historical stage are a1way limited by the general level of knowledge and by the development of military science, troop control theory and niathe— matical logical disciplines. At the given, specific and fixed level in the development o1 military science and the mathematical logical disciplines, the determined constraints create complexity and specifianess of the very sub3ect of research, the troop control process. For this reason in characterizing the real possibilities of mathematical logical methods in the sphere of the optimization and automation of control, it is important to point out that the problem of formalizing a whole series of qualitatively different specific factors which substantially influence the occurrence of the studied processes, the course and outcome of armed combat, and the effectiveness of troop control as yet has not been completely solved. This problem is particularly urgent in the spherr of troop control. Here there is a large group of factors the quantitative expression at which as yet encounters serious difficulties. For example, morale, discipline, the training level of the personnel, the talents of the conniianders, the quality of 1eadershi. and the organization of control, and so forth. Their mere listing indicates the enornus significance of these factors for any sphere of combat. In a whole series of instances, they are determining and ultimately settle the course and outcome of an operation. For this reason the coninanders of all levels carry out a compulsory qualitative consideration and evaluation of them. Certainly their quantitative analysis would significantly broaden the sphere of application of the method of mathematical logical formalization, and would make it possible to more fully reflect in the formalized models not only the general but also the specific traits of the troop control process. This in turn would raise the level and possibilities of automation. The reality of armed combat is such that the listed Iactors are uniquely woven into . fabric of a whole series of other ones, they are inseparably linked and interact closely’ with them. For example, the solution to the problem of the effectiveness of the specific type of weapons cannot be complete without a knowledge of the degree of training of the personnel 135 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 i r 1. l A e r• --•• FOR O1VICIAL USE ONLY -———I ;1] — Jiik_ . .niTiTiTc______________________________;0] operating thiB equipment. On the one hand, the given circumstance again emphasizes the importance of these factors, and on the other, indicates the specific wnye for considering them, in disc1oiing the po3sibilities of an indirect express1or of qualitative factors through their quantita— tive manifestations. Certn.lnly inequality iB manifested in properties which in a definite manner influence the occurrence of the process as a whole, and, consequently, cn.n be measured. In the above-given example, the training of the personnel is manifested in a reduction in aiming errors. This, in turn, inf1uence the evalua— t1oi o veapon efficioncy. An analysis of the influence of the training time on reducing aiming errors can underlie the determination of the correoponding cjuantitative funtiona1 dependence. The political and moral state of the troops is manifested in the ability to maintain battleworthi— ness with significant losses or to resiBt a numerically superior enemy. Consequently, having established the corresponding standards fbor units of measurement, it is possible to attempt to express this property quantitatively. Certainly the given examples are extremely oversimplified. In practice the ways of quantitative evaluation for a whole series or factors as yet are still unclear. Nevertheless, since such accounting is fundamentally possible, in the future the number of qualitative factors which are assessed quantitatively and considered in a mathemtica1 logical description viii rise. The search for the ways and means for obtaining such evaluations is preent1y one of the most important tasks in the area o control theory, automation arid optimization of decisions being taken. A majority of the designated factors concexns the social sphere of human activity. For this reason one of the most effective ways in this area, in our view, is the extensive carrying out of various sorts of specific sociological research. This research makes it possible to more profoundly understand the general, specific and particu1r patterns in the sphere of troop control, to disclose previous1 unknown relationships, to carry out a quantitative analysis of a whole series of qualitative factors, that is, to describe them mathematically. The mathematical processing of the materials from the applied socio1ogico1 research makes it possible to interpret these data not only qualitatively but also quantitatively, to profoundly analyze them, and to correctly understand and generalize them. For example, correlation analysis makes it possible to ascertain whether or not all the basic factors influencing the occurrence of the process have been correctly considered. One of the examples of how a formal approach makes it possible to pene— trate more deeply into the content of the studied process is tactor ana1r— sis. The essential parameters which are to be subjected to a quantitative evaluation are linked in such a manner that within each group the connection between them is closer (a higher reciprocal correlation coefficient) than between the parameters of the ditferent groups. This provides an 136 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PRflVFfl FOR RFI FASF Thiircdiv .Iiinp IR 2flfl (IA-RflPR?-flflRflRflflfl1flAfl1AflAR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY opportunity to unify all the parameters of the group into a single factor and determine its amount. As a result the quantity of considered factors is sharply reduced and the studied model becomes more encompassable. Moreover, factor analysis is often employed for disclosing unknown ractors. The process of finding the quantitative patterns of studied phenomena Is most closely tied al8o to Btatistical ana1yis which, regardless of a whole series of shortcomings inherent to it (the necessity of obtaining information on a rather large number of uniform operations, the difficulty of obtaining ob3ective data, nd the limited nature ot the natural variations of the situation), can provide very valuable results which are of independent significance. Thus, using statistical analysis during the years of World War II the problems were solved of the optimum composition or ships in a convoy, the effectiveness of arming submarines with homing torpedoes for hitting subchasers, the effectiveness of maneuvering ships in escaping from kamikaze attacks, and much elGe. Nevertheless, the substantial, limitations of the designated method necessitate testing, experimental exercises, maneuvers, and so forth. In the course of the testing it Is possible to obtain numerical data on the dispersion, the probability of detection, the range and speed of movement. The same thing can be said on detecting the influence of changes in tactics, the properties of military equipment and the methods of its use on the results of combat. Regardless of the inevitable simplifica— tions in the course of carrying out experimental exercises and maneuvers, the obtained results can be very valuable. Here the researchers are confronted with the possibilities of broadly altering the conditions for carrying out the experiment and, consequently, examining and establishing a broader range of possible parameters. Here it is impo’tant to bring the conditions for carrying out the experiment as close as possible to real combat and obtain reliable quantitative results. The process of impr3ving the mathematical apparatus plays a major role in broadening the possibilities of formalization, optimization end automation. The specific features of the processes investigated by military stience, and in particular the theory o troop control, require the elaboration of a specific apparatus capable of adequately reflecting the studied processes. Consideration of these specific features cannot help but entail the rise of new original research methods. The development level of the mathematical disciplines achieved in the course of the present-day scientific and technical revolution has prepared a sound basis for a quantitative description of the processes of armed combat. Mathematical methods are now becoming an inseparable aspect of the troop control process, and they are closely interwoven with such important elements of it as the evaluation of the situation, decision taking, and forecasting the results of combat. These help the coi?unander to determine the balance of forces of the sides, to assess the combat capabilities o1 his own troops, to make an optimum allocation of forces 137 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and means, to calculate the possible losses of personnel and military equipment, to assess the effectiveness of nuclear strikes, to solve the problems of optimum planning, target allocation, and so forth. It is essential to more widely employ these methods and technical means for realizing them. Control practices indicate that officers who have pro-. found knowledge ar. rich experience in using modern mathematical methods and computers make full use of the enormous potential possibilities of the ASUV The effective use of the ASUV requires a developed, special mathematical support [software], that is, the early creation of complexes of mathematical models, algorithms and machine programs for solving typical and specialized problems which at the necessary moment can be used by a control body. A library of such programs should be constantly replenished and added to. This requires the presence of skilled specialists in the area of systems analysis, decision taking theory, and the mathematical methods of optimization, that is, algorithmists and programaers who have definite operational and tactical training. Moreover, the effective use of automated systems and mathematical methods necessitates the corresponding mathematical training and work habits using computer information equipment on the part of the commanders and staff officers. The level of this training should be sufficient in order to make it possible for the commander to give a mission for formalization and solution on a computer, to determine the necessary data and criteria for evaluating the obtained quantitative recommendations in the inal taking of a decision, and to see the strong and weak aspects of the employed mathematical methods. Here there must be knowledge in the area of decision taking theory, mathematical modeling, algorithmic languages and prograimaing. This also necessitates definite skills, training, preliminary preparation, the preliminary calculating of a number of quantitative indicators, the compiling of calculations formulas, tables, graphs and so forth. Such diverse preparation makes it possible in the midst of combat to compare the existing situation with the previously calculated one, and on the basis of the quantitative characteristics of a similar variation, to rapidly take a decision which is close to the optimum. Of course, the possibilities of automation equipment and mathematical methods must not be overestimated. No matter how mathematics and computers develop, these possibilities are always limited. Even the most advanced mathematical methods cannot fill in the gaps in the knowledge of the very examined area. For this reason by using them it is not possible to surmount a potential limit of accuracy determined by the incompleteness of information, or by the presence of a large number of unknown, undetermined, random or hard—to—formalize factors. Consequently, the process of the development and elaboration of the mathematical apparatus is related to improving the operational—tactical apparatus. Both these processes should occur simultaneously, in parallel, under conditions of reciprocal influences and enrichment. Only the commander, in using all the diverse information, including that which cannot be machine processed, assesses 138 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .,J: CIA-RDP82-( _...EASE: June 1, 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the combat situation, takes a decision, ivea a mission to subordinates, and organizes the fulfillment of his decision, the fighting of the personnel for victory. A victory cannot be calculated rather it must be won. Mathematical methods and electronic computers merely- make it easier for the comnander to take optimum decisions and carry them out efficiently. They are not in opposition to but rather combined with combat experience, the operational— tactical knowledge, reason and wifl of the commander. It would be wrong to assume that the extensive introduction of automation leads to a certain leveling of the human intellect. This is a profound error. Individual features and the difference of creative possibilities of the control principals will not be reduced but rather increased in the process of automation. In other words, the advantages of a creatively strong commander over a weak one will become even more apparent in the ASU. For this reason, with other conditions being equal, the most successful in combat will be the conunanders who skillfully use the possibilities of modern mathematics, computers and automation. In completing an analysis of the conditions needed for the broad and effective use of the method of mathematical logical formalization, we must again stress its very close link with the development of full automation and the introduction of the ASUV into troop control practices. In actuality, on the one hand, the desire to use computers for solving various problems of automation and optimization provides an impetus to the formalization of these problems, and on the other, it turns out that the possibilities ror improving the automated systems depend substantially upon the successful formalization of the corresponding areas of control. The central methodological premise is the presently generally recognized notion that the aim of automation is not to replace man by a machine, but rather to bring about a maximum rise in the efficiency of control work. This, in turn, can be achieved only with a reasonable a1loction of the control functions between the machine and man. In line with the need to determine for each specific instance the degree of the possible and advisable formalization, optimization and automation of the various functions of a person included in an automated control system, within human factors engineering there must be the systematic carrying out of quantitative research on the mental and psychophysiological possibilities of man. Thus, a necessary and ufficient condition for the effective use of inathe— niaticaJ. logical formalization for solving the problems of the optimization and automation of troop control is an improvement and development of military science as a whole, the elaboration of an operational—tactical apparatus for a meaningful description of the studied problems, the studying of the mental and psychophysiological capabilities of man using precise methods, the introduction of various methods and procedures for obtaining the necessary quantitative characteristics, interdependences and values of parameters, the elaboration of an adequate mathematical logical ;1] ±1 J (•1VA iI.1 :Il. ,vjIrnT.I ,.,..IiTiTà.....L,I ;0] 139 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 D LA. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY apparatus, the broad use of calculators, and the presence of the corres— ponding1r trained personnel. The aggregate of these conditions determines the specific possibilities of formalization, and consequently, the optimization and automation of the troop control process. FOOTNOTES 1. Man acts as the modeling system in the process of cognition. Generally speaking, the role of a modeling system can be carried out by a living organism, a brain or computer, and on a wider basis, by any cybernetic system which is capable of receiving, storing and processing informs— tion and utilizing it for the purposes of self—regulation and control. 2. “Filosofskaya Entsiklopediya” [Philosophical Encyclopedial, Vol 3, Moscow, 196k, p k78. 3. See 0. K. Zhukov, “Vospominaniya i Raznrshleniya” [Remembrances and Reflections], Moscow, 1969, pp 192—19k. )4• “Issledovaniye Operatsiy na Praktike. Materialy Konferentsii NATO” [Operations Research in Practice. Materials of a NATO Conference], Moscow, 1962, pp 2k2_2k14. 5. See I. Anureyev and A. Tatarchenko, “Primeniniye Matematicheskikh Metodov v Voyennom Dde” [The Use of Mathematical Methods in Military Affairs], Moscow, 1967; V. Abchuk, et al., “Vvedeniye v Teoriyu Vyrabotki Resheniy” [Introduction to Decision Taking Theory), Moscow, 1972; V. Druzhinin and D. Kontorov, “Ideya, Algoritm, Resheniye” [Idea, Algorithm and Decision], Moscow, 1972; K. Tarskanov, “Matematika i Vooruzhennaya Bor’ba” [Mathematics and Armed Combat), Moscow, 197k. 6. V. I. Lenin, “Poin. Sobr. Soch.,” Vol 18, pp 306, 313. ;1] .i J’_ .. . iT!T i.’1i1i :iii J* iTiIJ.ii1 :JiTiIi II!iTiHiJi,i _________________________;0] 7. G. Klaus, “Kibernetika i Filosofiya” [Cybernetics and Philosophy], Moscow, 1963, p 227. 8. K. Marks and F. Engels, “Soch.,” Vol 20, p 37. 9. See “Filosofskaya Entsik1opediy,” Vol 2, Moscow, 196k, p 562. 10. V. I. Lenin, “Poin. Sobr. Soch.,” Vol 29, p 301. 11. “Filosofsksya Entsiklopediya,” Vol 3, p 329. 12. V. M. Glushkov, “Kibernetika i Umstvennyy Trud” {Cybernetics and Mental Labor), Moscow, 1965, p 19. 13. See B. V. Biryukov and Ye. S. Geller, “Kibernetika v Gumanitarnykh Naukakh,” p 132. iko FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006..3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CHAPTER 5: TI PLACE AND ROLE OF MAN IN AUTO?4ATE) TROOP CONTROL 1. The Problem of the Optimum Coordination of Men and Equipment SSTF24S the ASUV The recognition of. the determining role of man in relation to any, including military, equipment is the basic methodological premise in solving specific problems in the ASUV. People create and use automatic and automated devices for achieving their aims in troop control. But in order for a person to hold a dominant place in relation to equipment, definite structural changes must be carried out in the equiaent. The main purpose of the latter is to create favorable conditions for the effective activity of soldiers in the ASUV system. Such a complex problem in modern science has cone to be called the problem of the optimum coordination of’mn and equipment. Its essence consists in the maxinnmi adaptetioñ of the ASUV components to each other for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of each of thein.nd the entire system as a whole. This problem assumes particular significance in the ASUV, where man act8 in a single functional complex vith a computer and other technical devices capable of assuming definite functions in the ares of troop control. For this reason, before establishing the real wvs for coordinating man and the technical device in the ASUV, it is essential to examine the possible variations for allocating functions emong them, and to compare the possibilities of these components to carry out the basic elements of the control process. Here it must be pointed c’it that the relationship of the possibilities of man and the automaton may be 1ivestigated on the level of real or potential feasibility. In modern scientific literature, attempts have been made to compare the possibilities of nn and the automaton for processing information which is the basis of the control process. The main qualities inherent to human activity. ;1] i .1 •_J -oIi J ii I1 . .i . i L_51rn1T. F1! III iT I.%.r4I1IIe1 I’ .1 ifT4’iTiE1fi1 TiIiIi1IiIiIi1 iiiiiii ___________________________;0] 1. A limited capacity, a small amount of information processed per unit of time. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 ——1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2. A reduction in work eff’icency as wandering of attention. I, n of information and a limited possi— of the phenomenon from individual 5. The ability to work in unforeseen situations, great flexibility and adaptability to changing external effects. 6. A broad opportunity for choosing the methods of action, speed in using reserves and correcting mistaes. Basic qualities in the work of an automatic device. 1. A zero capacity for awareness; a careful programming of the structure of material. 2. Great complexity of progra’mning, since it is difficult to foresee all the possible instances, and hcce, to compile a program which foresees them. 3. Unsuitability for alternative thinking. . Virtually unlimited capacity. ;1] 4.rnr r iij.,., .1IIiTiIh.i,ijflThj1i________________________;0] 5. A slow reduction in work efficiency. 6. Rapid and accurate execution of computational problems. As for the quantitative characteristics of the abilities of man and a computer to process information, they have been given in a table the data for which have been borrowed from several works.’. A comparison of the possibilities of man and automatic equipment indicate that the most rational way for using the qualities inherent to each of these components is the creation of automated control systems. In them the man and equipment are united by common participation in the troop t control process, and act as a single functional control complex, in complementing the capabilities of each other in performing specific control problems. The given notion has also predetermined the real ways for solving the problem of an optimum coordination of man and equipment, that is, “from equipment to man” and “from man to equipment.” The first way consists in working out those design decisions in developing control ejuip— ment which would most fully conform to the psychophysiological and mental abilities of man who solves various problems using it in the process of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001000100063 lI2 tions. a consequence of fatigue and the 3, Comparatively slow and Inaccurate carrying out of computational opera- 1. The insufficient (incomplete) use bility of creating an integral notion events. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY troop control. Such a progressive variation corresponds to the active determining role of man in relation to the implements of labor created by him in anyarea of activity, including in military affairs, However, Ruch an approach to the problem of coordination cannot a1wis he realized due to the various factors, for example, due to certain limitations in the development of c1ence and techno1or. Quantitative Characteristics of Human and Computer Data Processing Parameters Computer Man Quantity Dimensions Response time Memory Functioning Capacity Access time Data input devices nd output Diodes, transistors, ferrite cores, etc. Up to 1O 1O2_101 em3 1O Sec. Hysteresis of ferro— magnetic materials 1oio bits iO_8_1O+2 Sec. Neurons 1.5.1010 1O——1O— cm3 lo_2 see. Change in synapses LO91O13 bits 1O—2—1O1sec. Ian ;1] J T•1VA . • 11TF1p niir v . i1’AiTiE!i1 lITITI1 FITITI’b i 11iiTW ——;0] Quantity of data Transmission rate Printer, punch, etc. 1o2_106 bit/sec. 6,000 bit/sec. Receptors, muscles, glands, etc. Unconsciously 1O bit/sec. Consciously (max.) 102 bit/sec. 10—30 bit/sec. For this reason the necessity arises of realizing the second way of coordination, that is, “from man to the equipment,” and this consists in adapting man to specific working conditions in the SUV. Undoubtedly, Joint functioning with an automatic device in a single control complex has a substantial impact ,.lso on man, in placing exceptionally high demands not only on his psychophysiologiOal attributes, but also on the specific mental qualities, in determining the inner organization of his mental activity and requiring clarity of thought. All of this has required the. adaptation of man to automatic equipment as expressed in the specific methods and procedures for training and instructing thepersonnel operating automatic equipment as well as in improving professional recruitment for work in the ASUV. Although these two ways of optimum coordination are inherent to all types of activities of people in the ASUV, however the specific procedures end methods of realizing them are largely determined by the specific features FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Switching elements Type Principle APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP32-00850R0001 00010006-3 Afl ;1] -, .J tJ T1YA . •i .1IIII _ • i. rr i.i.’IiTiIiI 1 J ii 3.vAiTiT:Ifi1 .IiTiTik liii IiTiTiTc_____________________;0] r. 1 A ‘ in FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY of those functions which the o1diers perf’orm in relation to the automaic equipment. This necessitates an analysis of the functional structure of the troop collective In the ASUV for the purpose of establishing the most characteri.tic groups of soldiers operating automatic equipment. The extensive introduction of automatic ecuipment into troop control leads to the development of AShY the functional structure of which is an entire hierarchy of subsystems united by a common functional goal of controlling subordinate units and subunits which mutually coordinate their activities for ensuring the effective fu1fi11ment o the missions assigned to them and are subordinate to a single commander. At the same time, in addition to the personnel directly involved in the ASU’J, it is completely essential to have a definite establishment of troops the functional duties of which are related to activities outside the given local systems. For this reuon we can represent an automated control system as a certain single integral system around which all the remaining subsystems of the control body are grouped. This makes it possible to view the human material in the ASUV as a complex troop collective with an extremely developed differentiation of troop specialties in which a fundamentally new collective form of utilizing automatic equipment is carried out. In the most general form, in the human material of the ASUV in terms of functional duties it is possible to isolate three basic groups of personnel: The group carrying out extrasystem functions; the group carrying out intra— system functions; the so-called command group2 (see Figure k). Automated Troop Control System (Asuv) Fig. 4 The first (extrasystem) group brings together those specialists who are not directly involved in processing the information, but merely supervise the normal functioning of the automatic equipment and the computer FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 — IflI FOR OFFICIAl USE ONLY devices of the connarzd post and the ijtafr. This includes all the en— 1neering a technical personnel which monitor the normal work of the system, which VprovTdes adjustment and repair o the equipment, periodic repairs ande1iminates failures, as well as a large group of prograimnermathematicians. The specialists of this group are involved with all automati equipment as a whole. Ther are in a way outside the process of processing the data flows which circulate within the aystem itself, they are next to it and monitor the correctness of data processing. The extrasystem functions of man in the ASUV are marked by a great degree of creativity-. Here in his activities are rather broadly represented all the basic functions involved in processing the information related to the state of the computer complex: its receiving, the taking of the corresponding decision and executor actions. The extrasystein functioning of man is characterized by the necessity of working in unforeseen situations, to respond quickly to signals, upon the indications of individual instruments to clearly visualize the overall picture of the state of the equipment, and so forth. As a whole, the functional features of specialists in the extrasystem group are related to analyzing the reasons for the malfunction of computer equipment, and the organizing of the corresponding measures to localize the emergency and quickly eliminate it. The work of a specialist in this group entails involved intellectual activity related to responsibility for the normal functioning of the equipment and for the effective operation of the entire ASUV as a whole. An analysis of the basic functions performed by the group of extrasystem speca1ists makes it possible to isolate two basic forms of their activities: 1) The observation and monitoring of the normal work of the equipment and the consecutive analysis of information on the functioning of its basic elements under the conditions of the constant expectation of an emergency signal; 2) Activities in situations of an abrupt disruption ofb the normal functioning of the equipment. This requires an instantaneous analysis of the existing situation, an assessment of the nature of the emergency and the finding of the most effective methods of eliminating it. Each of these two basic forms of activities by the men of the group of extrasy-stem specialists in the ASUV influences the coordinating of man with the automatic equipment, and determines the specific ways for creating the corresponding coordinating devices. Of exceptionally great significance for ensuring the effective functioning of the ASUV is the group of intrasystem specialists who are directly involved in the process of processing the flows of information moving through the conmiunications channels within the system. ;1] _I.4.4 • .i . ±,.ii r.. i.i...IiTit ,i , .i.i viTiM..iii 1ITITIb Ii[iIiIi[i1u ____________________________;0] 115 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A rrii ._ F APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 - — - - I_ — FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4 E4 The intrasystem activities of a man in automated control systems represent a cornp1ete1r new type of military activity and this has been terned operator work and is becoming the most typical at the present stage in the development of science and technology, in production and in military affairs. K. Marx described a man in such a situttion as the “main agent” of a technologicaJ process and who (because of soia1 or other conditions) Is forced to be an attribute of the machine, to be turned into a “living automaton,” to turn his body- “into an automatically one-sided organ,” and to act as “the automatic implement of the given particular work.”3 The most specific trait of the activities of an operator in an automated control system is the diffic.Lty, a a rule, of directly observing the actual controlled combat installations. For a notion of the real state of the controlled objects, the operator uses information received over the coiinunication channels. From it he draws up so—called inforination models of the real objects and these are a structure of symbolic images organized according to certain formal attributes and reflecting with a definite degree of accuracy the properties of real objects and the relationships between them. The information received by the disp1aj- devices including indicators and meters, requires a correlating with the real controlled objects. This process occurs in the stage of decoding the in- formation and is the basis for taking the eorrespondin decision. The activities of an operator with information models place high demands upon the data display devioes by which these models are created. This, in turn, innices extremely urgent the problem of the optimum coordination of man with the automatic equipment in the process of the exchange of information between them. An analysis of the intrasystem functions of man in an ASUV makes it possible to disclose a presently existing tendency for turning over these functlons to an automatic device. Remaining for man are the creative functions ot controlling the actions of the automatic equipment, checking the correctness of decisions made by the machine, their correcting in the needed directions and so forth. All these operations are performed by specialists of the extrasystem group. Consequently, with a rise in the degree of automation and with the broadening of the capabilities of computers, there will be a gradual decline in the intrasystem functions performed by man in the ASUV. He will perform chiefly extrasystem functions. To this fundainenta.lly new trend can be a.pplied the words oI K. Marx by which he described a similar process in the automation of production: man is put next to the production process instead of being its chief agent. Thus, there is a tendency for transferring definite intrasystem functions of man to the automatic devices. In this manner there is a transformation of all the separate automatic assemblies for da’ts’ process±ng in the control system into a single automatic complex. However full cutOmation in no way leads to the separating of the relationship between man and ;1] i .4.4 .[iV iT ._.. Ii r , ___________________________;0] 1146 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00350R0001000100063 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY the automatic device. The integrated system is not broken up, but rather only the relationships between the components are altered in it, they become more flexible and to the greatest degree conform to the development prospects of the human personality. Man no longer in included in the data processing process an one of the elements which in all ways in similar to a technical element. He is freed from the necessity of being adapted to the technical devices and correlating his activities with their functions. Here the possibility arises of a rational allocation of functions between man and the automaton whereby only creative functions remain for man. lJth a rise in the degree of automation in the system, the role of the extrasystem functions of the controlling principal, the functions of ob— servation and monitoring, rises. The fundamental necessity of human control over the correct functioning of an automatic device exists at any, however high level of development in automation. A person included in the ASUV s a social being. This gives his activities a number of specific properties which cannot be fully modeled and tu’ned over to a technical device. Thus, the presence of social aspects in the activities of an individual. is a decisive factor in allocating functions between the controlling principal and the automatie vice as components of a unified system. Let us examine the specific features in the functioning of specialists in the third group of the military collective of the ASUV who perform command functions. This rather sizable group plays an important role in troop control. It includes the officials responsible for the control of the subunits which are part of the automated system as controlled subsystems. In the AS(JV, this group plays a special role in relation to the two designated groups, the extrasystem a’d intrasystem. In participating in the general process of c’ata processing, each member of the command group can be simultaneously the end element in the flow of initial information and the beginning element in the flow of command information the basis of which is the combat decision. This brings him close to the intrasystem group of specialists. At the same time, since the connander functionally and territorially is outside the limits of the “man——automaton” system, inherent to his activities are certain traits of the group of the extra— systeM specialists. An important function of his is supervising the work of the entire system, and above all the activities of the two indicated groups. In a general form the activities of specialists from the command group are related to the task of ensuring the taking of a combat decision. They clearly present the overall mission of the ASUV and the various aspects of its solution. This is provided by the presence of an internal conceptual model In a person, and this model contains a notion of the end result of the work of the system and controls the process of the transformation of l47 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY VED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June .OOO1 00010006-3 I_I—I IAflI, I(1 11 I Al. iii 1N1,Y ;1] _1Jdi1VI..iIF1. . — • r’tL,i .ITr. i.IiTiL’öI, .111 IIIM..iI1 lITITI1 iii iTiHiTiTiT ____________________________;0] information by man. A mernbcr of a commrind group using the conceptu1 model formulated by him cttn va1uftte the ration1ity of variations of a decision which are presented b te used nystem and which reflect one of the aspects of troop control. Here the problem arie of the relationship of the information model which i 4’termined by the objective characteristics of the objecto of control tind the conceptual model which is a subjective plan of actions for the given chief. Precisely the conceptual model contains, in addition to the transformed data of the information model, a whole erieo of unformalized, crijatite and subjective aspects (a broader notion of the combat mission and Its significance for carrying out the nlis3ion, an analysis of th conequence of implementing incorrect decisions, a readiness to correct them instantaneously and oo forth) esentia1 for controlling the troops. The specialists of a command group should p1y the deci1ve role in ensuring the effective functioning of the ASUV, since within the range of thQir functional duties and within the aspect characteristic for them they should participate in working out the combat dcici sion. The quantity and quality of pecia1ists in this group are largely determined by the organizational structure ot the control body, by the volume of incoming infoination and by the specific feature8 of the combat mission to be carried out by the controlled troops. At the same time it must be considered that the organizational structure of any control body is based on the princiDle of unity of cozmnand. All the men of the command group in their activities come back to the solely responsible commander and form a complex hierarchical structure which ensures centralized troop control. For this reason, in a general form the functional structure of the AStJV can consist of subsystems. Each of these is under a certain chief, and it supplies him with the necessary data for taking the appropriate decisions which subsequently serve as the basis for the taking of a combat decision by the solely responsible conmander. !ere the mi1itary leader of an element superior in the control hierarchy can assume control over several inferior elements and use the decisions worked out by them when necessary. The command group of the ASUV should include the chief of staff who is responsible for its smooth and coordinated work. The chief ot starf bears reponibi1ity for organizing the information f1ow from the controlled objects, for the obtaining and processing of reconnaissance information, f,r carrying out mcaures related to all the basic types ot combat support, ard so forth. In addition to the chief of staff, a command group can include a number of other officials. Each of them is responsible for a definite area of preparing the trooDs for combat, and for the effective functioning of the controlling body under him. Regardless of the diversity of duties, all of thorn are aimed at solving the single combat mission set by the commander. Within their rights and duties the officials evaluate the combat 3ituation, they take a decision for the use of equipment under their control by the troop8, they plan the preparations for cnibat, and they direct their subordinate services, relying on the control body at their disposal. i18 FOR ()FFICJAI. USE ONLY A I.’ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVFfl F(R RFI FAF Thiirgthiv June fR 9flflq• IA-RflPRflARflRflflfl1flAfl1flflflR I’()R ()PII(; I Al, IJSK (NII’? The conmiand group must a1o include the party political apparatus which ensures thç4aily and integrated influence of’ the party on the life and activities of the troopo, k1d firmly and conBiBtently carry out the CPStJ policy. The political bodies are confronted with the important mission o indoctrinating the personnel in a 8pirit of’ a readiness and ability to cerry out the decision of the commanders, indoctrinating the men in a spirit of the ideas of Mftrxism—LeniniGm, total loyalty to their people, the motherland and the party, in a spirit of the friendship of the Soviet peoples, Soviet patriotism, high political vigilance and class hate for the enemies of communism, and in a spirit of a conscious fulfillment of military duty by each serviceman. Undoubtedly party political work under present—day conditions is alBo impossible without using calculating equipment which improves its flexibility and efficiency. The introduction of automatic equipment into troop control not only does not reduce the role of the specialists of the command group in raising the efficiency of the troop control process, but also predetermines a rise in its signiftcance. An automation of the data processing processes and above all the automating or the solution to numerous problems of a computational and reference nature can substantially facilitate and alter the work of the specialists in this group and make it more intellectual and effective. Among the specialists of the command group, a special place should be held by the solely responsible commander who provides overall troop leadership. He bears full responsibility for the carrying out of’ the assigned combat missions. The commander in his actions in the area of controlling troop combat relies on his subordinate control bodies and above all on the actions of the coimnand group. For this reason his ability to unify and organize the personnel to carry out the combat missions, and his capacity to rely on the staff, the party and Koinsomol organizations are essential conditions for efficient troop control. At the same time, the commander bears sole responsibility- both for his own actions as well as for the activities of his subordinate organs and troops. A decision taken by him to carry out the combat missions contronting the subordinate troops is the apex of all the work of the control bodies and is accepted for execution by all servicemen. The isolating of the basic functional groups of personnel in the ASUV makes it possible to differentiate the general problem of an optimum coordination of man and automatic equipment in the form of solving three basic problems which correspond to the three basic groups of’ specialists. As a whole, the necessity of the optimum coordination of man and a tech— n1c1 device necessitates a correlation between the data display devices and the sensory system ot man. Here the properties of the indicators largely determine the effectiveness of human activities in detecting the signal, ascertaining its meaning, recreating missed or distorted information, and so forth. 1k9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY S APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 — I. - —n IOk (U’F (Cl Al. (JS ONI4Y rtnA Undoubtedly the vrious types of instruments used as disp1ay possess varying visibility. For this reason the method and form of presenting information to a person hou1d correspond to the nature of his baGic functions in the ASUV. Each of the previously- iio1rted three basic groups of specialists in the ASIJV reciuires the designing nd use of specific data display devices. tlning the examples of foreign ASUV, let us examine the specific eature of solving the problem of an optimum coordination of man and equipment in the carrying out of intraystem functions by man. Zn these ASUV, the operator acts primarity as the receiver of information coming into him through the sernory channels of varying modality. Mere the criterion for 9electing the nature of the channel i its throughput data capacity as well as a person’s reaction time to the given message. According to the materials of modern research, the shortest reaction time in a man is to tactile, olfactory and vibration signa1, followed by acoustical and viua1. At the same time, t.e foreign press has pointed out that the designers of military equipment often overload the visual channel and this leads to a decline in the efficiency of the operator’s activities. As has been established br molern reRearch, a person is capable of perceiving just 70 bits of information per second over the visual channel. Specia1ist tee1 that at present the possibility has appeared of distributing information evenly between the various sensory channels. Thus, in using the property of the tactile channel which possesses the shortest reaction time, it is possible to place on the skin of the operator’s arm instruments which would inform him of the position of the controlled object in the form of vibration signals. Such instruments can also play a particular role in the ASUV in which the operator receives a large flow of information frequently requiring an immediate reaction. The next fundamental problem which must be solved for the optimum match— ing of the human operator and the automatic device in the ASUV is the problem of the lenguage of their conmiunication. In the opinion of foreign specialists, one of the real ways for solving this problem at present can be the use of cathode ray tubes built into the computers and having a graphic display on which the operator graphically depicts the structure of the problem to be solved using a special light pencil. The automatic device carries out the necessary calculations, putting them out either on a pmn tape or also graphically, and the research carried out has shown the exceptional promise of such a design, particularly in planning combat operations involving the use of maps, various diagrams, graphs, and so forth. ;1] . ___________________________;0] APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001000100063 150 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Let u exandne the specific features of’ solving the problem of an optimum coordination with the carrying out of extrasystem functions by man. In this instance the basic task8 of a man re monitoring the operations of control equipment, ensuring the set opcrating conditions of the equipment, monitoring the quality or its functioning, preventing and eliminating emergencies, and so torth. The problem of coordination obviously hou1d onsist of creating display equipment which would reflect all the particular features of the functioning of the technical devices in the ASUV and would make it possible for the person to carry out technical diagnosis and estftblish the reason and nature of the emergency. In such an instance the development of displays which reflect the entire system of features in the functioning system can be of great importance for raising the efficient activities of man. Uua11y information on each most important parameter or a technical device is read off a separate instrument located on an instrument panel or control board. In reading the indications from each separate instrument, a person should imagine a complete picture of the f’unctioning of the technical device. However the possibilities of a person to read the indications from the indicators are rather limited, and an increase in their number merely impedes the functioning of the operator. In the opinion of foreign specialists, this problem has assumed great significance in the ASUV with their cumbersome flows of very extensive information on the state of each of the functional assemblies of the “large system,” where an entire establishment exists observing a specially equipped emergency board on which hundreds of instruments show the particu— mr features in the functioning of the most characteristic assemblies of the equipment. Of course, under such conditions a mental synthesizing of their readings into a whole picture is virtually impossible. Special— 1st feel that at present, on the basis of the achievements in psycholor and the development of equipment, it would be possible to develop indicators which provide a person with the basic parameters of the automatic device in the form of an already composed unified picture. In such an instance the person would no longer be concerned with a mental synthesiz— irig of the individual elements into a single picture, as this is done for him by the instrument. Thus, several individual instruments which reflect the functional parameters of a technical device could be replaced by a single star the number of rays of which corresponds to the number of in— strument, while the length, color and position of the rays provide information on the normal operation of the system. Here in the human mind an image ,f the star is reinforced and this reflects the optimum function— in of the computer, and by using the controls he endeavors to obtain this image, no longer comparing it each time with the specific conditions of the ASIJV. ;1] !IiJ.1 .II1!I .. .1 • __. IiiI i F! [H1T i.’IiTiIi1 .J II Jri IIM4f ii thTiTiHiIiTiHiTi!ii ______________________________;0] 151 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 TOR OVFTCIAL USE ONLY Thus, the problem of keeping track of the functioning of a technical device using a similar instrument would be significantly simplified and as a result of this the efficient activities of man in determining the state of the systems would be increased. Let us examine the specific features of solving the problem of coordinating the command group. For taking a sound combat decision, the commander inunt correctly assess the problem situation and have a clear notion of the time—and—space position of the controlled objects on the spot. The realization of the principle -‘f viibi1ity in the display equipment in foreign ASUV is achieved by developing indicators of the plotting board type, mnemonic devices as well as using screen—type indicators which provide an all—round or sector view of space and on which the commander can visually represent the position of the controlled objects relative to the enemy. Here the relationships between the objects are modeled in different sensory features of the disp1ar elements which create a dynamic picture, the subjective image of which is formed on the basis of the visually presented image of the combat situation and is used in taking a combat decision. Under real conditions of a combat situation, the commander should, in adcIi— tion, receive definite information on the characteristics of each controlled object and essential for solving o. specific combat problem. Most often such Information is provided to the commander by the staff in a verbal or written form. In the ASTJV, for this purpose it is possible to use digital or alphanumerical forms which are displayed on the indicator next to the blip from the given object. There is also another way of coordination, that is, from man to the automaton, and the essence of this consists in a certain adaptation of man to the particular features of the equipment. The realization of this way also has its specific features depending upon the particular features of each of the three basic groups of tho ASUV specialists. Let us examine an example of solving the problem of optimum coordination in the event of the carrying out by man of intrasystem functions which have been most clearly expressed In operator work. As a whole the conditions for the activities of an operator in the ASUV are completely determi.ned by the great dynamicness and by the probability nature of a change in the combat situation. Abroad it is felt that operators can be exposed to stimuli related to the nature of the environment such as: A change in temperature, constant vibration, the effect of noise, ad so forth. These conditions can have a substantial unfavorable influence on the human organism, in reducing the efficiency of its activities. It must be pointed out that the rigid limitaticns of the size of a 152 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CIA-RDP82J - —— FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, FOR OFPtCTAL USE ONLY control board create serious ill Cficulties for the rational placement equipment and impede the operator’s work. All of’ this requires from an operator the development of such psycho1og.— cal qualities as the capacity to rapidly analyze the situation, emotional stability, the capacity to allocate attention, high sensory qualities and definite motor skills raised to the point of being automatic. For this reason, in professional recruitment for operator positions and with subsequent training, exceptionally high demands are placed on the servicemen. However, the most effective means for realizing this path of solving the problem of an optimum coordination is the training of the operator. In particular, this is manifested in the dependence of the reaction speed of the operator to the information content of the signal. Thus, in the first stage of training the reaction speed of a person depends upon the physical characteristics of the signal, and above all on the relationship of the signal to the background. In causing the orinta— tion activity of an operator, this factor in a wy conceals the information content of the signal, and this definitely tells on the efficiency of the operator’s work. Under these conditions the operator begins to respond in the same manner to the appearance of a secondary signal, for example the blips from clouds, and to a signal of such enormous importance as information on enemy’ strategic bombers. However, at a certain level of the operator’s training, the possibility of the appearance of the given signal and the corresponding degree of its expectation become the basic determinant in the speed of his reaction. The dependence of the reaction time upon the information content of the signal has a linear character which is described by- the so—called Hick’s law. Here the operator considers the degree of importance of the information cont.ained in the signal received by him, and his response time rises depending upon the degree of its importance. In the eourSe of’ further training of the operator, strong associative ties re ford between the displayed signals of increased importance arid the definite rctions to them. As a result, the reaction time to these iigna1s becomes constant. The operator who has achieved a high degree of training reonds to the signals simultaneously. He has no need of making a choict between the information significance of the signal and the reaction to it. I’he zolving ci’f the problem of the relative coordination of man and equipment tiiume definite specific features in the event that the man or operator performs extraystem functions. The work o1 the specialists in the extrasystem group hder the conditions of the normal functioning of the system comes down to monitoring the operating conditions of the equipment. But in a critical situation, a rapid evaluation of the nature of the emergency’ and the taking of a decision to eliminate it are demanded from the person. ;1] —‘ .J J 1•1VA .1 — Ill fii Fl!. II iT v .1 .13kiTi).i.’ri1 liTiTi IiTiTiHmTiT;0] 153 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A., I- APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 For ctrrying out theie ttiolcn t,hc peei1it in the extraiystem group nhould possesH jWfound knowledge of the equipment, of the essence of the processes occurrin In U Lila the in4eraction ot its individual a— semblies. fle munt a1io keep in mind a large number of’ quantitative char— acteristics of the different variables and parameters, and skillfully use them in making a technical diagnosis. This can be achieved both by the vocational selection of servicemen for work in the ectrasystem group of’ the ASUV as well as by constant training for the purpose of maintaining the necessary professional skills brought up to the point or being automatic. This way of’ coordination p1aj-s a major role in the event that in the ASUV the person carries out command functions. The working conditions of the command group necessitate the ability to rapidly evaluate a changing situation, and on this basis to take a sound combat decision and give it to the subordinate troops. A person who performs the functions of a commander should possess the capacity frr extended concentration of opinion, a great capacity of operational memory, a good sensory memory for complex signals, the ability to analyze space—and—time states of the controlled objects (and on this basis to take optimum decisions), decisiveness and an increased feeling of responsibility for the consequences of the taken decisions, and so forth. ilere of particuJ.ar importance is the ability of the commander to see the real objects behind the conditional signals, to recreate an integral picture of combat from the individual information signals, to select the best variation from all the solutions proposed by the automatic device and supplement this with the unformalized data. These abilities are considered in appointing a person to conunand positions in the AS(JV and are constantly developed in the process of carrying out all sorts of training, games, exercises, and so forth. Soviet scientists, in developing real ASUV, have endeavored to more fully utilize the truly human properties of the individual which contain inexhaustible reserves for his efficient activity as the principal of labor. For this reason, a solution to the problem of the optimum coordination of man and equipment should be aimed not only at raising the re1ibi1ity and efficiency of the control system, but also at ensuring conditions for the development of the creative abilities of an individual The solution to this problem in military affairs has its specific features determined by the particular features of military affairs themselves arid by those tasks which a person carries out in the ASUV. The carrying out of the principle of humanization is not always possible in solving the specific tasks of military technical designing. However, Soviet developers of modern military equipment have constantly considered the specific influence of the individual qualities of the servicemen on the efficiency of military equipment, and have been FOR OFFIC IAL USE ONLY P0K OPF1CA[ uSE ONlY i flursday, June 18, 2009: ii FOR OPFtCTAL USE ONLY constantly guided by this methodological principle in using the achievements of mbdern scientific and technical progress for creating hig1y efficient ASUV. 2. The Influence of Individual Qualities of the Servicemen on the Reliability and Efficiency of ASUV Being a most important element o the ASTJV, man participates in a system not only as the carrier of certain professional labor qualities, but also as an individual organically linked to the troop collective, the arnr, all of society and itG interests. In other words, in being an individual, a person is part of many or.society’s interrelated systems (subsystems) of varying complexity. For this reason the viewing of man as an element of the ASUV in a broader &ad precisely social context is an indispenab1e condition for a thorougb analysis of the reliability of a control system. In the works of bourgeois authors, the opinion is often voiced that the role of’ man in a modern war, particularly one using nuclear missile weapons, is determined solely by his professional and technical preparation. For example, the professor at the Universitr of Michigan, A. Rapoport, in the book “Strater and Conscience” thus describes the state and activity of a serviceman who has been turned into an attribute of the “weapons system”: “He sits before the controlboard in comfort, like a clerk at his desk. He observes the signals which are totally devoid of drama and designating commands. He hears neither the noise of combat, nor the appeal to bravely and self—sacrifice. Me is not asked to stand under the destructive enemy- fire or attack the enenw. He obeys only the colored lights which flash on and of f on the panel in front of him. The ‘ideal’ of a thermonuclear war means the complete automation of murder.”4 Such a view of a soldier included in a “man—-equipment” system is extremely one—sided and for this reason is methodologically unsound. Certainly the conditions of modern warfare have substantially changed. Now a serviceman does not always directly perceive his enenr, as they say, face to face. This, however, does not mean that he is indifferent to social and moral values (the aims of a war, its nature, the sense ot one’s life, goodness and justness). The ASTJV represents a complex sociotechnical system the reliabiiity of which depends not only upon the perfection of its technical 1eent but also upon the social maturity of the people operating the system and controlling the equipment. Marxist researchers who are working in the area of ergonomics (an area of scientific knowledge concerned with studying the interaction between man and equipment) consider this notion to be methodologically fundamental in determining the ways for increasing the reliability of the ASUV. In analyzing the humar est attention has been element of the ASUV, until very recentfr 1.he €at— given to the psychological aspect perse. In te ;1] . — . fzi!T rrr!. ,.IiTi1 , :1.1 vi[iiA.-f ii :1iTiIilIi!iTilIi!iTiT ____________________________;0] 155 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A I.’ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR (WFLCLAL LJSI ONLY opinion of certain scientists, 11psychological problems of the automation of industrial control comprise one of the areas of future economic pay— choloU. “ However, comprehensive research on man generally and man as an element of the system exainined’by us, in particular, is possible only within the limits of Marxist—Leninist philosophy. This in no way does away with the special methods of studying man. The philosophical approach “is of determining methodological significance for all others. In the first place, it fbrmulates the general methodological and ideological set in studying such a complicated and many-sided phenomenon as man. Secondly, in being based on special sciences of the system of human knowledge and its synthesizing possibilities, it contributes té the development of an integrated notion of man.”6 Due to the fact that in Marxist literature a uniform understanding of the structure of a personality and its qualities has not been achieved, it is advisable to give one of the possible variations for solving this problem, and on its basis disclose the basic lines for the impact of man on rais— iñg the reliability of the ASUV. Naturally the behavior of man and his activities within the ASUV are subordinate to the general patterns which determine his behavior and activity. This can only be a question of the specific behavior and activity determined by the particular features of functioning in the ASUV as well as the interpersonal relationships formed in it. In a man who represents a dialectical unity of two principles——natural and social—-there Is the development of all the components and their properties following two programs——genetic and social. In realizing a genetic program, man develops as a biological species end is subordinate to the patterns of highly developed living beings. “...The very fact of the origin of man from the animal world,” wrote F. &igels on this question, “determines that man will never be completely free from the properties inherent to an animal....”7 Obviously there is inherent to man a complex of biological (natural) qualities manifested in his functions as a living being (irritability, biological adaptation within certain limits to changes in the environment, fatigue, the ability to restore vital functions, and so forth) Also inherent to man is a complex of qualities formed under the effect of the genetic program but altered under the conditions of social development. These include: The selective capacity of the analyzers to perceive signals from the outside, attention, speed of motor movements, and so forth. The history of the biological adaptation of man to the environment which has occurred over hundreds of thousands of years as well. thi nioi1 experience are reflected in their formation. According to the information of the well known English physiologist, one of the pioneers in electroencephalographic research on the brain, Walter Grey, the electric activity of the brain In so—called identical twins in a state of quieG is maintained for 156 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Thurs j, June 18, 2009: CI,-. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY years, that is, is marked by great stability. However, in the responses to stimuli ,n.accord’with the different social experience of these twins, noticeable differences are observed in the patterns of electrical activity in their brains.8 For this reason, a number of the mental qualities of man, although predominantly determined by the genetic program but also modified under the effect of the social program, should be termed biosocial qualities. Undoubtedly the particular features of the biological and bioocia1 qualities of man determine his reliability as an element of the ASUV. At the same time, man possesses qualities which he acquired in the process of assimilating social experience, in the accumulating of material and spiritual values and in the manifestation of his social activity. Precisely these qualities determine the essence of man as an individual. “...The essence of the ‘articu1ar individual’,” wrote K. Marx, “is not in his beard, not in his blood, and not in his abstract physical nature, but rather his social quality....”9 The qualities of a person as an individual have come to be termed individual qualities. These are or— dinarily divided into physical and spiritual. The former arise on the basis of natural properties and characterize man precisely from the social aspect. They consist in his physical endurance, work efficiency, the ability to regulate the expenditure of his physical enerr, to coordinate body movement, to direct the activities of analyzers in accord with the set goal. The movements of the hands of a surgeon, a composer or a setter on an automatic line are not only and not so much the consequence of a gift àf nature as a result of skills acquired in the process of social practice. Physical qualities are sri inseparable component of the individual. Thus, K. Marx, in describing the individual qualities of a worker, also pointed to his physical capacities which he considered to be determined social qualities. 10 In participating in the ASTJV in the role of an element in it, a serviceman broadly applies his physical individual qualities. His abi1itr to endure physical stress, to work productively under the conditions of modern combat, to promptly overcome apathy and maintain attention under the conditions of the lack of active stimuli, and to master the equipment—-all of this is acquired in the process of long and specific training. The spiritual qualities of the individual are marked by a significnt1y more complex structure. By them a person carries out the following fund— tions: Cognitive—informational (a selective attitude toward the ordinary flow of information, an evaluation of its significance, systematization, storage and reproduction as it is needed); crative1y constructive (the ability to make jump in cognition, to go beyond the limits of the patterns and automatic actions developed in the process of training and self— instruction); regulative (the capacity to influence one’s activity and behavior, proceeding from existing knowledge, convictions, strength of will, developed habits, the clash of motives and mood) cozmnunicative (the capacity through various sign systems to transmit the content of one’s thoughts, desires and experiences to other people, as well as 157 ;1] J J I•1VJ .. . — •ii i rz TA.II i AITITIl V .1 ii :liIiTil iiTiTi1IiTiTiT ____________________________;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OF1TCIA1J USE ONLY perceive the significance of the signs which others use); emotional- sensory (the capacity to experience all acts of. vital activity). All the qualities o ntan are intertwined into the social activity of the individual who does not act just a the spiritual or exc1usive1r as the physical, but rather is a 5ynthesis of both. However the concrete type of’ an ‘s activity can be related to the predominant expenditure of spiritual or physical efforts. ThiG circumstance makes it possible to conditionally term certain types of activity as predominantly mental or physical labor Depending upon the spheres and nature of applying spiritual and physical forces of the socialist trpe individual, it is possible to isolate the following complexes (groups) of its qualities: Sociopolitical (loyalty to the cause of communism, socialist patriotism and interna.tionallsm, intolerance of social injustice, and sociopolitical activity); professional— labor where military qualities are a specific variety (competence, labor activeness, and so forth); family—domestic which realize the rights and duties of an individual in relation to other members of the family, relatives and neighbors; cultural—aesthetic (general education, the ability to use cultural values and participate in their creation); moral qualities (the attitude toward moral values manifested in the conduct of the individual) In permeating all other qualities and in possessing the capacity for integrating them, moral qualities usually act in combination with them (moral political, moral labor, moral combat, and so forth). Cultural and aesthetic •qualities possess the same property Al]. or these spiritual qualities of man gain their integrated embodiment in his ideo1or which is an integrated system of views on the world around (reality) and his place in it. However an ideo1or can be ordinary (formed in the process of daily practice and contact with other people) and scientific, including idealistic or materialistic, religious or atheistic, and so forth. In the armies of the socialist countries, a scientific communist ideo1or is constantly and iteadi’astl,y instilled in the servicemen. Its influence on the activity and conduct of the individual is so great that the 214th CPSU Congress defined the task of developing a communist ideo1OP in all workers as the core of all the party’s ideological and indoctrinational work.11 This thesis was also reflected in the decisions of the 25th Party Congress A scientific ideology of the individual12 represents a system of dialectical materialistic (philosophical), economic and sociopolitical convictions and assimilated fundamental conclusions of social and natural sciences which provide an integrated and adequate notion of the world and the place of the individual in the struggle for social progress and communism. 158 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR .z; iflursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-008 n. A FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consequently,Lwith the present level of the development of knowledge, it is impossible to speak of a scientific ideo1or of an individual if it has not mastered Marxirnn.-Leninism as the basis of this ideo1or. At the snme time, scientific ideology cannot be considered complete if the individua1 along with this basis, has not assimilated the fundamental conclusions of the natural (physics, biology, astrononr, and so rorth) and social (3,aw, ethics, aesthetics, and so forth) sciences. Ideological knowledge gains true force and causes the individual to become socio— po1itica11raàtive In the struggle for coimnunism only when this knowledge becomes its conviction and its Internal moral sets. Philosophical and sociological knowledge and convictions which are one of the components of the scientific ideo1or help a person participating in ASUV to more profoundly understand the relationship of objective conditions and the subjective factor and the laws of armed combat. The individual who does not know these laws feels himself to be the pawn of unbridled forces on the battlefield or in one or another section of the ASUV, and does not have confidence in the possibility of subordinatihg circumstances to his will. On the contrary, philosophical and sociological convictions make it possible for a soldier to have confidence in himself’ as the creator of circuinstanes and impel him to maximally manifest his activeness. Having assimilated scientific sociopolitical knowledge, a serviceman clearly realizes that the policy of a state, being the concentrated expression of the economy, can be just or injust, and that the expansionistic nature of imperialist wars is ultimately determined by the selfish interests of the ruling classes. In having a decided influence on the process of armed combat, new weapons cannot alter its political content. For this reason the soldiers of a socialist ariij engaged in an ASIJV are convinced that wars in the defense of the victories or socialism always have a progressive bent and a just character, Conviction in the justness of a war, as V. I. Lenin stressed, “raises the morale of soldiers and causes them to endure unheard of hardships.”13 This is a pattern connon to all servicemen. Legal knowledge helps a soldier who is carrying out the role of a definite element in the ASUV to understand the sociopolitical nature of war from the viewpoint of its legality; aesthetic knowledge helps understand the elevated goals of a war in the defense of the victories of socialism. Thus, ideological knowledge hones the social awareness of a soldier, and develops in him a hate for those who are encroaching on the victories of socialism, and they help him feel his involvement in the fate of the motherland and personal responsibility for its defense. Ideological knowledge makes it possible for the soldier to go beyond the specific situation in which he is one of the elements of the ASUV, and see his role from the heights of a scientific ideo1or. In this instance the humble role of’ a component of the ASUV appears in a different light, and assumes a ;1] _1_A J I.1TA . — _511TI7. ii .r i.’liTiTi1 .iil 31’iTiTJ..f ii liTi ii 1iTiTi IiTiTiT’;0] 159 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 I- - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , n ;1] — — J41 _._JIi • r’i...ii.i i. 1i!eL•j1 A ____________________________;0] nre profound social content. Certainly this tells on the attitude of the soldier to hi immediate duties. Ideological knowledge and convictions in military personnel re objecti— fled and gain a materi1 embodiment in their actions and deeds which, in turn, show the professional and labor qualities 01’ the individual. Although the latter differ little from the analogous qualities of specialists working in nationo.1 economic automated control and service systems, however they are realized in specific and rapidly changing situations of armed combat. Under these conditions the enenr can impede or completely disrupt control. Moreover, the circumstances oI’ comb.t strictly limit the time for a person to take a sound decision, and create a constant danger for liI’e. The military qualities of servicemen engaged .n an ASUV depend to a significant degree upon the training level, experience and skills in using equipment. In turn, the effect from the tnanifestatio of military qualities is determined by the scientific organization of labor of all the servicemen employed in the ASUV. It 1s generally known that the NOT is determined by the conformity of the organizational forms o1 human activity to the laws of this activity. In terms of the ASUV, this means to what degree the organizational forms of the activities of the men correspond to the laws of the successful functioning of the control system. NOT includes a system of intercoordinated measures which permit the constant maintaining of high combat readiness and capability of the ser’ricemen, and the ability to attain maximum results with minimum out1ars of time, mental and physical enerr of the servicernen, the least losses in personnel and equipment, optimum use of the equipment, and the constant maintaining of it in operational readiness. An improvement in control is tied to a further improvement in the automating of control processes and control qualities of the ASUV leaders as well as all the servicemen working in it. The ability to plan one’s own activities and those of subordinates, to foresee a change in conditions, and to optimally allocate one’s forces and means in accord with the general and particular tasks is not acquired all at once. Under combat conditions, the reliability of the ASUV will be higher the more complete the control qualities of the commanders. One of the widely found shortcomings in the control of ASUV is the inability of the commanders of individual elements in the control system to optimally allocate the load (duties). Most often the greatest burden falls on the commanders and the chiefs of staff. There have been frequent instances when under the condition of continuous “battles” (exercises) after a short period of time they were completely unsuited for work. Undoubtedly it is impossible to evenly distribute the load due to the different functions performed by the officers. Here the basic task is a desire to match the load on the servicemen to the level of their preparedness, their psychological and physiological capabilities and their functional duties. Skilled specialists at times experience an uneven load when they are improperly used. 160 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 I ._ - - FOR OFFICIAl, USE ONLY Thr rtLmII.y srid ilcJmf’:ltIc qur1ItIcn ol’ the norvIcenic!rl hILVe tn indircct In— rlu(lrIcc. on ttic rollablilty or tito AUV. Thc’ Irtrorrnatlon received by the rvicemen trom home hati a Gignificant pnychological impact on their attitude toward carrying out their c1utie. Conequert1y, the reliability of the AUV cannot be restricted to JuI3t military technical knowledge of the operating perBonnel. Cultural and aesthetic qualities of the individual 1so have a great erfeit on the reliability of the ASUV. The concept of cultural and aesthetic qual— itieB is uBed In ft broad and narrow sense. The• ciua1itie (in the broftd enI3e of their underotanding) manifest the attitude of the individual to society, to individual e1ement of its social structure, to the artificially created ob3ectlve world, toward mteria1 and spiritual velues as well as toward nature. Here it is a question of’ ocia1 man who possesses “the richest posBible properties and re1ationhips.”14 In the narrow sense, cultural and aesthetic qualitien of an Individual designate its capacity to carry out its daily activities, to organize its re1ation with persons in direct contact with it, proceeding not only f’rom purely utilitarian (considering exclusively practical benefit) considerations, but also on the basis of the laws of beauty. Precisely on thi8 level the monograph will deal with cultural and aesthetic qualities or the individual which are clearly apparent in its ability to bring the content and form of its activity to harmony and perfection, and to reel and sense the measure in communication, actions and deeds. Within the limits which cultural and aethctic qua1itie involve the sphere of conununication between people, they merge with the moral qualities of the individual. For this reason, in the given instance it will be a question solely of the influence of the cultural and aesthetic qualities of an individual on its attitude toward techno1or. The ability to perfectly use equipment in the ASUV depends both upon the general and special training of the servicemen. “...In order co use a rr.ultiplicity of things,” wrote K. Marx, “a person should be capable of using them, that is, he should be a highly cultured person....”15 The level of servicing equipment presupposes a coordination of the psychophysiological qualities of the serviceman with the equipment whereby its optdrnum measure is found in relying on the reliability of the equipment and bringing to perfection the skills of the serviceman as an element of the ASUV. It in impossible to deny the positive sigMficance of automatic responses and definite patterns in the actions of servicemen operating equipment. In tnem is accumulated an extended process of the adaptation oC man to a specific piece at equipment and the search for the measure of the technical level of the individual. The cultural and aesthetic qua1itie of a serviceman engagec in an ASUV nerve as r,n indicator of the perfection oC UOT achieved in a specific area of the control system. These qualities are manifested in numerous “dc— tai1” from which the functional activity is made up. Theoe include: The organization of working and resting conditiorv3, the preparation of ;1] I J1T•1. — -— . .Jdl. J4I • I iTY v.i..riiTit.1, .4iT3.rWjTjT.f.i,. .iiiiiiTliiiiii. ..Tiiii;0] i6i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY tr tD D APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 ,r. r r-_ FOR OPP[CIAI LJSI ONLY - nfl ;1] -‘ J J Ii1VA . . — -• . ITT i.sIiTiIö4 fr& .1.1 EIiIiM.ii .4e1ITIHIIIIIh fiT ____________________________;0] the work area, and no forth. Even the correctly found stance of a serviceman at hin work area can be a reervo t’or lncreariing labor productivity. A pecia1ist who ban mastered the equipment works not merely effectively but also beautifully and artfully. If the individual has developed a feeling for the beautiful, then it undoubtedly is also felt in the work. Care1esness, 1oppine3z, an absence of punctua.lity and preciseness, untidiness in work, on the one hand, and beauty, on the other, are incornpat ible. The formation of the cultural and aesthetic qualities of an individual occurs in the procens of daily activity, in contact with other persons and particularly in perceiving sensory and visual works of art. A high aenthetic culture of a o1dier is not an impediment but rather a powerful catalyst for the uccensfu1 fulfillmnnt of his functional duties as an element of the ABUV. A serviceman in an ASUV can work autonomously or in contact with other persons. Whatever the degree of spatial contact of a soldier (through the equipment or direct communication), he is linked with them as a member of the military collective. A military collective is a specific variety of a labor collective which represents a basic cell of a socialist society. The place of a labor (including military) collective in the social structure of a. socia1it society is determined by the contribution of each individual to the creation of the material and spiritual values, and to their multiplication and defense. The moral merit of a person is materialized precisely in the active, creative and military opheres and he is formed as an individual. In a labor collective a person realizes both his rights and duties as a cit4 zen and a member of various social organizations (party, Komsomol and trade union). A labor collective has a constant indoctrintiona1 influence on individuality. In it the new, socialist qualities of the workers are formed and the attitudes of friend— sl’aip and comradely mutual aid are established. The regulation of the relationships between the members of military col— lectives, including those which form the ASUV, is carried out by social standards or norms (the delTiands made on the individual). The fundamental portion of them is established in enforceable enactments (laws, manuals, instructions and orders). However, all social norms, regardless of their official legal reinforcement, are based on the strength of social and collective opinion, and the seif—awarness of the individual which is Conned under the influence of both objective conditions as well as all forms (types) of social awareness (political views, legal awareness, morality, aesthetic and other views). The moral and political viewB of the servicemen have the greatest impact on their behavior and on the relationships between them. The special place of moral and political views in the system of control— ling the behavior of servicemen is explained by the foUowin factor3. 1C2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006-3 FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY In the first place, in moral views and standards, in contrast to others (for xaznp1é, cientif1c), behavior is reflected in the most concentrated form. Ior this reason, at timen the sphere of behavior is viewed exclu— iive1y through the prism of morality (such an approach toward behavior is far from complete). Secondly, the activities of the servicemen in their specific manirestation, as representatives of a state body, are political activities. They directly realize one of the foreign policy functions of the state, and for this reason in their awareness political views cannot help but hold a determining place. Conseciuently, such moral qualities of Soviet military personnel as patriotism and internationalism are simultaneously political ones. Loyalty to the cause of’ communism and love for the socialist motherland and the socialist countries are an integral moral—political quality characterizing the personality of a soldier o,i a socialist arny generally and one employed in an ASUV, in particular. However perfect professional and labor (military) qualities a serviceman may posstss, in and of themselves they are insufficient to ensure the reliability of his activities as an element of the ASU’V. Special professional training may have a negative effect if this instruction is not accompanied by and strengthened with communist indoctrination. One must not be Bet in opposition to the other. Loyalty to the cause of conununism and love for one’s motherland anI the socialist countries are realized specifically through the attitude of a soldier toward the execution of his functional duties. The communist attitude toward labor on the part of military personnel employed in an ASUV means: An awareness by them that their duties to a higher degree are useful and socially necessary; the perfect mastery of their functional duties; the constant ensuring of functional reliability of’ that element of the ASUV which has been assigned to the various servicemen; a maximum providing of help to one’s comrades in the interests of maintain1n the reliability of the entire control system. No matter how perfectly an individual serviceman employed in an ASUV carries out his professional duties, the reliability of the entire control system depends upon the synchronization and the reciprocal coordination of all its elements. Moreover, the reliability of an ASUV as a whole is determined by the reliability of its weakest link. For this reason, the efforts of the entire collective aimed at maintaining the high reliability 01’ the control system may not provide the expected re— u1ts, if’ the corresponding reliability is not provided in all the sections ot the ASUV. A solution to the problem of ensLarin high reliability of the ASIJV depends not only upon the maintenance of the equipment in a working condition, but also upon the moral and political qualities of the servicemen in the sphere or the ASUV, upon their awareness, morale, and the feeling of collectivism and responsibility for the conunon cause. The responsibility of each to the collective and vice versa becomes an inseparable trait of our way of life and an imperative of the times. ;1] .A 1.VA ii •1 ‘ .1 • 1rnTi. FhVdI I IT I.. dIfiThII , TIT.i.i iTiT1ii .4IhTIl FiIihi iiIiIiI_________________________;0] 163 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Ann APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 P0k (WPICIAI W$K ONLY The Dhaping of ai twarenenn and feeling of collectivism occurs in the process of the entire vital activity of an individual in a socia1it society. However, the degree of co11ectivim, as an individual quality in militery personnel, is not the same. For this reason, the coimnandern, political workers, all the indoctrination officers, the communist and IComsomol members engaged in the ASUV endeavor not only to develop collec— tivist qualities in the men but also to further their 8et for self— indoctrinat ion. One of the specific features in the activities of military personnel engaged in the AS(JV is related to the ongoing scientific and technical progress leading to ever greater spatial autonomy and isolation of one another. In certain areas of the ASUV, a serviceman works surrounded only by equipment and does riot have an opportunity to directly observe the activities of hi comrades. This objective trend causes a shifting of the perception of combat from the sensory sphere into the intellectual and rational area. iepend1ng upon individual qualities and upon the strength of imagination of the men, in their awareness nonidentical in— formation models of combat arise. One soldier clearly sees the panorama of the engagement behind the readings of the indicators, and is clearly aware of all the difficulties which have befallen his comredes, while another may not have such images. Compensating for the informational and sensory starvation in soldiers engaged in ASUV is not an easy problem. Its solution is complicated br tI?.e fact that the coninunications channels of the ASUV are completely filled with operational information directly linked to the carrying out of specific combat missions. Moreover, all messages circulate in a coded form. The use of these ccmnunictions channels for informing the men of the moral state of comrades, their mood, heroism and courage i extremely limited. The 1iwk of such information weakens the feeling of closeness and empathy and one’s involvement in the fate of the collective. This problem can be solved by employing various forms and means for indoctrinating a feeling of collectivism in the men. The most effective are direct contact, the listening to reports of subordinntes on their mood and state of mind, as well as messages on the state of affairs within the entire ASUV, the prompt supplying of newspapers, pamphlets, photographs, tape recordings and so forth to the men. Certainly, these measures will produce a proper effect in the instance that coilectivst sets have been shaped in the men prior to their entry into the AShy. For this reason, it is advisable to select personnel for carrying out strictly autonomous (in the spatial sense) tasks in the control system considering the formed collectivist qualities of the service— men. ;1] • • I1TT’.i ,.i...iTit?L....i.i v i.v,[iI:f ii liTiTi1IiTiTiHiTiTiI,c ______________________________;0] Even the most intensive and accelerated operating conditions of the ASUV do not prevent the personnel engaged in its individual elements from meeting periodically in full strength or with representatives at party and ‘omsomol meetings. Persona). contact Is a very effective means for i6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 _.___ ._ VOk OFPtCIA, IJI ONLY I (lflfll indoctrinating a feeling of collectivism and reponsibi1ty for the functioning of the entire ASUV in the men. At the same time, such meetings in a combat situation require careful preparations and consideration of the conditions which exist on the battlefield. For this reason the men in the ASUV can often function under stress conditions. A dangerous situation in reflected in their feelings, it causes negative emotions and tells on their mood. Under these circumstances, only collected, morally strong and strong—willed soldiers can resist panic, the feeling of fear and bewilderment. Will is the capacity of conscience to regulate and control the behavior of a person, and is the concluding element in mental activity, when thoughts and feelings turn into the actions and deeds of an individual. Will possesses relative independence in relation to ideo1or. A strong will (like a weak one) can be inherent to persons with both progressive and reactionary views. This circumstance cannot help but be considered in ensuring the reliability of the AShy. Will is formed in an individual in the process of instruction, indoctrination and prticu1ariy self—indoctrination under certain conditions, in the process of overcoming difficulties and victory over oneself. Will has a varying focus. A person can possess a strong will causing one to show a steady interest in training exercises, physical exercises or mental labor, and at the same time have a weak will for decisive actions in a dangerous situation. For bold actions in a dangerous situation it is essential to shape the moral and volitional qualities of military personnel under conditions close to actual combat. A strong viii gives a soldier confidence, it helps to overcome the feeling of fear, and makes it possible to act decisively with unexpected changes in the combat situation. For this reason the tempering of the volitional qualities of servicemen involved in a control s:rstein is an important direction of preparing them to fulfill their functional duties within the ASUV. Thus, the professional and technical qualities of an individual, its special knowledge and training are a very significant factor but far from the oniy one influencing the reliability and efficiency of the ASUV. All the social qualities of the individual are closely- interrelated. For this reason the solving of the problem of the reliability of an ASUV cannot be considered sufficient if it is restricted merely to the special training of’ the personnel. All the social qualities of the individual must be developed. Only under this condibion can the reliability of the AShY in its human element be considered ensured. 3. The Creativity of the Commander and the Automation of Troop Control One of’ the urgent methodological problems brought to life by the military and technical revolution is an examination of the relationship of creative thinking by- the commander and the electronic computer in the ASUV. In elucidating these relationships, inevitably different views have arisen. ;1] •iil!E.,j iiiITiT i• III’LjW .1i.VI1IhI1jIIIJIL _._iTiTiT;0] 165 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Ii nnD APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 t - - t. Th.. J__. I-- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY a a Some researchers have placed fundamental limitations on the path of using electronic computers in troop control. Their basic argument is that the creative portion of a commander’s job cannot be automated. Others have recoiized the fundamental possibility of formalizing the creative activity of a man. In their opinion, in military affairs intuition will be replaced by “precise calculation.” At present basic attention is rightly being focused on the questions of an optimum combination of the activities of man and the computer in modern control systems,.and the computers are viewed as a means for broadening and strengthening the creative possibilities of the conmiander. In this regard greater interest has been shown in elucidating the essence of the creative activities of man, and in defining the content of such categories as “creativity,”“search,” and “intUitiOn” of a commander. The difficulties of solving the given problems are related not only to the insufficient-. ly examined “mechanisms” of human conscience, but also to the close intertwining of the discursive and intuitive in the thinking and activities of man • 16 Since thinking arises and develops in the process of labor activity, to one degree or another his has a creative nature. At the same time not each task carried out by man is a creative one. In particular, creative tasks can arise on a basis of contradictions between the goals and desires of a person and the means of attaining them which are insufficient or unknown at the given time. These contradictions cannot alwers be solved on the basis of ready—made rules, Instructions or advice. Creativity presupposes the resolution of the contradictions and the creation of something fundamentally new, let this be either the result or the very method of obtaining this result, or both taken together, that is, what did not exist previously at all. Such a definition makes it possible to emphasize the fundamental newness of the creative product. It is important to disassociate this from an understanding of the new in the sense of the result of conveyor or routinized productian of new objects, things and ideas. In being new in terms of the re— suit of the transformation of matter, each article which follows the prototype is a precise copy, a reprint of the preceding and in this regard is old. This is precisely fixed in the phrase: “Although the machine is new, the model is old.” For this reason creativity must be understood as a process of thinking and activity which is characterized not simply by a new result, but rather by a fundamentally new, “previously unknown or nonexistent result.” Of course, such a categorical criterion for the result of creative activity is of significance only as a principle. Certainly the degree of newness of the result and, consequently, of the creativity in the specific types of theoretical and practical activity can be extremely different. This circumstance finds its corresponding expression in the concept of “craft.,”“art,”“invention,”“rationalization,”“talent,”“geniality,” and so ;1] . . dL ..i41 •... I1i• r . i. 1IIi1....iei F 1 Ii J4’.e IIiI!.jI1lITIJih 1iIiflh,Th___________________________;0] 166 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVEfl FOR RELEASE: Thiirdiv Jiin 1R 200g: CIA-RflPR2-OflR5flRflflA1AOfl1flAOR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY forth. For this reason the amount of a personal creative contribution to the acti.vitie3 of various people can fluctuate almost from zero to high 1imit3. Creative and uncreative activIty are not isolated from one another by a Great Wall of China, for the elaboration of the rules for solving a prob— 1’m shifts the latter from the category of atypical and creative to typi— cei and uncreative. This pattern underlies the further broadening of thb possibilities of computers which are being given ever new problems ror solving, and the algorithms for these problems have already been found. At the same time the concept of “fundamentally new” is always taken in a concrete relation to definite persons, social strata or classes. When it is a question of the rundmenta11y new, involuntarily the question arises of for whom it is 9uch. Is this for all mankind, a class, a state, a group of people or for me alone? Consejuently, creativity, as thought and activity in the process of which something fundamentally new is created, can be assessed on two and more levels, that is, in relation to a definite social group or even to all mankind. Creativity in military affairs bears the imprint of the complexity and certain znosaicness of military affairs themselves which include the different sectors of military labor. In any sphere the soldiers are confronted with missions which do not have ready-made rules for solving them. In automated systems the degree of the creative participation of the various groups of personnel in the functioning of the AStJV varies (the extrasystem, intrasystem and command groups). In analyzing the balance of the creative activities of man and the computer in automated systems, it is advisable to understand by “man” the degree of the creative involvement of people in working out the programs and preparing the computer for operation, in the process of its operation and in taking the decision. Creative thought in the p.ocess of solving untypical, original problems relies both on the formal logic as veil as intuitive heuristic methods. The former consist in certain operations of thought, including: Analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, comparison, abstraction, and so forth. The latter presuppose the capacity of thought for imagination and intuitive leaps. These methods are in a dialectical unity, and in the various stages of the process of cognition and problem solving, one or the other assumes predominant significance. To the degree that a computer models primarily discoursive, reasoned thought, it is important to analyze the balance of these methods in the ASUV, to study the potential possibilities of modeling creative processes, to trace the dialectics of the transition of creative problems into un— creative ones, and on the basis of the obtained results, to clarify the possibilities of the further introduction of automation in the various stages of the connander’s activities in the area of troop control. At each of the stages, the balance of the creativity of the conmiander 167 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (officer) and the work of the computer equipment varies. The d?ee of automation for each operation in the chain of consecutive operations in working out a decision depends upon a number of principles. The most important of them is the following: the machine is given what it does better than man. The concept of “better than man” includes primarily the indisputable advantages of the computer in speed and accuracy of calculating. The creative thought of man has enormous advantages over the computer, and includes: The capacity for initiative, the setting of tasks, the working out of intelligent decisions with insufficient data, the generalizing of concepts, the capacity for intuition, and the possibility of volitional and emotional activity. For graphicness it is possible to examine the basic cycles in the mental activity of a commander. The first stage-—the explanation of the combat mission——remains almost completely the privilege of the creative thinking of a military chief. The commander endeavors to penetrate the plan of the superior chief. If it is a question of a regimental commander, then he ascertains the place of the regiment in carrying out the combat mission of the division. Here he creatively processes the received information (the order of the superior chief) and thinks out its basic provisions. As a result of the mental activity, new information is elaborated, and the task posed by the senior chief is remodeled by the commander. The problems of goal setting and goal fulfillment assume the necessary concretization considering the combat experience, knowledge, character and temperament of the commander. The process of elucidating the combat mission is not only related to the reasoning out of the obtained information, but also to the necessary generalizations and the posing of new problems. All these aspects are creative acts of man alone. Although self—instructing machines do work out programs for their own actions, man still stands at their sources. The elucidation of a combat mission is a most important prerequisite for using a computer In the process of collecting and processing information as well as for selecting the optimum variation of action. Certainly even the most perfect mathematical apparatus or an electronic machine will not help if the commander has not elucidated the essence of the combat mission, if he has not formulated the goal of the actions or determined the basic parameters for the forthcoming battle or operation. For example, at one time in the United States certain types of tactical testing of the ASUV were aborted due to the incompetence of the programmer mathematicians in military affairs. They had completely mastered mathematical logic, mathematical statistics, game theory and algorithm theory, but were unable to work out the methods for solving tactical and operational problems and an operating program for the computers on the staffs. In elucidating a ccmbat mission, the corrunander determines the volume and quality of information needed for working out a. plan of the decision, and designates the work procedure in the second stage involved in the collec— ion and processing of operational and tactical data. The collection of’ 168 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR irsday, June 18, 2009: CIA-’ ri I- ,-_ -!-I_. - ,_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - An (1tta necMlecI to iuctdaie the m[ton ftn(i tiLke a creative decinion i not purely IL technical problem. It prciuppoie: without fail active creative search, and a desire to solve the problem on the basis of a minimum of intorrnation. Under the conditions of the present—day scientific and technical revolution and a definite information “explosion,” it should be a question of the optimum parameters of the quantity or inf’orznation needed for solving a creative problem. On this level a man can solve the prob— lem of co11ectin and evaluating data “more economically,” for in an individual fact he is capable often of seeing more than a computer can. In the very perception of the world by a man there is a creative principle and a capacity for selectiveness in depicti,,g the world and a semantic evaluation of the perceived facts. However, with a rise in the amount of information needed for the correct creative o1ution to a problem, human thinking cannot always handle its processing. Here machines come to help and they provide a speed which is inaccessible for human thought. At present there has been a continuous increase in the amount of data received by the commander and a shortening of the time for processing them. Here one must note the essential difference between the inCormation capable of providing an answer to the arisen question and that raw material from which information must still be extracted. Some researchers have proposed that this raw material (in contrast to effective inI’ormation) be termed simply data. Others call it primary information. But they all emphasize that with an abundance of primary information, a “information starvation” develops. This is caused by the limited possibilities for human thought to process directly the entire. bulk of incoming data. Even a creative mind hesitates when confronted with the avalanche of data which should be systematized, analyzed and evaluated before use. Often with an abundance of primary information, a lack of the most important data is felt dealing with the enemy, its position, fighting strength, condition and intentions. As a result, creativity loses its gnoseological base, that is the correct reflection of rea1ty. Consequently, under present—day conditions the most important prerequisite for creative decisions is the turning over of the most labor intensive work of locating, collecting and processing the information to equipment, and primarily the cybernetic machines which complement man in creativity However here as well the involvement of man is required in preparing their activity. Only creative thinking by specialists on the basis of existing experience and knowledge can determine ahead of time what data on a combat situation are required and provide this in the machine program. The commander sets the criterion for the suitability of information, arid only he and his staff in the concluding stage evaluates the data processing results. In other words, an interaction arises between man and the machine, and in this man maintains all the creative work of preparing the computer for operation and interpreting the results obtained by it. ;1] J 1•IVA iiIil . .i — . .. rnr r . .f iTiEMi .4IIIIIHIIIII rir __________________________;0] 169 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 IF I• I- I I I A 1%•• FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ;1] .J :I•IVA . ,, . . — 1ITrri. iv iii .r r 1 ii I.4’iTiT.th1 hIi1ii iiTiTi IITITIT1______________________________;0] As is known, the results of the processed information can be obtained by- the comander on a display screen in the form of diagrams, tables, graphB and so forth. However the image on the screen i a schematic one, without details. No program can provide for the displaying oi the entire diversity of events which may exist in reality. Imagination helps the commander to see behind the 3igns and ymbo1s living people, real processes and the intertwining of necessary and random ties. The recreation of a combat situation in all its details and elements is the result of the creative thinking of a cotmnander. Regardless of the successes of cybernetics, the problem of ensuring effective information retrieval, the selecting of data, their analysis, storage, indexing, correlation, abstracting and other transformations as well as its final formation for use by man at present has only been partial)y solved. This applies particularly to the military area. Certainly the very nature of armed combat contains those aspects which can be understood only on the basis of the creative thinking of man. Sometims an insignificant fact which the computer va not prograituned to disp1ar (a combat situation in terms of its properties is infinite), caza provide more for an experienced commander who possesses the necessary knowledge than does the result of generalizing thousands of units of information. The culmination point of the creative efforts of a commander is the working out of the plan for the forthcoming combat, the establishing of it, including the mathematical calculations, decision taking and the planning of forthcoming actions. The plan of the commander for combat is the result of enormous preparatory work in elucidating the combat mission and evaluating the situation. Under present—day conditions the time allocated for decision taking and elaboration has been sharply reduced. The time factor determines the possibility of both proposing different variations and analyzing them. In facilitating and accelerating the processing of data on the situation which can be subjected to quantittive interprets— tion, the computers are unable to handle many factors which do not have a precise mathematical expression. For this reason, the commander, in evaluating the possible variations of action, uses not only- the computer data but also a mass of additional information which cannot be considered in constructing the mathematical models. AU the more because on the path to modeling social processes, including the troop control processes, there still are great difficulties caused by the multiple factor and stochastic nature of these phenomena and by the complexity of their quantitative express ion. However, these limitations do not reduce the role of the precise calculations which determine the value of one or another decision variation. Certainly the proof of it (in contrast to the proposing of a hypothesis) relies on the means of formal logic and on mathematics. The commander is aided by calculating devices which make it possible not only to test out the “strength” of variations worked out by the commander, but also can to son degree themselves propose corresponding variations. In the given instance, the operation of the computer is externally reminiscent 170 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONJ.Y A rr APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006-3 PROVFfl FOR RFI FASF Thiircdav Jiin IR 2flfl• IA-RflPR2-flflR5flRflOfliflflfl1flflO FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY of a creative search as the machine proposes variations. However here also the creative activity of m&i (programming) is shifted in time and space to the sources of the machine’s operation. The programmer creates a mathematical model of combat, while the machine searches for the state of this model which best would ensure the achieving of the goal. Since the constructing of a model requires the solving of complicated creative problems, the rezults of automation at this and other stages are not only the condition for creativity but also its product. The accumulated creativity in the computer program appears before u in fundamentally new result8 now obtained without hiuran p.rticipation. “In the sane manner that in a storage battery we store electric energy, so in algorithms and programs for computers, in slide rules, graphs, tables and namograms we store mental labor so that at the required moment we obtain an instantaneous return,”7 the Soviet researchers I. Anureyev and A. Tatarchenko have commented on this question. The advantages of the machine——speed and accuracy of calculations——advance the limits of creativity. It becomes possible to ca1cu1ate not one or two variations but ten and more. The computer does not conclude the process of searching for a creative solution. The variations of the decisions proposed by the machine on the highest level of control are not yet decisions themselves but rather their plans. They should be evaluated and supplemented by man, for a model never encompasses all the relationships and aspects of the original. “For this reason the conclusions obtained as a result of quantitative research are not a decision in the full sense of the word, but only the basis for taking a decision which is as a whole the result of the creative activities of the staffs and the will of the commander,”’8 writes V. Afanas’yev. The commander, in reflecting on the decision variations calculated by the cybernetic machine, can supplement the model parameters by such a factor, for example, as the moral—political and psychological characteristics of the enenr troops, and particularly their command personnel; he can more precisely consider the general political situation in carrying out combat. At present the quality of control, the degree of combat readiness of the troops, the state of their morale and other factors are best considered by using coefficients. This is just one of the measures which make it easier for the commander and his staff to select the most rational variation of actions. However the complexity of considering a large number of very fluid a.nd indefinite factors and the limited time often necessitate the taking of not only an optimum decision but i.1so an acceptable variation of a decision. It must not be forgotten that in a specific combat situation instances are encountered which are completely new, unique and which necessitate a creative approach on the part of the commander. While repetition in combat missions and situations serves as the basis for applying the regulations and consequently makes it possible to forma - ize the picture of forthcoming combat, the original features in combat 171 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 D t ai - _.___ ._ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ,. 1% and an operation impose objective limits to the formalization and require creative solutions from the commander. ft would be wrong to feel that a creative decision is merely the result of the direct logical conclusions from the process empirical material. Although machines using the corresponding programs do take decisions, the latter, however, cannot be described as creative. Creativity remains the privilege of man who creates the program of computer operations. The rise of a creative idea which underlies a decision is always preceded by a certain difficulty in mental activity showing the disruption of the formo— logical chain of speculation. In this instance help comes from the forms of mental activity, imagination and intuition which embody the specific features of creative thought. With their aid the conscience analyzes not only the actual data proposed as the premises for solving the given problem, but also all accumulated experience and all existing knowledge. A problem situation forces the memory of man to work, and to seek out additional sources of information. All these states are not inherent to a computer, the program and search limits of which have been rather pAecisely defined and do not permit an arbitrary playing of fantasy. Fantasy and imagination make it possible to use rather distant analogies, hazy guesses and chance. A random factor (for example, an abrupt change in the weather) can serve as that additional influx of information which will make it possible to solve a creative problem as a whole. For this reason the researchers of creativity problems have constantly emphasized that chance does not replace a creative act, but merely contributes to its dynamicness on the basis of rather complete factual data. The delimitation solving creative the computer and of the intuitive—heuristic and formal logical methods in problems is of great significance for correctly combining the commander’s thinking in troop control. In keeping with progress in the area of formalizing the ever new processes reflected by our conscience, certain mental operations which previously were considered creativity have lost this quality and have been turned over to cybernetic machines. Computers are constantly advancing the limit of creative thinking of a commander toward new, more complicated problems. One of them is the further development of heuristic programming, that is, the working out of qualitatively new methods for solving complex problems using computers. These models are constructed considering certain particular features of human creative thinking. In particular, it has been proposed that not all the variations for solving a problem be gone through, but rather the following of rules (heuristics) which at each stage of computer operations make it possible to reduce the number of trials leading to the proper decision. Heuristic programming provides speed and sufficient efficiency of the found decisions under the conditions of incomplete and current (variable) information and the particular complexity of the problem. The further development of heuristic programming will be evolutionary modeling which provides a certain capacity of the ;1] thJJ•’IVA .J•.. _, ‘v..”ii i.’JiTiL F :J II 3*iTi1Afj] :liIiTil I..ti FITITIT’—_________________________;0] 172 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFI?ICIAt USE ONLY progrwn for “neif—improvement.” This will make it possible to obtain the neceary data more quickly Ibor taking t more sound and effective de— ci 1. on. The need f’or heuristic and evolutionary programning did not arise by chance. It reflects objective difficulties standing on the path of creating a precise and complete mathematical model of modern combat. The actual process of armed combat contains an infinite number of such elemerits, many of which do not have definite significance for the course and outcome of it. Undoubtedly, oversimplification and idealization in creating the formalized model of combat or operation would tell negatively on the value of the obtained results. Regardless of the promise of heuristic and evolutionary programming, they are not an analogue of’ the leading “mechanisms” of creative thinking in man, for the method of constructing their programs (the sorting of a definite number of variations and a reduction in the number of trials) differs fundmental1y from the forms of activity in human creative thought.19 Research on creative human thought shows its amazing capacity to find the shortest paths for solving untypia1 problems, and to make wide use of fantasy, distant na1ogies, hazy guesses, emotions and chance. The disclosure of the secrets of the creative “mechanisms” of thinking entails research on the di lectics of the conscious and subconscious, the processes of idea actualization, and the use of the truly unlimited possibilities of the human memor’jj which includes the social experience of mankind. The intuitive and heuristic activities of the brain rely on formal logical methods of thought and include these methods in a detached form. This affirms the conclusion that human decision taking is characterized not by deterministic logic but rather by probability model logic. At the same time it is essential to br in mind that ready—made types of mental prob— lems are being programmed. Certainly only on the basis of detailed verbatim records of the human decision taking process is it possible to pre-. pare heuristic definite programs for computers. A commander in each battle or engagement must take a decision under completely new situations in which the preceding schemes of action provide little help. Here decisions are required considering the new demands of precisely the given situation. Since heuristic progralTlming, like ordin— ary mathematical algorithms, does not reflect the entire completeness of the situations of armed combat, since the emotional factors of the behavior of the sides are completely alien to it, arid since it is incapable of a great upsurge of mental forces and inspiration at the moment of decision taking, under present—day conditions it also has limited possibilities. Nevertheless the value of heuristic prcgainining in troop control is great. Using a computer it helps to determine the most suitable of all the possible decisions. However, a decision obtained on the basis of it again needs evaluation and supplementing by the creative thinking of the conunander. This is the last and most important level of troop control. ;1] . . •ii • ri ,mr. liIiIi i.iihHiIiIiT ______________________________;0] 173 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 I IAI FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY C -nfl- - - - One of the trends in the present stage of the development of military affairs is the strengthening of the collective principle in the work of the staffs in preparing data for decision taking. For this reason, electronic computers will play an ever greater role in the activities of the “integral commander” which control systems presently are. Thus, the ASUV cannot replace the creative capacities of the commander, his initiative, critical thinking, developed logic and intuition, the capacity for risk, the ability to use knowledge from different areas of science and life, and so forth. FOOTNOTES 1. See K: Shteynbukh, “Avtomat 1. Chelovek” [Automaton and Man], Moscow, 1967, p 226; “Chelovecheskiye Sposobnosti Mashin” [Human Abilities oV Machines), Translated from the English, Moscow, 1971, p 35. 2. Or course, other grounds could be selected for establishing the group, however the proposed method, in our view, most fully meets the task of examining the particular features of niilitary collec-. tives in the designated aspect. Certainly with a comprehensive analysis of a military collective, it is essential to consider the sociopolitical aspect of it. For this reason, although on a certain level of abstraction we can disregard this aspect, in real military collectives it is necessarily present and in many ways is determining. 3. K. Marx and F. Engels, “Soch,” Vol 23, pp 351, ;1] - 1 !JrT•1A Io11 i Iiir. F!! i,,r,.1_$2n,IZ fW 1iILriM:Jij .luITiL ..riIiririr;0] 1. A. Rapoport, “Strategiya I Sovest’” [Strategy and ConscienceJ Moscow, 1968, pp 255—256. 5. “Chelovek i EVM (Psikhologicheskiye Problemy Avtoniatizatsii Upravleniya)” [Man and Computer (Psycho1oica1 Problems of Control Automation)], Moscow, 1973, p 5. 6. A. T. Myslivehenko, “Chelovek kak Predniet Filosofskogo Poznaniya” [Man as the Object of Philosophical Cognitionj, Moscow, 1972, p 5. 7. K. Marx and F. Engels, “Soch.,” Vol 20, p 102. 8. See W. Gray, “Zhivoy Mozg” [The Living Braiii], Moscow, 1966, pp 226— 227. 9. K. Marx and F. Engels., “Soch.,” Vol 1, p 2142. 10. Ibid., Vol 23, p 178. 11. See “Materialy XXIV S”yezda KPSS” [Materials of the 2th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1971, p 83. 174 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PROVFfl FOR RFI FASF Thiircdiu Jiin IR ?flflc• (IA-RflPR-flARflRflflfl1flflfl1AflflR- FOR O!PtCIAL USE ONLY 12. The concept of “Individual icientific ideo1ogt” must not be confused with all the knowledge which an indIvidu1 poseser. A scientific ideology crynttilllzoG only the boen of thin knowledge. 13. V. I. Lenin, “Poin. Sobr. Soch.,” Vol 41, p 121. iIi. K. Marx and F. Engele, “Soch.,” Vol I4, Part I, p 386. 15. Ibid. 16. Discoursive is formal logical, reooned and indirect cognition. Intuitive is the direct cognition of truths, the o1ving oe a creative problem without a clearly realized chain of logical arguments. 17. I. Anuryev and A. Tatnrchenko, “Primeneniye Matenlatiche9kikh Metodov v Voyennom Dde” (The Use of Mathematical ?4ethod in Military Affairs :i, p 17. 18. V. Afanas’yev, “Nauchnoye Upravleniye Obshchestvom” [Scientific Control of Society], Moscow, 1973, p 133. 19. See IC. A. Slavskaya, “Mysi’ v Deystvii” [Thought in Action], Moscow, 1968, pp 110—111. 115 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PRfl\IFfl FOR RFI FA$F Thiirgcbiv limp IR 2Afl (IA-RflPR2-flflRSARAAfl1flAfl1AAflR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CHAPTER 6: ThE EFFECT OF AUTOMATING TROOP COM’ROL ON THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF M!LITA!Y AFFAIRS 1. The Effect of Control Automation on the Nature of Combat and Troop Organization One of the mnin patterns in the development of military affairs haz been that the nature zid methods of conducting combat have changed continuously in keeping with the saturating of the troopu with new types of weapons and military equipment. The weapons and military equipping of the troops have had a determining influence on the methods of combat and operations and on military art as a whole. In solving the question of the influence of automat ion on military affairs, of exceptionally important significance are the methodological instructions of the founders of Marxism—Leninism concerning the designated problems. “...The successes of equipment, having scarcely become applicable and actually applied in military affairs, Immediately—-almost violently, and frequently moreover against the wili of the mi:’.itary command——have caused changes trid even revolutions in the method of conducting combat...,”1 wrote F. Engels on this question. And this pattern in the development of military affairs was later pointed out by V. I. Lenin. “Military tactics,” he noted, “depend upon the level of the military equipment, and Engels mulled over this truth and put it in the mouth of he Marxists.”2 Having taken these statements as the basis, it is possible to establish the changes in the development of weapons which ha’:.. occurred in the present stage, to ascertain their relationship to the development of autornation and propose how all of this can be reflected in the combat and organization of the troops. As wa already pointed out, the present period in the development of military affairs is characterized by the appearance and rapid development of fundamentally new types of weapons and military equipment, by major improvements in all the previously known means of armed combat, by complete motorization of the troops arid their intensive mechanization. Here the great achievements of scientific and technical progress lie at the basis of developing the new types oZ weapons and military equipment. “A scientltlc approach to solving all the questions of military organization1 176 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY development has become an imperative of the times,”3 stressed Mar 513 A. A. Grechko. Among the most recent achievement of the scientific and technical revolution, along with the discoveries in the area of the energy and transport base of armed combat (the appearance of nuclear weapons and missiles), one of the first places is held by the discoveries in electronics, the appearance of computers and other automation which improve the efficiency of control work. The development of the existing weapons and the appearance of new more efficient ones are inseparably linked to the appearance and improvement of automation. For example, the appearance of missile weapons was caused by the most recent achievements not only in physics, chemistry, remote control, metallurgy, but also in radio electronics and automation. Some of the most important combat qualities of the guided antiaircraft missiles are the possibility of controlling their motion and the high strike accuracy. This has been achieved by using various automation devices making it Osible at enormous speed within a fraction of a second to detect and eliminate possible errors in the controlled missile. Precisely due to the use of automation it has been possible to substantially increase the accuracy of the guided missiles. Without computers and the development of fundamentally new control systems on the basis of them the effective use of modern missile technology would be impossible. The development of modern aviation is also most closely tied to automation. With the existing speeds of flight (up to 3,000 km per hour and more), the mental and physiological abilities of the pilot do not make it possible for him to promptly reflect all the diversity of the combat situation. For this reason for ensuring a response reaction (the detecting of the target, evaluating the situation, carrying out the actions and even taking a decision), man in aviation is aided by modern automated equipment. The use of automated control systems in aviation has led to a. significant rise in the speed of the aircraft and to an increase in their range. By automating control, there has been a sharp broadening of the range of altitudes at which flights and combat have become possible. Modern aircraft equipped with dependable automated control systems are capable of ascending to an altitude of 20—25 km and more. Along with this, automation equipment makes it possible for modern aviation to operate effectively at low and maximum low altitudes. The same close tie between weapons and automated control systems can be seen in the air defer5e troops. Modern antiaircraft artillery is equipped with advanced automated fire control systems which provide an opportunity of hitting airborne targets under any weather conditions both during the day and at night. The antiaircraft guided missiles are a qualitatively new means of modern air defense. The appearance and development of these weapons are also completely tied to the use of automation. Electronic calculating and other automation are used for guiding the antiaircraft missiles to the targets. Due to the use of automation, the accuracy of hit.ting the airborne enemy has been immeasurably increased. While in 177 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY a RELEASE: Thursday, June .00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY World War IT the antiaircraft artillery expended an Lwerage of 600 rounds and sometimes 1,000 roundo for each aircraft Bhot down, at present, due to the automation uneci in the nntiriircrart mIi1e complex, the enemy aircraft can be hit with junt one mii1e. The Improvement in naval weapcnry is also inseparable from the development of automation. Submarine cruises over thousands of kilometerl3 to any point of the world’s ocean have become possible due to the use of not only nuclear fuel but also new automated control equipment. The use of nuclear torpedoes and ubmarine—1aunched ballistic misi1e by modern navies would have also been inconceivable without computers and other automation. The automation of troop control has had particularly ritrong influence on the development of nuclear missile weapon9. The possibility of using these weapons by both belligerents can fundamentally change the situation tn the course of combat. In addition to hitting troop groupings and other installations, the making of nuclear strikes can lead to enormous destruc— ion, to the formation of large areas of fire, floodinp and to the creation of extensive zones of radioactive contamination. The situation in combat can be further cc.mplicated if the probable enenr will use other weapons of mass destruction along with nuclear weapons. Obviously- in such a complex situation it would be 1rpossib1e to get by without automatic equipment for troop control. Thus, the more advanced trpes of weapons and military equipment require qualitatively nev, predominantly automated control systems. At the same time, the introduction of the new control systems should have a reverse positive influence on Improving military equipment. All of this, taken together, can lead to a change in the nature of troop combat. The specific traits of modern combat can be: High decisiveness and maneuverability, dynainicness, rapid and abrupt changes in the situation, the uneven development of events along the front and in depth, and great spatial scope. The automation of troop control should have a determining influence on each of these traits, and this is manifested primarily through the development of weapons and military ecjuipment. For example, the decisiveness of combat is expressed in the aims of combat and the methods of achieving them, in the ability of the commanders to take bold deci1ons and to carry them out practically in the active, unstintin and energetic actions of the troops, and their desire to achieve victory by complete defeat of the enemy. In ensuring prompt responses to any changes in the situation, the automation of troop control contributes to the successful fulfillment of combat missions with the least expenditures of foroes, means and time. One of the most important qualitative indicators of the new equipment has always been Its speed, that is, the speed of the processes carried out by ;1] J J :I•VA .. . a . • •Th • iii i.1iTi1i V .1 .1 7.igiTiT.!.1i1 TiIiIi1 i,[iIjHiIiIiTi_________________________;0] 178 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 fl. n ne_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - - - 4 d, - ;1] ii .TSkYI ii •1 - — I1Ty i.1iTiTe F i ii !kweTiTTTh1 .JITITIL .Tihl FiTiTáTW;0] using it. The development of equipment has led to an increase in the speed of its operation. The importance of speed in military affairs i difficult to overestimate. High speed is the mtin condition for achieving surprise and is one of the most important factors in victory. Speed mn.kes is possible to seize the initiative, to impose one’s will on the enrmy, to anticipate enemy actions and to shift rapidly from one type of combat to another. Regrrd1es of what phenomenon or action in war we would take, in any of them speed holds the primary role. For precisely this reason, both in peacetime and in wartime, there has 1ways been a struggle for Buperiority in speed. A particularly great increE9e in speed in military affairs occurred after World War II and this has continued in the present. The introduction of automation makes it posib1e to clearly trace the development of the most important trait of modern combat, a rise in its efficiency. For this reason in methodological terms, it is important to analyze those relationships in which there is speed in the occurrence of the major processes in combat and the development of troop control automat ion. In using automated control systems it is possible to sharply increase the speed of’ the movement of troops and materiel. These speeds depend upon a number o1 objective factors, such as: The nature of the terrain, the degree of enemy resistance, the state of one’s transport, the season, weather, and so forth. At the same time they are also determined by subjective factors, such as: By the ability of the commanders and the starfs to organize and support the movement of forces and means, and by the ability to quickly orient oneself under complicated, frequently changing conditions. Control automation in combat will inke it possible to solve precisely this problem. With the existing speed of the movement of troops, combat forces and means, man with his physical and mental abilities in many instances is unable to control them. Here the automation of control comes to his aid. This expands the limits of his abilities. In increasing the speed of movement, the automation of troop control should thereby help to increase the maneuverability of combat and to create decisive superiority over the enemy in the necessary sectors and within a short time. As a result of this, with the extensive use of automation, it is possible to increase the rate of advance of the troops and the speed of conducting counterstrlkes and counterattacks by the second echelons and reserves. It is a1o possible to increase the speed of concentrating and dispersing the troops. This, in turn, can ensure the more successful carrying out of measures to provide defense against eneir weapons of mass destruction. An increase in the fluidity of combat can be largely aided by increasing the speed of the destruction and annihilation of enemy installation3 as 179 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 r ,. .— FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 114 - Inn—— - well as by the speed of preparing weapons for use and the delivery of them to the target. Before neutralizing or destroying the enemy, it must be evaluated, the means of’ destruction must be determined, the quantity or typo of wnmunition,and so forth. The automation of troop control can sharply shorten the time for carrying out such jobs. The maneuverability of the troops in combat (en operation) also depends upon the speed of creating and crossing various types of obstacles, fortifications and barriers. These speeds represent an involved complex of various types of speeds related to the abilities of a man, the weapons and other military equipment. Abroad it is felt that the rapid automated collecting of information on engineer works, the terrain and other conditions the computerized carrying out of calculations for mine laying and mine clearing, the crossing of other obstacles and the crossing of water barriers, as well as the use of engineer equipment reduce the time for carrying out the measures to organize or cross obstacles. This leads to an increase in the fluidity of troop combat. Also of great importance is the speed in conducting reconnaissance. For example, the following fact shows this. According to calculations made abroad, it would take a modern reconnaissance aircraft 60 years to photograph the earth’s surface. This task could be carried out by just one earth satellite lofted to a polar orbit in several days. The use of automatic and automated equipment in organizing and conducting reconnaissance is one of the most promising directions. The possibility of formalizing and programming the process of collecting and processing data on the combat situation has brought about the wide use of computers and other cybernetic devices in troop practices. Foreign specialists feel that over the long run, by using special technical devices, without any human participation it will be possible to cdllect important information on nuclear strikes which have been made. Using electronic computers, data can also be processed automatically on the radiation and chemical contamination of the terrain. Here a computer can not only generalize the designated types of information, but also considering information on the meteorological situat!on, forecast the radioactive and chemical contamination and warn troops of the threat of E.xpoure. It is felt that it would also be possible to automate the collectg processing and generating of information on the position of one’s troops. ltr this purpose in the companies and other troop organisms it would merely be a question of signing ordinary topographic surveyors with devices for transforming the data produced by them and transrnittin this to the computer. Here the obtained information, again according to programs previously put into the computer, could be automatically processed and transmitted to the superior levels oi conriand. ;1] -. .J J :IiiVA . — -i . IITiT- t.’JiTiTiI ,‘ :111 J.viiiT.Lji1 :li .._ . iliTiL . . ..1if;0] 180 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OPFICZAL USE ONLY From the data of the foreign press, automation on an ever wider scale is being employed in radar, ir and other types of reconnaissance. As a result, the time is reduced for acquiring, collecting, processing and issuing reconnaissance information, and its reliability and accuracy are Increasing. In the opinion of foreign specialists, this increases the efficiency of troop combat. In using computers and other automation equipment, an opportunity arises to more rapidly maneuver the nuclear strikes as well as the fire of conventional weapons. In the not distant past the concentration or shifting of fire over large distances entailed significant regroupings of the weapons. Under the conditions of’ modern warfare, as foreign specialists feel, the maneuvering of nuclear strikes and other weapons of mass destruction can be carried out virtually to any range without shifting the missile units. Here difficulties arise merely over the loss of time in taking the corresponding maneuvering decisions. Automated control systems, in the opinion of bourgeois military reviewers, make it possible to solve these problems too. An opportunity appears in a short period of time to shift the strikes to newly detected installations without moving the missile units. Under these conditions, the primary task of the troops will be the rapid penetration in depth behind the nuclear strikes for completing the defeat of the enenr and seizing important areas. According to the announcements of the foreign press, the introduction of automated control systems has a positive impact upon the maneuvering of not only nuclear (fire) strikes, but also the troops themselves, that is, the subunits, units, formations and field forces. They will more promptly and completely utilize the results of the nuclear strikes. At the seine time, the troops, in using automation, can more quickly escape from under eneiv nUoar strikes. The subunits, units and formations which have suffered significant losses and have lost battleworthiness will be replaced by fresh forces in a shorter time. Great opportunities are opened up for carrying out flanking and envelopment movements. Abroad it is asswned that the rapid and accurate depicting of the situation in using automated control systems can permit the conmianders and staffs to make more efficient use of the troops in making rapid strikes against the enenw flanks and rear for the purpose of sharply altering the balance of forces in their favor in the selected sectors and areas. Due to the automation of control (along with other factors), favorable conditions are created for shifting from one type of combat to another, for increasing the effort in the course of combat (the operation), for comnitting second echelons and reserves, for chsnging the battle formations, and so forth. As a consequence of the faster and more effective response to changes in the situation, casualties and the losses of military equipment are reduced. Thus, the probability of carrying out the combat missions is increased. At the same time, as foreign secialists feel, automated control equipment may also be used in combat by the enemy which also will gain an opportunity to more rapidly shift to decisive actions. For this reason, in usiní. ASU 181 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY c’ ihursday, June 18, 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY on ever greater scales, high dynamicness, flexibility and unevenness in the development of combat along the front and in depth will be characteristic. The methods and forms of troop combat will undergo substantial changes. In some sectors the subunits, units and formations will advance even more rapidly in depth; on others, active defenses will be employed; on still others the troops may be forced to even retreat. As a result of this, a focal character wiLl more and more be inherent to combat, according to the assertion abroad. For troop combat with the extensive use of automation and more advanced weapons and military equipment, there will be characteristically: The ever more significant dispersion of the troops, the execution of bold outfianking and deep envelopment movements, rapid thrusts in the enemy flanks and rear, and the making of surprise and decisive strikes from various directions. Movements, marches, actions from a march ft,rmation, and highly dynamic and mobile forms of combat and operations will assume an ever more predominant significance. In the opinion of bourgeois military specialists, the scale, conditions and aims of a troop maneuver will be significantly broaiened. A maneuver will be employed not only to put the troops in a more advantageous situation in relation to the enemy, but also for the purposes of rapidly using the results of decisive strikes by effective weapons. This will make it possible to advance rapidly in depth, to bring ones troops from under enemy strikes, and to replace troops which have suffered losses or lost battleworthiness. It is assumed that the use of ASU will also influence the increase in the scope of troop combat. This is determined by a number of circumstances: The automation helps to bring out more advanced and longer—range weapons, and increases the scope of the control systems themselves by introducing automatic equipment for transmitting information over long distances. Possibly, in using more advanced wcapons and full automation of troop control, combat will be carried out over more significant expanses than is presently foreseen. The zones of operations and the concentration areas of the units, formations and field forces can be broadened even more and the distance between the echelons increased. Abroad it is felt that one of the characteristic traits of modern operations is the tendency for an increase in the depth and the pace of the conducted battles and operations. Here also one can trace a direct and immediate influence of troop control automation. Being equipped with modern weapons and advanced control systems, the troops are capable of carrying out more complex combat missions, and their actions can be carried out to a great depth and at a faster pace. In the opinion of specialists, the use of full automation will lead to a maximum reduction in the period of preparing for combat. The reduction in the time available for collectieg, procesing and issuing information, for 182 FOR (‘FICIAL USE ONLY OVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, ‘100010006-3 I— -J a fI - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY fl F taking decisiono, for drawing them up and issuing them to executors will contribute to a further rise in the surprise of troop combat. Due to automfttion, the maneuvering capabi1itie of the troops are increased, and the time is reduced for carrying out the necessary regroupings and for working out measures related to the all—round support of’ combat. Automated equipment on an ever broader scale will be used not only for collecting, storing and processing information nd for making operational and tactical calculations, but also for determining the effectiveness of the strikes to be made. These are the basic directions by which even now foreign specialists are tracing the influence of automation on troop combat. In keeping with the advancement of troop and weapons control systems, in the future the influence of automation on troop combat will become, in their opinion, even more significant. It is assumed that the ever greater saturating of the troops and staffs with equipment for automating the processes of collecting, processing and issuing intormation on the situation, for carrying out operational and tactical calculations and for giving the decisions made to the executors will contribute to the even greater complicating of combat. The desire to anticipate the enemy in making attacks, with the broad use of ASU, can lead to the appearance abroad of fundamenta11r new, even more advanced weapons of m.ss destruction and other exsmples of weapons and military equipment. A visible example is the appearance abroad of the multiple—charge nuclear ammunition capable of making aimed strikes simultaneously against several objectives due to the use of automation. According to the information of bourgeois military specialists, the use of automation and other scientific and technical achievements will lead to a further improvement in the air defense complexes, the antiaircraft guided missiles, the launchers and various types of missiles with high accuracy. For example, powerful small-sized nuclear charges and super— small, low—power nuclear ammunition may appear, as well as types of weapons using various forms of directed energy. For example, the United States is already producing experimental missile builets with a caliber from 1.6 to 20 mm. Here there has been the greatest spread of a 13—mm pistol rocket 38 nun long and weighing ii.8 kg. In all the developed capitalist nations, ever more attention is being given to the development of missile weapons for tanks. Mere the achievements of radio electronics are being used tr a maximum degree. It is assumed that all the basic operations related o the control of tank missiles viii be carried out automatically. In the t’uture, in the opinion of foreign specialists, computers and automation will be ever more widely used in the processes of collecting information n the eneny. In particular, there are plans for systems of’ miniature electronic devices capable of detecting weak sound waves, the shaking of the ground or che.nges in a magnetic field which occur inevitably vith the movement of people or transport. Such “electronic scouts” equipped with radios can be secretly set by hand or dropped from the air into areas ;1] -. J?riy. .JiL. .i’i iiiiriTIjThjr;0] 183 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDp82OO35ORQOOjOOOjQOO63 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY of the probable appearance of the enenw. According to an announenient in the bourgeois press, such a reconnaizance unit of a seismic type was developed for the U.S. Army. The apologists of “electronic warfare” have rais’3d a real furor around the designated electronic devices. A special program called “Igloo White” was approved find within this the Pentagon has improved various types of electronic sensors, delivery devices, relaying aircraft, ground computer data processing centers and special aviation, artillery and other combat subunits for effective fire resistance against the discovered enemy.6 According to the evidence of bourgeois military theoreticians, the achievements of bionics are being used to an ever greater degree for control purposes. Thus, the U.S. Army, by ana1or with the sensory organs of living organisms, small—sized, highly sensitive and reliable attachments are being developed which provide automatic reconnaissance, as well as the formation, collection and processing of information on the combat ituation. Bionics is being widely used in research on the designing of homing equipment. In the armies of the imperialist nations great )opes are being placed on this science in the area of improving weapons and military equipment control. For example, for the U.S. Air Force, a muscular— electric control system has been deve)oped. This envisages the placing of special pressure sensors on the human body, and these would be connected to certain nerve endings. Such an automated system, in the opinion of the developers, is an unique substitute for the muscles and can be used for control. In tactical elements, the development of radio electronic detection, control and communications devices is leading, in the opinion of Americn.n spe-. cialists, to the creation of an “automated battlefield.” Many of the foreign authors, in describing the battlefield of the 1980’s, imagine so1dier with jet engines on their back, wearing bullet—proof vests, moving rapidly through the air and firing pistols with atomic bullets. One of the energetic supporters of this concept, Gen W. Westnioreland described such a picture of an “automated battlefield”: “In the future on the battlefield enenr troops will be detected and fired upon almost instantaneously by systems which transmit data, evaluate reconnaissance information on the computer and automatically control firing. Since the probability of the initial strike will be close to 100 percent and detection devices will be used making it possible to constantly track the enemy, to Cix resistance physically will become a less important necessity for L.rge forces.”7 This statement, like many other views of bourgeois authors, undoubtedly contains elements of an exaggeration of the role of a machine and automatic control systems. Bourgeois science always endeavors by any possible means to play down the role of man. In particular, it has been specially stressed that a future war will be a war of machines, a war of robots. Certainly, the development of automation will have an ever more essential influence ;1] i J !J 1I1V4 ii •1 ,I I ItflT! i&i..Ji1The4 W .1 iT1.rAIrIu.’rI1.4I[IrIuIrI1 IiTTèT_________________________ r ___________________________;0] i8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY on weapons, military equipment and the methods of conducting troop combat end the var as a whole. In the future man with the help of computers will be capable of developing weapons which to a maximum degree will raise its efficiency. The appearance of such weapons and their broad use in combat, in the opinion of foreign specialists, will lead to a new stage in the development of the nature of combat. Its decisiveness will be further increased and the actions themselves will become more complicated. Under the conditions of nuclear warfare, as military specialists abroad feel, the use of modern, more advanced automatic equipment will make it possible to master even more significant speeds in all the processes of armed combat. In turn, this can lead to the even greater mobility and flexibility of troop combat generally. According to the information of the foreign press, the automation of control has a substantial impact also on the organization of troops. The given relationship is already notable in the stage of developing the means and methods of armed combat. The appearance of new types of weapons, the growth of the fire and striking power of the troops and the changing nature and methods of conducting combat have necessitated new decisions in the organization of the troops. On the other hand, one can trace a direct and inunediate influence of the automation of control on the organization of the troops. The introduction of computers and other automation has required additional organizational elements needed for their operation. It is generally known that each new type of military equipment causes the creation of new formations. The development of automation provides an opportunity to prevent its excessive spread. Thus, if the rate of fire of artillery weapons is doubled by automation, then the required number of shells can be produced, having reduced the previous number of guns by one— half. By this it is possible to more rapidly deploy the necessary quantity of artillery and ensure the planning and execution of fire. In contributing to an increase in the striking force of the troops, automation is one of the most important factors for improving the organizational structure of the subunits and units. Striking power, as is known, consists of two basic components: the force of fire and the degree of “armoring” of the designated troop organism. The possible solutions to the problem of increasing the fire power under present-day conditions include an improvement in automation and on the basis of it the achieving of a higher rate of fire and accuracy of the weapons Foreign specialists feel that, being one of the most important ways for increasing the maneuverability of troop combat, automation makes it possible to respond quickly to changes in the sitution, in a brief period 185 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _...EASE: Thursday, June 18, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY of time to create an advantageous balance of forces on the decisive sectors, and to constantly strengthen the independence of the units and formations. During the years of World War II, the division was the basic unit which could carry out independent missions on the battlefield. The appearance of new weapons, and in particular nuclear weapons, has led to a revision of the given view. In the armies of the capitalist states, the demand is being introduced more and more of the independence of actions of individual subunits on the battlefield. Abroad it is felt that only this can help to maintain the continuity of combat under th& conditions of the disrupted centralized command of the troops. The use of computers, it is felt abroad, raises the effectiveness of not only centralized control, but also decentralized. In this manner automation provides great independence of the subunits and units. A decisii role in the independent actions of troop organisms is played by the possibility of having them carry out missions even in the event of the failure to receive aid from the command of the superior level. Only the presence in each troop organism of all the necessary elements for conducting independent combat can help achieve this. Control over such a large range of various elements under the involved conditions of a combat situation becomes possible only with the extensive use of automation. As bourgeois military authors assert, control over modern troop organisms is becoming ever more complex. The time expenditures on the transmission of the necessary information do not always satisfy the highly dynamic nature of troop combat. For reducing the path of the information used in troop control, recently a tendency can be seen abroad of reducing the total number of troop levels subordinate to the commander. ;1] i _ ioiv . • .r Ftrrnr. ,.1..j1TjIi . .1 !J.piTIT.1.-f ii IiTiTi1IiTiTñ i ___________________________;0] 186 According to information in the foreign press, such plans merit attention in the instance that they do not reduce the combat capabilities of the formations and units. The introduction of ASU helps to solve this complex problem. Certainly the elimination of one of the levels of command would cause a significant increase in the number of independent troop units directly under one commander. The broad use of computers and other control automation equipment will help to effectively coordinate their actions. The automation of control processes has a positive influence on solving organizational questions related to reducing the vulnerability of troops to weapons of mass destruction. Abroad they have noted the important role of automation in increasing the capabilities of the troops for rapid dispersion and concentration, and in organizing reconnaissance of the weapons of mass destruction and the possible consequences of their use. The extensive use of computers and other automation providing for the automatic collection of all the information needed to organize protection against weapons of mass destruction can have a direct influence on the structure of the reconnaissance units and subunits. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY F APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June i -. - - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The influence of the automation of control, it is felt abroad, can be seen also In the solving of such a problem as inf’antry armor. Thus, the broad introduction of armored personnel carriers in the troops requires more advanced controls. It is assumed that under conditions of heavy destruction the terrain can be altered beyond recognition, and for this reason the highly fluid combat of troops in armored personnel carriers and tanks is inconceivable without reliable equipment for ground navigation and special automated devices which ensure the correct actions of the subunits and units. As the foreign press has shown, the influence of the automation of control is particularly great on the organization of troops involved in the use of nuclear missile weapons, aviation and air defense. Here a large portion of the control processes and combat itself is being automated. As these processes are automated, the troop organisms carrying out these processes are eliminated and are replaced by new ones. In using computers and other automatic and semiautomatic devices, they carry out new functions. Here an ever greater proportional weight is taken up by radio and radar formations which provide effective use of weapons. Abroad the automat ion of troop control is also having a great impact on the organization of the rear units and subunits. This leads to a reduction in the enormous supply apparatus. This reduction becomes possible by the greater systematization of rear supply, by reducing the inventories of various freight, by mechanizing a number of labor intensive jobs and so forth. Abroad it is felt that in using computers and other automation, for example, it is not necessary to draw up a large number of various registers, tables, reports and calculations on the supply service. or other documents. Too narrow spec1alization of many rear bodies is not required. The automation of control will make it possible to consolidate many of these rear services. The complicating of the nature of combat will place even higher demands upon indoctrination, skills, discipline, moral—psychological training and the physical conditioning of each man. The commanders should possess particularly high moral-combat qualities. Profound conviction in the rightness of Marxist—Leninist teachings, loyalty to the socialist motherland and to the cause of communism, a high feeling of responsibility for the successful execution of the combat mission, firm knowledge of the patterns of armed combat, the manuals and regulations, the ability to master new equipment and a clear understanding of the basic principles of automated control——these are the basic factors which ensure decisive actions by the commanders and the effective use by them of the forces and means of armed combat in any combat situation. 2. The Content and Style of Work of Cozmianders and Staff Under the Conditions of Using ASUV The use of automated control systems influences not only the nature of combat but also the content and style of the work done by the commander and troop control bodies. Here it is essential to consider the following. 187 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY y, June 18, 2.J: PROVPfl FOR RFI FAF Thiircdiv limp IR 9flflç r.IARflPR,flflRflRflflfl1flflfl1flflflR FOR OPPIC tAb USE ONLY In the first place, the Leninist style of leadership based upon such main principles as party loyalty, scientifioness and foresight, undoubtedly, is to be maintained and will assume even greater significance under the conditions of automating a number of the troop control processes. This is caused by the fact that the class approach in solving the question of using the armed ftrces as a whole and their component elements in particular increases its significance under the conditions of the presence of two opposing social systems, and depends upon the level of the ever increasing technical equipping of the troops and their control bodies. At the same time, the principle of scientiricness and foresight in ASUV acquire a theoretical, technical and organizational basis of a. higher scientific level which provides for the use of the most recent achievements of the scientific and technica, revolution in the processes of collecting, processing and issuing operational and tactical information. In iurn, this should predetermine a rise in the role of the scientific soundness of evaluating the elements of the situation, a rise in the possibilities of carrying out operational and tactical calculations in a shorter time and with greater accuracy, and the creation of a possibility to optimize the use of the forces and means. As a result of improving the quality of the process of wor’ing out a decision, the scientific soundness of the decisions to be made can rise. The possibflity of modeling combat using a computer and the forecasting of its course and outcome can provide a qualitatively new and truly scien-. tific basis for prediction. Secondly, centralization, unity of coxmnar.d and collectivism, in our opinion, will remain in the ASUV. Even broader opportunities will appoar for realizing these forms. Thus, centralization for the purpose of unifying efforts in using the ASUV can be carried out in a shorter time, with a smaller expenditure of resources and more effectively. Unity of command and ASUV do not contradict each other. The ASUV is created for facilitating the work of the conunander, and he controJs and uses it. For this reason the role of the commander in the ASUV is not reduced but rather increased. That is, as under ordinary conditions, the commander’s decision remains the basis of control. An ASU can create the conditions under which the solely responsible conmiander will have more time and opportunity for creative thinking by turning over to the computer a multiplicity of technical and certain logical operations. The role 3f the solely responsible comander cen be increased also by another factor. He is given an opportunity more often than under ordinary conditions to personally elucidate the mission, to assess the situation and take decisions in a short time, using the calculation an1 information machine procedures solved on a computer with the output of the corresponding results. 188 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006-3 P{ rn’FlCtAI, iE ONLY ‘(‘he jotnt work of’ the eorunfinder tnd hL; :t.aff uiing the AtiV also i main— tuned, although It altern iti form iomcwhat. The role n’ the “advisers” hi often turned over to the computers, particularly In the area of carrying out uncreative operations. Here the immediate assistants of’ the commander, in having more time, along with him can be concerned with annlyztrig the situation and the variatiotis for using the forces arid means, thit is, they will help him in their intellectual and creative activities. Thirdly, all the above—given methods of’ on the basin of employing riore ac1vnced the commander and his ntaff officers to outlay of ener and time. control can be realized in the ASIJV equipment making it possible fur control subordinates with a smaller Computers with displays and other technical devices in principle increase the opportunity for more frequent contact with subordinates by personal talks by all officials of the control bodies htaded by the commander. Consequently, with an effective influence on subordinates in the ASUV, depending upon the situation, any of the control methods or a combination of them can be applied. Fourthly, it is essential to stress that the professional and organizational skills of many officials in the control bodies “an undergo great changes with the AS1V. The process of thinking is somewhat formalized, and is disciplined on the basin of the previously prepared standard machine procedures for carrying out the calculations, for providing information and variations for using the forces and means. At the name time it is 1m1,ortant to exsmine d’ alecticall.y the “routinization” of evaluating the elements of the situation, the actions carried out using the computer, and not tall under their influence. As a whole, the use of the most modern technical control devices can require changes in many professional skills related to the particular needs of dealing with the computer and processing the results obtained from it, to the new methods of obtaining and analyzing the elements of the situation, to taking a decision on the basis of a multiplicity of calculations and information obtained from the computer, the transmitting of instructions using various signal devices, the elaborating of new dccuments, forms, their reproduction, storage, accounting, and no forth. These professional and organizational skills can be 4mproved in the process of special training and then by practical work in the SUV All the elementary acts of the control procs, without eceptior, work for a solution which is not only the basic of control. Being born in the panp of complicated psychological experiences of not only he commander but also the entire collective which prepares data for establishing the decision to be taken, it permeates all the activities of’ a complex rlynatic system. The decision to be taken meets the needs of’ tnc greatest navins of forces with the greatest effectiveness. For this reason the processes LEASE: 189 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - )1OOO6-3 PRflVFfl FflR RFI FASF Thiircdiu iiin IR IA-RflPR?-flflRflRflflfl1flflfl1flflfl- P0K OPPICIAI, IJI ANLY of’ the collection, proceing and putting out of tctia1 infornation re viewed from th ttttndpoint or racllltatlng the taking or a prompt and ic1— entlflcnlly sound decision. In automated a majority of the Information ncedd ror deci1on tk1ng and efflc!Ient troop control can be ydtemitica11y twcumulated, proceed and tord In a computer, For thin reason, the very procedure or collecting ta tc1 information mti.y undergo change. WhiTh vlthôut u1ng automation large portion of the vorking time or the staff o”cer 1 ient on ecur1ng the necary Iid’ormatlon and plotting It on topogrph1c maps, In automated ytefli tb” coninaider tind dtaft can rece1v all important 1n’ormat1on either from pein1 automated information ource or, dpend1ng upon the nttur of the infortnatkn and the control element, directly from the computer. All information can be provided directly to the york areas of the o1’ticia1. The tt valuable information can be provided In the form of a text using a printer. A portion of the lacking information can be obtained in the form of reference material from the computer through the data Input and output dev1ce. In the foreign ASU, the collecting of informfttion on the position of one’ t.roop to a significant. degree i done automatically, since thi9 Information is fed in’i the control system vitliout hwnan participation, using various navigation equipment uhich ha been developed on a nichan1ca1, e1ectromechnica1 or electronic bagi. Such equipment cn have Gpeclal devices for coding and tranm1tting the coordinates of the podtion direct— ly to the superior conander, or through the con,roi element directl,y to the computer of the superior, adjacent., or vhen neceary, inrerior control e1ment. A’ toad the manual data input devieea iupp1ied vith the nav1gtt1on equip— iint make It po1b1e from the primary data sources to feed directly into the automated ytem all the remaining information vhlch cannot be formulated without hune.n participation. Such can be the Information on the enent, caaua1tie, and co forth. Using a computer all the information on the situation is sorted, veritied and consolidated (generilized) up to the level of detail which 19 eGentia1 for th Involved otflcialn of one or ‘mother control element (bod,). The comput;er proceed and generalized Intormation In this yten, .s eGent1a1 ehnn occur In thc Ituat1on, i autcmat1al1y trAnm1ttcd not only d1rct1y to the work re (exten1on dev1ce) of the ottIci1n, but alao to the comput,erG of the aenlor chiet, the taftn of adjacent nnd cooperating troops, and when necezsa.ry, to the nubd1natet. Here an autotatic detailing and dhtrIbution of lntormation are arr1ed out. The poaGibllit.y of nt.oring a rather large amount of lncoilng Information n the eoiquter ot the dezcrlbed yctem ake it pos1b1e for the otti1a1 190 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 POR OPPICIAL USI ONLY of the control bod1eI to oht,riin t’rom ft dtta on the situatiOn, nature rind direction (f’ actions or one’r, own rind enemy troops under certain conditions, Information on the availability, loscs and reserves of’ the rank-and—file, sergeant and officer personnel, weapons, military equipment and other types or support materiel. Often in the foreign A?JV, the collecting of data on the situation can be carried out by the transit method, that is the information is processed for the purpose of obtaining the background for decision taking using the given specific operational and tactical infor.....tion. Thus, abroad in an automated system the basic method for obtaining situational data is the a’itomatic generation of’ them through special devices or directly from the computer. Certain foreign autonation also makes it possible to assemble vaiioUs types or information on a differentiated time scale, depending upon the degree of its importance or urgency. A portion of the information in an automated system can be put out by a previously determined time, and the other as the situation changes, in accord with definite standards (criteria). For example, in the course of a march, after crossing a certain line or a previously set number of kilometers; in crossing a river, in seizing the bridgehead, the erecting of crossings and bridges; on an offensive, after the taking of defensive lines, and so forth. According to information in the foreign press, the collecting of tactical information as carried out in the ASUV using automatic and automated pri— p.ary data sources, high—speed intermediate receiving and transmitting equimcnt, and devices for the automatic enhancing of data reliability makes it possible to reduce the time for assembling data. on the situation, to increase its reliability and free a large number of officials from labor intensive technical work, in providing them time for the creative processing of the obtained Information. A dual procedure for data processing in the ASIW abroad is used. elecode information is initially processed in the computers and then being sent to the display or printer, is studied and evaluated by officers of the troop control bodies. Information which has been received over ordinar’ communic’tiofls channels undergoes primary processing by hand, and then s fed for irther processing Into the computers. 3lnce in certain foreign ASUV th2 moat important information on the enemy nuclear weapons as veil as on the state, condition arid possibility of one’s own weapons can be put out using extension devices directly at the work area of the connnnders, when necessary the coirinanders can personally solve a larger portion of the questions related to combating the eneny weapons. In particular, using a computer, it is possible to determine more quickly the enemy installations to be hit, the required quantity and power of the aunition for this, and their distribution betvcefl the 191 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ay, June 18, PROVFfl F / ;1] çoi . . . liii i. ii ii IT1 1IIiTi ,± .iiT,vdiTi’1,i..iii :iIiIiHiIiIii iTiTiTh.. ______________________________;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY vnrioun delivery ytems. Here, depending upon the Bet goals or the criteria corresponding to them, an opportunity is presented to exwnine severa. distribution var1ation and to e1ect the optimum one. Under the conditions of modern warf’are, a foreign specialists feel, the Use or automation will provide the implementing of centralized planning of nuclear strikes against the enenr, as a re9ult of which the efficient ue of nuclear mIile weapons will be ignificant1y increased. Other machine calculation procedureB in foreign oytem are computer nolved in an established sequence, and the resu1t are sent to the printer of the officer who has made the request. After verifying the obtained data, the officer responsible for the solving of the machine proced’are, reports them to hin chief. Simultaneously the obtained information i3 sent automatically to the printers of official9 who are interested in them. The results of solving all the machine procedures in these ynteins are analyzed and are reported in a generalized form to the conmiander, while the most important and urgent are sent directly to the printer of the commander, the chief of the branch of forces or service. Such an organization of the work, as the foreign press has pointed out, ensures the rapid preparation of all the calculation data. Mere a larger portion of the work is prepared by the officers using the computer, and only the most important and urgent data can be obtained by the commander independently, without seeking the aid of subordinates and without spending surp1ui time on hearing reports. Abroad it i felt that in determining the methods of troop operations, thc results are first evaluated for the computer solution to the problem of defining the ratio of the forces and means of the sides. Then, in ob— erv1ng the situation on the display screen or on a map, the coimnander evaluates the capabi1iti ot the enenv and his own troops. For increasing the graphicness of the display and ror raising work efficiency, the situation can be presented on the screen in units. For exmp1e, first the roup1ng of enemy and own guns is shown, then the situation of the combined-arms units and subunits, and oforth. The situation rn the screen is changed upon the instructions of the commander. According o information from bourgeois military specialists, in determining the methods and forms of maneuvering the forces and means in the course of combat, the commander first of all uses the results of a. computerized solution to the problems of forecasting the radioactive contamination of the terrain. And the calculation3 for the regrouping of forces should be doni in several variations. For each of them the duration of the regrouping and the probable doses of radioactive irradiation of the personnel are determined. The obtained results are analyzed and the variation is nelected which most tully meets the existing situation. 192 FOR OYFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AccordInj to rorei,n dat.tL, the sequence and content or the commander’s work depends upon the conditions of the situation. For example, in working out a decision to cross a water obstacle, determining the capabilities of one’s own troops to cross it will be the basic element in evaluating the situation, along with studying the enemy. For this purpose, on the computer the demaru for engineer forces and means is figured for supporting the crossing of the water barrier in keeping with the pace of the offensive being carried out. Then the possible duration of the ferrying of the troops is determined with the differing formation of the troops and different variations for the allocation and use of ferrying equipment. A comparison of the obtained results makes it possible to select the best method of troop operations and engineer support in crossing a water obstacle. In preparing for a march, in the opinion of foreign specialists, the commander will be interested first of all in the quantity and quality of the routes in the allocated area as well as the maneuvering capabilities of his troops. For this the computer would first provide a machine procedure for planning the advancement of the troops. At the same time it is assumed that in repelling counterattacks or counter— strikes the computer will be used to calculate the maneuvering capabilities of the enenw. The realization of this procedure will make it possible to determine the time of encountering the enenr and to plan the corresponding measures. When necessary, in such a situation the computer should solve the problem of the construction of field works. Moreover, the computer may also be used for accounting for the manning of the formations, units and subunits and for their material and technical supply. Thus, in accord with materials from foreign sources, in all instances the computer is used primarily for such machine procedures which make it possible to evaluate the basic element of the situation which has a determining impact on the methods of combat at the given moment. The use of automation in the work of the commander and staff in preparing data for decision taking, in the opinion of foreign military specialists, requires high organization and clarity in the execution of functional duties by all officials. The staff officers must know the scope and eon— tent of the calculation and reference information needed by the commander in one or another combat situation, and be able to promptly prepare the data needed by him on the computer depending upon the existing situation. tt is felt that this shows the systematicness of the work of the comnander and the staff, since their activities will rest on optimized working conditions and on machine procedures developed on the basis of generalizing the knowledge and experience of the best commanders, staffs, scientists and control science as a whole. For this reason the methods and content of the work done by the commanders and staff officers, in being somewhat limited oy the confines of the automated system, will ii fact be more precise, rhythmical, consistent and sound. Here theoretically the possibility of taking irrational, unsound decisions is excluded. 193 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED I- , June 13, 2 ‘100010006-3 PRflVFfl FflR RFI FASF Thiircdiu iiin IR (IA-RflPR9-flflRflRflflfl1flflfl1flflflR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Thc putting out of tactlcn.1 informtic’ri in certain foreign ASUV inc1ude primarily the giving of mision to subordinates. For this reason the automated system piovidei not only for the collecting of information and it passage from the bottom up, but a1o the issuing of information from the superior command levels to ubord1nate coimnanders and tffs in the form of instructions, eonmiands, ignn1 and inforrnationo.1 mesage. The inf’ormation put out by the comp1ter of the senior staffs is automatically received by the computers, relay device3 arid equipment of the subordinate control bodieB which are the primary sources of the ASUV. An automatic exchange of previously stipulated data on the situation is aio possible between officia1 within the staffs and conunancl posts. In such systems, over the telecode communications channels using iAe corn— puters and other automation, only the most iziportant zformation is trans-. mitted and t’or which the feeding into the machine does not take a good deal of time and does not require cumbersome forms. These are first of all the basic combat missions for subordinate troops and signa1 relating to cooperation, warning, target designation and identification. The remaining Instructions such as the commander’s plan, the detailing of the combat missions for subordinates, instructions on cooperation and ensuring the fulfillment of the forthcomiig mission, are transmitted over the communications channels and by personal contact. Abroad, the summoning of subordinates to the command post or the traveling of the conmiander to visit the troops for the purpose of giving corniat missions is considered very effective. Staff officers can also be sent to the troops for the same purpose. Such a method makes it possible to give orders to the troops in a more accesib1e form, to clarify- unclear questions on the spot and to check the understanding of the given mission by subordinates. However a visit by the commander to subordinates or the summoning 0i them to him is not always possible or advisable, as this can tell negatively on troop 1adership as a whole. For this reason abroad the issuing of a decision is frequently carried out orally or in a vritten (graphic) torin u1ng technical devices. And the commander gives the order orally using technical devices when there is insufficient time for organizing combat. In this instance he himself gives the missions only to those who are in the main sector or require an explanation of the basic idea of the mission. Staff officers 1ve the missions to the remaining subor’Iinates uin technical control equipment. The transmitting of orders over tne telecode comunieations channels holds one of the central places in the use of automation on the staffs, particul&i1y in issuing orders to subordinates in the course of combat. The tranrnittin of instructions to the troops in the form of written and graphic documents, according to the data in the foreign press, is also practiced in the period of preparinj for combat. In using automation, this method can be widely employed also in the course of combat. In this instance, the written and graphic documents containing the decision are 1914 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY B APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 II IAI FOR OFFICIAl. 115K ONLY ;1] I .1 J :l•1V4 ..I ‘iT . — . 5Irrr iii i.i..kJiTiIi1 .i.1 3:1’iTiT;..ii1 :TiI..... JiIiTi IiIiTiT’;0] Issued using computers and other automation both to the subordinate troops as well as to all officials of the given control body, and to adjacent units, assigned and attached troops, and to the superior staff. Abroad for accelerating the input of information into the computers, the filling out of the machine blanks starts immediately with the receiving of a combat mission. In the working part of the blank, they enter the address of the recipients and the dispatch time. Then, in sequence, as the data are received, their content is filled out. Here information is used accumulated in the machine as a result of solving other problems as well as that collected over the conventional communications channels. The signals for interaction, warning and identification can be worked. out in the course of decision taking, and are also entered on blanks for being put into the computer. And each element of the decision in being written out on a blank is immediately fed into the electronic “memory” of the machine, and is transmitted immediately to the executors. Moreover, the previously elaborated system of data addressing makes it possible to issue the decision as a circular, that is, to all subordinates at once, as well as in sequence, to individual executors in keeping with the importance of the combat missions. In the opinion of bourgeois military specialists, the choi of the method for transmitting the decision to subordinates depends upon the conditions of the situation and the availability of communications. In the course of combat, the missions, as a rule, will be given to subordinates in the form of brief combat orders transmitted over the telecode and conventional communications channels. According to information ir, the Western press, the organization of cooperation in the ASUV is also u’idergoing changes. If this is carried out using extension devices of the computer, the coordinating of the basic questions is done in the process of elaborating the decision. The given coordination is based on information received automatically almost simultaneously in all the elements and for all officials at each command point. Most frequently the clarification of the questions of interaction, both in preparations and in the course of combat, in the opinion of foreign specialists, can be carried out by brief orders fed into the computer and issued from it in a conveniently perceived form to the extension devices and with the subsequer.t clarification on the spot. With a limited amount of time, when the decision is given to the troops without preliminary approval by the senior chief, the clarification of the questions of cooperation, like the giving of combat missions, is carried out in the course of decision taking. In this instance there is the sequential transmission to the troops of that information which is needed for organizing cooperation for each element of the decision. At the same time, the use of the troops is coordinated. Here the unsolved questions of cooperation are clarified with the adjacent and cooperating troops in 195 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I.’ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY such a manner that by the time the decision is taken, all the basic questions of troop use have been coordinated and fixed on a map of the decision. It i f’elt that the automatic exchange of situational data between the van— ou command levels makes it eanier for the commander and the staff to maintain cooperation in the couroe or combat. ougeois mi1itry specia1its feel that the coordinn.ting of the actions of subordinate troops using weapons of mass destruction under the conditions of rapid and abrupt changes in the Bituatiorl should be carried out us.ng conmiunications equipment on the basis of computer-obtained data. The use of automation makes it possible even in this situation to go through one or two variations of the possible development of events within acceptable time, and to determine the basic questions for coordinating troop cooperation. The procedure for maintaining cooperation in the course of combat may vary. It is felt that the conmiander or the chief of staff, in giving new missions over the conununications equipment to each subordinate n sequence, gives instructions for coordinating his ef’forts with the actions of the supporting and adjacent troops. Regardless of the procedure used, virtually the entire process of coordinating combat, in the opinion of foreign specialists, is based on the results of solving.ç informational and computational problems using computers. In addition to the situational data which are continuously displayed on the screens, as a result of solving informational problems, the extension devices upon request can display information on the following: The composition of enenr forces in a set area; the quantity, nature and parameters of enenr installations which can be in the given area or in a certain zone; the combat capabilities of the enemy Indicating the probable number of nuclear ammunition, its caliber and overall power; the composition of enemy reserves and their location on the terrain. Such data can also be obtained on one’s own troops. It is assumed that in the course of combat, difficulties will arise in coordinating the nuclear strikes with troop maneuvering. In using automation, the data needed for such coordination can be quickly obtained using electronic computers. In particular, the computers can determine the capabilities of the enemy- to bring up its reserves, the demand for nuclear animunition for destroying a counterattacking or counterstrike group and the areas most suited for carrying out this missions, proceeding from the available time and the readiness of the weapons, the cepabilities of the troop to execute the maneuver and to utilize the results of the planned nuclear strike. Then, having determined the capabilities of the enemy and one’s own troops to carry out a maneuver, the conunander can quickly give additional missions to the troops and organize cooperation. At the same time, as foreign specialists assume, it is essential to organize the exchange of new int’ormation with the subordinate, superior, adjacent ;1] -, .1 J I•1 Ji1 .1 • [H1T ,‘ .Ji .veiTiT.,iui . ililil IiTiTi IiTii,il;0] 196 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I’ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and cooperating staffs for the purpose of coordinating the methods of troop operationi in carrying out the adjusted decision. This is aided by the presence of reliable telecode communications, display, printing and automatic data copying equipment This makes it possible for the commander and the staff to get in touch with subordinates more frequently over the equipment and thereby provide them with practical help in correctly understanding the occurring changes in the situation, the ensuing missions, as well as the methods for carrying them out. Abroad it is felt that in organizing cooperetion under the conditions of a shortage of time, personal meetings with he commanders (representatives) of adjacent and cooperating troops can be carried out significantly less often than in the existing control system. In the course of combat and in situations of rapidly and sharply changing conditions, it is possible to be completely limited to just those data which will be sent automatically to the computer extension devices A most important condition for maintaining continuous cooperat..n is considered to be the providing of the continuous operation of the complex of new control equipment, and particularly the computer, the telecode communications equipment and the data irut and output devices The processes of taking and drawing up a decision in an automated system may coincide in time. For this reason, the working out and drawing up of a decision using a computer, according to information from foreign specialists, represents a single logically and technically related process. Due to the use of automation, the opportunity arises of drawing up virtually all the basic combat documents by the time decision taking is over. Mere the amount of work to be clone by the officers manually is significantly reduced, and the total quantity of combat documents worked out on the staffs is also lessened. Since the missions are given to the troops using the computer and are promptly fied, this reduces the written combat orders. The orders given orally also do not need to be fixed by hand, as they are recorded using tape recorders (dictaphones) Bourgeois military specialists are convinced that a combat order, being the basic document by which the taken decision is given to subordinates, particularly in the preparatory period, may maintain its significance under the conditions of automation. The transmission of the basic provisions of the decision over the autonwted equipment does not replace the combat order but merely accelerates tne familiarization of the executors with its basic content. A written combat order even with a computer thus remains a most important document. Since the basic data on the situation, the nature, directions of actions and state of one’s troops and the enenr are s4rstematically accumulated and generalized in the computer in keeping with the essential changes in the situation, in the opinion of foreign specialists, in an automated system 191 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROVFfl FOR RPI PASF Thiircdav Jiinp IR 2flflq• IA-RflPR2-flflRSflRflflfl1flflfl1flflflR- FOR (WI1C1A1. I!4K ONlY Uirc hi no necwiLt.y lo iubmLttJn opcrationiU, reeonnince iand rear services reports in their traditiont1 form to the superior control elements. They may contain only the conclusions and propoa1n, and sometimes, as an exception, unforrnalized recjuests, since the necessary final data are obtained in each control element from the computer. Due to the fact that the most important information on the situation i collected automatically, in an automated system there is a signif1ant reduction hA the quantity of reports compiled manually and the content and forms of these reports are changed. They reflect only those data which are not transmitted by automation. For this reason, for transmitting reports and instructions using automation, abroad new standard forms of documents are being employed for each variety of tactical information. These forms are worked out together with the operational—tactical descriptions of the machine methods designed for computer use. The standard forms of coznbat reports and instructions are filled out either by the commanders therse1ves and the staff officers or by the technical personnel operating tie automated equipment. Abroad it is assumed that the availability at the computer complexes of large capacity storage units, high—speed printing equipment, situation display screens with microfilming devices, ecuipment for plotting the situation on maps and ccpying equipment and, f’Inally, sound recording equipment make it possible to automate the documentation process and sharply reduce the quantity and content of the documents, that is, to reduce the time outlays on elaborating them. Here the organization and execution of supervision has certain particular features related to the use of the new tech-. nical control devices. The use of computers, automatic and automated prim’ry data source3 as well as display and documentation equipment facfl— itates the monitoring process, since the most important functions of this process (the monitoring of the position, state and nature of actions of subordinate troops) can be done autozr.atically. The information automatically received by the computer is supplemented by generalizations and conclusions from the staff officers. In this manner a general picture of the position and state of the troops is createc. Here a comparatively greater accuracy and reliability are achieved in depicting the actual situation, particularly in terms of the position of the troops, the levels of radiation contamination, the types and epicenters of the nuclear explosions and other data which are collected and transmitted automatic11y. As is felt abroad, the use of automation in a number of the troop control processes makes it possible without any delay to evaluate the decisions of subordinate conunanders from t.he standpoint of their advisability and 198 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFPCIAL USE ONLY confocmity to the exitin ritution. lore data are automatically received from ubordinater on the eiection of the direction and objectives of one’s troopLi; on determining the forces for carrying out the set mis— ilon clarif’ying the forthcoming battlo order; designating the beginning and end cf action; establishing the sector bo.mdarie. and the possible positicn of control postG. All this Information, in reflecting the de— ci1o:’: of nubordinates, is presented in a graphic form on the extension device of the superior commander, and thereby makes it possible to evaluate the decision nd rapidly make the necessary corrections. However, such a method of work in no way exc1ude the other generally recognized and practically tested forms of 9upervision. Only a person who directly observes r..nd checks the positio.i of the troops nd their state can most correctly and completely evaluate the entire aggregate ct’ the 3ituation on the batdefield and provide the necessary aid to subordinates in using automation. This applies flrst of .11 to establishing the combat capability and readiness of the troops, and this is formed from e whole series of interre1rted factors which in part cannot be given a mathematical expression and automated. It is a question mainly of the nE’rsd and political state of the troops, and the possibilities and apabi1ities of a person to act under the difficult conditions of destruction and contamination caused by the eneny’s use O1 nuclear weapons. For this reason, under any conditions, it is desirable to combine systematic inspection carried out using technical means with visits by officials directly ir. the troops. The supervision carried out directly in the troops makes it possible to eliminate a maJority of the detected shortcomings immediately on the spot. Abroad it is assumed that such a method provides an opportunity to give the necessary practical aid to subordinate commanders and staffs in rrgan— lung combat and carrying out the set missions. Abroad the possibility of carry..ng out supervision using small groups of oCficers within a short period of time is considered to be a prticu1ar feature of organizing and carrying out inspection oC the troops in using automation. Certainly many data obtained by the superior levels automatically will not require inspection. Here the total time for the visits of staff officers to the troops will be significantly reduced. The basic purpose of these trips will conoist not so much in carrying out supervision as in providing help on the spot zonsiderlng the data not transmitted by the automated equipment. It is felt that the putting out of operational and tactical information in th, AShY can change both the content and the methods of work of officials in the processes of giving missions, organizing cooperation, documentation, supervision and aid. On this level the basic advantage of’ the ASUV is the possibility of increasing the initiative of subordinates with 199 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - ) FOR RELEASE: Thursday,J.. 010006-3 —nfl—. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY a simultaneous rise in the rigid centralization of control. This opportunity is provided by quickly transmitting commands (missions, signals and so forth) through one or two levels of command in transit. In the opinion of foreign specialists, along with a certain change in the work methods of the commanders and staffs in organizing combat and in troop leadership, in the course of combat within an automated control system a number of new tasks will appear directly related to the functioning of the mechanization and automation equipment. First of all, the necessity arises of raising the level of the technical training of all officers engaged in planning combat and providing troop leadership. The ctaff officers should know the general procedure and particular features of solving individual machine programs (or their complexes) on the computers and other computer equipment. A certain portion of the officers should be able to make the corresponding corrections in the elaborated procedures designed for a computer solution. The new duties of a majority of the staff officers include the preparation of initial data and the filling out of the computer request blanks, analysis of the results of their machine solution and the reporting of them to the corxesponding chiefs. Thetask also arises of monitoring the content of information circulating in the telecode communications channels. Abroad it is felt that the monitoring of the content of telecode information is an important part in the work of the control bodies in all troop elements. Its purpose is to exclude the possibility of the entry of incorrect information into the computers and the feeding out of false information to the officials. For monitoring purposes, all information received in the telecode channels from the automated data primary sources and the data manual input devices is “printed out” by the automated relay devices or electronic digital computers in those elements through which it passes in transit or is received at them. From the materials of the foreign press, the monitoring of the content of inforinat4on undergoing processing in a computer or stored in it is car— rie out in several directions. This is done by the automatic checking of data reliability in the course of its machine processing and by placing constraints on its feeding out to different officials in terms of its purpose, as well as on the output of dubious and unlikely information from the computer to other machines or v9rious output and display devices. An examination of the basic principles in the functioning of the foreign ASUV makes it possible to disclose certain common trends in changing the content of control activity as a whole. Along with the appearance of new functional duties related to the servicing of ASUV as well as the preparation of data for feeding into the computers and obtaining the results of collecting and processing the materials in the AShy, the procedure is being improved for the work and interaction of the officials of the control bodies. 200 ;1] -‘ J1T•VA IIi1 I .1 • ilI1 • itL,..fl1T t. I)T)II4 WIi’1 — - - - ______ ______ ______ / ______ __________;0] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIARDP82OO85OR00010OO°°°63 .1_. I-- FOR OFFICIAL4 (ISI ONLY -ni ;1] .. iW)’ ....niTiTiuhrIffl,_____________________;0] The higher the percentage of the reduction of manual labor, the more tinie is made available to the commander and Btaff officers for creative, ment1 activities, and for using those possibilities of thinking which are inherent to man alone. The nature of this thinking, in keeping with the increase in the technical equipping of the ASUV and the carrying out of’ complex machine procedures on the computer (up to modeling inclusively), becomes more and more ana1ytiea1 and approaches the level of the activities of a scientist. For this reason, the fears on the question of the routinization of staff officer work are at least groundless. Al). the more so in that the technical work of preparing the data for putting into the computer can be turned over to personnel of the control bodies which is less prepared in operational, tactical and technical terms. The forms of interactions of staff ofricer can be changed in two aspects. In the first place, there is no necessitr of an excessive spending of time on various agreements, since all the officials will receive the same data on the basis oI’ unitorm criteria established in working out the complexes oi computr—so1ved machine problems. Secondly, an opportunity can appear for a c:.oser coordination of fundamentally new, creative concepts arising on the basis of analyzing information obtained in the AStJV. The analysis made makes it possible to draw the following conclusions: 1. The style, methods and content of the work done by commanders and staffs in the ASUV in one instance can be altered only partially, and in another the changes can be ufficient1y great and necessitate the acquiring ot’ new practical skills. 2. The acquisition of these practical skills should be organized on a corresponding new base of scientific and technical knowledge. 3. Only a combination of a Leninist style of leadership vith a firm mastery of the modern technical devices in the processes of bhe collection, processing and putting out or information can lead to a proper rise in the efficiency of troop control. The degree of the interaction and reciprocal penetration of the above— given ideas depends upon many factors, including: The gca1s (functions) of the control system (body), the structure of the control system and the control oodies (points) comprising it, the level of the training of the personnel and the technical equipping of these bodies (points), the control cycles and processes occurring in the systems (bodies), and also upon the conditions of the situation. The possibility of reducing the personnel in the staffs depends upon the designated factors. Here foreign experience has shown that the introduction of AShY as a whole during the first stages increases the personnel of the bodies operating the control points and only as the level of knowledge of the staff officials constantly- increases and as they acquire the skills of using the ASUV equipment does a tendency arise for a gradual reduction in the personnel of the control bodies. 201 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82OO85OROOOlOOOlOOO63 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A clear nianifetat1on of the given trend depends upon the number of control elements of the ASUV. In turn, the ASUV is more ef’fective the greater the number ot’ control bodies it encompasses, in comprehensively solving the complex questions of controlling modern combat and operations. As a whole the ASUV should introduce a disciplining and systematized character into the work of control bodies. The work of the commanders and staff officers becomes more systematic and approaches the optimum. One of the main merits of the A3UV is the virtually complete exc1usicn of arbitrariness and a superficial analysis of the situation and the taking of careless decisions. In this manner control is reliably protected against voluntarism and firm scientific bases are provided for troop leadership. 3. Criteria and Methods for Evaluating the Efficiency of Automating Troop Control The ultimate aim of automation, like control itse1f in combat and an operation, consists in ensuring the fullest use of the combat and maneuvering capabilities of the troops, and the prompt execution of the set combat missions by them with the least losses in personnel, weapons and military equipment. For solving practical problems related to the introduction of ASU into the troops, the elaborating of a theory oI’ troop control efficiency is of very important significance. First of all it is important to correctly disclose the content of this area of knowledge, to establish the general principles for approaching an assessment of optimality in automating control, to determine the criteria and work out methods for evaluating the efficiency of ASUV considering the particular features of their functioning in combat. The necessity f working out these questions under the conditions of the ever increasing introduction of automation is partcu1ar1y felt since before ordering the new control equipment cne must be certain that the expenditures on it will bring a definite gain and an improving of the control system will ensure the optimum use of the forces, means and time. The efficiency of troop combat (combat efficiency) depends upon many factors. Among them one of the most important places is held by the political—moral state and training of the troop personnel. V. I. Lenin stressed that “an awareness of the aims and causes of a war by the masses is of enormous significance and ensures victory.”8 Under the conditions of nuclear war, if the imperialists start it, the significance of morale and the tra.ining of the troops will rise even more. Another equally important factor is the efficiency of weapons and equipment, the importance of which is difficult to overestimate. the nature of the operations and the methods of carrying them out primarily upon the state of the weapons and equipment. A ;1] — ii •1 . )1 i... I 1FIiI F1!ITIiT I iii__i1’ •‘I •J ZiIiI.tii .411111H1111111 11riTir;0] 202 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY military Certainly depend A 0D APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 FOR OFFICIAL USI ONLY The quantity arid quality of the peronne1, the weaponn and the military ‘equipment, a well n the perfection of their organizational forms t.nd the procedures for carrying out combat have an ixception&Uy great influenec on the outeon of armed combtt. Howevc ,he material base of armed combat and tne organizatinI. structure of the rc,op, vhile being eentia1, are not Gufficient condit1on for ennuring tnximwn cotithat efficiency. The actual efficiency of’ troop combat depends 1rge1y upon the able ue of the available forces and meann of arud combat, that in, upon the ei’f1— ciency of control. Consequently, combat efficiency () can be viewed a ti function of the effectivene or the torces and means or armed combat (Er) conidertng their quantity, quality, orgenizatiornil structure and emploled actions and efficiency of control (Ec): Em f(Ef”Ee). At the same time, the nececsity of a systems approach to evaluating cont.rol efficiency in combat and an operation, and conequent1y, the efficiency ot automating troop coitro1 io detennied by a definite control system which ensures the taking of decisione and the directing of troop efforts at carrying out combat missions. In eva1uting the system a a whole, it 18 essential to consider the efficiency of the cornponent comprining it. One of the most important elements in an automated control system in the forces and means of control by which a renponse is provided to a change In the combat and operational situation. Here of primary ignificance are the high moral—volitional qualities, the profound knowledge nnd organizing abilities or the connand personnel, since man p1sy the central role in any system, regardless of the une of the most advanc’d automatic devicea. An important role is also played by the automation equipment and other means of control, that is, that technical basis by which the officials solve control problems. The quality of this base determines the efficiency of the control system. If this base is insufficiently perfect, then with the present scope and nature of troop combat it is difficult and in certain instances impossible to take a rational let alone optimal decision tnd to promptly assign missions to executors. Another component of the automated control system by which control is carried out is the structure of the control bodies and points. We hove in mind the organizational torm in which the forces and means of control are represented. By the organizational form we understand the aggregate of such indicators which characterize the following: a) The number of elements in the system; b) The quality of each element irom the viewpoint of its capacity and ability to carry out definite functions; 203 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2... CIA-RDP82-L P0k (WPW,IM, WW flNIJY c) The organizational sicparat;enea of the individual groups or e1menta, and thin can be vieved an the preencc of definite uby8tem which corn— pride the given tem; d) The procedure of Interaction betven the e1ment and uby9temn In te course of their lunctioning; e) Th patiRi iritrpoittoning of the e1emn and ubyatm of the given nyntm, including the poib1e onn’ct1ng or one ubyntem to tanother.9 A third component i thc tiggregate of re1ationh1ps Into which the control bod1e and pointt enter in the proce ot troop 1eaderhip in using the means o full autcmtion. Th given aggregte of re1ation ii man1feetted through the work n.ethoda, th rights and functional dutie8 ot the o1’f1cia1. Each of the linted components reciprocally determineG the specific eature or the automated control ytem and its efficiency. A c!iange in any one of them leads to a varping ot the ytem aa a whole and to a reduction In the effielency ot automated control. Here It 1 eanentlal to Ofl1de that the control tem, a an aggregate of the lidted eomponent, i inieparab1y linked by a mu1t1p11ciy of direct Informational ties and feedback vith the troops an the object of conto1 or the controlled nytem. The given feature of control system i as determining a the feature or it integrity. Certninly only under this condition In the very procens of control enøured and the control yatem hat a practical ene. ConGider1n what has been ia1d, the concept of the efficiency of an ASUV can be formu1ted In the folloving manner. The erriciency of troop control In using autometlon In the compensated capacities of all the components of the automated control s’tem to provide an optimum execution ot the combat miionn controntlng the troops. Consequently, the efficiency or an automated control nye tern Is the degree of its adapatability to solving the problems confronting 1t.° The correct. definition or the concept ot the etficiency of autoiated control i of rundnsaental aignificance. However, the very evaluation of efficiency dependn largely upon those crier1a and methods idilch are used an the determinanto. Their choice ba9 direct bearing on the end results of the eftlclency of auiomat1on. Conaidering the epeciric featurea of the troop control processes, the basic demands made on the erite1a for the efficiency of automatcd control nytem comL dovn to the folloving. ;1] !iJ•1TAiui1..1.... !N1_ liii IS fF1V1-_p,FHiT ___________________________;0] 2OI FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP32-00350R0001 00010006-3 PO1 OPPtCIAL (ISP ONLY ch criterion hou1d: a) Measure effectivens ot automation in strict accord with the tasks of th ASUV; b) Dcr1be the quality of’ executing these tanks in uning automation equipment Md other new technical means cf contro1; c) Permit an evaluation of the efficiency o o1ving the most important task of combat; ci) B enitive (critical) in relation to those pararneter of the automated control ytem, the rational or optimwn aignificance of which murt be determined; e) Have a qdantitative exprea8ion; t) Poes small di8perion, that i, provide an opportunity to determine it vith nufficient accuracy vithout large 1oe and experiditure of time; g) Provide the most accurate evaluation of the automated 9ytem from different Gides aa poib1e; h) Be simple and have a definite physical sense. The total of th. criteria Ghould not complicate the tank at optimizing the autoelftted control system. At the name time their number should be sufficient for ati1ing the most important demands made upon controlling the nature ot modern combat. The choosing of criteria by esteblishing a correlation between them and the aims of combat (an operation) undoubtedly is the most correct. However it is difficult to establish such a confonity which would characterize all e.spectn of the automated control syatem, and would make it possible to Judge in detail the qua1ity of automated troop control. For this reason, along with the general criteria which reflect the degree of the conformity of the automated control processes to the aims of combat, as a rule, a rather significant number of particular (local) criteria is used. They reflect the very physical sense of control, that is, the indicators or its contormtty to those tasks which directly confront it. In other words, a definite system of etficiency criteria is used.12 Since the entire control process comes down to a response of man to a change in the oituat.ion by the taking (adjustment) of decisions and their carrying out, the criteria for the efficiency of autoizzating control should not on1 reflect the objective process of control, but alao correspond to the aims pursued by the principal in the given process. 205 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: tn the procefl a atitfactory et demandn are rie1ectd with i FOR OPPICIAL USE ONLY of troop control, in any other, man endeavors to obtain renult. Ord1nri1y thoe reu1t which correspond to the conic1ered ati9factory. P’or thiB reanon, criteria are tone of’ varinbic llmIta1 In evaluating the ASUV, It Is eent1a1 to o1ve a number of questions ahead of time. Tn tructura1 ternig, these can be rcpreented in the follow— 1n Gequence: To what degree the given yntem increases the efficiency of using the force8 wid meatrn ot armed combat; how quickly the rponse cf ofticia1 to a chtnge in the situation occurs in It; how reiitant i the control iytem to enemy trike (particularly in using weapons of’ mass detruct1on) and what are it cpb11itie in creating interference again!Jt them; what is the adaptability of the systet,i to conditions of abrupt ch.nges in the situation; by what material expenditures i the efficiency of automated control achieved; tu whet degree the control ytem reduces 1oses of’ one’s own troops with enenr surprise attacks; what i the econon’ from automating control in the expenditure of materiel, and so forth. All the 1ited and other charactritics of the ysti by which control is carried out in combat and an operation in utilizing automation hou1d be brought together in three large groups: 1. Factors reflecting the tactical effect provided by the automated control System. 2. Factors characterizing the technical indicators of the system. 3. Factors indicating the economic expenditures on the system and the possibility of repaying (compensacing) them. In accord with this, it is advisable to examine the tactical, technical and economic effectiveness of automating troop control in combat and an operation. By tactical effectiveness, one understands an aggregate of indicators characterizing in quantitative terms the capacities of the automated control system to solve the problems confronting it promptly and effectively. The determining of this helps to disclose the degree to which the automated control system conforms to the operational and tactical demands under the real conditions of a combat situation with definite technical charec— teritics of Its basic devices and economic expenditures. liy technical efficiency, one understands the aggregate of indicators re— f1ectin in quantitative tern the technical aspect of the automated system by which troop control is carried out. In the given instance it is a quet1on of the technical possibilities of the automation equipment and other control devices and the working convenience of officials using this cqulpment under the various conditions of a combat situation. To determine the technical efficiency of automating control means to answer the quention of how advanced and rEiona1 are the technicd means of autouvit— Ing control in the automated control system (with the determined econodc xpcnditures). 206 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PRflVFfl FflR RFI FASF Thiirdv .Iiinp IR 2flfl (IA-RflPR2-flARflRAflfl1flflA1flflflR- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY By economic effectivenein, one undertanth the aggregate of inc1icator characterizing In qu,ntitative terms the material outlayn on utomatin control and the pibi1ity of compensating (repaying) them. To determine the economi.o efficiency of automating troop ontro1 in combat and an operation menn to answer the question by what price that oprationa1—tactica1 and technical effect vhich is produced by the designated AEU is achieved. Since the most important aim of control itt combat and an operation is to enure the succenfu1 execution ot combat m1.sions by the troops, the operational and tactical efficiency of a system is of primary significance in evaluating the automated control system a a whole. The aggregate of criteria determining the operational arid tactical efficienc of automating control is ftndamental. It manifests the interrelated and reciprocally determined posibi1itie of the components in the automatic control system. Since the control system must provide the best conditions for carrying out conibat, the operational and technical efficiency of automating troop control must be a8sessed from the results of combat ite1f. With the given forces and means by which combat is to be carried out, the indicators used for evaluating it efficiency will be sufficiently critical also for the troop control 3ytem as a whole. !n conducting combat, it is e9sential ahead ot time to assess the tactical efficiency of automating control of the basic weapons. As the basic criterion of practical efficiency it is possible to use such an indicator which to a maximum degree reflects the inrluence of automating control on the course of troop combat. As such c. criterion usually they use the caused (Q4) or prevented (Q’d) loss or their ratio: Qd Eac - Frequently such a general criterion is used as the ratio of the d8mage (caused or prevented) to the total outlays on automation (Ca): Q’d or With certain limitations the given criterion is sufficiently critical, particularly when the compared automated systems differ insignificantly in terms of cost. The area of applying this criterion is ordinarily re— tr1cted to the inequality Qd’ Qdmin, stelTuning from the condition oC the inadvtabllity of using an ineffective ASU. It is essential to note that the constraintG in any’ posing of the problems of evaluating the efficiency of automating control are esentia1 just as they are in evaluating the efticlency of the operations themse1ve. If 207 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: Thursday, June 18, 2009: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001 00010006-3 PRO\IEfl FOR RELEASE: Thiircdv June 1 2flflg: CIA-RflPR2-Afl5ARAflfl1AAfl1AAflR- OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY there i no contrnint, tho problem of evaluating the tactic1,efficiency of automated control systems loosen it practical 3ense, since it can be formally solved in any manner. At the snme time it is esentia1 to consider that the practical application of the given criterion entai1r i..L’fIcu1ties in determining the degree of the influence of the various forces and means on the success of armed combat as a whole. At present it is not possible to find acceptable co— eficients for correlating fundamentally different elements of the battle formation and to consider all the diversity of factors in the combat and operational situation. Although in methodological terms, the finding of such coefficients is possible in principle. Until the given problem is solved, as the general criterion for the tactical efficiency o automtiting troop control, it is advisable to use the capacity of the automated control system to ensure the anticipation of the enemy in using forces, that is, the probability C of carrying out the control problems over a certain time. This criterion makes it possible to judge to what degree the automated system ensures the solving of one of the most important problems of armed combat in the course of action, namely to anticipate the enenr in deployment, in creating a superiority in forces and means on the crucial sectors, the going over to decisive actions, and thereby thwart the enemy’s plans, to force the enenr to spend time irrationally and fight under disadvantageous conditions. A quantitative value of the given criterion is determined as a function of the time spent on organizing combat by our troops (ta) and the time dictated by the nature oC combat (tn): pC = P(t
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