JPRS ID: 8203 TRANSLATIONS ON LATIN AMERICA

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~ I ; ~

S JANUARY i979 ~ i OF i
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JPRS L/8203
5 Jnnunry 19 79
~
~
TRANSLATIONS ON L~TIN AMERrCA
CFOU~ 1/79) ~ ' ~
~
. U. S. ,~OINT PUBLICATIQNS RESEARCH SERVICE
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d1dL106RAPNIC DAYA 1. Repoec No. t Iteelpient'r Aeee~don No.
tHE~T JPRS L/ 820 3
pon
~~TRAN5LATION5 ON LATIN AMERICA FOUO 1/79 ) ~ S January 19 79
6.
r. Aut at(~) Pertamioa Or`~ois~tfon Itept.
No.
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The serial report containe articlee on political and sociological developmenCs
in ma~or areas of Latin An~erica~ as reported primarily from Latin American
newspapers and periodicals. It also includes information on major segmenCs
of Latin American economy~ geography, culture, and ethnography.
. r ~ oen~eoc Aa~ r~u. Dercrlpcon
Political Science Inter-American Affairs Guyana
Sociology X Argentina Haiti
Economics Barbados Hondurae
Culture Bolivia Jamaica
Ethnology Brazil Hexico
Technological Chile Nicaragua
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' tri tdeoeltiec�/ope.-E.eed rei.. ~aican Republic i Trinidad-Tabago
Ecuador ~~B~Y
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JPRS L/82 0 3
5 January 1979
T RANS LAT I ONS ON LAT I N AMER ~ ~A
(FOUO 1/79)
CO~VTENTS PAGE
ARGENTINA
Videl,~'a Speech Viewed as Timely, Unifying
(Sergio Ceron; LA OPINION, 26 Nov 78) 1 -
Writer Points to Conformity of Church, Political Viewe
(Rodol�o Pandolfi; LA OPINIO~t, 26 Nov 78) 6
Columnist Reflects on Junta's Three-Year Ru].e
(Rodolfo Pandolfi; LA OPINION~ 27 Nov 78) 10
Beagle Conflict Jeopardizes Strategic, Ec~onomic Interests
(Sergio Ceron; LA OPINION, 5 Nov 78) 13
CUBA
Commentary Examines Situation ot U.S. Skyl~ib
(Gilbez~to Caballero Almeyda; PRELA, 22 Dec 78) 18
~
-a- [III -LA-144 FOL'0]
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ARGENTINA
VIDELA'S SPEECH VIEWED AS TIMELY, UNIFYING
Suenos Airea LA OPINION in Spaniah 26 Nov 78 pp 10-11
[Article by Sergio Ceron; passages encloaed in slantlines printed in
boldface]
(TextJ Firmness, deci.siveneas and, aC times, bluntneas. These are Chree
of the words used by observers to describe the message given to the country
last Thursd~sy by Che president of the nation. Lieutenant General Videla
was thus fulfilling hia obligation Co give the Argentine people a clear
explanation of his thinking, at the risk of his politicAl capital drop-
ping to irrevereible levels in the gradual deterioration ~bserved during
the last few weeks.
_ As pointed out in this same column by LA OPII~ION last Sunday, the fact of
the matter is that the military government's image was passing through an
umbra which could be characterized in this manner:/"slowneas in the hand-
ling of political'timing,' indecision, pulemics with respect to retire-
oaent and the naming of collaborators, i'ailure to meet expectations in
various sectors which required tacCical rectification of the outlines of
political ec~nomy."/
Apparently, the president recognized the need for reestablishing direct
communication with his people. He succeeded in--and this is a good sign--
arousing general interest, thanks to the announcement of his messa&e
which, according to the BIIENOS AIRES HERALD in its editorial on Friday,
1'aroused as much interest in private homes and public places as if it were
, an important football game."/ Even allowing for the subtle vein o� British
humor discernible in the comparison, we must agree that it is a suitable
sophism for the measurement of a politcal "r~iting."
Unsatisfied Concerns
Many unsatisfied concErns which were inciting public opinion to demand
an explanatirn from the man who, despite the legal points that govern power
relationships, continues to be, perhaps because of political tradition,
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. the mdst auChoritaCive epokeaman of the NaCional Reorganization Procesa, ~
above all becauee in recenC times too macty voices have been heard, which
came from the interior o� this proceas and which disseminated contradic- _
Cory and at Cimes antagonistic images. It was logical, then, for confu-
sion and discouragement.Co infusc the Argentines who were~ moreover,
eub~ected to the action of the paychological factori~a which were advanc-
ing wiChout resiaCattce over Cerrain free from obsCacles.
~ The aggravation of the conflict with Chile, the gccumulation of bitter
criticisme ~f socio-economic policy~ the expressions of alarm--some well-
intenCioned, others euspect--from political figurea on how the procese
was going and, finally~ the alarming outbreak of a atrike which repeat-
edly paralyzed the national railway network, were factora which created
a negative aa?bience. ~here were too many concerna on the part of the
people which were not given satisfactory anawers. _
_ Finally, on Thursday, Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla poked his head
into the homea of Che Argentinea. The serenity, confidence and aplomb -
with which he read his meseage were noted by observera. As LA NACION atate@
in its editorial y~sterday,/"In any event~ he did not eschew the tone
which habitually is used for blunt replies."/
The HERALD agr~ea with thia comment by maintaining Chat President Videla's
words /"should in large measure aerve to put an end to the talk about -
� indecision and tiredness in his government. So long as his words are
backed by action, to the degree ~hat the new cabinet takes care of its
many problems, Preaident Videla will move his ship out of the region of
the doldrums."/ In other raords, the presidential measage arrived ~ust
in time to halt the deterioration in hia government's image. However,
- words are not enough to strengthen and reinvigorate the imag~. It is
necessary that aut_hority be exercised and that euch exercise of authority
be perceived, without a shadow of doubt, by the people. This 1s a respon-
sibility which not only concerns Lieutenant General Videla but also the
Military Junta which, combined, is the sum total of political suthority
and shares the responsibility for th~e cunduct of the National Re~~ganiza-
tion Process. It is clear that the possible failuxe of one of the members
of the Junta will have an impact upon the others.
Definitions
The speaker clearly stated the general outlines of the process, repeatedly
set forth by him during his government. These are the principal elements `
of the Process:
--The political objective of the Process is to find a/~democratic solution
which is lasting/ in time.
--Toward this end, the Armed Forces are preparing to formulate a political
proposal which will reach /"all sectors and factions tha~t are ready to
shape a pluralist and stable democracy within the framework qf a modern
Argentina."/
, _
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-��Th~t propoeal will be bnsed upon ewo necegeary elemenCg: /"dialog to
enrich it and pnrticip~Cion to materi~l~ze it."/
~ At tize same time, the president of the nation deacribed the three sec-
.tars which for various reasons are oppoaed to the materislizaCion of
rhose proposals. He listed them ae follows: `
--/ElitisC group$/ which are ignorgnC of the naC~onal reality and the
most tragic world experiencea. ,
--Sectora which are beCting on an /electoral outcome/, lacking the aup-
port of a solid civilian-miliCary convergence.
--/Parvenus/ w~o aim tn disorient the Armed Forces by attempting to
enlist them in demagogic or populist positions.
Lieutenant General Videla aucceeded in transmitting the em~tion and
authenticity ~f his ~rords to his audience when he announced his decision
- not to convert his government into an autocracy and his ambition to share
authority with the Armed Forces, with the men who are represenCaCive
of the aectors and factions which make up our society and with the Argen-
tine people, the ultimate benefactors of this Process."/
It is evident that the president of the n~tion is c:ertain of the fact thaC'
authority in a complex communiCy such as Argen!:ina is ahared. The Armed
Forces, political parties, businesamen, unions, the Church, intellectuals, `
scientista and technicians, among other sectors, are participating in
authority. Only the sum of a ma~ority of those factions of authority can
insure the success and historical viability of a political plan. However~
what Lieutenant General Videla and his comradea of the Military Junta
should understand is that in order to mobilize the formidable latent ener-
gies of the Argentine people it is necessary to propose to them a national,
significant, imaginative, bold and at the same time realistic national
strategy. The definition of their ob~ectives and the proposal of an `
action plan to attain them will promote adherence to the propoaed policy
which the Armed F'orcQS intends to present to the country shortly for
consideration and analysis.
We ~re on the threshold of another era like that of the '80's. There is ~
even a symbolic and myster~ous analogy between the dates and the expecta-
tions for development, progress and greatness. However, the possibility
of that thxeshold bEing crossed by Argentina depends upon ourselves, our
lucidity, our generosity, our dedication to the common good and our bold-
ness. For if it is true that the winds of heroic deeds are blowing in
the country, it is necessary that we be prepared to live in /"a state of
heroic deeds."/
The responsibility of a ruler is not at oddts with dynamism in action; nor
is caution at ndds with d~rive; even less is wisdom at odds with imagina-
tion.
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The military government hg~ ev~ryehing iC nQeds Co propose a stretegy
of greatnesa: the aepiraeiona of 25 million Argentinea and the condi-
tions of the world situaeinn which offer a tempCaCion and a challenge.
To the degree that the miliCary government ie in harmony with events and
, doea not proceed contrary to the facts of the situation, iC will have the
keys Co poliCical dynamiam. And if it ie capable of marching in atep
with the rhythm of that dynamism, it will obligate all the sncial forces
to fall in line behind it. Then, neither feare nor euspicione wi11 be
~uatified in the face of Che opening of Che dialog nar the perepective
that through participation the representaCivea of the civilian community
will be incorporated into the governmenC.
Foreign Policy
As resarda foreign policy~ once again the virtues which hav~ character-
ized the president's hand].ing of this aector surfaced: good senae, reapon-
sibility and awareueas that it is necessary to exhaust all possibilitiea
before resorting to an a:�~aied confrontaCion. It ie not solely end aimply
- a question of the amount of blood [apilling] implic.it in such a confron-
taCion but also the frustration--at least the partial fruaCration--of the
moat intelligent and ~ffective policy which Spanieh-apeaking natione can
evince in South Ame.rica: a policy of gradual and irreveraible inCegration.
and wi=h the attainment of that policy the prepration of the conditiona
for a frank and pragmatic underetanding with Braz~l to form a solid pack-
age of intereata vis-a-vis the reat of the world.
Clearly, knowledge of these objectives of Argentina's continental palicy
cannot serve Chile as a pretext to make an effort to penetrate regiona
which historically have been subject to national sovereignty. Nor were
there gray aregs in thia sector in the preaident's meesage: /"in ehe same -
' manner that we must not lack caution in arriving at an equitable aolution,
we must not lack the decisiveness necessary to affirm our aovereignty,
~ should the need arise."/
These sober words were few in number; however, they were clear. It is to
be hoped that the addressee is able to understanC their profound signifi-
cance.
Also, on the aubject of the already stale legal proceedings involving the
compatible utilization of the Upper Parana'e resourcea, the preaident's
speech w~s eensible and cryatal clear: /"In the final analyais~ our posi-
_ tion is simple: ae muet find a just balance among the interests of the
three countriea."/
The Brazilian foreign minister~ Antonio azeredo da Silveira, stated (,aee
CLARIN, 25 November 1978, p 2) that Videla's atatements are /"perfect~
~ e~cen conciliatory."/ After this remark, he stated that he had not en-
countered a single word Which did not make good senae.
Notwithstanding the volubility which in recent yeare has charac~erized
- the actions of the Itamaraty titular, his reaction gives no cause for
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optimism over Che resolution nf differences concerning Corpue and, in the
fingl analygis, serveg to give an ~xgcC measure of Preaident Videla's
apeech. �
An Im~ge of Coherence
'Pwo oCher poaiCive facCors combined to resCnre coherence and eolidity to
the image of the military government. The first involved Che etatemente
made on the same day, Thursday, by the Army commander in chief, LieutenanC
Generel Roberto Viola, to diplomats who were holding a reception for
him.
Sub~ecr to Che rigidity of a questionnaire, obviously Viola did not take
up all Che queationa thaC the president was to diacusa houra later. How-
ever, hie speech clearly showa a political viewpoint exactly like that
expresaed by Jorge Rafael Videla, the same concern over guiding the ~nun-
try in Che direction of democracy and avoiding the influence of elieists
or demagogic factora which could impede rhe forward movement of the
Procesa.
A day laCer, Admiral Armando Lambrwechini was to allay the concerne of _
Salta newemen. When he was asked his opinion of the ar,aCus of the
National Reorganizad.on Proceae, he atated that he saw progresa being made;
however, he added that /"w!?at~ is important is to refrain from giving sec-
~tored or partial opinians."/ And in connection with Che problems asao-
ciated with the Beagle and Corpus, he elected to refer to what had been
said 24 houra earlier by the preaident of the nation.
. Both apeeches--Viola's and Lambrwachini's--contributed to reinf~rcement
of the image of coherence and rationaliCy a~~semin~ted by the epeech of
the preaident of the republic and, doubtleas, to cnnaolidation at the same
time of the A~med Forces as a function of authority.
One a~pect of Videla's speech remains to be coneidered. The president
refrained from entering the mine�ield of a polemic with the growing wave
of criticisms against hia minieter of economy. The railway atrike, which
a day after its occurrence evoked a comment by the provicari general of
the Armed Forces, Monsignor Victorio Bonamtn, is a syr~.tom which induces
one to reflect on the poasibiliCy of considering "fl:xibility" in the
rigid direction given to economic policy in its soc.',al aspect. Above all
because both of theae occurrencea in a way repreaer.t two enda of the spec-
trum: that of the labor movement, influenced by reno~~~ating currents, and
that of Monsignor Bonamin, characterized by its adh6rence to formulas of
conventional thought Within the frameWOrk of factions exiating within the ,
Church. When the spectrum of sectors critical of a political orientation
is so broad, the inevitable duty of a ruler ia to reflect on the viability
. of the policy in queetion.
COPYRICNT: LA OPINION, Buenoa Aires, 1978
814 3
CSO: 3010 ~
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ARGENTINA
WRITER POINTS TO CONFORMITY OF CHURCH, POLITICAL VIEWS
~ Buenog Aires, LA OPINION in Spaniah 26 Nov 78 p 10
_ [Article by Itodolfn Pandolfi)
(Text) There muat have been few 'historical occasions on which the sCate-
menCs of the Aigentine Epiacopate have had greater immediate and more
profound significance in the totality of national life. The Catholic
Church has aCtained a univereality in ita teaching which by far exceeda -
- the number of its faithful and which has an impact on all secCors. In
large part, Chie situation is due to the fact that the Church has increas-
ingly achieved a firm interrelationahip beCween the exposition of transcen-
dental trutha and their contemporary meaning.
The whoie world knowa that the Catholic Church, in these days, listena `
carefully before offering an opinion. It liatens and interprets the
signa of the present reality without allowing itself to be preasured -
either by old or new triumphalisms.
The lateat document of the Episcopate--like the texts which have been
~ emanating since 1916--may have attained even greater diesemination because
- of suapeneion of the public activities of the varioua political partie$. ~
The business or union aectors, although they have the national interest -
= in mind, expreas the concerna raised by Argentine pxoblems in different,
- concrete aectors. The political parties are making an effort to represent
overall strategic alternatives of a national kind, as they do not bring
together citizena on the basis of their belonging to a union but rather
on the basis of the ob~ectives they ahare. However, although the suspen-
aion of their activities has been interpreted in a flexible way, which
thus permita the expreseion of multiple thoughta, the political parties
- by definition--as parties--cannot assume a teaching function like that
- carried out by the Church.
Ab~ve and beyond these comments, there is no observable contradiction
between the Church's thinking and the voices which have been raised
recently from various currents of public, union and business opinion.
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In Chie connection, Eour aub~ecta can be cited:
a. The conflict between Argentina and Chi1e over Che Beagle Channel situ-
aCion. A11 sectora of opinion have stated Chat they are in favor of peace;
j however, aC the same time, the various political forcee,---oerhapa with the
~ sole exception of the group headed by Alvaro Alsogara,y��~-art advocating
a policy of firmnesa in the defense of naCional sovereighty.
b. 5ocioeconomic policy has generated anxiety in a11 aectors of opinion.
~ Independent of the value ~udgments which may be made with respect to the
administration of Martinez de Hoz, it is indi~;putabl~e that this adminis-
� tration, in a manner of speaking, is "in the eye of Che storm."
c. With ehades of difference, all the exponenta of national thought feel
that the time has come for deeper political debate~a which are called for
by the present situation. Lieutenant General Jus,n Carlos Ongania him-
self cited the risks of a prolonged depoliticizat~lon process.
d. All the political forces of the country have shown themselves to be
- firmly againat subversion; and they acknowledge Che~ merit in the govern-
ment's having eradicated it, although some of t'aem are making proceduxal
observations.
In the following Cable a comparison is made between the recent statements
' of the top leaders of radicalism, Ricardo Balt~in and Raul Alfonsiu, and
thoae of a group of citizens made up of Peron:lsts, popular conservatives,
Allendistay ChrisCian Democrats, socialists at~d communists. However, if
the question is limited generically to those four points, including what
is being done to the economic sector by the existence of a generalized -
malaise but without giving an opinion at,~out the therapeutics to be used,
the spectr~un would be complemented by ti~ie opinions of developmentalism and
of personalities such as Francisco Manrique and Rafael Martinez Raymonda.
The same thing is happening with respect; to the broadening of the politi-
= cal sector, a thesis with which Arturo F'rondizi is in agreement, although
he does not, of course, propose the same solutions as radicalism.
_ 7
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~xpreg~ed in thi~ manner, th~re is little dnubt ~bdut the ~ub~ecte which
are of greaCegt con~ern Cn Argentin~g~
But it ir~ the Cot~liCy di the situgtion end the tntelity of opinion~
~?boue Ch~ ~ittiation whir.h are refle~tpd by g new ~nd vibrant aector
thrnugh the wdrd di thp ~pi~cnpAte. In th~ aignificant C~xC of 19 Nnvemy
ber there are observetions which cannot be read e~relesgly:
~irgt. Sinc.. it cou]d not be otherwiae~ for naCurel and euperneCUral
reaeona~ the Episcopate exgltg peace and recalle in thie connection the '
wdrd nf th~ Holy Fathers: "PencQ ig the ac.n~ of ineeaianic wealth."
peace will never be go gtrong that it need not be fortified by prayer~"
the ~piscopaCe atatee.
The roncept~of pegc~ ie interpreted both on the domeetic level end on the
foreign level~ with an obvioue alluaion to the Argentine-Chilean conflict.
' However~ it ie in this latter sense that the w~rda of St Auguetine have
special meaning: "Peace is tranquality in order." The quotation ie c~ari-
:ied with a p~seage from the Koly Bible: "Peacp ie the wr~rk of ~ustice."
After that, the Epiecopate analyzes the content of peace as a work of
justice.
S2cond. The Episcopate also reflects the people's economic concern Which
ie shared~ moreover~ by the partieans of the preeent Process. In reaffir-
mation of the Church's social doctriae~ the text atates: "If man lacke
the essentials because another takes them from him or does not give him
his ohere~ [hia lack is the product of in~uetice; and peace ie shattered."
, Third. The Epiacopate also makes eeference to the need for participation.
After recalling the Apostnlic Letter, Octogesima Ad~veniens~ of Paul VI~
it states: "When man feels that he is alienated from everyday life or
does not actively participate, he suffers, if the eituatioa ia brought
about because someone illicitly prevente him from doing so."
Fourth. The Church atrongly urges recoaciliation and forgivenees. At
the same time, it offers this clarification: "Since xe have lived through
them~ We are very much aware of the events which succeesively constituted
a painful expreseion of this gradual deterioration in our country:
netional desencuentro [?discurdJ~ the lack o� great idaals~ the need
for authority and, as the culmination of this disiategratioa of the
Fatherland. thP violent outburst of terrorism aad organized subversion~
which were orchestrated ia many instances by ideologies of various kinds~
principally Marxist in origin~ all of Which are contrary to the Christian
ethic of out nation~ that Was forged vith ideal of justice aad freedom."
"We have euffered this gradual process and the hearts of Argeatiaea have
filled with pain over the bloody fight ahich has broken out, whose deep
wounds will not be easily staurnched." Pcoposals concerning a nes+ and _
imaginative legal mechanism vhich ensures the viability of the ~uridical
order and eoncerning adequate information about episodes deriving from
the antisubveraive campaign, are at the heart of the ecclesiastical document.
CUPYRICHT: LA OPINION~ Buenos Aires, 1978
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ARCENTINA
COLtJ1~Il~l IST REFLECTS ON JUNTA' 3 THItEE-YEAR RULE
Buenoe Airer LA OPINION in Spanieh 27 Nnv 78 p 12
~ [Article by ltodolfo PandolfiJ
(TextJ In e month~ three yeare Will have gone by aince thea~commaader
in chief of the army Jorge Rafael Videla addresaed a dramatic meseag~ to
the country and a direct~ final aarning to the government of isabel
Peron. Three tempeatuoue, alaast impoasible years have paesed since
then. Th~ republic emerged from the war agaitut subveraion to face an
extremely difficult international situation, without aa opportunity to
even catch ite breath. No one doubte that in almost all sector4, the
' goverament'o relattons are complicated~ daagerous~ agitated. There seem~
to be no peace in thia proceas vhich aa� launched to secure peace.
In the final analysis~ hov can the terma of the equation be exactly stated?
Everytl~ing conaidered~ year's end ia very aear--the end nf the f~scal
y~ear, one could amo.t say--and it is probably aorths+hile to make a haad
count of the factora to strike the balance.
1. Three years ago, subvEraive baads vere still capable of engagiag ia
a veritable military battle in the very heert of Greeter Buenos Airee and _
aere at the point of bringing about a deep cleavage in the normal atruc- _
ture of the couatry, vith the seiziag of importaat positioas and a large
amount of ver material. They auffered a deciaive d~feat in Nontre
Chingola, frao the aar-making atandpoint; as~d it vas there that if aot
the beginaiag of the end at least the ead of the beginning cook plice.
Today~ subversioe hae diaappeared frov a ailitary viewpoiat, although it
is enough for tvo bold pereoas at any tiwe to carry out a terroriat act.
Sectioa8 of the country vere bloodied in these three years, ~+hich were
marked by episodes �uch aa the Sosbiags of che federal coordinatioa and
siniatry of defecue office4 and by aasassinationa such as that of Paula
La4b n+schini. At a terrible coat, the entire country becase aaare of
th~ nature of terrorist subversioa at?oRe bcginaing tea yeara ago vaa
recogaized by very few as a hallucinatory siga.
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2. HowQV~r~ not only ttgv~ th~ eubveraive bands disa~ppared from ~
roiliCgry vi~wpoint but subvereion has cpg~ed being a politi~~l ~lterna-
tive. ~he few r~maining ~ubv~rrive ~ectore whinc ~ould attempt e poli-
tical movem~nt ere doing ~o in the greatest ieol~tion. Th~re is eiaall
doubt that the eituation hae compiicated fluid communication betueen
the governmenC, unione~ parties c,r univeretty atudente. However, there
is Qven lpeg doubt that the unione~ parties and univereity studente--to
speak of three secCnre which in some way could be vicCime of infiltre-
tian atCempte--are re~eeting terroriem like the plague.
- 3. After heving loet itu military and political battlee in the rep~~blic~
aubverAion made an effort to operate through inCernaCional preseure. It
_ should be recognized that in a very harsh var �ituation of the kind Argen-
tia~ experienced it aa~ inevitable that un~ust incidenCe nccurred ahich
every~ne regrets. Thoee incidente were used by the same person~ who
- publ~cly boasted of having aseasrineted Pedro Eugenio Argmburu~ Hermes
- Qui~adg or Arturo Mor Roig~ for example, to mention only three notorioua
casea.
Because of a complex combination of circumetances, including the tone
vhich pre)udice cuatomarily givee to ob~ective events~ it ie true that
out of good faith or bad faith, aith information or absolutely uninformed,
because of peculiar political calculatione or becauee of frivolity, hon-
estly believiag that they aere contributing to the improvement of the
aituation of the Argentines or thinking that they were harmiag Argentina,
democratic politicians vith great pcestige in Europe and the United Statea
epoke out in a highly energetic mgnner aith reapect to our couutry. Even
internati~nal orgaaization~ whose members had personally experienced the
terroriet offensive haatened to emit totally unproductive )udg~ents.
4. At the beginniag of the year~ but particularly during the last fea
month., the etate begaa to put the finiehing touche~ ~n control of the
situation as regards the undesirable effects of the aatisubversive ca~-
peign. As in the case of eubveroive terrorism, it can bp noted that the
isolaced incideat ia alaays possible. Noaever, the evolution was ao
marked that it escaped none of the national or international ob~ervers.
S. From that point of departure~ the Proceas vith rene~?ed force startec:
to change the image which had beeu creaced abroad. During his receat
trip to the country, the former commander in rhief af the Navy~ Adoiral
Emilio Eduardo Nassera, stated that his actiona had contributed to the
definitive Isolation of the lbatoneros. Social democratic parciea which
had ahown theoselves ta be oiAdful of the denuaciatioas made by the sub-
vecsive sector began to oodify their points of view. Also, becawe of
the influence of Americo Chioldi, but in recent time~ apparently, becawe
af the dynasic action by Admirai Massera above all, che social d~ocratic
sector adopted a nev criterioa with reapect to Argeatina. Duriag the
Iaternational Socieliat Congress in Vancouver, requeats to admit Kontoneroa
ae se~ber observera vere re~ected (it ahould be re~esbered that the
- Paleacine Liberacion Organisatioa is an observer at the United Nacionsj.
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~o~ o~~icin~. us~ orn.Y
.
The top 3penieh doci~li~t, ~elipe Con~glez, diff~r~ntieted betaeen reac-
tionary dirt~torshipe and rit~wtions gener~ted as dike~ in the f~ce of
seditinus activity.
5. Pac~d by th~ internationai situation preseeted in connectlen aith the
bordar litigatiutivith Chile--a sector in vhich the statement of the
Britirh Miriistry for Foreign Affairs r~iaforced th~ Argentine vi~upoinC--
the country gave evidence of a decis:[ve predilection for unity in the
pree~nce of an umergpncy vhase ~~tcome coutinuea to b~ unforeseeable.
Moreover, it is true that thQ elternativee of that question have dis-
orisntad rector~ of public o;,inion; ha+evQr~ ehia hae not diminished the
unanimity on exi~ting points of vier?.
7. The country's economie gitu~tian continues to bp a sub~ece of oolemic,
conrerning ahich mgny obeervers maintain tha". all the resulte announced oa
24 M~rch 1976 have not beee ~ttained. Neverthelese~ although criticisma
are far from extreme~ ve should kiep clearly in mind the maximum point of
economic and financial diuorganisation ahich the couatry had reached three
yeara ago.
8. in the educacional sector, the procesr weat through complex and, on
occasion~ contradictory ecagea. including the iaterim appointmant of
Ceneral Aibano H~rguindeguy, four men aith difftreat atylea (Bruera~
Catalaa, Harguindeguy aad tlerena) had to tackle the problems es.irting in
a sector vfi ich in thp real strategic human reserve of the country. The
last debate on eaveral books adopted in privace religious institutee
cospels us io remesber that excreme cnution should be used with reepect
to opinioaa ahich are offered occaaionally outside the integral context ia
which they should be considered. The ideological ca~paiga against eub-
version, at this stage of affairs~ requires the ~axia~ precia~lon in
oarkssanship to avoid evea the su~picion of exaggerationi. This ~ay or
eay not be the case: the Catholic hierarchy. s~reover, hes the ~udgseatal
factors for conai.deratian of the probles. No warning ia totally poiAtleas
when the entire country res~aber~ how e~bversion vas introduced at various
educational level~. ~lovever, it vill be useful to also re~esber that there
were those who two years ~ago denounced the distribution of a"subverstve"
cexc in a nusber of churchea to be suag pr~cisely at this tise of t!u year.
It was the Magai~'ieat~" the word� intoned by the Virgin Mary before the
Annunciation that sbe would fulfili all che prophecies.
COPYitIt~lT: LA OPINION, Bueaos Airu. 1978
8143
_ CSO: 3010
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AI~GENTINA
B~LE CONPLICT JEOPAttbIZL3 3TRATEGIC, ECONOMIC I1~'TER~3T5
8ueno~ Air~s LA OPINION in 3panish S Nov 78 pp 10-11
[Articl~ by Sergio Ceron: "Paradoxes and Reflections at the Bad of the
- S~cond Stagc of Negotiatione With Chi1e"; passegee enciosed in slantlines
printed in boldface~
[Textj Diplomatic observers stated at the end of the aeek that the situa-
tion in the dispute between Argentina and Chile was paradoxical aince both
governnenta were Waiting for g reply from the other to separate proposals
that practically crossed simultaarously. A cable fraa S~ntiago on Friday
said that the Argentina Presidpnt, Jorge Rafael Videla, had spnt g note to
his colleagu~,Augusto Pinochet, in tthich he propoeed direct negotiations--
presumably at the highest level and in peremptory terma--to reoolve differ-
ences.
The foreign minister fran across the Andes, H~etman Cubilloa, talked vith
reporters and estimated that 6 moaths af talks had exhausted the possibili-
ties for a direct understanding. Ia his jud~nt, the final act shoved
that /"there is agreement on some points aud disagreewent on other."/ in
consequence~ he in~isted in taking the route sham by the note sent by his
Foreign Hiniatry to San Martin Paloce, in which he propoaea en appearance
before the Internationul Court of Justice in The Hague or recourse to _
aediation /"bp a friendty govers~ent chosen by common agreement."/
The Chilean Opposition
Ia su~s, Sanciago is noc backing dovn 1 centimeter frao it~ original poti-
tion, It ie in disagreement aith everything that means analysing tbe
border probiea in thp ~ight of re~aon and frignd~hip, firsly grasping aa
avard that Argeatiaa rejects os abusive. An ~ward that~ vithou~ consider-
ing Argencine feelings and natioual pride, proceeded by n+ean~ af decisions
thot iwplied iAterference in Argentine areas that it never consented to
sub~it to anp arbitratioa. lfiis is the case of the isisnds sitw ted aouth
of the "ha~er �rea" vhich includea only Picton, I.enaox~ aud Nueva Iilaada.
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- On th~ oth~r hand, Chi1e quickly agreed to all th~ tprme, ga a complempnt
tn, ~nd for the c~canomic integracl.on ~nd the mutugl defenae of, ita Ant-
arctic, whereby it can obtain direct bpn~fits from Argentine goodwill. A
characterisCic of ~h~ diplomacy from acrose the Andee hse been to consent
to arbitration when the lande in diepure had legally belonged, up to that
time, to eomeone elmp.
- To expect th~t Arg~nting would ~ecept r~couree to the C~ourr of Juetice ie
nct very rpaponaible ahen it is renliz~d that there are close rel~tions
between thgt org~nization and eeverul membere of the arbitrgl tribunal~
whoae manif~st abuae of poaer led our cnun~ry to declar~ its decision null
gnd void,
'That ~?ould leave the eubject of inediation by a friendly country. The head _
of the Argentine delegation to Mixed Coumieaion No 2, C~n Ricardo Etcheverry
Boneo, on being interviewed by the Buenoa Airee preas, xigreed that that
~+as a posaibility, without expreasing an opinion on its real vinbility. ~
_ Ho~ever, he obaerved prudently that "the important thing Would be to locate
, someone Who ie more qualified than I aho could explain ehe difference bett+een
mediation and arbitration, because they are not the aem~."
Visit by the King ~f Spain
The coming visit by the King and Queen of Spain hae not ceased to provoke
the imagination of reportera gnd aaalystg, to the extent chat eoaieone had
to ask Etcheverry Boneo whether mediation could emerge a8 a conaequence of
the vigit. The reply Was obvious: it is a question thac is outaide af the
authority of the Argentiae negotiator and on which it is not for him to re-~
spond for reaeons af political ;~rudence. Nor is it poasible to find any
specific reaction at the higheat levels of the govermnent. In any case, in
the event that after appropriate analyaie the conclusion is reached that
saediation is acceptable-~not arbitration o: aa arbitral aWard--it would be
difficvlt to chooae a mediator more suitablp than the 3paniah Crovn.
In the first place, because I do not perceit?e that the mother couatry has
incrrests at stake in the area as obvioua as Creat Britain, which through-
out ica hietory haa knwn hoa to subordinate ita judicial speculations to
the specific practicality of ita own conveniences.
In the seca?d place, because the natioas of 8ispaaic origin, from the time
of their declaration of iadep~ndence, accepted tbe bordera eetablished by
, the Spaniah Court far its coloniea. Unlesa, of course, there vere later
cessions of territory by legal procesa and not by force. The archives of
the pcninaula posaeas a rich acore nf precedents oa this sub~ect.
Pacific and "Pacifisc" -
At all cventa, it is uselesa to apeculate oa this subject uatil it is
possiblc~ to proceed further on the basis of the decision that vill be
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taken in this reggrd by th~ Argentine Governm~nt, in who~ it ie iropossible
for the intern~tion~l public, if it hae carefully followed the progreas of
the interdict and its recent and remote historical background, not to recog-
ni~e g great amount of goodwill and pacific apirit.
And here it is nec~sagry to insiat onc~ more in the difference between a
pacific man and a pacifist. The former ia nonviolent, one who will eacri-
fice everything, except the eafety of his loved ones and hie dignity to the
cauae of peace. The latter~ on the other hand~ will sacrifice everything,
nbsolut~ly ev~ryChing, in order to flee reaponeibility and the underetand-
ebty human f~er of euffering the con~equencee of violenc~. The Argentine
i~ pacific.
_ AC the eame time, no Argentine writer has ever written geopolitical texts
to jugtify the expaneion of our frontiers. On the contrary, a certain
frankly univer~aliaC culture behind our backe hae led us to sacrifice
territories inherited from the mother country and therefore unquestionably
our patr Laony for a friendsliip that at times has had iCs only real echo in
our hearte.
Thc past is enlightening and it should help us to avoid falling into facile
optimism; but in no Way ahould it be a weight that inhibits the imagination
in projecting into the future. And What we are trying to do here ia imagine
g formula that aill permit ue to overcome yesterday'8 differences in order _
to vigorously build a tanorroW.
The arorld is marching toaard regionalization, toWard large geographic,
human, economic, and perhapa political concentrations. Secn frem this
perspective, the Beagle ~onflict aeeas to add up to a ridiculoua trifle.
Neverthcless, vhat is at stake is saoething much more than territorial
jurisdiction over some islea. Strategic, economic, and geopolitical ia-
terests of enormous significance are at atake. And for Argentina a matter
of dignity and self-respect, in additioa, aince it cannoC retreat from the
oceanic division principle dictated by hiatory and by eolemn treatiea that
Chile and the arbitral tribunal have ignored.
Starting aith this principle, everything is poasible. One can imagine auch
a broad cooperation and integration bet~reen both countries thar it could
even mean the first step tovard the unity of the nationa of the eouthern
cone. Hhich in turn could be built on such a solid foundation ae to attain
che old dream of Bolivar and San Martin, contiaental tu~ity.
For this, generosity and clear sight and further, consciouanesa of the real
historical intereeta of the Hiapanoamerican nationa ~a mecessary.
Cheuviniet Poaer Plant?
I caanot resist the temptation to reatate the title of the note publiahed
on Medneaday, the lst, in CIARIN by Enrique Alonso. It deals, of courae,
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with th~ ICaipu hydroelectric complex in the wake nf th~ gnnouncement Chat
Brazil gnd Paraguay dectded withoue warning ;:o raiae the number of turbines
ro 20 fran the 18 provided for previouely and repeatedly endorsed by their
experta and politicians.
"The unilatpral advantage thgt Brazil eeeka--n,inimi~ing the energy-genera-
ting poegibilities of Corpue--is in turn," says Aloneo, "at variance with
the norm of the common good, which ehould aim for the optimum uae of the
hydraulic potential in all ita different levels and fe11s."
In his interesting commentary my colleague adde that Carloa de Meira Mattos,
th~ Brazilian general, proposea the creation of seven regione of multi-
national inCegration throughout the length of hia country, One of theae
includes /"the southern part of Mato Groaso, wesCern Parane, eoutheaetern
Pargguay, and the Miaiones region of Argenttna."/ Thus, if this geopolit-
ical concept were applied, Itaipu would have a preciae miasion, similar to
that carried out by the Brazilian "bandeirantes" of the aolonial era: to
be the advance guard for the exp~nsion of the empire's frontiera.
While the Argentine Foreign Miniatry clearly maintaine that the change de-
cided on by the Itaipu pgrtners revives the Whole question of the canpati-
bility of that dam wfth the Corpus dem, c~:riously the greateat criticism
has come from the Bratilian preas. The editorial of the JORNAL DO BRASIL
of 31 October maintained: "The nea revision of the bilateral ICaipu agree-
ment, announced officially yesterday by Brazil and Paraguay is destined to
be a controversial decision capable of alterir.~ the political credibility
of Brazil."
And it adds later: /"For the Braailian Government the innumerable timea `
that Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira reiterated that Brazil would never
iecrease the number of turbinea did not matter. On the 20th of thia month,
in the solema ceremony opening the diveraionary channel of the Itaipu,
President Geir~l himself inentioned the number of 18 turbines tWice,"/
The following day 0 GLOBO agreed aith its colleague and at the same time
gave the folloWing reflection: /"The Corpus hydroelectric project also ie
of interest to Brazit, as it aill furnieh greater operating flexibility to
Itaipu. Thus an eventual Argentine Withdraval from that project vould not
benefit us."/
0 ESTADO DE SAO PAUTA expressed similar opinione at the concluaion of a
commentary with the affirmation that the episode /"aggravatee the tension
already existing be n+~een Brasil and Argentina, ~+hiah ie not to the inter-
_ est of any of the member states of the River Plate basin."/
There is no doubt that Argeatina must reconsider its poaition. And the
- first aapect that should be analysed is ahether, after Yacyreta~ Corpua
ahould have priority in the execution of the large iafraetructure pro,~ecca.
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There are m~ny and very r~epectabl~ voicea that demand, in th~ intereet of
a~olid nation~al strategy, con~ideration of ehe Middl~ P~rana and th~
B~rme~o canal pro~ecrs for priority gCt~ntion.
Unity in Diversity ~
- At the end of a week of evenre, r~porte~ ~nd rumors of grear int~n~ity~ the
, President announced his cabin~t. In thp epieod~s that accomp~eied th~
chgngp--in which a wiee uee of time aae not observed, diffprent for thQ
_ military sen,aibilitiea than for the civilien--the unity of action of the
armed forces wae d~finiCely confirned. It ie a unity that--and it arould
b~ in~genuous to conceel it--do~s not f~il to ehow chae th~r~ are differ-
encee of opinion on how to focue oa th~ eitugtion. Th~ purpose of Che
lunch Videle had on Wednesday wiCh che three coaAaandera-in-chief a~e With-
out doubt t~ ehow that th~ spirit of unity had not bean broken and that the
proceas had regained ita manenCum.
e.t the same time, Adm Arm~ndo Lambruschini had a parcicul~r inter~et in
emphaeizing, as he did in the morning, that /"the baeic documente of the
National Reorganfzation Proc~es hav~ undergonQ no changee aith r~gerd to
the degree of participation by the Navy in the preeeat proce~s,"/ and that
this service /"is aorking to ensure that thia proceee aill go forward and
become dynamic.";
W'hy is it important for the country ~or military unity not co b~ fraetur~d?
- Because th~e future of Argencina depends baeically on the nation's mobilising
: itself around a plan that integraces all eectore of society. This objec-
tive can hardly be achieved if the armed forces, ahich on 24 March 1976
rcpresented the last redoubt agaic~st anarehy and diasolution, do not c~n-
ac:ve unity of action. This is e substantial motive for a~aking pos,ibl~
g convergence with the civilian pr,E~ulation thar ai11 vitalise the eaergiea
of the nation.
COPYEtIGHT: La apinion, 1978
9~15
CSO: 3010
17
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CUBA
CO1~N'fARY BXAMINBS SITUATION OF U.S. SKY~AB
- tiavana PRBt.~~ in Spanisri 2130 ClfP Z2 Dac y8 PA
(PRHNSA I.ATINA sp~cial f~etur~ by Qilbarto Caballero Alm~ydas "The Trogic
Skylab Fiaeco"~
(Taxt~ Tha aanounceoent that thQ Ua~ted Stat~e is abandoning efforto to
salvage tha erratic "Skylob" orbitai atation, iQaving it to fa11 on onr
heada, undor.cores the iaefficieae aay in ahich thia apacQ pro~QCt aas
concoivad.
Thio fira~ aad oaly habitdbi~ U.B. �paco �tatioa v~s~ duriag its doya of
glory, a~yobol of vhat sava U.S. ociQat~oto tri~d ta pr~,4nt to tho ~+or1d
aa Washiegtoe'~ supra~acp ia rpace. guilt at aa aitrono~icai co~t of over
$2.~ billion, "Skylab" (elcy labor~tory) receivad three group� of aatro-
naute becveen 1973 and 1974 within its tons of ~atal and aophi~ticax~d
~quip~ent. Lat~r abandon~d, it bocar o"phanto~ ship" orbiting ~arth
avarp 93 ~inutes at an luitial b~ight of 435 rtors (u r~c~iwdj aa0 at
lover h~i~t4 during oubs~qu~t yura.
Accordiag to U.S. �paca ruearch piana, Skylab woa to r~ait~ nm~naaad aad
in orb~t for 10 ysars aftar the thr~o aisriona w~ar~ co~pl~t~d. Dusing
that ti~e~ ocientist� of th~ ~tatioaal Aaroaau~ics and Space Ad~ioiatr~tion
p~ASA) w~r~ oupposed to hevs had cha opportuaity to iartali a nn? prop~i-
aloa rociut vhich ~ould offer two ponsibiiitius ~o boost it in~o a
higher orbit~ or to guide it back to earth tovard an oc~an or unpopulatad
aroa.
Bovtvtr~ NASA's p2ana failed reaound~ngly. an~d the huge eass, vith a 35=
rt~r la~gth, 7-~eter diaaeter and a vsigfit of 85 tons, began to tuable
aad los~ altitud~.
U.S. techaiciana aad ~ai~ntiat� have orchutrated a caapaign for ~ootbs
to r~duc~ vorldwide f~an abouc tho pro~p~ct� that a~hip of such sist '
could f~ll on so~t citi~s in a rain of ataal particlea. R~fer~ac~a wra
s~d~ to orbital corr~ctioas~ po~ition cha~agaa and~ lately. to a lon~-
avait~d spu� shuttle that vould carrp a propulaion rocket to Styl~b to
�teer it tovr~rd its dutruction vithout riik to ~aiciod.
18
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No~?ev~t~, it ie impog~ibl~ to parmenentiy conc~~i ~p~C~ fi~~cog during
our ~im~. ~y mid-Diacamber~ thQ sea~ion'r orbit hdd dropp~d to 360 km
and now~ final~y~ PrQaidnnt Jam~o ~arter hae baen forced to announce
what th~ whoia irorld knaas Nobody can reva Skylab.
Acnording to NA3A, cha anormous ~aboratory uiii Q1ummQt into oarth'�
ataaephar~ b~tveen July and 3aptembar of aexe year e~nd, whea it dis-
intagratQO~ bstvQen 400 and S00 fragmantg wi~1 fa11 to earth ov~r an
aro~ 3~500 km long and 150 km aide.
irherQ vi11 ehay fali? Aii countrine locatnd betwean the pquato: aad
la~itudas SO dagreas north aad eouth--almoee ail of I.~cin America,
Buropn, Africa, Aaia ~nd pdrt of Norch Am~rii:o--are candidat~a for th~ _
d~ngQroua rAinfall. Accordtng to NASA, the c.~uatr~ee on the rean~ry path
- con b~ giv~n only a 1-hour a~rning. "Har~var, ai11 mak~ plen~ for
quick m~dical aeo~etonca to thor~ affnctad," a Wa~hin~ton epokaAmau
announcnd in a euppo0adly reaeouriag tona.
CSO: 3010 END
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