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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000'1000'10050-4 23 : ~ ~ ~ ~ i ur i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 FoR oFrlclN~ us~ ~N~Y ~ ~7PR5 L/8243 25 January 1979 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERf~ EUROPE (FOUO 7/79) ~ ~ ~ U. s. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 NOT~ Jplt5 publicutiong conCUin informnCion prim~rtly from foretgn newspnperg~ perindic~le ~nd books, buC also from newe agency transmissions and broadcagts. MaCprial~ from foreign-language - sourceg are trnn~lated; those from ~ngligh-language gourcea are Cranscribed or reprineed, wirh the original phrasing and other characteristics ret~ined. _ _ Headlines, editorial reports, and m~rerial enclose~ in 'urackees are supplied by JPR5. Proceasing indicaeors such as ~Text~ or (~xcerptJ in the firae line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicaCe how the orSginal information was pr~ocessed. Where no procESaing indicator ig given, Che infor- mation was sumcnarized or extracted. - Unfamiliar na;nes rendered phonetically or transliteraCed are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a quea- - tion mark and encloaed in parentheaea were noe clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notea within the body of an item originate with the aource. Timea with in iCema are as given by source. The conCents of this publication in no way represent the poli- ciea, views or attiCudea of the U.S. Government. PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS - JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Infora~ tion Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. In order- ing, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited. Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports ~ Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog ~f U.S. Government PublicaCions issued by the Sunerintendent of Docucnents, U.S. Govercunent Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Indexes to th is reporK (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691. Correspondence pertaining to matters oCher than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 g16LI0GitAPNIC bAYA N'~' Jp~s L/8243 �~ripient'e Aecr~riuu Nu~ SN~ET ~ n a.~n ~u u c S~ l~ epnrt ate 25 January 1979 TRAN5LATIONS ON W~STERN EUROP~, (FOUO 7/79 ) 6, 7, Au~huc(s) 8. Per(ormin~ Ore~nisa~inn Repc. Nn. 9. ret(otming OrKanirdtion Name rnd Addrras 10. ~'toiect/T~~k/Work Unit ~o. JoinC Publications Reeearch Service ' 1000 North Clebe ROAd , 11~ Contr~et/Gc~nt No. ~ Arlington, Virginia 22201 1Z Sponsoring ArR~nizrtion N~me and Addre~s 13. Type ot Repoct N Petiod Covered As above u. 15. Supplcmcr~rory Note� 16. Ah~.trncts The serial report contains political/economic information on West ~uYOpean energy, f inance and trade policy matters as well as developments and trenda = in the doctrine~ programs and problems of th~ ma~or communisC parties, including their relationa with communist partiea outside the West European area. ' 17. Kry Y'ads snd Uoeument Analysis. 170. Uescriptors ~ Political Science International Affairs Luxembourg Saciology Austria Netherlands Propaganda Belgium Norway - Economics Canada Portugal Energy Cyprue . Spain Industry Denmark x Sweden - Trade Finland Switzerland Financc ~France Turkey Greece United Kingdom i~b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms Ieeland x Weet Germany =s`~ ~Italy _ 17a C.OSATI Field/Group SC ~ 5D ~ 1Q 10. Availability lcatemcnt 19. Secu~i~y Clas~ (Thi� 21. Ko. of Pa6es R`P�`.` ~ 51 For Official Use Only. Limited Number of Copies Available Fran JPRS. ' pa ~"`y " A SF ro~M Nr~r~s ~~cv. ~�~:i TN(S FOa11 UAY BE REPROOUCED u~coM.~-oc t~~s:�~~: APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/8243 25 January 1.979 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE (FOUO 7/79) CONTENTS � PAGE FRANCE Aerosp~,tiele~s Mitterrand Reviews Company's Position . (A~ & COSMOS, 23 Dec 78) 1 Transport Squaciron~s i978 Activities Reviewed (AIR & COSMOS, 23 Dec 78) 4 Briefs Qovernment Helicopter Purchasea Down 10 ITALY Modu,s randi of UCC Terroriat Group Described ~oberto Chiodi; L~k'~1ROP"r.o, 8 Dec 78) 1.1 Memb~rship,�Structure, Fiscal Policy of Iabor Unione (Salvatore col; IL soLE-24 O~tE, 1~+ Nov, 19 Dec 78) 18 SWEDEN Leading Busineas Prognoses Prove Inaccurate - (Fditorial, Olle Fatil.en; VECKANS AFF~t, 14 Dec 78)... 26 WEST GIIiMANY . Activities, Status of bni.~e Falitical Groups in FRG (Uwe zimmer; sTERN, 30 Nov 78) 29 Government~a Domestic Survei].lewce Program Reported ~ (9T~tN, 16 Nov 78) 32 P~nel Discusses Uneraployment, Iabor Markret (9T~tN, 3o Nov 78) 38 - a - (ZiI - W~ - 15~ FOUO] . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FRANCE - AEROSPATIALE'S MITT~RRAND REVIEWS COMPANY'S POSITION Paria AIR & COSMOS in French 23 Dec 78 p 11 " [Article: "Aeroapatiale: Great Call on Subcontracting"] [TextJ Jacques MiCterrand, president-director general of AerospatiAle (National IndusCrial Aeroapace Company], was the guesC of honor on 13 December 1978 of rhe Aeronautics and Space Public Relations Club under Che presidency of Etienne Daum (Paris airport). Opportunity for the French Economy ' [Mitterrand said:] "In a seemingly somber econumic situation, aeronautics as usual is running against the tide and its intermediate-term future appears under a favoxable sign. This situation denies Co some extent the presumptively pessimistic or skeptical opinions regarding the contribution of the aerospace sector to the ~'rench economy. Despite export orders which are not as exceptional as were those of 1977, the intermediate-term prospects of the aerospace industry represent one of the opportunities for the French economy." For Aerospatiale, which accounts for 40 percent of the French aeronautical potential, proapects continue to be favorable but call for a certain degree of prudence as regards helicopters, one of the rare sectors in which French industry has reached the American scale. The space sector , will he streamlined following new orientations laid down by tns minister of industry, Andre Gir~ud. For tactical missiles Aeroepatiale has had some successes comparable to those of MATRA [General Mechanical Aeronautics Company, Propulsion Section]. New Situation for Aircraft For fixed-wing aircraft the situation is basically new after the somber prospects 3 years ago. To make the Airbus prog:am succeed, the cooperation structures have been modified and a coherent policy has finally been adopt~d. The start-up of the marketing of the Airbus plane raises industrial production pro~lems in entirely new terms. Finally, the decieion to launch the A-310 [new Airbus version] has been made. i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~qk ()h'N'fCiAl, (15I: qNLY Under Chege conditione Aeroapntiule Lg in ~ positton Co implement a pol.icy of direcCing ils indu~Crial ~ctivities ns a funcCion of mnrket need~. It will reeorC eo tt lurge extent ro subconCraceing which iC will reaceivaCe attd the national company wi11 thuc retrieve its fundamental role. , While sCriving to increase iCa industrial flexibtliCy, AerospaCiale plans ro solve Che problems raised by civilian productir~n within the framework - of ~n international co~operat~on policy. It doea not envision pursuing a policy of civilian production outside the cooperation arrangement defined by the Europegn governments. In the Airbus program th~ parCners do not seek new parCners. But neither are they opposed Co participation in th~ form of subconCracting agreements with an interesC in development and riska. ~nkker is cooperating satisfactorily in Che A-300 B 2/4 model pro~ram and naturally ha3 its plac:e in Che A-310 program up to the poinC where, having globalized the problems, the Nerherlands brought Chese prospects into quesCion. At the present stage of the F-29 aircrafC pro~ect sufficient elements are not available eo evaluaCe the chances of commerc:ial success ~f Chis pro~ec~. At any raCe, pareicipation in such an undertaking could be envisioned only within the framework of Airbus Industrie [Airbus Industrial CompanyJ. Recalling the priority given to the A-310 program, president Jacques MitCerrand declared that the plans for ~ets seating 120 to 170 passengers have not for all Chat been forgotten. New proposals will be submittQd to Che users during 1979. When it is possible Co make decis:.ons, this program will become part of Che Airbua family. Aerospatiale's Industrial Policy ~ President Jacques Mitterrand sCressed the policy of Aerospatiale will follow to face its new industrial responsibilities. Undoubtedly, atnce early October 1978 the national company has come to the end o� its policy of cutting personnel who were reduced by more than 3,000 workers. The policy brought down to 1,350 individuals the personnel in iCs research department. But there is however no question of initiating a large-scale hiring policy. The problem of the flexibility of adaptat~on of European industry in the face of market variations has been raised. As a national enterprise, Aerospatiale must furthermore generate activities. It must irrigate the entire French industrial fabric by means of subcontracts. - This problem is not simple because it implies that one find approp.riate subcontracting enterprises. The president of Aerospatiale also mentioned it~ linked subcontracting with Dassault-Brequet. In order to adjust to its work load, Aerospatiale could have to reneg~tiate or abandon some subcontrac~ing for which it has signed agreements. But it plans to honor its commitments. It has already conclude~l nr~w agreements on the Falcon-20 program with Dassault-Breguet. It will get rid of marginal = or deficit-producing ac;ivities. But its commitments to its customers and 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~OR OFFICTAI. U5~ ONLY ir~ responeibil~l~y nH n nutional enrerpri~e dem~nd thae ir not relinguish ~ctivities if no other induytrinl secCors ~re available eo reactivate th~m. - CenerAl Aviarion: ber.iqions Under Study Questioned abour eh~ nctivities af Che national comp~ny in the field of gecieral aviation, Jucquea Mitterrand recalled that developmenta i~n Chis sector do not do credit tn the national company. Expenses are continuing to be incurred for the Carvetre (a program whose cost will have exceeded l billion French francs) and, as regards SOCATA [Air Transportation Corporation) whose future may be built on the TB-10 program, the behavior of the group regarding that company will be determined in Che nexC few months. It is also in the next few months thcit a decision will be made on the fuCure of Che Fouga-90 aircraft pro~ect. Jacques Mitterrand recalled that his company is very actively inCeref;ted in a basic, modest training aircraft for which it has submiCted Che TB-30 pro3ect to the Ministry of I)efense. Uifferent Financial Results Asked ahout the financial performance of Aerospatiale, president Mitterrand indicated that it will appear as fundamentally different from the preceding years. Mentioning the increase in the company's own funds to which those allocated in the government budget ~ust approved will contribute, Jacques Mitterrand said that this improvement will not be as great as he would have wished. The president of Aerospatiale also noted the interest of a linked subcontracting policy to over.come the difficulties of too specialized products, but he indicated that he did not seek the establishment of a holding company whoae creation the government has announced for the spring of 1979. - COPYRICHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1978 2662 CSO: 3100 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 F'OR O~F'ICTAI. U5E ONLY ~ ' FRANCE TRANSPORT SQUADRON'S 1978 ACTIVITIES REVIEWED Paris AIR & CnSM05 in French 23 Dec 78 pp 24-27 [Article: "Diatinct Reactivation of the Operations of the 61st Squadr~n in 1978" ] [Text] The 61at Tranaport Squadron based aC Orleans-Bricy has a little more than 400 members of whom 115 officers and 180 noncommissioned officers are flying personnel according to the followin~ normal breakdown: 155 pilots, 55 navigators, and 85 mechanics. The ground mechanics assigned to the squadron are relatively few, the near-totality of troubleahooCing and repair work of the firsC stage (which, in a fighter unit, for example, are done at the squadron level) being performed in Orleans by GERMAS [Maintenance and Repair Group for Specialized A:tr F,qui.pment ] . 500 Paratrooper Jumps a Day The crews of the three flight units ("Touraine," "Franche-Comte," and , "PoiCou") of the 61st Transport Squadron are trained to have the capacity, - in wartime as in peaceCime, to carry out very diversified missions involving at times tactical and at others logistical operations. They range from attack air transport and air drops of light or heavy loads to operationa, planned or on demand, of passenger or cargo transport and including humanitarian-type missions. Included in peacetime tactical asaignments are, naturally, the instruction o� crewa (appr~ximately 15 percent of its annual activity) and the training of airborne troops (some 25 percent of its annual activity). The latter is carried out eKSentially in Pau and Toulouse for the llth Airborne Division but a _ good part also takes place at Calvi. These training missions of airborne troops are part of those which the 61st Transport Squadron conducts for tt~e general staff.of the armed forces. All these missions were described - , in great detail in issue No 656 of AIR & COSMOS. The account of acCivites of the 61at Transport Squadron during the 4 most recent years appears in the following table~, of services rendered: 4. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 a~ait c~t~~?~�rr,rnt, usc oHtaY ' ~ . 5ervices Rendered by the 61at TransporC Squardon in 1975-78 1975 1.976 1977 1978 Passengera TransporCed 112,200 127,600 102,000 119,300 _ Tons of Cargo TransporCed 10,750 6,550 7,500 13,520 Yaratroopera 215,000 195,000 200,000 167,900 Tons o� air-dropped equipmenr 1,750 1,700 2,050 1,650 = ~ While the number of paratroopera who, in the courae of their training, "~umped" from the hold of Transall aircraft was lower this year than in ' preceding yeara, this aCtivity etill repreaented on Che average aa re than 0 500 ~umps per working day, is significant. , , L'xpressed in terms of hours of flight, the operat~ans of the 61st Transport Squadron in 1978 nearly reached the high level that they had evidenced in 1973 before they were harshly affected, especially in 1976 and 1977, by the induced effects of the oil crisis of 1973-74. The table below indeed reflects four very distinct periods: 1970 to 1972 witnessed the upswing , in atrength with the gradual formation of the three flight units; 1973 to 1975 were the "record" years; 1976 and 1977 were years of low activity , for economic reasons; 1978 reflected a return Co normal activity. Flight Hours by the 61st Transport Squadron in 1970-78 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 12,300 15,300 17,700 21,000 19,400 18,500 16,000 16,250 20,000 The year 1978 ~aw among other things the ferrying from France to Lebanon of heavy equipment and rolling stock slated for UNIFIL [United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon]. These missions repxesented some 250 hours of flight. Cveryone knows additionally the important role assigned to the C-160 aircraft during the recent interventiona in Africa. The carrying out of the various missions entrusted to the 61st Transport Squadron within the normal framework of its activities calls for ~ the dispatch of a number of aircraft which may range from one to about 10, at times more. Under ali circumstances the immediate availability of the aircraft has been excellent (over 70 percent) and the unit did not ~ have to interrupt any of its missions by virtue of technica? hitches involving one ar more planes. The operational result can thus be charact~:rized as very satisfactoxy. This pickup of activity by tt!e Transall planes in the 61st Squadron in 1978 was obviously felt in COTAM [Military Air Transport Command] which supervises all the C-I60~p1anes used by the French air force. The total of flight hours in 1978 will reach 24,600 and it will be even higher in the coming year. 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ! ` t~ok c~r~rtc;rnt, cJSr ot~T,Y Tactical Sequenti~tl N~v~.g~kion In u hosCile transport planes are particularly vulnerable: On one hund the Transall has, like a11 cargo aircraft of thie type, a radar signnl thaC is relatively easy to pick up because of the dimenaions of Che aircraft. On the orher hand it moves slowly on airborne a~Cack missiona near the ba~Clefield. The infrared radiation of its engines artracCs enemy short-r~nge ground-to-air missiles. In addition, the ~ aircraft is equipped neither witih a decoy launcher nor with a radar collision detecCor. Ttie only remedy for iC ~s very 1ow-altitudp flighC and Chat is why the F'rench air force has always insisCed that iCs Cransport crews follow very advanced Craining in this field. COTAM has j.ncidentally sought for several years now to expand Che range of the tactical use of the Transall plane because of the attractive possibilities offered by some of its equipment (Doppler radar hooked up Co a computer; meteorological radar with a very good definition). Inspired by methods used by the FAS [Strategic Air Force] on the Mirage-IV aircraFt and by the FATAC [Tactical Air Force] on Mirage-IIIE planes, an autonomous "sequential" radar naviga[ion techniq~ie has recently been developed by CIET [Transport Crews Instruction Center] and the 61st TranspArt Squadron. This method makes possible the execution, preferably by night to reduce the vulnerability of the planes, of low-altitude navigation without visual _ observation 150 meters fr~m the ground under operational conditions leading either to the air drop of personnel or equipment at the lowest _ altitude permitted by the performance characteristics of the parachutes - of airborne troops (150 meters for the ~umps of personnel in operations) _ or to land on ~n attack air transport miasion using a simple, natural ` - sCrip 800 meters long. Demanding rigorous preparation nf the iCineraries on the ground and a very ' strict division of work loads among crew memb~rs in the air, "sequential , radar navigation" has as its basic principle a follow-through of routes by guesswork controlled by a navigational computer in tandem with a Doppler radar which i.s frequently reset, by "sec~uences," on the basis of landmarks yielding easily identifiable radar signals on the instrument panel. They are then compared to photographs of radar displays programmed in advance. The discontinuous use of the radar increases "electromagnetic discretion." In practice, what is involved is following an itinerary with a set time of arrival at an altitude of 300 meters above any o~stacle located 9 km on either side of the route and 4 km fore and aft of the aircraft's pasition by navigation with such precision as to allow on arrival the use of a radar be~lcon to carry out either an air drop without visual observation or a breakthrough [through cloud cover] before landing on an attack field. 6 _ FOR OF~'ICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 , H'Olt OFFICIAL (JSC ONI.Y + Th~ r.adur on Trans~ll Aircrnfti now in service indeed has available a "beacon funct~,on" which enables iC to pick up ehe s~.gnal Cransmirted by � Chis beacon ~o the exclusion of any oCher signal. The radar beacon iCself is a lighr, handy piece of equipment which is available to army and air force units and is rendered operaCional in very short order. A mndifir.ation is now in the of implementation on all the C-160 aircraft of COTAM in order ro make them cap~tble of carrying Chis beacon. Shortly, numeralization by a data sys tem p rogrammed from the careography of the entire I~'rench and European terriCory will make it possible Co have available radar coverage whose exploitation could be effected 3n minimum time by the specialized centers developed by the French air force. 'Chis type of mission implies the specific and continuous training o� the crews for, in order for operaCions of this kind to be successful, great skill is required considering the duties involved for each of the crew members. '1'he Cechnique is perfected by now. On two occasions, on 24 October and 4 December 1978, the Minister of Defense and the press were able to verify it. The success of these operations has demonstrated the validity of this new technique of navigation without visual observation and the efficiency of aCtack air transport free from the constraints of preparation and regrouping related to air drops. The perfecting of this sequential navigation does not however mean the definitive start of all-weather tactical flighCs for military transport aircraft. There are sCill numerous constraints and limitations. Low-altitude navigation without ~ visual observation co~es up against arduous problems of air traffic control for the training of the crews in peacstime. Yet, such training would have to be inRured on a regular basis Co achieve the necessary safety and preci.sion of execution. In future, more modern navigational - equipment may make it possible to considerably lighten the task of the crews while insuring for them high-precision navigation without the radar on board transmiCting signals whatever the zone of overflight. The plane's radar would th2n become a complementary means of correction and control, used more discreetly. Well-Planned Mainten~nce Entrusted with planned preventive and remedial maintenance, of the 48 Transall aircraft in service in the French air force, also charged with the repairs calling for significant servicing facilities as well as daily - troubleshooting and repair work on aircraft of the 61st Transport Squadron. CERMAS 15-061 has more than 400 personnel of whom seven are officers and 366 are nonflying noncommissioned offtcers including 350 specialists. The unit also has 35 enlisted men. 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 FOK OFFICIAL USE ONLY The major maintenance cycle oF the '1'rAnsall aircrafr exCends over 16 yeara. 'The AIA [Induatrial Air Worksl~op) in Clcrmont-Ferrand underCakes the eask every 4 years by b1oc, each of Che four blocs corresponding to very specific portions of the sirframe: (a) Central section plus upper cargo _ section; (b) engine nacelles, leeboard, upper forward pare and extreme righr wing; (c) lower cargo secCion plus fixed horizonCal sec~ion; (d) radome and extreme left wing. The operations to be underCake~n on each of the four blocs cons titute a ma~or inspecCion whose duration is in the order of 3 monChs. For the ATA Che r~nnual checkup program involves 12 ma~or inspections. At each mri~or inspection bearing on one of Lhe four blocs designated above, tt~e AIA also checks the three other blocs for a certain numUer of operations of the �ourth stage which c~uld not wait for the subsequent complete cycle. From one ma~or inspecCion to the next the 'Transall aircraft iip to now used to fly three spells of op~rations of about 700 to 780 hours each (taking into account the assigned potent3al), interspersed wiCh two periodic inspections (minor inspections) lasting about a month on the average which are ef�ected by GERMAS. Between the end of each ma3or inspection and the first of the minor inspections, between the two minor _ inspections, as well as between the sFCOnd minor inspecCion and the subsequent ma~or inspection, GERMAS undertakes intermediate inspections whose duration is in the order of 2 to 3 days. Over-all, each year the AIA effects 12 ma~or inspections while GERMAS does 24 minor inspections plus 36 intermediate inspections as well as a certain number of safety - inspections, very specific ones, which never take much longer Chan about 10 hours. This technique of maintenance by sampling is the result of the search for upkeep at least cost. In the case of the Transall aircraft, the method of judiciously dividing all the sections over the annual program makes it possible to have a sound knowledge of the technical condition~of the entire fleet by considering only three "entire" aircraft. This method which makes possible great flexibility involves a constraint: Essentially, all the aircraft have to be given the same assignments. In 1977 each minor inspection had involved 294 systematic verification operations (investment: 1,100 hours) plus 1,400 hours of special work made necessary by the determinations made at the time of these systematic _ operations, plus 400 hours of modification work and corrections after f lights . What should be stressed is the very favorable evolution of the maintenance cycle of the Transall aircraft: The assigned potential which used to be 150 hours in 1967 increased to 500 hours in 1973 with a 10-month cycle and _ then to 720 hours in 1976 ~ith a 14-month cycle. Tt will r3se to 800-850 hours with a similar 14-month cycle. As for the number of systeniatic operations, it dropped from an average of 500 in 1967 to 294 in 1977. f3 FOR OFFT~IAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 I~c)k C1P'l~ I(.IAI, t)tili f)N[.Y ~ 'Ch~ pntential di th~ 'Tyne engineg~ ndw of 1,8d0 houra~ could in~reg~e tio 2,000 hours. All th~ dv~rhnul oper~Ci~ng ar~ perfdrm~d by SnCATA. ~xch ov~rhaul 1egr~ S monChe but Ch~ gogl i~ Co reduc~ Chie Cime to 3~~ mnnth~. OE th~ 4~ Trnngall plgneg in ~ervtre, eh~ one with the lgrgeee number nf hnurg of op~rgtiong tn itg cr~die hgg rhglked up S~OdO (involving S~gOU 1~ndingg). 'Ph~ uircrgft with th~ l~~gt numbere of hours hag 3,000 (wiCh z,200 lnnding~). 'Che repnir ~quadron of G~ItMA5 wi11 have ~verh~ulpd ~ome 2~430 planeg in 197$ (involving abour 7~500 breakdowng). Thig figure ghould be compared with the numb~r of v~rioug iCeme of equipment on eh~ Trun~all gircreft-- nbout 800. CUPYRICHT: Air 6 Cogmog, parie~ 197E Z662 C50: 3100 - 9 ~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 F'f1k (11~ N'tC I AL It!;L (1NLY FRANC~ gItIE~5 COV~[tNMENT H~LIC01'T~Et I~UItCNASE5 DOWN--Aerospatiale ie worried; Covernmene purcheses nf helicopt~rs have declined greaCly. Ueliveries for exporr amounC Co 7$ percent of Ch~ Cotal, and foreign orders now make up 95 percent of the total orders placed. Since rhe Puma and Gazelle [helfcopter] ordrre~ the Coverrnnent has not put in an order. The ~rench miliCary has net yee ordered the new bauphin helicopCer Char is adapCed for surveillance nf el~e maritime econnmic xone. [TextJ (Paris VALEUItS ACTUELLE~ in French 8 1an ~9 p 13J ~ CSO: 3100 � 10 FOR OPFICIl+L U5E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 F'nk U1~~ICIAL US~ t1NLY ITALY MODUS OPLRANUI OF UCC TERRORIST GROUP D~SCItIBED Mil~n L'EUROPEO in Italian 8 UeC ~8 pp 18-22 - /Article by ttoberto Chiodi: "Guerrilla Wgrf.are 'RegulaCions /Texe/ L'EUROPEO publiahes an excepCional document: It is the eecret bylaws of the "fighting party." Here ere the rulee on recruiting, chain of command, security regulationa. An average of eight "misaiona" per day. Terroriam has for some time gone _ b~yond the guard level, and we are at the creeping guerrilla Warfaze atage: 150 initials counted from the beginning of the yegr, a psychological stock- pile thaC continuously increasea under the pressure of disappointmenta, anger, daily impotency. But how are these militants of the fighting party recruited and fitted into the organization? What "ttegulations" must they . accept, and hoW are the units they report to etructured? L'EUROPEO found the answers in an important document rhat came to light during a trial which end~d in Florence last Week. It is the "Regulations" which nne of the more active and ramified of guercilla actione, Che Cammunist ~ighting Units, adopted and appli~d for yeare. Members of the unit that killed Fedele Calvosa, the public prosecutor of Froeinone~ and two men vho ~ accompanied him at Patrica~ were following these "Regulations." The document was seized in April 1977 at a base frequented by two members of the Pighti~ng Units. M attempt aas made last January to free them by an ogs~ult on the jail at Murate (policeman Faueto Dionisi was killed). At the beginning of the trial, the UCC hit 11 "ob~ectives" sia~,ltaneously (includ- ins the ex-physician of the prison and the peraon vho planned the new Florentine Penitec?tiary), in order to demonetrate an operational capability that aas intact and aideapread. Before they aere sentenced to 13 yeara in prise~~ each, the tvo defendants praised the "fighting party." But does thie "party" actually eacist? If it exists, it certainly has the organization accurately described in the "Rsgulations." After a broad premise concerniag errors coamit~ed (We do not say, 'War is the master' as othera do. 11 FOR OFPICI/~L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~d~t d~~ICtAL U5~ ONLY Nor, 'Revolution tomorrow' a~ we have dnnp mnny C1m~g. 'Th~e~ preggure tgctic~ havp di~ageroue ~ffeet~) thpre ig ehe b~eic geaCement: "The mgximum pc~~~ib1~ ~xp~n~~nn mu~e b~ permitC~d the irr~gular b~nd~ who will engage in fighting in thi~ phaep, and laCer becocne g regul~r grmy gC Ch~ time o� war." In Che pree~nt ph~~~, this ie Che organiz~Cion indic~ted in the "Regul~tione": (1) Cuerrilla Generel Staff; (2) Central Cuerrillg Units; (3) Proletarian Cuerrilla Squadg; (4) Preee, Propagande, Activities in rhe Movement; (5) Services. "ICem 2 in particular indicates aCtacks; Item 3 expresee~ combat; ICem 4 expresses fighting on the line and promotion of commiCteee. Every unit, like every comrade, is on combat atatue." The latter statemcnt showa that even the Cerrorist leaders aYe required to personnally become committed in actions. But how does one "~oin" these organizations? The answer ig found in the chapter entitled "Recruiting" which also refers to promotions: "The instrument of organization is presence in the movement. Recruits enter the organizaCfon from beloa. This doea not mean that every '.ime contact is made with a comrade who has certain abilities, he is to be sent to cleans~ himself in the movea~ent. However, it is important that before every promotion a period of time must pase to permit verification of the comrade's ability in terms of aecurity, training and self-training (we refer to a period from 3 to 6 montha)." Before every promotion, a higher-ranking comrade must keep the candidate under observation, carrying out an inveatigation on levele uf security (hie origins, professional dedication, prior record), checking possible contacts with the enemy (and surveillance if necessary) and verifying his military " capacity in operations ahich he must carry out aloae. At this point, he is ~ sub~ected to interrogatic~n which ahould conaider political homogeneity~ personnal initiative, and "consequences of his ~oining up." After this long period of examinations, "The staff aill decide Whether the candidate is accepted." Who are the members of this "Guerrilla varfare general staff" and vhat are their tasks? First of all, it must be said that "it has decisionmaking powers. conducte national relatione and controls the organization's budget." Elections to staff are made "through methods of democratic centralism, not because the individuals represent aectors or are good in the art of public epeaking," but for their ability to express aad implement stated objectives. ~ FOR OFFICII,L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 I~UIt UI~ I~ I C I AL U;;I: (1NLV ~;nch member of the staff, fn addition tn undergt~ndin~ c~v~r~ll ~r~gnix~rinngl prnblems, mu~C hr~ve ~ kind nf sp~einlizneion: "Th~ unit ~omm~nder~ in military pr~Ctic~; the comrad~ r~pre~pneing the 'sni~ntific' funneinn, gn und~rgtgttding of teahnology ~nd ingietice; those invdlv~d in 'int~lligenc~' mugt know infor- mation; gquad cc~mradeg must know relationghipg with the mov~ment." The ~teff remain~ in offir.~ for 1 year. Ie gubmitg a r~gign~tion to th~ yearend political Confer~nce. An pxecuCiv~ commgnd~r ie elected ro the etaff. Staff membpr~ fight alonggide units. And h~re we come tn "guerrilla unitg." They have two fundgm~ntal ob~~ctives: Aetack and expropriation. They are ~neirely derached from the rest of the , organizntion, ~nd the commander 1s the only contact with Che ~Caff commgnd. ' ToCally self-~ufficient, they have bages gnd gupply depots, and Chey muet have Che characteristics of maximum capaciCy Co gcC and mobilize. it~ membera ~re ehnse who pgrCicularly dietit~guiah themgelveg in the squada. Combat and self-fingncing are the main ob~ectiv~s of tl?e "proletariatt ~qu~de." While thp unita ~re compl~t~ly manned by "regulars," the gquads are composed of irregularg under the leaderghip nf one or more regulars. The laCter are reeponeible for Craining the squad in combat, political-military leadership, and security checks. The liaison between the various squade and the staff _ consists of the national staff which consists of all squad commanders (the "R~gulationa" warn: Avoid large gatherings: If ineeting~ congist of more than five persons they should be halved). Advance discu~sion by headquarters staff is required for "armed action." Regulars and Irregulars The diatinction beCween regular and irregular guerrillas should not cause perplexity. It is one of the principal innovative characteriatics contained in the "Regulations," destined to influence the personality, the identity of the new terrorist, who in the "Regulations" is called "regular cadre." Above all, he lives in conditions of semisecrecy, he maintains his own identity, he has a legal regidence and a legal autocnobile. He lives "separated from areas of niovea~ent or in any case from areas that catt be infiltrated." He cennot be placed under surveillance as an individual (like members of the brigades) "~ust because he exiats; but only if he is caught in the act or in possession of something illegal." Sooner or later, the "Regulations" read, "comrades will fall": Therefore, it is important to avoid possession of political documents and illegal material simultaneously~ since it must not be possible to link a crime with another person." This is so that a technical defense can be raised, that is~ a trial based only on crimes committed. Example: A"regular" is arrested during an act of expropriation LrobberZ/ in a bank. The technical defense consists of trying him only for robbery~ not for subversive conspiracy: "Siace jail is not a'second home' for us ke pose the problem of lYberating political ' prisoners, and also that of obtaining light sentences." ~3 FOR OFFICI/,L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~ntt 0~~1.CiA1, U5~ (1NLY It ia n~~~~dary Co b~ atCpnCiv~ td ~11 eh~ ~lcm~ntg which in one way or snother cgn lead back to s"regul~r." Nere ~rises the need to "place filtera b~ewp~n one~elf and ~11 rhnge rhin~~ which, even ehough legel, c~n gerve the ~ gdv~r~~ry for purpoge~ of idenCification, frnm phygic~l d~gcription to social ~t~tug." And mor~ particularly: "We do not intend to r~commend the role of g lo~:?-ie~~i employee gs Che pinnttcle of disguiee. Certainly apppar~nce ~nd dr~es mu~t not be ton eccentric. Cgre muat be C~k~n Cn ~void u~~ of the f~mily a direcC link in tracing us dr at least not en imm~diate link. S~pnration, in order eo be Credible, must be progre~~ive ~nd ie carried nut nn ~ case-by-Cgse bagls." Unq~~sCionably m~mber~ of Ch~ unit who killed the ~roeinone prna~cutor, ~edel~ Calvog~, w~r~ following Ch~ latter "R~gulationg~" Rob~rCn Capone~ th~ geudent killed in the attnck, lived in these condiCions. He w~g det~ching himself from his family, he had loosened cnnCacts with the political move- mentg to which he had belonged. He had ~dnpted nn unsuspect~d cover as an . employee in an architect's office on a salary of 300,000 lire per month. And, in fart~ the "Regulations" require the organization to guaranCee "ficCitious employment and a budget thnt tiakeg inCo accounC the crearion of busineas activities with more or leas false places of employment." This for those comrades who "are in a position where they must socially justify the source oE their income." Nicolg Valentino who shares Capone's apartment and is soughC fnr the killing, had not renCed a place for nothing when he said t~e wanted to establish a~hop for the sale of coral. After the ruleg of conduct the fundamental requirements are: Political homogeneity, fighting qualities, availability 24 hours a day, abilities lead- ing to promotion and leadership, objective determination, discipline, acceptance of the hierarchy. Specifying military initiative, the "Regulations" single out three "basic operational models: 1) operaCion without weapons--for example, a skillful theft, surveillance, reconnaisance, street fights; 2) armed action without drawing a weapon--fnr example, a barglary, stakeouts, terrorist actis, propaganda; 3) action With use of weapon--for example, disarming, immobiliz- ing, kidnaping, theft, firefight and any other kind of attack. The regular cadre must have been involved at leaet once on all three levels of operations." However, the irregular is required to have a fighting quality that is sufficient on the second level: That is to say, operations in which use of a weapon is expected and necessary are reserved for full-time guerrillas. Regarding availability, it is not desired to "create peopZe's martyrs, not to tolerate armchair revolutionaries." All guerrilla groups are always in agreement on this subject. "Sacred cows" must not exist in the red brigades. In the CAP LPartisan Action Croup/ created by Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, it wae the leader himaelf who led the more spectacular actions. All members of NAP LArmed Proletarian Nuclei/ played a direct role. However, the "Regulations" provide that "the regular may be asked at any time to go u~erground." He is "conscious of belonging to a centralized and therefore rigidly hierarchical organization. ThereforP, he disciplines himself according to ite internal - rules, he takea no initiative without consulting his direct superior or, in cases of emergency, the highest ranking person he can find." 14 FOR OFFICI/+L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~ Frox n~~tr,r.nt. t~sr oNr,v - In r~turn, the org~niznti~n ~u~rrar?t~e~ medicgl, m~chanical, and 1~g~1 s~rvices, nnd the possibility of escaping abro;~d, Pgrticular gtC~nti~n i~ given eo leg~l ~ervices: "Th~ cnmr~de lnwyer mAy from time to time adequgtely eelecC thp line of defenge only if h~ is politically in pnssegeion of ehe organiza- tinn'e program; and only in ehig case can thpre be u vnlid pxchgnge wiCh the cnmrnd~ prigon~rs." The strengehening of services is one of the immedigte gc,nle to be reached, dn the basis of the so-called "network." '~he latter is differ~ntiated in - "g reul friend with awareness in the politicnl grea; and in the purely aupport neCwork, uninfnrmed." Thi~ is a ~oneiderable differ~nce above all because of ehe different development that members in Chi~ sectar may have: The former, rhat is Che aware network, is c~n~idered e privileged terrain fnr testing cadres selected from the area, future candidgtee for irregular groupg. The l~tt~r, that is the uninformed network, can be established on the basis of school , family friends, or whomsoever, because a relaCionst~ip oE esCeem or reciprocal confidence with a comrade, g~aranteeg a service." � Some Cabinet-1eve1 Friends These few phrases embrace the entire world of sympathizers, of those who move around the orgranization, who guarantee its survival and development. In this kind of organization "enCry from below" is not unplanned. Thus, one entprs by beginning to guarantee a service, a document, information, a suggestion. Perhaps this would be received from a friend who esteems us ~nd who could never by the furthest streCch of the imagination auppose that the material will turn out to be useful to terrorists. This ~s probably the sitatuion of the various "moles" who are believed to be holed up in the ministries. Perhaps it is not matter of conscious spies, but merely of "school companions," "friends of the family," who indulge in confidences based on a misplaced trust. ?n order Co avoid shocks, requesta directed to the network are made on a gradual basis. Fi;~ally, "a minimum of political debate is guaranteed to network comrades." Since the organization puts down its roots in such a broad and deep way, would it not be possible to trace back the branches so, as to identify the regular cadres, the commandera and the political-military leaders? We have already seen how many barriers (through examinationa, interrogations, tests and security checks) must be oveccoms When a comrade wanCs to enter the organization. But there are other rules that, at least on paper, are designed [o prevent infiltration. One of the principal ones is "compartmentalization," the total separation between various units. Bases and supply locations must obey this rule: The least number of comrades possible must have accegs to headquarters and, in regard to neighbors, these visits must be justified by a social reason. It is recomanended that a atraw taan be found for bases where operations are planned and where comrades are hidden. Working areas are considered as highly aabile structures. Consultation and updating of - files, and technical work must be carried out in legal quarters where illegal material is transported only at the m~ment of use in a suitcase and all the rest of the material needed remains in place, ~ustified by the legal activity being carried out. 15 FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~tlR O~F'ICIAL U5~ ONLY Nnt~~ Y~g, Tel~phone No ~mphaeis mugC be plac~d on this ~CCenCidn that the draf.tierg of Che "Regulaeions" have ded~caC~d eo the erection ~f A"1egn1 f~cade" which will serve as a cover: Meneion i~ expressly made df quarCere ac~d legal acCtvitieg that can serve Co nover illegaliCy. What could Chis Cover be? The rear areas of a shop, a lawyer's or architecC's office, a bookstore, a private school? The "Itegulationg" nlways carefully avoid any reference to real siCuations, to . locall.ties or peraon~ who could be traced. Even the chapter dedicated Co meetings atresses Che criterion of secrecy. MeeCingg of comrades ghould not include more thgn four or five pergons at g Cime. Meetings, which ahall be "short, productive and secure," could also ~ be held in the open if the area guarante~s good visibility or in public places wiCh two exits. Otherwiae, they must be held in "bases for that purpose rented by the organizeCion or in homes of comrades only if Chey are 'clean,' or better in network safehouaes." The telephone is used as 1itCle as poeaible and only to receive messages in case of emergency. It is betCer to use noCea left in agreed upon places or other systems. The "Regulationa" recommend studying a code to indicate places of appoinCment in the presence of third parties, on the telephone, or wr~ting. It is recommended that a selection be made of three conventional names, for example, . the station, the bar, the cinema, which will corregpond Co three different places prepared in advance. While maintaining the nomenclature, the actual place st~~uld be changed at least once a month." An ideal place is the heavily populated suburb, far from friends and enemies. Never wait more than 10 minutes. The code will be useful for emergency situations. Agreed upon phrases will serve to indicate three degrees of warning: Prealarm (remove documenta and and illegal material from the houses and maintain alert); alarm (cease all activity); danger (separate and move to other cities). Comradeship but noC Friendship Even within the organization, contacts between guerrillas are sub~ect to detailed regulations. "There muat be no relations of a personal n~ture. These are tolerated among regulars of the same unit, but it is advised that each one release his tensions in localities not connected with the organization. Relations, however, must be limited to maintaining~that level of comradeship and adaptation that is useful in action and work." In fact, in the past, personal relations had led ta the "destructian Af that 'gang of friends' of which they were a member," the drafters of the document recall. "In fact, ` there existed a creeping suborganization which advanced its own informal debate on everything. This was the first step toward personalism and added discontent to discontent." 16 FOR OFFICIkL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 h'~Et OI~'~tCIAL U5~ ONLY E~'inally, links eo the masges: These muse Cake plgce through the press, propgganda, preaence in Che movement. The unie thaC deal~ wieh this "is cnmpdsed of the squads and the area thar they activaee under Che leaderghip of the regular Ce11e"; iC prometea debaCe on the aub~ect of armed sCruggle, ir aelecta and recrutts new cadres. ~or this reason, it musC adopr "a legal. facade Chat would link it to a political area." Ae a conaequence, it is necessary Co hRVe a local newspaper, even if a national newapaper exists. The final rules refer Co Che preas and are among the moat algrming: "The editorial office of the newspaper muat be a point of explicit reference for comradea in Che area. The legal editorial office must work under the control of a regular comrade." . _ COPYItIGHT: 1978 Rizzoli Editore 6034 CSO: 3104 17 FOR OFFICIl,I. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~ I~'c11t fll~ I~' I(; I Al~ 1?tii~~ (1NI,Y ITAI.Y MEMBERSHIP~ STRUCTURE~ FISCAL POLICY OF LABOR UNIONS Mi1an TL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 14 Nov, 19 Dec ~8 [Article by Salvatore Col] _ [1~ Nov 78, p 3 ] � [Text] , The Italian labor burocracy today has swollen just about as much as 3t dare swell: any fatter, and it would be quite unable to function at all. From the figures we saw ear- lier, ~hough~ we get the impression that the limit is about - to be declared obsolete, since the average number of new hands coming aboard the apparatus is ~oo high for any sudden drop to zero, or, in other words, to the ordinary level of attri- tion and turnover. As to where the new level may be set, there . is a total lack of any procedure for replacement that would allow this burocracy to r~tain its functional agility~ and at the same time immunize i~ against elephantiasis. Urgent adop- tion of this mechanism is rendered additionally advisable by the current sluua in membership, after 10 years of steady rise � in the rolls. Theoretically, organized labor in Italy has two possible ways in which to stop the expansion of the labor burocracy: it can update its own leadership through cadre training centersi or it can make at least some of the union offices elective (i.n other words, have people in jobs for specific ~erms, then ei- ther re-elect them or pick somebody else). In fact, though, . neither of these approaches will work: the first, because the - union training centers enjoy no prestige whatever, nor do they command the neceasary recognition to exercise a role of advance- ' ment and updating of labor cadre. Almost all the labor training schoola merely pass along the in-house line, and none has the tools to foster high-level research and information. The second approach (making at leas~ some of the organization management jobs elective) is hampered primarily by the rigid 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 _ I~OIt UI~ l~ IC IAL USL nNLY oomp~rtmcnb~].:ii,11t:LOt1 ~f' the ltabor motremonb into par~y - Cr~c;l, i.~~i,~. W.iiiii3 i~~~~ .i.u rnu~~ cu~c:~, wnuld bc; u m~t~e;r o� :ii?~~ Ln oiiu ot�' tho~~ Cacb:iori~, rat�tic~r i;haL oric: nf any real lead- er~h3p c~pabi:l3.~y or management skills in~ide~ ~he apparatus~ par~3cu~.arl.y s3nce ~he politic~~. part3es alway~ have been and ~ sti11 are the main channel for un3.on o�ficials. Helping to make this ~pproach even more unpromisin~ :ts the very - stron~ espri~ de corps tha~ unites members of ~h~ 'labor bu~ro- cr~cy. As Bruno Manghi notes: "The union man can become an o�- _ �icer of the consensus because he belongs ~o a pr~tected. P1.ite. Protected, because it is called upon to embody a legitima~e and honored institution. [Missing words or sentences.]...capaci~y of ~:he internal democratic mechanisms to jeopardize the leader- st~ip role, meaning the hi~h stability o� those roles. Thi.s is - how the dominant pa~tern becomes that of ~he average politician: the one who gives with the ebb and flow of events so as to hang on~o his consensus and his delegated power." Movin~; ahead in our examination of the data on the burocracies~~ it is worth while to devote a good deal of attention to the phe- nomenon known as transfer (distacco): transfer comes about when all or some of the individual~s remuneration for union work comes From hi~ employer. In addit ion to cadre trans�erred f rom productian and set to work in the work place, the union also has an equivalent number of transfer people working outside the work places, within its own burocracy. Specific data are available only for the CGIL, but they will do to give some idea of how widespread the phenomenon actually is. Of the 5, ;Ol officials working full time in the Federation Chambers of L�abor, transfer people account for 1,$10, or 28.5 percent of the total. If we apply that same percentage to the other two confederations, we can estimate that full-time official transferred f rom production number around 2~~00. In the CGIL, 934 transfer workers are paid by the una.on (all fringe benefits are paid by the company from which they were transf~erred), while the remaining S~G ~re paid in toto by the company. The CGIL tends to transfer out of production only polit ically know- ledgeable cadre, and to look outside for its technical staf�. Transferees from production added to the technical staff number only a s~ant 6.6 percent. Geographical distribution of trans- ferees is also quite heterogeneous: it ranges from 186 in Liguria (85�7 percen t of union officials) to 1(19 in Lombardy - (12. 8 percent ) to $0 in Sicily ( 8 percent Unf ~~rtuna*.el,y, we have no way of knowing where the transferees comt~ �rom (.industry, - agricultural serv:ices, civil service...), and i~ is difficult therefore to understand the underlying causes for t~e wide dis- parity from region to region, or the possible motivation that ~9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 FOR OF~ICLAL U5~ ONLY ~ a~ ~ ~ ' ~��r ,fJ ~-I L~ N h h t'~ et 00 r-I ad M M[~ O~~O ~+'1 d' N U1 W M rl - cd ~-i ~tl O~ i-1 ?r1 U1 ~1 N M V1 d' l~ N~O rl ~Q O d' Q~ ~O rl O ~ .G ~ N V da M N 00 M r-I O~ d' rl M N N ~ rl ~ cU 4a a~ o~ ~ ro v~ s~ s~ v ~ ~n ~ l~ h~O Q~ ~G M Q~ ~D O~ d' M~O ~O c'7 Q~ h O~ M O 00 0 - ,1] 3 ~ cD 4d r~l ~-I rl i-I M~ N N t~ Q~ M r-I V1 N ~ ~~p HE+O ~ ~ c~ rl 0 r~-I t~'' � i~+ ~r~l ~ 1 I~o I 1 rl I i I I 1 I I I I 1 I I I 1 h � ~ ~ 1 1 N I I 1 I 1 I I I 1 I 1 I 1 I I I I N U - W ' ~ 't! 4~+ H �~I > 4~+ 0 4-t ~ W ~ 0 S3~ ~ A O !A V ~ ~ �rl rl . H H fa U1 pr ~ O I d~ GU ?~1 ~G M r{ O~ M oo V1 ~ i-1 ~O ~1 N N O~ T C~ C) U 4-1 O I?r1 M t~1 rl ~O N~-I d' ~O i-i r-I rl I N ~ b c. o a cn ai w o~ a~ H z ~ H ~ ro o c~ao ~ ~ - (s,, tE.~ ~ ~q ~ et M t~ I N I N oo ~n I I I I 1 1 I I I I I ~-i q R1 0 ir �rl i~ I I rl I 1 I I I 1 1 1 I I 1 et cd ~ W U1 O.~ H ~ ` ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ G4 ~U1 ~C~ W .C W U ~ �~I U1 � V O 41 RS ~ i c'7 O~ rl O~ ~O 'rJ' I~ ~/'f rl rl N M O et' rl 00 O~ M i~ ~ i~ ~ E1 W O rl O~ l~ 1C-{ M N~`~ e-1 M M N ~ a�~r o eo ~ b . ~ b ~ao b n~i ~ ~ a ~ ,0 ~ d ~ U O . ~p ~ Rf 1 . o ~ z ~ ~ s ~ ~o a ~ a � +~o ~ o>a�~ ~a�a ~ ~~o ~a H ~3 ~ ~ H ~ d Rf 'd ~ 1 I ~ v �~I �rl V �~I �e~ H ~ rl C7 ~ 'd �G~i ~ ~ 'ri ~d .C; ~ 0 N V~1 ~ ~ r-I .G r i ~ rl p W O f. W ~ e-I ~~�rl ~g U~I G~i .a ~N f~. r-i ag~�v1 r-I �U i+ E-~ Hr~IW x a>aa� ~Hti~f~H~~r~.1d~UdfAt~VIt1~ H V~! ~ - 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 FOEt OI~'I~ ICI,AI, USC ONLY m:i.~hl, :Lcud a mur~ 1;0 t~p li:i.s own ~job simply to }iold ~ pc~s~t tl;, Fa ur~ i.on oL'E'~.~:i.ul.. One bi~ ot intoc~mation comes through very c~.ear~Ly~ though. Tn i:he South~ ~he peroentages of transferees to the total apparatus payro~.l ~re lower than the n~tional average: of 1, 386 officials (bo~h technic~l ~nd political), only 245 (l8 percent) are trans- - ~erees. In casbing about for an exp~.ana~ion o� ~hese figures, we s~iould men~ion tho difficul~ies bhe union runs in~o in ~he South when i~b br~ies to inserb of~3cia~.s �rom the work places into its internal offiaial ~ppara~us. Because of labor~ s lesser~ a~;gressiveness k~y comparison wi~h ~he North, and because oi' ~he m~re recent emer~ence oE indus~rial areas there, workers in the Mezzogiot�no who are able and willing {;o ~ak~ nn management jobs i.n th~ union appara~us are far fewer ~han in ~he rest of tlie couiit;ry. The many uriion training schools that have sprung up in thc: South, mainly because the CGIL wanted them~ only rarely ~uc- - ceed in doing what they are supposed ~o do. - l~urther confirmation of this state o~ affairs comes to us from thc �i~rures on turnover in the appara~us in 19~6 as compared ' with 19'75. In northern Ita1y, political officials coming in during 1976 numbcred 'L62, of whom 205 (~8.2 percen~) were trans- ferees from production. In central Ztaly there were 48 new poli- tical officials, 3~ o� them (77�1 pe~cent) from production. The situation is diff erent in the Mezzogiorno, where out of 60 new recruii;s only 33 (55 Percen~) came froni production. The remain- ing 45 percent consists of students or unemployed graduates. In today~s ].abor burocracy '~there is an increasing flow of edu- cated people without satisfactory jobs, who see in the union not only an ideal chance, but also a fairly st able job opportunity with promise for self-fulfillmerit (Manghi. ) This trend is more marked in the South for the reasons cited, but it is substantial even in the center and in the North. F or the long-run impact on the social. makeup of the labor buro- cracy, the phenomenon is beginning to cause some concern and not with~ut reason inside the con�ederations themselves. ~l~) December 19~8, p 3] [Text~ When it comes to the more specific ally sociological fea- tures of union apparatus (social background~ original occupation, education)~ the unions are very cagey about providing informa- tion. With a littlc patience, though, it is possible to work out a reliablc pi.cture of their makeup, aware that the extrapo- lations we arc boin~ to make will not give us exact quantities, but will merely r~eflect reasonavlv probable trends. The labor organizations ~hat are most generous with data in this area are the CISL (Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions) and the UIL (Italian Union of Labor). The CGIL confines itself to giving 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 I~'Ult OI~EICIAL U5L ONLY _ th~ age oi' i~s ofiioia~.s and the percenbage of cadre who have n~ver been in i;he labor world and have come into ~he apparatus over recent years. One 1.ast .~tipulation i ~'i}1C following �i- ~ures stil~. relate orily ~o the political apparatuses involved in the horizon~al and ca~egorica7. structures o� ~he CGYL, CISL, and UZL at the provincia]. level. For the CZSL~ we have some figures on re~ional appara~tuses~ on the national category lead- ership, and on ~he ~pparatus at the home o��ice. The CGIL~s political apparatus consists o~ i,7o3 officials under 35 years of a~e, ].,646 between 35 and 55, and 232 over 55� Among that las~ group are 72 officials over 60. In the CISL 403 0�- fa.cials are under 30 and 918 are over 50� There are no data on the remaining 421. 'rh~:se f igures re�1.ect, albeit not in any homogeneous way, the three phases of the history of organized labor over tne iast 30 ye~rs. The �irst generation of o�ficials (those over 50) is s~i11 numerous. These of�icials in most cases hold high posts in the horizontal structures, particularly. The second age group, the 35- to 5~-year-olds, include the generation of o�fi- cials who got ~heir early start in the conti�act disputPS of the Sixties. The last group, those from ,;0 to are the youngest ~enerat ion, largely made up of cadre who have taken part in and often often had a leading role in the worker of the hot autumn. These o�ficials are the "new blood" in organized labor~ and most of them are active in the provincial category (vertic al) structures. On the whole, the average age of the CISL cadre man is slightly � greater than,that of his CGIL counterpart. This is particularly true in the Mezzogiorno, where the CISL, inlike the CGIL, has an average age in the apparatus than in the rank and fi1e. The incidence of CISL organization men over 50 in the South is 20 percent, while for the country as a whole it is only 15 percent. In the South, with ~he exception of Apulia and Sicily, the CGIL has a cadre group that is relatively younger than in the rest of Italy, because in this area maizy of the provincial Chambers of Labor have exis~ed for only a decade or so. The union lead- ership, mainly grown up in the inunediate aftermath of Wor1d War . II, come mainly from the ranks of farm laborers, and are con- centrated almost exclusively in Apulia and Sicily. T~have skipped over the UIL because this particular organization is a unique case. The UIL in fact does not have any of the cadre trained during the late Forties which is still running the CGIL and CISL today. Its burocracy consists largely of officials be- tween 30 and 40, with around 10 years~ executive experience. In other words, the UIL officials embody the experience of the Six- ties, enriched with the bargaining background of this last de- cade. 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 Nbk (1N'N'iCfAL U5L CINLY Ar~nthr:r d~t;um ~h~ ur~l~l~H, wi~h Lh~ ~xC~p~.tnt~ ~l' t~hc CGtL~ ~rc wi1L_i_~~~; t,n r~~lt~u~r, ir+ r~Cl?nlusilt I~r~~:k~rt?w~dH nP tlt~ir nfff- r! I?~ Lhc: C75L 1~ pc,r~e~~t, nf' di'CiGif~l~ huv~ L'inigh~ed grad~ r~Ghnn"l~ 33 p~rChnt liuv~ middlu ~Ghnn1 ciiplnm~a~, r~nd ~tx ptrc:~cit; huld upp~r middlc: Hchool ~erLiCf~ut~g~ wliil~ nnnLhet� ~ p~re~ent hnvcs cc~ll~ge d~gr~h~. ~'or tlic~ r~m~ining ~q p~res~nt ( Slg o~~f- ~i~l~) th~r~ nr~ nd d~ta dvnil~bl~. An ah~ ~~n ~h+~ 1~v~1 n~' c:duCatiun in th~ Ct~i~ buru~raCy di~~~r~ ttnm~wl~a~, thdugh nnt excec~siv~ly~ from tt~~at nC th~ ~talian pt~pulatinn t~~ n who1~. Theg~ ~i~ur~g vnry ~r~dtly i!' w~ ~nngid~r t,h~e ~du~gti~n~1 1~v~e1 ~ nC tli~ CYSL in th~ 5nuth. ~n thig art~a~ univ~r~ity gr~dua~~g dCCt~WIt ~or nnly 5 perc~nt, ~nd u~p~er-mfdctle-~~hdd1 ~r~d~~?t~eg nnly 35 p~rcc~nti, whil~ 'ly percc~nt h~vc~ middl~ ~chonl diplnm~~ und 12 percent hav~ t'inish~ed gr~d~ ~Chan1. mti~ t~i~h~~t ~.~v+~~ dt` edur.atinn mm~ng CI5L cgdr~ in the 5nuth f~ td be tr~~~d td tli~ iinii-~w~inn baCkground o~ mt~ny Cadres people working in th~ prot~in- cinl labdr union~s (CI5L~~ provincf~l ~tru~ture~). ~t ahc~uld a1r~o b~ borne in mind thut th~ widc~,~pre~d prc~~~n~c~ t~~ thr~ CI~L in th~ civil sorvice nlldw~s ttii~ or~actiz~tidn tn hav~e~ ~1: thc r~~~ne tim~, cudre comin~ out o~ th~ laboring wnrld gnd thag~ with high-HChonl educutianq. In thc: Nnrth~ wherc: thc~ propnr~ion o~ workfng-C1ass p~~p1e in th~ CISL iss highQr, o~~icigl~ with coll~ge degre~s ~ceount for only 1~.5 p~rc~nt~ whil~ SO perC~nt o~ them h~vc~ high ~cho~1 diplomns. A sfmilar ~e~ture c~n be ~ound fn the CGIL wa11, wher~~ we already noted, a'very high percenteg~ o~ neN of~icigl,s in the South~ much higher than in tl~e North, comes directly from the classroom. An fnitial conclusion leads to the aasertfon tf~~t thQ intermediat~ echelons of the hierarchieg of the CISL and CGIL do not dfffer substantially fn levele of ~ducgtfon. Leval~ high~r th~n the average for the nation as ~ whole ~r~ found mginly in the ~ou- thern r~gian~. In this inst~nce, too~ th~ UIL~s gpp~ratus fg n c~~e ~pgrt. g~- cause oF its heavy membership among technici~n~ gnd office aork- crs in fndustry ~nd in the tiertiiary ,sectoc~ thig organization has no trouble finding officials in the working world f9S percent oF cadre) with a high educational level. The fa~at i~ that 40 pcrcent of UIL of Fici~ls hold high school diplomag~ and anothc~r 10 percent have college degrees. A great many of these offfci~l~ = t~ave attended special instftutes for skilled fndustrial aorkers, technicians and clerical workers, and surveyors, ahile those aith ~ backgrounds in the sciences are by no meang rare (around ZO per- cent of the degree-holders). Mother 37�S percent of UIL offi- cials have middle-school certificateg. The high number of young and well educated officials in the UIL should algo be vieaed es 23 FOR OFFICIAL USB ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 l~~ Ot~'~'I~tAL U~~ dNLY ~ ~ h ~ w ~ ~ ~ v ~ ~ u'f ~-1 ~ h A~ M i-~I t~t u'1 ~ A ~0 M~{ 0~ . . . � � . . . � � . t~ i~ ~0 ~ ~ , ~ M M~ N~ ~ V1 M'O N~'! O H O w ~ 4~0 ~ ~ i+ ~ t~~t~~~ ~ ~~a0~ ~ 0~ 0~~ o~ A .~r rl ~ 19v1, tn d~d~10 ~ ~ i, ~ON ' ~ M d M .C V Sh~NNdl .i 0 rl R1 i. 0 Q ~ ~p~ ~ v 4ai i1 0 ~ ~ ta1 ~ Q d r'~-1 A ~ ~ O ~ V#~ ~.i 1A ir ir w ~ ~ ~ @ rl ~ ~ . M N '0 Y~ 0'N i-1 - � .~i '+~d fA ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ u a� a~i ~ .�c ~ ill N G4 M 't! ,C .i'. ~ f!1 O~ ' ~ tq ~ 41 ~ ~V ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~cm~rab ~ z ~ o a~ a m ro w ai a~ < ~ n a o E .c ~ o ~ ~ c~. o c"~i n~ ai c�`' 4. m ~x . i ~ �~~1 N ~ t~. H O ~ ~R. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O O~~~~ ~ C~r"~~ C~ v V W rl w~ ~i O~ 41 q w ~ 41 ~ L~ ~r~l L~ ~ e > 4 ~-I i. Q t~ t, ~.~1 t+ v~+> O ~ m ~ ~ c: ~ ~ ~ c a m ~ c~�. ~ ~ m ~ ~ M o a~ ao e��a ~ c~~~bao ed fA ii w w w ~0 ~ f0 rl q O O i. ~ ~Y.�~ooa~'o~.~ r~o`"~~ � w a sc ac ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ H ~ ~ ~ v o a~3 v=i ~ 3� c~ N~ a�~ * N c~. e�r a~ ~ ~�n 24 ~ F~t OFFICIAL U3E OHLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~dtt U~~IGIAL U5~ f~Nt,Y an ~CCort tn r~~dvt�r thC dr~anizatidn~l nnd polit3~~1 initi~t3vC ~rr~m tl~~ nth~r twd nr~dnirntinn~. Whi1~ thc r~t~hn~l diplnmu i~s ~i~1y p~rt;l.y ~n ~r~~ d~ ~~re~ning ~nr thc intarmedi~t;rs lcv~l~ ~C tha urti:t~n h~~r~r~hy, i.t ig g Gr~.ti~~1 Cd~tor in ~dv~n~t~m~iit~ bn th~ upper r~~~h~s~ d~ th~ but~oer~~y. In u~pnr~ o~ thi~ ~g,~r~rtidn dn~ t~~~d ~nly aite ~h~ fdllnwing i'i~,ur~~. ~n 1~~q, out n~ c~~~f~iglg ~mploy~d in th~ CI~L~g c~~gidt~ul o~~ic~~, nin~ ( x6. y p~rCr~tit ) w~r~ callgge gr~du~t~~ ~nd 15 h~?d high ~~hdoi diplomr~~s. Mc~ving up in th~ hiernr~hy, uut o~ 7~ df~i~~.g1g wdrking ~t C~SL~~ c~ntr~l headqu~?rt~r,~, (S~ per- C~nt) w~r~ roll~g~ ~rnduat~~ ~nd ~7 p~ra~n~) had high ~chool dipl.omgg. Nigh 1~v~1,~ a~ +~duC~tidn w~r~ ~1,~0 ~nund in th~ ~p~~- rntu~ o~ tl~~ CI~L~~ ~~t~got~y ~~d~r~t~.on~s aut o~ 1~b offici~l~, thrr~ w~r~ d4 ~o11~g~ gr~du~t~,~ (~~.4 p~rc~nt) ~nd 7~ high ~~hool ~;r~udu~t~eg C4o perC~nt ) . Thc GCIL ~nd U~L h~ve thu~ P~r prnvided nn r~lisblr~ d~t~ nn th~ir r~~;fon~l ~nd n~ti~nal ~pp~ratu,~~~. It i~ f~ir tn gsc~um~, tihough, th~t th~ge nrgani~~tic~ng would show tr~ndg id~ntic~l with tho~~ ,just CftCd ~~r the CISL ~ppar~tu,~, ~ tr~nd thgt a~s bc~rne ou~ fn nn inquiry cnnduCt~d by ~ilippo 8at~aglia b~ck it~ 1g71. mhc~ re,~ult$ o~ that gurv~y ghow th~t ev~n th~n, the p~ra~nti~ge of whitQ collnr work~rg ~nd ~tudent,~ ai~h high~r th~n ~verage ~ducgtion a~g vc~ry high nmong th~ memb~rg of the CGIL-CISL-UIL csxc~CUtiv~ coun~ila~. I think ~h~t, in the light o~ g1~ tha~~ d~t~, ac: cannot but ~gree aith what Gfurseppe Della itocca wrote recently: "The high cultu- ral 1eve1~ the declining trend in th~ group of people of workfng ~lagg backgroundg, the pervasfve pragence of whfte collar workers and ~tudenta~ the pr~etige and the social rel~tfong surfgeing in th~ work of the union offici~l plece the full-time memberg of ther r~nk v~ry close~ on th~ lev~l of eoci~~. gtatug, to the mid- dl~ clasrse~. " To ahat de~ree doea awar~n~ag of thi~s ~tatus influence the b~hg- vior und ~hepQ thc~ line of the It~lian labor movement? The move- ment f,~ goinf to have to gt~rt coming up aith some an~saers to thi~ kind of quegtion. COPYRI(3HT: 1978 ~ditrice I1 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l ~ Glt.~ CSO: 3104 25 FOR OPPICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 I~UIS f1M'N'ICIAL t15~ hNLY SW~;nLN l,~Ab~N(i BU~INE:~3~ p~0(}Nd;~~ p~t01t~ INACCURAm~ :)to~kh~lm V~GKAN~ A~FAR~R in ~w~dit~h ].4 D~c 78 P 7 (~.'d.itori~l by 011~ ~ahl~n: "Wi1]. the Trends D~~~ive th~ ~'rognost3cator~ A~u3ri in 1q7~? ) (m~xt) mhc rennc~mic i'oreC~sta of tihe N~tional 5~~+~dish ~n~titut~ fbr ~conomi~ )tescar~h (KIJ, the ~'c~1c~r~tidrr oi' t3wedish ~ndustries (Stj and the SN5 (~ndus- trial. C~uncil for :,dcial unri ~Gnnomic Studiea~ hav~ in r~Cent yeurs been Wid~ ~ c~t' thc murk. I~' thc ma?rgfn o~' their errc~r i~ the same in 1979 ~weden will t~~?vr~ a~rrn+th rute oi' abouL ~ pcrc~nt. (mhe most optimiatic ~atimate is ~ ~erccnt.) .krcdcn' ~ rcport~ c~f' cconrnni c trends publiaheci this autumn reflect consisLent optimism for 197q. KI ex~ects a groWth in the GNp of 4.3 pprcent. SI is a t~it more cons~rvative, huL still exp~~ts 4 percent. Le~st Monday the annuaL - rcport i'rom ;r~~ xgs puhlished e~nfl thttt org~?nization expects a groath in the CNP in lq'(9 of not lcss than 5 per~er?t. 'rhese are very high f'igures. Among the O~CD countries today only Japan is exp~ct~d to attain a GNp gror?th oF aare than 4 percent next year. Tttie ~edish prognosticatorg have not r~ccumulated a particule.rly good record of for~casting in recent years. The ~?utumn reports from IQ, SI and 3NS were sip,r~ifiCantly in ~rror for 1977 and 1978� 7'hc dia~;rum r,hrn+r the CNI' forecaats. In 1977 ~~den's (iN~' fell by 2.5 per- G~nt. ~3ut in the autwnn or ~976 all three reports fbrecast xn increase. SNS tiu~l tli~, ~m?a] ~:rror, .just 2.> prrCC~ntsge ~oints above the fYnal outcc~me. '['In~ r~brno~l,3.caLors w~r~: Clr.ar7,y imprc~~ed b,y 197'('s dccline in CNP. In the 1'~~r~:~:r?::t.:; ~t' nu~~nru~ l~'/'( Cor th~: ye~r 19'/8 both SI and SNS predictions fell 1~r~1vw I.f~~ mu~;i.c:ul zc:ro linc. Iristcucl, preliminary figures for 1978 shrnr a ~;mwLh ;n� GNl' ~l' :'.2 perccnt. KI's pro~nosis was th~ closest, but was :.6 i 11 Ii~ ~:rrnr I;y m~rc: l.1?un onc pcrc:cntuge point. J.1, is I,~~mp~i.i~ t,~ 3ucl~~~ thc 1979 Predictions on u b~sis of results from recent ycurs. Bc!'ore 19'~'r they vere at least a couple of percentage poic~ts too high - ~ 26 FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY - f APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 1~i~it ~~I~7~'tC:li,l: U~~I~~ OIJ1,Y and t,ei'dr~ 1~7~3 they w~re a coupLc d� p~rcent~e pc~ints tnd ~ow. If it ig n~? t;im~ fbr annthrr cxa~;~eration, ~"re~listic" fbre~ast for the 1~7~ C1Np nhou].d t,a abc~ut ~ nr~rc~~nt;. 'i',f�re ar~, t~~w~vc~r, ~r~me mdre~ dr ~.e~~ :~peci~l f'~,etvr,~ whiCh indieat~ that ~r~wth ai11 be unusu�~11y high next ye~r. 'rhl~ p~st ye~r the 1arg~ im~rov~ment in the b~].~n~~ o~' tr~d~--in~re~g~d exp~rts ~nd reduced imp~rts--~xpl~ins a lsrge p~?~t of the grnwth in the GNp (and ~:xnl~in~ ~dme of th~ errors in prediction~). On the dtner ~iand the r~duCtion oi' industrial inv~nt~ry hc?d a suppres~ing eff~~t on th~ (SNp. P1crt ycur thc UulunCe ~i' will be unch~nged comp~red with 197$~ Iju~ ic~vr:ritory rcduGti~n wi11 in l~rge mea~ure be ~ompl~ted. Aceordin~ to Krt Lh~ incre~se in ~nv~r,tory investm~nt wi~.1 cauge the CNp to grow by 1.3 p~rcent. ~ 4lithout the inventory effeCt the CNp predictidns wou].d be on~ to ~wo perC~nt 1~w~r. ~larthermc~rc 5N;3 exp~ct;s n m~rk~d incr~~s~ in private consumption (fbllowing dccrc~ses in 1~7'l und 197~ nf t~ tdtal oi' bar~],y 2 p~r~ent). 1~t's progno~is :unounts to 2.t per~~~nt Whilc ;~1; believes that the incr~ase W111 be as much ~s 3�5 prrc~nt. 'This Will be attuincd through an increas~ in re~.l spendable income of' one to two prrcent, und the effect of th~ tsix packc~e will give an additional one pcrcent. Fl~rthermore a reduetion in family savings of on~ p~rcent is expect~d. mhese high gror+th predictions should give nes+ direction to th~ debate over ~ economic policy. To enter a period of high growth With measures to stimulate the econcm~y introduces the risk of causing a negative effect on the rate of in�lation and the balancc of trade. The bul~nce of tracic is not, hoSrever, seen as ~ problem by SHS. It depends largely upon ahcther one supports official statistics. According to KI the totuL deficit in thr. trade balance for 19'(g will be 7.2 billion kronor (comp~rccl xith 1~?.~ billion kronor fn 19`t7)� But according to statistics ut,ilized by SNS thc ~+edish bul~nce of tr~de xill improve substantially thi ~ ,year . 7'her~ n~turully it doe~ not makc: much difference if it worsens by one or two - t~illion next yenr duc to ~u~ inrre~s~ in the volume of imports by over 8 I?~~rc~r?iL. 27 FbR OFFICIAL U3E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~OR nf~'t~'t~t~u, U5~ ONt,Y C 1~Prognoser oah utfalt sNs c 2 ~ sNP. A~in vay~,~u~~ng (3)?.oe�+: K~ , s~ .~y� . ~ ~ , ~ ; , . ~ ; , ` A, ~ t_ - -r C~ . . ~ + " ~ ~ �'4" ~ . . ~ 4*'~~R~ 1 . ~ ' . } ~~y�' ~ ' -~`~~'L, ~ ~ ~ ? ~M i ~ ! ~ . .A, ~:,.a' r t. r . lt~' :ti . 1~7~ _ ~ Key: 1. Prognoses and results 2. GNP. Annual amount of change 3� Percent 4. National Sr+edish Institute for Economic Reaearch 5� ~ederation of 3~redish Industries 6. Industrial Council for Social and Economic Studies 7� Result COYYRIIGFIT: Ahlen & Akerlunds Tryckerier, Stockholm, 1978 9287 CSO: 3109 28 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE O~.~t ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~Ok nN~~tCtAL U5~ ONLY t+1~ST G~ItMANY AC'fIVI~I~S, S'CATUS U~ ~MIGttE POLI'CICAL GttOUpS IN ~ItG Hnmburg 5T~RN in German 30 Nov 78 pp 250-254 (Arti~l~ by Uw~ Zirtm~r: "PCnC~CCive N~nd~ frdm ~uligch"] (Text) A hundred nnd ~ighty-geven exCremisC group~ with 60,UU0 m~mb~r~ ~r~ u~ing the FRG ~e ~ betCleground againeC th~ir nativ~ gov~rnments. itighewing radie~ls, in particu- lar, can count e~n tolerance from G~rmgn Officialg. 'Che vocabulary ia reminigcent of blood, bombg gnd Bagder-Meinhof. "Revo- . lutionary life-gnd dp~th battle," "Let ua create revolutionary associations and groups," "'Cl~e apparatus of the sratp mu~t be destroyed wiCh the dia- lpctic nf thc word and wiCh dynamite." Bur it is noC home-grown terrarista, it ig CroaCien nationaliets whn ~re Chundering such sayings. And Turkiah rightwing extremiats or Persian leftwing fanatics are playing the eame tune. They are g11 miausing the ~RG as a base for operations against thoae in power in their ovn countriea--the communist Tito in Belgrade, the eocialist Lcevit in Ankara and the monarch Reza Pahlevi in Teheran. Of the approxia~ately 4 million foreigners who live in the West German area, about 60,000 belong to 181 extremist groups, according to the most recent findings of the Office for the Prot~ction of the Conatitution. They call themselveg "Croatian Republic Party," National Salvatian Party," or "Con- � federation of Iranian StudenCS," and terrorists actions like murder, man- slaughter and bodily harm, atteropts involving explosives and arson can be laid to th~ account of their violent adherents. Just the Croatians operating in Wegt Cern~ey are charged by the Federal Criminal Police Bureau (BKA) With 4 murders, 8 attempted murderg, 20 crimes involving exploaives, and 3 attacks in Yugoslavia With a total of 14 deatha. 'Chts doeg not include the death of 35-yearrold Radamir Gazija of Sarajevo, Who lost his life on 11 November in Constance in a"tavern brawl" (as the poll~ce bulletin put it), shot by members of the Croatian "fascist-terrorist underground," as the Yugoslavian embassy in Bonn surmises. Possibly the .~ssumption is justified. For 1,700 members of the colony of exiled Croatians in the FRG, Which is 15,000 strong, advocate force as a 29 FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~Utt ()N'CICIAL U5~ dNLY m~nn~ ~t politiCal di~C~~~inn, in th~ vi~ew dt Ch~ MintgCry of eh~ Interinr in 13dnn, ,~nd gt 1~~gt lU0 af the exeremimCg "~~nd tdwgrd C~rrorigC gCC~." But eh~ pxi~e~n~~ of ~h~ ~rimin~l grdup of 100 wduld h~rdly have b~pn noCiced by ~dnn if Yugd~lav ~cr-urity offiei~l~ h~d nnt seized th~ pr~~Um~d C~rrnri~Cg Brigitr~ M~t~nhaup~y Sipglind~ Hofm~nn, p~Cer Ju~rg~n Boock gnd Ro1f Clempns Wn~ner in Mny 197~. ~he government in gelgrade uged the foursome, whn were imprignn~d in ~~breb, a~ pl~dg~g for it~ d~mand, which hnd b~en i~~u~d in vain fnr y~erg, Ch~C gonn ghould pro~e~d m~~rp gpverely 8gg3n~t th~ violpnt CrnnCi~n pxil~s. ~'hgt ~he four German~ were th~n finnlly relea~ed i~ conn~cCpd wirh Ch~ r~fu~~l to pxtrgdie~ eighC Cro~ti~n leaderg ~nd ~h~ "unch~ngpd ~G~ndnlnus g~n~rnsity eownrd violenC CroaCi~n crimin~ls" which gtill pre- v~ily, as n CebineC m~mb~r in Bonn gelf-crieiCglly poineg oue. Thc nttitude df W~~t Cermnn official~ Coward ~xtremigt foreigners i~ a~ lob~e ~g th~ police ~nd thp ~ourt~ gr~ ~trict in lpttin$ a11 Chose whc~ have b~~n ev~n m~rginnlly ~onnece~d with terrorism, a~ occupi~r~ of hou~e~ or as helpers, fnel the rigor of the 1gw, gnd ~g the $uttdege~g ~nd the Bund~erat dr~w tight the meehps of ehe law to fight terrorism. The 'Curkish fnscist lexder Alparglen Tuerke~ wns able to arouse his country- men to murder unhindered: "Ki11 Ct~e communi~t doggl" Ten thousand fanatical ~c~vit opponent~ acelaimed Ch~ demagng ~t the ~nd of Octob~r in Dortmund, arnund 1,000 in Berlin. It is true that the Tuerkes strike force "Grey Wolves" beat up those wieh differing political opinions in the Wegtphalian town df Hamm and demnlished union offices in Hessian Russlsheim, but "in- dicatinns of illegal acCion are noC known to the F'ederal government," ac- cordong to tl~e secretary of state for the interior, Andreas von Schoeler (~bP). But not all foreigners are treated as generously as the right wing radical Turks. Refugees from Chile, for example, are carefully investigated to see if they could possibly endanger the basic free democratic order of society. Only those who do not fail the test of political opinion are allowed to enter. And represenCatives of black African freedom movements who wanted to go to Bonn for an antiapartheid congress were only admitted - to the country nfter lenghty grilling. ~ven in the case of opponents to the Shah among Iranian students, officials register every activity with pginful precision. Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constftu- tion: "In this report year, increasingly close links between Iranian re- sistance groups and German 'K' groups were found." Secretnry of State von Schoeler does noC wish to preceive the difference in treatment for leftist extremists and rightist fanaticg: "The Federal government alw~ys applies the standards and criteria of the law concerning aliens." Yet no one knows the bitter truth better than the Free Democrat Andreas von Schoeler. Since the beginning of October a task force on "exiled YuRoslav extremists" of the Ministry of the Interior has been working on 30 FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 Fn[t n~~ICIAL US~ ONLY n r.~pnrt ~b~ut th~ir ;~~tiviticg ~n Cerm~n yni1. 'Th~ h~d drder~d th~ d~~s~i~r ~~eer he had r.ppe~e~dly reque~red in Che c~bin~e th~t eh~ Crn~~Cinn l~~d~r 5e~~pnn Uilnndzic ghduld fitt~lly be "pur dn ~ l~~gh." IC i~ eru~ ChgC ehe men in ~nn hnd refueed eo exer~dit~ BilnndziC tn Belgrad~ becnug~ h~ wgs involved in n crimin~l c~g~ in Cdlogn~, buC Ch~y inCended rn C~ntrd.l his behbvior in ~uture, according eo their promi~~ to Yugnglnvi~. ~ut bec~ug~ ~ilandzic continu~d to p~rtiCipae~ in ig~uing procl~mntions, to give pres~ cnnfer~nceg ~nd hnnd oue mdrking po~m~ (g~mpl~: "When w~ prntc~t ~ dice~enr's gwKy/ w~ ~hould not be surpreg~ed rhi~ wgy"), Ch~ ~hnttc~llnr wanCed ro knnw exncCly what had bz~n don~ in th~ ~ttG ag~ingC rhe vinlenC ringleader. 'I'he resule of the experC r~p~rti is aleo the basis for the "rnbid counterategck" (~EtANKF'URT~R RUNDSCHAU) frnm gelgrgd~. - Although Bilandzic--who c~m~ Co Che F'RG i1leg~lly in 1958 from Yugoslnvia-- ' hnd Cnme intn conFlice wieh eh~ police 17 eimes in gll, and hgd even be~n t~~ntenced Cn 3 yegr~ in ~nil in .t964 beC~us~ of n crime involving explogives, the authoritip~ permiCted him privileg~s: he was allowed Cn sCudy aC Che redggogicnl College gnd rise Co becnme direcCor of n dormiCory for foreigners. Ne was ev~n further educnted in Cologne-Porz as a gncinl pedagog after Che police hgd discovered an grs~nal of tnilitary weapons in hig house. And nlthough ~g e~?rly ns 23 November 1965 all political acCivities had been fnrbidden eo him~ he w~s able to eravel unhindered to roake procl~maeions nnd attend demoristrntions, to publish inflann;aeory pamphlets, to acclaim uirpl.ane hijnckings nnd other attacks against the haCed Tieo regime. A Cardy realizaeion by the minisCer of Che interior in $onn: "Bilattdzic is ut thts time one of the most important leading figurea in extremist Yugo- ~lav exile circles." Alnrmed by the list of the Croatian's sins, Interior Minister Baum gave tn tl~e appropriate colleague in Dusseldorf, Burkhard Hirsch, the urgent "recommendation" that he should institute charges against Bilandzic because of constant violations of the ban on political activity, and to take police surveillance measures as a precaution. This appeal awoke no response. On the contrary: on 17 October the North . lthine-Westphalian authorities issued him a new alien registraCion card and 2-year visitor's visa. The reason for this sounds like mockery: "This decisinn assumed that the presence of Bilandzic did not ~eopardize the concerns oF the FRC." Diland~ic knew how to use his new freedoro. He journeyed to a Croatian meeting in Amsterdam, and collected money in the Croatian stronghold of Chicago, until Che Americans showed him the door after 5 days. There is .7 plausible explanation from the bu~seldorf Ministry of the Interior of wt~y the Cro~tian was treated so generously. For years the Federal News 5ervice (BND) in Pullach had worked closely with the Croatian exiles and had placed protective hands over the emigrants. "And this made an impres- sion nn the authorities." CUPYRICNT: 1918 STERN 9337 ' 31 CSO: 3103 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~O[t Ot~'~'ICIAL US~ ONLY W~ST G~RMANY GOV~ItNMENm' S bOM~STIC SURVEILLANC~ PROGItAM REPORTEb . ~ Humburg STERN in G~rman 16 Nov 78 pp 73-78 � [Text] The railway segtion posr office in Munich is gt Hopfenserasee 10. At 7 o'clnck itt tihe morning a blue Volksw~gen bus with license platea "M-AW 2249" pulls ineo ehe yard of the post office. Two men in leather jackete climb oue and disappear into rhe poar office. Minutes lgter they - . push n cart filled with bulging bags ro the vehicle. "Deutache Sundespoat" regds the inscripeion on the jute bags wieh the black, red ~nd gold sCripea. Their contents--thousands of letters from Hungary, Romania, the CSSR and Yugoslavia, addresaed to persons in Munich and the surrounding area. The leather-~acketed men load the mail into their car and drive off. Their destination is 1 kilometer away. In the courCyard of a house at Schwanenthaler Strasse 91 the bags are unloaded and dragged into the officc building. Here resides the Munich branch of the "Main Adminiatra- Cion for Specfal Data Processing," Bonn 2--an agency that cannot be found in the Munich telephone directory. The infoimation officer of the Munich postal administration, Johann Meier, is also unaware--"I muat pass on this matter. I know nothing about it." Eight hours later the two men--iC's 3 pm--drive the mail bags back to the railroad post station. Their blue VW-bus has been registered in the name of the Munich inaurance representative, Harald Becker, who told STERN on the telephone: "I have a red Siracco." Munich is not an isolated instance. Every day in many West German metro- polises camouflaged official vehicles transport letters to myaterious offices with mm~es such as "Administration of Federal Property/Special Property" or "Research Office for Foreign Affairs." These are branch ' offices of the Federal Information Service (BND), headquartered in Pullach near Munich. Here selected letters are read, letters sent by West German citizens to countries in the East bloc, and letters addressed to West ~ German citizens. The BND makes copies of the letters, registers senders and re?cipi~nts. All information, millions of bits of data, are then for- wc?rded to the BND headquarters for evaluations. 32 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 rtltt O~C~C iAL US~ dNLY Bcge Nelp~xg for Che Intellig~nee Offic~r~ Ar~ Ch~ "N~gro~g" JunCeion poinrg fnr pngtgl ernf~ir �rcxn th~ C~gti b~.OC are ehe go-c~11~d poetal di~pgtch cenec:r~. L~Ct~rg from tih~ GbR ~rriv~ in Braunschwaig, Bebru, Hof, Hambur~, ~nd B~rlin. Air m~i1 frnm eh~ Sovier Union l~nds ~t thc ~irfield in ~'r~nkfurC. Mes~a~~e from Ch~ CSSR, Hun~~ry, Romania - and Yugo~luvi~ are rec~iv~d i.n ehe m~in p~ge ofLice in Nu~rnberg. ~'rom Chc Gbtt glone mor~ than lOd million 1~CC~rg arriv~ nnnu~lly. But nnt only m�~il ig utider ~urv~illanc~. Anybody who t~l~phon~g an ~~gt- ern cc~untry or r~ceiveg ~ c~11 from rhere can be fgirLy sur~--the ;1Nb ia listening. The ineellig~nce ~g~nts h~ve instiallpd eheir li~t~ning device~ in the switching grations o� ehe federgL poat offic~g. The "negroes" (burcaucrgtic jargon) 40-centim~eer-long box~s full of electronic pquip- mene which allow ehe liet~n~r eo bug every conv~ra~tion. Fra~n the long- distance awitching cenrerg, dir~:.+cr linpg run to rhe control atations of ehe BND. Th~re bugging experCg wieh ~xpeneiv~, heads~Cs sie nnd simultancougly listen in to four convergatione. ~verything thar 8eeM9 to be of intcrest is recorded on .:assetees. And for the men frnm Pull~ch ~usC about everyChing seems to be of inter~sr. 7'his is Cru~ to ehc motto of the chiei: of the BND diviaion Ib SecCion 2 (Acqui~iti~n Sdvict bloa, conCrol of post and tclecommunications) who goeg by the cover nFUne of Colonel Gerverth: "To survey extensively all that we can get." Thc material that Mr Gerverth has processed into hot informgCion seems te be rather modest in this connection. ~or example, his section deemed noteworthy a letter from a GDR citizen, dated 2 November 1976. It read in part: "During the last maneuverg the Russians again acted like awine; they stole potatoes, etc. But the canrades always maintain that the Ivana are our best friends. You can believe me that we would gladly do without such friends." Or a letter dated 4 November 1976: "Our supply has been satisfactory for some time, but of course it's not as good as in the 'capital.' Of coura~, one needs three times as much there becauae foreign diplomats have to be _ shown the 'world standard' and Che bossea also have to make a living." But the acquisitioners of the BND do not limit themselves to such vignettes that can be read in every newspaper when they canpose the aecret measages. Quit~ consistently they survey correspondence and telephone conversations betwcen Gcrmans east and west. Thus the department "Acquisition Soviet bloc" reports of a 28-year-old kindergarten teacher who since February of 1977 "has repcatedly had contact by letter and telephone with her fiance in the FRG" and describes in detail the difficulties that the young woman h.~s hnd in her uttempts to get an exit permit fran the GDR. 33 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 , ~oK oi~~~~tCfAL USL (~NI,Y _ 8uch inform~eion ig rccorded on mpc~i~l fdrm~, preprint~d wteh ehe ei,ti~ "Con~id~nCigl R~pdre nf ~n Inform~tinn S~rvic~--Offici~l Secr~ti." On the upper and 1ow~r edg~~ of thp foxm a r~d gt~mp wiCh tih~ in~cripeion "G 10" has b~~n pr~.nted. Thi~ i~ en gigni,fy ehge ehe r~porr ha~ been gath~r~d by circumv~nti~ng eh~ principl~ of mgil confidentigliey eseablish~d in AreiclQ 10 of eh~ B~sic Law on~ of ehe ba~ic rights. I~ c~n only be brok~n ~e~ording tn rhe eo-called "G-10 1~w" und~r pr~cie~ly esteblieh~d circwn- gtanc~s. T?~e bugging 1aw in ParagrAph 3~lldw~ eh~ ~NU tid op~n lpee~rs ~nd listen in ro ecl~phone conver~atione wirhouti probgble cgus~. But only "for the collection of intelligence ~bout ~iruaCion~ th~ knowlpdge of which is necpe- ~gry for the tim~ly recogniCion of a danger of armed g~greasion gg~inet th~ F~dergl Republic of Germany and fnr the me~ting of th~C danger." And P�ragraph 2 stipulBC~e rhat "knowledge and maC~ri~ls [ehua obtained] cannot , be uepd to ehe detrim~nt of individuals." L~w I~ Circumv~nCed Under Slogan o� "Official ABSistance" Many fnrma of the $ND bear a gecond gtamp. This timp iC ia ~reen and bears Che wnrdg: "German Services AL~e Informed." Behind these four simple words is hiddc~n the s~cond acandal of the BND's millionfnld anooping. F'or th~ men fran Pull~~h, whose only purpose in life is the gathering of intelligence in hostile and friendly foreign coutttries, send to Cheir collpagues of the Protection of the Conatitution and the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) news about FRG citizene they deem to be aecurity riaks. But thie ie preciaely what the legislators have forbidden. In remembrancE of the omniscient Reich Security Main Dir~ctorat~ of the Ngzi era espionage abroad and counterintelligence at home were asaigned to two independent agencies. But bureaucratic usage has caused the blurring of these aepara- ting ~ines under the label "official assistance." And nobody has control over what is happening in this twilight zon~ of the secret aervices. Zt~e basic law ancl the G-10 Act have long been ahot full of holea. The former vicc president of the Federal Constitutional Court, Walter Sruffert, has long been convinced that there cannot be any legal postal survrillance "thaC could justify investigation by the bagload." But the standnrd procedure in Bonn goes lik~ this--the BND in pullach justifiea its requegts for information by compiling a list of "danger areas" that is forwarded through the Bonn Defenae Ministry to the ~ederal Interior Ministry. The list as a rule contains the member states of the Warsaw Pact. From ther~ danger always lurks, maintains the BND's president, Gerhard Wessel, whosr fnvoritc term is "the swindle of detente." Cuuses for reques[s for "s[rategic surveillance and intelligence" hav~t been the election of the federal president in West Berlin and the conflict be- tween Egypt and Libya. The ahopping list of the Pullach buggers is then 34 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 i~'Ok 0[~ I~ IC I AI~ USL ~NLY gtven th~ blem~ing uf thc G-10 cnmroitrc~e nf ehc federal pgrli~menC ehaC ig yuppc~sed en sup~rvig~ Cn~ br~gchey of th~ Con~id~ntinliry o� ehe mail and t~lc~phnn~. Thie ~nmmieC~e ig c rnnpoqed of llr ~'riedrich Vugel (CDU), chair- mnn; Helmuth Beck~r (SpD), viae ehttirman; Dr Wglter Althammer (CSU), Heinz Pengky (SPD) and Ur Friedrich W~ndig (I~'bp). Onee~ ehc~ rJanger 1i~~ hue becn approved, nNU ucquisieion~r G~xvereh goes eo worlc. G~rv~rrh, who likes to bieycle nround Che PuLl~ch compound, hae his own views reggrding the G-10 Acti: "Wc m~ke ~xtiensive uae of the authority gr~nt~d ~ It will remgin a gecr~C of the BNb whgt eh~ �ollowing reports, selected by Gerv~rrh's ~cquisition g~ceion from the GDIt mail, have ra do wiCh an armed ttggreygion frnm the Ease gg~inge the NATO countries. For inatance: "W. n~ lnnger thinkg that our ehird requ~sC will be apprnved. Now only Loewen- ttigl or th~ Unir.ed Nationa can help..." (A leeeer dated 15 November 1976) Or: "But Ch~ comrgdps reaCeed very angrily Co niermann. Moet only know thnt hc dneg not Chink highly of rhe SED...." (A lettier dated 20 November 1976) Respon~ible for the illegal Cransfer of the BND's information to the Verfas- ; sungsschutz and Che MAD ~re BNb officers Dr Wernberg, Juettner and Fleming. In Pullach the informaCion from Che mail and telephone surveillance ia for~ ward~d to the "Peraonen-Bereichs Archiv" (humAn intelligence archive) and to the "SP~" ("5echbezogene Personenerkenntniase fuer Tipgewinnung und Anwerbung") (subjecCive personal identifications for information gathering and recruitment). In plain language: The BND distills from letCers ~nd telephon~ conversations information about ciCizens who could be of interest or persuadable for recruitment as informanta--both in the GDR and in the Federal Republic. As Par as the G-10 Committee of Parliament is Concerned the Spy World Is in Order... How far the practice of Pullach has moved away from the theory of the law is demonstruted by the almoat naive commentary of the Federal Ministry of clic Intcrior to th~ G-10 Act, The possibilities of the BND are commented upun as follows: "This surveillance potential is, however, limited, aince nn ngency ch~rgcd with the maintenance of internal security, especially w ith defense agninst unconstitutional attempts, can make use of it. It c:~n b~ used only by thc foreign intelligence service within the framework of its limited authority." And for the pacification of the citizenry it gocs on to s~y that BND surveillance can "only be authorized for specific .~nd exactly definable individual cases within the postal and telecommunica- tions traffic." As far as the five members of the Bundestag comprising the G-10 Cortanittee are concerncd, the world of the spies is in order. Committee chairman 35 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 roti or~rtr, U5f: ONLY i~'ri~drich Vogu1 (CSU) suys, "Should wc: heur of recruitment procedures we would tell Che fed~ral goverrunent--you cannoC do that." To be aure, the inapectors have noe yeC personally inspecred. Dr Menfred Schueler, chief of the ~e:dc:ral Chancellor's Office and supreme political boas of the I3ND takes a more Elexible view. He said to Che STERN, "Nobody c~n demand thaC rhe evaluators should close their eyes when they came across information ehAt is important: Co the Off:Lce of the ProCection oF the ConsCitution and the MAD. Of course this information has to be Curned over as rapidly as possible." Schueler does not consider the official commentary of the Interior Ministry to the G-10 Act "the spirit of the law, I do not even know the commentary." Even within the BND there have been sharp discussions regarding the masaive snnoping. The favorite--because it is Che only bug-proof place--for auch conversations on the Pullach compound has been a meeting "over a beer on the LadensCrasse" of the canConment. But such internal rebellions have changed nothing. Two hundred fifty employees of the BND department 1 D 2 are busy with the control of mail and telephone. They steam open the envelopes or roll the lettcrs within Che envelopes with the aid of a special device, pull the 1etCcrs out of the side of the envelope, and reinsert them after reading. ...But the Experts Are Preparing New Attacks on Mail Confidentiality Among the secret service people there rages a dispute that has not been solved to date, namely, whether a wooden or an ivory needle is better for rolling out the letters. In the meantime BND technicians have brought a machine into action that can light up the letter from Aunt Emma in Leipzig to her nephew in Castrop-Rauxel. ~ Newer and newer~devices for electronic snooping are being developed in Munich's prestigious suburb of Stockdorf. A high fence and an iron gate prevent the curious from entering the "Telecommunications Technology In- stitute" and the "Federal Office for Telecommunications Statistics" at Wannr.ystrasse 10, characterized by a tall antenna. In tlic suburb wild rumors are aloft--even a rocket base is supposed to be _ located thcrc:. In reality it is the tinkering shop of the BND buggers. Togetli~~r with specialists from the army they work on new devices for an uteack on mail confidentiality. In 1962, during the Cuban crisis, the American intelligence service CIA had all letters going from Germany to Havana opened and read. Foreign - intelligence in Germany was at that time still firmly in the har.ds of the Americans. When the case of the Cuban letters became known, a sto~tu of 36 FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 r~sk ~~i~~~~cttni. U5L UNI~v public indtgnnei~n tnsucd~ The CIA'~ ~dup w~~ the ineentl,ve td hgve the Germnn~ themgelve~ emb~rk nn th~ ~nnnping intin lettprg ~nd eeleph~np~, und~r th~ cln~e gupe rvigidn df pnrlia~mene ~nd ~ gupervi~dry body, eo be ~ur~~ The G-1Q r~~ittee wag in~tnlled in o~fie~ tn 1968 jugt ~g Chp so-c~11ed "Conani~t~e ~E Thrce" whi~h i~ charged by the ~undese~~ ~pproving ~nd guppr- viging all b~~ging gnd contrdl m~a~ur~~. mh~ Cuban ~c~ion w~~ n~v~r ~gain tn b~ rc~pc~tcd. But even in 197~ "Cuba" ig ~ dnily ocCUrrenee. Aceording to ehe r~ueiou~ e~timuecg o~ gn ~xp~rt df Ch~ SPU frnctic~n~ ne le~gt 1 to 2 pere~nt of po~~ul und rrlephon~ trnffic ie ~nder ~urveillgne~. ~or th~ corxespond~nc~ frcnn the one r,~rmnny to eh~e other rhis m~gn~ g dgily enooping in up to 1f1,00d lc~tterr. CUPYttIGHT : 197 g 5TLCtN 9x4U CSO: 3103 37 POR OF~ICIAL U5B ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 I~t1k t11~'M'tt;lAl, i)314 f1NI,Y W~ST Q~RMANY t~AN~L UISCUS3~S UN~MPLOYMLNT, LABOR MAtt1t~T . N~mburg 3TERN in German 30 Nov 78 pp 92, 94, 96, 98, i00, i02 (T~xC] At A forum organized by 3TERN in Hamburg ~ uniojn repr~Aentativ~, a profeseor of econo~cs, An induatrialigt, e b~nk~r, and ~ labor market an~ly~C took poeieion~. Aft~raerd~ they engaged in di~CU~gion~ aiCh politiciaae, economic exporee and ~ournaliets. H~re ar~ excerpt~ from the minutes: � proE Arniin Cutosieki, pregident of the HWWA Ineti~ute for Economia Research in Hamburg: As f~r a~ i am concerned~ the "sacred cow" of full employment c~n be butchered. W~ would do vell to recall the time inmediately after the (Second Noridj War. in thoee days everybody Was fully employed--and even if the ~ob involved nothing more than to exchange a seck of potatoes for a fev bed eheet~. Everybody aae emp~oyed, but our country wae econo- mically in ruin~. In d~veloping cotmtriee~ too. there exiats "full am- ploymen~t~" but only in the sen8e that there even children are sent into the ~treets to go begging or many tradeamen loiter abour hoping to be able to ewing a little deal aow and then. The Bast Bloc couatries. too, have full employment, for if the government can order ahat people are supposed to do~ they vill in fact work, though frequently aithout much purpoee and not very efficiently. All of thie CEIMOC be what ae are after. The fanwus English economiat Keynes said: URemployment can be eliminated by letting people dig holea ahich afterarerde ere filled up again. That kind of emplayment~ ho~rever~ has been recognized as nonsensical. por in that case oae could eimply pay uneroployment compensation and save people the digging of holea. What ae need is an economy ahich is efficieatly fully employed. Md that could be attained if there vere more profitable production possibilities for the employers. ~ihen the profit incentive ia there~ entrepreneura vill invest nnd create nei+ job openings. 38 FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 1~'dk tll~'N'tf; IAL U5~ t~NLY L dn noe b~ii~v~ ehat eh~ ec?erepr~n~ux ~oday h~e b~~otn~ ~ t~i~vi~ion ~ntrp- pren~ur, whd do~g nothing but gi~ in fron~ of thp r~i~vl.~ion waiting for eh~ announc~m~nt of ~n ~aonoe?i~ up~wing. N~ i.~ r~th~r ~b1~ ~nd ~ri113ng-- if thi~ W~rp nat ge, w~ could ehrow out ~eonomi~ order ov~rbo~rd--to mak~ u~~ ~f all prnfitabl~ produc~i~n ~h~ng~~. In ehie 8~ne~, I~m ~ppe~ling t1~ ~nCr~preneure ea paai their cre~tive end innovative forcee nnd r~~11y ~ry td ug~ a11 chan~~~ Ch~t pxi~t. g~t ie aould b~ nn~~id~d td ~pp~~~ orily ea eh~ ~:1tr~pr~n~ur~. In ord~r eo t~~t whether ~ntr~pr~n~ur~ ~r~ ~ti11 ~ner~preneurs and wh~ther our eaonomy ig ~Cill functioning, a~ mugt g].go epp~al to the ~mpluyp~g. They ought t~ lee ir be known for a 1ong~r p~riod of time that th~y ~i11 giv~ ~ntr~- , prenpure ehe chance to produce with better return~. if th~ uninn~ er~ worri~d that in so doing distrib~tion is ehifted too m~ch in f~vor of the ~ner~pren~ur~, th~y ehould think about e~yatem of profit ~h~ring with rh~ ~imult~n~ou~ gharing of the employe~a in th~ riskg involved. Th~n rh~ Work~r~ will have a~h~r~ in the profie if ther~ i~ inve~tment and gucce~~ful p roduction. .In that ca~e, however, a part of the ri~k Will be taken of� the ehouldera of the entr~preneur eo that he is, indeed~ able td inv~st. I am in favor nf not giving in to fatali~m, but rather to Rive the market- economy path etill another try. Our economic order hae proved itself for so long that, I believe~ it aould b~ v~ry, very hazardoua to throw it overboard jugt noa even in the preeence of an unem~lor?ment eituation Which ha~ existed for som~ time. Dr Dieter Mertena, director of the Inetitute for Labor Market end Vocational Itesearch of the Federal Inetitute for Labor in Nuernberg: For 3 to 4 years we have had an annual average of a million unemployed, and the Wildeet ideas are connected with this figure; for example, the tdea that there are a million people of whom every aingle one hae been une~loyed for 4 yeara and is unable or unailling to find a ne~? job opening, while all the other 21 million aorkera are not endangered and are employed without interruption. Realicy looks different: Every year S~a 6 million people are looking for a n~w jnb opening in a new firm~ either because they were dismisaed~ have quit themselvea, are neWCOmers to the labor market as adolescents or merried aomen, or because they are forced to give up an independent profeseion. If one adds thoae who find another position within their firm, ae are talk- ing about something like 10 million people who oace or m~re often during tl~e year change their place of employment. Between 2 and :f million citizens go through the experience of unemployment cvery ycar in so doing--for a shorter or longer time period~ 6 m~nths on tlic uvcra~e. A qrow?ing number--naw already a quarter of a million--are unenq~lny~d for over ~ year. Moreover, not all unemployed are registered statistically. The statiatical key date figure of a million une~loyed~ therefore, doee not convey the complete picCure. 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 1~'UIZ Ul~'t~' Lt; I AL U51: r)NI.Y ~ Wh~t are kh~ ~~u~~~ for Ch~ und~trem~loym~n~? UnCil 14~~, eh~ ~umb~r df p~op1~ �ir~d and hir~d Were approximgrely i.n bai~nce. in 1974, th~ numb~r of di~mi~~~l~~ for eh~ fir~C eim~ gurpagg~d eh~ nwnber of pasitiori~ fi11~d by abo~t GU0,000~ and in 1975 thie difference amounted to more than ~ millf~n. ~inc~ 197b, ~hp nwnbpr of di~mi~~a18 and the nun~bQr of posieion~ fill~d ~r~ ~g~in in bgl~nr~ on an gnnual ba~is, bue the gap ftiom +the y~~r~ 1974-1915 h~~ noe b~~n fi11~d ~g~in. If our ~eonemy h~d grown by 6 pere~ne ~v~ry yp~r f~r thp p~gt 4 y~~r~, rhig w~uid h~v~ be~n en a~Cain fu11 ~n~ 1oym~ne onc~ ~gain. Unfortun~e~ly, haw~v~r, eh~ upgwing in pro- duc~ion gine~ 19~6 i~ noe ~erdng ~ndugh. WQ muge add that ~inre abdut 1973 a~ hav~ not ~horCened eh~ g~nergl aork- ing tf mc in Che F~d~er~l R~public ~g much g~ w~ did in th~ pr~ceding years. Nucl w~ cc~neinu~d a1on~ eh~ ~ame lin~g d~ring th~ y~arg 1950-1973-- ~ during ehie tin~ w~ ~hort~n~d our aorkin~ time by mor~ th~n one-fourth-- un~mpl~yment wduld b~ 1dw~r eh~n i.e ~pp~~rs to b~ noW~ But th~ Gurren~ un~mpldymene ~g eh~ regult of g g~p in ~eonomie growth in 1974-1975 ig noe ge ~11 ehe domin~nt problem for the future. Demograph- ~r~ ~glculat~ thgt during Ch~ n~xr 10 y~arg the popul~eion in the t~ttG will decrea~~ by 3 millian people, whi1~ eh~ nwob~r of German workere will inercag~ by 1 million. The demand for job opening~, in c~the r aorda, will continue to go up. If, however~ during the coming years we have economic growth that 3e b~rely sufficient to keep Che balance between dismise~ls and number of positions filled, this meang that ae Will be ehoring up - unpm~loymene by this 1 million additional workers ahich the next 10 yeara ~will add to the labor force: to the figure of 2 million. If the grawth - rate of the ecnnonry fg11g under 3 percent~ the number af unemployed vill ~ be correspondingly higher. ` The so-called pill bend, that is the sharp decline in the number of births in the aixties, Will not prpduc~ an effect on the labor market unCil the 1990's. Nnt until then will~ labor be in ahort supply ~nce again, if in the meantime there ia neither accelerared growth nor greater redu~tions in the working time nor a moderation in praductivity progreas. Karl Otto Poehl, vice president of the Ge nuan Federal Bank: Just a few years ngo we had a problem in the FEtG which caused us a great deal of worry: the problem of the lack of manpower. Tod~y one must ask oneself the queaeion: What has changed since that time thnt we now have to talk about unemployment as a pe mm~ent phenomenon or ut least the possibility of unemployment becoming a permanent phenomenon. Ln my vfeta, the change has to do witht~e fact that in 197~ we experienced .h great shock aith regard to the entire World economy; a shock that actually is compnrable only With the crisis in the World economy in 1932-1933. In 1913, ae experienced the collapse of the international currency system and 40 ~Ott O~PICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~~nEa c~r�~'t~1AL U5E, dNt,v ~ qu~druplin~ df ~he di,i p~rice ~g eh~e ~an~~quenre ~f th~ pr~~~ding worldwid~ inflgCion. Tt~i~ led Cd Che r~~~~e~on of 15~5, wh~s~ cnn~~quenc~~ not oniy in ehe Fpdergi R~pubiic-..bue ~18o in the ~ed~rai Republi~--hav~ ndt be~n fu11y ov~r~on~ ea ehi~ dgy. ~'h~ qu~~tion i~: Uo~~ on~ hav~ eo accept th~ l~vpl of un~mploym~nt produc~d by Ch~ r~.~ssion? And are eh~r~ Crendg eh~t ~ug~e~t ehat ~hi~ figur~~-ae et~ re~ult of ~ chenge in the deveiopmene of th~ pdpui~eion--wi11 p~rhgpg ~ven ~rnw? 3ur~ly th~s~ gr~ eeriou~ probl~~. Bur I rgkp eh~ vi~w Ch~~ a~ ahould ~1~d nue m~ke them eb re dr~~eir Chgn eh~y ~r~. buring th~ fifire~ gnd gixti~e w~ ~uecppd~d in ~oping wfth much gr~at~r Ch~ngeg nf this kind. During ehp fifie~~ we hgd to eak~ in many million~ nf refug~~~ from th~ 8agt~rn t~rr3tori~g. During th~ ~ixtiee w~ ~1~o success- Eu11y cop~d aith th~ ron~iderabl~ ~eruccurai ch~n~~ in agricultur~, ~e a re~ult of whirh 1 1/2 mi~lion pc~nple lefe ~nd became ~s~imilat~d e1~~wt~~re. in oth~r word~, th~ face in itg~lf eh~e during ehe nexr few ye~r~ th~r~ uill perh~p~ b~ ~ detn~nd for an ~ddition~l 1 million job oppningg, it ~~pn~ to me, ghould noC aorry uB Cdd much. 'Che que~tion of technicgl progregs, tad, w~ ~hould not over~~timarp. Th~ pr~blem of technolo~ical un~mployment hag b~~n brought up ggain end ~g~in: in rh~ 19th century when machin~~ c~m~ i~eo b~ing; in the twenti~~ wh~n the ggg~mbly line Wag introduc~d; in rhe sixtie~ ahen automatinn g~emed to threat- en jobg. But the reault of a11 of this in the end was ~+ell-being and fu11 eroplayment. I dd, hcyw~v~r, vieW with a certain amount of apprehension the fact that We in the t~EtG, too, are ~mbgrking upon a discussion Which involves certain features that ~re opposed to rationalization. I believe that, among other things; we owe our economic upewing during the postwar period to the facr that, in contrast to ot~er cnuntries, raCionalization and progress in praductivity were welcomed and positively accepted by all groups in the FRC. Ir would be very regrettable if, as the consequence of unemployment, there would be a change here--perhapa in the direction which ae have ex- perienc~d in Creat Britain gc?d which led to very resulte there. Mother agprct which is of ia~ortance for the progpects of growth, and Which is r~gponsible for the fgct that We have experienced a sla+down of growth, invnlves ehe currency exchange rateg. 5ince the end of 1972, the value of the German Mark hag appreciated by approximately 60 percent against the dollar ~nd nlmost doubled in relation to the Bnglieh pound. IE one conqtders che tremendous outcry that took p lace in the FRG vhen in 1961. the C~erman Mnrk vas revaluated by 5 percent--in those days people fore- guw the ruin of the Cerman economy--one can perhaps surmise after all What these enormous changes in the price relationships in Khe world mean for a country ahich exports rtb re than .a quarter of its total production. Connected aith tl~ix is die fact that the Ce rn~an economy today has ~ust about the high- eHt rost l~vc~l of all industrial countries. ~'he reason for this is not the 41 FOFt O~FICIAL U5~ ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~'tlk dI~~~CIA1, U~~ t~NLY ~ f~~t ~hat wa~~~ i,n~r~~~~d f~~e~r in uur counery tih~n ~brd~d. 'rh~e i~ quie~ dut of Ch~ qu~~tiun, on Ch~ contr~ry. W~ges eiimbed f~~e@r in ~inb~C ~1i oeh~r r~untri~~ durin~ rh~ p~ge f~w y~~r~. 'I'h~r~ i.~ hardly a eounCry which Chi~ y~~r ha~ ~u~h a 1ow wa~~ in~r~~~~ th~ F~G. Th~ reason fnr our tiop ~o~ition whea it ~~mes to rdsts is, o~ coure~, first af ~11 thp face that ~n ~xpnrt n~Cien mu~t cai~uiat~ th~ w~g~ i~v~l in dollar~, thar m~an~ i~ ~eh@r word~ in ~ comparabl~ m~a~uring unie. Ner~ rh~ enormou~ r~valuation of eh~ ~rman M~rk make~ ies~lf f~1C. Atn~ng oth~r Ching~, thi~ h~~ 1ed to th~ f~ce ~h~t prafit~ in th~ FRG ~r~ ~ gr~at d~~i 1ow~r ehan in Cot~arr~ble eaunCrie~. Mpg~ur~d ~ga~.n~C ~al~~, th~y ~r~ 1~~~ th~n hglf es hi~h ~g in th~ Unir~d 5tat~~. N~v~rth~less, I fepl thne on~ ~hould n~t drgn~tize th~ problem of un~mployment; for ie hae turn~d out th~t at 1Qast a p~rC of thig problem cgn be ~olved through gr~nC~r eCOnomic growCh. An example of thie is eh~ UniCed SCaC~e, wh~r~ it prdv~d poe~ible to increage th~ numb~r of ~obs during th~ past few year~ by S miilion. Hnw~v~r, I teke Che vi~w Chnt thig problem cgnnot b~ snlv~d ~olely by using the insrrum~nt~ of economic policy, bue that policies ~ffecting eh~ structure ag~urt~ increasing gignificgnce, ChaC the go-called problem grnups must be d~alt wirh mueh ~nore ~ntengively--un~mploymenC among the young, older em- ployee~, the phyaically handicgpped--that this will perhaps be the mogt important economic ~nd ~ociopoliticel task of the next few years and that probably the succesg or failure of the poliCieal force~, ron, will be measured by their solution. Prof Dr Rolf Rodenetock~ president of the ~'ederal Association of German Industry: The elimination of ~obs through rationalixation is by no means a gogl nf the ente~prises~ but rather the goal is to maintain the ability to compete. Rationalization also brings with it a whole series of positive effects which arQ not always seen correctly because it is said: Through this or thnt technical improvement~ ~obs have been elintinated again. In so doing, it is forgotten that every rationalization preaupposes exCensive prepara- tions~ development and planning phases, which require additional and, what is more, qualified workere. 7'hrou~;t~ the building of new a~chines, new employment poseibilities are ~reated. Thus~it c~n be demonstrated thaC the production of investment goods i~ nx~re wage intensive than mass production which subsequently carried out aith machines. Nere, then, raCionalization contains a plus effect. 11~~~e who complain about insufficient demand, insufficient economic growth and, us u result of this, insufficient possibilities of ~mployment, should keep in mind ti~at it is precisely ra[ionalization movea which frequently cre~te new demand. For demgnd is not a fixed magnitudF:. Demand, that is ~Iw~ sibilLCy .tind willingness of the market to absorb, depends decisively on tl~ priceR ~f ti~e products. If, in other words, say, We are able to offer ~ FOIt OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 " I~'C)it t11~ I~ I t; ~ AI, I I;; I; t1Nt,Y ? ~ub~e~nti~lly chpgppr ~lpceronic in~e~ll~ri~n~ thraugh r~Ci~n~lix~eion, to produe~ l~~s ~xp~n~iv~ C~l~eyp~ machin~~, fdr exampi~, throught~~ us~ of microproce~eore, rher~ wili eleo b~ an increaae in eale~ and production. in shnrt, morp such producta wi11 b~ purcha~~d. Pockee calculators are a typical ex~mple of thie. The d~v~lopn~nt gnd producCion of new pradu~e~--in ~hnrti, innovatiot~--Chat ie afeer ~li eh~ decisiv~ qu~~eion fdr dur eeonomy. ~~eearch and development pro~~ct~ ghdnld b~ gupporred in ~v~ry ~onr~iv~b1~ w~y in order I:o mgk_ ug~ of the emploympnC ~nd sglee po~~ibilitii~g thae gre prespnt here--beginning with rh~ eolar c~11 Co bro~db~nd communic~Cion, frdm Chp enormou~ progress in tl~ medical field to las~r technoingy. gut in Che nrea of th~ production of cugtomary gooda ~~till ~e~ ~hancps fnr growth. Tho~e who epeak of rt?~rk~C saturat~on arp ala~ys looking only at r.~rt~in gtandard congun~ r g~od~. Y~~ ~ven thpr~ ~ cprC~in demand for replgce- ment ~nd imprnvement exigeg. I would ggy that in th~ sector of housing enn~trucCinn, the congtrucCion of priv~Cp homeg ~nd their equipment~--ee- pecially if one thi.nks of the young people ~ust now ~ntering their working lif.e--~ l~rge demand ig pregent. There are many plans to mobilize thig-- for example, rhrough investment help. A great dea~l could be done here. Begid~s we have the foreign market. The world populaeion ig conatantly in- creasing. If the share of German products in Che increasing demand could be strengthened through advantageou~ production, through good development,of innovations, I still aee infinitely many possibilities, not last of all in area of investment gaoda. If we produce at low cosr and efficiently here, there will be employment. One more word on the labor market. Not a gre~t deal is noCiceable in Che way of an excess of workers. I would like to give an example from my own enterprise: In our Ebersfeld plant, 30 kilometers east of Munich, we have been lnoking for 60 untrained workers for 3 nanths. To date we have Eo~~nd unly five= in spite of excellent transportation connections--and those wcre furcign femttle workers. The job listings in newspapers suggest that Cl~~re tu evidently also a great shortage of skilled labor. b'or ttii;~ renson, I believe tliat a shortening of the weekly working time would hnve precis:-~y the opposite effect from tfiat hoped for, that is, no increase in employment, but rather less employment. If, foa example, my 300 toolmakers work less or would not be allowed to work overtime, then there would be less employment for the subsequent production and for work on innovations. This must be very carefully considered in connection with ct~e shortage situation that exists with regard [o skilled workers, so that thc baby is not tossed out with the bath wat~er. ~F3 FOR O~FICIAL U5E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 t~'OR O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY ~ug~n Loder~r, ehairm~n of th~ M~Calwdrk~r~ Un~,on: Tin~ ~nd ag~in ie i~ in~inuat~d for the union~ to havp demand~d that tha employ~e muat heve "hig" ~ob guaranee~d. That i,~ ~trong. We know very we11 th~~ it is not pos~ible for an empioyee to keep the ~ob h~ has forever, that ia until his retire- mQne. ~ut h~ do~s have a elaim to "a" ~ob. For one of the ~�und~m~negl righte af man i~ hia righC to work. And thi~ r~.ghe cgn be r~~lized only ~ through fu11 employmenr. Th~ prc~,~r~ms of th~ German Labor Unton ~ed~r~eion (DGB) aimed 8t tr.e eli- minat~on of un~mplnyment, grogaiy ~3mpli�ied, ~r~: Acceler~Cion of qua- litative economic growth, technical chang~ w~.thoue eocial hardshipa and r~duction of working time. tn our ~rruggle for the reduction of working e~m~, we have already in ~~rlier dec~des done a great deal for the m~inCeaance and creation of ~oba. IC COOk ug n~arly 11'yenra, Co bp mor~ pr~cig~ from 1956 to 1967, Co reduce Chp workweek from 48 Cn 40 hours. T'he ~ituation, Cherefore, ie not that guddenly a new variant lieg before those in positions of reeponsibility, like a nwn~ter which one could not handle. 1'hat coaCe ~nd weges have increased I dn not wgne Co argue. Otherwise I wauld virtu~lly have to call into que$tion my union experience and activity, and I gm not dreaming of doing that. - It ig known that reductions in working Cime always take place according Co pl~ns involving a aeries of stepa. I cannot imagine at all that when a union demande the 35-hour week thia could be realized at one stroke in the context of the next change in the wage etructure. Through the reduction of the workweek plus the extension of the vacation provided for in the wage agreement, we have--for the period of time I have mentioned--increased the number of employed in the metal-processing industry alone by half a million. Without these measures in regard to the reduction of the worktime, the em- ployment situation, measured by the incursiona that have now been added, most likely would be very different, that is, a substantially higher number of unemployed tharl we now have. The thesis that an increase in profits would sutomatically bring about a reduction of unemployment, it appeara, has not been confirmed during the last few years. Eor us, of course, wage equalization is an integral part of Che quesCion of the reduction of worktime. We do not think much of unpaid part-time work--which is what it would have to be called if it were done without wage equnlization. All of this, however, has nothing to do with an additional cost burden for the employer side. Rather a part of the latitude that is available during wage negotiations for increases of the hourly wage is used for reduction of worktime. In so doing, a part of the wage increase is "paid" not in cash, but in the fotim of more leisure time. This we have also already - practiced in connectian with earlier reductions in the Workweek. ~ FOR OFFICZAI. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 I~UIZ UI~ I~'t Cl i AL U~l. !)NLY ~vpr ~ince uniong h~v~ b~en in ~xigC~nC~, Che c~uegeinn ha~ be~n rgi~ed: "Whgr wi11 th~ worker do with sei11 mnr~ leiaurg Cime?" It wae asserCed again and egain that reducrion of Ch~ warkweek ~nCail~ a greae dang~r for the wdrker, thae ehe work~r do~~ not know whee Co do with Chie Cime, thaC he wduld ki11 ic in a bar; ~nd whae~v~r ethe~ fi.$ureg of ApE@CI1 were uged. Hawpver~. they ar~ really appropr3aC~ only for rh~ last ceneury. For ~very- one kncnaa what in fact has been the resule of eh~ reduction in the workwe~k. We now have th~ free Saturday. NoC a~ingle persun is willing to gacrifice it. We hgvc coneentraCed aulturel and sporCg events on Saeurdny. Sunday;has b~en fr~ed for Che churches. Whar nll did nnt happ~n form~rly on Sunday morning! I could do n song and danc~ gbouC thie based on my experienc~ with my own organization~ Entire new r~cr~~eion indu~eries have been added. The gtimul~tion of demand ~a a regult of nare leisure time is unmistakable. 'I'he pogitive effect of additional leisure eime on fgmily life is wiChout ques t ion. Today we no longer have such a prospering economy as during Che fifties and sixties. But where it is posaible, we should nevertheless proceed with the reduction in working hours in a measure and reasonable way. I car? imagine thaC a reducCion of working hours in the railroad and steel industry~ where we have experienced an acute and deep crisis for. years~ given a measured first beginning~ could have extraordinarily positive effects for Che em- ploym~nt siCuation in this branch. There would be fewer diemissals. Let me draw a political conclusion: We hav,e firmly_eatablished forces in the FRG parliament and in the atate parliaments, and we have a government that ig capable of functioning. In spite of many difficulties which tae do not want to embellish at all, the economic and political circumstancea are on the whole stable. The FRG ia not rocking along the edge of a precipice, end it will not land Chere even as the result of further reductions in working hours. The Discussion Henri Nannen: In the first book of Moses in the third chapter, the 19th � ver~e begins with the words: "In the aweat of your face, you :,�.~all eat your bread." Those who regard this as the biblical promise of full em- ployment do not have the context in mind. At issue is the expulsion from paradise, in which, as is well known, there was no work. Work in the sweat of the brow was a curse; it was God's punishment for man, who had eaten from the tree of knowledge. ' in the meantime, we have picked a good many fruits from the tree of scienti- Eic and technical knowledge. That has produced more and more work for us, hut prosperity as well. ~5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 1~'dk di~ ~ LC tAL U5~ t~NI~Y '~A Nnw ie 1ddk~ ~hdugh thig d~ve~opm~nC ig going en overwh~lm ug: Mor~ and mor~ neCiviCieg gr~ being taken dver by machinea, aut~maCe, eompuCere, and mo~t r~c~nrly ~lso Uy microprocessors, nnd ].ees and ~.Qes nnrk remains for tn~n . Ndw that~wor(,, as ~C wer~, b~eome~ ~ commodiCy in ehorC ~upply, iC appear~ Cn u~ sudd~nly as a bleseing; iti is nd longer a curae, buC a v~1ue in it- ~p1f. And unemployment hes becom~ th~ eaourge of m~nkind~ Now I a~k my~~lf~ why in f~ct Che right eo work gnd why noti the r3ghe Co e d~cent hum~n 13fe with as lirel~ work ag poseible? Would iC not be beCeer tn m~k~ purposeful use of the working power and working time fr~ed by ec~chndlogy in Che privaCe or public domain so ChaC all of us wou].d have nar~ titne for ourselvea or for each other; asauming thae we would aucceed in di~tributing equitably ehe work, Che remai.ning working Cime, ttg well as Che fruitg therpof? prof Kurt Ngns~n, chairman of Che board of direcCorg nf Bgyer AG (Bayer, Inc.): We ghould ~ay in general: There ~xises a moral righe to work. Whttt would life be withnut work? Imagine we were living in paradise, with nothing to do, ~nd would do noehing but laze around. We would be able to gtgnd thie kind of life for a week nr two, or perhaps eveti three, during a vacation, but certainly not for a lifetime. The good Lord gave us a brain. It enables us to think, eo do work. I believe we have the damned duty and obligation to see to it that people think. Now to turn to technical progress. The basic queation acCually is: Does technical progress destroy 3obg or does technicgl progress create new ~obs? Ladies and genClemen, basically we would be wretched men without technical progreas. Through ~chnical progress we have increased life expectancy from 30 to 70 years within 100 years. Through technical pro- gress we are hale and hearty in spite of our age. Through technical pro- gress we have gotten rid of heavy labor. Al1 theae, after all, are ad- vantages. Let me mention the reduction of working hours as the last point. Mr Loderer, ~omewhere an end Co Che reduction is also called for. ~xpressed in the opposite way: I believe, everyone needs a certain amount of work. Sometimes it is a good thing to take an extreme as example. Let ua assume C~lilt we would work only 3 days a week. Don't you believe that at least 50 percent of the people would t~ke on a second job for the other 3 days? But you don't create new ~obs in this way. In New York, we have cases where many plumbers hold dawn two ~obs. During the first half they work for tlie Meier company, the second half for the Jones co~any. We cannot kcep people from working. I said at the outset: Without work, man is unthinkable. ~ 46 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 N'dts t1H'I~LC;TAI, U5~ dNLY N~nn~n: 'Th~ ~i~~erici~ns~ unien :tn Ncw Xark ~C eh~ mam~nt ~g fi.~hein$ for th~ ~5-hour w~~k, wiCh a gueren~~e of 5 houre of overCim~. H~ng~n: ~h~t ~pprd~.maeply wiil b~ eh~ ~nd r~~u1e! Alcxnnd~r Scho~n, commiagion~r-gen~ ral ~h~ Hamburg firm~Rud. Oeea Mcy~r: Mr Lod~r~r~ when in ~gr~~m~ne wieh eh~ unions w~ reduced ehe wnrking haur~ frdm 48 ~hrough 4S ~d 42 ~nd finally to 40, w~ h~d extr~ cd~e~ o� b~twe~n 20 gnd 35 pere~ne. ~'hae w~~ during ehe ~ame Cime p~riod wh~n rhe reduceion of workin~ hours took piace. Due Co the we~ving ~f th~ f~mous n~t of ~dni~1 ~~curiCy, th~ gdditional en- cumbrunceg in e~rms of p~rgonn~l ec~stg Codny have rigen eo 70..80 p~rc~nt. Our pi~cework costg, with 1g G~rman Marks ehe high~at in ehe world, amount ed c~pproxim~eely ~ m~rk~ of addiCion~1 per~onn~1 co~t~, compared to 1.70 mnrks in Great Britain, gn indu~Crial c~untry which in Cerms of ie~ out- put ~~p~ciCy ro~y be r~ted ag b~ing ~imil~r to the ~itG. Nane nf ehe g~nClemen, Mr poehl includ~d, hg~ taken g positinn wiCh regard tn the qu~etion of how in the future ehese co~tg ~an be digesCed by th~ natidn~l economy--I won'C even epeak of th~ ~mployers or the economy ag such-_an economy which, ae you yourself have $aid, is dependent not only on dom~gtic demand, but to Che extent of aa re than 25 p~rc~nt on foreign demand. Those who demand a reduction of working hours must also sub- stanei~tp why thpee co~t increasea are defeneible. - Prof Dr Eduard Pestel, minisCer for gcience in Lower Saxony; Lven if we do not shorten working hours furthe r and continue to have only weak econo_ mic growth, a~ we are presenCly experienceing iC, there will be a high de- gree of labor shortage in the ninetiee, perhaps even by the end of the eighties. This forces us~ of cours e~ to continue even at preaent with rationalization measures, not only in view of the merciless international ~ cort~etition in which we find ourselves. I would like to proceed to the aecond point. This point concerns something wl~icl~ worries me and which will occupy us for a much longer period of time. [ ~m rc Cerring to the growing gap between Che educational aystem and the ~?ccupntlon system. If we continue with the present educational system-- and it is probable that this will happen-_we will, as the result of demo- ~r;~ptiic developments and the push into higher education, have almost three tirtws as many advanced Hchool graduates by the end of the century among the members of the labor force plus 1 million graduates of advanced tech- nicat schools. ~7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 Fdit f~~~~CtAL US~ dNt,Y Lt r~n th~n b~ ~ngi,ly cal~u].aC~d: ~v~n f,f ~h~ r~e~.~n d.~ dneeor~ ~nd 1~wy~r~ 3~ doubl~d, 3f Ch~ numb~r c~.� offi~3.~1~ an~ employ~~~ in the high~r (civil.~ s~rviee ia doubl~d, th~r~ will b~ fiv~ eo six eim~~ many gr~du- ~te8 of edvgnc~d ~chools de~c~ndin~ upan ehe ~conot~y. I n~k my~e].f wt?~~her ehe o~eupaeion ~y~tem in rh~ ecnnomy ~nd i.ndu~try is e~p~bl~ ~e ~1~. of ~b~~~bing ~F~a~~ p~~pl~. A~ sny rate, it b~hoov~~ u~ Co ehink gbdue ehis h~r~ today. 2hi~ al~o ~pp1i~~ to th~ ~conomy. i~a noe ~g~in~e high~r edueaeion, bue I beli~v~ ehat w~ muet thfnk ~bouC how tn find empioym~nC for gh~~~ people~ In eh~ ~dv~nc~d ~~1~001~ and ag ehos~ ~nvoiv~d in making ~~i~nc~ poiicy, w~ must think about haw ~o reform Che curriculum in such a way as to make th~s~ gradugtes aar~ flexibie and trore mobile in the w~y in which thdy can be us~d ehen up to now. I b~li.~v~ Ch~C w@ h~v~ ~ very diffieult probl~m, ~h~t i~, ehe onset of qu~lit~tiv~ unemplc~yment, ahieh l~~dg nnC only tio r~gignatidn ~ng thoee eon~~rned, bue ~l~d p~rh~p~ to np~n reb~113nn, ~gp~cially ~g~ingt the gtat@, whieh w~~ ingtrun~nt~l in ~rrgnging thig privtleg~ of higher ~du- cgtion for them. At the same time it is to be noe~d th~t with e~re~inty during this time period the number of graduates of the iatermedi~C~ gchool, which at pre- sent gmounts to over 16 raillion among thoge gainfully employ~d, will de- creage to about 10 mtllion. !'lis means, in other worde, that p recisely in the area in which these peo- ple c~n be used we must continue to rationalize. For all sorts of reasons, ae ai11 certginly not be able to afford to import foreign labor once again in increased measure. Nannen: That is a very important point of view, becawse Che question arises Whether with growing academic education the demands do not also grow, so that one day it will prove i~ossible to fill a Whole series of profesaions. Tod~y it is ~lready imposaible to find a filling atation attendant, one has to pump gas oneself. Ur C.erd Buceriug, oamer of the "Zeit" publishing house and chairman of the bonrd nf directors of the Bertelamann corporation: The academicians do not cnu~e us any worry in the economy. Among ~ournalists, perhaps 20 percent have had prior academic training. No damage would be done if tliis fi~ure nrtaunted to 50 percent. Even an account of the murder in tl~e Ackerstragse can be aritten better by an academician than by an un- trnined journalist. 48 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~~ok ~~~~t~�ittrnt, u~t~: ONLY I3ue y~u may ne~ ~ounC on rh~ f~ce Ch~e we w~.ii ~~.~e eomeone prpference becgu~e he i~ gn acad~tni~i~n. In ~dn~.nigtration, ~oo, we have a whole serie~ of op~n pos3tione w~Ch a grose income amounting ro 40,000 eo 80,000 marks. Nobody turne up~ I~ you offer ue people, who come in and also hgv~ ~n ge8demiC ~ducstion, why not? BuC th~ economy w311 not be prepgr~d eo ch~nge tihe employment syetem for no ~Cher rea~on than the fgct thgC there i~ an incregsed supply of acade- mic3an~. ~'he 1aw governing the operatinn of industrial enrerprises (Betriebsverf~~~ungege~eex) glone prohibiea ehe preferenrial treatiment of a~~demici~n~. So Che young people who ca11 upon sncieey in order to re- cpive a high~r ~ducetion wi11 have to see whether ~fterward they can do anyCh~,ng wiCh higher education. Mr Lod~r~r, the connection between earning money and invegting really can_ not be dieputed. I am chairman of Che boerd of directors of a large enter- prig~ which worka e11 over the world, wieh sales of several billion marks. Thae meang, of coura~, a eteady stream of applicaCinns for investments. The capable superiors want to expand the arp~s of their activiCy and de- mgnd mnre naney. The management pute these requesCs together and says: This year we can invest 100 million marks. Shall we, or ahall we not? So what doee the bogrd of directors do?_-IC aske the group which wants to inveet: Are you going to earn it this year? If the anawer is "no," Che chairman says: I am sorry, the inveatment will not be made. I can assure you, Mr Loderer, that happens not once here or there, but quite regularly. Where there are earnings, investments will be made. When the earning quotas decline the way they have declined, investments must grow amaller. Leo Brawand, editor-in-chief of the MANAGER MAGAZINE: I would like to address myself to the demand side, to the ques tion of reinforcing demand, which would with cerCxinty be one of the most important means of eliminat- ing unemployment or alleviaCing the problem. Ludwig Erhard once said that he could not imagine a person a11 of whose wighes werc fu11y satisfied, who would not always find something else l~e wnuld like Co buy. T believe that he was right in saying this. It d~es not h~ve Co be a yacht after all, but it can be a rubber boat, a :snorkel, all of the producCs thaC are sold in the recreation sector, in tl~e srctnr wl~ich~ as the result of the reduction of working hours, will become ~ con~tantly growing market. I am not so pessimistic and am anticipating positive effects for the labor market. We have to think through: Do we want to tackle this problem in principle on t1~e basis of the market economy, or do we want to follow the princi~le "divide more, regulate more, distribute more?" ~+9 ~ FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100014450-4 ~OIt OT~'I~"rCIAL USE ONLY I be l~.eve ChaC ~.n order to solve the unemploymenC problem we need a kind of armistice, a kind of declarakion of principles in tihe debaCe over the basic poliCical order, so that the consumer no longer saltie his money away in a savings account, but knows: Thinge will go sensibly and steadily, so I can proceed to realize my plan Co build a house, so I can save for a larger gcquis~.r~.on. The entrepreneur musC know: Even 10 years from now I can in pr3nciple sCi11 manage on the basis of the principles existing up to now--of course, with social improvement oF all possibiliCies. If we geC this declaraCion of principles through parliament, Che govern- ment, and in entirety, we wi11 already be much closer to the solut~.on of this problem. Nnnnen: Of course, we were unable to solve the problems. But I believe we have ascerCained one thing: that such questions must be solved only in facCual discussions, not in an ideology-laden quarrel. In this only employers, employees and poli~icians can work together. If everybody re- presents only his own opinion as given and immovable, rhen we do not make any progress. COPYRIGHT 1978 STERN 89 70 CSO: 3103 END 50 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100010050-4