JPRS ID: 8261 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

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JpR5 L/82fi1
2 February 1.9 79
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TRANSLATIONS OP~ USSR MILITARY P,FFAIRS
CFOUO 5/79)
U. S. ,jOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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4, ~il~~ ~~n~ ~u iu r S~ Rrpott ate
'I'ItAN5L~1m10N5 ON U551t Mit,l'CAfIY AH'I'AIEt5, (FOUO 5/79) 2 Fabruarv 1979
d,
Aui6~~rh1 8. Per(urmin~
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13, 5upplement~ry Note~
16~ Abs~r~ct~
'~he rep~rc c:ontaine informttCton on the Soviet military and civil defense
e~tablishments, leadership, dnctrine, policy, planning~ political affairs,
organization, and equipment.
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Kcy yord~ ~nd Oocun?ent An~lyfii. 7a Oe~erlptor~ - ~_r
U55R
Military Organizutfons
MiliCary ~~~ilitie.s
Military Personnel
1~6. IJrnula�~~/(1pemEnded Tetms
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ror~ n~~rc~~L usr oNLY
~PRS z/826~
2 February 1979
.
TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 5/79 )
CONTENTS PAGE
C~ntenta of '~'OR~ICN MILITA~Y REVIEW'
(Z,ARUBLZliNOYE VOYENNOYE 0B02RENIYE, OcC 78) 1
Soviee Proptrees and Political Policy Reviewed ~
(7.ARUBE2HNOYE VOYCNNOYE 0$OZRENIYE, Oet 78) 3
CommenCS on U. S. Armed Forces Command and Control
(V. Gidaspov; 7.ARUBEZHNOYE VOYBNNOYE OBOZRENIYB, Oct 78)...... 13
, Commente on U. S. Armed Forces in South Korea
(N. Miehin; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYL OBOZRENIYE, Oct 78)........ 22 ,
Commente on NATO Employment of Aircraft Carriers
(V. Vostrov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRBNIYE, Oct 78)....... 34
Commente on the U. S. Seventh Fleet
(I. Karemov; ZARUriEZ~1N0YE VOYBYNOYE OBOZRBNIYB~ Oct 78)..,,... 4Q
Commente on U.S. Naval Aases and Ports
(V. Stepanav;ZARUBEZHIdOYB VOYBNNOYS OBOZRBNIYS, Oct 78)....... 46
Book Diacueaee Drill Train�ng Methoda
(MSTODIKA STROYSVQY PODGOTOVKI, 1978) 50
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i~hil UI~ t~ CC I ~L U~:I: hNi~Y
- CONTENTS OT 'FORF.ICN MILITARY REVIEW'
Mo~cow ZARUBE2HNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Ituesian No 10,
Oce 7~ piqned to preas 5 Oct 78 pp 1-2
(Indicated in the table of contents below are the full CexC �
transl~Ciona and the excerpted tranelationa which
will be publiahed in thi~ aerieR and an excerpted tranalation
which will be published in the Jpi25 F'OUO Periea of the TRANSLATIONS UN
WESTERN EUI~OI'~. ]
[Text] CbNTENTS PaRe
*Grea t Oc tober' R Couree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
" GENERAL MILITARY PROBLEMS -
*U.S. Armed ~'orces Command and Control--V. Gidaspov � � � � � � 9
*American Forces in South Korea--N. Miehin . . . . . . . . 16
*China: In Alliance with the Reactionariee--Yu. Petroy 23
CRGUNU FORCES
Logietics Support for an FRG Divieion in Combat--Ye. Iviinov. . 29
*The Company in Night Combat--A. Kol'taov . . . . . . . . . 36
Sweden'R Armored Equipnent--Ye. Viktorov . . . . . . . . . 41 ~
, Directional Fragmentation Mine--V. Opilat . . . . . . . . . 46
AIR FORCE5
***The Norwegian and Danish Air Forces--8. Sikolin 49
**Using Simulators to Train American e~ir Force Flight -
Crewa--G. Oaipov, N. Kolesnikov , . . . . . . . . , . . 52
**Pilot Survival Aide--0. Oblipov, V. Mikhaqlin, ~
K. Vladimirov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 ~
Safety CogRles--V. Utkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 ~
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_
t~ntt ~~t~ rr.c ~ ni, u~r nNt,v
NAVAL 1~Ut2Ci's5 '
~~CombnC i;mrlc~,ymr.?~l uf Airrrr~Cf: Cnrrier~--V, VoKrrnv 69
*~~~1~~ ~~~i1. 7C~1 T' ~(~C~~~"T ~ ~~111'G~II~nV ~ � . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ � ~ ~ ~ 74
'I'hc l tcilinn Lupn-Clciap Guidrd M~ta~ail~ ~r~gate--
N. Nt].ov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ , ~ . ~ . ~ 78
T}i~ Aegiq 5AM Sy4tem--V, Niknl~yev ~ ~ . . . . . . ~ . . . 83
Ch~ck Your Knowledge. Capitc~liat Country ~rignte~a 88 '
MILITARY ECONOMICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Areillery and Sm~li Arm~ We~pona Productiion in Che FRG--
V. Gnrnkhdv . . ~ . . . . ~ . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . gg
Gre~t BriCain's Supply of ~nergy-Producing Raw Materiale-- ~
Ye. Nikolayenko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 '
~N~7vnl. iiases and PortR in tihe U.S.--V. SCepanov gg
INrORMATION, CV~NTS, FACTS
The Increa4inq Power of Israeli Aviation . . . , . . . . . 103 ~
The NATO A11ied Nava1 Exercise Bright Horizon j
Thc Hansa ECM Aircraft ;
T'I~e U.S.Navy's Submarine Ocean Surveillance SyeCems Center !
A S~mularor to Train Forward Artillery Observera ~
A Ne~a Wind Tunnel ;
A New Noazle for ICBM Engines
U4ing Uranium Cores in Armor-Piercing Subcalibsr Shella ~
~
FOREIGN MILITARY NEWS ITEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
ARTICLES IN FOREIGN JJURNALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
COLORED INSERTS (unnumbered pag~s~)
The Swedish STRV-103B Main CombaC Tank I~
' The American England CG22 Guided MisBile Cruiser ~
The Itulian Lupo-Class Guided Missile Frigate
The Israeli Air Force's Kfir C2 Multi-role Tactical Fighter
COPYRIGNT: "7.arubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1978
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i~'Olt (11~T'ICi~L USI: ONLY
~OVir'i' I'i20GRIs~S ANb POLI'I'ICAL POLICY REVICWEU
Moscow 'I,ARUliT:711N0Yi: VOY~NNOYC OB07RENIY~ in Rvasian No 10,
Uct 7S 4t~;ned ro preps S Oce 7~3 pp 3-8
[Article: "Greae October'a Couree"]
[Tr.xt~ 'I'I~c w~r.ldwide ht~tortcnl Qign~ficance of October--the ~
mniii event nf thr. 2Qth Century--conai~ta of the fact that it
fundament~lly changed the course of mankind's development and
convincingly revealed the revolutionizing power of the ideas
of At~rxiam-Leniniam. The Ocrober Revolution--accompliahed by
tl~e working claas of Russia in alliance with the peasantrq~
under Che leadership of the Bo1'shevik Party created by the
Cre~t Lenin--opened a new epoch in mankind's hi~tory--the
epoch o� the transition from capiCalism to socialiem, the
epoch of the struggle for the liberation of the workers from
i.mperialism, for the cessation of ware between nations and
for sociali~m and communism.
The world liberation misaion of the working class was embodied
in the victory of October. Soviet pawer actually eneured true 'Y~'~`:
freedom and democracy for the workers and it arouaed the mighLry''
energy of the massea. Under the leaderahip of~the Communist
Party, our country's workers have succeasfully handled the ~
. primary, most complex task of the socialist revolution--the -
tack of r.onetruction. They implemented Lenin's plan for
constructin~ socialism, a plan which encompassed a1l~the main
spheres of social life and which transfornted the land of the
sovtets into a mighty socialist power. Our country d.id ~ot~ ;
sis~ply fight for fts freedom and independence.during the grim r;'
yc.~rG of the Cre~t Patriotic War, it also made a deciaive: ` x
r.ontribution ~to s.~vinp, world civilization from fascist slaver~r. � ~
y~
Th~ �nrty's c:~nsiatent implementation of the plan developed by ~
V. i. T,enin for creating a new society ~ ensured unprec.gdented',
rate4 of deveJopmPnt for the ecor~omy, Science and culture attc~
i t provided n~ucce~sful resolution n� the inati;onality.'problem.
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roEi c~rrtr,Tn~, clsr oNt,v
Our countr.y prr~c~?~e1y t~iiy enormous economic, acienti,fic nnd
rer.t~nolo~:ic~i] po~cntt~] nC l.ta di~pnpnl, IC~ defenae cepabilitv
tp ptrnn~ ~nd rel~nblc. 'The Scviet people ~re Eirm1~ repnlv~d
to cl~vote n11 eheir ~rrr.n~rh t~ Che sCruggle for rhe complete
_ Cri~mph of. communism'~a idexls.
The pociery o~ develop~d aocinLi~m,--t~day'a highest achievement
oE aoci.al progresa--which hap been bui1C in our country, ht~a
b~cnme An outstanding trtumph of Lenin'Q ideaa. L. I,'Brezhnev,
~eneral accreC~ry of tlie CPSU Centr~l CommiCtee and chairman of
Ci~e USSR Supr.eme S~viet I'reRidium, comprehensively c!escribed '
r.he proces~e~ which completed ~he con~truction of developed _
aoci~ilism in nur counCry. He drew a ~oncluaion which is of
import~~nt theorertc~l and practical significance: "...the aCage
oE ehe mature, developed Pocialise society sCands out as a
ttec~a~~ry ltnk in 4oc3~1. transformations and aa a relatively
1on~ srrip oF development on the path from capitallam to ~
communism. Moreover, ehe knowledge and uae of all the reaource~
of developed 4ocialism is, at the 4ame Cime, Che tranaition to
the con~truction o~ communism."
T1~iG new 4tage in the history of our motherland ia reflected in ~
the new U55R Conatitution, whoae fir4t annivereary was recently -
celebrnted b,y the SovieC people. ~ The adoption of the USSR
ConstiCution--an inRpired mattifesto for the epoch of communiam'e
construction--was a powerful stimulus for a new up~urge in the i
creative activity of the ma~ses in accomplishing the hiatoric ~
plans outlined by the 25th CPSU Congress. . ;
Our state has a firm foundation to successfully accompliRh theRe ~
tasks. It hns never before possea~aed auch powerful economic,
scientific, technological and spixitual potential as it haa I
tu~lny. under the conditions of mature aocialism. It ia suf- i
ficient to mention some data to show the diatance separating
the current sCage of socialism's development from ita initial
4tage in our country.
~
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It now take4 1eRa than a month to obtain the ssme volume of (
gro;~a social. product which was produced during the entire year E~-
in 1936. Since that time, Cne power-worker raCio has increased
. I~y ~7]mo~C 1 Factor of g in industry and by a factor of over
15 in a~riculture. During Chis same time, there are 34 times
.~s many ~pecialists with a h3gner and secondary education in
industry and 47 times as many in agriculture; the�percentage of `
workers with a higher and eecondary education has increseed from =
lese than S percent to 73.2 percent. .
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~ The Sovie~ people'r. Ptandard of living hae changed radically. ,
For example, 14.9 million square meters of houaes.were built in -
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ro~i c~i~rrr,tnc, us~; otvt,Y
~q~(,, c~hile rh~ counrry received over 110 millinn squnr~
meter~ in 1971; per pereon expendieurea and benefita fr~m
rfte public conaumpr:ton �unde urere 21 ruble~ and rhey reached
380 rub:lr:? 1n~e ye~nr. '~he proceas nf mxCerinl and cultiurnl
growth wFap accnmp~nied by the people'A epirituAl improvement -
= Find by Ch~ formfitiion of tiheir eocialiQt conacinut~n~sc~.
Tlie Sovier econc~my develcping at higher ratea tk~an is
produceion in the capitalipt countriea, During the paet 7
ye~rar ehe Average annual ra~e ~f growth for indusCrial out~uC ,
in nur country ~xceeded ehe simil.Ar index: by a factor o� 2
- fnr the US, 1~y ~ C~7ctor of. 3 f.or. ehe Common Marker counCries and
by more ri~an a factor of i,7 for Japan. The eteady growCh
_ of ehe Soviet economy is primarily ~ re~ult of the ut3lization
oE the ob~ective lawQ and advanti~ges of the aocialist economic
ayatem and a res~~lt of the planned management of the economy.
The Communist Party arid ehe Soviet government are devoting ~
4peci.al atCention to the prnctical implemeneation of Che ~
pnrty's a~rartan policy. The program developed by the March
1965 CPSU Central CommiCtee Plenum scientifically reflecta "
the new condition~ and requirements of socialist society.
"The modern agrarian policy is the par~y's Lenini~at strategy
and tactica in the area of agrtculture under the conditiona
of developed Rocialism," ~omrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in '
hic repoit~"On the ruture DeveloptaenC of USSR AgriculCUre~"
at the 3 July 1978 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.
The July CPSU Central CommitCee Plenum was a new,impor~ant '
Rtage in accomplishin ~ the party's ~trategic mission--~o
achieve a reliabl~ supply of food for the country's population '
and a reliable supp].y of agricultural raw materials fo~ industry. ~
It concentrated the parCy's atCer.tion on solving..the moat urgent
problems of agricultural production and eliminating i~ts bottle-
necks; ir also defined the main direcCion for the future develop-
menC of agriculture and the sectors support.ing it$ industrial- ~
ization and itc scientific and technological progreas.
The pleni~m evaluated the resulta of the cuuntry's a~ricultural
development during the past years. The average grosa:yield';
of a~ricultural products for all categories of farms during .
' 197]-1977 was: 189.6 million tons of grair., 7.91 .million~,: ton~ :~r
of raw cotton, 88.2 million tons' of potatoes and 23.3 aiij~lio~ tj
tuns ~f veRetables. Durtng th3s same period meat `*-ion'. ~
, pro~uc.,
increased to 14 mi111.on tons, milk production increaR,ed' to~ �
88. 8 millton Cona and egg~; production~ increaaed~ to' S3`.S 'billion t:~
_ . . ~
units. The sale of ineat product8 to the populatiion'xhxongh`~, w
statie and cooperative retail outlets slmot~C~doubled from 196"5." ~
. , ~ .
Chrou h 197Z~~~and it exceeded 10 million tons a~ e,ar on ttie; ave
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I~Uk Ul~i~'LCI~L llti~ UNLY
Mil.k ;+alea to thc sC~te ~1mo4t doub~.~d--from 15.~? to 30 mi111on
- ~ona; butter yalea Co Che ataee increaaed from 702,000 to
~ 1.276 million ronp n?id egg a~1ep 3ncreaeed from 10.3 to 34
billion unity. Per perqon cnnsumprion of ineaC ~nd meat producte -
~wiCh ~tt growth in popula~ion of over 28 million people) increased
by 16 kilogr~mR and waa 57 kilogrgme in ~.977, '
The ma~.n ta~k which rhe party is aseigning Co agriculCure is '
to achieve a r.ompreh;ensive, dynamic development for a11 3ts '
sectors and ~ reliable supply of fuod and agricultural raw ~ ~
m~teriala for the country Ro th~e the growth in Cheir production
wi11 ensure n further, significant improvement in the people's ~
:+Cnndard of 13ving. In cnnnecrion with th~s, plans call for
br3n~ing Lhe average anrual grosa grain yield up to 238-243
r~~i111.on ton4 in 1981-1985 and up ro an average of 1 ton per '
person throughouC the country by 1990. By the end of Che next
five-year p1An, meat production muat be brought ttp to 19.5 '
million tnns. It will a1RO be necessary to greaCly increase '
, the production of m~lk ~nd eggq, The accompliehment of theae
plans wi11 make iC possible to raise per pereon consumption !
of ehe most valuable food producta and it will make it poasible ~
- to approach scientifically~based standarda by the end of the ~
11th Five-Year Plan. ~
i
'The Ju1y CPSU Central Committee Plenum was a ma~or event in the ;
- life of our party and stAte. Its~decisions clearly defined i
, the pathc for the future development of our agriculture on.
behalf of a significant increase in the people's welfare. i
Comrade L. I. Brezhnev s report is of enormous theoretical and '
practial significance. The report's propoeitions and co.nclusions i
. are a new, ma3or contribution to the developmenC of a Leninist ~
agrarian theory under the conditions of developed socialism. I~
They are mobilizing milliQns of Soviet people to implement the
program planned by the party for the development of agricultural
_ production.
The workers of city and country received the deciaions of the
.7uly CPSU Central Committee Plenum with profound t~atisfaction
and patriotic enthusiasm.. The confident voice of the Soviet i`'
pQople can be heard from one end of our motherland to the
other: "We will accomplish ev~rything the party has plannedi"
Th~ Great Occo,ber Socialist Revolution was the kind of event ~
in world hisCory ~which ha~ profound, lasting conaeqnences ~ox ~
m~nkind. It lit up the paths to the future. for th~e, people ff-
of many countries. 'Among;the i�nternational consequencee.of
. , :
OcCober, which have formed the character of,,our epoch, ,~the .most
important is the beginning and'�the development of the:worl:d
socialist system. The experience of..history-',has-~"shown:`that�the ~
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
T~OCt Ui~'C]:CIAL USC ONGY
cdmpreheneive, fr~rern~il cooper~tion berween rhe socialist
cnmmonwealrh a~ countries h~s become a powerful �acCor in
accomplishing th~ir naCion~l ~nd inCernaCiona.l missions, in
- defending their revnluti3onary achievements and in the struggle
. to pecur~ rhe p~ace ~nd qecurity of Che people, The fraternal
~ocialist countiries--members o,f the Counc~.l for Mutual ~conomic �
Assistance (CMEA)--aYe quccesafully accompli~hin~ Che creative
missions facing them of. social.iat ~nd communist construction
~nd they ~re tncreasing their economic potiential. BaQed on Che
~greement~ reacl~ed by the leaders o� the �raternal parties in
the Crimea,ns we~.1 as gr other meetiing4, cooperation iR being
consolidated w~.thin ~he crtrn framework on n mul.tiilateral and bi-
l~tieral basis �or rtie purpoce of realizing ehe measures of
apecific, longterm progrdms.
On the background oF the crisea and worsening contradictions
in the cnpitali~+t world, the confident, dynamic growth of
the economiea of r.he CMLA member countries convincingly
demonstrates tl~e advsntages of the socialist atatea' aocial
and polit3cal s;~stem and the e~fectiveneqs of their sCrengChening
mutual cooperaC:ion. In comparison with 1975, Che natinnal ~
income of these countries increased by 12 percent; in 1977 and
industrial output increased by 12.4 ;.ercent compared to 1975, -
the overall voll~me of their foreign tr~de Curnover increased
by 24 percent in 1977 and exceeded 158 billion rubles.
Compared to th~e precrisic level of 1973, the volume of industrial
producCion in Che developed capitalist countries increased by
7 percent in 1977 while it increased by 32 percent during the .
same period in khe CMEA me'mber counCriea.
The flights of ~paceshtps wit~ international crews wer'~ important
events in the practical realization o~ the program for multi-
lateral cooperation in the exploration of outerspace; ~hese
crews were made up of citizens o�f the CMEA member countries:
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR. The
successes in developin~ the economic syatem, acience aitd
technology and the expan4ion and intensification of co~npre- '
hensive, mutual cooperation are strengthening the power and -
pre~tige of the socialist commonwealth and they`are increaaing
its inftt~ence on the course of. world events.
Gre.~t October had an enormous effect on_,the development_,of_ the~
national liber.~tion movemenC~; it aroused the consciousneas of j
co].onial peopleG and helpe'd them achie~ve large auccesR:~s i'n t;
their struggle for l.iberation from the ~oppression of~ ifhper;ial-,,- ~
~
ism. ~ Since Warld War II and the Soviet Union's vi~cto,r3es, ~over;:. .
fr~scicm, over 2 billion people have thrown off the yok`e~ 0~,:4 ~
colonialism and ~they have achieved national indePende`nce. ~tiMany; ~
of the liberated countries are. re~e"ctir.o the capitalist p'ath
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
. ~
r~oi~ nE~T'ICr.ni, usi, oNt,Y ~
of developmenl ,~nd, t~1lc~tng thelr bearinga on vocialism, Chey
. ~re aettin~ riie conyCrur.tion of a cnCiety Eree Erom exploiCMtion -
ay their ~oul. The SOC3F11'I8C ctiun~riea are faith�ul and r~liable -
friendp of. theqe state~ ~nd they ~re rendering them a11 possible
assisCance and support.
.
Na~urally, imperialism ha4 not reconciled itsel` Co this course
of developmen~ for ehe liberared countries. By making use of '
their pocitions--which are ati11 extremely strong--within the
Former colonies, ~he imper3a1icti4 are trying ta do everything
' poasible to preeerve ehem and, where poseible, to aCreng~hen
- and exp~?nd tliem. Thia eendency is eqpecially no~iceable on
ttie African continent. The US has become the main instigator '
of neocolonialism in Africa. It is conducting a policy of
armed inter~vention and open interference in the affsirs of
_ African st~tes and Guppreasion of the national liberation ~
movement. Thi~ iG specitically attested to by the armed ~
intervention in Zaire'a internal affairs by a number of ~
western cnuntries under the political and military leadership
of Washington nnd a1Go by imperialism's plots to include
several Afric~n state~ within the sphere of the aggressive
NATO bloc's nctivities and by attempts to put together so- '
called "inter-African" armed forces to suppresa t�he liberation
struggle on th3s continent. ~
~
However, Che imperialist� are forgEtting that such a policy is
doomed to failure izi our epoch. Nobody will be able ta break
the will of the independent states and freedom lovit~g people !
of Af.rica and other continents nor will they be able to break
their,determination to defend their independence and free ~
internal development. The historic victory of the pe~~ le of ~
,
Vietnam is an example of this. p ~
;
~
The Great Octnber Socialist Rev~lution marked the beginning of
a new Gtage iii the development of the international.work,ers j
move:~ent. The successes of the conetruction of social3sm in
the USSR, and then in other countriea, promoted an incrense -
in the political maturity of the working.class in the capitalist~
states. The level of organization within its ranks increased f`
significantly. A force,--Che international communiat movement-- '
which is playing a great role in history, w3s formed. ~
Capitalism is more and more clearly s,howing its worth as a
society without a future. The chronic, feverish activity, in 1~
the economic system, unemployment,.pri~e,increases,~inflation,
shady political machinations, the corruption of~ hi 'rankin ~
8 6 ~
figures, the abuse of power, the increase in cri�ae ~ and the - �
flagrant violation of human ri h'ts in ca italist, socte't ~all : }
g P y-- , , ;
of this means.that the ob~ect3.ve economic and ao'cio p~oliticul:
. . .
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
l~Uti Ul~1~'tCt11L U5l, hNLY
rrrrequt~�itrH fc~r tlie tr~ttatt~c~n r~ aoCi;tli~m h~ve re~eh~cl
.h high dc~rec~ ot' m7turity, '1'hh depi.t~~ nf the mnpp~~ far
, rndir.71 c~l~c~n~},e~ F;r.nwing in �ritn.tipt cnunerir~; the
~~mmuttiUt rnrtit~ ~f th~~e ~at~t~~ ~~r~ eryin~ e~ i.mprov~ Ch~
~~rc~t~~y ~nd t~c~ir.~ of eheir x~vdlu~idnc~ry ~tru~gle, Th~y .
~re ~r.hi~vi.ng n unific~tinn df ~11 d~mnCr~Cic Earc~~ in eh~
~t~ug~le n$~ingC ehe prednminttnce nf m~ttop~lie~ $nd far .
d~mn~racy ~nd poc~iali~m~
~he birtl~ df ynvi~t pnW~x w~~ m~rk~d by rh~ ~dop~idn of Len3n'e
nr.Cr~h on Pe~c~ which definpd eh~ m~3n erend in eh~ e~~ee'~
forpign pnlicy frdm eh~ fir~C d~y of ii:g ~xi~tenc~~ The con-
ai~t~nC ~our~ae of pence ~nd fri.~nd~ahip beewe~n pEdplea whi~h ~
ie b~ing conducted by ehe p~rey ~Cem~ from ehe very nature of
snci~nli~m. Th~ C~SU 1~~~ canCinually d~vde~d end cvntinuee to
d~vo~e i.C~ primnry nee~ntion eo eh~ iA~uey of an~uring a firm,
religblp pe~Cp. The tir~l~gp ~cCiviey of L~ I. Bre~hnev,
g~n~ral ~a~cr~tnry ef th~ CpSU CenCral CommiCCe~ gnd chairman
_ oE the USSR Supr~me 5ovipt Pre~idium, hc~~ won eh~ enormoue
reapect of the p~ople of dur plAnee: he hag made an outatanding
Contribution Co Che cnupe of int~rnaCional deCpnte and univer~al
~ecurity. The prineipLeg ~f peaceful coexi~tienc~ are winning
mare and mnre ~urporter~ in our time as the only realistic and
r~ttional principleg'in int~rnational affgir~. Thie reflectp
Che r.hc~nge~a in ttie balance of power which are taking place in
the uorld, ~nd primarily the increase in the power and authority
of the Saviee Union and the entire socialist commonaealth.
The ~uz~pg~~~ aChieve~l by the ~orce~� nf the national liberation
movempnt and the international workere movement are alao promot- ~
ing ,~n affirmation of the principlee of peacef ul coexietence
beCw~en states.
During recent yeara, we have all been wiCne~eses to the poeitive
changes in international rQlations. The �avorable effect of
the relaxation of Cenaion ie especially noticeable in the
~ituation whtch has developed on the European continent; the
people of Chis continent are now living in their fourth decade _
withouc a war. The Final Act--which wgA signed in Auguat 1975
iu Elelainki nttd which brought th~: Work of the Conference on
European Security and Cooperat{on to a cloae--WaB a graat
p~tilitical victory for the forces of peace.
~x
,
The progreae ~+chieved in the area of detente must-be continually
supported, etrengthened and expanded by enriching the practice
of peaceful cne~i~Cence and cooperation.
,
During the yeare which have passed aince the Aelainki Conference, ~
a large number of international treatiee and._agreemente have
been concluded with the ~ ~ ~ ` ~y~
_ participation of the S.t~viet.Utiion,_thase ~
treaties and agreements directly reapoad to.the goals,o~ building$~~
a firm, legal.foundation for the g~licy of det~nte. " -
~ -
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
t~Ok OCF'ICtAL U5L tlNLY
'Cli~ bu~ine~p mc~~;nhtep c~t' ehh milie~ry indu~~r~~l compl~x~~
nt' the 1nra~r+t Cnpituli~e ~CnCep ~r~ noC in ~~Y~~m~nG wiCh
~I~fN dpvelnpmr.nt af inC~rnc~tian~l proc~~~e~~ 'Che mo~t
n~;~;re~a~atvr im~erinli~t cirel~~ are whipping up ~he arme r~e~~
'Phtt~ ~~n b~ ~e~n ~~peGi~lly vividly in Che axamp~e of Ch~ NATO
Council'e lac~t ~~pRion whieh ~dopt~d ~ 1ongC~rm, 15-year pro-
gr~m; Chi~ pr~gr~m prnvid~~ for ~~ign3ficant quantiiC~t~.ve and
quglitnCive in~r~g~~ in ~rm~ment~ This dangerouP deciaion
fnr mgnkind i~ ~1r~ady b~ing implemented.
To g greaC extene, Che future development nf ehe international
~iCi~aCion dependQ upon how rh~ urgent, preee~,ng i~apues of .
d~tene~ are r~~olved in the mil3tary ephere~ Under current
Cunditionp, eh~ mese importa~C Ching ie to take practical -
pCep~ to ~urb rhe arme race ~and reduce armamente. The 3oviet
Union ptprp~d forward with a comprehenpive program of ineASUree
in rh~ ~re~ of disarmament~which arou~ed a wideepread responee
- from w~rld public oyinion and which were eupporeed at a apcciel
penpion of the UN General A~aPembly. Several repregentatives
of western bu~in~ps circleP have xeeponded to the enbetantive
proposnip put fnrward by the aorialist ~tatee during the recent �
nr~gorintionp in vienna on forc~ reductione tn Central Lurope.
Ttie main principlp which is able to enRUre actual progreea for
the negotiationa--equal aecurity for all it~ participantP--
formed the b~aie of theee propopals.
The meeting which wee held between A. A. Gromyko, member of
th~ CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minieter of
Foreign Affaira, and C. Vattce,U.5. SecreCary of State, in
Geneva in mid-July of thia year, attracted the attention of f
world public opinion. The talka again demonetrated that the
- Soviet Union ie doinR everything neceseary to reeolve thoee
few ispues which have again and again draWn out the conclueion
- of a Soviet-American agreement on strategic arme limitation. -
The achievement of an ~greement on the military ie8use of detenre
would promote the ptrengtheniag of peace and eecurity among ~
ppoplea to r~n enormous degree.
,~Y~
At a seAgion held in July 1978, the higheet bodq of U33R ~
etute power--the Supreme 3oviet--again confirmad the couree -
.`s~'_
of our LaniniRt foreign policy aith'ite full povar; this ~ ~
.
policy ie directed gt etrengthening detente and stopping-tha
arms rnce and thie couree t+as refl'ected ia the '
Prograte of , .
measures submit~ed to all-statee. "Doing e;very,thing �to ::itop= .
the arms race and to strengthen peace .~and:,securitq=,amoag _
~ ~ ~
peopiea--ae aee in thie the fundamentai, mi,asion Y_of3.-:our `~~'orii' n ~ -
. . - : , , ~,8 3~:
policy," etated Comrads L. i. -Hrastinav ;tn.~Baku;~wbiia~aita~d~ng 'z
- the Order of Lenin, to Che.:capftol of ~Aserha~rdsh~:�~'~Y - _ _
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
1~UH clf~'t'~CtAL ll;iti c)NLY
llow~v~r, ~tnppit~g Ch~ ~rm~ rn~r. ~nd di~~lrmnmcnC are ndt ~impip
m~ttCr~~ Mt~ny r.e~en~ C~~eb teptify te the f~~t Ch~t Ch~ ~n~tni~~
nf dt~tr..n~r ~~rr brcc~min~m~rp nCtive in t}~e world pnlieir.~1 ar~ne.
tn ~ numhr_r r1r cohatrrn ~~nu?tertrp, tller~ gr~ influ~tttial for~e~
which arC trying to rr.tut~n the t+orld yo the "Cold Wa~," They
ar~ r~~+r~p~ntfng thr in~~rr_~t~ oP ~he p~dp1~ t+hc~ t~r~ ~~rni~g
eh~ir.livtn~ from th~ ~rm~ r~c~ ~nd frdm th~ wnr~ening inter-
r~~tidnnl pitu~tinn. Afr~id tn r~penly ~e~tp th~ r~ai rea~ons
f~r th~ir viol~nt .~t~tidn d~sinpt th~ pr~e~~~ of ndrmalixat~on
in th~ wdrld'~ p~litic~l c13m~e~, th~~~ fdr~e,~ ~r~ unlea~hing
~~l~nd@rdu~ propa~~nd~ G~mp~ign ~g~ini~t ehp USS~. ~h~ tru~
purpd~~ nf eh~ trumped up ~nri-Snvi~r ~Cnri~g is eo ~erve ae
a pmoke ~cr~~n cnverin~ th~ p1~n~ oi r~~~Cinnari.~~ in the
W~~v~, ~1~nA dir~rted ~e und~rmining deeent~.
- China'~ fnr~i~n pnlir.y i~ rnuging mdr~ and mdr~ alarm among
reac~-lovinR hEU(~~p. ti~~in~ betreyed eh~ principl~ of friend-
shir ~nd ~~iid~rity wieh th~ ~oci~li~t cnuntri~g, ehe government
nf thip country i~ nnw ioining Che fore~a of rhaction in the
wnrld ~r~n~, whil~ ~�bi~cCing the ~oei~li~t ace.ompli~hm~ne~ of
the Chin~~e people to gr~aC dangpr. An "e~c~l~~ing rapproche-
menC" i~ takin~ pl~ee in NATO'p r~lat3ona Wirh China. Th~
Pentagen ia aceive].y ~n~oureginR the Attraction of Ching ta
Chip aggrh,~pivp bloc. P~king'~ leader~ are prenching Che in-
~vitnbili~y of n n~w wnrld war, s~boCaging the cause of die-
armampnt in every way poa~ible, forming bloce with the moar
reactionary miliCaristic forcep and trying to undermine detente.
Seeing the Soviet Union and its peace-loving polic;? ae the
main ob~tacl~ to ehe conduct af its couree, Pekiag har z~alougly '
undertak~n th~ ferm~tion of gn nnti-Soviet front.
NoWever~ th~ combined forceA of re~ction are oppoeed by a mighty
coalition of champion~ for the cnu~e of peace, democracy and
progreap, headed by the 3oviet Union--a coalition Which haa
th~ people'~ aell b~ing ae their goal and not destruction and =
the annihilation of people. ~ ~
Th~ Combined Arm~d ~orces of the Warsaa Pact member etatea plaq -
, a moRt importunt role in defending peace, eocialiet accomplieh-
~rentg an~d security among people. They are oppoeing the main ;
force giraupinR of the ma~or imperialiat poaere ahich meke up
the nRRreeaive Atlantic bloc and they are reliablq eneuring the
inviolabitity of our border~ aed the etability of the revolution-
ary accomplishmentP of the Pocialist commonwealth couintria's. ~,,~a
The Soviet Armed Forces form the basis of their fightipg
strength; they hnve all the ~aodern mean8 of arm~d conflict
at their di$posal. They include the strategic nnclear foYCes_ ~t~
which eerve ae a rel3able ahield for~the Morld iocialist syat~,m. ~
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
t~'Utt h~t~'tCtAL U5~ (~NLY
"'I'h~ Armed ~nrce~ r~~pnn~il,iliey ea thp p~rey ~nd p~op1~ f~
~r~at," M~r SU t), Ugt3nov, m+~mb~t~ df Ch~ CPSU C~nrr~i
Cnmmitt~c Pdl~tburn nnd U55R Ttinipepr n~ U~f~n~~, point~d out.
"'Ct~~y c~rp accnmplipf~in~ a nab1~ mi~~ion. ~'h~y ~r~ ~~rvin~
ldity ~~~1~. ~'hip re~p~n~ibility, thi~ n~i~~ian a~d therae
~aai~ in~pir~ ~eri~nnnei eo coneinu,~lly imprdv~ Ch~ir �omb~e
~xpertipe.~~
tikr th~ ~neire devhldpm~nt ef 5dvi~t po~i~Cy, th~ 1if~ ~nd
~r.~ivity df nur Armed ~~rc~~ pror~~d und~r eh~ growing influ~nce ~
n~ the id~e~~ di th~ 2Seh CPSt1 C~nRr~~~ ~nd und~r eh~ ~ymbol of _
th~e ~tru~~l~ th fulPill it~ dpei~idn~~ ~h~ P~rviGemen of the
~rmy ~nd nnvy ~ampl~tely r~~d~nir.~ eh~ir reaponeibility in '
th~ ct~uuc nf d~fcndin~ the mneherlgnd--eh~ cr~aCion of Great
d~~dber~ '~hpy apc ar.113evin~ n~W ~ucC~~~e~ in combat ~nd ~
(~dltCir.~1 ~rpining ~nd thpy dre mor~ fu11y di~chargin~ the
r~quirem~nt di the Communige P~rey--to in~rQaAp th~ efficiency
~nd qu~lity nf Combae Craining and to work better today ehan
y~pt~rday and b~tter tom~rrow Ch~n tod~y.
Cnmrnde L. i. t;rexhn~v'~a pUbpt~ntiveiy profound reporte aed ~
t~p~ern~t~ and ~].~an hie book~ "Malayg zemlya" ~nd "Rpbirth" have ~
~rouped a new ~urge in politieal end combat activity among a11
~ th~ defenderp of the fatherland. Accepting Comrade L. I. ~
~rexhnpv'~ advicp and ins~ructione as the party'a combat order, ~
5evieC ~rervicemen are directing their effortp toWard ~ccomplieh-
ing thetr ~esiRned mia~ione in a Worthy manner~ toaard achieving
new AUCC@9A@P in military 18bor and in further increaeing combat
regdinb~aA and vigilanc~ aith re~pect to the aggreeaive intriguee
of imp~rialist circles and toWard reliably defending the great ~
accomplishmente of nocialism, democrecy and peace.
i
Our country ia confidently folloWing Great October's course. '
United around the CommuniPt Party, the Soviet people and thei.r ?
vc~liant Armed AorceA are doing everything eo that :+ur 8oCj8118t E
fatheriand Wi11 achieve nea victoriee on ite hsetortc path to `
th~e complete triumph of communiBm. ~
;3
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoys obozreniye", 1978
.
9 (10 l
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
1~11k ~11~ t~ t.C;1 ~1, C~,~~; ~NLY
COMM~N'TS ON U, S. ARM~U ~ORC~5 C(l1~tMANri ANb CONTROL
Me~~nw xARttBC~fINf1Y~, VOYENNOYE dBdZR~NIYE in ~u~Aian No 10,
Oce 79 ~i~npd eo pr~~~ 5 OcC 7H pp 9-16
[Arti~le by Mg~ Gea V� Gida~pov: "U.S. Armed ~orc~~+ Comm~nd
~nd Cdnerdl"1
['C~xt~ Am~riCnn epecialiptg underetand by the term "Command
and Contr~l Syptpm" thp CoCgliCy of techniG~l equipment,
,~kiil~d p~r~onn~l ~nd the method~ and procedureP for operating
it Which mupt ~n~ure Ch~ commander conet~nt supervieion over
hiP forcee and facilitie~ in g11 situatione by providing him
with all th~ d~ea required to make operational deciaione and
get orderR (romm~ndP) to the executors. The command and con-
trol syatem i~ regarded ae an independent organizatio~~l un3t.
In addition to ihe ~lem~ntp cited above, it aleo includee
difEerent gubpypt~mp, the nece~sary facilitie~, Qquip~nenC,
etc.
Aa reported in the foreign presa, Che entire leaderehin of the
Ameriran Armed PorceR ia based upon the World ~iide Military
Command and ConCrol Syet~m (WWMCCS). Based on the aidespread
employment of modern communicatione equipment and computer
technoloRy. it unite~ the eenior ngtional and military command
~nd conrrol agencieP. The ~yPtam began to be created in the
60'A when, due to the adoption of a nea military doctrine ~+ith
the "f]exible reppon~e"8tra~egy as ita basie, the government
and pentaqoa approved new principlee for developing and organ-
izing the armed forces according to epecific miesions. ~
.
~
The Roa1 of this reorganization Wae the creation of "balanced"
armed forcee capable of conducting both general nuclear t+ar,'and;- ~
;
limited wer~ With and Without the employment`'of tacticai nuclear
weopon8. , _ ~
� ~
Tn accordonce s+ith the new directi~ee of the politico-mil.itarq ~
lend~rShip. rhe tL3. Armed Forcee aere divided up; 'from an ~
.
: .
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
roi~ aN~r r.r ~ n~, ust: C1NLY
drg~nir.~-~tic~n~] pc1Lnt oF view, ~~~COrdin~ Go ~p~cific dp~rgtinngl
anci ptr~tcgir. mlr~pidna in the folldwin~ mnnn~r: ia~r~t~~ic nffen-
niv~ fnrre~ (ICf)Pt'a, 5513N'p ~nd ptr~rp~i~ bdmb~rp); ~CraCegic
de~r~iy[vG Corc:rp (t:h~ fnrc~~ ~nd f~cilieie~ fdr def~ndin$ th~
Am~riC~n cc~nti.nc~nt ~~~in~t mi~i~ile, ~pg~ce ~nd ~ircr~ft ~re~ck) ;
g~npr~~l ~ur~d~~ forCe:a (1~nd f.orc~e~, th~ Air t~'orc~ ~xrluding
~er~t~~iC ~viatinn, ehe N~vy ~exrludin~ 3SgN'p); Ch~ force~ gnd
~.yr.i].itieH fnr ~tr~eegir ~ir ~nd ~~~iift; ~nd tih~ ~rmed forcee ~
r~yerve, '
'['tic fdrei~n pr~~p pmrh~taize~ Ch~t the Chang~ in ~tr~CEgy ("fl~xible
r~e~panae" in place dP "m~~~ive ciu~lpgr !'r~C~li~Cion") and the
~pprnval af npw nrincipl~p tor milit~ry organizaeion (the appz~r-
nfi' ncw rc~mrnnpntp e~rmerked to ~ecdmpliph quiCe c~pecific operaCional
nnd ptrr~tegi~ mi~~ic~np ~longpide eh~ c1~p~ic~1 fnrm~ of forc~
or~hniz~tidn--the ~ervice~ ~nd bran~hep of Ch~ ~rmed forcee)
brnught ~bnut the ne~d for cr~~ring n eruly world~side eyerem of
Comm~nd ~~nd Cdntrnl ftir the grmpd forcee, a Ayetem which i~
rp~pc~naive to the r~~greaaive rol~g of American imp~rialiAm,whoge '
for~~a are alre~dy d~plny~d dn all Ch~ world'~ conCinentiA and
hC@~t1E~ ~t1 hCaCQtif11C?.
rh~ component~v of the World Wide Military Command and Control
Sypr~m are: the Joint Chief~ of Staff Main and Alternat~ Com- ~
m~nd Centcr~ and thp JCS Airborne Command Poet (the JCS MCC
and ACC ~nd the JCS ABNCP); the main and alterngCe command
poetn nf th~+. aervic~~+ and Marin~ Corpes the command poet of the ~
_ Qpecified commande (5trategic Air Command--SAC, Aeroepace DefenPe
Command--AUC and the Air ~orce'~ Military Airlift Command-^MAC), ;
the unified comm~nds in ~�trategic areae (European, Atlantic aad
Pacific, Central and South American) and the unified Readinees !
Commnnd. ~
~
The JCS command and control elemente (the MCC, ACC and ABNCP)
are incorporated in the National Mi:.itary Command Syetem (NMCS) ~
whicti is the hub of the WWMCC5. It ts equipped with electronic~ '
computerR, diRplay equipment and high epeed meesage hattdling ;
equirment Which makea it possible to eimultaneou~ly receive and
proCepn dat~. In the opinion of American apecialiata. the i;"
nntional gyptem ie the brfdge which links t:te aenior U.S. politico- ;
milit~ry leaderAhip (the President, Secretary of Defenee and
Chairmnn of the JCS) aith the other elements of the WWMCCB. I~
Ir
The JCS Main Command Center is deeigned for peacetime command
and control of the armed forcee (it aaa built 3n 1962). Ia
mid-1976, it Wae relocated to a new, apeciallq constructed
facility located in an underground part of the Pentagon ~the ~
overall cost of the work aae $15.4 million). The ceoter ie noL` "
protected againet nuclear attack.
~
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
t~Ult Ut~'CtC;~At~ lt;;l; c)NLY
A l~r~e hai..l for r.nnclur.tin~ ~mex~enr.y m~~Cin~~ i~ idC~1~lC~ in
rhe middle nf th~ Mf;C, It i.p equipped wirh ~ix 1~rg~ ~cxe~n~
whi~h dippt~y incomin~ dne~; ~pecifically, dne~ on Ch~ lo~~xtion
nf hnemy miaa tl~~ ~~nd ott~er ehtiipm~ne ~p we.ll ~a nCh~r in�drmBM
tion ~equired for cleci~ionm~kin~ A 1grg~ Cat~le i~ lo~aC~d in
the cent~r ~f the hall; m~mb~rp nf Che JCS end tih~ senf~r m~li~
Cary 1~~derQhip pir nr~und ~hi~ rnb1~. Cach of eheir popitionR
i~ ~quipped with mir.rnph~n~~ ~nd a~~ure e~l~erhnn~~s wiCh theee
C~l~phdn~~, ap emphn~ired in tha Am~r~~an pr~~s, ie i~ pdseible
tn ~~Cabli~h imm~di~t~ cdmmunicaeidn~ ndC nnly with Ch~ commgnditlg
gpn~ral~ df individugl cnmmattd~ buC ~l~ao ~rith ehe commandere
_ nf m~inr Khipq. In addirion en thi~a h~11, Ch~r~ are a numb~r of
rc~dmg wh~re gr~up~a o~ ~p~c;i~li~tp ~~s~mble and evaluate incoming
ir.fnrmarion. 5mu].1 Al~~ping quare~rs h~v~ be~an eet up fpr
per~nnn~1 eo r~~e in.
The cene~r op~r~Cpp arnund-the-Gln~k~ S~veral shifts pull ~
duty; th~~e shifep ar~ made up of epecialiste from the Jo3nt
St~ff ~nd Che bef~nge Intelligence Ag~ncy (13-16 off3cere and
NCO'~n h~nd~d by c~ colnnpl). The MCC receivee operntional
r~eporr~ from the ~nervice~a, mgin Commanda, U.S. miliCary attachea
and ~mb~~ai~p nbrond and alBd information from diverae CxA
ponrce~ ~nd peparatp reports originaeing from the White Hause,
th~ State Depnrtment and CIA. Tl~e center haa direct communi-
cationa eo the governm~nt~ of eeveral countries. Its ~quip-
m~nt provide~ ~ueomnted collection, processing and dieplay of
current situntion data on the acreenP and it provides supple-
mentary reference information on the moet urgenr individual
ie~u~~. Standard programs for computing options for the employ-
mpnt of armed forcea in different siruations are stored in the
center'P computer.
The JCS A1~Cernate Command Center is lncated ia the foothills
of tiie Blue Ridge Mount~ing (90-95 km northaest of Washington).
According to AmericAn presP reports, it iA hardened againet
nuclear attack and h~A a gplf-contained poWer etation and aater
supply and ventilntion Pyetems. rhe ACC operaeea around~the-
clnck; it ia not fully manned in peacetime. It ie equipped
~imilar to the mdin center. All information is sent to both
centers simultaneouPly; this makes i[ possible.to exercise =
command and control of the ermed forceP from the ACC When
necess~ry. Work has been underway at the alternate center ~
Rince 1974 to conn~ct ita equipment_to the automaCed:data;pro- ~
cesPing syRtem located in` the Pentagon. Approx,imately. ,$3:;mi1lion ~
aere allocated to a~complish thi~ program ,in tNe 1977~�78 f3ecal
year. _ x~=
~ . ~ . ~
The JCS Airborne Command Post was created in 1962 afld~it'38 -
preeent~y Ret up on the E-4A. Altogether, thr~e;airc_raft~hav~~
been outfitted; they are based :at O~ffutt`ApB ~(Neb'raske~. .=The
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
~
t~dlt Ul~~1CtAL U5L dNLY
A(iNCP ip dcpL~;n~~tc~d fdr enmm~nd ~nd cdnrxnl o~ Ch~ ~~rm~d
fnr~c~K whcn ~hc MCC nnd ACC gz~ d~e df commi~eYon, The ~oreign
prcyp ~m~~hapirr~ ch~ie Ch~U~S~t're~3d~nC ~nd hi~ entouxnge can
b~ tr~naf~rred tu ~h~IK AHNCP in n Cri~i~ gituation. Xn euch ~
n pi~untion, one of rhe rhr~~ ~3r~r~fC w~.ll Cnn~CenCly be on
duty nr Andrew~ A~13 (M~rylnnd) in regdinesp to take the
~'repidcne on bnnrd; ehe othpr two ai;cr~fe w~.~.l remain at
OffuCC A~B.
An ~peraeion~ grnup con~i~ting dP 15-17 men pu1Ls combat
duty on Che AUNCp. Old ~quipmettC (.from ~h~ EC-135) hae
bcen tempor~rily installed on Che aircraft; this equipment
m~ik~e~ it pos~ible eo ma3ntain kelegraphi~ communicatione '
(in ehe v~ry lnn~ weve band), ne~r and long ran~e cowmunica~
tions in the v~ry ahdrt nnd ahorC wgve bande and telephonic
nnd e~legrgphic cnmmunie~~tionp via ~atellite~ The lack of
automat~d data procp~aing and dipplay equipment ia conaidered
one of the phortcomings n~ eh~ equipmenC. IC is anticipated
thnC this ahorCcomin$ will be eliminatQd when the ABNCP .
receiv~p ehe C-4U in 1983.
'Th~ commend ~~n~ta of the qervicea and Marine Corps are loeated
in rhe Pentagon.
;
The UepartroenC of Army Coromand and Control 5yPtem (DACCS) ie ~
deployed at the Army Command Poat; its miesion~coneiste o~ ~
collecting, processing and outputting data for the Army command
element. '
~
The AF HeadquarterR Command Poet is a two-etory building con- ~
~
aisting of a main hall and an upper tier (an area of 540 aquare
meters). Computers, diverae command and control con~oles and i
communicatione equipment are employed here. The ha11 has tvo ~
183 x 183 cm pro~ection ecreene. The aork poaitione for AP 1-
Hq personnel are laid out in rooms on the tier. The Air Porce
Command and Control Syetem (AFCCS)�ia employed in the interesta
of the AF Hq; the AFCCS was built baeed on~the 473L deRign.
It acr.ompliPhea the same miasions ae the DACCS.
-
i::
The Navy Informatfon Center (NAVIC) is located at the Naval f~r
, : i�-
Nq Command Poat; i~a miesion cona38te of automated proceaeing
of incoming data in three areas:, force command and control,_
support an planning force development (over 4,000 ~meeeages ~i;-
arrive on a daily basis). " :
~ . . . ~~~.i~
: .
.
As reported 3n the foreign,preas, the American.leaderehip attachee ;
apec~al sign~ificance to further `improving the command,' control ~
~
and communicariona systeme for.strategic~ofteriaive toscee sridy ' ,y~
' ~ . .
to getting the Presideat's commaads ;`(orders) ~ to ~all l~orcesw- tin -
rtght doan to YCBM launch sites-.'and-~individual gubmarine unftg-=
within the shortest ~ " ` } ~ ~ ~ ~
pogeible : tiine. T,h`er`efora, the~ SAC' comm~nd,;`
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
i~(lit (11~ 1~ I:C;1 ~1L U;+I: CINLY
cntttrnl ~?nd cnmmu~~icc~tion~ by~t~�m ia r.nnpid~Xed th~ mo~at h~.ghly
dev~lap~d cnmm~nd, control and cc~mmunic~tipttp gyetem o,� the
~p~cified nnd m~in commcind~.
CINCSAC'~ Camm~nd Pn~e ig ].oc~eed uttdc~rground near Offutt A~B .
(N~br~~ak~). Six 4.8 x G.8 m acr~cn~ hnv~ b~~n pee up in iC
Co dipplay rhe currpnti ~itu~tion; b~ped nn prngr~m~ nr queri~s, '
diver~e d~C~ c~n b~ display~d on Che~e ~creens with tt~e pro~ecror~~
Th~ av~rnp,~ rim~ l.ag from the ~3me of. ehe query tn it~ display '
~ on rh~ gnreen i~ apprnxim~eely 15 secands. The Cr ha~ g ep1�~-
coneained life ~upporC ~ystem and ie operet~a ~round-the-clock~ '
All inCOming inforro~Cion is proce~sed by the 465L auromaeed
cnmmand ~nd conCXOI ey~t~m (ACC5)--CYNCSAC'~ prim~ry means of
command and conCrol. The main mis~aione of this ACCS arei
aurnnetpd calcul~tion df ICDM and straCegic nircrafe opera-
Cional rendine~p seetiu~, e~?~1ueCing th~ aceual force combat
r~edinese Qr~tus, planning logisCi~a snpport and er~namitring
opergeional ordera to l~unch missileg nnd aircraft. Ordere
und reporCs nre ernn~miCted along cable lines via AUTOb2N
- (AuComatic Digital NeCwork) auCom~tic ~wiCching centers on
aecure, high a~-~~ed printer. Moreover, order~ can be tranamitCed
gs a collective r~ll, to a group o� addrePaees or to an indivi-
dual corraspondent. In the long term, plana call for using
the SAC Automated ToCal 2nformaCion Nerwork (SATIN) ACCS.
t
The m~in miaeion nf the SAC underground CP is to receive
timely w~rninR of a po~eible atCack on the United StaCea and to bring
~trgtegic affensive wegpnns to maximum operational readinese, ,
while launchinA the atrategic bombera at the same time.
CINCSAC'~ ABNCP i~ allocated an important place in the SAC
command and control system. Five EC-135 aircraft have been
earmgrked for its deployment; they are based at Offutt A1~B '
and, since 3 February 1961, they have been Caking turne pulling .
. around-the-clo::ic airborne duty with an operatione group on
board. In the opinion of the Aroerican presa, xhis CP is able
to assume command and control of SAC forcea in the event the
ground command and control postQ are out of commission.
fioreign epecialists beli.~ve that command and control over the
ICBM's and Rtrategic bombers will be exercised from CINCSAC'e ~
ABNCP immediaCely before and during a nuclear war. In peacetime, ~
the operations group on board the ABNCP consists of 11, officers
and 5 radio operator~; it is headed by a duty general to Whom~
emergency powers are delegated. When a situation-detertor_ate8,
~ it~ compl~ment Wil1 be increased. -
r`~
Accomplisfiment of the missiona assigned to the ABNCP for command
and control of SAC forces during a nuclear war will,, :b'e =eriBtired ~
_
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
I~c11t t11~ I~ iC I AI, tl;;l~; c1NI,Y
by Che uCiliznCi~n n.~ CINC5AC's A~NCp aircrake, Ch~ A~NCP'e
fnr Che en~rcrn ~nd wc~t~rn ~reas, th~ ~~.rborne IC~,M launch
~nnerol pnintP and rr~dio r~lay nircrafC (.glrpgetihex 27 EC~135
nircrr~f t) ,
If nn emergenCy ~i~uat3on ~risep, the AgNCP aircraft and the -
rndto re1My nircraft ure l~unched and, according Co data from "
the foreign pre~a, ehey nrp nble to en~aure the timely trgns~ 1
mippion df Che c~ppropri~Ce cnmmgnda from CINCSAC's ABNCP to
e.he C~mmand conCrol p0:~~qfnr ICBM's and stratiegic hombere.
CtNC5AC c~n alsn use th~ bunkered CP'e of the lSth A~r Army
(March AF9, California) and 8th Air Army (BarksdalE AFB,
Lnuisiana), as we11 as the complex in Wes~over (Maeeachusetts),
~p nltern~te command and cnnrrol postA.
The immediaee d~livery of erdera from the senior politico�-
military leadership Co SAC nuclear weapons carriers ts ensured
by rhe utilization of specially bui1C communications eys~emst
of whtch the mo~ae impurtAnt are the 494L and the 48~L,
The 494L ~ystem ia a backup meatts o� transmitting JCS ar.j
CINSAC order~a to all command and control elementaR-~right
down to ICBM ?aunch control ai~es and SAC aircraft on the
ground and in the air--under emergency conditions with radio i
relgy miasile~ (Minuteman-2). Special equipment designed to '
transmit previously recorded (voice) ordera in the very ahort �
wave band are insCalled on them inatead of nuclear�warheada. '
~ The radio relay missiles can be launched on ~ommand from the i
JCS MCC and from SAC command posCe. After ths miesilea are ~
launched and arrive at their assigned tra~ectories, th~ ~
order ia immediately tranamitted on ten set frequenci,es.
The signals' area of audibflity covers the entire territory ~
of the American continent.
The 487L aystem ie de~igned for commar.d and control of SAC ~
forcea if short wave and very short wave radio communications i~
are interrupted by the effect from enemy high altitude nuclear ~
bursts. Its special f~ature is transmitting commande via
telegraphic and telephonic communications e ui ~ent '
9 P operating ~
in the long wuve and ~very long wave banda. CINCSAC has the
t~
capability of transmitting combat orders'via;four,;powerful
ground transceiver centers; one ,of these cen~ter8 ie ~:loca,ted .on
the P�acific coast (Barsto~,.California).; the:second fa-in the
r ;t
central part of the country .(Grand Island, Nebra'ska);,;:the'' -
third is on the Atlantic coast (Norfolk Vir inia ~ 1
fourth is on Puerto Rico. ' 8; ~4 8nd~the ,
The 8ytem's receiqere _bre~at`the i
CP'a of all .SAC large unita, units and.~subu'nite. -
- _ _ ~ , ~
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
~
t~~~z c~rrtr,~n~. ~ISZ c)NLY
'Thc~ 1'AS (rr~m~iry A1cxt 5y~tnm] (eelephane) yya~em .Eor d~clnring
r~lerep n].pu belongp lc~ th~ prtm,c ~vs-~r-~,~...nr.,.~ ",...,~a,a ?~.~.'i~~.a ~a~'r'~_
~`~st
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
.
. ~
FOK O~FZCIAL USE ONLY
_ ~
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' COMMENT5 ON U.S. ARMED FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA ;
Moacuw ZA12UB~ZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Ruasian No 10, � ~
Oct 78 eigned to presa 5 Oct ,73 pp 16-23 ~
_ ~
[Article by Col (Res) N. Miahin: "A~mer3can Forces in South
Korea"] .
[Text] As is well known, a poaitions-of-streng~h policy has
always been characteristic of the foreign policy course of the
+Inited States of America. This is caused ~y the ag~ressive ,
naeure of American imperialism and its immutable desire to u;
"contain communism" and to affirm the supremacy of Amei~ican `
_ monopolies on a global scale.
According to foreign preas reporta, the United Shates has used ite armed
forcea in aggro,~~ive ware and conflicta, or has resorted to the ;
threat of their em.ployment~215 times since 1945. This eloquently '
testifies to the role of world policeman which American im- '
~ perialism ie playing.
E~,~ I�
Although--thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union and the ; i
other countries of the socialist commonwealth--a traneition ~,,i
from the "cold war" to a confirmation of the principles of
peaceful coexistence has emerged in the mutual relations
between world socialism and capitalism, there are atill'many
aupporters of the "positions-of-strength" policq i~n the United States. !
Furthermore, aggressive militaristic tendencies, apurring;on, t r.:
Che arma race and a steady riae in military expenditures are ' i"
presently characteristic of the United States. , i
. , , r
In the CPSU Central CommitCee Report to the 2Sth Party~Gongress,.~
Comrade L. I.'Brezhnev pointed 'out that.there are~influential,; 3
forces in the United States "who'are not interested in~iiaproying~relatione '
with the USSR or in the relaxat'ion of international ,.tenaion t'~
overell. They are depictin,g tahe Soviet ::~Union's ~policq in; a ~ ~
bad light' and, by citing an imagina�ry Soviet": threat,C~;~theq,;zare
~ appealing for a'aew .,round in "th'e =arms : race i'n ttie, Unitied~ SCates- _
. ~~nd NATO. ' ' F~` ' 1~
. , ~ r ~ A 4
t
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.
~'oK c~N'~r.~t~~L u~~ c~Nt,Y
A~ repnrted it~ ehe ~c~rci~n pre~~, th~ nttnuat U.5~ mili~~xy t~udg~~
hna pre~enCly ren~hpd .h r~~nr.d figuxeY4~ver $l~n billinnj th~
w~apon~ ar~ennl i~ b~in$ reinforc~d wirh new w~~p~n~ af ro~~g
de~Cruction; v~gr., inn~ term pr~grnm~ fur m~d~rnixing th~ Ameri~~n
Armed ~'or~e~ nnd NAmO Allied ~nr~~~ k?gve Ueen d~velop~d; m~~~ur~g
hgv~ b~~n ~~?lcen Co m~k~ eh~ politir.o-mi.lie~ry bloae (NATn, ANZU~,
CENTO) ~nd bil~Cera1 mil:tta~y ~1lidna~~ more a~c~iv~ and ~Crong~r;
the ~xpnrt of w~updng tn r~n~tidnury regime~~ hag expand~d; ~tc.
A11 of ehi~ ti~~tifiee en ~ti~ c'~eC thnt ChE ch~mpion~ u~ ren~3.dn
ar~ cr~ating divprge ~b~Cc~~l~g on eh~ paCh tn ~ goiueion of th~
Csrdin~l probJ.~m a~ modern tim~~--curbing ehe arm~ rare. Zt ig
epecific~lly tlieir faule th~r iC hg~ nde yeC b~~n po~~ibl~ Co
~omplere ehe dev~lnpmenC og ~ muCuglly ~ccepe~bl~ Sovi~t-Am~rican
agr~ement on etrategiC dff~nsive arme l.imiti~tion.
The r~soive of th~ U.5.lend~r~hip eo noe only pr~~~rv~ bu~ al~o
expand eh~ Americ~n miliCary pr~e~nce ~.n the mo~t imp~reant arene
of ehe world remnin~ ~ne of ehp i;ey featureg ofU.5. ~lobal p~l.i~ico-
military strategy.
Maintaining fnrceg and miliC~ry bnr3p~a on fnreign
territdry ne~r ehe ytnte bnrders af tha US5R, t~~e nther
socialiet counrries and th~ independen~ developing ~t~tes aervee
tite UniCed SCntes ue a mesn~ for uchievin~ exp~ngidnistiC mtlitnry, political
and economic goals. With ire overeeas force groupings, the
Pentagon ie attempting ta re~lize Che notorioue etrategy of
"credible dererrence which ie primarily diYected againet the
Sovier Un~.nn; it is carrying out a neocolonial policy aithin
whose framework national liberation movements are euppreesed,
reactionary puppet r~gime~ are inetalled and entire peoplee and
states aze enslaved.
The most eignificant group~nge of U.5.Armed Forces abroad are eon-
c~ntrated in the countries of iieetetn Europe. According to
- Department of Derense data, there are 300,400 EM and officers
there. There are also numerous US Armed Porcea ia the countriae
of the Weatern Pacific--approximatiely 130,000 men. They are
equipped with the moet up-to-date weapone, including nuclear
weapone. ~
The U.S.Armed Forcee in th~ West~rn Paci~ic are ~epresQntgd bq
Army and Air Porce large unita and untte located in 3outh Korea, :
Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines and a18o by the 7th Flaet ahich ,.k:
inciudes combat ships of different classes, aviation aad Marin4o. ~
~
~
After the defeat of American imperieliem in indochina, "the for- ~
Ward line of U.S.defenee in the Pacific" .moved 'to the-east oa ths
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
t~'(~it d~~tCtAt. UJr f~NLY ,
~ gdu~hr~rn f1~~k nnd ie hdw run~ ~1ang ~ iir.~ ~ram 3outh K~~r~g i.
vin Jgpan (dkinna~) ~n~l T~iw~n ~d eh~ Phiiippin@~. Ma~@~~,r~r, ?
ehere ag~ ~ fur~h~r impravem~ne in nde oniy J~p~n'~ bue ai~o
Snueh Knr~a'~ str~te~i~ rai~~ 'Th~ At~~rie~n ~ag~zin~ TIM~ Wroe~= `
"Th~ Kore~n p~nin~ul~ w~~ ~nd ig eh~ k~y rc~ at~bil'' y it~ North-
~~~e A~ia.~~ Looking ah~~d to ~h~ po~e-vi~tnam ara, th~ cregror~
of Am~rican ~trgt~gy ar~ alr~ady planntng ~ defenee ~it~Q ~n
Nar~h~~~e A~i~, ~ iin~ whieh pg~~~~ through J~p~n, '~aiaan and
3ouftl Kar~~. `The Unit~d St~~t~~ hag m~~nr ~~dnnmir. ine~r~~e in ~11 ~?i~~~ ~
~duntri+~~ ancl it i~ 13nk~d eh~m by ofFici~i, mutual defene~ t
Cr~~ei~~~" '~h~ iner~~~ed miiienry ~nd e~rate~ic importance vf
Nor~h~~~e A~i~ found ie~ offiei~i r~tl~ction in "Pord'e" so- .
~g11Qd "P~cific Do~trin~~"
'Th~ American miiit~ry prae~n~~ in Korea hae a iong and extremely
di~m~i hl,~tory. Loc~king a~ the Korean penineula se a convenient "
briclgphead whieh rou].d b~ u~~d to cond~ct offeneiv~ op~rat~,one
dp~p within th~ Asi~n c~n~it~eat in cae~ of a8r and ahi,ch couid
bp u~~d ta exprt poiieieo-miiitgry pr~~sure on neighboring
counCrie~ in p~~~eeim~, ~he United 3t~e~~ ~~nt it~ forc~g to Kor~a im- '
ro~di~tely ~fter th~ end of Worid War TI in the Par 8aet.
~t� landing nf Aroerican Occupation Forc~e coneiet3ng of three
infdn~ry diviaion~ of ~h~ 24~h Army Corps bPgan on 8 3eptember
1945 in ehe Korean port of inchon. The immediateU.S.ob~ective s
wae to accapt the eurrender of the remaine of the Japaeeae
Kw~ngtung Army--who had laid doWn their ~rme under the attacke `
of Soviet forces--vithin Korean territory eouth of the 38th
parallel. Subsequently, they aere to eneure fulfiliment of ~
th~ decieiong which aere made in con~unction With the USSR r'`
and the oth~r Alli~~ and vhich were directed at creating a i
eingle, independent, democratic Korea, ahich is what the
progre~sive patriotic forcee of the Korean people vere s~riving ~
for. ~ ~
f ~
NoWever, with the he1~~ of the occupation forcee, the agenciee ~
of democratic eelf-gof~rnment (peopie's cnmmitteee) Which had
appeared in South Korea~ vere eliminated and the act~ivitieo af
left aing po~icical organizations aere limitad in avaYy vaq
po~sible. At the same time, reactionary poli~ical figurea and
groupinge aere mobilized and uniead; thesa raaceionaries vere
ready to eerve American imperialiem and they axprassed the f j.
~nCereet~ of the local bourgeoisie, landoanare and tha ,upper ,
crust of the bureaucracy. i~`~~s~g
!
In order to cnneolidate the influence of bourgeoi~ raactionary
forces in South Korea, the occupa~ion anthorities_.quicklq oat_
about formiag arm~d forces and a police force made up o!`Rorsan
nationals. Io November 1945~ the headquarters of the Amesican '~.R ~
Occupation Porces established a"National Delanae.Dapart~isnt"`~ ~
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
1~t11t t1M'1~1C;tAl, ll;~l; C)NLY -
lic,~cl~d by Nrlclat~itr.r Genrr,~1 CS~hi.E~~1c), lluric~~ t1~~ tir~t ~e~~~;~, plry~jg C~~11~d
- Enr 50,tld0 m~n in ~ne arm~d f~r~~~ ~nd ~5,000 in th~ po1i~~
fr~rc~.
5tC~ by pC~p, tiic~ tl~~irc~cl ;;t~t~tc~ prc~~~~dtd ~l~n~; th~ p~eh df prrepnring ~n
~r~~e~ ~ pupp~~ gdv~rnm~n~ in 3ou~h Korea #~vorabi~ ~o it and
if w~~ er~~e~d in 194g ~ rQ~uit di the ~~p~ra~e eieceion~
~a ~"N~tion~l A~~~mbiy" ~nd eh~ ~~rm~tion of a"gov~~rnm~nt of
Che ~~pubiie Knr~~." Thi~ uniiae~rai, grbier~ry ~e~ i~d
Ch~ divi~idn nf Kdr~~.
Frdm Che fir~e d~yg df ie~ ~xi~e~nc~, th~ S~oui r@gime h~~ e~ken
g po~~Ciott of ~x~r~mp hn~eil3ty in ie~ r~laeiong w3th North
Knr~~ ~nd, aithU.5.88~i~~ane~, iC began eo en~rg~tically buiid
up it~ miliC~ry p~~tur~. in the opinion of Q~n MecArthur, the
forro~r command~r af U.S.Force~ in the F~r Eaet, Ch~ South Kor~an
Arm~d Ferc~~ w~r~ alr~ady compl~t~ly fi~ for aar in 1949. Con-
~id~rin~ ~he ine~~~~ed eombae cap~biiity of the pupp~t army ~~d
~l~e ~h~ UN G~n~r~i A~~~mb].y'g app~~1 f~r a withdraWgl af o~cup~-
~ion fore~n from Kar~a, ~h~ U~S.Comm~nd fl~cided to change the
farm nf ite mili~~ry pr~senc~ on phe penineulas by m~d-1949,
ie ti~d withdr~Wn Ch~ main forc~s of the 24th Army Corps of
Occup~eion ~n J~pan, l~nving a large group of military adviAOre
in 3outh Korea. AC the eame tim~, the Amer~can~ retained the
right of "renderin~ the South Korean Army active military aagie-
tance if it i~ in serioue danger."
In 1950, rhe puppet armed forcee were actually in such a eitua-
tion ah~n, aft~r eetting aut on their "campai,an to ehe north,"
they euffered e erushing defeat from the Korran People'e Army.
Then, American forcea were agein introduced S,nto 3outh Korea.
Covering them~e~ves aith the UN flag, the Am~ericans used the 8th
Army,--conai~ting of~the 1$t, 9th and lOth Army Corps ~nine
divisione) and several independent brigadee and regimente--the
main forceg of the Pacific Fleet, ma~or Air Force large unite
a~d aiso the forceP, shipe and aircraft of a number of capitaliat
8tatee to wege the murderoue aar againat the bPRK (Democratic ~
i~eople'a ~epublic of Koraa~. During the War, the U.S. forces
strength in Korea reached 325,000 men.
At A coet of enormous losaes in manpoaer and materiel, the inter-
ventionista Were able to eeiae a eignificant part of the DPRK s-
territory in the fgll of 1950 anfl ehey Were able~-to braak out ~
.
to t he bor ders of China in~individnal sectore. ~~ovever, 1ed :
~y the Korean Labor Party and relying on the enormou8:fratarnal
~ assistance fro~a the US3R and the_other eocialiet~:countries::and a
also on the intereational solidarft ~ T'~
y. of the pe~cs ~loving= torces
of a11 mankind, the heroic KoYean'~ pa,ople ~inflict~d p,oaer~ul
~ ~ a
. .
a t tacka -ag~ine t., the advaiicing ; enamy: groupingo ~ anc~ dr.ooi .bis, out s T~~~
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
1~'dtt C)l~'~iC; tAL U;~C tlNLY
c~~ N~reh Kr~Ye~, `t'he uub~~qu~ne ~~ur~~ df ~h~ w~r fia~lly
C~nvinrrd thc ~~ggr~p~dr~ thaE it w~r~ impn~gihle td ~~hi~v~ ~
militnry viCedry dver the 11Pt2K ~nd, in 1~53, eh~y w~r~ fere~d
tn gi~n ~n ~rmipttGe ngr~~m~nr whi~h ig ~ei11 in #o~e~ up Co
ehe pre~~n~ eirn~~
~t gl~duld b~ p~int~d au~ ~h~t ~hp Am~rt~an Eor~~~ ace~d in ~n ~
eX~~emei~ EierCe m~nne~ durit~~ the war by ~mpldyi.ng ~h~ b~~eb~~i~a
"~~dr~l~ed ~~rth" ~e~ei~. M~ny hundr~d~ of ~hou~~nd~ of p~o~i~
w~r~ kill~d ~nd m~imhd; eh~ m~3~ri~y of eh~ indu~eri~l ~nt~r-
pri~~~, ~OU,dUU ham~d ~nd ~ i~rg~ ~tumb~r of ~uieural gnd ~ervic~
in~itueinng wer~ r~zed ar cdmpleC~iy d~~eroy~d.
Ait~r ~he ~nd df rhe wa~, Am~rican fnrc~~ wer~ noC withdraWn ;
from 5nuth Knre~. Ti~~y b~came ~he ma~or obe~aele on ~he path ;
te eh~ unifi~ati~n af Kor~a inCo a eingie, national s~ate and
th~y were dn~ of Che ~rav~ ~ourr~~ o! int~rn~e3onal eension ~
in thp ~'~r ~n~~.
During th~ p~~at qu~rt~r nf a cpntur~;~, the num~rical and fighting
eeren~eh of eh~ t1,5. Armed ~orees in Soueh Korea hgs changed many ;
;~me~. Nnwevpr, for a11 pracCicg~ purpog~~, th~ir basic purpose
hug not ch~nged~ mh~y are geill ~ w~~pon of ehe policy directed
~t t~~epin~ S~uth K~re~ ~rithin Ch~ Amerie~n ~ph~re af ~nfluence
gnd ~t uging ie as a~tr~tegic militgry bridgehead for aggYee-
gian and a~ gn ob~ect of exploitation by U.S.monopolies. The
American magazine DEFEN3E MONITOR Wrote that "Th~ defenee of
SouCh Knrea ie rpally not important to U.S.defenee. The American '
pledges to defend South Korea are of political importance for
our aarldaide poeitions end for U.S.intereete in Vortheaet Asia."
L. Sullivan, a former assietant secretary of def~ense, once re- ;
ported to the Senate Armed Forces .!~at American fotrcee ;
in South Korea "are maintaining ttie tialance of poaer in an area ~
of the world where the intereeta of China~ the USSR, Japan and ;
th e United Stntrs clnsh." Consequently, the protracted American military ;
pre~ence on the Korean peninsula is.not caused by th~ imaginary
"aggressiveneas" of the bPWt (its peace iov.ing pol~.cq is uni-
vpreally recagniz~d) nor by the "security" inteYee~s of the �
"South Korean p~ople"--eg the lying bourg~oia pYOpaganda is ~.y
trying to prove--but by the overall aggresaive aapirations ahich
fnrm the basis of American imperialism's global policy. '
The Eoreign preeg point8 ouC thgt the strength of America~ forcee
in South Korea ig regentl fixed at appro'ximatel 40,OOO.man.
P Y ; _ Y ~
Orgnnizattonal~y, they are comb ined in t,he U.S.Command in 3outh _
Korea ahich is also the "UN Command" at'the_aame>time. ~Theoe t~
~
forces are currently oniy repreBenCed bq, the U.S. Armed Forces;
thQ other couptriea which participat4d~-3n eha~militaiq in_tervin- V'~
tion in Korea only have liaieon�officera attaahi~ to'it~.haad= 1~~
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
t~'Uk ()Ct~'tCiAL U~L hNLY
Thr cxtrcm~ cnutinn nnd pluggi~hn~~~ whiCh i~ being ahnwn ~.n
fmp].ementfng etie d~~i~idn ~a withdraw AmeriCan g~taund far~~g
from Sduth Kc>r.en is primnrily ~xpl~in~d by Ch~U.5. unc~re~inCy
ubnut. ~he srability di the unCipopul~~ SouCh ltox~an r~gime
t~itd eh~ ~bi13Cy uf th~ pupp~ti rulrr t~~k Chong-hui ensure
thc inrere~e~ n~ Am~rin~n imperi~li~m in Che ab~ance of "Ch~
fnr~tgn bnyon~ta" which wprv~ ~p ~ support for his power. Ici
CdnnenCinn wirh eh~~, th~U.5.gnv~rnm~ne h~a again a1l.ocaeed
~nnrmoug mnn~egry repour~~~ Co arm SeoUl.
in th~ 1978-79 fiqGal y~ar, $1.165 Ui11~.on w~.ll be allocated to
th~ militnry ttggi~C~ttce rrd~r~m fnr 5ouCh Korpa~ The Senate
~nr~ign Affnirs Committi~e ~pprnved the progrgm which providee
for dpliveri~~ Cn South Knrea, free of charge in the amount of
$g00 million ($275 million was grantpd ae cr~diGs), of any
militnry equipmcnt requir~d ro "aompensaCe" for the planned
wiChdrr~wal of ground fdrneg. A1tiog~Cher, Che SouCh Korean
auChnriti~s cdunC nn r~c~iving $1~5-2 bi113on from the Unit~dSCates
- t~ Ein.xnc~~ the seCOnd five-year moderniz~tion plan for the
"N~tion~l" Armed ~orcee (1976-1980)~
'The Am~ricans nre solidly sCrengChening Seou1 and not rushing
the withdrawnl of eheir forces from South Korea also because
Jnpun ia very sensitive about the issue of a U.S.military preeence
on the Korean penineula. Wa~ahington ie try3ng to prove to iCe
mnin Pacific ally that the plann~d action will not lead to a
"force imbr~lance" and threaten ehe very existence of the South
Korean military police seaCe,which Tokyo sees ge a"cordon
sanitaire ~gainQt the penetration of communiem from the north."
At d bilateral Japaneae-American meeCing on "security treaty"
issues, which was held in Honolulu (Hawaii) in January 1978,
the representatives from Washington asaured their~ Japanese
colleagues that tl~e United States did not intend to reduce its military
presence in the ,tapanese Islands and the western parc of the
Pacific and ir did not plan to ~ithdra~ its armed forces from
South Korea in the near future.
ACCnrdingly, rhe favorable attitude toward the U.S.military
presencc in Asia on the part of China also influences the
Pentagon's plan8 and concepts. According to Americaa preas =
reports, the Chinepe leaders canvinced the President's NaCional ~
Security Advieor, Z. Brzezinaki--aho recently vteited Beijing--
not to withdraw American forces from-South Korea. ' ~
~ . _ .
_ _ ~
Fianlly, the idea of reducing the scale of the'U.S.military,pre- , ~
sence in South Korea was met at bayonet point by`many:ehamelesa vr~
U..S.militarists since, in their opinion., it rune counter to tfie ~
.
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
t~'c� cirrtr tnr, u;~?. nKt,Y
~pirit df' t1~C U�~,pg{~yn-p~Cific Cc~~tt ~er~~~gy, ttt~ m~~ning o�
w}iir.h w~p ~xpr~g~~d by N. Brown, th~ 5ecrer~ry df nef~n~~~
in 1~ig gp~ech in Ldg Ang~1e~ in ~~bru~.ry 1~7gt "We are ~nd
will b~ Ch~ mnin pnw~r in th~ pa~i~iG nG~~n~ W~ ~~nnot h~
~~rdng in ~urnp~ and w~~k in Asi~~ Afe~r ~11, our ~tirengeh
itt A~ie influen~e~ our atrettgth in ~urope and vice verea."
Conspquenely, et~p wideiy pUblicix~d U.S.ine~neian C~ wiChdr~w
itg ground tnrc~~ from South Kor~g I~ a~Cu~lly ~ poli.eiGa1
eriCk. I~ c~nndC 1~ad ~nybody n~Cray ginc~ iti i~ compl~~~1y
ubvidu~ tih~C, wh~n approa~hin~ Ch~ Kor~an problem, Ch~ ieau~
must rh~ cnmpl~eC~, ~.mm~diaee and uneonditinnal wiChdrar+al
of ~11 forpign fnrces from Sauth Knr~a, eh~ di~pnlution of
Ch e so-called "UN Comrnand" and replacing Che miliCary
armietiG~ agr~ement wirh n p~ace ~reaty. Thi~ ~.s Che oniy key
tin ~rcating fc~vdrnble cond~Cion~ tio convert the armietice in
Kn r~a Cn a~tiab1~ pegc~ nnd Co acc~leraCe the uni.iicat~on of
bd th part~ of Che ~ountry. The UpRK governmene'Q efforta,
which nre rec~iving eh~ fu11 supporC df Che SovieC Union and ~
eh~ oCh~r cnuntri~s of the social3se commonw~alth, ~re d3rected
at ~chieving Chesp conditions.
COPYRIGHT: "7,arubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1978
9001
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
~n~ ot~ ~~tc tni, USL ONLY
COMM~N'TS bN NAT~ ~MPLUYM~N'~ 0~ AtftCRA~ CARR2~RS ~
Mo~cow 7A~UB~7.HNOY~ VOYENNOYR O~O~tt~NIY~ in Rus~ian No 10, Oct 78
e3gned ta rr~e~ 5 occ 78 pp 69-73
~Articl~ by Capr lgt Rank V. Vo~trov: "U~~ of Aircraft Carrierg in
~attl~ - According tn thp View~ of Foreign Military Specialiste"]
~m~xt1 C,en~rnl-p~rpns~ n~vn1 force~ arE one of the m~ane by which �
the rulin~ circ~eg of the United SCntes and the oCher NATO countries
carry ~ut their ~xpnn~ion iat plen~ and the attacking nucleue of
theae force~ is ~ircraft carriers. The role and importance of air-
craft carriers are determined above ~11 by their mobility, conaider'
able autononry, broad range of fire capabilitiee~ and high battle sta-
bility. in rhe opinion of foreign apecialiete~ they are the only
genernl purpose weapons system at sea that ie capable of operating �
effectively at any point in the World ocean and~ using conventional
or nur;~gr Weapons, wiping ou~ aerial~ eurface, underwater, and
coastal targets. ~
i
Aircraft carriers are the main atriking force at sea in conventioral f
wars and n highly prepared reserve of strategic fc~rcea in nuclear -
war. Ag the experience of the War of aggression in Viet Nam demon- ~
strated, they perform important miesions in local vare. Moreover, ~
U.5. atrateRiats conaider them a key tool for achieving politieal ~
goal~ in peacetime by n"demonstration of force." ~ ,
'fhig nA e . . ~
. s sxment of the role of aircreft carriere is supported by
their numbers, condition, end plans for further develapcaent. :'Phe
re~ulAr U.S. Navy has 13 aircraft carrieret Chree atomic carriers F`
~ ' .
(the ~nterpriae and two Cheeter W.Nimit~ types) and 10 aith conven-
tional poaer plante (four Kittq Navk typee, four Porresta l; an d t~io ~
Midw~Y tl?pe8~ . ' . . ` ~
, _ t
~ - ~ r..
. , - . . _ : : `
The 1~t~,at ship of this class is.rhe atomic aircraft carrier-DWi ht; ~
_ , $ _ -
A. Uisenhower (Cheater W. Nimits type), ~+hich _va8 comnfseioned:'in ~ ~ r
. � .
October 1977. In 1981 tfie atomic 'aircrafr carrier ~Carl Vinaoa" is t `
to oin the a , . f _ : , ~4, . ~X ~
~ ~lee_. Afeer..that the-U.S. Naval.Commsad..i~t`tends~'to _ ~ ~ ~
_ ~ . � - ~
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r ~ :~~A E ' ~~u C
3"'~. . ~ ,yt = 3.�_~~, z.. , . `:i ,k
z=-.....d~_..~ 5
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
P'Uk ~tl~t'IC1AL U5L ~'~NLY
but.td c~n~ rnore w}i.i~> c?f l}~i.y yr~me type, A~ tht ntnmic ~ircra~C rarri~rs
,~hin the ~l~~it Midwxy type yhip~s wi.1l. be d~~ctivntpd, tn th~ future
eh~ 1.e~d~ry of thr be~'ense tl~pnrtmenC ~nd U,S~ Nttvy~ giving gg their
r~a~nn th~ high cdst df iienmic nircr~Ct c~rri~rg~ plan to build ships
o~ th~ ~nrne Cing~ with ~ma:t~~r dl.spl~~~menr gnd ~nnveneinn~l pnw~r
pl~ne~. At ehr g~me etme r.h~ ~xigetn~ ~i.rcra~t cttrri~r~ nre eo be
mnd~rniz~d td pxtend Cheir s~rvi~~ 1iF~ C~~ 40 years.
- Thp t~:ngli~h Nc~vy'g nnly ~irCrnfr c~rri~r, eh~ Ark ttoy~l~ is ~o be with-
drawn tntn ehp reg~rveg in t1r~ ~~rly 1980''s~ The ~rench N~vy has the
multipurpn~~ c~rrier~ Cl~m~nceau ttnd I~'n~hE~,
'~en nE Ch~ 16 nircruft cgrri~rg belnnging eo these cnuntr3eg are per-
man~2nely ~e~rioned in Ch~ Atl~ntic (in~luding ehe 6eh F'leet's rwo
c~rri~rg in the MediC~rr~nenn) and ~ix arp ~.n ehe Pncific (two of them
in th~ ~th rleet)~ In extraordinary cnnd3Cions, accordin$ eo the
~A~esgment of the U~S. miliCary-politic~l leadership, 85 percent of
tlie American airCraft carriers shouLd be in ful~. combgC readiness.
WiCh the beginning of war ehey wi11 operate as parr of the NATO strik- '
in~ forc~ in the Atl~neic (4-5 cnrriers), NA~O sCrikin~ forces in the
Southern Curdpe eheater (2), and 7Ch Fleet (3-4 carriers)~ It is
planned tn ~is~ the English aircr~fr carrier eoreeher with the Amsrican
ones a~ pare of the NATO striking forces in the Atlantic, while the
F'reneh ~ctrri~re wi11 operate in the Mediterranean.
{~t~en Che gtomic carri~r Karl Vinson is built the U.S~ naval command in~
Cend~ to create four atomic aircraft carrier groups (two in the Atlantic
nnd two in the Pacific)~ In the opinion of American apecialists~ it
will be possible to use them ns means of "rapid reaction" end shift
them on ~n operational basis to regions of heightened tenaion or aend
_ them in to reinforce exiating groupings.
As a rule, aircraft carriers and their escort ships operate as part of .
multipurpose (etriking) carrier groups. F~oreign military specialists
believe that it is necessary to assign up to four atomic guided missile
cruisers to escort an atomic aircraft carrier, and up Co 10 aurface
~hip~ of the cruiser~ deatroyer, and frigate classes.for a convett-
tional aircraft carrier. In addition~ atomic torpedo boats are in- .
cluded in the eacort and deployed in the anctors where a meeting with
enemy submarines is moat likely. In view ~~f the shortage of atomic
ahips ~ mixed composition is allowed for the escort with atomic _
guided missile r.ruisers and Spryuens-type destroyera~ F
y
Judging by matertal in the foreign press, when combat'acCions begin '
it is plAnned to use the aircraFt carriers'for the following primary '
missions: Winning and keeping superiority at sea, covering nuclear ~ -
strike~ against sea and coastal targets, operating blockades in~ses ~ x
region~~ defending sea lanes in the ocean,� supporting the landirig'of~.
inndin ~
g parties~ and aviation support for the action of ground forces ,y,.~
in coastal sectors. : *f'
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
t~'c~it t~i~~t~'?cctni, u~i, oNi,Y
Winning ~t~d holclinb gu~~eriority ~t q~o, ngsumes nchieving superiority in
r}~c ~ir~ ~'~C gp~'1~ nnd imder ~he se~x oP suEficienr time and scale ro
carry out the ncr.cgy.~ry op~r~tion, Judging by material in rhe foreign
presq thiy is the prim~ry mi~sion oE the American Navy, The naval com~
m7nd expecCs ~n ~ccomplish iC prim~arily by mulCipurpose use of aircrafC
cnrriers which c~n~ under current conditions~ fight againsC aerial,
surface, and underwaCer enem~.es,
Modern American aircr~ft cnrriers can operate in rhe assault and anti~
sub modes ~t once or in either mode separately, The combined mode is
con~idered basic for winning superiority a~ sea, Tn this case the
air wing will include heavy ItA-SC ~,~igilant ground~attack reconnai.ssance
plnnes (one squ~dron~ three planes), A~6 Intruder and A-7 Corsair-2
ground-ateack planes (ehree squadrons~ 40.p1anes), F-4 Phantom-2 or
F-14 Tomc~t fighter planes (two squadrons~ 24 planes), S-3 Viking
antisub planes (one squadron~ 10 planes),SH-3 Sea King antisub helicoptera
(one squ~dron, eight aircra.ft)~ E-2 Hawkeye 1ong~range radar surveil-
l~nce planes (four), I?A-6B Prowler electronic suppression planes, and '
KA-6D I:ntruder refueling planes (four),
The srriki.ng vnrtation assumes concentration of primary ef�orts on de-
livering sCrikes against shore ob~ects and supporting ground forces, ~
This var:tation is possible only after superiority at sea and in the ~
air has been won. In this case the number of ground~atCack planes is ~
increased through a small reduction in the number of fighters and anti-
sub planes~ ;
Judging by material in the American press~ the antisub variation of '
carrier use is envisioned to defend sea lanes and to support strategic ~
troop movements, In this cgse~ tfie air wing may include up to 36 ~
antisub planes and helicopters (that is, about 40 percent of the total ;
number of aircraft on board). ~
;
Foreign specialists believe that the i
possibility of varying the compo- ~
sition of the air wing to respond correctly to the expected threat is
an important advantage of the multipurpose aircraft carrier. In their f
opinion, this kind of operaCional flexibility can be achieved by mov- '
ing the base of nircraft from one aircraft carrier to another or by I
f.lying them out from shore ,airfields.
_ One of the missions to be accomplished while winning superiority at
sea is fighting groups of enemy surface ships. .Carrier-b'ased
grourid-,
attack aircraft and the surface ships and atomic submarine,of tfie
escort forces are enlisted to
_ participate in this;operation; . `r~;
~
, .
Carrier-based grounti-attack aircraft are.viewed,as,.the:cHief.means of~~
sCriking enemy ships at sea. They can_ use. sir `to'-surface guided::
missiles and.bombs. According Co inforination in~the foreigii press, ~
a) ~w.
the ground-attack planes are capable of deliveririg effective stiikes ; ~
against surface ships in a radius of 1'300-1~800_kilometers. w
~ _ ' Con'sider-~ ~
� ing that the,sircraft carrier group can travel up.;to .600 miles (about 'i ~
: , t . t; ~ ~
1,110 kilometers) in 24 :hours, giyen favorable coriditions ~itis aircraft_ `
4 t
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
i~~r~rs c~;~rirtnt. v:;r. ~,rr~,Y
ln tlif4 tlmc~ ci~tt rFfE+ctlvcly n~urtttur n w . , . . ; '
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
I~Ok nI~'I~'ICIAL USC dNLY
Ch~p~~r ~ .
Princip~e~ o.f. Dri1~. ~'rA~.n~.ng Me~hods ,
f~ri;i.i c i'r:lnc t~~].eh '
1~.xcc:rp~ llri:ll tr~ining is an independen~ area of combat
ruinin~ ~ncl en~~r~ as an or~an~.c element in~o many other areas
o� tnstruction, oxel~~in~ t;liereby ~.n influence on ~he development
ot ~he knowlpd~e, ski~.ls, habits and psqcho].og3.ca1. stability es-
~c:n~ia]. f.or milit~~ry per~onnel. in modern warfare. ~he guiding ~
l~rinciples of ~ov3.et pedagogy therefore form ~he basis of drill
in~~ruction.
~1 hi~h ~.evel. of driJ 1 proficiency on the part of officers, war-
rant o.fficer~ ~nd NCOs ~.s of decisive 3mportance in achieving
success in dril.l training ~nd 3.n their ab~.lity to execute in
exemp7.ary faghion the movsment;~ and activities prescr3.bed by the
Dri~1 hegulations and to instruc~ ~heir subord3.nates 3n the
methodologically correct manner.
~t is not; enough for ~ commander to be possessel of a high ne-
gree of inethodologioaJ. mastery, good theoretical training and
practical skills; it i~ also important for him to k~.ow how to
stimulate the cognitive activity of his subordinate~, and this
may be achieved by improving the quality of dri11 i.nstruction,
developing in personnel the ability to think creatively and ~
helpin~ them master the most effective movements and activities
_ during ~he course of ins~ructi.on. The movements and activit3es ;
learned during drill training exercises should be practiced and ~
perfected in the course of tactical fire and ph,qsical training
Exercises as we11 as during the routine of daily life. ~
i
Every commander should always remember that the bases of in$truc-
tion are best laid in the first days of training. It is pre-~
cisely ~t this time that is developed and then transformed into
habit a certain procedure in the atudy of drill movements and ~
activitics as well as activities with weapons and in militar9 ~F
vehicle~. ~
. i'
~.~le knaw that the 1:imits to human knowledge are relative; it is
l;l7eref~re necessary to strive to i s
n ure that subordinates do not
f.i.nd themselves encumbered by today's lack of knowledge.(or lack ~
of ~kill). It is not ha who does not know,but who.aearches.'.out `
an~wers and pursues kno�~rled~e who is ~ieserving of reproach, ~but - f~
r~~ther he who does not know `hut pretends ;that he ;does. ~
. . ~
rlustery is un3ers~anding plus memor � maste
Y, ry of knowl edge , is
. ,
this plus thE application of knowledge to practice.
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020006-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100024406-2
1~'(11t 111~ I~ I(, I Al~ U;;I~, ONLl'
l.r, v~~t~y itnj~ot~t;r~r~i; :tr.t ~l~e.~ l;r~i.ini.n~; ~7:~~ocF~r~:~ to E:,it;r:lblisli con~
n~ct; io~u; bc; Lwc~~t~ ttte l;~iawt~ r:~ixc~. i;tie uc~kn~wri ancl Le:i;~,~eeri t;htnry
and pr.~ict;ic~ ~~r~d ~.ax~.r.~iv~: r~t ~h~ ~nc~;~t ~f.�c;c~iv~ f.drms and m~~hod~
at dril.l it~:~t;:~~uct,:~on..
It; i~ ~~.t~o v~;ry :i.rn~~or~~~nt ~a tn~.~ur.c t;h~~t ~~ch di~3.~.1 cxerctse i~
- c~ncluctecl ~~,~ins~t ~lie bt~clcf;round c~.E ~ comp~~.~i~~n a.� results of
tha:3e com~et;3.n~ wi.t~i one ~norh~r with :i.~~ cot~sc;