JPRS ID: 8263 TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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JI~It5 L/8263
- 2 F'ebruary 19 79 I"~'!I'~ `
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TRANSL~ITIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FOUO No, 621
U. S. JOit~lT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE 0[~LY
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SH~ET JPIt5 L/ 82G3 I
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TRAN5LATIONS ON 5UII-5AlUtRA1V A~'RICA, t'OUO No . 621 s~ ~e~~~~ ~a~c
2 Februarv 1.979 '
. ~
6, =i
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7. Au~herl~l 9, Per(orminR fkR~nit.it~~ n R~;~i 1
_ No, ~
. V. F'erlnrm~n~ UtRin~t~~ion ti.~m~ and AdJre~~ 10~ Nto~ect,'1.~sk-u ,rk l:n~~ I
Joint Publications Reoearch Service
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SS. Supplemen~uy Note~
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- 16. Abntr~cc~ 1
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The report contains information from African and specialized West E~:~opean
publicationa and radio on political, economic, and sociological developme~ts. '
I
17. Kcy Word~ and Document Analysi~. 170. Descriptor~
Political Science ~Inter-African Aff. ~Ghana Rwanda
Sociology ~~gola ~_Guinea Sao Tome and
Economics Benin Guinea-Bissau Principe
Culture (Social Botswana Ivory Coast Senegal
5ciences) Burundi Kenya Seychelles
Technological Cameroon Lesotho Sierra Leone
- Cape Verde Liberia Somalia
X Central African ~Madagascar South Africa ~
Empire Malawi Swaziland
X C~ad Mali Tanzania
Comaro Islands Mauritius X Togo
X Congo Mozambiq~e X Uganda
D~ibouti Namibia Upper Volta
Equatorial Guinea Niger Zaire
ta~~~~r~�.~oP~~�Ended Terms X E[hiopia Nigeria Zambia
Gabon Reunion
Gambia X Rhodesia
17e. CUSA'rl Field/GrouD Q2~ S~~ SC~ 5~(
1{. Ar~ilab~luy 5~atement 19. Secur~t Class (lhis
Y 21. Ko. o( HaRes
F'(tH UFF1C[A1, US}~: UNI.Y. Limited Number ot~ RePor~~
Copie:~ ,lvailable From JPK5 � ccurity ass ( h~a 22, p~~~~
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JPRS L/8263
2 ~'ebruary 1.979
TRANSLATIOIVS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRI CA
FOUO No. 621
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CONTENTS PAGE ~
- . INTER-AFRICaN AFFAIRS
Briefa
Ghana-Ivory Coast Electricity Interconnection 1
~
ANGOLA -
Article Analyzes Reasons Underlying Cabinet Changes
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 20 Dec 78) 2
Briefs -
Luanda Execution Site 4
CENTRAL AFRICAN II~'IRE
Siovenia-Bois Installations Opeaed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 29 Dec 78)........ 5
Briefa _
UNDP Aid to Agriculture ~
PRC Br~Ldge Construction Agreement 7
CHAD ~
Briefs
Petrole~mm fcefinery Financing g
CONGO
Briefs
French-~Congolese Financing Agreements g
Aagolaa Cultural Center in Brazzaville g
L'T~iIOPIA
- TWO Revolutionary Leaders Discuss Situation in Britrea
(Faris Bazzi; AI,-~~TATAN AL-'ARABI, 14-20 Dec 78)......... 10
- a- (III - NE ~ A- 122 FGUO)
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CONTENT5 (Continued) PAGL
' CNANA
- Briefa
HydroelecCric Pro~ect Coat U.p 17 -
_ Bulgarian Trade Delegation 17
_ Replacement of Diaeased Trees 17
~~UINEA ~
Conakry, Guineans Surveyed, Paradoxes Pointed Out
(Mohamed Selhami; J~UN~ AFRIQUE, 20 Dec 78) 18
Possible Solutions Reviewed for Currency Recovery ,
(Sory Serinde Di~!,lo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 20 Dec 78)......... 21
MADACASCAR
Report Indicates Improv~d Production, Trade in 1977 -
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8, 15 Dec 78)..... 23
Upward Trend Noted =
1979 Budget -
Briefs ,
_ Defense, Other Miniatries' Budgets Increased 29
RHODESIA
Nkomo Tells Why He Met With Smith
(Joahua Nkomo Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11-24 Dec 78).... 30 =
TOGO
; Briefa
Austerity Budget Adopted 35
French Financing Agreement ~S
UGANDA -
Briefs ~
ADB Aid 36
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I~OIt (11~'F[CIAL l~til? (1NI,Y -
INT~R-AF'fiICAN AFFAIR5
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BRIEFS
GHANA-IVORY COA5'~ ELECTRICITY INT~RCONNECTIdN--Dr E. E. Quartey, Che ,
_ direcCor of the Volta River Authority (VRA), and Mr Lambert Konan, the `
munnging director of Ivory CoAat Electricity (EDCI), signed on 11 December
in Acc~a a protocol agreement for the interconnection of the e~ectrical
networks of the Cwo counCries, a pro~ect Che cost of which will amounr
to 25.76 milli.on units of account, that is the equivalent of 6.8 billion _
C~A franca, which is to be financed ~ointly by the African Development
Bank (ADB) (10 million UC), the European Investment Bank (EIB) (11.03
, million UC), Ghana (2.39 mtllion) and the Ivory CoasC (2.34 million) and
on which work will begin this year and will be finished in 1982. The .
feasibility srudies for this pro~ect, whos~ conception goes back to 1963,
although nothing precise was agreed upon until the first bilateral
agreemenk was concluded in 1975, were turned over in 1976 to the Belgian
research firm, Fernand Court, which made its report to the interested
countriea last February. The agreement which has ~ust been signed in
_ Accra is on~ of the concrete results of the visit to the Ivory Coast by -
~ the Ghanian chief of atate, Lieutenant General Akuffo (MTM 8 Dec p 3379).
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANI:ENS in Fretach 22 Dec 78
p 3506] 8956 ,
CSO: 4400
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,ANCOLA
ARTICLE Alv,a:LYZES REA.SONS UNDIItLYING CABINET CHANGES
~ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 937,20 Dec 78 p 33 _
[Text] At tl~e end of an extraordinary session of the MPLA Central Committee
on Saturday, 9 December, the following officials wei�e fired: Ango].z.n Prime
Minister Lopo do Nascimento, Minister~of Planning Carlos Rocha ~'Dilolwa,~~ the
other two deputy prime ministers, Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Pedro da Costa
van Aunem, and three ministers, Paulo Pinto Joao (domestic trade), Manuel de
= Oliveira (housing and construction) and Maria Mambo Cafe (Deputy Minis�ter for
Domestic Trade). This dismissal is more t~ian a simple palace revolutinn. It `
shows how far Agostinho Neto intends to pursue his dual policy ~f diplomatic
overture abroad and pra~natism in internal affairs, begun since~the end of
the Second Shaba War 9 months ago.
The Mgolan president hit the high and mighty, Thirty-eight years old, prime
_ minister since the independence, a brillant and elegant intellectual, Lopo do r
_ Nascimer~to was generally consiaer~d to be one of Agostinho Neto's trusted men
. and one of th~ more active artisans of the policy of rapprochement with the
. West. During the past year, his contacts with the Nigerian authorities--
- acting as a sort of inediator between Angola and the West--t~nded to prove
that, on that specific point, the prime minister agreed with his president. ~
In fact, the difference of opinion between Nascimento and Neto centered mostly
an domestic policy and more specifically, on the Cuban presence. 'Besiaes, -
JEUNE AFRIQUE had already disclosed that the two men differed on that subject, ~
Neto favoring the progressive reduction of Cub~ns xn Arigola and Nascimento ' '
advocating their stay, if not their increase (J~UNE AFRIQUE No 932). Supported ~
by thc Minister of Flanning Carlos Rocha ~~Pilolwa,~~ a bearded half'-breed, Lopo i=
do Nascimento was asserting that Angola needed the Cubans more tha.n ever to f
fight the UIdITA men and r~launch the economy according to ~~authentically ~
socialist principles.~o As for Neto, disappointed over the ~~bearded ones'~~ ~
lack o~' mil itar~r effectiveness in ths fight againat the guerrilla P~nd made `
i~ cautious by ~he inexperience of' the te~hnicians from Havana, he ad~vocates !
calling on.~stern collaborators--especially Portuguese--in addit,ion to ;
developing the private sector. ~ ~
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[3y initi~}ting such an importunt purge and, at the same time, abolishin~; the -
post of primc minister and deputy prime ministei�, Agostinho Neto has undoubt-
Edly ytr~ngthened his authority. Will he be ~zblc to go further along this
path without causing u reaction oii the part of his already fairly worried
allies in the socialist bloc?
COPYRICN'T: 3eune Afrique CitUPJIA 1979
685?
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ANGOLA _
' BRIEFS
LUANDA EX~CUTION SITE--Executions are said Co be Caking place daily at a
football stadium in Luanda, the Angolan capital, according to statements -
by Angolans who fled their coucttry on 30 December lasC on a raft and
- sou~ht refuge in Namibia (formerly SouChwest 4frica). [Text] [Paris
- VAI.EURS ACTUEL'LES in French 15 Jan 79 p 35]
C50: 4400
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, ~ CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE -
SLOVENIA-BOIS INSTALLATIONS OPENED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~;RRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3568
~ /Text/ On 8 December 1978, in the presence of the Yugoslav federal government
representative, Emperor gokassa I opened the Slovenia-Bois lumber company's
new inaCallations.
These installations icaclude a cutting mill, a wood-peeling mill and a strea*n
_ driven power station using wood chips. They have ~ust been added to the saw
_ mill which began operating in 1915.
_ '
Slovenia-Bois is an SARL /Limited Liability Company/ with a capital of 250
million CFA francs, a subsidiary of the Sloveni3ales company in Ljub~ana.
It was established in 1970 by ECA %Economic Commission for Africa/ at Bayanga
in Haute-Sangha, that is to say, at the tip of land that separates Cameroon
from the Cougo Republic, south of Nola.
Slovenia-Bois receivEd a permit to explore 100,000 hectares and another for
300,000 hectares, kept in reserve for the moment. The exploration is in
_ particular producing sapelli and sipo, but also some ayous, limba and ~ibetou.
In 1977 Slovenia-Bois produced 49,436 cubic meters of rough timber and 2,000
cubic meters of sawn timber. It exported 33,269 cubic meters�of whic~h 10 ~
percent went Co Yugoslavia and 30 percent to other European countries. The
country therefore re~nks fourth among the lumber companies set up by El'.A.
_ The new installations will make it Fossible to process a large part of t.his
raw timber, as in 1980, Slovenia-Bois expects to produce 15,000 cubic niEtRrs
_ of sawn timber, 2,OOQ cubic meters of wood-peeling and 1,200 cubic meters
oE cut wood.
- Half of the company's total output can thus be exported by river on barges, '
as 85 percent is now being exported on rafts with countless conaequent losses.
Thanks to Slovenia-Bois, the little fishing village of Bayanga has become a
lsrge~important village. In fact, the company is employing 15 exiled Yugoslavs
and 510 Cehtral Africans. It therefore had to build 12 wooden houses for tha
. staffs, 70 dwellings for the personnel, a canteen-bar, schools, and a police
headquasters. Slovenia-Bois has bxought about all this growth and Bayanga
now has 2,500 inhabitants.
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Slovenia-Bois' Cotal ECA investments are evaluated ~t 2.5 billion CFA francs.
- Mr Franc Benovic is the Slovenia-Bois manager.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cip, Paris, 1978
8870
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~ C~NTRAL ArRICAN EMPIRE ~
BRIEFS
= UNDP AID TO AGRICULTURE--The Central African Empire and the United Nations'
' Pro~ram for Development (UNPD), on 9 December, signed an agreement relative
to agronomic research and the increase of food seeds which FAO /Food and -
Agricultural Organizations/ experts are promoting. This pro~ect, CAF/77/
' 003, is a conCinuation of CAF/72/003 (Increase of food seeds) and CAF/72/006 -
(Agronomic research on food, vegetable and fruit seeds). The Central
American minister oF international planning, statistics and cooperation on
this occasion stated that this pro~ect "is in keeping with both the quant-
_ itative improvements in food production and with the prospect of establishing ~
. a highly productive modern agriculr.ure." Pro~ect CAF/77/003 will extend
over 4 years. ICs estimated cosC is $1.75 million which includes the sending
- uf experts (19 men/month), the allocatfon of grants (24-month ~rants + g~roup
training), equipment ($200,000) and various loans ($100r~000). %Text/ /Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAN~ENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3568/ 8870 -
PRC BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT--The Central African minister of international
plannin~, statistics and cooperation and the ambassador of the People's
, Republic of China at Bangui, on 8 December, signed an agreement according -
to whicti China agrees to build a bridge over the Lobaye. %Text/ /Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRA,NEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 356~/ 8870
CSO: 4430 . -
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CHAU
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9RIEF5
P~TttOL~UM R~~IN~RY F'INANCINC--The Isl~mic Bnnk of Deuelopment will furnish
Chnd wi~h 3 bi9.linn CFA francs toward~ an oil pro~ect which includes
the cnngtruction ot a rzfinery and a pipeline totaling 15 billion CFA france.
/TexC/ LParie MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRAN~~NS in French 29 Dec 78 p3568/
8870
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CONGO
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F'It~NCN-CONCAI.~SC ~'INANCINC ACii~~MENTS--Three fin~ncing ~greements to the
~mount nf ~R (C~A) 440 million (~r (French) 8.8 million) hns ~ust been signed
in grazzaville between the Congo nnd ~rance Chrough the Aid and Cooperation
~und (FAC). 'The firat has in view FAC's pnrticipation in the realignment
of the Congo railroad (CFCO); the second ig concerned with scientific research
~nd the third deals with completing the equipmenC intended for Che Geographic
Institute of the Congo. /Text/ %Pnris MAItCH~5 TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEEN5
in French 29 bec 78 p 3568/ 8870
ANGOLAN CULTUEtAL CEN'I'~R IN BItAZZAVILLE--The Cor.g~lese minister of culture, '
arts and aportg has innugurated a recently established cu~tural center in
Hrazzavill~. During the ceremony, the Congolese miniater stated, among
other things: "Long before colonization, in Manikongo's time, these two
peoples (Angolan and Congolese) were closely united in an economic and spiritual
but not cultural plan. Today the desire to construct a socialist society -
has led theae two peoplea to enter into a firm alliance of brotherly friend-
ship and cooperation in all areae." This cultural center includes a conference
hall,_a library, a lecture room, a moving-picture hall and aports iustallations.
/Text/ /Parig MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER:tANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3568/
8870
CSO: 4400
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~TNIOFIA
.
TWO REVOLUTIONAItY L~Ab~R5 DI5CU55 SITUATION IN EItITRP.A
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'A1tABY in Arabic 14-2A Dec 78 pp 32, 33
/ArCicle b~? Paris_Bazzi: "Britrea between the Sickle of Ethiopia and the
Hammer of Russia"/
/T~xt/ Soviet military eupport for the Ethiopian counterattack against the
- national liberaCion~forcea in Eritrea has ?nanaged to diaturb the bxlance of
power in the Afric,an horn. Yt has entatled the creation of a new inter-
, national strategYc politital situation whoae moral effects have begun to be
reflected in citcumetanceg which were not.typical of the Soviet Union~ in
its cuetomary rule as a natural ally of liberation forcea. The Soviet
tlnion hae preferred to enter the game of a teat of etrength by relying on
. ,Weetern criteria derived, fran atteaQ te to develop imperialiam by the part- �
ly overt, partly covert meane of indirect dominance and benevolant guard- -
ianahip.
The latest reports coming out of Khartoum fran the battlefronts state that
znvolutionary brigadee have emerged from a violant clash with an Ethiopian
_ attack which they succeeded in containing. The attack wae launched narth
of Keren with the aetablishment of a ne~+ lins of defanse atretching from
the hill area to tha ited Sea a few kilom~tara from the northern haighte
above the city of A,mara.
The 3aviat fleet set out to amash aowe poeitions along the line of defenee
through a compreheneive banbardment vhich on two succeesive occaaiona had
the ob3ective of bringing armored forcee up to the haigHts abave the port ~
- of Gulbub, a small fishing harbor, isolated ae a result of the con~equancee ~
' of var, ~rhich iu 90 kiloaietara noxth of Maa~aaa. i
Sourc~s in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Britrea say tnat Saviet ~
los4e~ in theae two atcampta vere extreme, aince the Soviets ware aurprised f
by a drnaity of fira vhich they had not taken into account.
'Perhap~ it is thia~f~ilure vhich led to a eactical changt aimed at zurning `
tha Sthiopian iavaaion into daninaace of the coaat region ta ord~r to i~o- `
i~te the ravalution~ries from tba outar vorld. At thia point tha ;
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t~012 OI~I~ICIAL USI; Or~LY '
Ethiopinn-5oviet tendencies have agc~umed an especially grave character,
makin~ the Soviet Union ndt a partner in a police action but an active
partner in a real war which is destined ro conCinue. _
- While Arab obaQrvere are keeping their eyes out hopefully for the reaults
_ of the di~aur~ion going on in Khartoum, on initiaCive of Preeident Ja'far -
Numayri, among repreeentativea of the three detachmente of the revolution~
- the war of words is ~till going on among them. Perhapa an expansion of
Che scope of diecusaion by various bodies on true reaponeibility for tnu
military dieaster which has befallen the revolution will be very beneficial
in giving the ravolutionariea help from Arab entitiea in evalueting their
errore~ proceeding from premisea of epecific responeibili.ty.
In this framework~ !1L-WATAN AL-'AEtABY this week is completing the indirecC
- dialogue berween Oeman Saleh 5abbe, preeidenC of the Central Bureau of Che -
~ritrean Liberation ~ronC~ Populer Liberation Forcea, and 'Ali al-5ayyid
'Abdallah~ member of the Pdlitical Bureau of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of ~ritrea (reaponaible for securiCy). Thie is a dialogue which
hae taken place as followe through aeparate interviews with both men: -
Oeman Saleh 5abbe: Thoee Who Traffxcked in Marxist Slogans Sear RaBponai-
bility for the Defeat
/Queation/ Whom would you hold responaible for the fall of the Eritrean
towns~ in particular the Keren baee?
/AneWer/ I hold thoae aho trafficked in Marxiat slogana reaponaib:~, both
in the Revolutionary Council and in the Popular FronC. They are aholl~
reaponeible for enabling Ethiopia to regain the liberated towna. Iz ~he
leader of the Popular Front, Isaias Afevork, had accepted the unity agree-
ment which aas signed in Khartoum ia 1975, and if he had also accepted the
unity plan for the three detachmenta in 1977, Eritrea wauld be an independ-
~nt stete today, becauee, during this period, We enjoyed a number of poe-
itive advantagee, including Ethiopia's military we~kneea and the readineea
_ of the Arab states and a number of African couatries to recognize EriCrea'e
indapendance and support it politic~Ily and militarily. -
The Revolutionary Council also bears the eame extent of reeponsibility be- -
cauae in 19~6 it abrogated the unity agreement etgned With the Popular
Liberation Forcea in 1975.~ Then it abrogated the miliiary coordination
agreement.it had also signed With the Popular Liberation Forces in 1977, `
without any national justification. At tQ?at time ita excuee ass that a
third party~ the Popular Froet, Was atill outaide the framework of this
unity ~nd thus, through thia conduct ic i?eakened,instead of strengthening,
the unf'fic~tionist tenden;y. It then entered into a procaes of maneuver-
- ing with ehe Popular Pront uy declaring a unity agreea~enc between itself
and the Popular Front in October 1477--aone of the stipulations of which
vere c~rried out�-ard the leaders of both orgaaisations became tha�priaon- `
era of their psraaul ~nbitions aith the objactive of caAOpolizing p~+ar
and al~aaating the other party.
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rUK Ut~e Ll:l~?l~ USI; UNLY
Thig is what hQlped Che ~thiopian m~neuvers play a game of exploiting the
~r~trQan r~fte. ~thiopf.~n nou:ces, for inaCance~ portray the council es
the proKrensivu party with which one muet reech an underotanding~ and eome-
time~ they giva thie description to the popular FronC.
5ome foreign countries supporting Ethiopia he?ve helped make this game a
succees, eepecially the Soviet Union and the countriee revolving in ita
- orbit. The 5oviet Union rained down appeals onto the leeders of the de-
tachments Chrough its intermediaries, calling for Che attainment of a p~ace-
ful regolutton through negotiaCion~ Last Berlin and Aden were two funda-
mental poete in thia maneuver. Isaiaa Afework, on his own and through the
_ delegationg repreaenting him, made frequent visite to EaeC Berlin, where
he met the head of the Political Camnittee in rhe berg~ Berhanu Bayeh, in
May 1978. He had met with him in Aden, prior to that, in September 1977,
_ and a third meating with a delegation consiating of four membere of the
Central Comnittee of the Fopular Front, took place in Addia Ababa, in
February of thia year.
_ At the eame time, the Revolutionary Council ie making an effort to seize
an illusory opporCunity and has been vying with Che Popular FronC in pro-
pounding ite Marxiem. It sent ita delegates ro East Berlin three times,
in November 1977 and June 1978, and theae meetings aere crowned by Ahmad
Nasir's visit to Moacow in June of this year, after being acccrmpanied by
the well-known media clamor in Beirut.
For our part, we have been observing evente from an Lritrean nstionaliat
point of view and have been discovering what ie going on between Addie
Ababa and Moacow. It came to our knowledge, through a fraternal Arab atate,
after our delegation returned from Baet Berlin in November 1977, that the
' real Soviet objective behind these appeale was to gain time for Mengistu's
regime under the veil of peaceful appeals, so that it would be in a mili-
tary poaition which Would enable it to pounce on the Eritrean revolution.
For the hietorical record, We have conveyed this infora~ation to officials
of the tWO fronts via certain fraternal Arab countriea, but without tha
leaet response. The Soviet acheme continued as it had been planned. By
a fortunate coincidence, ae obtained the minutes of ineetinge betvaen the
leulera of the tWO organizations in the Revolutionary Council and Popular
Front and a Palestinian leader of Marxist tendencies. These minutes con-
- tained serious information regarding the roles the Revolutionary Counsil
_ was expected to play in order to arrive at a compromise solution of the -
Britrean problem~ euch as a solution represented by a confederation~
which Wculd of neceasity include the liquidation ot the Popular Libarat~on
Forces. The minutes concluded With an opinion by thie leader, who recom-
a~end~l ehat a military blow be atruck concurrant With diplomatic activity,
consideYing ehat to be tha eole meane fc~r attaining a political raaolution
to tbe Hritraan problem.
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_
ron orrrct~~r, usr; orrr,Y
Theee minutes were dated May 197~ ~nd wcre pre~e?~red to the Soviet Union.
They are lengthy minutoe~ coneisting of 180 legal-size pa~;ea. Not much
time elapsed before w~ ~aw Che re~ults of theee con~piraciee gppaaring on
the etage. The Lthiopian inva~ion, becked up by Soviet arma and Cuban
soldiero, tnok pl~ce after they had guargnte~d thar the deeachmenrs of the
Lritrean revolueion would bE: fragmented.
Prepared To Reepond to Any Invitation
/suestion/ You reeponded to the ~ast Germ~na' invitation in May of .l.asc
year, juet as the 1Qadere of the council and the Popular ~ront responded.
How do you ~xplain your participation in negotiaCiona eimilar ta thoBe
ahich took place in Berlin?
/AnsWe~/ We have no touchy fQelings toward eny country which makea efforts
on behalf of creating a peaceful solution to the Lritrean cause~ be that
Eaet Germany or Weat Germany. We are now ready to visit Sest Germany,
Moacow or any other country in the world, if this will help in attainmene
- of our aepirations to national independence and establiahment of a,~ust
peace in the region. Whan our delegation visited Laet Berlin, it expresaed
our organization's viewpoint clearly and frankly and ec~hasized theae two
� fundamental points:
1. We are ~n favor nf negotiating With ~thiopia~ without relinquishing
our legiticoate demand for independence.
2. Negotiation muet take place after the attainment of unity among the
three detachaienta, so that the delegation, snd not one group to the exclu-
sion of another, Will repreaent Eritrea.
The Revolution ~lill Remain Strong
/Queetion/ Hoirever, if agreement on formation of a united delegation to
the negotiationg is reached among ehe detachmenta of the revolution~ will
you agree Go negotiate during thia phase, now that the Sthiopian regime
h4a regained all the 8ritrean tame Which had been liberaCed?
/Ansaer/ From the time it o~rned one rifle, in 1961, the Eritrnan revolu-
tion hao besn atrong, becauee ic has posaeseed total popular aupport. The
regaiaing of one toam or 10 tams will not create a cordition of weaknesa
~ as Ear as the Britrean revolution goea--the Eritr~an countryeide aill re-
~ main a mighty atronghold of the Eritrean revolution, and the to~+na aill
coatinue to be surrounded by the countryside.
Do not forget ttut the Eritrean revolution, in spite of ite many ~+roblems, ~
atill poasaases weapon8 a~xi maa. I can say, without revealing a aacret,
that in ehe put 6 montha of thia year va luve recaived double the artns
we received the paat 2 yeara and we ue coafident that the Sudan, vhich
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I~OIt UI't'ICIAL USL ONi.Y ~
conetitutea e strar.egic heartlan~i of the ~ritrean revolution, will con-
tinu~ Co support the revolution for reaeone of principle, security and
etrategy.
/sueation/ Cir~lea in the ttevolution~ry Council ~ay that they have foughl�
against the Popular Liberntion Force~ in order to prevent Americ~n influ- -
ence from infiltreting the region through th~ Eritrean revolution.
/Angwer/ tJe are not on America's aide ~gainat Itussie or on Rusaia's side
ageingt Americg. However, it ie useful that the world know that rhe two
countriee' poaitinn on Chie erea is governed by the policy of interngtion-
al detente and America's fixed view of preventing ~riCrea'a independence
- in order to preg~rve whge it calls the unity of ehe ~thiopian empire, How-
ever, Che WegCern ~tates ag e whole epprove nf the extensiott of ~Chiopia
along the Ked Sea, as a Chriatian country, in place of the establiahment
of an independent ~ritrean etate linked of necessity to the Arab nation.
If Chere !a a real reason compelling the Revolutionary Council and the Pop-
ular Front to meet with the Pop~lar Liberation I~orcea~ that ia fear of the -
_ Populer Lit~eration Porcea' poaition~ which holda that Britrea muat be
~ linked to the Arab nation. Aa far ae we are concerned thia ia a natural
matter which ia made inevitable by Eritrea's gcographical, hiatorical,
cultural, r~eligioue and security relationship With the Arab nation.
Numayri's Poaition
/sueation/ What will be your poeition regarding anticipated negotiations,
~f you are compelled to deal with the Sthiopian regime and with President
Ja'far Numayri, in his capacity as president of the current 8ession di the
OrganizaCion of African Unity, proceeding fram the Charter on African Unity
which rejects changea in the official African boundaries inherited from the
colonial erae?
/Aneaer/ President Numayri ha8 asaerted to us that he Will not interfere
in the type of solution. Rather, hie fundamental concern ie to bring both
sides to the negotiating table. The type of solution Will depend on the -
~ te8ulta r~tteined by the Eritrean and Ethiopian parties: President Numayri
has aleo pointed out, more than once~ that the Eritrean issue is not an in-
ternal Ethiopian matter. Thie means thac the Eritrean problem dose not _
fall within the framework of what are called iesues of aecegaion. In the
event of negotiations~ ae are ready to reach understanding aith 8thiopian
demanda related to Britre~n outleta to the aea, because Sthiopia, as is !
well known, is a landlocked country which does not posae8s them. The
Britrean party must reach an under~tanding on Bthiopia's need for an outlet
to the sea but in a manner Which ai11. not lead to the losa of Eritrean aov- -
ereignty avar the caaste of Eritrea.
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[~Oit Oi~i~ ICIAt, U5[. ONLY
Interview with 'Ali nl-Sayyid 'Abdallah
/guesCion/ It hne b~nn ob~ezved th~t in the atatemQnt in whi:h you en-
ndunced Che wiChdrawal Erom Keren, you used the expreseion "gCr~?tQgic wiCh-
, drawal~" while you said that you had made a tacticel withdrawal from the .
Maesawg-Asmara road.
~ /Angwer/ The new circumstancea, which aroae from the nature of the atrug-
gle, caused e~e to make a scrategic withdrawal from Keren becauee we do not
intend at the preaent time to attack the enemy's positiona in the town of
Keren~ while our withdrawal from the Messawa-Aamara road ~as a tactical one ~
wherein we were etill carrying out operationa of eurrounding enemy positiona
- on thig rogd.
We are not at preoenC f~cing the army of Che Derg. We are facing the 5oviet
Union, which has put all ita military reaourcea into ehe battle. Soviet
experta are performing direct surveillance of the baCtles underway. Pro- -
ceeding from thie fact, it was necessary, in the face of thia ne~r reality,
to change our military poeitiona and linea while the Ethiopian-Soviet in-
vaeion was atill going on, eince ita object ie to reach the last poaitions
lying under the daminance nf the Popular Front in the Coastal Directorate--
that is, to reach Qarurah, which lies alongside the Sndanese border~ if
poesible. The enemy ie working seriously and ia concentrating hie human
and military forces, for which he has mobili~ed no leae than 120,000 soldiere
supported by hundreda of tenka. .
_ Soviet participation in the Combat
/sueation/ What ia your information ebout 5oviet participation in the
combat?
/Ans~+er/ Soviet participation ia on a wide scale and takes a form Which
gives the iu~raseion that it ia coneidering trying to exterminate the
Sritrean people. Citizens aho have fled from the fighting aere pureued by
MiG aircraft flam by Soviet pilote.
We Are Agaiast Internecin~ iiarfare
/Queetian/ 6ihat ia your ~pinion on the internecine fighting ahich ~tarted
up agaln betwe~n the forcea of the eouncil and the Popular Liberation Forces
during your confrontation With the army of the DergZ
/Ma~rer0 iie basicall~l COtidpmtl all internecine fighting ahich mighr arise
bet~+een Eritreana. He are firmly convinced that eecondary contradictions
cannot be solved by force of arou.
Our Heeting with the Derg in Barlin
,/gueation/ There are people who balieve that the contacta you made pravi-
- ow ly vith the Derg in Berlin, Adan and Beirut l~ave also hsd a nagativa
�ff~ce ud have also shnt you off fraa a vision of tha future.
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ru~c u~~~N'lUlAL USL oNLY
/Answer/ WhQn wu reeponded Ca Che requeet for negotiations, we did not go
to negotiat~ wiCh the Derg. During our meeting with representutivea of
~aet Germany and the Derg in Berlin, we were asked ~bout our view regard-
ing a eolution C~ the Lritrean q~egtion and we emphaaized one thing;
Firet~ Che ~thiopien regitne must recognize the leaderahf,p, which wae formed
- by us and the RQVOlutionary Cnuncil as a resulC of tha OcCober agreement, -
ae the aole legitimate representative of the Eritrean people. The Derg
wqs Chen n~king ita first atCack~ at Che vcry time iC was raiaing the slogan
of a peaceful reeolution to Che iesue. Through our inaiatence thgt the -
Derg'e slogan w~a a maneuyer and noChic~g more, we went Co Berlin to reveal
thia fact. What we leaxned from the ~thiopian delegation was that it was
_ impoesible for it to ecc~pt any solution which was noC within the frames~ork
uf the nine poinCa 3t hgd previously announcecl.
~ We Do Not Recognize Sabbe's Group -
/QueaCion/ It ie well known that the Sudaneee authoritiea have aent the
three parties an invitation to meet at one table in Khartoum. What ie
- your pasition on meeting with Oaman Saleh Sabbe? -
- /Ana~rer/ We were noC informed by the Sudanese auChoritiea of the principle
that the meeting Would be held between the three detachmenta of the revolu-
tion. For our part, as ie well known to everyone, we do not recognize the
third party, ~hich consiate of Sabbe~s group. Our underatanding ie that
the Sudanec~ authorities' invitation wae for a meeting betwecn the two or-
ganizations. In epite of ~hat, we have agreed that the meeting ahould take
place at ite echeduled time.
, We Will Never Negotiate fran a Poeition of Weakneae
~
/sueetion/ Bxtenaive African and international contacts are underway to
seart the negotiation in order to arrive at a peaceful resolution of the
Sritrean issue. What ie your poeition?
/Mewer/ We are not ready to negotiate from a poeition of weaknesa. At
preeent we are arranging our circumetances and once more reorganizing our
army. We are defining our methods of action, and what ie harmcnioue with
the new stage. Our struggle aill be a long one and ae ue eaib~rking on a
- long-range people's War. However, ae are fully confident of the inevita-
bility of our victoryy no a~tter ha+a the preasures on the revolution might
increase, and no matter ho~ it might be exposed to attack by foreign forcaa.
COPYRIGNT: Paris A].-Watan A1-Arabi 1978 ?
11887
CSO: 4402 .
i
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rOK OrF'tCIAL U5L ONLY
G11ANA
I3ItI ~ C5
~ }IYURO~LCCTRIC PItOJ~CT CO5T UY--The Kpong hydroelectric pro3ect, which
initially was to cost 230 millinn cedis (on the basis of ehe price of
materinle in 19~7) will, because of wor~d inflation and the devaluation
of Che local currency, finally amount to 80fie 570 million cedis. That
is what Che director of the pro~ecC, Mr. M. E. A. Mensah, announced at
" th,s beginning of December, pointing out neverCheless, that work was
progessing nom~ally, according to schedule, and that completion was
still planned for the month of May 1981. At present, between 10 and 15
~ percenC of the work has been completed. [Excerpt) [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ~T MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Dec 78 p 3506] 8956
BULGARIAN TiZADE bELEGATIAN--The delegation consisting of two members of
_ Che Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Bulgnria, headed by its direct~r, -
Mr S. T. Staner, accomp~nied by Madame Maria Petrunova, who had come to -
tour West Africa (Ghana, Togo, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Benin) was in
Accra at the beginning of December and signed a trade agreement with
the Ghanian chamber. Mr Staner invited Ghana to participate in the
next Plodiv fair (3-10 September 1979) and hoped at least that the
. Ghanian commissioner of Commerce and Industry would attend. [Text]
(Paris MARCHE3 TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Dec 78 p 350~] 8956 -
REPLACE~NT OF DISEASED TREES--An official of the Ghanian [Commission) for
cocoa sffairs recently revealed that 37 million trees had been found to
be infected with swollen shoot and wou7..i have to be destroyed and replaced
� by hybrid varieties having an early a+d high yield. The official,
Mr S. M. K. Adu, atated that 90 percent of the diseased trees were located
in the Orientale region. He pointed out, moreover, that since 1976,
27 million treea had alreudy been destroyed and replaced. (Text] [Paris
MAItCHES TttOPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Dec 78 p 3506] 8956
CSO: 4400
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CUINEA
CONAKftY, CUINEANS SURVEYED ~ PARADOXFS ppINTED OUT
- Paris JEUNE AI~'RIQUE in French No 937, 20 Dec 78 pp 24, 26, 27
[Article by Mohamed Selhami]
- [Excerpts~ The UTA [Air Trnnsportation Union] DC 8 begins its descent toward .
the airport. We are flying low over Cuinea on this sunny day, 30 November.
The rainy season has ended. Through the window we can gaze at the variety of
the landscape dom3.nated by the gre~nish savanna. The ground is still soaked.
_ ~iere and there, grayish patches appear. We are told they are lodes of iron-
bearing ores.
So, here we s~re in Conakry.
The exuberance af nature goes hand in hand with the diversity of the popula-
tion. It is todag's Cuanea which does not differ from the old Guinea. Life
has not ~changed either. Nothing betrays the effect of the police world
which may be found a few kilometers f~arther in Dakar, Abidjan or Freetown.
Here, the people are still living at the rhythm of their ancestors: hunters,
fishermen, barterers and dancers. Politics is foreign to them despite the
claims t4 the contrary o#' a few intellectuals. The Guinean's enemy is neither I-
'the Frenchraan, the American or, even less, the Ivorian or Senegalese. The ~
enemy is the boWl of ricQ and fish which has becane difficult to earn. Yet~
~ricultural potentialities are n~erous, so fertile is the land.
The Conakry market offers a multitude of vegetables and frui~s spread over ~
- rickety stands. It is too bad that most of these produces are so '
one kilogram of tomatoes costs more than 400 si1 s 1 si1 ~ensive: ;
we latow that the av~r e y~ Y= 12.5 CFA). When ~
aB wage bareZy exceeds 2,000 silys, ~r~e can understand ~
. why the bowl:of rice and fish is so coveted. As for meat, unlike what is ~
being said; there is saae~in Guiaea but the price is prohibitive.
No trace of modern~ty in Conakry. Yet it . ~
grows, poor as ft is, mud houses
are:sproutinq like'mushrooms-due td the~rural ~odu~ and the birth rate which ~
. is.:close t4:50 per;1,Q00. "The population.which numbered 300,000 inhabitants ~
t b in:1976 now.exceeds SOO,OOq, ~ ~
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Tlircc to t'out� familics 7.ive in one housc. Lacli pay a mont}ily rent of 1,OU0 -
Silyy. ThouyAnd~ of childrer, swarn~ the streets, Uarely r.lotl~ed and bare- `
' footcd. 5omc go to school but� do not look like school children. Oth~rs, a =
littlc o:l.der, go to thc Po:lytechnicu] lnsti.tute, but their Icnowledge leaves
much to bc desired. Othcrs sti1~. bclong to the militia. T}ieir rifle slung
over the yltouldcr, they cheerfully stroll through the town on tlie look~~it for
anti-revolutionuries or a tourist trying to take pictures (it is forbidden to
take pictures in Conakry).
The soldiers' and policemen's good nature comes as a surprise. Seeing them
_ like that, they appear incapable of using their tremendous power. Yet they
do it so scr~u.l.ously tl~t they spread terror through the population. Arn?y and
police are the undisputed musters of the country. Ttiey receive their orders
~ directly from the chief of state .
Ahmed Sekou Toure is much esteemed by tl~e Cuineans. All those we questioned
about him showered him with praises.
The "Great Sily~~ is both revered and feared. His specches appear in school
and university programs. His picture, spontaneously drawn by young volunteer
- artists, can be found in every street corner.
The Guinea we visited from Conakry to Kankan is socially poor, to be sure, but
rich in heart. It is in a developing stage, though the Monrovia Summit of
Marct~ 1978 may have already begun the process. The Guineans are delighted.
Without rejecting their past policy, they talk about the future with, occa-
sionally, undue optimism. '~We will get rich rapidly and we will be able to
deal with the rest of the world as equals."
Valery Ciscard d'Estaing's visit to Conakry is impatiently expected. '~We
pref.er the French to the Sovi~ts. The latter w~re not useful at all. You
- see the state of our country and the ability af our cadres. Everything leaves
to be desired. Their influence was useless, fortunately, even ideologically.
Paradoxically, those who were trained in Moscow fight Marxism the most
vehemently and preach overture toward the West: "Maybe we will see a liberal-
ization of the regime in the near future." They believe in this very deeply.
Mnny nr+e those who wish for the return of exiled opponents: ~~The brain drain -
was vr.ry detrimental to us." Do those opponents not rurz the risk of encounter-
_ in~G thr. s~une fate as Diallo Telli and his companions? No answer. Everybody
knows rrh~t happened, but nobody talks about it. At this point in the conver- -
- sation, terror settles i~, even among the favored.
Cuinea i~ a country of paradoxes: abundant Health, but too evident a poverty;
profes~ed freedom, but impossible to exercise; a simple, modest and intelligent
chic~' o#' state, but his actions are often deplorable; Marxist oriented
theories, but an Islam very much alive. With regard to religion, Conakry wi.l.l
soon have a great mosque being built by the Moroccans and financed by the
~ Saoudi (25 million dollars).
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Since the early days of December, Conakry has been preparing feverishly ~o
~rcet the I'rench presidcnt. ~xtensi.ve work is being done to ~he I'idel Castro
Hi~hwny as we1.l ~s thc Avr.nue of thc Independence which leads to the presi-
d~nt i l~ I ptil ace , Cui.neans arc convi.need that things wil'1 change in their
country. Their on:l.y f'eur comes from tt~e moodiness of Sekou Toure whose
reversal s ure f~unous .
One of the latest: ~fter having been received wai^m1.y for 5 days, we were
suddenly expelled by order of the president. The policemen's explanation
remains difficult to understand: ~~Unfortunately for us, you are Moroccans."
How~ever, what little time we spent in tl~e country enabled us to revise many
- of our ideas on Guinea. Despite the shocking n~ture of the official policy
_ in Guinea, there are the Cuineans and that is what counts the most. ~
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afri,~ue GRUPJIA 1979
685? �
CSO: q400
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= HOlt OI~I'ICLAL USE ONLY
~ culrr~n =
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS REVIEWED FOR CURRII~iCY RECOVERY
Paris JEUNE AFRTQUE in French No 937, 20 Dec ?8 p 15
- [Article by Sory Serinde Diallo: "Will Guinea Reenter. the Franc Zone?
(J~UNE AFRIQUE answers question submitted by Jerome Kouacou)"J -
_ [Text] In March 1960, Cuinea Mrithdrew from the fra.nc zone. It created an
issuing institute, the Bank of the Republic of Guinea (BRG) to replace the
' local BCEAO (Central Bank of the West African States) agency, and a national
currency, the Guinsan franc (FG) equal to a CFA franc, but inconvertible.
The reform was followed up in June 1961 and January 1962 with the nationaliza-
= tion of banks and insurances. In the mind of the Guinean leaders, this would
give them mastery over monetary policy and credit and, consequently, over
economic policy as well. _
Due to both the officials' inexper.ience and political i,~terferences, BRG
managenent soon brought on inflation and a lack of interest in the new cur-
. rency. In March 1963, to avoid disaster, the government withdrew the bills
in circulation and replaced them with new ones. No economic measures having
been taken, the slump persisted and inflation worsened. The monetary mass
grew in proportions unrelated to ~he level of economic development.
_ Consequently, another reform was effected in October 1972, involving the cre-
, ation of a new currency, the sily (1 sily = 10 FG = 10 CFA francs). It was
- no more successful than the previous refoims.
Today, the sily is even being shunned by th~e government which has been collect- -
. ing taxes in products (rice, corn, fonio) sine~e 1975, part of which goes to
pay ~overnment employees and public enterprises. Tn 1976, the government
stopped~issuin~ bills and withdrew a large number of them from circu~ation,
for burning.
The cure was worse than the sickness; it led to such a shortage of silys that,
~ now, Cuineans buy with CFA ~rancs which they acquire in neighborhood countries
(Ivory Coast, Sene,gal), a fairly easy matt~r since the opening of the borders. -
Paradoxically, the authorities shut their eyes, with the result that, in March
19?S, one CFA frana was being exchanged on the black market for 50 silys.
, , 21
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I~Uk Ul~l~ [Cl~l, 1J51: c1HLY
- Th i y i;; thc ;3 i tuctt i o~~ wh i~~ h i 5 5upposc~d t:o bc s tabi I i zed by the new rc t'orm
- ;??~?,~~~?,~,~~i t,y rrr.~ident Sekou Tourc last Octub~r. The called~for meayures
havc not yet becr~ d~f'ined, but threc ychemes arc pa5sihl.c. The firyt would
aimply ent,iil ~~h~inRin~; thc cw~r~~ncy wli.i.le maintaining thc~ autonomous zone and
i n~~o~~vcrt i b i l ity af' thc currr.ncy ;ind, eventua.l ly, adopting it new parity, 1 t
W~,~~i,i t~~, thr, rcen;~ctment of p~ist rcf'orm~ whiCh Scem to have been censured by
experiencc. Second ~ol.ution: ~i pure nnd simplc, but progress.ive, reintegra-
tiur~ ir~ro tl~c f'ranc zonc, witli ad}~cra?ice to UMOA (West African Mdnetary Union)
~in~i ,idmtsyion to I~;CAO. The Sily woul~l be replaced by the CF'A franc and E3~2C
wou_ld once ~~~ain b~come E3C~:A0 ~~gency. In the present state of the Cuinean
economy, members of the f'ranc zone t,roul~i be unlikely to accept thi~ solution,
even if' Con~~kr,y wcre to request it.
The third and, sc~~min~;ly, more probnUle ycheme is as follows: Guinea, like
Ma1i, would Iceep its currency and iysuing institute, but it would nevertheless
t�c intc~;rute t}tc franc zonc . I ts currency would then be convertible and guar--
antced by the I~'rench Treasury where Cufnea would have an operating account at
its disposal. (Operating 1iCCOU1IC: nn ~tccount opcned by the Crench Trcasury
in bchalf of issuing instiCutes of states which are mer,,bers of the franc zone,
for depositin~ funcis (foreign currency) acquired outside their issuing zone.
in exchange, the I~rench Treasury holds at the disposal. of those institutes
tl~e funds necessary to settle their accounts in francs and foreign currency.
In its role as banker~ the Treasury is not without imposing certain conditions
~~nd restrictions.) However, Con~kry would have to pay the price of such a
solution. Among other things, it would have to reorganize the management of
public enterprises showing a deficit, by reducing the number of employees and
even st~utting some of them down. French representatives Mtould have to sit on
the board of directors of BRC.
- This aould present a problem more political than technical: som~ could see it
_ as a challenge to the attainments of the revolution and a revenge of neo-
colonialism 20 years after the Na of 28 September 1958. �
COPYRIGHf: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
GEi57 _
C50: 4400
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M11bAGA5CAIt
- R~pOEtT INbICAT~5 IMpi~OV~U F'RODUCTION, TItAb~ IN 1977
Upward '~rend Noted
pari~ MARCllE5 TROI'ICAUX ~T M~bI'T~~RAN~ENS in ~rench 8 bec 78 pp 3389-90
(Text) In itg report on the year 1977, the "Banky ~ampandrosoana Ny Varotra
(~~'V)" [tranalation gnd expansion unkr~oWn) takes a sweeping overview of the
Mal~g~sy economy in 1977, and note~ Che following: improvement in agri-
cultur~l producCion, steadier industrinl production in certain sectors; gen-
erally apeaking, e higher 1eve1 of cot~nercial activity, particularly during
the second ltielf di the yeat 1977, and more particularly in the area of
foreign tr~de~ and a cnntinued eloWdown in the inflationbry process. _
- Productions
Agricultural production--Fevorable weather conditions pr~vailed in 1977,
Which alloa~d ~gricultural production (to ~ha.?j a more satiefactory level
than ehe previoug y~ar. That improvement affected, among othera, rice,
coffee, cloves, peanuts and "cape pegs" (aimilar to lima beansj.
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1~Uit c)t~ t~ tC t ~L tlSl: t1Nt,Y
ANrtcultural I'roductton (in Tons)
Kicc: 1976 19~7 (1)
production 2,042,500 2~~00,000
M.~rketin~ 308,000 26~,000
Coffee 50,000 70,000
- Ceanuts:
prnduction 37,400 40,000
Marketing 17,000 20,000
CotCongeed 34,723 3y,000
_ Clove~ 10,600 13,000
"Cape peag" 11,220 13,155
Tobacco 4,030 3,326
pepper 3,500 3,000
Vanillt? 866 ~SO
5ig~1 1g,552 18,778 -
5ugar cane 1,0~3,428 1~033,634
(1) Temporary figures
Rice--itice production in 1977 was more favorgble than in 1976 (a 7.7 percent
incrp~ge). However, the volume of commercial rica definitely dropped and
only rexched 86 percent of thp performance atCatned in 1976, hence the heed
for new import~.
Coff~e--In contrast to the 1976-19~~7 harvest, coffee production improved
notieeably and reached e vnlume of 70~000 tons in 1977 (a 40 percent in-
creaee over 1976). However~ becau~e of insufficient production during the
previo~s year and b~cxuse df a certain slowdown in sales, the volume of
coffee exports was only of 47,900 tons, Which resulted in an increase in
inventory amounting to 31,000 tons. 5ti11 that carryover was entirely sold .
on foreign market~ during the first months of 1978.
Cloves--The 1977/78 crop givps reasons to hope for a clove productinn of up
to 13,000 Cons, or a 22 percent iacre~s~ over 1916. However, in 1977, ex-
ports regieCered a noticeable decrease, as they totaled only 3,500 tons. ~
Although therc Were major shipments during the monthg of November and Decem-
ber, inventory by the end of the year Was definitely inflated in comparieon
to previou~ yearc~. That situation was purposely created as a reault of the ~
busin~ss leaders~ palicy to try and raiBe the export prices.
Vnnilln--In the fece of a continuing drop in produciton~ as the 1977 output ~
regched only 63 p~rcent of that of 1976, which aas elready loWer, +we find
a steady detmnd on the foreign market. Bxporte totaled 1,800 toas in 1.977, ~
as opposed to ~,200 tone in 1976. Also, prices have been rising ateadily ~
and reached $23.- per kilo in 1977.
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rott ot~ t~ rc t nt, i~sH: oN~Y
CuLCot~--'Phc~ riKC~ n~~led iti 1~176 li~y cor~tit~urd, and 19~7 production reached a ~
re~ord itgur~ of ~7,00(l tony (a 6 pc~rcent increase).
5u~ar cane-~-Production ha~ dropped further. ilowever, the nmount of sugar
= obtained hag increaged, due to better processin~ and to ~ hi~her sugar ~on--
tent in th~ cane.
~
~ I'epper--No cnnclusive golution h~s been found to tt~e damage cauged by the
di~en~e of the pepper tree in the North. 'That explains the continuous drop
in prddu~tion. production for the 1977-1978 year should not be higher than
- 3,000 ton~ (a 14.~ percent decline).
peanuts--i'roduction and tngrketing of peanuts in 1977 }~ave reached a more
y~tisEactory level than that recorded in previous ye~rb.
'Cob~c~o--'Tobacco productton has dropped sh~rply and ig only 82 percent of
tl~e 19~6 annual production. This wa~ recorded particularly in tt~e area of
family production.
Indu~trtal and mining production--On the whole, industrinl production shows
noticeable improvement in relation to the previous year, which was char-
n~terized by a cerCain gtagnation. On the other hand~ mining activities have
regresg~o sharply, particularly where chromiCe ig concerned. We note a 22
percent drop in production and 45 percent drop in marketing. _
The fnllowing table bring~ ouC the v~rying evolution in a certain number of
areae in 1976 and 1977 (in ton~ unless otherwise indicated):
1976 19~7
Cooking oil 5,800 6,300
5ugar 107,300 109,400
Beer (in hl) 257,000 273,500
= Cotcon goods (in 1,000 m) 78,~00
Chramite:
Produccion 211,426 164,789
Marketing 217,837 119,069
Cr~phi[e:
Production 17,402 15,726
Marketing 16,473 16,072
Mica:
Productioa S1 1,49$
Marketing 931 1,660 -
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i~uit ~~i~ i~ i r, i ni, usi~; t1NI.Y
Commcrcial Activity
nomestic Trade--Contrary to what wa~ noted earlier, the level of trade activ-
ity 1i~:~ improved ~reatly. Indeed, the fir~t semester's seayonal slowdown
w~z3 ic~~w m~rkc~d and r~rovery w~y more definite during the se~ottd half of
1~1y.
'Chat ~ituatinn is due~ ~mong other factors, to the rise itt purchasing power
r~HUlting from the increase in agricultural productiott and in the rise of
s~le prices at the producer level. The prosperity of company treasuries,
nlre~dy noted in previous years, was repeated in 1977 and contributed to
_ tt~e tr~de improvement. AC the same time we witnessed a decrease in problema
of paymentg.
Alehn~gh the volum~ oE accounes receivable was in the SArt1e range ag in 1976
, witt~ respect to securitiey, it was definitely on the deCline with respect Co
Checke.
~oreign Trade--That sector was marked in 1977 by a record level in the volume
of import ~nd export trade, with a 33 percent increase compared to the year
1976.
Tt~e following table shows the 19~7 foreign trade situation comp~red to 1976
(in millions of Malagasy francs):
1976 1977
~xports (~OB) 65,368.7 85,976.5
Iroports 64,601.8 g7,9Ci7,7
Bnlance + 766.9 -1,986.2
Cover rate (percentage) 101,2 97~7
In 1977 imports show e 36.2 percent rise compared to 1976. This is partly
due to a very lerge carryover of the 1976 import program to 1977, having to
~u, among other factora, with tranaportation equipment and parts. Also,
at the beginning of the second aemester, ~ certain liberalization in granting
licenseg was observed.
_ Exports shoc~ a noticeable increase, more than 31.5 percent over 1976. 1'hat
increase in export revenue is due in part to the rise in export prices of
coffee and vanilla, although there Was a period when the entire production
of cloves and coffee was not being exported, taking into account the above
mentioned facts.
In short, we observe a slight impairment in the trade balance, compared to
1976: from a surplus of 766.9 miltion malagasy francs, We drop to a deficit
of 2,986.2 million. The cover ratio of imports by exports was 97.7 percent
in 1977, compared to 101.2 percent in 1976.
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- t~Uk O1~1~ 1(:lAt. U51. (1NLY
l'rices--The tendenc:y for the upward gpiral to ylow down, as noticed ~ince
1915, ti~s ~ontittued, Altt~ough the tradttional~type con5umer price index wae
on thc ri~e in 1976, in 1977, on the contrary, it became steady during the
fir~t qu~rCer, thet~ ingg~d until 5c~ptember. In spite of ~harp riaes towards
the end of tl~e year, the avc~ra~e index only roqe by 3.1 percent, n~ oppo~ed
to 5 percent in 1g7b.
The modern-type consumer price index st~adily incre~sed throughout the year,
but at a lower rate than in 1976. The increase was of g percent ns opposed
to 9.1 percenC in 1976.
_ 1979 Budgee
- P~ris MAttCN~5 TItOpICAUX ~T M~bIT~EtItAN~~N5 in ~'rettch 15 bec 78 p 3451
[Textj The finance bi11 of the UetnoCratic Republic of Madagascar for the
1979 fiscal year hinges Che "investments to the limit" progrgm advocated by
pre~id~nt Itatsiraka, Tt~~e proposed budget, adopted on 8 Uecember by the -
People's Nationel Assembly, sets at 216.3 billion Mul~gasy francs the amouttt
_ of national assetg ~nd liabilitieg for 1979, whereas in 1978 there was an
initial bud~et of 157.5 billion corrected to 179.7 billion during Che course
. nf :he year.
Tlte 1979 budget appears as shown on the following table (in billions of
Mnlegasy francs):
Revenue Expenditures
F'irst section (g~neral budget,
plus additions):
1. General budget 119.1 163.7 -
a) Operation 119.1 106.9
~ b) Investments 56.8
2. Related budgets 9.5 9.5
a) Operation g~s g~g
b) Investments p~7
- Total of First Section 128.6 173.2
5ectinn II (treasury operations):
Operations of special treasury
a~counts 25.2 40.6 _
- Section III (capital operations of
ti~E~ national debt)
a) Division of foreign and domestic
loaas ~ 38.3 2.5
b) liquid assets to be awbilized 24.2
Total of Section III 62.5 2.5
Grand 2ota1 216.3 216.3
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I~OIt c)I~1~ [CtAL 1J51: ONi.Y
One fe~iture of this budget is the stabilization of operational expenses
_ (lOG,9 billion) and the investment effdrt to be made by the National ~und
for ~connmic Uevelopment (~NDC), for which 56.8 billion ig nllocated. The `
purpo~e ie ingurin~ tl~gt the 1979/1980 I~lan is launched under favorable conW
diCions.
- Itt the roatter of receipts, the operntional budget (119.1 billiott) is ftnan ced
by tax revenue in the ~mount of 109.1 billion and "other revenue" in the
amount o~ 10 billion.
According to the pregent~tion report, this evaluaeion, based on the current
_ tax ~:onditions, congiderg the following factors:
--modificaCion of the import quota ~eruceure, while respecting the volume
required by the equipment ag dictated by development imperatives, snd also -
filling the need for congumer goodg due to Che tnsufficiency resulting from
_ combinations of circumgtanceg, particularly last year's drought;
--a ~elective review of the customs duties (import tax) without affecting
those goods known as necessities of life;
--reconsiderntion of the duties levied on monopoly products (flour, beer,
tobacco, imported beverages), end
--efEccts of the economic expanaion eapected to result from Che "investments
to the limit" programmed within the framework of the Plan.
A; Co capital operations, Chey will be backed easentially by loans (38.3 ~
billion projected) and by mnbili2ing liquid assets (24.2 billion).
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1978
119 36 -
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I~UIt UI~ i~ IC I/11, U;;I. tINI,Y
MAUAGA5CAit
BltI~~5
U~~~N5E, OTH~R MINI5TItI~S' $UbG~T5 INCIt~5~U--Antananarivo, 15 J~n (It~U'1'~~)--
Milit~ry allocaCions in the Malagasy bud~et for 1979 h~ve been increased by
b billion C~A francs over 1978 to ~ total of almost 17 billion Malagaey
francs [~MG]. This increase in the allocations was widely expected follow-
ing the "Chreat of foreign invasion" reported by the authorities in 19)8~
Among the ministries whose budgetg were also cnnsiderably increased are:
the MinisCry of Secondary and $asic ~ducarion, whose allocation of FMG
18,$14,858,000--as oppoaed to 17,001,199,00(1 itt 1978--was the largest,
followed by Che Ministry of National befense; the Ministry of Publie Heslth
with fiMC~ 9.2 billion, as opposed to 8.192 billion in 1978; the Miniatry of -
Higher Education [ua received) and Scientific Research with F'MG 7,010,500,000,
ae opposed to 5,711,240,000 in 1978; the MiniaCry of Rural Development and
Agricultural Reforn~ with FMG 7,500,500,000, as opposed to 7,108~000,000 in
1978; the MiniaCry of Finance nnd Planning with ~'MG 7,247,475,000, as
opposed to a previous 5.4 billion. The new finance law provides for another
increase in import duties on various typea of inerchandise. [Text] [London
REUTER in ~rench 1658 GMT 15 Jan 79 PA] _
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I~Ult ttf~t'tCIAt, U;;I; clNt,Y
EtHOD~5IA
- NKOMO T~LL5 WHY N~ M~T WI'TH SMITH
Paris AFEtIQUE-ASI~ in ~rench 11-24 Dec 78 pp 37-38
/InC~rview ~+ith Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU and co-preeident of the Pa-
tridtic ~ront, by ,1,hne i3er~;c~ro1. nc~ee ~~nd plnce of interview noe p,iven. J ~
~/TexC~ /Question% In the month of August 1978 you accepted an offer to meet
eecretely with Ian Smith. In view of what that persan is and what you repre-
gent, that might ~ppear aurprising. What caused you to mgke that gesture?
/Answer/ I will tell you. After the Salisbury Agreement, which aet up the
would-be "multiracial ~overnment," we reaolved to step up the armed struggle.
The Ian Smith regime reaponded to that brutally. Smith knew the atructurea -
of our organization and many of its members. A large number of key elements
in our movement (leadera of sector committeea, zone committees, province com--
- mittees and even some members of the Central Committee) were killed. That
happened before the affair of the "Viscount" which we brought down and ahose
civilian paseengers we were accused of killing, but th~ massacrea became even
worse after the proclamation of martial law.
_ In fact. Smith was actinR that Way not because he thought he could get away
with it but becauae he was certain that he would have to lesve.
When people underatood that they beRan to come to see me. All kinds of peo-
ple: Africsn farmers, bueinesamen (including a fev whttes), miasionariea
(Catholic and Protestant), peaeanta and Workera. I met them in Lusaka and
some_of them even in London. They told me: "Smith is carrqing out those mes- ~
eacres because he kno~s he has loat. He no longer has a government. So it's
up to you to do something." Chirau and Ndiweni alao came to tell ae the eame ;
thinR, but I don't knoa ahether Smith knes~r it or not. ' ~
~
~
' It is hard for a~ to give advice to those people. It vould fir8t of all have ~
- been necessary that they reaign fran that ao-called "muitiracial government." ~
: I could not trust them but I saw through them very easily: theq Were afraid;
they fe1C that they were surtounded by our young combatante and that theq
~ were looking for a aay to eacape their fate.
.y=~ _ .
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t~ott or~trtnt, u5~. otvt.Y
Theti out~ viaa pr�c~ici~nt ~ Jo~iah C11111~111bI10~ wt~o ~~~as yti11 iri
the interidr oi' the country, let tne know thcxt Iart Smittt war~ted _
to sec mc. I aslced why~ and Josiah replied thc~t ~xmon~; Smitlt~s
i'ollower~ the word ~.~as that he ~~~s i'inished a~td wanted to wind
thin~;'S up .
To me Smith is a dis~,vstin~ pcrsr:n, but ~ thou~ht that it was
impnrtar~t for mc to lcnow ~just wh~t he w~nted to see m~e about.
So I a~reed to meet him, but T toolt my precautions . S~zsked
the Ni~;erian ltead of stAte, Gen`ercal Obasan~jo, to de~ignate a
~truatwc~rthy person to be preser~t ~at my meet~.n~ with Smith ~xnd
to be~r witness to ~11 that would tz�anspire there.
Oh~son~jo choee G~arbe~ tt former feder~l commisstoner for Forei~,rn
Afi'airg; ond thQ ma~tin~; tnnk placc in L~~;os .
~an Smith is a wily politiciAn. l{e told me thAt Atuzorawa, Chi-
rau ~nd 5ithole ~oere incompetent, and then ~aic~: "I w~nt to
~;et c~ut." Then he aslced me wh~t ~ eould do. I replied th~t I
- wtts not the only one td Ue consultied on that, that I wanted to
- he~r wht~t he had to say; but that I could decide nothing with-
out Robert Mu~abe.
"I thou~ht tti~1, you wanted to talk to me about tt~e movement for -
wt~ich I alone att~ responaible--zAPU," I told him. "But what you
now reveal, about the posaibility of your departure~ concerna
the entire Patriotic Front nnd the people of zimbabwe." Smith _
3nsiated tht~t w~ continue thQ discussion anyway, but he ulti-
mataly accepted my proposal to meet with him a second time to-
ge ttier witli 2tobert Mu~;ebe .
[Question] But why did you keep this meeting secret?
[Angwer] Nhat mattered was thet Mu~;abe azd I aee Smith~ after -
all, and force him into full capitulatfon.
Even if he refused, we could come out of thia interview ahead.
~1e could announce to ~he whole world th~t Smith had come to us
aithout even informing the "internal solution" advocatea, and
thfs newa would sow dissension amon~ his foZlowers.
I said to Mu~;ebet "We~ve got Smith where we want him. And even
if he refursee to yield, we will blow his ~multireciel govern-
mc~nt~ to amithereens."
[Qu~g~ian] Would ~ multipar~ite conference have the oppogite
e Cfac t?
, [Arisr?er] Yea~ I~saw this dan~er. ile aould have moved toaard a
- Namibi