JPRS ID: 8277 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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i3 FE6RUARY i979 CFOUO 2179~ i OF i

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,7PR5 L/8277
13 I'ebruary 19 79
� ~ ~
�
,
~
_ TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
CFOUO 2/79)
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Il1ULI0Gf2A{'HIC DAYA L ttrp~rt No, 2 keripient'~ AccraFion \o,
SN~E:T Jriis 8'l, 77
- 4~ I ii'I~~ `~ul~i i~~ - 5, fleport
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'I'EtAN5 [1\'1' i(lNS ON NGr\!Z F:.A5'~' ~\Nn NOft l'It ~~~'a r.CA, (~'OUO 2/79 ) ].3 t"~bruaz�y 19 79
6,
7~ Authut(~) 8. 1'ctforming (hy,~niz~~tinn ltep~,
No. ,
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- Covered
ne ubove
~ 14~ `
1S. 5upplement~ry Notea
- 16. Ab.uncc~ _
T'}~e sc~rial report contatns information on socio-economic, governm~nt, political,
and technicnl developments in the countries of the Near East and Nortti Af.rica.
17~ Kcy R'ocds nnd Document A~aly~i~. 17a. Descsiptors
Political. Scicnce Inter-Arab Affairs Libya SulCanate
, Soci.ology X Nor~h African l~iauritania of Oman
Economics Affairs X Morocco Syria
_ Cul~ure (Social 5ciences) AE~;hanisc:an People's Demo- X Tunisia
Ethnolo~;y X Algeria cratic Republic X United Arab
_ Ceo~rapt~y Bahrain of Yem~~n Emirates
Tecf~nological Fgypt Persian Gulf X Western
Military Scie~ces ~Irun Area Sahara
Iraq Qatar Yemen elrab
17b. Idcncifiecs'Upen�E.nded Terms ISY'8e1 Saudi Arabia P,epublie
Jordan Spanish North
Kuwait Africa
Lebanon Sudan
t~~. c:~snn ~~r~a/c~o~~, Sb, SC, SK, 15
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~7PRS L/a277 _
13 February 1.9 79
- TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 2/79)
CONTEVTS PAGE -
NOItTH AI~RICAN AI~FAZRS
Pollsario Claicng Moroccu Caused Spanish F~&hermen's Death
- (CAMBIO lb, 31 Aec 78) 1
ALCL:KIA -
Political. Situation, Pos~ible Succession to Iioumediene
Annlyzed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARA13I, 4�-10 Jan 79) 5
If2AN
Shah's Downfall Laid ro Corru~~tion of Officials "
(Lutz ~indernagel; ~TEI:N, 17 Dec 78) 17
MOROCCO ~
King's Actions on Saharan Issue Denounced
� (Hassen Zenati; AI~RIQUE-ASIC, 25 Dec 78-
7 Jan 79) 22
Report on Stormy Third USFP Congress
(Mousleh Ali; AFRIQUE-A..SIE, 25 Dec 78-
7 Jan 79) 27
Austerity Measures Mean Difficult Two Years Ahead
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Jan 79) 31
TUNISIA
Period of Some Uncerta~,nty Foxeseen for Tunisia
(TlIE MTDDLI: CAST, .Jan 79),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, .
33
Export Outlets, Social Stability Closely L~nked
(THE MIDDLE EAST, .fan 79) 36
- a' [ I I I - NE ~ A - 121 FOUO ]
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~ CONTEN'PS (Con~inued) pnge
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Shaykh of 5har3ah CoanenCs orr Arab ~roblens
(Stuiykh Sultan ibn Muha~ad al-Qasimi Interviev;
' AL-WATAN ~1Ir'ARABT, 7-13 Dec 78)w 41 ~
WESTERN SAHARA ~
Polisario Secretary General Notes Saharan Peace Prospects
(TEiE MIDDLE EAST, Jan 79) 48
Polisario Off icial Says Only Morocco Wants Saharan War
(CAMB~O 16, 10 Dec 78) 52
= Organization of Polisario Camps
(TfiE MIDDLE EAST, Jan 79) 55
Brief s
Spanish Fishing Boat Attacked 57
-b- -
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1 NOR~H AI~'RICAN AI'1'AIK5
POLISARIO CL~IMS MOROCCO CAUSED 3PANI9H FISH~RMEN'S AEATEi
Madrid CAMBTO 16 in Spanieh 31 Dec 78 pp 37_3g '
ext7 It wae alrea~dy getting late on the afternoon oP Tue~day
8 November when one oi' the lc~okoute on the deok of the Cruz del
- Mar ehdu~ed the warning= "Here oome the Moorst" Taking no
spealal precautions, the Canary I81and fishermen helped to
moor the forel.gnera' Zodlac launah and in a few minutes, a dozen
_ men drea9ed ae frogmen e~nd armed wlth riflee boarded the Pishing
boat anchored off the Sahax~an coaet. _
During the long dinner hour together, no one auspected that ~
tragedy wae near. Suddenly changing their dem~anor, the invaders
rounded up the 10 crewmen on deek and began Piring at them. ~ut
threo fiahermen survived, and thie ia where the ambiguitiea and
eontr~.dictiona begin.
Rescued by the Chico (}rande, the three aurvivore--Miguel Ange1
Rodriguez, Manuel Hernandez and Eusebio Garcia Rodriguez--reached
the Ca.nary Islande. "We couldn't recognize anyone,'~ maintains
~ ~ueebio. "~veryone looked alike to us," was the Pirst thing he
a~id. -
A week later, the Canary Island press claimed tne attack was
_ doubtl.esa the work of the Polieario Fron~~�. Furthermore, a Madrid
_ morning daily pub~.iahed photos of two Saharans who are said to
have boen identiPied by the aurvivora. Confided ~uaebio to two
Spanish reportera, "Out of hundrede of photographa, theq kept
- ineist~ng on the ane of Mohammed Sa19m."
A~cording to s4urcea Prom the Canary Islande, Mc~hammed 9alem and
Moha.mmed Embare~ ha.d taken part in the masaaore. But after the
hasty accusation, new data began to arise. Mohammed Salem, a
_ member of the Pollaario Front'e Foreign Relations Committee, lived
on the Canary Islands for several years until his expuleion in
_ February of 1978. On 18 November he left Madrid, where he had _
1
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oome a few days ea,lier to take part in the World Conferenca
on 9o11darity with Chl1e, and, on 14 November, iz~ ceremoniea
organized on the ocaa,elon of the third a~nnivereary of the
Madrid Trlpartite Aocord.
- Tho night oP the attack, Mohammed Salem wa~e dining in plglers. ~
MBria Agullo Canto--who showed r~er National Identl.ty Card, '
- Document No. 21,294,390 to CAMBIO 16 as prooP of her eerious-
neee~ oate~gor1ca11y etatea that the alleged participant in the
ma,eeaore had dinner wS~th her and her femily in the Algerian
- oapital. For their part, two Spanish reporters, Joaquin rortil.lo -
oP Spanish Na~ional Radio and Alberto Miguez, a agecial envoy
from the dailles INFORMACIONES and LA VANaUARDIA, claim tha,t
e oouple of days a1'ter tho ma8~aexe, Mohammed Salem was partici-
pa,ting in a press oonference i.n AZgiera .
- Moroocsn Si~.~noe
The other person aocueed by the morning paper--Mohammed F~nbarec
_ according to t,ho testS.mony of ~hmed Bouhari, ~the Polissrio Front' a
representative tn Mr~dri.d-�hae been living in Havana, Cuba, where
he is doin~ univerg~ty s~udies. ~
While theories wer.e being formulated Prom dift'erent press
~ media about the poesible author o~ the mas8aore, Transport ~
Miniater Sanchez Teran a~serted a few hours after the attack
that the 8paniah authoritles already poasessed auffioient data
to clarify the act. Three weeke later, howeve~r, the official
silence continued.
Of necesslty, tha hypotha~es pointed to two probable suspects; -
Morocco or the Polisario Front. CAMBIO 16 tri~d by all poasible
meana to obtain a responee from the Moroccan embasay in Madrld.
The attempta were fruit,leea, Nefther did the Moroccan authorities
reply to the 5panieh government's notes. ~
From the moment news of the Cruz del. Mar massaare wae recei-red,
the Folisario Front diecounted ite pa,rticipation, accusing
Morocco of wanting to obgt.ruct relations between the Saharan ~
peoplee' repreaentatives ~.nd the Spaniah government.
= On Thuraday 14 Decemtar, DIARIO 16 made the accusa~ion witrout -
~ doubt s "Nlorocco impliceted ir.. the Cruz doI Mar maasacre." The
report, confirmed by inhabitants of the Qr~a, points out the
~ pa.r~;icipati.on of a Mor~ecan convoy that l.eft the coas~al area
_ of Cabeza de P1aya the flay before the cr.ime and headed t~auth.
Reconn~iasance Flights
That inPormat3on--CAMBIO 16 was told by sourcea close to the
2
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~~o~i c~i~i~ rc:int, utih, nNi,v
D@II1qCZ~t~~~,o Center UI1~.OI'~--ie coneidered highly reliable, Ahmed -
- Bouhari to]..d this magazine that they aleo had thoae data
- from Saharan~ wh~ livo 1n area$ occupied by Morocoo. Morocco
c~ti,11. did not reply. ~
All roports recelved by CAMBIO 15 coincide regarding ~he exle-
tez~ce of the above-meritioned oonvoy, composed of eix Land Rovers
~nd two AML 60's. At the game time, a Zodlao launoh--llke the
one that p~,rticlpated in the boarding-~Was aetting aail and ~
sma,11 Moroccan plane waa making reconnaie8ar:oe flighte over the
_ ~rea in which the Cruz del Ma~r was attacked.
"Acoording to what the i~nhabitante of the reg ion have told ue,"
- sald Bouhari, "~the membera of the patrol did no~ return to tY~eir
poin~ of departure after the attaok on the SpQnish Piahing ~Aat.
_ ~e Zodiac launch w~,$ traneferred7to Field number 1, BIR ~
.
_
- The eourcee from UCD coneu7.ted by ~hie magazine said that they =
were eurprised about the doubta that have ariaen a,bout the
ma$sacre; "Beeidee analyzing the faets--which~ on the other hand,
show that it is not the way the Polisario Front usually a~ta-~
- it is necessary to make a politica~l evaluation and agk ouraelvea
who would benefit from thie action.~' _
~ The answer ia offered by Bouhari, who emphasized that "The fi ret
result of the action would be a poeaible conProntation of the
- government, the political parties, and the Spanieh public with
_ the perpetrator. The Saharan representa,tive also streased that
all. o~' the pollsario Front's diplomatic activity to~~ard Spain-- -
_ even 1n the moet difficult mo~:enta--is directed toward improving
- relatlona. In this eense, BoUhari recalled the ~oint communique -
signed by UCD and the FP ~ollsario Fron) la8t 14 Oatober,
_ "when we ehowed, once more, our willingness to have a dialogue
= by freeing the crew oP Las Palomag." _
The Saharan representative atated that enterest exiat~d in
certain Spanish sectors in blaming them for the massacre. "Other-
wise, how do you explain that not only the interpretations, but
. also the facte are being falsified4~~ T~he newa reporta published
by the Canary I81and preea claimed that the boarding happened
in the Cape Cabino area, near Cape Bo~ador. "The crew oP the -
Mencey (which knowa the area),~~ said Bouhari, "asaurea ua tha,t
- heavy waves in that area and the presence of Moroccan shlps make
the preeence of an FP comma,nd unthinkable. The attack, he
= aseerted, aotually occurred eome 20 miles south of E1 Aaiun, in
a pla~ce that was well controlled by the Moroccana. Be8ldes, the
- Moroccen army can only withdraw to a few kilometera from E1 paiun."
- ~
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Previoue actiong oommitted by the FP--the capture oP fiahir~g
boats--oacurred in the area of Cape Leven, Par f'rom EJ. Aaiun,
and many milee eouth of where t.he boarding oP the Cruz del Mar
ocourred.
The ECO DE CANARIAS also got the conPidential stories of the arew
_ of the Chico (}rande, which reacued the survivore from the Cruz
_ del Mar. They olaimed that they had been prevented from making
- any et~~ement about the act~. Two of the survivora were invited
_ to the televislon pr~gram "Far~.,ta~tico" a W~ek later. Upon thelr
. return to the Canary Ia~.anda, ~,hay stated that they had been
prevented from freel3? to111ng what had happened.
Againat Peace ~
"We aseort tha,t it was Morocco," in~iated Bouhari, '~a.nd there
~ are aeveral facts that prove lt. In the first place, Morocco ~
remaine alone anc~ ~e trying by evexy pnesible means to blockade
- the dynamio of peare initiated by us."
These attempts would be tranalnted into difPerent actiona with
regard to diPPerent fronte. W:lth respect to Mauritania--with
which the P~lieario Front ha,$ '~een holding talka air~ce the month
- of July~-afte r calling a ceaee f3re, a Morocean patrol last
- ~reek attempted to attack ~he train from Xuerat, to blame the
Saharans, but it was caught in the act by Mauritanian soldiera.
"Regarding Spain," reasons Bouhari, "every time there are indi.-
cationa of a cha.nge in the Spanish poaition, Morocco responds
wlth threats."
A few days after the signing of the UCD-FP ~oint communiquea,
Morocc~ reiterated ita claim to Ceuta and Melilla.
- "The government and the Moroccan political partieey" explairled -
the FP repre$entative, "launched e. eerioua attack against the
' UCD to annul that communique, which Pailsd. The attack on i;he
Cruz cel Mar occurred ~uet as repreaentativea oP the Democrs~tic
5a~haran Arab Republic were praising the Spanish government' f3 ~
attitude befo~e the UN Genaral Asaembly, and when 90 UN courirries
were voting to aupport the aelT determination of the Saharan
people."
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ALGC RTA
POLTTICAL SITUATTCN, POSSIBLE SUCCESSION TO BOUMEDIENE ANA.LYZED
Puris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Jan 79 pp 16-21
[Article: "Who Is Coming Afrer Boumediene?"]
[Text] Snaps: ' _
_ Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad was the first Arab president to arrive in
Algiers to attend President Boumediene's funeral. He was accompanied on
the plane by Yasir 'Arafat.
The last head of stare ta arrive was Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, who was r
accompanied by Dr 'Ali al-Turayki.
The brother of the departed was in deep mourning at the grave af the de-
parted. He was wearing simple clothing, like all Algerian country
peaple. He lives in (Ghalma) where his mother still lives.
There is disagreement as to Boumediene's actual age. The civil status
records which were under French administration show that he was born on
23 August 1932. But many of Boumediene's relatives and acquaintances say
that he wss born in 1925. Consequently, he was 53 when he died. In any
case, the physicians who have been treating him are inclined to believe
thar he was older than his o�ficial age.
Thcre was a record number of faintings among the cro~rds that accompanied ~
thc funeral. A large number of the citizens pinned pictuxes of the de- _
parted president on their chests.
The Algerian Revolution Command Council was advised by a number of Arab
circles to adopt the National Liberation Front [FLN; as a referance and '
a fundamental base for its actions.
A wave of grief that swept through Algeria and turned Che ~uneral of de-
_ parted Yresi.dent Houari Boumediene into what observers have described as =
"thc wedding of tears," has receded.
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. Cverybody has truly wept for the depareed preaident, beginning with Rab~h
Birut, the chairn~an of the People's National Aasembly, who has assumed the
interim presidency for a period of 40 days, and ending with Abdelaziz
Bouteflika, who delivered the final obituary in the name of the Revolution
Command Counc3l, Co the man in the street who expreased his buried ~rief
with ucclamation and rears, and who tried to ahow whaC he could noC express
through the gatherings of young men and women who tried to break through :
_ the security barricades and to ~oin the funeral.
Thus, Boumediene's procession was not so much a f~uneral as it was a wed-
ding of tears. The wedding of tears began when it was announced on Wednes- _
day morning that Boumediene had died at 0355 and continued until he was
buried in the High Cemetery to the right of Prince 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri,
the prince of strugglers.
The Algerian authorities made a great efforr Co prevent w~hat happened in -
'Abd-al-Nasir's funeral from recurring. LarSe forces of the army blocked
the entrances to the route of the funeral procession from the People's -
_ Palace to the great mosque and then to the Aigh Cemetery. Meanwhile, ~
insC.ructions were issued to the government and party officials in the vil-
lages and the cities to hold popular meetings with the aim of preventing
a human march on Algiers. However, this did not d~ much good, and crowcis
- marched from everywhere. The human barriers set up by the police and ttie
gendarmerie had great difficulty in repelling the waves of human masses
and in prevent'ing the crowds fran mingling with the official funeral pro- -
ceasion.
- The phenomenon that has drawn attention is the fact that the youth element
was predominant in those crowds. This is not surprising, because official -
statistics indicate that people below 20 years of age comprise 65 percent ~
of Algeria's population, and they reflect the Algerian aspiration to cope -
' with the facts and problems of daily life. .
A Man for All Keys -
The legacy left by the departed Algerian president is heavy, because the
logie of things presupposes divergence of views in interpreting his way of
running many of the vital affairs. He held in his hands 1:he.keys to most
~ foreign and domestic political affairs, and he alone handled many vital
- issues: ~ ~ -
1. Foreign relations with the two camps.
2. The Algerian role in the Arab world,
3. The Algerian role in Africa. ~ _
4. The oil poli.cy.
5. Algeria's policy in the Third World.
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6. The econocnic c~nd social. policy,
7. Thc miliCttry policy. _
8. Tkie reltttions witti Morocco and Maurirania through Che apecial relation- -
ship wiCh the Polis~rio. -
With his unique, ciynamic character, Boumediene was able to meet the requ'!re-
ments of these policies, which are overpowering tasks. The final decision
was in his hand. The others, es~ecially A~delaziz BouCeFlilc~, tried to -
understand him and to acC accordingly, Boumediene was always the ruler
and the umpire. This is why ~ fearfully serious vacuum was left when he
became di~abled by sickness.
There is no doubr th.~t the AraU policies of the departed president huve
implanted Algeria in the heart of the Arab homeland as an Arab country
_ participating in rhe confrontation against Israel and againsk the im-
perialist-Zionist plans.
It is no surprise that ~he Israeli comments have reflected some kind of -
_ rudc gloaring. Israel cannot forget Boumediene's role in the 1967 and
1973 wars and in the developcnents that followed.
~ There is also no doubt that his African policies have implanted Algeria
iii the heart of Africa as an African state supporting those struggling _
for liquidation of the colonialist and racist rule.
- I~ is also indubitable that his economic policies have succeeded in build- -
ing the base for an Algerian industrial edifice despite the conditions of
extrame austerity that they have imposed on the Alger ian people.
Biit these policies, the keys to which Boumediene held solely iri his hands,
_ are imposing on his successors, or successor, a heavy legacy and trouble-
some priorities.
In the list of priorities facing the new Algerian era, the problem of the
rclations with Morocco in light of the ramifications of the Algerian policy ~
towar~ the Western Sahara issue features prominently. ,
Tliis problem forms the base for relations in the Greater Arab Maghreb. -
= Fc~r example, Algerian relations with Tunisia are still cool because at
tlie outset 'Cunisia adopted the Moroccan and Mauritanian viewpoint. These
- re~lations are suffering from a constant, but latent, crisis--namely the
crisis of mapping out the southern borders between Tunisia and Algeria,
T}~is crisis took the form of quarrels between Algeria and Tun3sia when
Al.geria received the Tunisian opposition leaders and when Tunisia coun-
_ tcred by giving the right of political asy.lum to Col Taher Zbiri. Algeria -
ttien retaliated by receiving Ahmed Ben Saleh on his escape from his Tuni-
sian prison.
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NOR n~I~LCIAL US~ ONLY
prnbl~m n~ ItC1~Cinng With Murnccn
The fncC i~ ChuC rhe prdblem nf relgCiung With Moroccn, re~ulting ~rdm ~
~hc Algerian policy toward th~ We~t~rn 5nhgrg p~nblma, fnraan gn itnpo~CgtiC
bnse thr~t plnym a dccigive role in chnnn~ling ehe Algeriun d~v~lo pcents
gfCer I3oumedi~n~ and, cnn~equ~ntily, in d~t~tminin~ the quality nf Mornccnn-
Alg~ri~n relaeion~ in ehe new ern.
I3c~cnuge o~ itg d~oma~eic ramifications, thi~ is tihe m~in probl~m f~cing
Chc succeeeore.
Obviously, after Boumedienc'e death ehc lgten~ disagYeement over ehis
problm? among the Revolution Co~nand ~ouncil wembero was brought oue inta
ehe open--a disagreement which first led tn dividing th~ Council into four
~x~~ [factions) gnd then into two axes: ~
An axis Chat calls for continuing the previously declared policy, becauae
_ it will lcad to Kiving Algeria an outleC on the AC1anCic Ocean.
An ~cia that snys thae this policy causes economic gtCrition of ehe Alger-
ian econany, embroils Algeria in n conflict with Morocco--a conflicC in-
compatible in goals and nature with the Creater Arab Mag1;_reb plan--and
involves Algeria in endlesa bloody dieputes with Morocco.
This axis finds aupport, according to Bouteflika, in the development in
Boum~diene's thinking in his later days--development that made Boumediene ~
- inclined toward an undergtanding with the Moroccan monarch and toward
accepting Saudi, French and African mediation on this issue. .
By the way, th~z Algerian monarch has disclosed to Ed~~uard Sabilier, a
French colle.:gue, that a se::ret meeting was sct~eduled t~~ be held between
him and President BoumedieTie on the 26th of the curreat month of January
in Bruasels to find a s~:;:lement for the Western Sahara problem.
Thus, perhapg it is no exa~geration to say that agreement on a successor
to President Boumediene will cane through the agreesnent on the policy to
be followed toward Morocco and toward the Western 5ahara problem by virtue
of ita being thc morc urgent problem and the problem wiCh greater impact '
on Algerian developmenl:s.
Within 15 days of the death of the late President Boumediene, Rabah Bitat,
the constitutional interim president, is required to hold, in cooperatic+n
with the Revolution Command Council, a general FLN congress so that he,
along with the People's National Assembly, may preaent the name of the sole
candidate for succession for a public referendwn. The Algerian presiden-
tial el~ctions Will be a race in vt?ich a single horse will run in accord-
ancc with a planned program.
Lven though many obaervers vieW What has happened in Algeria since the
announcement of Boumediene's aickness as something planned to serve the
8
FOR OFFICIAL US8 ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020022-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020022-4
1~~)It UPI~ [C f AL U51: UNLY -
intercat ot the ccindidatc that will. be produCed by the ~ilenC gkt'u~gle within
= tl~c~ [tr.volutinn Co~mnnnd Cnuncil, mnny oeh~r obgervexg b~lieve ChaC Qverything
iy ~racr.eding .7t prf~sent, ~~nd utteil fureher noeice, in f~vnr of Cnlon~l
Y~~lii~i~ut. liowever, ~he~e ob~erv~rg clo ndC ~xclude g~utrprixe. i:veryehing
iy posHiblc 7t any momc.~nt, ~nd ellere ie nothing Co prevene ttie rise nf a
ttcw dc ~~cto gitu~tCiun de~~pitt: t une of immedincy. When cAn now pose the question of how they cAn
the Snhruwi ~~col~le recover:+ it,q sovereignty present a pseudo�solution which ntlempts ~o
_ o~�cr thc Westem Snht~rn in itv lululily it will resolve the problem through the creation of
be ~xr.s.9ible G~ rethink this q~eslion. We p m~~.mini�state. However, the only accep�
cnnnoL v~~enk uf unity ~ir fed~~ratinn wilh a tnble solution for the Sahrawi people is lhe
- cuuntry which ylill cxcupies part of our e9~Ablishment and recognition of the R.ASD ~
nutionnl tcrrrilory.
Whnt H~ns the result of lhe on the entire temtory of what once wus the
ncgotit~tions belween representutives of Sp+lnish Sahara.
Pulisnr~o and Maurilanian diplomuta ? At the present time 17 states have
w~hich recently took plnce in I3ummko7 recognised the RASD. Besides Algeria,
- VI'cre negotinliuna opened with the only South Yemen in the Arab world is
D1uroccnns in the A'Inlian cnpilal7 among these counlries. Why has the
O It is a fHCI thnl negotintions liave heen Polisnrio cause such limited diplomutic
guing ~m bclwcen l.he 1tASD and the new success in the Arab world?
- !11nurilnninn mgime. The mi~t recenl rc~und O As you hsve seid, RASD is recognised by
uf tAlkq tcx~k place in E3mm~ko. Unlil now 17 etates including two from the AreU world.
the~e ncFolinlinny hnvc n