JPRS ID: 8299 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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J~r~s L/8299
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1 March 1975
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TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
_ (FOUO 14/79) . ~ .
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1 M~rch 1979
TRAN5LATIONS ON WGSTERN ~;UROP~: ~ (FOUO 1.4/79 ) b, _
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JPR5 L/8299 -
~ 1 Maroh 1979 ~
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 14/79 )
CONTENTS � PAGE
FRANCE
Position of 'Var~ous PS ' Currents' Attalyzed
~ (I~anz-Olivier Giesbert; ~,E NOWEL 08SERVATEUR,
30 Dec 78) 1 ~
La~rent Fabius Comrnents on PS Unity, Econoniic Austerity
(Laurent Fab:tus; LE NOWEL OB3FRyATEUR, 15-21 Jan 79).... 7
ITAL1 -
Membership, Structure, Fiscal Policy of Lab~or Unions
(Salvatore Coi; IL SOLE-24 ORE, var~ous dates)............ ',0
SPAIN -
PNV President Discusses Basque Perspective on Constitution
(CAMBIO 16, 12 Nov 78) 31 .
Catalan Viewpoint on Constitutional Isgues
(Jord~ Pujol Soley; C~11~I0 16; 12 Nov 78) 33
WEST GERMANY
Public Employees Union Aead InKerviewed on Demands
(Heinz Kluncker Interviev; STERN, 11 Jan 79).......,.r..... 36
. ~ _
- - a - [IxI - WE - 150 FOUO] _
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FRANCE -
PQSITIONS 0'~' VARIOUS PS 'CURRENTS' ~1NALYZED
Paris LL NOWt'L OBSERVATEUR in French 30 Dec 78 pp 25--26 f
(Article by Franz-Olivier Giesbert: "Socialiat Part~r: Inventory of a -
True Debate"]
[TexC] Will the "war of t~e three" take place? On 6 January, in the big
hall of the third ur.~erground floor of the national asaembly, where the
directive committee af the Socialist Party c~i~l hold ita session, Francois
Mitterrand,Pierre Mauroy, and Michel Rocard will kr.ow if they ~~ill tr~ily _
become unstitched. Until then there is suspense. In any case, as a few ~
weeks separate us from Che Congress in Metz, the temperatur.e is ristng.
This is the time of manifestos and polemics. The socialisC leaders are
tense as on the eve uf combat. Yet, will they draw their swords from their -
scabbards? All of them are ready or, at least, so they say.
Believing in preserving his image of unif ier, Pierre Mauroy keeps repeat- ~
ing that r.e has decided to achieve, at all costs, a synthesis of majority
trends. This would work against some Rocard and Mitterrand supporters.
"In any case," he said, sounding more ecumenical than ever, "a synthesis -
will be achiered, because the party wants it. If we act as collectively
stupid in expos~ng our divfsions, the Socialist Party could slip in a few -
months. Therefore, we must put an end to the dialectics of an internal -
divisiveness."
Yes, but~how? Not t.ecessarily by closing down the debate which is beginning
today within C~e Socialist Party, for the play which is being staged in _
"France's first party" is, nevertheless, far more than a family affair.
The political theater is such that all we see on the Rtage is the bouncing
back of a settlement of accounts. Beyond that, however, basic questions `
are being decided concealed by too much excitement. It is in that area ~
however, that the real debate should start. Its topics sre quite wel;
known. ~
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- l. Break With Capitalism ~
~rancois Mitterra~nd willingly epeake of a"break" and so do Che "hisCorical ~
chiefa" o~ the CERES [Center for (Socialistj SCudies~ Research, and Educa-
tion]. So does Gaeton Defferre. Michel Rocard apeaks of iC almost never.
Ia he against it? No, he is for. However, he does not like the term, tt?at ;
ia all. "With thia matter," says Patrick Viveret, for Che past 30 yeara
- one of the theoreticians of the Rocar~l team, "the practice of the forked
tongue has reacHed its penk. 'This proves the e~.t~nt to which Che Mo11et
temptation threatens our party. With such kind of hollow formula one can-
not prepare the parCy for renl change." "Lenin," goea nn to say the
~ deputy from Yvelines, "took four years to break with capitalism. There-
- fore. . . ,
ThErefore, the debate on the "break" is quite aimply theological. Its
evangelists, actt~ally, are in great trouble the moment they try ~o define
it. To some ir_ is Che "irreversible threshold" to be reached within the
~ first 100 days of the future leftist goverrnnent. To others it is the ti~e -
when social relatfons among forces overturn. Like Pierre Mauroy, Gilles _
. Martinet~ or'Dominique~Taddei, Michel Rocard would rather speak of a"pro-
ceas." lie believes that a county cannot be turned upaide down suddsnly,
by adopting three lawa and making three m4tions, replacing one sysCem with
another. Nor does Jean Poperen. A Mitt~rrand supporter, hardly suspected
of supporting Rocard, the deputy from the Rhone says: "In history there
' has been no touch with a magic wand. No such thing has ever existed."
He reminds us that our "bourgeois revolution--the 'classical' example of
a revolution--took several~decades."~
2. The Marke[ Economy
This is, above all, a eemantic quarrel. Michel Rocard inaugurated it by
- promoting the virtues of the market. "Let us call a cat a cat," he said
one day. "All experiments which have led to the disappearance of the
risk and of economic penalties have consisted of building bureaurratic
development models." His plan is clear: The economy must be guided,
framed, and corrected; the market would do the rest.
. Francois Mitterrand shares that view. "Out~ide of any monopoly phenomenon,"
he stated two years ago, "the market economy will c~ntinue to dominate
- the development of French society. . . Ft is not the purpose of the
socialist experience to eliminate it." Yes, but the first eecretary al-
llowed, at that time, one of his lieutenants, Pierre Joxe, to accuse -
Michel Rocard of having spoken once of "global market control." Ah!
Joxe is the most Marxist oriented and the least Rocardian, i.e., he be-
longs to the Mitterrand team. A plodder, he has the particular ctiaracter-
istic of being thoroughly familiar with his files. So is Rocard. A
rather stormy competition developed betWeen ~hese two m~n within the
Socialist Party, while Francois Mi~:terrand remr~ined uninvolved.
~
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Yet, Che firHt secxeCary easily supporCs today the predominnnce of the
plan over the market'. Yet, ao do Mauroy and Rocard. Any pneaible breach
would be be~weeh the M~ttQrrand-Mauroy-Rocaxd trio and the CERES which ie ~
~ mo.re of a"planner" than a11 the others. -
3. The SCate and Nationalizations ~
n -
~ A graduate of the National Administration School and the Finance Inspec-
torate~ and former secretary general o�,the NaCion's Accounts Commission,
Michel Rocerd presents himself as the chief salesman of the state. Yet,
he is the most anti-statist among the socialiaC leaders. One of his Cheme
songa is, "the establishment of socialism in France does not ~o through
the strengthening of our administrative apparatus, already omnipotent as
_ it ie." Thie was also said in May 1968.
A super-regionalist yet less reticent in terms of nationalizations, Pierre
Mxuroy doea not think of fighting the state. Nor does Francois Mitterrand.
The firsC secxetary of the Socialist Party, who considers nationalization
one of the fundamental principles of socialiem, opposes Rocard's "basism":
"To think that the base covld instinctiYely resolve the problems which a
methodical organization alone could undertake ~aould lead ua into utopia."
At CERES, hearing such "Girondist" statements by the deputy �rom Yvelines,
the "historical chfefe" raise their arms: "Not to usQ the levers offered ,
by the state would mean cutting one's own hands! If we do not take them
over the atate apparatus would turn against us!"
' 4. Economic Harshness
,
On this point as' well Michel Rocard is quite alone. He emphasizes that,
"the left must not promise more than it could keep." Before the elections
, Rocard opposed the Socialist Party leadership on the SMIC [Interoccupatic~nal
_ Minimum Growth Wage] of 2,400 francs. Facing th~; Communist Party, he
thought that the 2,0~0 franc level should have ~,een supparted--the initial
socialist pogition. "LPt us ~xplgin to the workers that, by skipping
stages, we risk an inflation exploaion. They would understand." Preasured
~y Pierre Mauroy, Trancois Mitterrand finally decided in favor of the
2,400 franc SMIC. He does not regret it. "Had a leftiat goverimQnt been =
unable to set up a 2,400 franc SMIC in March 1978," he stated to LA CROIX,
la~t Tuesday, "it would have meant that sU~h a government would have been
totally ineffective!" -
The same a~*pliea to the last major aocialist proposal: The 35-hour woric
week with no drop in wages. In this casa, Michel Rocard believes that one
should dare to lower the high salaries. Francois Mitterrand~shtugs. In
his case, unquestionably, politics is more important than economics. T'his
~ applies to Rocard as well even though the latter adds smilingly: "Providing,
however, that one is able to control it."
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- 5. Internntion~l Yolitics `
On the preceding martere Pierre Mauroy is ready to accepC any kind of
compromiae. He stops ahort at international poliCics. He considere bending _
ttie European line followed by the Socialiat Party out of the queation.
_ Socialism's future goes through Europe. Not a Europe as ~onceived by
Giscard, naturally, but that of the "workera." Inevi~ably, the European
social democ~ata will evolve. If criticized in his preser.ce, the mayor
of l,ille always concludes by t~aying: "True, they make errors. Frequent- -
ly they are too cautious. Ho~oever, these are workers and they hold the _
power." Let the French socialists be warned.
Mtchel Rocard is also a European. Doth men share the view of Gille Mar-
tinet or pominique Taddei that one must answer positively and immediately
- the cn11 of the Italian Communist Party for tightening up relaCions an.ong
the European political left. They are horrified by the wave of chauvinism
which is rolling today over France. SomeCimes they ask themselves whether =
- Francois Mitterrand has not lost his European fiber.
He has not. A European from the very first, Francais Mitterrand has al- -
ways favored tfie development of the Comnon Market within the framework of _
- the TrPaty of Rome. He has always called for a"free France within an _
independent Europe." Yet, true, he has become quite cautious. He would =
rather let Giscard to extricate himself with "his owti" type of Europe. The
Socialist Party's formulation of the great European manifesto has been
delayed. In parliament Che socialists abstain in voting on European prob-
_ lems. Actually, Jean-Pierre Cot nas bsen so affected by the "timidity"
of his party when it concerns Europe that he has asked for a"cl~rifica- _
tion" meeting of the socialist Eroup in the National Ass~mbly. "If this
goes on," he says, "we will end up nowhere." Indeed, everything has been ~
clarified, and the Europeans within the Socialist Party have found them-
selves facing the comb~ned assaults mounted by the Mitterrand-chosen
people, the CERES or the ..."wine growers." Whgt worries the Europeans
within the Socialist Party, in fact, ia the ascendancy of what they de-
~ scribe as "the new nationalism" within the Mitterrand current, through , _
Pierre Joxe, that same Joxe who holds today the position o� the first
secretary's great political coordinator.
~ However, it is Rrobablg in terms of the CERES that the anti-European -
_ ideology has scored ~he biggest number of points in recent months. The
= minority's contribution plan is greatly hindered by the dislike of a
"German-American Europe." The "historical chief~" of the CERES willingly ~
~ state that France would be able to accomplish a revolution only through
- a nationalistic upsurge: They have no inCention of letting the right
accomplish this. All this is encompassed within an overall vi~w of the
world. The view is quite pessimistic. Tt is also very "authoritarian
socialist." Thus, the CERES denounces the "anti-tiietnam" campaign launck~ed
- by the leftist press: "Human rights are part of the debate on humanism,
� on the dominant ideology."2 They are concerned with "the use of dissidence
by imperialist ideology."
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6. Uni�ication of the Left
Everyone favore it. Opinions diverge on the way to promote it. According _
to Pierre Mauroy, Michel Rocard, or Jean-Pierre CoC, a new policy must be
- formulated, along with a new eubsCance of such a unification. Their thesis -
is the following: "The Socialist Party can no longer preach union with
the Communiet Party wiChout an effort to inCen,aify the discussion, limit-
ing itself to violent criticism of the coaQnunisC line. End to the wait-
~ and-aee attitude! No more a defensive unionl" "We muat heap questions on
our partners," Gillea Mnrtinet says. How? Well, the socialists wi11 make
the communist~ "evolve" by questioning Soviet reality, the world criais, -
or else their contradictions between "social chauvinism" and proletarian _
internationalism.
Really? Neither Francois Mitterrand nor the CERES leadership believe this.
The former would like to "keep up" with the Epinay Line while the latter
would like to "return" to it. Yet, in their view,, the ways to unity, long
and tortuous though they might be, have not changed since 19 March. Her~ '
is the exp lanation of Gerard Delfau, one ~Y the Mitterrand theoreticians,
Paris-VII profesaor and mayor of a small co~uni.ty in the Herault: "In
- the final account, one of the two big parties will have to take over. We
must first put the Co~unist Party in the poaition of accepting the experi- .
ence of a leftisC union, outside of which it wou~ld not avoid an electoral _
erosion. Then we must be able to w ithstand Che shock with it in the vari-
_ ous undertakings and associations. Such are our targets. Yet~ iC would "
be absurd to plunge into an ideological debate with the Co~unist Party." -
7. 1'he Party Concept
Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard dream of a great Socialist Party, lese of
- an "electoral machine" and more popular and stionger in the factories.
~'hey willingly mention Francois Mitterrand~s "presidentialism" and demand =
- "more collegial action at all levels." On this point their positions are
� similar to those held by the CERES. However, to both Prancois Mitterrand
has the opportunity to mention the state of French socialism when he as-
s~ned leadership in the.Socialist Party in 1971. "Remember those acattered,
divided, worn out socialists, who had sunk to nothing." ~
5o there. There are five big currents today within the Socialist Party:
The Mitterrand group; the French style social democratic movement, favoring
~ unity and decentralization, headed by Pierre Mauroy; Michel Rocard's self-
management "Mendesism"; a new type of Marxism, free from the ideological
twists of a Gilles Martinet~or Christian Pierret; and the CERES "progres-
sivicm." None of these currents could govern the Socialist Party by itself.
Therefore, anything could happen before the Metz Congress: All kinds of
alliances and twists. Including the Mitterrand-Mauroy-Rocard syntheais.
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FOOTNOTES �
1. See "Nous Sommes Tous Archaiques" [We are all Archaic] by Jean
' Poperen, Editions Roblot. _
- 2. REPERLS, November issue. . ~
COPYRIGHT: 1978 "le Nouvel Observateur"
5157 -
C3Q: 8119/0745 �
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, FRANCE
LAURENT FABIUS COMMENTS ON PS UNITY, E~ONOMYC AUSTERITY
~ .
Paris I~E NOWEL OBSERVATEUR ir. French 15-21 Jan 79 p 33
[Article by Laurent Fabius, deputy from Seine-Maritime, member of the manage-
ment committee of the Socialist Party (PS) and associaCe of Francois Mitterrand] _
[Text] When I found some 15 ~ontributions from PS activists on my table, I
was r~minded of a remark made by Woody Allen. It provides a good introduction
- to our disc.ussion: "The answ~r is 'yes'; but tell me again: what was the
~ question?" Accordingly, in the current polemics, in which the party's inter-
� est is often neglected for the pleasure of a provocative statement, I suggest
- that we abandon ready-made answers and get back to a few simple questions.
1. Party unity is necessary. Without a doubt. But what is party unity?
In the first place party unit,y rests upon a certain number of points which,
one could say, make up th~ Ep~~:~ay line: unity of the Left, class fronC,
' self-manageraent, nation~li~t~tion, planning. One cannot really be a~artisan
_ of unity and question this premise. One cannot say that he agrees with group
' strategy and re~ect essenL-isl aspects of the program which accompanies it.
One cannot proclaim txis f idelity to the spirit of 'Epinay and speak of "auton-
omous action" of the PS. One cannot hope to extend socializations and to
nationalize without transferring capital pro~erty. One cannot declare his
attachmenC to,.the PY~an and~advocate maintenance of most of the present market
,
operations. One cannot proclaim the international character of socialism
and take pride in nationalist feelings. '
To seek unity also means wanting to be militant together. How many sncialists
are today discouraged by the networks, bureaus and parallel finances being ~
- maintained by certain individuals who sing the praises everywhere of forth-
- rightness,,democr~cy~an~, togetherness! Nbw many new adherents drop out, dis-
� appointed after a few meetings, because they come to fight against the R{~ht
and find themselves thrust into vague procedural struggles betw~en minor clan _
chieftains, canstructors ofi sectarianism and destroyers of activism. Is not
the desire for unity also a preference for the pattisans of this unity over
the proponents of divisionism?
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' 2. Economic string~ncy is necessary. Without a doubt. But what is economic -
sCringency?
Is it a queation of postponing socialism until the year 3000? Certain',y noC.
On the other hand, is it a question of demanding everything immediately and -
for everyone? Not that either. One readily confusPs economic stringency
with sacial stringei~cy. But Raymond Barre is not an economist of stringency;
he is only an economist of the Right. Of course, there is evidence that no
~ne can i.gnore today. We are no longer living in the 1960's, during,.which
the necessary redistribution coul.d have taken place on Che surpluges alone
of large growth., Frnnce, sub~ected to the "laws of the world market," has
attained a degree of integration which'renders.any political independence
� more delicate and more necessary. That is tru~, even obvious, but it is parC
of the trappings of a diploma and not of economic stringency. -
On the other side of the coin, a false, pseudoscientific idea is flourishing
concerning economic stringency. The raising of the SMIC [i~ter-occupational
minimum growt~h wage] to 2,400 francs (April 1978 level) would not be stringent =
because it is the shared c~pinion of Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Raymond
Barre. The reducing of the work week to 35 hours also would not be stringent ~
becausP Francois Ceyrac shares the opinion of these two men. It is a quick
forg,etfulness of the express conditions established precisely :;y the PS so
~ that these ~easures, which were sociatly necessary, would be economically _
bearable: tightaning the spectrum of revenues, aid to the manpower-using
industries, progressiveness, negotiation.s, European harmonization. It is not _
in the,fortnulating ~f these proposals that stringency is lacking. It is in _
~ the denying of the means and conditions for these proposals. For example, =
failure to take into ~ccount the facts of the world situation. Or better
yet, doing without the essential tools such as credit control, a v~luntarist
Plan, extension of ~orker rights, a new fiscal deal. Economic stringency can
be lacking because of dogmatism. It can also be lacking because of weakness.
' 3. The Socialist Party must take into consideration the st~kes of the
future. Without a doubt. But what are these stakes?
- First, qi~estians about the France of tomorrow: employment and the traumatized
regions, independence, excessive inequalities, our entire country in the near
future. Let us go farther. Are we not in the process of shif.ting the center ~
of the world, from the Atlantic to the Pacific? What is the next stage after
the fragile oil respite? What are the consequences of and the remedies for _
the demographic crises of the West? Are these not enough questions to mobilize
, our ~nergies?
The future is also the upcoming elections. All ~ocialists agree on the con- -
struction o[ another Europe; however, we must guard against drift. I acu a -
little concerned when I observe that the lesdership of our party has had sub-
mitted to it a draft of the European program of the Socialist Party which is _
- totally unacceptable for the defense of French socialism because it is merely
an import product. This concern seizes me again when, a little later, there
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, i~ nn eifort tn once more que~tion a deci~ion of tihe ~ncinlist group in the
~ Na~tunal Ass;.mbly~ wi~ich hnd th~ auddcity td vote against the government in
ordrr to ~ignnl nn end to Che ssbot~ging of the Ass~mbly in Che ~uropenn TVA -
(value-added tnxJ ma[ter. C1n the other hand, we mu~t gl~un Che oCher drift
like the plague; i.e., r.he nationaliet drift. N~tionaltgm is tn gCCbrc~AtlGp
- wit~~ neith~~r our economic nor our political interegt~, nor witli the vocation
- of eocialiem. I~ ie n~t up to us to give our own answer: the Eurapp of the _
workerg of the 3S hourg, of the "Airbus," etc.?
_ I fully b~li~ve that the �uture will belong to t?;ose (tto matter what their
age" who ghere with me these feelings, theae questions and these proposalg.
- These indlviduals do not belnng to any church and nre not behc~lden to flny
fiefdom. They ar~ sociulisCs; that ir~ all. And they want a great Socinliet
Party. This as~iration doeg not have Che solidity of the ~yclic alli~nce
berween old resentments and new ambitions. But it is fortunately, I Chink~
ir~ ehe ~ea~ority in the PS.
COPYRIGHT: 1978 "le Nouvel Observateur"
8143
CSO: 310C
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ITALY
~ , ~
MEI~ERSHIP, STRUCTURE, FISCAL POLICY OF LABOR UNIONS ,
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 29, 31 Aug 78j 3, 20 Sep 78s 1, 11 Nov '78
[Article by Salvatore Coi: "Behind the Labor Union Scenes"; for related
articlea aee JPRS L~8243, 25 January 1979 (FOUO 7/79) pp 18-25 and JPRS
L/8274, 12 February 1979 (FOUO 11/79) pp 38-47)
(29 Auq 78, p 3J
(Text~ Conaionplaces, reticence, half-truths have sur-
rounded the organizational ~s~ects of Italian labor
unione with mystery for a lonq time. And they still
surround it to a considerable deqree. In the recent
paet, ideoloqical divisions, organizational weakness,
financial problems have justified qross tamperinq with
data or mere sflence.
The picture of the situation has improved sliqhtly in
these last 3 years. In 1977, at the time of their
congresses, the CGIL ;Italian General Confederation
of Labor], the CISL ~Italian Confederation of Labor _
Unions) and, for the first time, also the UIL fItal-
ian Unian of Labor~ disclosed fiqures on thefr am .
members. Previously, the CGIL and the CISL had pu-
' blished seme figures on financing and on structure. -
Theee data are, however, either ino~aq~lete and full
of gaps or very aggreqate. For example, members of
craft unfons are caaputed in one ainqle fiqure for
all Italy.
~ � In dther countries, like Great Britain and Germany,
labor union organizations malce no mystery of their
orqanizational actfvity. It fs not understood why,
� , in Itely, this is a matter reserved only for the _
persons fn charqe of the confe~ration orqanization
bureaus. The inveatiqation to be prasented on
these pages will examfne three aspects primarily:
the number of inembers fn labor union orqanizations ~
in the period from 1968 to 1976, the labor union
structure, ffnancinq. Much of the data to be
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revealed in a atudy by Salvator~ Coi that w~ are be-
qinning to publieh have not yet been reported by
labor unions.
Yn 1976~ there were 8,245,399 members enrolled in the three labor union con-
federations. ZY?is fiqure alao incluc3~s 1,099,335 retired membera who have
a union mea~erahip card, although they are no lonqer active in the latwr
world. Ther?sfore, in 1976, there w~ere 7,146,064 workers enrolled as labor
union members. ~fie ratio bet~reen this last figure and tY?e total nim~t~er of
wage-earning workers is the�rate.af unionizatfon. In 1976, the rate of union-
ization in Italy was 51.2 percenC. This figure is hiqher than the average
ffgure in other European countries (in Germany it is 33 X,ercents in Greati
Britair~~ 52 perc.~ntf in France 25 percent). In comparison with 1968, the
increase in enrolled members is very con~iderable: over 74 percent. In
fact, in 1968, there were 4,170,000 members enrolled in the tihree labor
union confederations ~excluding retired members). 1'he rate of unionization,
only 33.6 percent, sha+s the weakness of labor union presence up to that
tia*Q. It should'be noted that these last-mentioned fiqures were revealed _
_ onl~~ between the end of 1974 and the end of 1975. The estimates provided
previously by the labor unions were entirtly different. In tihe period
fran 1968 to 1976, the increase in memberghip occurred constantly (8-9
per~entaqe increase points each year), w~th the exception of 1973. _
The atrong expansion of Italian labor unions is tied first of all to the
resumption of industrial conflicts at the end of the 1960's. The new
cycle of strugqles speci.fically involved industrfal w~orkers (metalwork-
ing and chemistry) in the north. In 1969, 216 million hours were lost in
labor conflicts in northern Italy (71 pervent of the total for Italy).
In the industrial sector alone in that qeographic ~rea, 185 million hours
were lost (61 pervent of the total for Italy).
At the same time, there were 6,613,000 wage-earninq workers in northern
- ttaly, in 1969 (52.5 percent of the total for Italy), incl.uding 4,160,000 -
in the industrial sector. Tt~is last ffqure is 63 percent of the total
n~nber of workers in northern Italy and 33 percent of the total for the
nation. In the years following 1969, vonflicts were spread m~re uni-
formly (with the exception of 1973 because nf contract renewals in in-
dustry) amonq che geoqraphic areas and amonq the economic activity sec~� _
tors.
The revival of conflicts enabled labor unions to strengthen their pre-
sence in factories considerably. In fact, in industry, the rate of
unionization increased from 25 percent, in 1968, to 49.5 percent, in
1976. This last fiqure is very close to, but~still below, the national
average fiqur~ for the rate of unionization (51.2 percent). Zh2 hot autumn
also naturally involves the other sectors of labor unionism. The griev-
ance drive accompanying these struqgles and reflected also in the poli-
tical world, enabled labor unionism to pick up members and followers in
the sector of services, aqriculture and public office. 'ifie South was
also involved in this process of labor union change and qrowth.
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Light should be thrawn on a very importiant aepect of labor union qrowth.
~ In tihe period f.rom 1968 t~ 1976, labnr union u?emberahip increaged almost
identically in each of the three confe~erations. Tn 1976, Cr2L members _
inCreased 75.4 percenti in comparison with 1968= CrSL membera, 74.1 p~r-
cent and UIL members, 70.4 percene. Thie parallel qrowth in membership
in the three confederations left the atrenqth relatiionship unchanged within
- them. In fact, in 1968, the C~GIL had 52 percent of the tiotal number of
~ memberss the CISL, 34.7 percentt the UIL, 13.7 percent. In 1976, the ai-
tuation was unchanged. The fiqurea are, respectively, 52.4 percent, 34.2
percent and 13.4 percent. The CGIL atill has an absalute majority of the
number of inembers in comparison with the 4ther two orqanizatfons. The
intQrnal compactness of the CGIL has been strsnythening its positfon
subsequently and has actually been putting it in a si~uation of "relaeive
hegemony" with regard Co the CISL an8 the UIL.
A questfon comes up spontaneoualy, when the equilibrium existinq between ~
the confederated organizations are mentioned and the figures preaented
above are known. Is the ytability of the size r,atio be~ween the confede~ra- -
tions in Che period from 1968 to 19~6 an accidental stability or a"con-
trolled" stability? In other words, is this equilibrium of forces t~~e nt~-
tural continuation of an equilibrium already in existence since �196'L, or
is it the result of the new course, characterized by t.he interconfederation
agreement on "freezinq" the debate on orqanic unity, on mechanisms qovern-
ing representation of the confederations in the Unified Federation?
An unconvincinq answer is that the cause of this equilibrium is the decline
of the ideological motivation that had driven a worker, up to tt~en, to join
one labor unfon raeher than another. Anyone who has followed labor unfon
vicissitudes in recent ye3rn knows that this has not happened, e,v+en in
the most unified craft federations. Instead, it is more likely that the
CGIL, the CIS~, and the UIL have operated, in order to maintain a certain
deqree of equilibriu~ of forces within each one. The plan for labor union
unity alwaya takes this fact into accoimt. The problem, rather, is so
deeply felt that often recourse has to be had to not very ~rthodox methods
of election and cooptation for fozminq the council of deleqates (the basic
unified structure of tha labor union in places of work in Whose election
all wage-earning workers rtiay participate with their vote, regardless of ~
whether or not they are members of thf union). Every effort is made to -
' guarantee the satisfactory presence of each of the three confederatfons
within this bc~dy: ' '
Labor unionism itself recognizes the existence of these methods and de-
nounces the more serious casss. 1,ldo Aa~oretti, national secretary of
the FILTEA (Italian Federation of Workers in Carpentry, Constructxon and
Related Industries]-CGIL and a member o� the confederation organization
bureau, describes the situation as follows: ,"It ranqes from the direct
appointment of orqanizations not subject to control by the assembly or ~
the council to situations in which first the deleqate to be elected has
.
been apeciffed and then the homeqenous qroup suftable for that purpose.
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~fiis ~aatter becomee worsa when it qoea from the ~ouncil to the executive
aonmittee. In thie reepect~ the mogt serious phenomenon is not, acCually,
reproductinn nP the federat~ive mechanfem, thet ia to eay the eatablietwienti
of a joint +a: ~.:utive cnmmitte~. A~ually, the truly serious situations oc-
cur when this L~:es place under the table, qoing so far as to give rise to
secret votinq with predetermined resulta."
Then, in addition to ti.t~e interconfederation relations, tihere are problema _
of relatfonship betw~een the various political party trends within each in-
, divual cnnfederation. lceeping this eom~l'ex equilibrium of foroea alivc~ re-
q~iree a considerable expenditure of energy by Italfan labor unionfam.
Wag~s-earning Workers (in thousands) and Union Membera by Confederation.
bata �or All Itialy
Wage-earniny Union Members: Absolute Data
Year workers CGIL CISL UIL TOTAL
1968 12,396 2,461,297 1,622,158 648,393 4,731,848
19?2 12~988 3,214,82~ 2,184,279 842,912 6,242,018
1973 13,239 3,435,405 2,214,199 901,916 6,551,520
1974 13,620 3,830,1?5 2,472,701 965,051 7,267,927
1975 13,802 4,081,480 2,593,544 1,032,60r 7,707,629
1976 13,955 4,316,699 2,823,812 1,i04,888 8,245,3~l9 n
Sources: ISTAT (Central Statistics Institute~ tI.abor Statistics Yearbook)
C~;IL, CISL. The 1976 UIL data were furnfshed by the UIL itself.
The rest of the data w~ere w~orked up by us.
( 31~ Auq 78, p 31 , .
[Text) The considerable increase in membezehip by the three labor union
confederations involved every economic activity sector and every qeoqraphic `
aroa. But not unfformly. A detailed examination of the data makes it
possible to show the factors affecting this expanaion.
First of all, polftical tr.adition, deqrees of conflict, Qconomic structure,
scant original presence of labor unionism. In 1976, there were 4,268,881 -
members enrolled in the three confederationsin northern Italy. Retired
union meaibers are also included in these fiqures. There are no separate
dath for them, with the exception of CGIL members. Therefore, the raCe
~ of unionization turns out to be ovarestimated. This rate is 59.4 percent -
in northern Italy (the national rate, including retired members, is 59.t
� percent). In northern Italy, the CGIL has 2,392,773 members; the CISL,
- t,395,469= the UIL, 480,639. The percentaqe ratios are 57 percent, 31
percent, 12 percent, respectively. These fiqures show that the greatest
weiqht qoes to the CGIL, also with reqard t~ the national averaqe.
The high number of waqe-earninq workers in the industrial sector and the
presence of the PCI are strength factors for the CGIL. It is interestinq
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,
to'note that the regione administered by the Communigt party have very high
unionixatfon rateg. Naturally, the largeet contribution tio tihe formatior~
of thig rate was providad by the CGiL. in other words, there is a direct
' rQlation betwden ehe votinq force of the Connnuniat Party and the pregence ~
of the above-meneioned confederation. Take, for example, ~milia-Ftomaqna.
There, in 1976, there were 1,041,549 union mambera ~96.4 percent of the
wsge-earning workers), 755,227 (73 percent) of whom are CGIL mec~bers. I~s
we shall ~ee, a aimilar situation occurs in Tuscany. -
The situation in the northern regions administered by the Christian t~mo-
cratic Party (Venetoo Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adiqe) is quite
. different. In these regions, which havo, however, a good deqree of indus- -
trialization, the CCIL not only does not main~ain the levels attained in
other regions, but it is definitely surpas~ed by the CISL. The rc+t~ of `
unionization itself ,if much lower than the national average. Zn Venetio, _
there are 600,159 union membera (56 percent of tihe waqe-earning workers).
Of these, there are only 252,745 (42 percent) enrolled in tho CGIL, while
the CISL has 288,602 (48 percen~). It shou3d be noted that the economic
structure in Veneto ia not substantially different from ths one in Emilia-
Ftomaqna. TherQfore; tihere is a close relationship between political tra-
dition and labor union presence. With an important characteristic: tihe
~ communist tradition is accompan~ed by a very high labor union participation,
_ much hiqher than what is true of the Catholic tradition.
The opinion is widespread that Italian labor unionism has the larqeat num-
ber of inembers in the aare induatrialized areas. Now, although i~'is true
thae labor unionism in the north has much hiqher levels of organization and
~ activity than the rest of Italy, it is not equally true that a higher rate
of labor union mecnbership by waqe-earninq workers is recorded in that area.
This does not occur in Pieclmont, the most industrialfzed reqion, where
the rate of unionization fs fixed at 43 percant, one of the absolutely
lowest rates, and it does not occur in Lombardy, where the level of union-
ization is higher (56 percent) but still below the natfonal averaqe. A
high deqree of participation in strikes, in the industrial sector, has only
a partial influence on the choice of unfon membership. As further proof
_ of this, in 1968, that is to say before the outbxeak of conflicts in in-
dustry, the raCe of unionization in Lombardy (36 percent) was hiqher than
- the national averaqe (34 percent).
- The narrc~~+ relationship between industrialization and deqrees of unioniza-
tion (in the two rec~ions examined the relation seems definitely to be the
reverse) is also proved by a rapid parallel between reqiQns with a different
deqree of industrializatfon. The larqest number of inea~bers is recorded
precisely in the less industrialized reqions. For exam~le, the rate of
- unionization fn Veneto fs 56 percent. In Friuli-Venezia Giulia it is 59
percent.
l4oreover, the national rate of unionization in industry iteself is lower
than in public administration and in agriculture. In northern Italy, the
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percentaqe increase in union membere in the period frc~m 196A ~0 1976 ie 62
pe~cent, much loyer than the national averaqe increaBe owing ~o the high
initial presence in the Red reqions ~Emilia Romaqna and Liquria) and otirinq -
_ to the gmall percQntage incidence in Piec~aont. ~
In central Italy, there were 1,574,152 lt~bor union members, in 1976, 58.6 -
percent of the total ninaber of workera. Tfie number ie distributed as fol~-
laws among the three confederationss CGIL, 920,032 (58 percent)s CISL,
453,181 (29 percent)t UiL, 200,939 (13 percent). ,
Tuscany is the moat interestinq point in this g~ograFhic area. In that re-
qfon, dominated ~y the PCI, the remarkg ~ade on~ideological nativatfons
of labc~r union niemb~r8hip are ia~cactly confirmed. 7fie dominarit preeence
of the CGIL is confirn~ed there, with 70 percent of the union members and
a rate of unionization of 67 percent, a rate abundantly above the natfonal
averaqe, is recorded. ~'he,most evident confirmation is ~furnished us, haw-
ever, by Lucca Province, the only province in Tuscany adminiatered by the
DC IChristittn Democratic Partyj. The percentage particfpation in the CGIL -
out of the total number of orqanized union members is 48 percent, while
the CISL, which has 22 percent in Tuscany, com~es out here wfth 40 percent.
Although the degrees of conflict showed a definite increase fn nentral
Italy, startinq in 1969, they are stfll within the physioloqical limits,
eapecially if sfght is not loat ~f the situation in the north. Greater .
fragmentation of the productfon situation and a lack of the serious social .
- prablems peculiar to the industrial areas in the north have made labor
conflicts less severe.
_ When wa qo on to examine the South, the first thing noted is the distor-
tion in the strength relations between the confederation orqanizations.
In 1976, of the 2,401,784 union members (58.8 percent of the waqe-earning
workers) the CGIL had 1,003,312 (41.8 percent); the CISL, 975,162 (40.6
- percent)t the UIL, 423,310 (17.6 percent). A first explanat~.on of these
figures is the South's economic structure. In fact, that is where 73 per-
cent of the national total of the waqe-earninq aorkers in aqriculture,
21.7 percent of the waqe-earninq workers in industry and 30 percent of
the r+aqe-earninq workers in sebvices and in public administration are
concentrated. Of the total n~anber of waqe-earninq workers in the South,
20 percent are employed in egricultures 38 peroent, in industryt 42 per-
cent in services and public administration.
Thp weiqht of the bureaucratic structure favors, in the South, the action
of the CISL and the UIL, organizations traditionally more suited for pick-
ing up the consen~us of the middle classe~ and also owinq to thefr rela-
tions with the Christian Democratic Party and the lay parties. Rather,
the activity of the C2SL is often tied to the membership of the party
with a relative majority in the South. The OGIL, which, in the last few
years, has succeeded in doublinq the nt~ber of its a+n members and in
strenqtheninq its structures, is undergoinc~ the initiative of the CISL.
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The closed attitude of many craft federatione and a pract3.ce of corpora- _
,
- e.ivc~ grievances ~re etill preventiing the e~tiablishmenC of new labor union
, etruoturea nnd ranovation and reform Action.
The htqh reeP of percentage in~rease in 1976 in cnmparison with 1968 plus
130 pez.^.en*. ~or the CGYL and plua 108 percent for the C*3L is certainly
explained al~ao by the increage in participa?tion in political activi~y r+~d ~
labor union action, in addition to ~he initial''� ema11 l~bor union ~reg~nce.
7'herefore, the gap with regard to the North is ..ill very pronounced. IdQO- -
loqical dualism (Catholi~c tradition of the CISL and communist tradition of
the CGIL), geoqraphic dualiam (stronq participation in labor union activity
, in the North and survival of the old bureaucratic structurea in the South), -
' social dualiam tworkQr labor unions and middle-c:lasg labor unions) are the
structural facts of ztalian labor unionism, oftien suppreased and ignored.
_ We,ge-earning Workers (in thousands) and Union Members by Con�ederation.
~~ata broken c~aam by large geographic distribution
Southern and inaular Italy (Molise, Abru~zi, Campania, Puqlie, Basilica~a, _
~ Calabria, Sicfly, Sardinia)
Union Members: Absolute Data
Wage-earninq
Year workers CGIL CSIL UIL TOTAL
1968 3,622 435,491 469,470
1972 3,753 615,750 656,743
19'73 3,823 672,960 660,498
- 1974 3,969 845,305 804,426
" 1975 4,024 929,268 861,368 330,719 2,121,265
1976 4,084 ?,003,312 975,162 423,310 2,401,784
Sources: ISTAT (Labor Statistics Yearbook)j CGIL, CISL, UIL.
[3 Sep 78, p 3J
[Textj Confederated labor unionism is present in aqricultu+ce both among -
farniworkers (wage-earning workers) and amonq sharecroppers and tenant farm-
ers (aelf-employed workers), The data furnished by the confederations de-
_ serve special attention. As Table 1 shows, in 1976 there were 1,165,021
farmworkers enrolled as members of confederations, a figure hiqher than
the fiqure furnished by ISTAT, still in 1976, for the total number of wage-
earninq ~rorkers in agriculture. The three labor union confec3erations jus-
tify this phenomenon by mafntaininq that part of those computed by ISTAT
among self-employed workers (tenar~t farmers, assistants, sharecroppers)
are also members of t1~e farmworker federations. The indiscriminate
classification of self-employed workers in fact makes it difficult to
make a definite classification among waqe-earninq workers or amonq self-
employed workere. In case of c]oubt, the conf~derations, primarily the
CGIL, prefer to orqanize part of the far~mers in farmworker federations.
The rea~on is obvious. Amonq the farnw?orkers, the labor union can count
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on almost unanimlty of inembership and on a good orqanizational level, es- ,
pecially after the agreea:ent signed at the end of 1973 committinq the INPS
(Natf onal Social Sacurity Institiute) to make the labor union deduction by
dele