JPRS ID: 8300 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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JPRS L/8300
1 March 1979
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TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA I
(FOUO 5/79)
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BIBLIOGttApHIC DA7A L Itepon No. 4~ J~ Hecipient's Atcesriun Na,
SHEET .1~RS L/8300
~ i~ c~n ~u 1it e S. eportraie
TRAN5LATIONS ON N~1R ~A5'C ANb NORTH AFRICA, (FOi U 5/79) 1 March 1979 ~
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The serial report contains information on socio-economic, government, polieical,
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17. Key 1Cads ~nd Daument Analy~i~. 17a De~eriptor~
' Political Science _Inter-Arab Affairs Libya Sultanate
Socio2ogy North African X Mauritania of Oman
Ecanomics Affairs Morocco Syria
. Culture (Social Sciences) Afghanistan People's Demo- X Tunisia
Ethnology X Algerta cratic Republic United Arab
Geography ~ Bahrain of Yemen Emirates
Teahnological _Egypt Persian Gulf Western
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JPRS L/8300 -
~ 1 Marah 19 79 ,i
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- TRANSLAI'IONS (JN NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRI ~A
(FOUO 5/79~
CONTENTS PAGE
- AtGERIA .
Posaible Candidatea for Preaidency Discuased
- (AL-WATA13 AL-'ARABI~ 11-17 Jan 79) 1
MAURITANIA ~
F
Ould Saleck Facing Difficulties at Every Turn '
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Jan 79)............ 8
� Planning Minieter Dfecuases Country's Poor Econumic Situation
(Mohamed E1 Moktar Ould 2ame1 Interview; AL-WATAN '
AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Jan 79) .......................o....... 14 -
SAUDI ARABIA
Officials View Sovlet Encirclement Danger
(Jerome Dumoulin; L'EXPRESS 13 Jan 79) 17
SUDAN
~ Numayri Facea Div~erse Internal~ External Problema
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 14-20 Dec ~8) 21
TUNISIA
Brahim Tobal Calls Role of Arm~? Increasingly Oppressive
~ (Brahim Tobal; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 22 Jan-4 Feb 79)........,. 24
Ti~ani Abid Leadership of UGTT Denounced, Oppoeition Praised
~ (Cherif Rachid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 25 Dec 78-7 Jan 79)...... 29
~ ~ ' a ' [III - NE ~ A - 121 FOU~)
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ALGERIA
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POSSIBLE CA~IDIDATES FOR PRESIDENCY DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Jan 79 pp 2C-22
(Article: "Surprises in Search for Successor to Boumediene; Algiers: Un-
_ opposed Candidate Ia Not Available and There Is More Than One Compromise
Candidate; Yahiaoui Is Conticlu~tion of Bouniediene But Collective L~adership
Ia One of Pro~ected Sol.utions; Zbiri Group: Democracy Is Fundamental Demand
of All Algeriana"] ~ -
[Text] Algiers--AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI correap4ndent's dispatch--"They may dis-
avow me after my death and bome of the~ !nay spit on my grave, but nobody will
apit on these edifices that I have built here and there by employing the oil '
revenues to create a real industrial base in Algeria..."
This is what Boumediene said in an hour of contemplation during an interview
with a promin~nt European ~ournalist who met with Boumediene a few months
b~fore his death, when there were no indications that Boumediene would fall
the victim of a sudden malignant disease.
It seems obvious that Presiden~ Bownediene felt, being a realistic man, that
people would disagree in ~u~ging him. But he also expressed absolute con-
fideuce that i:he eatablishments that he founded will survive by virtue of
their being the true support for any ruler who would succeed him if such a
- ruler wants~to actually rule the country of the 2 million martyrs and the
2 million problems.
It also seems ~bvious that the scope of selecting new establiahments to re-
place the existing ones ae executive and guidance bases is an extremely nar-
xaH acope under the cs,nopy of the transitional conditions under which Algeria
lives and under which the hPirs coexist.
= The awareneas of this fa~t and acknowledging it as a measure for exclu3ing
any disagreement on the po$t-Boumediene era were the motive for the unanimoua ~
agreement in issuing the Revolution Command Council statement on continuation
of Boumediene's courae and policy in the immediate phase.
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_ But does Chis mean that Che only change wiZl be in ehe: identiCy of Che ruler -
~nd not in hia policy, even though the ruler's peraonal qualitiea and char-
acterietics are usually reflected in hie directiona and courses and even
, though everything aseumea~ by Che logic of th~ngs, tihe peraonal imprint of
the ruler? '
- Yahiaoui on Boumediene's Line
- There is an almoat unanimoua agreement that n~ noteworthy change will occur
in the first etage if agreement is reached on Co1 Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui as
the sole candidate for the presidency, because Che man ia s~milar in many
of his qualities and characteristics to the departed president. He may even
, aurpass him in aueterity and in the desire to keep gway from Che limeli~ht.
_ Yahiaoui livea a modeat life. Those cloae to him note ChaC his wife, wno ~
' has borne him~ aix children, each time entered a popular obsteerica hosp~.tal
and was treated like any other ordinary woman, because Yahiao~i has always
refused any privileges for his family and has refuaed any allowan~es ex-
ceeding his ealary--a salary rapidly conaumed by the needa of his large fam-
_ ily and by inflation.
BuC this unanimous speculation is noi based on a unanimous agreem~nt to se- -
lect Yahiaoui. Perhaps the lieC of candidates which wi11 be presented to
the party congreas on the 29th [sicJ of this manth so that the congress may
aelect one of the candidates ia much longer than many th:.nk, especially if
there c_;,:itinuea to be in the Revolution Command Council a lack of agreemer.t �
on aelecting one candidate from among the coun~cil members. _
Ahmed Ben Cherif Is Compromise Candidate
On the occasion, some circles have begun to pro~eet the name of Ahmed Ben
Cherif, one of the RevolutiQn Command Council members, who is 41 years old,
as a compromiae candidate whose selection can put an end to the competition
of the varioua wings and forces, in additi.~n to the fact that Ben Cherif
does not evoke the fears that Yahiaoui d^es.
It is said in informed circles that there are high-level discussions to make
� the new regime assume the quality af a collective leadership through a solu-
_ tion stipulating that Yahiaoui be selected as presidential candidate, pro-
vided that he app~int in return Abdelazi~ Bouteflike prime minister and Ahmed
Ben Cherif, vice president.
i In any case, evrrything seems to be hanging on the course and discussions
of the FLN Party c~vngress which will be held in 2 weeks.
A decision has been taken setting the 25th of this month as the date for
convening the apecial FLN congress. 'L'he decision was taken at the beginning
of the :~~w year at a ioint meeting between P.abah Bitat, the interim president,
and the Revolution Command Council members.
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At tlint meeting~ it wna decided Co foYm a preparatory committee to aeaume
the tusk of holding the congreae~ which will nominate the so~e candidate Co
, aucceed Baumediene. The commitCee includes Mrs (Jenroud), chairman of the
Women'~ Federation, and n number of miniatera, including Ben H~mouda~ the
miniatsr of public works, and Belaid Abdesaelam, Che ministier of light in-
duetry (as representative of the Kabyle aector). -
The participation of Cal Slimane~Hoffman, who ia in charge of ex~ra senai-
tive security tasks and who~e role has been expanding since President
Boumediene ga;. aick, has drawn the attention of obaervers. It has also been
noticed that Che statement concerning hia parCiciparion in Che committce de-
acribes him ae "chairman of the Foreign Relations Bureau."
A new military elemen~, namely Col Hachemi Had~eres who ia commander of one ~
of the military disf:ricta, has entered the preparatory committee. Ahmed
Taleb Ibrahimi, who was tied by spzcial friendship to the late president,
_ has also been included in Che committee.
Contacts With Oppositian
, Informed Algerian sourcea have also said that the Revolution Command Council -
has entrusted Col Slimane Hoffman with the Cask of contacCing the opposition
leaders living abroad in an attempt to achieve a national reconciliation be-
fore the congress is tield on 25 January to get complete agreement on one
candidate.
These sources have added thaC to win over domestic and external opposition
and to put an end to its attacks, the higher authorities are now studying
the possibility of introducing a constitutional amendment limiting the pr~s-
_ ident's terdi to 4 or 5 years as an initiative inCended to reassure that the
~ door of disucsaions for amendments will remain open so as to preserue
national unity.
_ It might be premature to speculate on what developmenCs may crop vp in these
2 weeks before the convocation of the FLN Party congress, but oba~arvers do
not find it unlikely that the element of 3urprise will play its r.�ole at any
moment, especia].ly if the preaent ahaky balance between the vari-ous agencies
in thi~ period of compulsory truce is upaet. -
. The consultative conference of the National Youth Federation, ~~hich started
its works at the Palace of Nations last Saturday and ended them at the be-
- ginning of thie week, is part of the preparations for the conf3ress and for =
completing its fundaaental basea.
This conference is considered the last in a series of conferences to lay
down the permanent foundations of the FLN Party agenciea. This conference
= was preceded by a conference of the labor unicns in March last year, a con- ~
ference of the peasants in April~ a conference of the war veterans in May
_ and a conference of the women's organizat~.ona in October.
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Thie sr.udent conference has attracted the special attention of observers
becauae of the eCate of reatleaeness Chat began to emerge among ehe studenta, -
especi~lly at the beginnin~ of the current academic year, and becauae of the
emergenee of signg indicating an independenC ~nclination that re~ecra or dis-
agreea with the organizaCions auggested for the student councils, and that
- demanda greater freedom in the university campus, as it demanda that the
aCipulated student aid noC be reduced, eapecially in regard ko reduced trana-
portation farea and to housing.
Perhaps the source of the obaervera' intereaC in the student gathering is
due to Che fack that iC repreaents mnre than 10,000 students, who constitute
' the future technical cadrea in the various departmente, and due Co the ability
of the stud~nCs tu establiah contact with ancl to influence the massea, in
addition to the preaence of evidence that many nf the atudent elements aym-
~ pathize with Che underground oppoeition. '
On Che occasion of [the atart of] .the academic year, the security agencies -
prepared a report on the situation in the student circles in which they said
_ that the student circlea have turned into a cenCer for infiltration by ~he
~ Socialist Vanguard Party which uses many of Che atudent gatherings sympathi-
zing with it as inatruments~ and which has inherited the cadres of the A1-
gerian Communiat Party that turned into underground acCion after it c,~as dis-
sol~~ed in 1962.
It seems that conflict has escalated recently in Che student circles between
the leftist elem~nts and the tradiCional Islamic elements. This conflict -
was crystallized in the violent quarrels that erupted on the eve of the con-
ference in the city of Constantine because of differences over the method of
selecting delegation members to the conference. -
Perhaps this explains the strict security measures which were supervised by
_ Col Slimane Hoffman on the occasion of the holding of the conference, which
is considered a barometer of the political mood of the Algeria~? elite.
Lights on External Opposition - ~
Even though there are indications uf the escalating whisper campaigns that
are being launched by the domestic opposition which has refused the idea of
= a truce until the convocation of the congress on the 25th of this month, ~con- -
sidering such a truce an obstacle preve:.ting it from expressing its opinions
in an effective direct or indirect manner in the congress or on its periph-
eries, other signs indicate that the external opposition is still feeling
its way to reach a common program toward the real goals of the inclinations
- of the ruling Algerian agencies and eatabliahments [to be founded] thraugh
the FLN Party congrese.
Interview With Ahmed Mahsas
Contrary to what has been recently said and reiterated by the western press,
no official contacts in the fult sense of the c~~:~ have yet been made between -
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- tt~e oppoaition and the of.ficials of the ruling lea~~ership in Algeria. This
is at least wha~ Ahmed Mahsr~e, one of Che +~oet prominenC opposition lea~lers,
has sCreased Co AL-WATAN ~!.L-'ARABI. -
Mahene (a former member of the Revolution Ccmmand Council and of the FLN
Polit~.cal ~ureau and a former miniater of agriculture and agrarian reform)
formed wi'th ltis tw~o colleagues Taher Zbiri (commander of the chiefa of staff
, of the people's army and former member of the Revolution Command Council, and
the well~-known hero of the coup atte:mpt again~st the late President Boumediene)
and Kaid Ahmed, known ae Ma~or Slimane (a former member of the Revolution -
~ Command Council and minister of finance, planning and Courism and former FLN .
_ official)--tihe three formed a popular organization known as the National
Coalition for Democracy arid Revolution in Algeria.
'L'his coalit~.on has several opiniona on Che developments in Algeria atid on the
= post-Boumediene era. These opinions were expressed by Mahsas in Chis inter-
view with AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI:
[Queation] How do you evaluate the post-Bownediene era or how do you view
- things after Boumediene's departure?
(Answer] Ws believe that the late President Boumediene constituted Che back- -
bone of the entire regime. His departure means the fall of the main layer
of thi~ regime, along with the aubsequent resulCs. We believe that the ~
existing regime is not fit for the Algerian socipty for several reasons, the
the most important being the absence of democracy and the handling of the
country's affaira in a dictatorial manner. Democracy is the fundamental =
demand of all the Algerians inside and outside the country. We are fully
- aware that the ruling group believes that the people are not qualified to
receive and absorb democracy to solve their historical problems. This is a
mistake, because tnere are political figures, currents and leaders capable
of organizing and di:ecting democracy in the interest of the people. Recent
years have proven that the existing regime is incapablQ of solving the exist-
_ ing problems with the means that it is using, be they economic, social nr
political problems.
Ther~fore, our view of th~ poat-Boumediene era relies on the following main-
stays: Regardless of the type of developments that we or the new phase will
witness, it is important to lay down the foundations of the new regime on
- democratic structures and establishments. This is a fundamental right of -
every Algerian citizen and a right that should not be squapdered.
Democracy is capable of eafeguarding the revolutionary gains and the genuine
heritage, contrary to all claima to the opposite.
Socialist Democracy
[Question] WhaC kind o� democracy specifically?
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~ [AnswerJ To p�t it briefly, we demand a aocialiet democrgcv based on the _
multiplicity of partiea, freedom of Che preas and of publication and fre~dom
of elections. -
[Queation] Doea this require a comprehenaive rer_xaminaCion of all the exist- _
ing establishmente, and perhaps pro~ected goals? - ,
[Anawer] As for the revolutionary goals and options, we expreas no reser-
vationa or opposition that would �oil these options. We agree on the main
- goals, but re~ect the means adopted to achieve these goals. Specifically,
we re~ect the realization of Che economic goals with the d3ctatorial method
adopted. Thia means that we call for adopting the method of democratic dia-
logue when diacuseing or examining any political or economic plan or viaual-
ization.
[Quzstion] Have there b een any contacts between you and the leaders of the
present regime? -
[AnswerJ There are numerous rumors that have been circulaCed by many papers
' on thi:s issue, but we canr.ot say officially that such conCacts have actually
taken place. All rhat can be said is that opinions and viewpoints have been '
exchanged on several issueQ .
We Will Take Part in Government if...
[Question~ Can this exchange of opinions result in any certain 3evelopments?
We mean: Is there any possibility of your returning to the country to take
- part in the government, for example? '
- [Answer~ The issue does not~lie in thts question, i.e. it does not lie in
the possibility of our participating or not participating in the government. _
, The i.ssue goes beyond opposition as ind~viduals to reach goals and options -
in whose light we must work.
In other words, the fundamental issue of concern to us as opposition lies in
this question: Will the new regime produced by the post-Boumediene era be
capable of proceeding in democratic directions?
Our position on participating or not participating in government w~ll be
det~rmined in the light of the answer to this question. .
- [Question] To put it differently, are there certain conditions for your
- acceptance i:a participate in the new governmerit?
[AnswerJ We will participate in the government if a specific agreement is
reached on ~he democratic options.
[Question] Do you have certain candidates co succeed Boumediene?
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[Anewer) The naries are not imporCanC~ I will repeat: Whati ia importanC -
- is chanRing the syatem~
[Question] Are you personally opti.mietic in this respect? '
[Anawerj Yee. The will for change is present among the various aecturs of
the people and thia wi11 mus~ be ultimaCely translated at ~he practical 1eve1.
_ [Question) But the opposftion did not move until after Boumediene's death.
Where was thia opposition throughout the preceding period?
[AnswQr] No, the oppoaition has been and is:still moving damesCically~and
externally. Otherwis~, how can you explain the liquidations to which many
- of t~~ose who had b~en in the opposition were exposed? As for the information
blackout, the haras:sment and the persecutions, they are all problems emanating
from the oppressiv~ charactEr of the regime. -
Our Position Toward Sahara Problem. !
[Question] Where does the opposition's strength lie: in the army or in
- the people? What is, exactly, the oppositi~n's strength?
[Answer] (Mahsas laughs bef~re answering) Why do you want me to reveal our
cards to you? Be sure that the opposition has roots in the various sectors
of the people. ~
[Questien] Would a ca1~ ta ~ne opposition f or a national reconciliation be
possible,ir the oppositiort itself is fragmented?
[Answer] The opposition is not united yet. This is true. However, cease-
less contacts have been made to unite this opposition or to reach agreement
on a future cooperation formula. As for the issue of national reconciliation, ~
this is possible when democracy is achieved. This is the fundamental con-
, dition and inlet.
[Question] A finai question: What is the National Coalition's position on
the Sahara problem?
[Answer~ Our position is clear. We are against any solution that leads to
the outbreak of war between Morocco and Algeria. Is it permissible to have
100,000 people killed, for example, in a war to have a state with a popu-
lation of no m~re than 60,000 people created? This is ~ust a question. -
COPYRIGHT: 1978 A1-Watan A1-'Arabi '
8494
CSO: 4402
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� MAURTTANIA
OULU SALF.CK FACING DIFPI(:ULTIES AT EVERY TURN
Paris JEiUNC ArRIQUE in French l7 Jan 79 pp 30-34
[Article by Siradiou Di-allo: '!Power Sometimes Feels Impotent Against Harsh
ftc~ility"; passages in ~lantlines are emphasized in the text]
['1'ext~~' At dawn on 1Q July 1978 the Mauritanian army ovei�threw President
Mokhtar Oulcl Daddah. Six months have gone by. The new lea:iers have had
to confront tlie same problems as the preceding government, iti~ a Maghreb =
ti~:at is still tcetcring between war and peace. Siradiou Diallo went to
sec w}~~it tl~cy have already done and what they expect to do. "I never -
tl~ouglit ~eace would be an easy weapon to use," President Ould Saleck told him.
Six months after the coup that ended in the overthrow of President Mokhtar =
Ould Daddah (10 July 1978) and the army's taking power5 Mauritania lives in =
ti~e expectation of some miracle.
In the euphoria of their victory, Colonel Mcustafa Ould Mohamed Saleck and
his comrades on the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) promised
all at once a quick peace in th~ Sah~ra, an eaxly recovery of the economic
situation, the complete and immediate liberalization of commerce and measures
furthering national unity and ~ssuring social justice. '
But measured againstxhe weight of the responsibility and the size of the job,
- Mokhtar Ould Daddah's "losers" now seem to have been both prudent and careful. ~
Like many others before them, they quickly learned that power is only a shiny
veneer hiding the bedrock of special interests and that when faced with the
hard facts of domestic and foreign affairs, princes sometimes find they are
impotent. So it is in the Sahara affair.
Obviously no one can doubt their sincere w~sh quickly to achieve peace and
harmony in the region.
Under the circumstances, however, good intentions are not enough. The n~w =
masters of Nouakchott have aicreasedtheir contacts and held secret meetings -
with representatives of the Polisario Front and requested the mediation and
blessings of friendly capitals like Paris, Abidjan, Tripoli, Madrid or Bamako,
but all in vain: they have heen unable to untangle the Saharan knot. At most
8
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, thcy urn saiJ tc~ hc wi 11 in~ to let ~;o of 'i'iris el-Gh~7rbici, the piece o~
ticiharu thtit fcll t~ them hy virtue nE the Madrid ~preemCnts of November 1975,
~ Iluwr~vcr, thcy h,~ve rc~?lized in the ic~st G m4nths th;~t ~;iving lt ur unil~~trrnlly
, wc~ii 1 ~.1 nc~t sn 1~�c thr ~~rot~ 1 etn, f~iorocca doe~ nnt intend tc~ y i e 1 cl i t s S~ih~r~n pro-
vince ,it Utly pCiCr,. As lon~ 1s that is thc cese, the war will ~o on in th~
rc~;ion, drnk~;ing the ~faurit~ninns H~illy-nilly into its w~ke,
_ lt is h,nrd for M~t!rit~nia alone to get out of the S:~h~r~n r~ornrts' nest,
'fh~ su~lcler realiz,~tion o~ thase hard geopolitical facts sheds new light on
' thc he~;it,ntions ~nd temporizinX that oc~ur in ~1~uritanian dfficfals~ contra-
~fictory clrcl;ir:itions,
'1'w~~ ex;imt~les wiil suffi~c to illustrate their emb~rr~ssment ~nd outline the -
r.h,~n~;inK shape of their diplom~~cy, where ~n increasing numbcr of mistakes ~re
_ ~liic tc~ incx~~c�~ ien~c. On ZR 5eptember 1h78 the xovernment press published a
i isi c~f imrnrt;~nt ~~reFertor~l changes, All the appcinted prefe~ts were on it ~
rxc:c~~t thc anc ~or 't'i ri s cl-Ghnrbit~. /"Wc didn't w~nt to upset the pol isario,"/
_ ;i hi~h ottici~il told us.
11 sec:on~i cx:~mpic: io resrond to the good-will gestures by the Polis~rio, the
~;ovcrmncnt ~iccidcd to set freC somc SO 5~haran prisoners on 8 berember. As
thr rirr~h tclephone works better in Nou~kchdtt th-?n in ~ny other south 5aharan
c:~~~it:~l ~ the wholc city w:~s informed of it wel l l~e�ore it happened. 'Thus,
khrn IN prisoners lcft hcadq~arters that aay to t~ke the m~in rn~d to town,
a I:ir~;c crowd w~s w,~itin~ for th~m. '~here was even ar~ exchange of grretings
hctwcen thc hc,7dqu~irters commanding offirer, Lieutenant Colenel I~iohamed Khouna
_ Ould ?I,,id711a, and a spokesman for the liberated prisoners. The former regretted
h:~ving hacl to put /"brothers"/ in jail, and the latter thanked the army for its
/"~ooJ t;eatment, especi111y since tlie events of 10 July."/
in a lordly manner the headquar~ers commander did not hesitate to summon forth
:~n officcr dcsiknated to provide pocket money and provisions for the prisoners,
who wcrc withnut supplies and obliged to make a long trek homc. Curiously,
thc ~;overnment media (radio and press) did not breathc a word about this amazing
disrl,~y of fr.7ternization , which was filmed by French television and broadcast
to the f~ur corners of thc earth that very evening. {Vhy this excess of discre-
tion? (3ec.7use, a hikh-ranking officer informed us, /'~we men of the desert do
not likc to hlow our own trump~t."/ �
'fhc faccs are murh m.7re hrosaic. In both cases ~he authorities' behavior is
cx~il.7inc~i :~hovc :~I1 by their inability to extricate ~fauritania alone from the
~:ihhran harncts~ nest. Colonel Ould Saleck is a cat un a hot tin roof: he is
i~cin~ r;~l icd I~y Al~;cri:i and thc Saharan fightcrs on the one hand to recognize
imme~li;itcly the fuil anJ camplete independence of Western Sahara, Mhile hiorocco
is ur~in~ him, on thc othcr hand, to honor the commitments stemming from the
hl:iciri~i ;i~;reements ,tind, consequently, to continue the "war of resistance."
ti:ilerk's :~II-roints missions, which often c~nclude with declarations about
/"~~antc~ctti witl~ the T'olisnrio~"/ do not fool anyone.
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t~t)It ~tl~t~rClnl, U;;I: ctNi,v
W;i i t i n~ I'c~r Al~;er i;i, W~i i t i n~; tor Mor~cCO...
/1 forci~;n ~li1~lnrnnt ~ont'icicd to us thnt both Nouakchott anct Itub~it nnw think
th,~t /"nothln~; is rossihlc bc~ore ci new tc~m tnkes over in AlKarin.'~/ 'I'he
~?r~~tic~i~~r ot' Mr Chcikhnii Oulcl I~foh.imecl I,a~;hclr?t, ~lnurit~~ni,~n ministcr ot (~c~rci~;n
~1f'f';~ i rti, ;it thr funCrul ot' I~resiJent Ildunri 13~umeclicnnc, thcn, ~~t thc be~inning
ot' .)unuury, f'riendly otfic:it~l decl?~r~tions regarding Algeri~i and the I'olisario
cr,n~irm thi~. Nounkchott seems tu be secking a rapprochement with Algiers in
ho~~e~s th~t (3oumedlennc's successors will ~llnw them to move tow~rd the "gener~l,
clefinitc" rettcc thcy desire.
'I'hc Mauritiini~n lcaders~ room for m~neuver is ull the more limited because
- hldre~c:c:o is ~lrt~gging its fnet in evaeu~ting the troops it hss stationed in �
thc nortliern pnrt of the country. In Nauakchott, it is b~ing whispercd abnut
tli:~t tlic DlorocCnns flutly refused to lcave. /"'~here~s nothing to it,"/
Culonel Mnustufn Ould 5aleck confided fio us. The htauritanian head of sta~e -
_ ncvcrthrlcss pdmits the Moroccans /"nre being a little slow in organizing
ti~c~r transpCrtati~n ~or thc ev~~cuation."/ This did not kcep him from stnting -
cl~;it /"lietween now ~~nd t}ie encl of tlie first quarter of 1979, the Atoroccan
troo~is wi 11 bc Com~~letely gonc.'~/
'i'hc Ilc:~vy t3urden of f~oreign Debt
'I'hough it is not as cli~ficult, thc economic :cituation is nonetheless deiicate.
/1n official clocument entitled as a financial and economic recovery plan has
t~cen ~~rcpnred by thc ministry of plunning wit:h the help of two experts from
thc Wor1J I3,7nk. Tliis do~ument states that /"precarious situation"/ exists -
in the bal,7nce of payments and public financE~s. The result is that the foreign
Fin:incc situatinn is /~~very disquieting."/ '1'here are several reasons. F~rst,
thc persistent bad situation on the world irc>n market means less foreign cur- -
rency c:oming in (almost exclusively f,rom the sale of iron ore). Second, import
rrices continue to increase.
/lddecl to th7t is tlic hcavy burden of foreign debt resulting from past commit-
ments. 'I'i~e rcport states that in the last 5 years Mauritania borrowed about
SI15 ini 1 I ic~n ;i yc;~r (about 25 hil:ion francs CFA [African Financial Community])
fc~r ~~rojects that wil] havc no shnrt or medium term effect on the gross domestic
~~rc~ciuct. 'I'his is especially ~the case with the deep-water port of Nouakchott
_ :~nJ thc Nou;ikchott-Kiffa-Nema road.
'I'licrc :~rc :ilso thc Prestigc projects of doubtful profitabili~y, like the sugar
cnm~~lex I~uilt in the port zone of Nouakchott and the Nouadhibou oil refinery:
tl~etia two t'ine, completel'y built plants are rusting away because they cannot
i~c ~~sc~l, tiic tormer bec~use after the plant was finished it was found that the
m:~ci~inery Ji~l not meet the desired su~ar cake production norms; the latter
he~;~use it was desi~;ned to process A:gerian oil and can no longer be supplied.
- 10
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- ht thc ri~cl c~t A~~ri I 1~)7ti torcign publ ic debt ranched $711'tnil lion. I:ven if' -
thc~ ral'inoin~in~; c~~ dehtti tn I,iby;i iincl ~loroc:cn is tt~ken into r~ccotmt, tha timount
wi I I tit i I i re:ich rihuttt ~1?2 mi l lion (about 14 hil lidn frnncs C(~A) 7 ya~ir betwcen
I!17~i sin~i I!~ti3. 'I'his ;~nioui~t:; to 3U perc;ent o~ exhort earnings. It is under- .
_ ~;t;incinhic~ th;it mnn~ylanclcrs wnulcl hesitate to c;nmmit themsclvcs in thc ubsencr
~t' mc,~suras h~in~; tnken to c:orrect thc situati~n quic:kly.
'I'ha ~;c~vcrrunent hns undertuken to chnnge cour:;a Uy putting ~ ceiling on oper~-
tin~; cx~~entics ancl by inrrcasing reccipts. IVliile endeavoring to have creditors
rcft~i;in~c thc debt, the government is thus striving to be vcry strict in the
~lioicc ot new investments. In particul~r, it intends to be very prudent in
~;r,inting endorsements or gunranteeing foreign lnnns to private or semi-public
conccrn:~,
I,ihcr;il izin~; in Austarity
- 'I'hc cx~~crt~:~ rr~~ort rc~ommencls fib;incioning ull projects that /"c:annot bc justi- -
f i c~i t'i n~in~ i c~ I 1 y un~l economica 11 y. I3ec~use of the t ight budget, the govern-
ment will r~o lon~;cr grant subsidiCS to projects that are in trouble, be they
i~uhlic or j~rivate. 'i'he World Dank experts even recommend th~t the Nouadhibou
oil refincry and the Nouukch~tt sugar complex not go into operation /"until
it iti cle~~rly establishecl thut their operation will not encumber either the
hai~~nce of payments or the budget."/
11s for thc thrce im~~urt~~nt projects that started up a few weeks ago, the guelbs,
tlic ~~ort of Nouakchott and the Kif�a-Nema road, the first seems to have won the
a~i~iroval of the ex~crts C~illed to the bedside of the Mauritanian economy while ~
thc othcr two aprc~ir to have been saved from the IVorld Bank experts~ knife only
I~ec:iusc tl~cy wcre so far advanced.
'I'lie :iusterity ~measures are already causing a ccrtain morose outlook among hiauri-
tanian businessmen. Sincc the govcrnment is here, as elsewhere, the biggest
rustomer, a tight-bud~et policy could nnt fail to have repercussions on the
markctrlacc. That is why many companies have stopped work and laid off workers.
/"lVe will start up .?~;ain,"/ a husinessman tol~] us, /"once the new government
I~,i~ ~~ussrcl the exum that S,iu~li /lrabia is now giving it."/ In fact, even the
immc~nse r�~sque under construction in the ce*~ter of Nouakchott through the genero- `
- sity of King Khalid is now only a giant ~host of steel and concrete where sea
I~ircis t~razenly hidc from sandstorms and thc dread desert wind.
'I'I~c memhcrs of the liberal ~rofessions had becn promised by the new government '
tl~:~t tl~cir activities would be quickly and completely liberalized, but they
~untir,uc to wait and are ~etting a little impatient. Doctors are in a hurry to
o~~en ~~riv:~te c:l incs and pl~armacists, their own stores, but on the whole they -
rcmain retiolutely optimist6c especially because the liberalization they wish
t'or hati tounJ an initi;il api~lication in the nerve center of money.
?1
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" ,5incr. Sr~~temher 1h78, tha Central [3tink nF Mauritnni~ h~s ~;iven up Its J~nwrr
to ;tuthoriz~ imJ~drts in thc nrea of products of prima ner.essit~~. 5u~h operti-
tian~ iirr nc~w ~;ivan c~ver tn sipJ~ointac~ intcrmadiaries, I,ikewisC, htauriC~~nS,~ns
~i ra ~~ei i c~n~;er r~c~~i i r�acl to clec: l urc hnw much forc i~;n c:urrrnc:y they h~~vc in the i r ~
~ ~u~ssetisinn whan th~y raturn to thc cnuntry. A recent measurc ,ilsv tends to
nli~;n thc nugulyu (tl~~ nntional mnnetary unit, equiv,7lent tn 5 fr7nCS CrA)
_ w?th the Cf~A fr~nc. Thc new gdvernment is not s~tisfied with e~sing its con-
trol ovcr CXC}1U11j~C rntes; it h~s ~lso decided to join within the next few
months tha West Africa cle~ring house, whence some have nlre~dy hastened
to predic:t that M~?uritnniu will sdon rejoin the West Afric7n Monetnry Union
(UMOA), n bank of issue that includes genin, thc Ivory Const, Upper Vd]tn,
Niger, Seneg~l ttnd Togo.
Ot' r.oursc, Coloncl hioustufa Ould ~lohamCd 5a1~Ck and his comr~des on the C~1RN
circ in f7vor ot clnse cooperatinn between the Centr~l gank of rtauritania 7nd ~
' tha IiCI:AO (Centrr~l Bank or" the West African 5tntes), the headqunrters o~ which
wus recently trans~erred from f~aris to bakar. Contacts are being made between
thc two bnnks to est~blish the menns of this coop~ration, and Colonel Ould
5nleck has asked I'resident Ilouphouet-Boigny to help him find 7 formula tht?t
is l~oth quick uncl 7ccept7ble for both monetary systems.
Ilc~wever,in Mauritnnia itself, afficials who are knowledgeable ~bout the matter
Jo not sccm cnthusiastic nbout a pnssible return to the UI~tOA, ~t least as it
now n~~er;ites, They think tht~t its credit mechanisms are so restri~tive that
thcy dcliberately block the economic development of inemUer countries. It is
/"n real r.conomic rfalthusianism,"/ one of the opponents of such a return told us.
'fhc M