JPRS ID: 8302 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-OOSSORO00'100030005-2
~ , ~ ~ i ur i

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
FOR 01=FICIAL USE ~NLY
JPRS L/8302
_ 2 MArch 19 79
~
TI~ANSLATIONS ON USSt~ MILITARY AFFAIRS
,
CFOUO 7/79)
,
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
FOR OFFI CIAL USE 0[YLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
,
- IVOTE
JI'ft5 publicarions conCain informaCion primarily from foreign
newspupers, periodic~ls and books, buC also from news Agency
Cranymissione nnd brnadcasCs. MaCerials from foreign-language -
source~ ~re trttnslnted; those from ~nglish-language sources
are transcribed or reprinCed, with the original phrasing and
other chnracCeriseics reCained.
tleadlines, editorial reports, And materinl enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPR5. processing indicators such as [TextJ
or (ExcerpC] in Che first line of each iCem, or following the
last line of a brie~, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicaCor is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or exCracCed.
Unfamiliar n~mes rendered phonetically or transliterared are
enclosed in parenCheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in par.entheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as approprf.ate fn context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within ~he body of an
item originate with the source. Times within irems~are as -
- given by souzc:e.
Ti~e contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION -
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
010LIOGRAPNIC DA7A K~hn� No~ 2. J~ Necipient'a AceeaRion Nu.
SHEET JPRS L/ 8302
1. u i~ ~~m ~u u 5. epott ~te -
1'IUINSI,AT[ONS ON U5Sit MLLL'l'AftY API~AIRS, (FOUO 7/'/9) 2 MarCh 1979 ,
6~
7. Au~hurf,l 8. Per(ut�:.in` Ore~ni:~tion Rept,
No. -
9. ('~rrlwnting Org~niz~tiun N~me �nd Addres� 10. Pcojeet/T~sk/Wotk Unit No~
JoinC Publicatione Reeearch Service
- 1000 North Glebe Road t1. Conenct/Gr~nt No. -
- Arlington~ Virginia 22201
12, Sponsnring Org~niz~tion N~me ~nd Addre~~ 13, Typc of Repoct k Period
- Coveted
_ A8 B~IOV@
~ 1,~
15. Suppleme~tary Note� ~
16. Abatr~cts -
~'1 The report containa information on the Soviet military and civil defense
establishments, leaderahip, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs,
~ organization, and equipment. `
17. Kcy Words and Document Analy~i~. 17a. Deacriptort
US5R ~
Military Organization~
- Military Facilities
Military Personnel
lTb. Idenci(iers/Open-Ended Term�
- 17e. c'n~ATI Firid/Group ],SC '
18. Availibilicy Seatement 19. Security Cl~ss (This 21. I~o. o( Paaes
FOR OFFICIAL USG ONLY. Limited Number of R~po~c~ 42 -
Copies Available From JPRS .�o~~~y ,s, ~ h~s 22, r;~e
Raae
UNCLASSIFIED -
~~OAM Nt13�)7 ~plV. )�7i1 VSCOMM�OC UYSO�P77
THIS FORM NAY BE REPRODUCED
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
F'OR OF'I'rCIAL USE ONLY
~ JPRS L/8302
2 March 1979 "
TRANSLATIONS 'ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 7/79)
CONTENTS PAGE _
Commenta on China's Anti-Soviet Course
(Yu. Petrov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
Oct 78) 1
Commenta on Night Operations of NATO Motorized Infantry -
Companies
~ (A. Kol~tsov; ZARUSEZiiNQYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
Oct 78) 8
~
Comments on U.S. Flight Training Simulators and Method6
(G. Osip;,v, N. Koleanikov; ZARUBEZHNOYE
VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, OcC 78) 13
Comments on NATO Pilot Rescue Methods and Equipment ~
(0. Oblipov, et al.; ZARUBEZHNOY~ VOYENNOYE
OBOZRENIYE, Oct 78) 15
Comments on Western Antisubmarine Defenae of an Aircraft
Carrier Group
(A. Chistyakov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE
. OBOZRENIYE, Nov 78) 17
Comments on the U.S. Sixth Fleet
(I. Karemov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE
~ OBOZRENIYE, Nov 78) 25 -
~ Comments on U.S. Navy Automated Control and Communications =
System �
(I. Loshchilov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE
OBOZRENIYA, Nov 78) 31
Commenta on the U.S. Guantanamo Base
(Yu. Sedov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYFNNOYE
OBOZR~NIYE, Nov 78) 40
- a' IIII - USSR - 4 FOUO)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~OR O~FICIAL USE ONLY
COt~tENTS ON CHINA'S ANTI-SOVIET COURSE -
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 10, Oct 78 -
sigr,ed to presa 5 OcC 78 pp 23-28
~ [Article by Col Yu. Petrov: "China in Alliance with the Reaction-
aries"]
[Text) It was obaerved at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union that the pc~licy of the current leaders of China is
openly directed against the ma~ority of the socialist states. "Further-
= more," General Sacretary of the CPSU Central CommiCCee Comrade L. Y.
Brezhnev said in the Accountabillty ReporC of the Central Committee to
- the party congress, "it stands right alongafde the position of the most
_ extreme regctionaries in the world, from the militarists and enemiea of
detent~ in the Western countries to the racists of 9outh Africa and the
~ fascist rulers of Chile. This policy is not only completely devoid of
socialist principles and ideals; in actuality it has become an im-
portant reser~e for imperialism in its struggle against socialism."
Bei~ing's feveriah attempts to stop detente, prevent disarmament, and
sow mistrust and hostility among different atates and its endeavors
to provok~ a world war and itself come out ahead present a great
danger to all peace-loving peoples.
The Bei3ing leaders use the Maoist notion of "three worlds" as the
theoretical substantiation of their foreign policy activities. This
conception was first proclaimed in 1974, but since then it has been
somewhat revised, above all to strengthen its anti-Soviet orientation.
According tn this idea sll the countries, regardless of their social -
- orders, are divided into "three worlds." In the first the Bei~in~ _
_ "theoreticians" put the "superpowers": the USSR and the United States.
- The second i.s the industrially developed countries (both capitalist _
and socialist), and the third, of which Beijing claims leadership, is
~ all the developing countries, including those with the most reactionary,
anticommunist regimes.
The purpose of the idea of "three worlds" in its current form is to
_ ~ustify the policy followed by the Maoist leadership of total hostility
1
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
FOR OFFICIAY.;~L~~ ~~~`Nl.;Y
~ ,
;Z~~;;.
_ Co the SovieC Union. Thie iden is ~.nCended to unify Che reactionary
fnrces to cre~te an internattonul anti-SovieC front. The Chineae
le~ders formally proclaim Che necessiCy of creaCing a front fer the
etru~gle agninst the two "super powera~" but in reality th3s "struRgle
against hegemony" has an openly anCi-Soviet character. ,
_ While aligning itself wiCh the imperialiat etates, Bei~inR noC only -
call~ on them Co unite againot the "enemy," which is the USSR and Che
other socialist countries, but even tries to uae them to build up ita
own military-economic potential. -
The Bei~ing leadere, while following their anCi-Soviet policy, have -
adopCed a primary line of rapprochemant with the United StaCes. They -
say Chat Bei~ing and Washington have many "common" and "para11e1"
interesta. Hua Guofeng and other Chineae leaders essentially agree
with those openly imperialistic aspecCs of U. S. policy which
prevent the alleviation of.international Cension, promoCe the arms
race, and mainCain the U. S, military hegemony in Western Europe and4
certain regions of Asia.
"The Bei~ing leaderahip insists on mainCaining an Americat~ military
presence in Asia," American professor S. Spector, who visited China,
- reported. "The Chinese leadership is demanding thaC U. S. Armed
_ Forces stay in South Korea and Japan~ China favors keeping and en-
larging U. S. naval forces in the western parC of the Pacific and in
the Indian Ocean. China does not want the United States to withdraw ~
from Southeast Asia." They ~ustify this position with references to
the supposed Soviet threat. On many international issues discussed at
the United Nations, Bei~ing forms a bloc with Washington. It is also
common knowledge that the former U. S. Secretary of State Schl~singer
and former naval chief Zumwalt, who are died-in-.*.he-wool opponents of
detente and represent the interests of the military-industrial complex,
were received with great pomp in Bei~ing.
A mutual search continuea for channels of military-technical coope'~.-;
ation bPtween the PRC and militarist circles in the United States. In
this connection, the press in many countries has called attention to
the recent trip to China of an American government delegation led by -
F. Press, the U. S. president's advisor for science and technology.
The Japanese newspaper SANKYOI SHII~IBUN reported that this delegation
conducte~ talks about supplying China with equipment for military and
spy satellites and various electronic equipment which could be used
for military purposes. Bei~ing, the newspa~er observed, is trying to
receive military-technical documents from the United States, including
- documents on missile building.
According to reports in the foreign press, the U. S. Government is re-
moving one limitation after another on the export to China of thosa
types of madern technological equipment that can be used for military
purposes. The administration in Washington has become particularly
active in reviewing the question of relaxing checks on exports to the
PRC after the trip to Bei~ing by presidential advisor for national
security Z. Brzezinski and his talk with the Reijing leaders.
2 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
I
~'OR OFFICIAL U5~ ONLY
Represent~Cives of American imperialiyt circles are counCing on China's
_ deep-aented anti-Sovietiam~ "China hs~s become ~n ully o� Che United
5CuCes. The I3ei~ing leuderghip is promoting a sCron,ger NATO and sup~ -
porting American diplomacy in a number of problems, beginning wtth the
Middle Eas~ and ending with Soueh A~in," wroee R~ Solomon, one of ~
Brzezineki'o aseistanCa, in the ~ournal FOR~IGN AF~ATRS. Bei~ing is
makinR great efforta by var.ious meana to slow down or. completely prevent
the Soviet Union and the United 5tatea from reaching agreement on Che ~
iasues of deCente, limitation of strategic offensive weapons, and other
matters of great internaCional imporCance for strengChening peace Chrough-
out the world.
While maintainin.g a policy hostile Co the SovieC Union and the socialisC
counCries, the Chinese leaders have underCaken a rapprochemant with the
Weatern European membera of NATO on questions of military-political
_ cooperaCion and conducting ~oinC actions against the peace-lovinR policy
of the USSR and Che other socialisC countries. linder the pretext of
strengthening "general security" from a supposedly growing threat by
- the Warsaw Pact Organization, Beijing encourages war preparaCions and _
the arms race in the NATO countries. T~ established its first contacts
with the headquarters of thia imp~cialist bloc as early as 1975.
- The European NATO country with whom th~ PRC is developin~ relaCiona
most actively is West Germany, and it ahowa ~pecial sympathy for the
reactionary forces. Supporting the revanchiste aspirations of the
Weat German "rightiats~" Bei~ing expressed its sympathy with them
"in connection with the splitting of the German nation" and demonstrated -
approval for their demands for its "reunification~" It is perfectly
clear, writes ZyCIE WARSZAWY that when China speaks of unification it
~ "has in mind not only absorption of the inc'.ependent German state, the
German Democratic Republic, by the Federal Republic of Germany, but
also restoration of the 1937 borders of th~ 'Third Reich."' This is
also confirmed by Che atatement made by the Chineae leaders to the
de].egation from Che West German television company ZDV, which came
to the PRC in September 1977 at the invitaCion of Bei~ing Radio. The
atatement says that China "considers Berlin a constituent part of the ~
, Federal Republic without any resCrictions." The Bei~ing leaders sup-
port all attemp~ts by reactionary imperialist forces to thwart the
four-power agreement on West Berlin and thus make this city a dangerous -
crisis point once again.
Placing its hopes in Western Europe on extremely reactionary politi-
cians, Bei~ing accepts representatives of the English Conservatives _
with open arms. Thus, Mrs. Thatcher~ the leader of the British Con-
servatives, was received in Bei~ing like a head of state. The main
reason for this was that in har statements in China she harshly at-
tacked the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and all the countries
of the socialist community. Therefore, Deputy Premier Li Xiannian,
in conversation with Mrs. Thatcher, found "a good deal in conanon" in -
their assessments of various important international issues. Both
the Chinese leaders and the leader of the English Tories show a desire
to oppose the policy of detente~ which, in their opinion, "is beneath -
mention." The anti-Sovietism of Chief Air Marshal Cameron, chief of
;
3 1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
I
FOR OFFICI aI. U5E ONLY -
. defen~e hettdqunrters f.or Grent Hrit~in, and Lord Chalfont wcre also ~
greeCed wiCh grent sati~fncCion ii~ Bei~ing.
It is emphaeized abro~d Chat, while calling for aiiouti aCrengthening
of the NATO bluc, Che Chinese leudera attach great importance to re-
acCivating FrQnch ties with Che NATO military organization. SupporCing
= the propnganda campAign developed in France concerning the "threat"
from Che socialist countries~ the Chinese press welcomed Che new mili-
- tary idea call.ed "expanded zones of responsibility~" which enviaioned
immediate introduction of French armed forces into acCion if a conflict
occurs beCween the NATO countries and the members of. Che Warsaw Pact.
A Chinese military delegation headed by deputy chief of the genernl
sCaff Yang Chengwu visited France.
According to the Ceatimony of the French press, the Chinese delegaCion -
ahowed particular interest in various types of missiles, airplanes~
and other modern military equipment. A PRC represenrative stated that
China is counting on French help to modernize its armed forces. In -
its Curn, France demonsCraCed an interest in further expans~on ~f bi~ _
lateral military cooperation, which began in 1972.
The expansion of political contacts with Western Europe and intensi- _
_ fication of the campaign to discredit the policy of detente were accom- -
- panied of activation of Bei~ing's links with the European Economic Com-
= munity. In April o~ this year the "Common Market" granted China the
= atatus of moat favored nation. In the words of a representative of this
- organization, the agreement with China does not envisiun any restrictions -
_ on sale of strategic materials.
The Chineae leaders, following a policy of militarization of the country _
and modernization of the armed forcea, are looking for ways to buy mili-
tary equipment and weapons in the West. According to a report by the -
DPA Agency, Bei~ing emissaries in West Germany intend to buy a license
from Che MeaeerachmiCt-Boelkow-Blohm Company for the production of heavy
helicopters. In 1975 a ma~or deal was concluded with the English Rolls
Royce Company for the purchase of Spay ~et aircraft engines and to grant
China a licenae to manufacture enginea of this type. China has purchased
- Alouette and Super Frelon helicopters from France.
The Bei~ing leaders, ~usC ~ike the bosses of the NATO bloc, are urging
_ the capitaliat countries of Western Europe to increase their military
expenditurea. They support eacalstion of the arms race. In their desire
to w�n favor with imperialism the Bei~ing leaders have gone evea furthFr
than the Washington "hawks" and NATO militarists in their praise of the
neutron bomb, whose producti.on is resolutely opposed by the peace-loving
peopleR of the entire world.
_ Bei~ ing's servility before tt,e world imperialist reactionaries has recent-
ly become highly cynical and flagrant. Today the Chinese leaders not
only aupport NATO by every means but directly identify China with this
agressive bloc. Anawering questions from American 3ournalists, deputy
4
FOR OFFICIl~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
_
,
~ FOR 0~'FICIAL USL ONLY
premier of the PRC State Council Deng Xiaoping stated Chat he basically
agreed with the opinion of the U.S. Ambnasador to J~pan rhat China ia
- an "Eastern NATO" and hinted at the necesaity of Che three countriea,
Che United Statea, Japan, and China, tak~ng ~oint actiou 3n the Far East
against the "Soviet threat." -
The Swedish newspaper NORSHENS~A,I,AMAN pointed out, in th~,s connect:lon,
that the NATO leadership has every reason to be more than satis~ied with -
the actions of the current Bei~ing leaders. In top NATO circles Maoiar
China is even called the "16th NATO member:"'and given the role of a `
' kind of "Far Eaetern flank" of thia reactionary organizaCion.
Bei~ing's tiea with NA~'0, the Finnish newspaper KAN6.~N UUTISET remarked,
are becoming more acCive every year. Therefore we are fully ~uetified
in saying that, if iC is not a matrer of a miliCary alli.ance yet= in
any case the policies of China and the NATO countries are moving in a
common direction. ~
- The NATO counCriea are not the only ob~ects of the f ixed bttention of
the Bei~ing etrategists. In their attempt to forge an anti-Soviet front
- the leaders of China also direct their gaze to the East. By uaing
flagrant presaure and blackmail and playing on the nationalism of reac-
tionary Japanese circles, Bei~ing was able to get Japan to sign :he so-
called "treaty of peace and friendahip." It has an anti-Soviet orien-
- tation, which has been mentioned more than once by the Bei~ing leaders
themselvea. China's line in relation Co Japan aims at supporting the ~
forces in Chat country who stand for militarization and revenge. Deputy
premier of the PRC State Council Deng Xiaoping openly praised Japan last
- October for building up its military stxength. Trips to Japan by Chinese
figures who always visit the northern regions of the country and make
anti-Soviet stateaients while there are used to stir up revanchiste
clgims against the Soviet Union. In this way Bei~ing is clear~.y claim-
ing a right to use the Chineae-Japanese Creaty for its own far-reaching -
plans and h~gemoniatic purposes and to involve Japan in actions that en-
danger the cause of peace.
The Singapore STRAITS TIMES and the English DAILY TELEGRAPH point out -
in their comments that "it is impossfble to ~eny the possibility that Che
Japaneae-Chineae treaty could grow into an alliance of the United States,
the PRC, and Japan." U. S. Assiat~nt Secre~`ary of State Holbxook spoke
even more openly. He said, in the HaK�Rtian Islands in June 1978, that
Japan and the PRC were the bulwark of U.S. Asian policy. According to
_ the r~porta by the Japanese paper SANKYOI SHIMBUN, Holbrook also em-
pha~~ized that the United States, China, and Japan have common interests
on fihe level of maintaining atability in Asia and thus hinted at the
_ possibility of an American-Chinese-Japanese pact to prevent Soviet pene-
tration into Asia.
The formation of ,;uch a bloc would, accor.ding to th~ thinb.ing of opponents
of the alleviation of international tension, r�ake it possible to put
- together Japan with its highly developed economy and military potPntial
and China, which has enormous human resources and reserves of strategic
raw materials.
5
FOR OFFICI.4L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
. .
- FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY
r
By following ite ~nti-Soviet line in the international arena, Bei~ing
is in f ach betraying the in~eresta of the nat_onal liberation movement -
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and ~oining wiCh the moat reactionary
_ forces of imperialiam and the internal reacrionaries in the countries
_ of theae regione. China now considera the farces that receiv~ aupport `
from Che Soviet Union and the socialist countries to be its biCter ene-
miea.
China'a ~o3nt actiona with imperialiam to auppress the national libera-
_ tion movement are no longer isolated casea, but rather an established
line of foreign policy activities.
Bei~ ing has betrayed the anti~inq~exialiat movemenC ~,n C1vLle and, like .
' the Unit~d States, supports the fasciat Pinochet regime.
The Chineae leadership oppoaed the national liberatian movemenC in
. Angola. Together with Che United States iC sup~orted the sectarian,
- proimperialiat grouping which fought then and sti11 fights alc.rgside the
- South African racista against the revolutionary government of Angola.
~ The event~ in Zaire are one ~nore example of Bei~ing's alliance w~th
reaction and imperialiam. AfCer the NATC counCries intervened, a dele-
gation from the PRC headed by deputy chief of the general staff Chi ~
Haotian viaited Kinshasa. During the visit China promised to deliver
= a new batch ~ aeapons and military equipment Co Che Mobutu regime.
One iCem promised was patrol boats. As the AP reported, China also -
_ offered to send military advisors to ZairP.
The leaderahip of China covered itself with shame during the events ia
= the Horn of Africa. It took part in an attempt to str3ke down the youna
socialist EChiopia and, together with the United States, approved of tY~e
_ aggressive actions taken by the Government of Somali. The Chinese did
� not limit theMae]ves to verbal support either, but with the NATO coun-
_ tries shipped military goods Co the Barre government. According to the -
English DAILY TELEGRAPH,the weapons sent to SomaZi by Chi.na included
ground-to-air miasiles. ~
_ Bei~ing tried to cover up its aid to the Somali leaders by slandering -
_ the Soviet Union, which was supposedly preparing to "seize" the African -
_ countries one after the other. "However, Bei~ing's pseudorevolutionary
phrases," the Hungarian newspaper MAGYAR HIRLAP wrote in thi~~connection,
"cannot conceal the regrettable f.act that the Chinese leaders are acting _
in alliaace with international reactionaries agaYnst progressive forces."
' The policies of the Bei~ing leadership with respect to the national
liberation struggle against Isrseli and their support of the proimperialist
_ line and capitulationist policy of Sadat also illustrate Beijing's
- betrayal.
The events on thE Indochinese Peninsula are striking evidence of the
_ hegemonistic, expansionist aspirations of the Chinese leadership. With
6
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
the asaist~nce of Kampuchea, Bei~ing delivered a etab in the back to
socialist Vietnam, which had only recently concluded the hard but vic-
Corious wa~ againat American agression and begun peaceful building.
' Bei~ing provided subatantial material and military aid to Kampuchea
and presaured it to go Co war againaC the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
At the same tim.e China i.s trying to put economic and political presaure
- on Vietnam to sCop aocial~st building in that country. The f lagrant
_ betrayal of the heroic Vietnameae people by Bei~ing not only arouses
the indignaCion o~ all progreasive people in the world but also opena
- the eyes of many to the true content of Che policy of the Chineae
- leaderahip, whoae cenCerpiece is a desire for world hegemony and a
frank orientation, as emphasized in the foreign presa, toward aeizure
of vast areae of ~eighboring statea,
In ita relations with China, the Soviet Government holda firmly to the
principles of equality, respect for soverei.gnty and territorial integ-
rity, nonintervention in the domestic affairs of others, and re~ection �
of the uae of force. However, all Che SovieC Union's initiativea Co
re-eatablish good neighbor relationa have either been re~ected by
- Bei~in6 or lef t unanswered. For ita part, the (;hinese leaderahip is .
direcCing all ita e~forts to artifically stirring up anti-Sovietism and
- takea every opportunity to demonatrate its hostility to the USSR. In
response to the me~sage of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
addressed to the Permanent Cotmnittee of. the All-Chinese Assembly of
People's Repreaentatives on 24 Februar.y 1978 propoeing to normalize
Soviet-Chinese relations, the Bei~ing leaership began a new campaign
of slander agairet our country.
At tbe same t{;ne M:3~~fs heirs are continuing a line aimed at thwarting
t;he peace-loving e:foits of the Soviet Union and the other aocialiat
countries, a policq that favors continuation of the arms race and push-
ing the world ~.,,;;~rd another war. This Bei3ing policy profoundly con-
- tradicts the interests of all peoples and demands that the Soviet
people show high vigilance toward the tricka and ruaes of the Chinese
militariata.
COPYfitGHT: "Zarubezynoye voyennoyc~ obozreniye", 1978
11,176
CSO: 1801
_ 7
- FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
FOR O~FICIAL USE ONLY -
C~1~II~IENTS Or~ NIGHT OPERATIONS OF NATO MC~TORIZED INFANTRY COMPANIES
Moacow Z~itUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 10, Oct 78 signed
to preas 5 OcC 78 pp 36-41
[Article by Col A. Ko1'tsov: "The Company in Night Battle"] -
jText] Dcspite the desires of the world's people �or establishment of
lasting peace on earth, militarists in the United States are drawing up
new plans to incxease their military might and tisining troops to wage .
aggresaive actions at any point on ~he globe ur.~er any conditions.
In recent times a great deal of attention in the foreign military press
and in new regulations and manuals of the armies of the principal capi-
talist counCries has been devoted to the problem of waging combat actions -
at night. The primary reason for this is that, with the appearance of
new weapcrns, night no longer causes a decrease in the level of combat
action. Thus, U. S. Army manuals staCe directly that modern night vision
instrumenta allow gr~und f~rces to wage combat actions under any condi--
_ tions, delivar accurate fire strikes, organize cooperat3on and contro~,
- and provide aupport to large and small units at night in pxactically the
' same fashion as during the day. ,
However, the use of night vision instruments cannot, in the opinion of =
foreign specialists, eliminate all the difficulties that arise in con-
, nection with the physio~..ogical and psychological characteristics of t?~e
human organiam. A~ :.~giit the human being has a heightened susceptibility
to fatigue and aural and light signals, the outlines and dimensions of
ob~ects, and distances ar~ perceived in distorted form. As a result,
- a faeling of uncertainty and even fear arises, the reaction to danger is
- diminiahed, the nervous syatem relaxes, and, f ighting effectivenesa is _
lowered. Therefore, Western military epecialists believe that victory
in night battle will go to the side that is best equipped and trained
_ for actions in conditions of complete darkness and poor visibility. In
their opinion, this training will achieve its purpose if it is carried
on syatematically at night using the latest night vision instruments and
illumination equipment.
1
.
8
FOR OFFICItiL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
,
~OEt O~F'ICIAL U5C ONLY
'['t~e.y believe that niRht battle ia ui~ually n coneinuntion of daytime
buttla. ~'hPrefore, the uniC~ nnd HubuniCg will be forced Co operate
in dnrkneg~ not only on unfpmilidr terrnin buC also in an unele~~r aieu- -
ntioxi, where the comm.~nders do noe hnve time to organize Che baCrle.
- Subunit maneuverg mugr be as simple ~e pngsible, nnd their actiona wi1L
be more ind~p~ndenC.
_ 5uccesg in Chia type o~ fiRheinR, the foreign presg emphaeizes, dependg
_ ~reatl;~ on Ch~ unity of tl~e aubunits, eheir abiliCy to ari~nC them-
~ Helves ~nd keep tn ngsigned directions. F'or example~ a motorized in-
Enntry compnny will ugually attack on f~~oC, ovet~coming ehe enemy dp- -
fenge in unfamilinr terr~in~ and it may enccunCer various manmade and
n~turnl obst~cles, Performance of the combat miesian wi11 depend ,
greatly on ekillful bnttle leaderahip by NCO's, the deCermination and
teamwrrk of the plntoons and sqt~ads, their orientation gkills, and
~killful use of night vision instruments ~nd means of illumination~
In some c~sea when the enemy antitank defenae is comprratively weak
or has been reliably neutralized, a motorized infantry company at-
tacka the enemy in combat vehicles. When this aetack procedure is
. used, it is recommended that before ~he niRht battle rhe company com-
mander carefully study the terrain and c:hoose a sector for the break-
through which does not h~ve any insurmountable obstacles. All the
_ combat vehic~es ahould be equipped with night viaion insCrumenta and
the drivers must be tr.ained for actions at night~
The troops should prepare themselves and go onto the attack aecretly.
If it is impossible to achieve surprise, the attack is carried out
with ill~~minntion of Che terrain; it is recommended that f irst of
all the enemy be blinded and his night vision instruments knocked out.
Illumination eq~ipment should be used continuously and evenly. The
- illumination is distributed both in time and by place in the battle
formation of the forward platoons of the company. In this case~ 3uat
as in daytime, there are artillery preparations~ passages are made
throuRh minefields and other engineering obatructions, and the attack
is carried out with aupport from tanks~ infantry combat vehiclea~ and
sometim~s also fire aupport helicopters.
The success of night battle depends greatly on choosing che correct
axis of attack. To do this, spe~ialists believe, it is essential not
only to completely uncover the enemy's defense, but also to study Che
possibilities of a concealed approach to the line of attack using
woods, brush, and folds in the terrain, conaidering that the enemy
also has modern niRht vision instrume~ts.
The company commander carefully analyzes all information from recon-
naissance and personal observation and then outlines the sector of
the breakthrough, the primary axis of attack, and concealed approgches
- to the line of attack. With supporting artillery he coordinates the
lines for opening and transferrinR fire and the targets that are to
be neutralized immediatel,y. He otgenizes cooperation with neighbors
and Rives missions to his own platoons. The company commander may
9
FO(t OFFICII,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~OIt O~~ICIAL U5B dNLY
plan to i~y down ~moke which wi11 obsrrucC enemy observntion gnd
nimed fire. It i~ recommended Chae ehe smoke be laid down ott call
~ go thnC it will not obgCruct the gCC~OttS of the atCacking aubunita.
Wh~n the company b~gins moving tnw~rd the 1in~ of atCgck, the ar-
tillery should be firing ati normal inCengiCy, Chgt ie, ~s it hgg ddne ~
~ on prpvious nights. It is u good idea, gpecialiste f~el, to organ-
ize flanking fir~ by nei~,hbors agginat targeCs in the axie of the
compnny's attack. When the plaeoons reach the line of atCack, the
artillery concentrates its fire on the ob~ecCa to be seized. As Che
atCackers advance fire iA traneferred deeper to cuC off the path of '
retreat and mortars and antitank guided mi~ssiles conCinue ro fire aC
fire pointe that have not been euppressed and are obatrucCing thP
platoons' attack. ~
'The foreign prees emphasizes thaC artillery supporC for an atCarlc ae _
ni~ht involves great difficultieg b~cause the targets are invisible
and cnrrecCion of fire Ly shell exp:losions is exCremely comrlex. It
is extremely complex. It is recommended, therefore, that all targeCs
_ and lines be rgnged as much as poasible during d~,ylight hours and
fire at night be waged according to pre~agreed signals given by the
forward lire of the atCacking company. Combat engineera must prepare
a passaqe when a company attacking at night crosses a mine field.
The company commander, who ia in the front line wiCh the control
group, secretly advancea to the predetermined atCack line with tw~
platoons. Then these platoona, wiCh combat engineer support, croas
the minefield alon~ the passage and make a breakChrough in a narrow
secCor. After thie one of Che platoons races to the depth of the -
enemy defenae, wiping out command posts and communications equipment
first of all, while the other, providing fire covpr, brings the
third platoon through the passage anri continues to advance.
_ ~
During the battle the company commander gives the aignal to uae il-
lumination rockets. At this time division artillery begins execution
of its misaiona to illuminaCe targets in the depth of the 2nemy de-
- fense~ devoting special attention to the routea of movement of enemy
second echelons and reserves. Battalion artillery usually does not
take part in illumination of the terrain, so that it will not be di-
verted from its immediate miasions of aupport for the attacking
companies.
As definite lines and ob~ects are taken it is recommended that the -
subunits immediately secure Cheir defense. To do this they quickly
aend an outpost ahead~ organize cooperation~ and beEin setting up a
system of fire and digging trenches. The artillery is given the mis-
sion of laying down concentrated fire in frcnt of the company defense
sector. Cooperation with neighbors is org~nized and snines may aleo
be laid in the directions of Rreatest tank danger. Specialists be-
lieve that the success of night attack depends greatly on holding on
to captured ob~ects.
10
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~OEt 0~'~ICLAL US~ ONLY
Precig~ contXol and cooperation be~ome especinlly importunt fn
nighC fighring, The company commander much show greaC iniCiative and
independence. He m~kes a11 decigiuna quickly ~nd immediately pute
Chem into e~fect, Itadiu, light aignals, whistlea, bugle~, and the
like nre used for r.ommunicaeion with plaCoon lendrre c~nd supporting
subuniCa. Special. ~ttenCion is devoCed to preciae deaignation o� the
exig of ~Ctack and lines for opening fire and traneferring fire;
mutunl recognirion is also imporCanr.
Ntght battle, as the foreign press observes~ demanda special troop
training, 2n many armies of Che NATO bloc. Cherefore~ up to one-
third of training time is nighttime. Night acCions nre a key ele-
ment of combined arma exercises, Be~ause ehe units are saturated
with the latesC nighC vigion instruments and illumination devices,
hiah~r demands are mnde of pereonttel. In ~eneral they are the fol-
lowing: acquire solid skilla in night orienCaCion and keeping an
assigned direction, learn to use night vision inatruments and illumi-
nation devices, and be able to move eilently and conceal oneself re-
liably.
.
Foreign military epecialists recommend Chat troops be prepared for
niRht actions in sCages. FirsC~ they believe, personnel must be
taught to perform the simpleat duties at night, then gradually train-
- ing moves on to the skills of using the weapons and night vision
instruments~ as well as gimple tactical pr~cedures, engineering ~obs,
and, finally, executing marches. At first marches are across fa- .
miliAr terruin, but later they will be on unfamiliar terrain. The
concludinq stage is considered to be waging practice combat actions
at night at the range, firing the regular weapon and using night
vision instruments.
To give subunits more effective training in actions at night, foreign
specialiats propose that specially prepared aectors (wooded, swampy~
and others) be set up in the field to allow troops to be trained in
silent, rapid assembly in definite regions, concealed approach to the
enemy, openi~g fire on the enemy from ahort range, and also aecretly
filtering through the enemy battle formation.
Commnnder training, the foreign press observes, should include the
questiona of planning night battle, control, cooperation~ combat
aupport, and uae of night vision inatruments and illumination and
signallinR devices. It is recommended that training periods with
cotmnanders be held on unfamiliar terrain at rright, with A xapidly
changing situation. The primary purpose of such training periods is
to inetill solid skills in controlling subunits in night battle. -
The study of night vision instruments is assigned an tmportant place
in the syatem of combat training. The armies of the main capitalist
countries, above all the U. S. Army, are receiving more and more new
models. During the U. S. aggression in Vietnam the troops used pri- ~
marily radar and infrared instruments; in the mid-1960's subunits
11
FOR OFFICI/,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~'0~ O~F'ICIAL US~ ONLY
began to receive light-ineeneifying instrumenCe, and by Che mid~1970'g
rhey aere gsteing heae vigion devicea built on the principle of in-
tenaifying he~C emissions,
Modern non-inteneifying elecrronic-opCical inetruments (for example
binoculare nnd eightie) do ~iot require any epecial training to uae.
They are lege cumberaome an~ eimpler to operate. Their range of ac~- _
Cion on a aCarlit (moonliC) night is about 2~000 m~ Similar inetru-
mentg have also been devised for the driverg of combgt vehicles and
can be used to dr~r'.ve at night~ But they all require at leasC minimal
illumination~ and it is hard to uae them in heavy rain, enow, fog,
or smoke.
- Heat-vision devicea nre, in the opinion of foreign specialists, the
moat promising. They work on Che principle of receittiug an image
by meana of fixing the heat contrasC between ob~ects, their particular
elements~ and the eurrounding background. Theae instruments do not _
- give out emiaeions and need no illumination or light inCensificaCion.
Their range of action in darkneas or wiCh limited visibility ie
~ rouqhly equivalenC to the effective range of the rifle. With these
instrumenta it is poesible not only to fix targets and determine the
distance to them buC also to see the outlines of eqctipment and per-
sonnel distincCly ~n the form of glowing ailhouettes against the
dsrk background of the environment. The difficulty wirh them is
that they are heavy and cumbersome, as ~rell as expensive and diffi-
' cult to produce and use.
~ Equipping ur.ite with modern night vision instruments, teaching per-~
sonnel to op~rate in darknesa, and the developmenC of night fighting
tactics by subunita are evidence that tfie ground forces of the
countries of the aggressive NATO bloc are preparing extensively to
wage combat actiona at night.
~ CQPYRIGHT: "2arubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1978
11,176
CSO: 1801
12
FOR OFFICIl.L USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
ro~ or~zct~, crs~ orrt,Y
~ -
- COMMENTS ON U~ 5. F'LIGHT TRAINING SIMULATORS AND METHODS
_ Moacow zARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Rusaian No 10, Oct 78
- ~igned to presa 5 Oct 78 pp 52-58
(Article by Cnl (Ret) G. Osipov, candidate of miliCary sciences and
docent, and Capt N. Koleanikov: "The Uae of Trainera Co Prepare
American Air Force Flight Personnel"]
(Excerpt] One of the important meaeures to atrengthen American mili'
- tary aviation~ in addition to supplying it wtth the latest aviation
equipment, is to improve the flight tr~ining of Che crews. As the
foreign preas reporCa, trainers have been used more and more widely
in recent yeara in flight training in the U. S. Air Force~ naval
aviation, and army aviation. Trainers are used to improve quality~
reduce the time and costs of crew preparation~ and cut the accident
rate in line units. `
Foreign military specialists believe that an improvement in crew
training can be achieved through simulation and practicing all stages
of flight o~i trainers. This, in turn, makes it posaible to teach
personnel the skills of controlling the aircraft and its weapons and
to maintain these skills in periods when not actually flying. When
pilots are trained with moc~ern trainers, it is possible to use such
regimes as automatic assignment of initial exercise conditions
(altitude, distance~ velocity, target aspect angle, and the like)~
stepped-up transition to the starting line for the next stage of
flight, temporarily halting the drill, review~ reproduction of the
conditions of the exercise ~ust finished, and demonstration of ex-
emplary per�ormanc~. Trainers make it possitil~ for trainees to
practice the samc element over and over as well as broadening their -
- knowledge.
' The reduction in costs of flight personnel training uaing trainers
resulta from the fact that nne hour of training on a trainer costs
less than in an airplan~ or nelicopter and the monthly flying time
of crews can be reduced. It was reported in the foreign press that
the U. S. Defenae Department has decided to reduce the flying time
13
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
FOIt O~F'ICIAL US~ ONLY
of pilote 25 percent by 1981 through exl�.ensive use of erainera, In ~
n~val aviaCian, for exnmple~ iC is alrendy authorized to perform 10
percent of the Cotnl mandatory flyittg Cime and 25 percent ~f the min-
imum annunl flying time by instruments on Crainers. The followin~
facts were given in the foceign press ~g an example of reducing the
- cogte of piloC training.
. When pilote were trained to fly helicoptera by instrumente using
the 2B24 trainer, an average of 6.5 hours of real flying ri~ne in the
- helicopter was used per trainee insCead of 60 hours, and the saving
was $4,000 per trainee~ ~It was aleo reporCed Chat even complex and
exrensive trainera had a eubatantial economic impact. ~or example,
it coste $250 an hour at Che tactical aviation command to operate a
trainer f~r pracCicing aerial battle in the F-4 plane. In one hour,
however, it is posaible Co have up to 3.5 practice baeeles, where in
actual flight in a fighCer plane not more than three could be done.
AccordinR to calculations by American apecialists, the cose of con-
ducting one aerial battle on Che trainer is roughly onQ-thirt{eth of
tha cost of doing it in a real plsne, wiChout counting the ammunition
savings.
A review of the existing trainera, the content and Cechniques of
drills, and the primary lines of further development of trainers for
training U. S. Air Force flight personnel are reviewed below. [passage
- oi~:~.tted]
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1978
11,176
cso: isoi
i
14
FOR OFFICIlsL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
FO[t OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY
COMMENTS ON NATO PILOT RE5CUE METHODS AND F.QUIPMENT
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZR~NIYE in Rueaian No 10, Oct 78
eigned to presa 5 OcC 78 pp 59~67
(Article by Capt lat Rank 0. Oblipov~ T.t Col (Ites) V. Mikhaylin, and
Ma~ Med Serv K~ Vl~dimirov; "Means of Pilot Rescue"]
(Excerpt] In recent years the United StaCes and the oCher capitalist
countries have done a good deal to modernize existing means of rescu-
ing crew members of military airplanea and helicopters and to devise
new, more effective means. The reason~ say foreign specialisCa, is
Chat despite the fact that aviation units and subunita are receiving
increasingly sophisticated flying craft~ loases of aviation equipment
and flight personnel are increasing year after year. For example~
in the U. S. Armed Forces alone there were 367 flight accidents in
1975 resulting in the destruction of 239 airplanes and helicopters.
In addition~ the experience of so~-called local wara demonstrated that
existing means for reacuing ttie crew membera of aircraPt that are shot
down are inadequate to modern needa.
Considering all these factora, as well as the great cost of aviation
equipment and the difficulty and length of time required to train
flight peraonnel to fly modern airplanes and helicopters, military
specialists in the United States and the other members of the aggrea-
sive NATO bloc are giving great attention to devising means of pilot
r~scue. These devices are subdivided into two primary groups, those
for abandoning the aircraft and those Por saving pilots who have
abandoned their aircraft. The former group includea parachutes and
ejection seats. The second group is further divided into three aub-
groups: survival and life support means (inflatable life jackets,
protective suits~ boats, supplies of food and water, medications~ and =
other special packagea); signal devices (emergency radio sets and
radio beacona, optical, light, and smoke aignalling devices); and
means to deliver pilote from sircraft that have been shot down to the
position of friendly troops. In the opinion of foreign specialista,
the increasing costs of building and introducing these devices will
be repaid because they will save the lives of experienced pilots who
have suffered accidents or been shot down and theae pilots will return
15
FOR OFFICIl~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
C
FOR n~~'ICIAL US~ ONLY
to the rnnke quickly. ny conern~t~ trgining new piloes would eake -
eignificant maCeri~Z expenditures ~nd~ mogC imporCantily, time.
_ According to the views of ehe U~ S, Air ~orce Comm~nd, the effici~ncy -
of piLnC re~cue devices can be chnractierized by the percentage of
pilots who eafely abandon aircraft and return Co tfie positions of
� their units.
With the purpose of studying Che capabilities of existing systems for
emergency abandonment of airplanes attd helicopCers and to find stepa
Co promote the aurvival ef pilote after e~ection~ repreaenCa~ivea of
Air Force headquarters and apeciali. ~s from Che aviation and apace
medicine laboratories of the Air Fa...e and U. S. Navy Medicgl Service
analyzed daCa obtaine~l during the conduct of combat actione by American
aviation in Southeast Asia~
As a reaulC, they came Co the concluaion that while regular devices c;o
provide some degree of saf~ abandonment of,damaged aircraft by pilots,
the systems for life aupporC~ �inding them~ and r~eturning them Co
friendly territory are ineffe~tive and do not meet current requiremenes.
As the foreign press observed, a large ma~ority of the American pilots -
who were forced to abandon their aircraft over Cerritory occupied by
- forces of the naCiottal liberation movement were taken pris~ner. The
percentage of pilots taken prisoner was especially high when they
landed near large populated points or concentrationa of enemy troops, -
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1978
11,176
CSO: 1801
16
FOR OFFICIGL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~O[t O~rICYAL US~ ONLY
~
- COMMENT5 ON WEST~RN ANTISUBMARTNE DEFENSE OF AN AIRC1tAFT CARRTER GROUP _
Moacow ZARUBE7.HNOYE VOYENNOY~ OBOZRENIYE in Ruesian No 11~ Nov 78
aigne~ Co presa 3 Oct 78 pp 65-70
(Article by Capt 2nd Racik A. Chiatyakov: "AnCiaub Defense of an Air-
craft Carrier Group"] .
[Text] Following their aggressive plans against Che Soviet Union and
the other socialiet countries, miliCaristic circles in the Weat assign
an importanC role to multipurpose and aseault aircraft carriers, which ~
. are the primary element of general-purpose forces in the navies of the
leading cspitalist states (the United States, Great Britain, and
Ftance). ~n the opinion of foreign apecialista~ both at the preaent
and in the future aircraft carriera will be the primary striking force
of the navy ix~ wara where nuclear weapona are not u~ed and a strateAic
- reserve in the case of allout nuclear warfare. Aircraft carriers are
expected to help gain and hold supremacy at sea and in the air in Che
region of combat actions, deliver strikes against ground and sea tar-
gets using conventional and nu~lear weapona~ provide air cover for
assault landing forcea durirlg the sea croesing~ provide direct sup-
port to marine aseault parties and ground forces in the co~stal zone,
and blockade atraits to prevent enemy afiips from reaching the high
seas. In peacetime the imperialists use aircraft carriers for shows
of force in key regions of the world in order to put pressure on other
countries and carry out interventions against them.
The regular U. S. Navy has 13 multipurpose aircraft carriers, the _
British Navy has one assault carrier, and the French Navy has iwo
multipurpose carriers. According to futsre plans, multipurpose air-
_ craft carriers are to be built only in the U. S. Navy, which expects
to maintain at least 12 ahips. At the same time, plans call for
modernization of ships of this class that have already been commis-
sioned.
To accomplfsh the missions given to aircraft carriers carrier assault
(multipurpose) forces and assault (multipurpose) groups are formed.
The primary organizational unit is the carrier group. The carrier
group of ships with conventi,onal power plants includes one aircraft
17
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY
carrier, 5-8 escort ahips (cruisers~deaCroyera~ and frigaCes)~ and an
atomic tnrpedo submnrine,
The atomic aircraft carriar group may include, in addieion to a
nuclear-powered cnrrier, up Co four atomic cruisers and an,~atomic
torpedo submarine. American naval specialiats believe that euch a
group has eeveral advantagea ov~r the conventional group becauae of
its greater mobility and self~auf.ficiency and ite abiliCy to carry
more airplanes, aviatio?t ~mmunition~ and fuel~ '
Foreign naval apecialista believe ChaC multipurpoae and assaulC air-
~ crnfr carriera are more vulnerabl~ to modern naval weapons Chan ships
of other clasaea becauae of eheir very great aize; the aComic air~raft ,
carrier Chester W. NimiCz, for example, is 332 metera long and 40.8
meters wide. A deeply echeloned defense against enemy forces is cre-
ated, tt~erefore, to inaure their fighting stability in a11 atagea ot
action. Special aCtenrion is devoted to antiaubmarine defenae, which
is performed by surface shipa~ aviation~ and atomic torpedo subma-
rinea.
Surface ahipa are one of the primary means of searching for and des-
troying enemy submarines and usually operate Cogether with carrier- _
based anCiaub helicopters as a close acreen for the carrier~ These
ships can wage effective battle not only against submarines but also
surface ships, airplanes, and winged missiles. Destroyera and frigates
with both missile and artillery weapons and also cruiaera are the pri-
mary classes of surface shipa used for antisub defenae. These ships
perform misaions related to other types of defense (air, missile, and
ship defense) at the eame time.
Surface ahipa have various means of detection and destruction for
, antisubmarine defense of aircraft carrier groupa. According to in-
~ formation in th~ foreign presa, the primary meana of detection on U. S.
surface ships in the screen f.orces of a carrier group are sonar sta-
tions of the following types: AN/SQS-26, AN/SQS-23, AN/SQS-56 (a
modernized variation of the AN/SQS-23 sonar, it is installed in anti-
misaile defenae frigates of the Oliver H. Perry type), and AN/SQS-53
_ (on destroyers of the Spruance type). The DDG47 destroyers and
- CGN atomic cruiaera being planned for construction are to be equipped
with new AN/SQR-~19 direct listening atations.
Three types of missile complexes are used for antisubmarine defense on
aurface escort shipa: Asrok (United States)~ Malaphon (France), and
Ikara (Great Britain).
Among the primary antiauomarine torpedoes used by surface ships and
equtpped with self-guiding systems are the American MK37 (model 0), ,
IKK43 (model 1). MK44 (models 0 and 1), and MK46 (models 0 and 1) as r
well as the French L3 and LS (model 1). l
18
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
Antiaub helicopters occupy a speci~tl place in Che weapons syaCem of
' surfnce Hhipa. PareicipaCion by helicopters in the aearch for an _
underwater enemy expands Cl~e ahip's capabilities fnr detection and ex~ _
_ tended tr~cking and increases the probability Chat Che submarine wi11
be desCroyed by antisubmarine weapons. -
According to reporta in the foreign press~ American shipa have adopted
SH-2D and SH-2F helicnptera of Che Lemps syatem and the SH-3A and SH~3b
modificationa of Che SH-3 Sea Kina helicopter~
" The surface ahips of the nritish Navy have the Lynx antiaub helicopter
which~ according to the predictions of experts~ wi11 be the most com- _
mon antisub helicopter in the naviea of Che NATO counCriea~ In addi-
tion, they have Sea King~ Wasp~ and Wesaex helicopters.l
Antiaub aviation ia the ~rimary means of providing antisub defense f~r
an aircraft carrier group~ Antieub aviation includes shore-based
patrol aircraft (P-3C Orion, MR-1 Nimrod, and Brege 1150 Atlantic),
~ carrier-based planes (S-3A Viking and Brege 1050 Alize)~2 and helicopters. -
- In recent years atomic torpedo submarines have been widely Lsed for the
antisubmarine defense of carrier groups. They have high speed~ secrecy
of action~ and the capability of maintaining reliable communicationa
with surface ships, which makes it possible to organize close cooper-
W ation during performance of miasions at sea. Traveling under water
at a certain distance from the carrier and mainraining underu~ater
audio communication with it or one of the escart ships~ foreign ape-
cialist~ feel that they can wage an effective stru~gle against subma-
rines. The atomic submarinea have various types of sonar equipment
for detection.
The American atomic torpedo submarines are equipped with the Sabrok -
antisub guided missile system and self-guiding torpedoes to destroy
enemy submarines,
- Foreign military specialists note that the antisub defense of an air-
craft carrier grcup is done in close coordination with the SOSUS
permanent passive long-range sonar observation system, which signifi-
cantly increases the effectiveness of the antisub defense of an air-
craft carrier group.
In certain cases antisub helicopters launched from assault helicupter _
carriers can be used to reinforce the antisub defense of NATO aircraft -
carrier forces.
~
1 For more detail on ship antiaub helicopters s~e ZARUBEZHNAYE _
VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE No 8, 1977~ pp 79-84 (Editor).
2 For information on shore and carrier based antisubmarine sirplanes
see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OB02RENIYE No 2, 1976, pp 83-90 -(Editor).
19
FOR OFFICII~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
FOR OFFICIAL USC ONLY
7'he antisubmar�t~~e defense of a carrier group iP a zonal-ob~ect defenae
which combines de�ense of an ob~ect (the aircraft carrier or other
- ma~or ships of the group) and a zone. Expected enemy resistance, the
- presence of friendly forces~ the missione being performed by the group~ _
and characterietica of the carrier group's croeaing route and region of
combat maneuvering are Che chief influences in organizing the etruc-
ture of escort forcea.
In Che region of combat maneuvering the structure of escort forcea _
ahould guarantee maximum e~fectiveneas in the use of weapons~ primarily
carrier-based aviation, witih adequate defense againaC submarines~
meana of aerial attack~ and aurface ships~ -
The arrangemenC of shipe relaCive to Che center of the order, where an
aircraft carrier ia usually located~ and the 1isCance between ehips
vary depending on the siCuation. ~ -
Primary eff.orts in the atruggle againsC enemy submarines are concen-
trated on the Chreatened aector 6ecause iC is there Chat the aCtacking
submarine will have to break through the echeloned defense; the defense =
is provided by antisub airplanea~ submarines~ surface ahipe, and heli~
, copters. American apecialists believe that tiie main problem for a sub~
marine that intends to attack the aircraft carrier with torpedoes
will be its speed, But increasing the speed of the submarine itself in
order to occupy a position for the attack increases the likelihood that
it will be detected by eacort forces.
In all stagea of activiCy of the carrier group~ close and distant
zones of antisub aefense are usually organized.
The close screen~ which is provided by close escort ships and carrier-
_ based helicopters~ is usually circular~ Where there are not enough
escort ships their place can be taken by antisub helicopters~ and if
necessary an atomic submarine may be included in this force. The pri-
mary mission of the close screen forcps is to prevent an enemy sub~
marine from carrying out a torpedo attack. In the opinion of many
foreign specialists~ submarines should be detected, attacked~ gnd des-
troyed mainly on the crossing route of the carrier group by mixed avi-
ation-ship search and deatroy groups that include antisub sirplanes
- (shore and carrier based),deck-based helicopters~ atomic submarines~
and surface ships.
When an aircraft carrier group is deployed for a crossing at fairly
- high speed (more than 20 knots), the escort is reinforced in the for- -
ward sectors of the cruise formation (see illustration below) because
= this is the direction that is considered most dangerous with respect
- to submarine attacks.
20
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
I~'OR O~N'ICIAL USE ONLY
AnCiaubmnrine FormaCion of an ,Aircraft Carrier Group
buring a Sett Crossing
150-2DOMU1tb (a)
- -
to0 Mun~
.42:_.9Qe~un~~
30+40A+un~,
18MUnti ~
O
~ ~s'2Q~~U~ _
~ 36 ~
o _
- ~ Nenocpe8cmeeH~roc~
(b) oxpairf
i~ue 6 3o~~ezo 3ona aan ~~e~ px~uneHUS~ioaoyno _
npomuso`not~oy?iozo ~
- oxpaNenuA
~ ESymbole]~. '
am~Mr~C~ mo~r~eBHa~
~ aouaNOCe~ no 0o Has o Ka
- (f) ?cpeucep YPO ~ ~---~p np� eepmonemb~u _
~8) a JNUNOaNOCe~by~0 ~k~ pOdb4Hbi~i~ cap,~ nemr -
(h) ~ 3A1UH~HOCe (1) HI~ 6aaoetiu narr,pynb-~
r+bi~i oaMOnem
~u
- Key: (a) 150-200 Miles (All other distances also given in miles~;
(b) Close-In Ship Escort . ~
(c) ZonEa of Close Antisubmarine Screen;
(d) Zone o� Distant Antisubmarine Screen; _
(e) Aircraft Carrier;
(f) Missile Cruiser;
(g) Missile DesCroyer;
(h) Destroyer;
(i) Atomic Torpedo Submarine; -
(j) Antisubmarine Helicopter;
(k) Deck-Based Antisub Airplane;
- (1) Shore~-�Based Patrol Airplane.
21
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
'I
- FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY =
The cloae screen ships nr~ arran~ed a~ u distance equal Co 1~75 Cimes _
the operating range of the sonar equipment to create a solid ring ~f
sonnr observaCion~ The submarine deCecCion range of close screen ships
together with helicoptera is up to 40 miles from the center of the
crui.se formation~
During the search for enemy submarines deck-based helicopters cooper-
ate cloaely with deck-based antisubmarine planes~ When the carrier
_ group approaches a region wh2re the preaence of enemy submarines is
likely the deck-based antisub pl~ne3 and helicopCers take off from the
aircraft carrier. The planes search on the distant approaches to Che
carrier and Che helicopters work in the zone of the close-in eacort
ships.
- An airplane aearches for submarine~ at an altitude of 240-370 meters
for about four hours. If it finds a sub it atCacks it, simultaneously
reporting this to Che command element of the grou~y. However, American -
specialists believe that an attack based on the data from the init:ial
- detection may not always be successful. Therefore, helicopCers or
other airplanes are aent Co the region of Che last detection of the
enemy submarine~ Success is great?y improved if radiosonic buoys and
a magnetic detector are used for more precise determination of the
submarine's position. Radiosor.ic buoys may be set down along a closed -
contour that covers a given region or in a line across the assumed =
- course of the submarine. When using a magnetic detector planes fly at -
the minimum safe altitude (about 30 meters).
In the search for submarines helicopters usually follow encirclement
_ tactics in which they occupy positions in a small circle that covers
the presumed location of the sub and then, maneuvering in spirals,
- converge. They examine the region using dipping sonars, periodically
hovering at altitudes of 4-6 m above the surface of the water at the
places where ehe sonars have been dipped.
In the opinion o.f foreign specialists antisub helicopters have the
following advantages over surface ships: greater speed in examining
a region, the possibility of surprise appearance above a submarine -
and establishing contact before the sub can evade detection, and the
- ability to track a fast-moving target for a long time. Among the
shortcomings is the difficulty, and sometimes impossibility, of using
helicopters in bad weather.
Wtten surface ships search for submarines it is considered that the
_ sonar transmissions of the surface ship can be detected under the
_ water at a much greater d~.stance than the ship can detect its target
(submarine), and thus the submarine, upon learn.ir.ig that it is being
hunted, can take steps in time to e~ade a meeting with the escort
forces. Therefore, foreign naval specialists think it is wise for
- only the close screen forces to use sonar sets and comple~es in the
active mode. It is recommended that the surface ships o~ the distant
- screen use primarily passive means of searchin~ and helicopters to
avoid being a beacon for enemy submarines.
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~dit O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
In re~ton~ nf combnt mnn~uver ehe clo~e enei~ubmnrine ~creen ie or~nn-
- ized ~trlCtly by r.cm eH, wieh re~ourceg di~tributed ehrou~hout the ~n-
tire re~ion, In thiq cage too, nneisub defense i~ reinfdreed in Chose
region~ wh~r~ the nppe~rnnCe of enemy gubm~rinee i~ mdgt likely, When
the region of combne mnneuvering chgnge~ ehe d~f~nge of eh~ db~ect (~ir-
crnft carrier) ig inten~ified but ehe principle of defense of a region
i~ m~ineained.
~ In a distant zone, both during the aea crossing and in the region of
combnt maneuvering, the ge~rch fnr en~my ~ubmerine~ is carri~d on by
~hnre and deck baeed nntieubmarine airplgneg and by ehe geomic gu6m~-
rine, At the fnr border of the di~Cant zone of gnCigubmarine d~fense
the sparch ig usually conducted by one or two ghore~baged patrdl ai~-
craft which fly to the threnCened secCor 20b mil~s (370 kilomet~re)
from the carrier. beck-based antisubmarine planes patrol either on
the perimeter of ehe fnrmc~tion or in a ChreaCened ~~ctor at a di~e~nce
up eo 100 mil~s (185 kilometera). When the aircraft carrier~ in the
~ntisubmarine vnriation, hag 'l0 nntigub plnn~~ on bdard, as mgny r~g
eix may be in the air simultaneously.
Atomic torpedo submarines used for antigubmarinE defense in the dis-
tant zone may operaCe independently or be contro.lled by a surface relay
ship which maintaine constanC communication between the submarine and
the command element of the group.
In the sea crossing submarines travel parallel to the course of the
_ cnrrier force and aearch for enemy submarines using their sonar com-
plexes in threatened sectora.
In the region of combat maneuvering atomic torpedo bubmarines can
cover sectors where it is possible that enemy submarines will break
- through to Che defended region. Their posiCion Por Chis purpose is
set 40-90 miles (72-162 kilometers) from the center of the region of
combat maneuvering.
_ In the opini.on of foreign naval apecialists, using atoQ~ic submarines
for the antisubmarine defenae of aircraft carrier groupi: significantly
increases the effectiveneas of the group's ar~tisu6 defense in al~
atages of its activ!.ty.
Co~trol of the antisub defense of a carrier group, including coordi-
nation with other antisub forces (for example, with a permanent system
of long-range aonar obaervation) is carried out from the antisub defenae -
control $tation, which is located on the aircraft carrier or one of
_ the escort shipa. It exercises centralized control over the antisub
defense resources of the group, collects information about the under-
water situation in the reRion~ evaluates this information and prepares
proposals for adopting plans to wipe out submarines, warns escort
ships, and allocates forces to destroy enemy subs. The antisubmarine
weapon control officer controls direct antisub actions by an escort
ship from a battle information post.
23
FOR OFFICIkL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~att f~~'~~CIAL US~ t~NLY
Cnntrdllin~ eh~ gr.eidn~ a~ c~n ~edmiC enrpedo ~ubmarine und~r wgeer i~
- th~ mn~t difficult c~gpect~ In thi~ ~n~e, the ~ubm~rine cntt eeegbli~h
cammunicntidn with gurf~ce ~hip~ only by me~n~ of underw~t~r audio :
communicdCinn. The pror_ess of cnntrol is compllcaCed by ehe need ed
tr~nsmie ~ppropriate informneion from ehe ~ntigub defenge command staCion
of the carri~r group, In rhe~e cas~s escort ~hip~ mu~t bp u~ed ae re-
lnye. According to reports in the foreign preas, atomic dubmarinea have
- ~hnrt nnd long wave rc~dio receiverg, ewo shortwnve tran~mitCera~ and
~onnr equipment to maintnin cnmmunic~tians betwe~n ships under water
~nd gurfnce ghips fnr the purpo~~ of controlling Che ~ubmgrin~s.
Cd~~ered, ext~ndable, edwed, and buny ane~nngs mgk~ it po~~ible to carry
on ewo~wny cummunicntion abov~ ~nd uttd~r wgter.
Thue, the nav~l commandg oE th~ Unit~d St~tes, Great Britain, and France
- ere devnting considerable attention eo question~ of the anCisubmarine
defense of aircraft carri~rs boCh in the sea crogging and in combat re-
ginng. They believe that effective anCisubmgrine defen~e will be one
n~ the primary conditinng for maintaining Che combat stability of air-
craft carrier forces~ n key element o~ general-purpose surface forces.
COPYRIGHT; "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye"~ 1978
11,176
CSO: 1801
24
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~dtt O~~ICIAL U$~ ONLY
COMMENT5 dN TNE U. S. SIXT}~ I~'L~~T
Moscow ZARUB~ZI~NOY~ VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIY~ in Ruseian No 11, Nov 78
pigned to press 3 Ort 78 pp ~1-'l6
(Article by C~pt 1st Rank T. Kc~remov: "The U. S. Sixth ~'leeC")
(Text] The milita�ristic plnns of the American imperialiste asaign a
special place to the Mediterranean Sea, primarily because of its im-
, portanC strategic posiCion~
The Mediterranean Sea is the connecting link among three continents~
- Europe~ Africa~ and Asia. Tnternationally important sea and air routes
pass'along it, connecting major European countries with the countries
of the Middle East and North Africa and, through ehe Suez Canal, with
the countries of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region. It is
near the rich oi1 deposits of the Middle East, which repreeent 70 per- -
cent of the explore~ reserves of the capitaliet world. According to
reports in the foreign presa~ each year more than 20b million Cona of
petroleum is transported across the Mediterranean Sea. Wt~en the Suez
Canal was closed many petroleum pipelines were brought directly to
Mediterranean ports.
U. S. imperialist circles consider the Mediterranean Sea region and
the territory ad~acent to it as a good base of operations for posaible
direct acts of aggression against the USSR and other socialist countries.
' Durin~ World War II American ships in the Mediterranean landed troops
in North Africa, on the island of S.icily~ and on the south coast of ~
France. In 1945 the U. S. naval command left a emall force of ships
in the Mediterranean to support American troops in Italy. The head-
quarters of thia force was ~~cated on a destroyer mother ship based in
" Naples. In August 1947 this mother ship was replaced by a cruiser.
On 1 July 1948 U. S. naval forces in the Mediterranean were officially
reorganized as the Sixth OperaCional Fleet.
The U. S. Sixth Fleet took final form in 1950. It includes surface
ahips~ submarines, and subunits and units of naval aviation and marinea.
25
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
- ~nx d~~icrn~. vs~ oNLY
According eo the plane of rhe U. S. ngvel command the 51xeh ~le~r i~ _
given Che following primgry mi~gions: gain and hold ~upremgcy ~C sea, _
we~~ combnt nctions from ehp eea, ~upport ground forces, eupport Che
nctivi.ties of ntomic mie~ile submarines on cdmbAt petrol in the
- Mediterranean, end demonetrate th~ U~ 5~ military pr~~pnr.e in this
region. it ie nn important m~gn~ of inCervenCion by American imperial-
iem in th~ domestic affatre of the MediCerranean counCriea.
The commander of the Sixeh F1eeC is ge ehe ~~m~ tim~ cammgnder of naval _
' aggault forcee in ehe Southern ~uroppan eti~~rer, Wiehin the American.
military he ie subordinaee to the commgnder of U~ S. ngv~1 fotices in
- ~urop~ (With headquartere in London) and in ehe NATO nrganization he
ie aubordinaCe to the commander nf NATO Unified Armed F'orces in the
Southern ~uropean Cheater (headquarter~ in Naplea). The deputy com-
mander of the Sixth ~leet for questions of planning and coordingtion
of fleet activity within the NATO Unified Armed ~orcea is also per-
mnnently ~tgtioned there. H~ heads a epecial ahore headqu~rtera with
3S-40 officers,
� U~ S. strategists consider the Sixth Fleet rhe most univereal, flexible,
and combat-ready operational formation of American naval forcea in
~urope, with significant striking power? IC has formations and unita _
of the fleet, naval aviation, and marines. In 1977 the Sixth ~leet had
up to 50 shipa and auxiliary vessels, including two multipurpoae air-
craft carriere (carrying 160-180 airplanes and helicoptera), 3-4
missile cruisere, 15-20 destroyers and frigates (ittcluding missile
shipa), 5-6 atomic submarines, 5^6 landing shi.ps (including landing
helicopter ships with 32 transport-landing helicopters on board)~ and
mobile rear support vesaels. An expeditionary marine battalion is
permanently aseigned to the landing stiipa. The fleet has about 25,000
peraonnel.
- The fleet do~a not have a fixed shi.p composition; instead it is com-
posed of combat-ready shipa and naval aviation and marine units of the
Atlantic Fleet (Second Operational Fleet) which spend up to six montha
in the Mediterranean. The e::ceptioi: is LIIC i iaKSi?ip ~ a missile
cruiser on which the cruise headquarters of the fleet commander is lo-
cated. This cruiser apends 2~3 years without a break in the Mediter-
ranean Sea.
When the international situation in the Mediterranean region worsens
the Sixth Fleet is uaually reinforced with shipa sent from the United
States. Thus~ during the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958
the fleet's ship compoaition was increased to 76 fighting ahips and
auxiliary veasels and the number of personnel rose to 35,000. Just
before the Arab-Iaraeli war in October 1973 the total number of ships
in the fleet wae raised to 65.
Organizationally~ the Sixth Fleei includes several task forces which
are designated to perform both independent and combined missions.*
* M organizational chart of the U. S. Sixth Fleet Was given in
ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENI~'E No S~ 1977, p 70 -(Fditor).
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
t~'OIt O~~ICIAL U5C ONLY
The tn~k forc~x h~ve 2~di~it ~=.umb~r~ in which the firse digiC tndicaten
nfEilineidn with the 51xth ~lee~ ~nd i~ alwgye "6,"
The 60th Taek ~orce (nircrnft cgrri.er) i~ the main ~eriking force of the
- fieet. Tt ueuglly hae nt lease ewo gircraft c~rrier groupa. The for-
eiqn pree~ repnrrs that e~ch ~roup includes a mulCipurpo~e aircr~ft
carrier, ~ne or ewo missile cruisere, 5-6 de~rrnyer~ and frigaCes, and
nn atomir s~bmarine.
At the atart of 1g7~ the SixCh ~leeC hgd Che mulCipurpose atomic air- -
crafC carrier Che~ter W. Nimitz gnd ehe multiputpose carrier Am~rica.
~ach cerrier hn~ nn ~ir wing with up to 10 squadrona of airplanea and
helicoptere (ebout 100 aircraft), Thus, according eo reporta in the
American ~ournal AVIATION W~~K, the following aircraft are based ~n
, the carrier America: two fighter aqundrons (each with 12 ~-14 Tomcat ~
plnnes)~ a ground -attack squadron (14 A-6 Intruder~ including four
_ refueling plane~), twc? ground-aCCack equadrona (14 A-7 Cnrsair~ each),
a equadron of long-ratige r~dnr detection planes (four ~-2C Hawkeyes)~
a squudron of four ~A-6$ Prowler radioelecCronic auppreasion plgnea,
a detachment of three RA-5C Vigilant heavy ground~attack-reconnaie-
sance planes, a aquadron of 10 S-3A Viking antisubmarine planea, and
a aquadron of eight FH-3A Sea King antisub helicoptera.
The missions nf the 60th Task F'orce are: deliver atrikes against aea
and land targets with both convenCional and nuclear weapona, provide
_ air support to ground forcea operating in coastal aectors and to
marine landing parties during their landing and fighting on ahore,
and combat enemy aurface ahips and eubmarines at sea.
Deck-based aircraft are capable of delivering conventional or nuclear
- weapons to targeta at up to 1,800 kilometere from the aircraft car-
rier. A special feature of the carrier task force, in the opinion
of American military specialists, is itr, high mobility which makes it
poasible for the task force to move up to 600 miles (about 1~100
kilometers) in 24 hours.
Under ordinary conditions, the foreign presa reporta, the fleet air-
craft carrier groups operate aeparately about 400 miles from one
another. Each day planes from the carrier perform about 120 takeoffa
and landings. The angled flight deck and other special devices allow
planes to land at 30-second intexvals. During a aix-month stay by an
aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean the sir wing loge up to 3~000
houra of flying time.
Judging by material in the foreign press~ 70 percent of the airplanea -
of a carrier must be in Constant readiness for takeoff. However, mil-
_ itary apecialists acknowZedge that this level of combat readineas is
_ not always maintained.
The 61st First Task Force (amphibious assault) is designated for nwv-
inR a marine assault party across the sea and landing them on a share.
27
FOR OFFICIhI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~dit O~~ICfAL US~ ONLY
mhp ta~k forcc includes u grdup of lnnding ~hipe ca11~d ehe Amphibiou~
Rendy Group~ mede up o~ c~n g~~nult h~licopeer ehip~ en n~~eule h~li-
copter ship�dock~ gn n~enulC Crnnsport~ddck, g Cattk landing ~hip~ and
a lgnding freighe tranaporC. The etiip~ nf Che group can move and lgnd
1~800-Z~000 m~rine~ (an expedi~ionary baCC~lion) on ahore uaing naval
ageault-landing meane or inland from Ch~ cogeC by meang of tr~naporr-
landing h~licopt~r~~ Th~~e methods mgy also be combined.
The lnnding ehips of the r~~dy group are aleernated every eix monehe~
Th~ 62nd Taek Force (m~rineg) is gn exp~diCionary battalion (e marine
baCt~lion with atCached tanke, areillery~ and helicdpt~rs). IC ie
usuglly drawn from the U, S~ 2nd Marine Diviaion. The battalion is
replaced at the same time as the ship~ of the ready group~ on which it
ig etationed~
The 63rd "Tgek ~orce (eervice forceg) performs rear eupport services for
Che shipe and avieCiott of the Sixth F1eeC. It hag one high~epeed com-
prehensive supply transport, special weapons and ammuniCion Cranaports~
_ tankera, a peeroleum carrier, a food transport~ a destroyer tender~ an
ocean-going tug, a reacue ship~ a repair and maintenance ahip~ and
, other auxiliary vessels.
. -
The headquarters of the task force monitora the use of fuel and
petrcleum producta by the fighting ships of the fleet and refuels them.
American tankera on the Mediterranean~ according to reports in the
foreign presa~ are capable of carrying about 100~000 tons of fuels and
_ lubricants.
Virtually all supply articles for the ships of the Sixth Fleet are de~
livered from the United States. Each month more than 1,550 tons of
food and about 300 tons of consumable goods are delivered from Norfolk
to the Mediterranean �or fleet personnel, Freah produce is bought at
foreign porta.
The U. S. navy command devotes significant attention at exercises to
practicing methods of replenishing ehips supplied at sea. As the
AmericRn presa reports, the 63rd Task Force carries out more than
2,~00 operations to replenieh ahip supplies at sea and on the move in
a year, with traneport helicoptere participating in 10 percent of them.
The 65th Task Force (temporary) is formed periodically to perform spe-
cial miseions. In 1966 it was formed tQ locate and raise the B~52
bomber and its nuclear bombs which had fallen into the sea near
Palomares, Spain; in October-November 1971 it was formed to conduct
tests of new sweeps and apparatus for sweeping acouatic and magnetic
mines by helicopter. It included a subunit of minesweeping forces
that had a headquarters group and four CH~53A Sea Stallion minesweeper
helicopters~ The subunit was based at the Suda airbase on the island
of Crete. -
- 28
FOR OFFICI/~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~Olt n~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
'Che 66th 'Cn~k i'orc~ (C~mporary) is de~ign~Ced Cn r~infdree Che gnCi-
pubmnrine defen~e df rhe Sixth rleet's ~ircrgfti c~rrier egak fdree if
Che aiCUntion in the MediC~rrgn~nn Seg region becdmes complex.
The 67th T~ak ~orce (antisubmarine) searches for and d~~erdy~ ~nemy
submarin~~ nnd curricg nn recdnngie~ance~ It has p-3C Orinn ~hor~-
b~eed paerol girpl~ne~ that operxee from the naval air bgee~ gC
5lgonella on the ieland of Sicily and Sud~ nn Cr~t~, well g
equadron o~ reconngiasnnce plnnes seaeion~d gC th~ U~ 5~ N~vy airbase
_ , in itot~, Spnin. :
The 6gth Task ~orce (submarine ~orc~s) hag several aeomic submgrinee
that nre bnsed aC La MF,ddalena~ Sardinia.
The naval bnses and portg of ICaly,Greece, Turkey, Spain, and the is-
lnndg of Malta and Creee are uged for b~se~ of fleet ghipa and for
visite. The U~ S~ navy command worke Cireles~ly Co turn some of theo~
ports inCo perm~nent baeea for its fleet. According Co report~ in Che
foreiRn prese~ the United Stat2s has already received cottsent Co equip
and use the Italian port of La Maddalena and two Spanish porCs~ Ceuta
and Cartagena, as naval bages. The lease on th~: leading naval base at
- Rota has been extended. Negotiaeions are underway with Che Government
of Israel to lease territory for basing American ships in the port of
Haif~. ,
During the Ara6-Israeli conflict of 1967 the Americans set up an ad-
vance operaCions base in Suda Bay on the island of Crete to aupport
naval actions in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Ongoing re-
pnir for ships of tfie Sixth FYeet is performed there on a destroyer
tender. Repair work is also done on an atomic misaile ~ubmarine
. tender atationed ar, the Rota advance naval base and an atomic submarine
tender at La Maddralena.
The fleet has apecial detachments in Naples and Ro~a to coordinate
logistic support and insure uninterrupted operation of the supply
system. These detachmenta use aircraft of the 24th Naval Aviation
Transport Squadron to transport freight. Theae planea usually take
off from the Rota and Sigonella airfields and fly "special" routes
determined by actual suppl.y neede. Each month carrier-based trans-
port aircraft deliver at least 250 tons of different kinds of freight
to the aircraft carriers of the Sixth Fleet.
The combat training of the Sixth Fleet is conducted in accordance ,
with plans to use it in limited (local) conflicts as well as in gen-
eral nuclear war. Training aims at raising combat readiness of the
assault forces of the fleet first of all~ the aircraft carrier groups
as well as antiaub forces and marines. As the foreign press has re-
ported~ ships of the Sixth Fleet spend more than 50 percent of their
time at sea participating in various exerciaes. The Sixth Fleet de-
votes more than half of the time allocated for combat training to
~oint exercises with the naviea of the other NATO countries on the
Mediterranean (Italy~ Greece, Turkey, and also Great nrita{�..~ and
France). During these exercises the carrier groups practice~ the '
29
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~dit U~~ICIAL US~ nNLY
mi~~ion~ of d~liv~ring strik~a ng~in~t gnd grdund C~rgeC~ wieh
cnrrier-b~ged ~irCrnEt, prnvidjng nir supporC eo ground fnrce~ in the
coastel secCdrg of ehe 5outhern ~urope~n thegter, fighting enenry aur-
f~~e ehipe and eubmnrines, landinR a~egult parCie~~ end cgrrying ~n
the air and antisub def~nse of the tnek force~.
Siroil~r mig~i~n~ ~r~ p~rform~d by ~'nre~g of th~ Sixth ~leeC aC ~xer~
cisee of the N~tional Week type~ held ~n the b~gi~ af U~ S~ N~ity
nationgl plans twice a ye~r~ The Sixrh ~1eet uguglly works on fighting
en~my s~rface ve~~elg in bilnteral exerciaea nf aircrnfe carrier groups
during which each grnup, using cover and d~cepCinn and ob~erving fu~.1
radio nnd r~dar ~ilence~ maneuvere in an aseigned region in an attempt
to find gnd degtroy the enemy~ The American presa r~porte thaC auch
exerci~ee usually end in succese~ with ehe einking of one af Che air-
craft carriers gnd several escort sAipa~
~
According to ~taCemente by Pentngnn leadera, the SixCh ~leet, being an
"implement of deterrence~" is always in a high degree of combnt readi-
nese and even in peaceCime is staffed at wartime levels. A~ the base
for formation of NATO naval assault forces in the Southern European
� theaCer~ it can~ as shown by the events of recent yeara, operat~ ~Inde-
pendently in support of the imperialiat policy of the United States in
the Mediterranean Sea reg3on~ eometimes not coordinating ita actiona
with NATO partnera at all~
For example~ during the night between 24 and 25 October 1973 (at the
time of the Arab-Israeli War), ttie Sixth Fleet was awitched to a atate
of combat readinesa No 3 without notification of American alliea and
the main forces of the fleet (two aircraft carrier groups and a group
of landing ships with marines on,b~ard) were asaembled in a region to
the south of the island of Crete~ in the immediate vicinity of combat
actions. Moreover~ a tRird sircraft carrier group (the carrier John
F. Kennedy with three escort ships sent from the North Sea) was brought
into the Mediterranean and the carrier Hancock from the Seventh Fleet~
with escort ehips, arrived in the Arabian Sea to inaure an American
presence to the south of the conflict region.
This information from the foreign presa concerning the activitiea of
the U. S. Navy 5ixth Fleet, which is by no means the full story~ illus-
tratea that it ia one of the primary tools of the expanaionist ~olicy
of imperialist circles in the Mediterranean Sea basin.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1978
11,176
CSO: 18U1
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~OEt d~'~ZCIAL US~ ONLY
COI~tENT5 ON U. 5. NAVY AUTOMATEb CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
Moecow zARUBE2HN0Y~ VOY~NNOY~ OBOZRENIYA in Ruseian No 11~ Nov 78
eignpd to preae 3 OcC ~8 pp 76-84
[Article by CoI-~ngr T. Loshchilov~ candidate of Cechnical aciences:
"Automntion of the U. S. Navy ConCrol and Communicat3ons System"] -
(TextJ In Che next decade, the foreign press reports, the U. S.
military leadership intends to reviae the navy command and control
syatem so Chat iC is better suited to the requirements of its mili-
tary strategy and the increased capacities of�weapons and combat
equipment. At the present time the cotmnand and control syatem neede
centralizgtion of auch functions as collection and analysis of obser-
vntion data~ monitoring the poaiCion of ahipa, operational planning _
of their use in combat, attd formulation of miasions by the higher
command element for all combat-ready forces down to the individual
ahip.
American navy specialists believe that all this can be done through a
fundamental revision of existing control and communications systems
and automation of them. In 1975 the U. S. navy command reached a dP-
cision to work out a long-range plan for development of a general-
purpoae Naval Command and Control System (NCCS)~ Following thia plan
a aeries of new structural and technical concepts to be imple-
mented to improve the operating effectiveness~ survival capacity~
flexibility, and secrecy of comtr~and and conCrol.
Operating effectiveness is to be improved by high-speed automatic
- processing~ diaplay~ and transmiasion of data. It is considered es-
sential to concentrate the processing of moet data on shore in order
to give ahip command and control elements prepared data received from
observation and reconnaissance elements and information on other
types of combat and logistical support.
The survival capability of the command and control system �s to be
- maximized by using standardized command centers capable of organizing
and restoring command and control quickly during preparation for and
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~OIt n~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
waging of combat a~eion~~ They ehould be mutually replaceable and
capnbl~ of rediseributing misgions in cusp one or ~evernl c~neers gre '
knncked oue~ Vnrioue CypeA of communicationa will be u~ed �or data
exchange ~mong the commgnd cettCere~ In the opinion of American mili-
tc~ry specieliets, Chis wi11 inaure Che necessary reliabiltty of infor-
mation tranemi~sion under conditione of radioelectrAnic warfare.
~~.~xirtliey ig to be inerenAed by ~nining pgreicular command and con-
Crol gysCems, aCandardizic~g them~ and then ineegrating them~ Special
gttenCion is being clevoCed eo the problem of the compatability of
different command and conerol gystems (surface ehipa, submarines, and
naval g~igeion) with one gttother and with the nther brgnches of the
armed forces, inCegrating ehip eyateme for control of forces and wea-
pons, and ~oining ship communications and navigaCion equipment into a
single complex~ -
Secrecy of command and contro~. ia to be achieved by exteneive uee of
equipment Co encip?~er telephone gnd digital communicaCion.
According Co foreign preas reporta, Che NCCS eyetem will be based on
ehore command centers for fleeta and tactical flagship command and
control centera at sea.
The fleet command centera will provide proceaeing and summarization of
- operational information received from various sources, display of it
in a form that is convenient for deciaion-making~ and rapid~ precise
delivery of plana to subordinate formations and higher command levels.
One of the primary functions of the centera will be Co integrate infor-
- mation received from the ahore antisub defenae c~ntera~ the information
centers of the Ocean Surveillance Information SysCem (OSIS)~ and the
centers of the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS). The proc-
esaing and summarization of information will be done in the interesta
of both shore and ship command and control elements. Another important
function of the center is communication with organs of the atrategic
leadership of the U. S. Armed Forces. Thia will be done by including
theae centers in Che global system of operational command and control
of the U. S. Armed Forces and aupplying them with standard equipment
for automated data procesaing and transmission.
Plans call for setting up fleet command cpntera at the headquarters of
the commanders of the Atlantic and Pacific flQets a~rd the U. S. naval
cormnander in Europe. An experimental conna~and center for the commander
of the Atlantic Fleet is now being put together at the Norfolk
~Virginia) Naval Base. It will use a standard Hb000 computer and a
special data display sysCem for automated data processing. During the
trials in 1978-1919 the general procedures for functioning of the com-
mand center. the reliability of operation of the equipment~ and the
primary data processing al~orithms will be tested. In this same period
completion of developmene of the Composite Operational Reporting System ~
(CORS)~ a system for preparation of operational reports on the condi-
tion of the nevy. is contemplated. This system will be used for
32
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~'OEt O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
- prepnraCinn and fe~ding senndard mes~gge~ eo the cnmputer wieh eub~e~
, quenC nuComaCic trnnAmissinn wiChin Che global ey~eem of operaCional
command nnd conCrol of the U~ S, Arm~d Forcea~ Afeer Che CeeCB have
been made, ttie comm~nd ceneer equipmene ia Co be insealled aC Che
- headquartere of the commnnder of Che P~cific ~leet and the U. 5, naval
commander in ~urope~ Similgr equipment ia to be supplied to the c~per~
' ation~l cenCer of N~vy N~~dqunr,C~rs nlso~ In the fireC helf of the
19gU'g the~e cent~rg nre going eo be ~oined into a si.ngle network~
which will provid~ dir~ct, high-apead dgtg exchange~ use of general in-
fnrmgtion file~ by each command elem~ne, gnd gutomatic ~election of
datg on query by the legdership and compneite reports (cnncerning the "
~itu~tion in miliCnry Cheaters) for operaCional orieneaCidn of subor-
- dinate force~,
Tacticul flagahip commnnd and controL cent~rs gre to be deployed on
figgehips (nircrafC cnrriers, mieeile cruiaers~ and Che h~adquart~rs
ehipe of nmphibiou~ forces)~ 'They wi11 eerve as the basie for organ-
' izing the co~mnand and control of ~11~arms formations; rherefore, Chey
- ehould provide coordingtion with the command and control systems of
various clasaes of ships~ naval aviation~ and aubmnrines,
According tn information in the American presg, the centers are being
developed in two stages, In the first atage a Cemporary variaCion is
being developed and going through comprehensive te~ting under real con~ -
ditions. This ~quipment variation was installed on the aircrafC carrier
- John F. Kennedy in 1977 for C~eCing, and precise determinationa were
made of time requirementa for accomplishing operational-tactical mis-
sions, the intEnsity, completeness~ and reliability of information
received from observation systems, procedure for coordination with
the fleet connnand center, and Che abiliCy to maintain continuoue con-
trol when some equipment is down. Tn 1979 the equipment is to be
installed on several more ships for testing and preparations will begin
for series production. In the second stage standard equipment will
be developed~ manufactured~ and installed on ships. In all about 40
set~ of such equipmenC ar~ contemplated. The approximate completion -
- date for the aecond stage ia 1984.
The flagahip command and control centera should conCain tactical
support centers (TSC's) and intelligence centers (TC's)~ which are
- deployed on aircraft carriers, and automated systems for tactical air
radio and radar intelligence called the Tactical Airborne 5ignal Ex-
ploitation Syatem (TASES) and the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS~.
The tactical support centers are designed to coordinate the actian,s
of the antiaubmarine aircraft of carrier task forces. They ahould
provide exchange of information during the planning and performance
of missions [a combat submarines and processing and display of daCa
for the crews of carrier-based planes and ship commanders. These -
cent.ers are a constituent part of the control system for tactical
ant~aubmarine aviation (ASTACS - ASW Tactical Support System) and
operate in it as the link between the flagehip command and control
centers end the NTDS. Experimental models of equipment for the
33
FOR OFFICI~,I. USE ONLY
t
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~Ott n~I~'YCIAL US~ ONLY
c~nCers arc~ now going Chrough ee~ting und ~eries producCion ie conr~m~
_ plnted in 1980~
It ig expecred Chr~t Che TASES eysCem wi11 be in~ealled on 5-3A aneisub
c~irplnne~~ Thi~ ehould eign~ficanCly Qxpand the cnpaci~iee of tacti-
cal flagship command centerg For co~.lection of information an the sur-
face aituation in naval theatera~ Juat 16 plnnes are eo be equipped
with thia aystem. IC 3s expected Chnt Che eysCem wi11 be put into opqC-
ation in the firet half of the 1980'e.
The inCelligence cenCers are part of Che Naval InCelligence Proceasing -
System. They have been operated since 1962 and are now being modern-
ized. The primary goals of modernizaCion are to awiCch to up~-to-date
auComgted dat~ procegaing and displny equipmenC, to ineroduce more
sophiaticated programs that provide remote access and updating of in-
formation files, and to work out reliable methode of enciphering data.
After thie, the centere should aupply intel~igence data through the
NTDS system to virtually all ahips in the tactical control element.
~n the opinion of U. S. naval specialises~ the NTDS syaten, which has
nlready been insCalled in about 84 shipe~ remains the basic naval com-
mand and control aystem at the CacCical level. It can perform a
broad range of miasions related to command and control of the combaC
actiona of operational groupa~ detachments~ and individual ehipa~ or-
ganize the antiaubmarine struggle, and control aviation and other
types of weapons. The further development of the aystem is the sub-
~ect of three pro~ects and will follow the path of standardizing auto-
mation and communicaCions equipment and interlinking equipment already
in operation with future models.
Qne of the projecta contemplates development of the AN/UYQ-21 aeries
of standardized display units (displays, large screena, automated
panels, devices to automatically read daCa from documents, and equip-
ment for atorinR, switchinq, and transmitting measages). All,these _
units will have modular design. Judgin$ by reports in the foreign
press, an experimental batch of 17 sets has been manufactured and
aeriea production is planned in the early 1980's. The AN/UYQ~21
geries of diaplay units is to be used all the way until 1990 in vir- �
tually all tactical command and control sygtems in the navy.
- The secot~d pro~ect gimg at improving the aet of terminal equipment
for the LINK 11 automated data transmission radio line. The set in- =
cludea a ama]1 AN/UYK-20 computer, an AN/USQ-69 display for display- .
ing alpha numeric information, and a transce:iver. After completion ~
of development work in 1979 the LINK 11 set w-'ill replace the obsolete _
equipment used in the NTDS.
The third project envisions integration of all ship combat informa-
tion control systems and the development of standards for thF equip-
ment used in the Naval Tactical Data System.
34
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~'OIt O~FICZAL USE ONLY
_ In the future the NTDS eyseem is ex~ecCed to be u~ed an ships of nll
cl~sse~, One proJecC, in purticular~ envisiona building a special
vnri~tion oE the system for inetallnCion on Charles Adame~type miasile
desCroy~rs nnd certain frigatea. Tt includes the atiandard AN/UYK-7
camputer~ peripheral equipmenC~ and g atandardized ser3ea AN/UYK~21
- displny unit~ The firsC modela of Che new system are contemplated for
inatallntion in 1981~
The NTUS is connected ro the Air Tactic al D~Ca System (ATDS) combat
inform~Cion and control syatem designed for the command and control
of the comb~t acCiona of naval aviaCion. The ATDS ia now being
modernized (new automation equipmenC, radar, and navigation meana are
being insCalled on Che ~-2A and E-2C planes)~ In addition, the system
is being interllnked with the Airborne Warning and Control Syatem
- (AWACS) developed by the Air ~'orce for long-range radar detection and
' control,
When large marine assault parties are being landed the tacCical flag-
ehip command and conCrol centera are assigned to coordinate the actions
of the operaCional formation and marine unita. Technically speaking, ~
" this miasion will be accomplished by interlinking them with rhe auto-
mated system for command and conCrol of marine combaC actions, the -
Marine Tactical Command/Control System (MTACCS) whose introduction is
planned in the first half of the 1980's. Several subsysCema are being
developed for it: an operational aubaystem (Tactical Combat Operations
System - TCOS); intelligence subsystem (Marine Air Ground InCelligence
System - MAGIS); a fire and aviation supporC aubsystem (Marine Inte- �
grated Fire and Air Support Syatem MIFASS); the Marine Air Coum~and/
Control System (MACCS), and others. They will all be interlinked with
aimilar elements existing at Che tactical supporC centers, intelli-
gence centers, and in the TASES and NTDS aystems. -
According to the foreign press, cooperation with other branches of the
armed forces when the navy ie supporting ground forces in coastal sec~
tors will be organized Chrough the tactical flagship command and con-
trol centers. Cooperation will be based on the principle of compati-
bility at the tactical level among the command and control syatems of
the navy~ air force~ and ground forces. The chiefs of staff assigned
several programs for this purpose. Two of them~ the Tactical Air
_ Control System/Tactical Air Defense System (TACS/TADS) and Ground and
Amphibious Military Operations (CAMO) have been assigned to Che naval
chief of staff.
The TACS/TADS progr;im ~envisions combining the command and control
- systems for aviation and air defense. In the navy it includes the
NTDS, ATDS, and MA~;CS systems; in the ground forces it encompasses -
~ the AN/TSQ-73 aut~,matic antiaircraft artillery control system; in the
air force it covers the Tactical Air Control System (TACS) and its
conatituent elements (command/control and warning centers), The basic
tactical-technical requirements for interlinking th~se systems have
now been fully developed and in 1978 work on the program moved into
the stage of experimental design.
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
FOR OFFICIAL USC ONLY
The GAMO progrAm aims at guaran~eeing compatibiliCy among the control
systems of the branches of the armed forces participating in ground
operations~ Tn Che navy the program encompasses Che TCOS~ MIFASS~ and
- MAGIS systema;in the ground forces it covers the Tactical Operationa
_ 5yatem (TOS), Che Tactical Fire Direction Syatem (TACI~'IRE)~ and an
automatic sysCem far determining position, recognition; and data trans -
miasion called the Position Location and Reporting System (PLRS); in
the air force ~.C includes the Tactical Information Processing and Inter~
cepCion Syetem (TIP~}. Work on the GAMO program was begun in 1978 and -
should be completed in 1986~
~ In the opinion of American miliCary specialists, practical realization
of the principl~a of conatruction of the NCCS system depends primarily �
on continuous~ rell.able~ and aecret communications between command -
centera snd aubordinate forces. Moreover, ttiere muat be direct real-
time dnta ~ransmission among computers on special high-speed automated
chP,nnels and a greater degree of'specialization in command and cAntrol
of naval forces from shore installations. This increases tfie importance
of circular communications syatems~ There muat be an improvement in the -
� exchange of information among a11 elements of fleet organization (ex-
tensive automation and standardizaCion of the processes of collection,
proceasing, and disseminating messages is contemplated). These require-
ments should be realized in the Naval Telecommunication System (NTS)~
whose modernization is a consCituent part of the program for builda.ng
the NCCS. Figure 2[not reproduced] shows the primary'structural ele-
~r~ents of Che future Naval Telecommunication System.
Onehore communication in the NTS system is accomplished through main
and auxiliary ahore communications stations deployed in different re-
gions of the world. They are part of the U. S. Department of Defense's -
automated communications systems AUTOVON and AUTODIN, which make pos-
sible telephone conversations and data transmission in discrete form.
The five main stations, located in San FranciscA, Norfolk, Naples,
Honolulu~ and the island of Guam, provide communications for naval com- -
manders in their zones of responsibility~ coordinate and monitor the
work of auxiliary stations, and carry on circular transmissions. They
are part of the Fleet Satellite Broadcast (FSB) system of navy space
communications which uses channels of the Fleet Satellite Communica-
, tion (FLTSATCOM) satellite comTr~unications system.
Development ~f the onshore part of the NTS system is proceeding by
automation of inessage processing and distribution to serve all command
and control elements and naval institutions and provide reliable and
operational information exchange with ships. There are three basic
programs at the present time.*
* See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOY~NNOYE OBOZRENIYA No 6, 1978, pp 78-81 -
- (Editor).
36
FqR OFFICII~L USE ONLI -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
t~0[t O~N'ICIAL U5~: nNLY
'Che flrqt pro~;r~hm ~~?,~iyiUn~ crentio~i ~f' att ~utomated ~y~tem fdr meg~
~up,c exchnnge .7mntt~; HubHr.ribcrs at shore headqu~rt~r~ ~nd serviceg -
(tt~e Locul nigitnl Mes~age t.xch~~nge ~ t,bMX) ~~aeh unit of iC ~hould
~erve ag a rerriCorinl. center ~or proceggin~ me~snges nnd serve up to
- ld sub~acriber~, It i~ ineerlinked wiCh Che AUTODIN ~y~tc~m, makin~ it
' possible f~r subg~t'ibers to rer~ch the control elemente of other
brr~ncheg oE the c~rmed forces r~ncl centrnl ingtitutiong of the Dep~rtm~nt
o~ befense. At the pre~ent time uniC~ of the gygt~m h~ve been deployed
c~t 17 nav~t communictttions stntiong.
The gecond progr~m envisions creation of an autom~ted message proc-
esging system~ the Nav~l Communications proce~sing ~nd Routing 5ygtem
(NAVCOMPAR5), for qhore ship - ghore communic~tion~ It can per-
Form nll the function~ of the LUMX syseem, but in relation rd fleet
Communicntions stntion~, ~nd therefore it is ~upplemente~l by speci~l
equipment that m~keg it posgible to interlink with trangceivers and
tr~~ck Che position of shtps. NAVCOMI'AIt5 serve~ ag the connecCing link
between the AU~'ObIN system and Che ~leet 5ate11iCe Broadcast 5yetem;
- afCer full deployment of rhe ~I,'~5ATCOM satelliCe communications system
it will provide l~ip,h-apeed message transmission to ships from any ehore
post. The system equipment includeg two 5pectrum 70/45 compuCerg~ Qne
serves subscribers in real time and ehe other ig on sCand-by or per-
formin~ subsidiary operations, The computer hgs Cwo modules for tnulti-
channel communic~Cion thaC connect 82 teletypes, two high-speed input
units, an optical reader, and 10 displays.
The third program envisions building "remote information exchange
- terminals" (RIXT'g). They nre being organized at various shore com-
mund and control ~gencies. Using this equipment subacribers will have
direct access to infoYmaCion files atored in the LDMX and NAVCOMPARS
systems, formulate messag~s rapidly for dispatching after receiving ~
- the required information, and receive correspondence from other points~ ~
Plans call for setting up a total of 95 points provided with this equip-
ment. -
The FLT5ATCOM system (decimeter wave band; first satellite launched in
February 19~8) is receiving primary emphasis in Che organizaCion of
' ship - shore - ship communications. It will provide data trans-
mission for the navy on 10 radio channels (one is allocated for circu- -
lar transmissions). Three data exchange subsyatems have been organ-
- ized using them: n general-purpose subsystem; a subsystem for exchange
with aubmarines; and a subsystem for exchange acaong fleet command
centers. The first, the Common User DiRital Information Exchange 5ub- -
system (CUDIXS) is designated for exchange of digital information among
shore and ship cor?mand and control elements. It consists of several
radio networks~ each of which is controlled by a main station and
covers a group of 60 ships. F'ifty subscribers of the Rroup (small-
displacement ships) transmit only. They recAive information by the
circular communicacions sqstem.
37
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~OK 0~'~ICIAL US~ ONLY
The other 10 s~bsCriberg hgve equipment for ewo-wny inform~tion ex-
chan~e~ mh~ exchgnge re~ime i~ constr~~cted following Che principle
di time aharing ne ndaikned by the main station~ IC periodicnlly as-
~igns ~ech eubecriber g time inCerval durittg which ie ig authorized
to Cr~ngmit ar re~eive mes~gges. The mgin ~C~Cion is ehe inCermedi-
nte link b~tween the NAVCOMI'Ait5 system and the eatellite commnnicatiort
terminnl stntintte, thug gllowing ehip subscri~er~ to be part of the
AUTODIN eystem.
The new poeaibilities offered by satellite communicaCion will~ in Che
dpininn of American military epecialistis~ ca11 forCh n significane in-
cre~se in information flows in shore - ahip - ehore communications.
This will requir~ nuComatinn of dgta processing not only on ahore buC
right ott the ahips. Work is underway on the Nnval Modalar Automated
Cnmmunic~tiotts SygCem (NAVMACS), which envisions building an auto-
mated communications eygtem. ICs gasignment includea auComating the
following functiona: "scanning" information transmitCed by the cir-
cular syeCem and selecting megsages from it for the particular ad-
dresa; procesaing CexCual and graphic informatic~n; organizing data
atorege and retrieval; disCribution of inessages to internal addresaea
and tranemission from the ship to other obiecte. The apparatua of the
system must be interlinked wiCh all types of ship communications, but
it ie orien[ed primarily to circular satellite communications and the
digital information exchange ayatem. NAVMACS ia compoaed of func-
tional hardware and software modules whose number and composition de-
pend on the clasa and designation of the ship~ A total of six types
_ of sets are envisioned. The simplest are already in aeries production
atitd are being inatalled on amall ships. The moat complex are in the
teeting stage. Plans call for ships to be fully equipped with the -
; NAVMAC~ system by 1982,
1
According to information in the foreign pr~ss, the U. S, naval com-
- mand has begun aupplying satellite communication terminal equipment
to its ships without waiting for full deployment of the FLTSATCOM sys-
- tem (the aecond and third satellites are to be launched in late 1978
and early 1979). At the present time about 90 percent of the termi-
nals are capable of receiving circul~,r communications and about 30
percent can carry on telephone conversationa and tranamit data along
satellite communications channels. Some of the flagships will be ~
equipped with DSCS-2 Department of Defense satellite communications
terminal stations to establish direct communication with organs of
the higher military-political leadership and the naval command. This
range ha8 greater noise immunity~ but in the opinion of American mil-
- itary specialists widespread use of it in the navy will be limited _
by the high cost of the terminals and the necessity of stabilizing
antennas.
In addition to these systems, the traditional types of shartwave~
medium-wave~ and long-wave radio communications continue to be impor--
tant for organizing ahore - ship - shore communication. In addition
to them circular transmi~sion of commands to submarines under water
may be carried on in the medium-long range band through relay sircraft
of the TACAMO system.
_ 38
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~O~t d~~ICIAL U5~ ONLY
ShortwFrvC c?nd ultr~shurCwnve communication~~ which hav~ undergone ~ig-
nificnnt chnnges, rem~nin the primnry form of close-in communicatiott
mm~ng ships nnd between phip~ and aircr~ft, New types of golid-HCate _
shortwnve trnneceivera with apecial modes increase the speed of
dntn transmieeion to 2,400 bauds~ It will become the primnry meane of
communicnCion in npernCiongl formaCiona in Che fueure, ~xieCing u1Cra-
ehortwnve sete nre eo be replaced by eeandnrdized modular equipment
with improved nnige immuniCy. plnn~ ca11 for building combined ghort-
wave/ultr~ehortwave cnmmunications equipment for the airplgnes of navgl
evintion~ which will make ehem compatible with gtandard marine commu^
nicntions equipment~ A new syetem for communicatidn 6etween sh3ps and -
navel avigCion is being developed on a gpecial pro~ram, A laser sys-
tem is being d~veloped for surface ships gnd aircrnfC to communicate
with eubmarineg.
5pecinl attention is bein~ direceed to the apparatua for enciph~ring
ahortwave~ ultrashortwave~ and aetellire communications channels.
- This equipment will begin to be inatalled on shipa~ submarines~ and
airplnnea in 1979~ Further plans are for rhe development and in-
atatlation on shipa of appAratus for group enciphering of all radio
channels.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubeahnoye voyennoye obozreniye"~ 1978
11~176
CSO: 1801
39
FOR OFFICIl~L IJSE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~OEi O~~~CIAL US~ bNLY
C~MM~N'CS ON 'TH~ U. 5~ GUANTANAMO BAS~ _
Mnecow ZAItUB~ZNNOY~ VOY~NNOY~ OBbZR~NIY~ in Ruseian No 11, Nov 78
eigned to preas 3 O~t 78 pp 103~104
(Article by Lt Col Yu~ Sednv: "The Americ~n Military Base at
GuanCanamo"~
[T~xC) Readers comrad~s S~ S. Mikadze~ V~ M.
Titov~ Yu. P. Ugo1'kov~ and others have asked
us to tell about the American military base at
CuanCanamo. The article below fulfills Chis re-
queat.
Military baees in Latin AmQrica olay an important oarC in the mili-
tary-strategic plans of American imperialism. They are used as an
inatrument of neocolonialist policy and a tool for U. S. interveation
in the affairs of other countries and auppressing the national liber-
ation movement in this re'gion. There are more than 50 bases belong-
ing to the United States of America in Latin America; the naval base
at Guantanamo, located on the southeasCern coast of socialist Cuba,
is particularly important. It was established in conformity with a
treaty imposed on Cuba in 1903 according to which the United Statee
~ leases 116.5 square kilometera of land and 37 squar~ kilometers of
territorial waters~ including Guantanamo Bay. The e!itire southern
part of thp bay and the region stretching three miles south from iCS -
mouth have been declared by the United States to be closed to naviga-
tion by the ehips and vesaels of other countries.
According to the foreign press~ the base has a large number of mili-
_ tary and other facilities, including 1,400 service and residential
buildings, 14 weapons~ ammunition, and supply depots~ petroleum
storage tanks~ a center af the armed forces radio and television net- -
~ work. ship repair yards, many docks~ and so on. The broad, deep,
well-protected harbor and the structures and equipment located in it
can accommodate and service up to 50 ahips of different classes~ in-
cluding aircraft carriers. The Waterfront has a total length of 3,000
meters with depths of 10-17 meters at the docks. _
40
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2
~ox o~~tcint, us~ nrn.Y
The bu~e hn~ twd l~rge airfields~ Livord ~iel~�`c~ith g runwgy of 2~400
metere dnd MncC~llic~ with d runwny of 1~500 metez~~ Air force gnd
nnvy plnn~~ nre ~edtioned Chere.
According co n foreign pre~s egtimnte, th~ b~gp i~ opergepd by ~b~ut
7,b00 peopl~~ 2~500 of them ~~rvicemen~ In addiCi~i,n~ Ch~r~ ~re _
_ ~~000-5~000 Ameriegn ~~ilnrg nnd officers dn the ehipg of Che U. S~ ~
S~cond ~leet, which atands in the rdadstead of the b~y~ Uuring Che
"C~ribbegn ~ri~i,~" in Octnber 1962 the total number of U. S~ militgry
perennnel gt ehe bgse was raieed Co 20~OOb,
The Cugntanamo Nc~v~l Ba~e is used eo mnniror the Cgribbean Sea xone
and npproache~ tn ehe P~ngmg Cannl and for tegCing new ryp~s of a~a-
pon~. It i~ coneidered th~ maet convenient bage in Ch~ Aelantic gnd
e~ch year more than 150 ghipg came to work on comTiat ergtning missions,
The bng~ hns been a cenCer of provocntion and eabotage ggainsC Che Re-
public of Cuba for many years~
Despite the 1ega1 and fair demand of the CuUan people for Che uncondi-
tion~l elimination of the American military ~ase~ the Pentagon con-
Cinueg to hold it by forc~ and use it for ite own purposes, consider-
ing this strnCegic point to be a key ngval installation in the
Caribbean region and in Central and South America.
COPYRIGHT: "zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye"~ 1978
11,176
CSO: 1801
END
41
FOR OrFICIGL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030005-2