JPRS ID: 8325 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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' I I ` ' .
9 MARCH i979 CFOUO 3179~ i OF i
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JPRS L/8325
_ 9 March 1979
~
= TRANSLATIaiVS ON tJSSR POLITICAL
A~ID SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO ~/79)
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U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIC~NS RESEARCH SERVICE
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JPRS L/8325
9 March 19 79 ~
TRA.NSLAi iGiVS ON USSR POI~ITICAL
ANA SOC~OLOGICAI, AFFAIRS -
(FOUO 3/79)
CONT~NTS PAGE
IlVTERNATIONAL
Detente~e Contradictione, Iesues Lnpeding Ite Pmgresa Viewed
(V, M. Kulieh; RABOCHIY KLASS I SUVRI~MENNYY MIR,
Jan-Feb 79) .....................................o....... 1
Medvedav Inten~iew on Soviet-Chineea Re~,atione
(Roy Medvedev Interview; LA STAMPA~ 27 Dec 78) 20
NATIONAL
Roy Medvadev Charges Dietortion of Hia Poeition~
(Roy M edvedev; LA STAMPA~ 26 Jan 79) 23
- a - [III - USSR - 35 FOUOj
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INTEItNATIONAL
DE'TENTE'S CONTRADI(:T?ONS, ISSUES INiPEDING ITS PROGRESS VIEWED
Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 79
aigned to prese 28 Dec 78 pp 17-32 LD
[Arti~le by V. M. Kuliah: "Detente and the Threat of War--Alternative
Trends"] r
['fext] In the aecond half of the seventies the process of internaCional
detente is manifesting itaelf increasingly noCiceably, albeit tn a some-
_ what contradictory fashion. On the one hand its influence on international
- relations is increasing, the number of states sctively supporting it is
growing and the positions of politir..al and social forces fighting for
detente are strengthening. On the other hand, the criticism of detente
by rightwing,' conservative forces in Western countries, particularly in the
United States, is intensifying. These circles are receiving active support
from the present PRC leadership. Thf~ criticism from both directions is
turning into direcC aL�tacks on detente and open slander of its supporters.
In several cases it contains the demand for a return practically to the
_ cold war and appeals to prepare for world war. In his time former U.S.
President Gerald Ford also joined in the "antidetente" campaign, publicly
refusing to uae the term "detente." Then and now, many people try to give
_ their own interpr~tation of the detente process and on that basis to criti-
cize and re~ect the phenomenon itself. Certain influential groups, and
sometimes even governments, in Western countries act more cautiously: They -
verbally support detente but in fact exert considerable efforts to retard
tlie process of its development and prevent it from spreading to the mili- ~
tary sphere.
Tlius detente is the sub~ect of a bitter political and ideological struggle
which has drawn into its orbit all states and governments and political
and social forces in Che world, without exception. This str4,;gle has
embraced all spheres of international relations and is exerting considerable
_ influence on the behavio~ of both governments and sociopolitical forces.
In this connection the Soviet theory of international relations is faced
with the task of devoting even more attention to studying the factors which
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determined rtie emergence und development of the detente process, revenling
le~ moCive Corces und contradictions and yeeking ways and means of pence-
fully resolving these conCradictions in the inCereaCs of further developing
the entire procese.
'The article here offered to the reader. pursues Che goal of giving a general
characterization of inCernational detenCe and examining the problems with-
out whose resolution it cannoe be deepened.
Changes in the Correlation and DistribuCion of ~orces in Che World--The
Most ImporCant Precanditions of Detente
Interttational detente is the necessary result o~ the development of poliCi-
cal, economic and social processes and Che successes of science and Cech-
nology, which led to a substanCial chan~e in Che correlation and diseribueion
of forces both internationally and wiChin many states. "As a result the
distribution of forces in the world arena has changed completely," L. I. Brezh-
nev noted in the report ''On Che Draft USSR Constitution" at the CPSU Central
, Committee 24 May 1977 Plenum. "The real possibility has appeared of averting
a new world war, and the threat of the emergence of such a war has already
receded, although we still have much work to do in this sphere and a stubborn
struggle still lies ahead"~1~.
A simplistic interpretation of the question of the change in the correla- ~
tion of farces and the substitution of the question of the correlation of
military forces is often en~ountered in the WesCern pre~s, particularly the
American press. Of course, miliCary strength as yet remains one of the most
, obvious and dangerous indicators of the might of this or that statp, al-
though it does not reflect its real might in full. But even if preference
is given to military strength, a detailed impression of the real stren~th of '
states and of the potential for its foreign political realization can be
o~tained if this strength is assesoed within the system of international
relations which determine the correlation and disCribution of forces in the
world and its regions. This is of exceptionally great significance for an
understanding of the ~ssence of international detente and for revealing its
methods of influencing states' foreign policy and their potential for
realizing the foreign policy resources at their disposal, particularly such
extr~mely dangerous resources as mil~tary strength and war.
_ 'l'he most important condition predetermining international detente was the -
consolidation of the international posirions of world socialism. It is ~
known tiiat socialism as a teaching rejects war as a rational policy means,
_ except in Che case of a just war for independence and national and social ,
liberation. The idea of peace is directly connected in this teaching with
the ideas of national, social, economic and political progress. With the
: formation of first one socialist state and then a system of such states the
task of excluding war from mankind's life becomes the aim not only of
progressive social forces but also of a state policy based on economic, moral,
politj.cal and military might, and also on the international prestige of
- socialist states.
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' Tlte governmenCs of socialist countriey have proceeded and proceed in ttieir
proposals from the basis of,the now generally acknowledged fact thaC not
only fundamentnl conCradictions but also spheres of common interest exist
between socialist and capitalisC countriea. The peoples of all Che world's
c:ountries have an interesG in averting world war, in disarmament, reducing
military expendiCure, the effecCive exploitaCion of Che advanCages of the
inCernaCional division of labor, the exploiCation of the riches of ~he
world's oceans and environmental conaervaCion, resolving the problems of -
- energy reaources and raw maCerials an~i eliminating mass hunger and dangerous
dis~ases. The existence of auch common or coinciding interests among statea
and peoplea and the ever-growing demand for them to be acCed on is a con-
vinefng argument for the policy of peaceful coexistence and internationnl -
detente.
The inCernaCional communist and wcrkers movement is a significant forc~
capable of restricting and stopping the actions of Che aggressive forces of
imperialism. And although these forces are seeking by every available means
to weaken the resiatance of the communist and workers movement via the
Eorces of militarism and aggression, these efforts are not bringing the
desired result. Communist parties have become an important component in
- the distribution of forces in capitalist countries. In 3ome countries they
havP taken the lead in the working people's mass political struggle and
become a nationwide political force (in France and Italy, for instance), and
in others the procesa of communist parties emerging into the arena of
national activity is under way. In a Chird group of countries the communist
parties' role in political life is becoming increasingly noticeable.~2]
Energetic actions by communiat parties ~ointly with other leftwing and anti-
war forces in capitalist countries are promoting to a signific3nt extent the
_ change in the correlation of forces in favor of international detente and
peace� -
The socialist community states and communist and workers parties of most
countries of the world build their policy in the struggle to maintain peace
_ and international detente with consideration for the trends in international -
relations determined by the development of world processes. Such an approach
made it possible as early as 1956 for the 20th CPSU Congress to formulate a
conclusion on the absenc~ of the fatal inevitability of wars in modern con-
ditions. Some 5 years later the CPSU program adopted by the 22d Party
Congress stated that "peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist
states is an objective necessity of the development of human society. War
cannot and must not serve as a means of resolving international disputes."~3~
This formulation of the question of peaceful coexistence between states with
different social systems has been supported by the world communist and
workers movement.[4J
'fhe peace program adopted in 1971 by thQ 24th CPSU Congress sets out the
Sovier Jnion's concrete tasks in insuring peace and friendship among
peop.les. Their practical implementation promoted a significant acceleration _
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- in rhe development of rtie procesaes of relaxation of tension and establisti-
menr o� cooperation beCween Che U;;SR and capitalisC counCries. The 25Ch ~
CPSU Congress adopted the "program of fureher struggle for peace and inter-
national coopergtion gnd for the f.Yeedom ~nd inde~endence of the peoples,"
which included concrete Soviet proposals on questions of peace and insuring _
inCernationnl securiCy. These aim at resolving urgenC tasks in sCrengthening
Che relaxatiun of tension and making ie irreversible.
By ~oint efforts, tlie socialist communiey states have elaborated a realisCic _
program for resCructuring the system of iuternational relarions so as to
~ preclude ttie possibility of the emergeiice of a siCuarion in which poli*_ical,
economic and ideological contradicCions and conflicts berween capitalist and
socialist states, accumulat~ng, expanding and becoming exacerbaCed, would go
- so far as to be eransformed into armed struggle, into war. In a series of ~
~oint declaraCions and appeals Co Western srates they have proposed the
- resolution of the problem of emer.ging from the cold war and eliminating its
consequences, creating international sCabiliCy in Europe and subsequently in
other regions by developing mutually advantageous economic, scienCific,
- tschnical and cultural cooperation, eliminating the most dangerous elements
_ in the present-day international structure (for i.nsrance, military confronta- _
tion, milirary conflicts and military-political blocs) and di~~armament.
~xception~lly great significance for the development of the process of
international detente is attached to the elimination of the colonial system
of imperialism, the profound social transformations taking place in coun-
- tries freed from colonial dependence, the formation of new states and the
" increase in their international political prestige. All these phenomena
substantially reauce the reserves and restrict the sphere of operations
of imperialism and its main means--militarism. Most of the Asian, African
~ and Latin American counCries liberated from colonial dep2ndence have chosen
nonalinement as the basis of their foreign policy. Their proclamation of
neutrality with respect to the military-political blocs does not mean they -
are indifferent to such international quesCio~s as those of peace and war,
imperialism and colonialism. Having an interest in cooperating with other
countries in the sphere of the economy, science and technology, culture and
healCh care, so a~ to accelerate their countries' development, break out of
- the backwardness to which colonialism condemned them in the shorCest possi-
ble time and achieve full national independence, economic independence and
social progress, the liberated countrie~ come out as active supporters of _
- detente and opponents of everything associated with the policy of cold war ~
and military confrontation in international relations. They wage an active
struggle against militarism and the thr.eat of nuclear missile war, with
which t}iey associate the danger of the restoration of f.oreign exploitation
an~ political oppression.
Tlie emergence and strengthening of international solidarity among Asian,
African and Latin American countries on ttie basis of the nonalinement policy
' has promoted a significant change in the correlation of. forces in favor of
- maintaining peace and insuring international securiry. This is also
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reflected in Ctie chnnge in the disCribution of~forces in the UniCed Nations,
whose membere now numbe~ 150. An abboltlCe majority in the United Nations is
mude up of socialisC sCates and staCes liberated from colonial depen~3ence. `
Ctianges have ala~ Caken place in western sCates' governments. In a number
of countries the parCies, groups and politicians attaching most importance
in their ~olicy to military sCrength have lost some of their influence on
- go:ernments' foreign policy, while p~rties, groups within them and peop.le
cApable of implementing a more realistic foreign policy have strengChened
their positiona in Che leaderahip of the statea. And although, as is known, ~
wesCern sCatea' ruling circles have still not renounced their former atti- _
tude towaLd the "position of strength" policy or their habit of thinking in _
terms of mili~ary strengkh, they have begun to implement a more realistic
policy. As a rule supporters of a tough policy wiL�h respect to socialist
states form the oppoaition in their countries' parliamenCs: The eonserva-
= tives in BriCain, the Christian Democrats in Che FRG, and rightwing, con-
~ servative republicana and democrats in the United States. Such a position
_ has ariaen in most of the developed capitalist states. ~
The changes in the correlation and distribution of forces in the world
ilave influenced the "position of strength" policy and the atCitude toward -
its main means--military strength. On this question, American researcher
Col Amos A. Jordan Jr wrote: "A paradoxical situation has arisen: In -
recent decades the gulf between the military potentials of atrong and weak
states has increased, but the ability of the strong to impose their will on
the weak has seemingly lessened. It seems that the traditional role of _
military strength as supreme ruler of interstate relations has changed to
some extent."~5] At approximately the same time another American researcher,
J. Clark, wrote this: "Of course, nations can exert moral, political, eco-
- nomic and other influence on one another. However, inasmuch as the ultimate,
- supreme arbiter of international dieputes is war, Che military factor
acquires a higher degree of signif icance in political calculations. Any
_ symptoms of weakness or unpreparedness on the part of a great power is
immediaCely reflected in its political status."~6~ Such an argument on
questions of international politics, set out in the pages of a military
. ~ournal at the beginning of the period of detente, could be put down to -
the military author's ].imited thinking. But later, other similar state-
ments appeared, made by politicians. In March 1976, for instance, U.S.
Secretary of State H. Kissinger stated: "Without reliable military strength
_ in all arms categories no diplomacy, however skillful, can help us. That is -
= why I have resolutely supported a strong national defense in all weapons
categories."~7]
It is traditional for capitalism to make the role of military strength
absolute. As V. I. Lenin pointed out, "Under capitalism any basis for
distributing spheres of influence, interests, colonies and so forth other
than that of considering the /strength/ (word in iCalics--FBIS] of those
participating in the shareout--general economic, financial and military
strenqth, and ao forth--is inconceivable,"~8J and military strength ~.s
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sllotted the deci~ive place, Che role of "supreme rul.er of international
relations." It is this which determines the desire on Che pnrt oE imperi- -
alist atate, above all Che i7niCed SCntes, to possess mil.itary superiority
over socialism, which could i;~sure Cheir domination in Che world. Their ,
- poli,cy in the forties and fifties aimed at achieving this goal, when rhe
' governments of thoae aCate~ conaidered Chat rhe solid economic, scienCif,.ic
and Cechnical potential of the North American countries, the West European
coc:ntra.ea restored since the war and Japan wi11 make it possible for them
- to creaCe nnd consCanCly maintain Cheir military might at a 1eve1 which
would be unaCtainable for any other state or group of states, particularly
the 5oviet Union and other socialisC sCaCes, which suffereci enormous losses
during World War II.
_ The wesCern states, despl.te Cheir desire, tremendous material expenditure and
efforts, did not succeed in achieving overall military superiority over the -
USSR and all the socialist community countries. They have had to setCle
for relat:ive strategic equilibrium. For instance, i.n central Europe a more
or less :Ldentical level of Warsaw Pact an~ NATO armed forces has been estab- _
lished now for many years, despite differences in their organizational
_ structures and training which are determined by soci.al, political, economic _
- and national features, historical Craditions and military doctrines. A rela-
_ tive equilibrium has also become established between USSR and U.S. Strategic
' Nuclear Missile Forces. The maintenance of the relative equilibrium of
forces in these key areas in the military structures of staCes of the two
_ social s~stems virtually means thaC an overall strategic equilibrium of
military forces is insured.
, Maintaining such equilibrium demands the expenditure of tremendous efforts
and material resources on the part of the Soviet Union and all the socialist
community countries, but they are obliged to act in that way. The success-
ful implementation of this task has made it possible for the socialist
, countries to insure reliable defense and has prevented the imperialist states _
effectiv~ly realizing a situation of the constant danger of war in their own
interests, although such attempts have more than once brought Europe to the
brink of all-out war. It has made it possible to restrain the aggressive '
Eorces and preserve peace in Europe for more than 30 years. It has made it -
possible for the Soviet Union and other socialist cormnunity states to place
on a practicable footing the resolution of the questions of disarm~ment and
averting war.
The relative equilibrium of military forces has influenced the official
views of the U.S. Government on the ~~le of military strength as a foreign
policy means. In his annual report to Congress, U.S. Defense Secretary _
Harold Brown writes that in its foreign pol.icy the linited States must not
- rely maLnly on military strength, but must also make use of wherever
_ possible oi other means--economic, industrial and agricultural potentials,
� 1Ave1 of technology and so forth~9~. NoneCheless he allots the decisive
_ role to military strength. "It is true," he goes on ta write, "that _
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inCernational diaputes are rarely resolved constructively by milic:ary -
moans� i3uC iC is equally Crue that in rh~.s Croubled world we can rr~reLy ~
resolve internaCional dis utes by peaceful means unless these are based
oii military potential". tig~
_ The process of "recognition" of the fact of the chang,~ in the correlation
of forces in Che world and of the establishment of a Yelntive equilibrium
_ of miliCary forces between Che socialist and capitalist state systems on the .
, part of leAders of western staCes is far from correspording to the real .
sCaCe of af�aira. Pre~udice aCtempts to pass o`f whaC is dEaired as the
_ reulit;~, in shorC, various kinds of confusions, errors and miscalculations
have prevenCed them from gaining a realistic impressioci of the real currela- _
- tion of forces and correctly assessing it�s internatiunal political siKnifi-
canc~� The illusion of miliCary superiority and the ass~c~~ted confidence
in military impunity have created and maintained among tt~e.r,, ehe opinion that -
. the only ~anguage in which they could "successfully" carry out a dialog wi.th _
the USSR, other socialist states and peoples which have been and are being -
liberated from colonial dependence is the language of force.
The numerous failures of foreign policy plans and actions undertak~n "from -
~ position of atr~ength" wiCh respect to the socialist countries and defeats _
in wars againat National Liberation Forces, particularly such striking
defeats as in the wars in Korea, ?.ndochina, Algeria and Angola, have each
had a more aoberiug effect on the ardent supporters and creators of the
"position of strength" policy and made them consider to a greater extent
the real correlaCion and distributi n of forces in the world. Approximately
since the midsixties statements have appeared with increasing frequency in
the American and West Europe3n press on the equilibrium or party of forces
between East and West, above all the strategic forces of the USSR and the
- UniCed States, and ateempCs have been made to clarify the effect of this
- phenomenon on relations between states with different social systems. Only
in the sevenries was the existence of such an equilibrium acknowledged by -
U.S. official circles.
It is hard to overestimate the slgnificance of the party of forces, and
still more of its acknc:�~ledgement by official circles in Che UniCed States -
and its allies, for Chr. development of the process of international -
deCente. First, thia t?elped to seriously restrict the potential of imperi-
alisC "position of strength" policy, to develop pea~eful reJ.ations among -
staCes and to increase the international prestige of the policy of peace-
ful coexiatence. Speaking at Notre Dame University 22 June 1977, U.S. -
President J. Carter said: "We can no longer count on Che other 150 coun-
tries submitting to the diktat of those who hold might in their hands; we -
mu3t have faith in ourselves and strive to inspire, convince and lead other
cauntries." Second, they were the direct preconditiens for the turn in the
- poLicy of the United States and other western states away from confrontation
and nuclear blackmail to talks with sociaiist states. Third, this acknowl-
edgement, reflecting the real correlation of forces between the USSR and -
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ehe Unieed StaCes, between the socialist community states and capitalist .
countriea, made ir possible for governmenCs on both sid~s to choose the
principles oE "equal security" ar?d "not prejudicing the security of any
_ counCries" as the basis for holding further talks on limiting strategic ~
nucl.ear missile weapons, reducing arms forces and armaments in cenCral
_ Europe, and disarmamenr. Finally, Che wesCern staCes' acknowledgement of
the overall parity of military forces between Che two world systems of =
states could act as a precedent for the resolution of prob7.ems of reducing
armed forces ~.nd armaments and of disarman~ent in respect of individual _
reqions of the world.
In the most general terms the eata.blishmene of a relative equ~.librium of
- milieary forces and iCs recognition by the ma~or imperialist powers, to-
gether with the strengthening trsnd toward a change in the overall correla-
tion of forces in the world in favor of socialism, natio~al liberation and
progress, create favorable conditions for the further develoi.�ment and the _
- deepening of the process of international detente.
The Contradi~tory Nature of the Detente Process, the Preservation of the -
- Danger of War -
Other forces and opposite t:ends leading to an exacerbation of international _
tension, the continuation of the arms race and Co war are still active in
tt?e world and exert a considerable influence. First, the conditions which
gave rise to the cold war persist, and extreme co~tservative forces seeking
to insure that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism, between
_ states with different sacial systems are resolved by means of force and
violence have not lost their influ2nce on the policy of western states. `
Secand, colonialism and neocolonialism have still not been fully eradicated,
. and are constantly engendering international crises and military conflicts -
= in Asia, Africa and Latin America which to a greater or lesser degree objec- ,
tively help to preserve international tension and are often used by reac- I
tionary, conservative forces to maintain such tension. Third, the system of
military canfrozztation created in the cold war yeaxs remains--the bloc i
structure of international relations, developed military organizations ;
- of blocs and states, a level of c;ountries' mobilized preparations and ~~f the
" combat readiness of the sides' arme~l forces which is excessively high for
peacetime, and military bas~s and armed for~es on other countries' terri-
tories. Fflurth, the arms race is continu~ng even more intensively. Fifth,
the military expenditure of an absolute ma~ority of countries is increasing
~ fr~~m yenr to year.
Thus international detente is a concrete historical state ~f international
relations in which alternative trends are operating simultaneously and ;
, exerting a substantial influence on tt~e most important events--tr.ends toward ~
- preserving peace and strengthening international security, toward developing
all-round cooperation between countries, and on the other hand toward _
exacerbating the international situation, stepping up tension and increasing -
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tl~e danqer of wnr. I3y virtuc o~ thic~, th~ p~rticipnnts in the I3erlic~
coc?ter~nce of Europsua Communiet and Workera I'arties noted, univerK~l pe~ice
, ls stilt not p,uar~nteed, detente "h~s not yet become lasting" ~nd "seriou3
obstar_les ~till remain a1on~ Che p~nth to reliable security ~~nd cooNer;~- `
tion."~llJ
I.nCernational detente is ~ proces~ of developing the entire sy~tem of _
internationul relutiona from n cold war situation Co a 3tat~i, insuring
~ the reliability of penceful relatione among state;~, above all amony, states
with difterent oocial ~y~tems, ~nd to busineeglike ~nd equal cooperation
~mong them, a procesq distin~~i~hed by exceptional dynamism an~1 by it~ con-
= tradfctory nature~ y~ determined by th2 actions of the opposlnf; trendr; i?~ -
the internationnl. situation.
lnternatinnal detente is also that type of states' foreign policy aimed :.~t
~ 7rEServing peace nnd insuring all-round cooperation among states and
- p~oples, averting international conflicts and wars and implementing effec-
- tive measurea to curb Che arms race, reduce armed furces and armamenta and -
- bring ~?bout diearmament.
- Internationnl detente is connected in the mogt direct way with the change
� in the forms of confrontation betweLn the twn world systems, in lhe forms
_ of resolving the contradic�;:i.~ns inherent in th~ ~~r~~rld system of ~tates.
The establishmecit af a r~iative equilibrium .,i military forces on the two
sides introduces serious changes into the syatem of the str~ggle to possess
military superiority, a sCruggle which has always been characteristic of
exploitative societies and their states. In our time this goal is only
- pursued by one of the two main systems of states--the imperialist system.
The socialiat community atates are consistent supporters of preseiving a
stable equilibrium of militar.y forces and military potentials between statea
witti different social systems, of ending the arms race and of disarmament.
Ln order to resolve the problems associated with social transformations
and socialist and commun.[st bu~lding, and to reliably defend themselves
and their interests, they need a stable equilibrium of military forces, and
not military superiority. 'The Soviet Government~ like the governments of
otlier socialist community countries, has declared this repeatedly. In an
interview for the West German Newspaper VORWAERTS L. I. Brezhnev said that
"the Soviet Union believes for its part that approximate equality and
_ parity are sufficient for defense needs. We do not set ourselves the goal
of actiieving militacy auperiority. We also know that this very concept
loses its meaning in view of the existence of the present huge arsenals
of nuclear weapons and delivery means already stockpiled".~lz~
Tt~e fact that the 5oviet Union has not sought and is not seeking milir.ary
superiority is attested by the entire experience of military competiti~n
between the USSR and the United States and between states with different
yocial systems throughout the postwar period. As a rule, it is the United
States and the other western powers which have created new weapons or
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- mtlitary ~y~tem~ and Chereby chullenged the 5oviet Union and the other
gocialist comr~unity atates. 'I'he socialist countrieg hgve beett forced to
accept the r.hallenge and tn respond to ie wiCh apecific measures tn
etrengt}~en their defense and protect their interests by equalizing the
sidey' military might or n~utrgli.zing the we~tern countries' military
adv~ntugea. This has been and remains a gpecific manifestati.on c~f the
struggle between the aforemenCioned two opposing rrends in contemporary
international rel.~tions. The ~ocialist community staees and the working
~ CLASS }iave aucceeded in imposing on their class opponenes both peaceful
competition in the ypheres of tihe economy, acience und technology, and
culeure, and relations between states with different gocinl systems based
on tl~e principles of peaceful cr~exisL�ence, and in achieving internationnl =
detente.
Ag noted above, international detente, which has to a considerable extent -
- developed under the influence of the change in the world disposiCLon of
forces, the establishment of relative equilibrium between tt~e military
Eorces of the two world syst~ms of ~tates and the r~alization by wesCern
powers' ruling circles of the international political imporrance of Chis
equilibrium, contributes in its turn to maintaining this equilibrium and
determines tt~e need for states to seek forms of foreign policy activity
whict~ are adeqtiate for ie. At the same time the maintenance of the mili-
[ary equilibrium at a high levea. ia not only exceptionally burdensome and
uuinous for the peoples but also dangerous from Che military viewpoint--
something which determines the urgent need to lower this level. This is
also prompted by the fact that the military equilibrium of forces is dynamic
in nature and is constantly developing. It is connected with the arms race, _
and the latter in its turn contributes to maintaining~-and, in periods when
it is intensifying, also to sCrengthening--international tet?sion and to
prese:ving universal suapicion and mistrust in Che warld. Moreover, any
equil.~'>rium, especially an equilibrium of military forces--and a high level
at r.hat--causes a dan~erous trend towards attempts to disrupt it. For
instance, tt~e desire of the United StaCes and iCs allies for military tech-
nological and therefore to some extent strate~ic superiority over the Sovict
Unton and the other socialiet community countries l~as been and remains the
main source of the arms raee and war danger. In particular, the American
policy oE constantly stepping up military expenditure is fraught with a
dieruption of the established equilibrium between U.S. and USSR mil:tary
forces. In an August 1978 interview with BUSINESS WEEK Magazine, U.S.
President J. Carter declared: "1 foresee defense expenditure rising
steadily for the remainder of my presidency--I can see no prospect of
significantly reducing military expenditure--pven if the Strate~ic Arms
I.imitation Agreement is successfully concluded. We must maintain our
defense potential. Ttiat is a ttecessary and good investment".~13~ For its
part Ct~e U.S. Department of Defense is without any reservations planning
the constant buildup of the military budget. The latest report by U.S.
Defense Secretary Narold Brown plans an increase in spending from S116.8
billi~n in 1978 to S172.7 billion in 1983.~14]
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As a rule, pnrtinl ~nd eempor~ry discrepancies xnd inequelities in
individual el~menta mnking up the general equilibrium of military forces
erisc in Che procegs of Che army race and the sides' miliCnry prepurations. -
in themKelves thc~~e di~crepancie~ nnd ir.equalities moy not repreaent aerious
militgry ndvantggeg for one ~ide over Che other attd may not create a tt~reat `
or military danger for other eCates nnd peoples. But ineofar ae there nre
forces which ard not interested in intern~tional deCente, Chese dispropor-
tione may be utilized by them in order to fuel international tension and to
kindle crisis and cnnflicts. Advantages in the most important elements of
armed forceg while there is nn overall equilibrium between the siden' forces
maintained at a high level muy create in the moat aggregaively minded groups
in government circlea the illusory certainty tihnt they possea:~ ytrategic
superiority and may tempt them to utilixe these adv~ntages for their foreign -
policy aims. There are many examples of Chis use of partial straC~gic
~dvantages. The most indicative of Chem are the intervenCion by the
~ western powere and primarily the United States in Korea in 1950-1953, ttie
- Americ~n intervenCion in Indochina, the attempCS by the United Srates and
NATO to exert mil~tary pressure on the Soviet Union and oCher countrie~ of
the world and, finally, the Israeli armed forces' acts of sa~ot~6~ ~painst
Uganda nnd Lebanon and the acta of military sabotage by the Rhodesian racist
regime's army agninst neighboring aCates. It is also appropriaCe to recall
the Eact that Hitlerite Germany unleashed World War II in the expectation -
that its advantages in tank force.a and aviation and also the political con-
tradiction~ between its enemies would guarantee it military victory despite ~
the fact that it not only had no overall military superiority over them but
, w'as considerably inferior to their combined strength.
With a view to fueling international tension the western countries make
wide use of the vagueness of the concept of "equilibrium" or "balance oE
forces"--something which createa a certain freedom not only of interpreta-
tion but also of practical acCions for the foreign policy utilization of
= military force. For instance, relative equality now exists in Europe be-
tween the military forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The aocialist
community countriea are proposing to the western atates tt~at this be accepted `
as the starting point for the elaboration of an agreement and the adopCion
of specific measures to reduc:e armed forces and armaments and to decrease
the level of military confrontatian between the sides in central Europe. _
The repreaentatives of the NATO countries deny the existence of this
equality of forcea in central ~urope. Judging by certain of their remarks,
the western atates would be'suited by an "equilibrium of forces" in this
region which ruleci out the possibility of the socialist coamiunity states
influencing international events outside their owc? borders. In their
proposals at the talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in central
Europe they proceed from the principle which they have formulated of an
aeyrtanetrical or unequal reduction in the sides' forces. Acceptance of
these proposuls by the socialist states would be equivalent to acknowledging
the right of the NATO western powers to have substantial military advantages
in Europe. Judging by western preas commentaries, the weatern poWers'
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,
- rcpre~enta~ive~ gC tlie t~lkg in Vicnnu are utilizin~ ag justi�icc~tion for
Cti~ir po~ition dat~ on differenceg between Che ~Cructures of the gideg' ~
armed forcee nnd the numerical strength of certain brgnches of them. ~ut
here they digregard the r~ver~ll strategic correlaCion between Che sides
Forces which incorporaCes all the component parCs of ehe armed forces--
- ground forces, air forceg, sCrntegic and t~cticnl nuclear forces and oCherg.
AnoCher facC which is disregarded is that the present equilibrium between
miliCary Eorces in ~urope took shape in the process of protracted military
competition between Che sides in which one side~s advantages in a purticulnr _
br~ncl~ of the ar.med forces have been couneerbalanced by Che other side with
ndvanCages in cCher branches of the armed forces and armaments.
Thc~ constanC repetirione b5~ rhe weatern countries' r,iass me3ia of the thesis
of tVie Warsaw PaCt's ~upposed "su~eriority" of strength over NATO are
uCilized to ~uatify the constant buildup of NATO's armed forces and military
potenCial ~nd the we~tern staees' position nC the Vienna talks and are also
aimed at convincing the weaCern public of the existence of a military
"tlire~?t trom the Euye." This propaganda cocirributes to maintaining in the
weytern country mistrust of the socialist states and to maintaining in
Europe and throughout ttie world an atmosphere favorable Co the "position-
of-strength" policy.
international detente c~nnot fail ro exert n substantial influence on the =
potential for and fnrms of states' foreign policy utilization of military
" force. Governmenr:~ or statesmen are free to recognize it or not, to use
the term "detente" or not and to attach their own meaning to it or not,
but they are forced to reckon with the situaCion reflecCed by the term.
In tt~e last few years the opinion that under contemporary condiCions world
nuclear war would be so destruc:tive and devastating that it loses all -
political point has become predominant. Recognition of the political
irrationality of world nuclear war, however, does not mean--so long as
there exist stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them,
spcct~l military organizations fc~r their employment and poliCical forces
championing the buildup of strategic nuclear forces and their utilization
as an in~crument of foreign policy--that the danger of it is automatically
eliminated.
1'tie d~~nger of world nuclear war which persists even under the conditions
of international detenta exerts a serious influence on every aspect of _
c~nte~nporary international relations. It has an imp