JPRS ID: 8332 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JpR5 L/8332
13 M~~~h 1979
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TRANSLI~TIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 7/79)
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NU'I'L;
.1E'RS public~eions coitt~nin tniormation primarily from foreign -
newqpnpers, periodic~tle c~ncl boolc~, bU~ ~~lso from news ~gency
trnttemissions a~~d bro~dc~ist;~. Marcrials from forcign-lan~uage
~ources are rranslated; those irom I,nglish-l~ngu~ge sourc~s
, are rranscribed or reprinted, ,oiCh rhe original phr~7sing ~nd
other char~creristics retained.
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliCeraCed are
- enclosed in parenCheses. Words or nam~s prece.ied by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parenChe.�es were not clear in the
original but have been supplied asappropriaCe in context.
Other unatCribur.ed parenthetical nores within the body of an
item originate witli the source. Times wirhin items.are as
giv=n by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
, cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Gc~vernment.
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111U~lOGRAF'FIIC DAT11 1. Neport Nn, ,
SH~~Y JPRS L/ 8332 p�jP~ent'~ Acce~Riun No,
4~ u e an au t it c S. epott ate
TRANSLATION5 ON NCAR ~1ST ANn NORTH A~'ItX~A, (FOUO 7/79) 13 March 1979 `
6. -
7~ Author(s) 8~ Performing Organizrcion kcpt.
No.
9. F'er(orming Utg~ni:ation Name and AdJrera 10. Peojcrt/Tssk/1t'rrk Unit `o,
Joint Publicntions Research Service
1000 NorCh Clebe RoBd 11. Contr~ct/Grant No~
~ Arlington, Virginia 22201
12, Spon~oring Org~niz~tion N~me ~nd Addte~s 13. Type of Keport 8c Period -
Covered
Ae above
U. -
1S. Supplementuy Notc~
16. Abatr~tt~
~ 11ie seriul report contains information on socio-economic, government, political,
and rechnical developm~nt~ in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.
17. Kcy Words and Document Analysi~. 170. De~eripcors
Polit.tcal Science `Inter-f~rab Affairs Libya SultanatP
Sociology X North African Mauritania of Oman -
Economics Affairs X Morocco Syria i
- Culture (Social Sciences) Afghanistan People's Demo- Tunisia ~ `
F.thnology X
Algeria � cratic Republic X United Arab
Geography Bahrain of Yemen Emirates
~ Technological Egypt Persian Gulf Western
Military Sciences Iran A~ea 5ahara
X Irgq Q8t8r Yemen Arab
17b. iden~itieci/Open�Ended Termi Israel Saudi Arabia Republie
~Jordan Spanish Nortn
. Kuwait Africa
_ Lebanon _ Sudan _
17e. COSATI Firid/GrouP 5D, Sr, SK~ is
18. Availabilicy Statement 19. Security Cl~~s (This 21. \o. ot f'~ges
For Official Use Only. R`P ~ 34
Limited Nunnber of Copies Available Fro,~ JPRS. ��~~~~y ass (Ih~s =Z. N~,� ~
Paae
�on~ Hn~�ie i~sv. ~��i U:VCLASS(FfF.D
TNLS FORM MAY 8E REPItODUCED vecoMM�oc ~.oe:�vi~
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JPRS L/8332 ~
7.3 Maroh ].9 79 -
TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 7/79)
- CONTENTS PAGE
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS `
U.S. Unveils New Mideast Strategy in Wake of Tran Events
(Mousleh Ali; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 19 Feb-4 I~iar 79).........�.. 1
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS � -
Mauritanian Moves Posing Problems for Morocco -
(Faiez Ouldna; AFRTQUE-ASIE, 22 Jan-4 Feb 79).......... 3
_ ALGERIA
i4ove Into Post-Boumediene Era Examined
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Feb 79) 6
Expansion of Mining Activity Being Planned
(Howard Schi~sel; THE MIDDLE EAST, Feb 79) 10 -
IRAQ
Trade Partners To Be Those on 'Good Terms' With Traq
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Feb 79) 13 '
Planning Ministry Works To Fill Manpower Gap
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Feb 79) 15
Focus To Be on Heavy Industry
_ (THE MIDDLE EAST, Feb 79) 17
Transport Planners Diveraify Trade Routes
(TEIE MIDDLE EAST, Feb 79) 19
Food Seen as Fut~re Defense Weapon
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Feb 79) 21 -
" a' [ I I I - NE A- 121 FOUO ]
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CONTI:NTS (ConCin;~ed) Page
Strict Oil Policies Formulated fo: Minimum WasCe
- (TH~ MIDbLE ~AST, reb 79) 23
.TOItDAN
New Tactics Tried in War of Prices
(Ian ICellas; TH~ MTDDLE EAST, Feh 78) 25
- MOItOCCO `
~ ~nergy and Mines Miniater Discusses Morocco's Plans
(Moussa Saadi Intervicw; THE MIDDLE EAST, Feb 79)..... 27 =
~
UNI'TLb ARAB EMIRATES
- Government Changes Attitude on Industry Ro1e
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Feb 79) 31
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~ok orricznr, vsc orn~Y
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
~
U.5. UNVEILS NEW MIDEAST STRATEGY IN WAK~ OF IRAN EVENTS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 19 Feb-4 Mar 79 pp 14-15 LD
_ [Report by Mousleh Ali: "WxshingCon's New Plan"] -
- [Text] "Accept the Camp David agreements.... Concentrate on the need to
_ establish regional linka between all the countries in the Middle East's
'free world'...and the UniCed Statea is prepared Co give you politfcal
: and military help in providing concrete protection for your respective
regimes...." That ia the gist of the message which U.S. PenCagon chief
~ Harold Brown has been told Co convey during his CQUr of the Micldle East
_ which began 9 February.
In fact, thia is a definite plan which the NaCional Security Council, led
by Mr Brzezinaki, drew up following eventa in Iran with a view to reassur-
ing U.S. allies in the Middle East. Becauae, for several weeks, messages,
_ warnings and statements from many capitals in the, region have been co~-
tinually pourinb into the White House, the State Department and Che Penta-
gon: "Are you goitib to abandon ua~" the Western proteges ask, "to com- -
munist subversion, to control by the Soviet Union and its allies? Why
don't you do something? Even Communist China is complaining about your
_ inability to meet the challenge of our common enemies who already dominate _
- Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syrig, Libya, South Yemen, Ethiopia and many
other counCries which control the Indian dcean and the entrance to the
Red Sea...."
From Riyadh to Rabat~ from Amman to Tunis~ from the Gulf capitals to
Khartoum, from Cairo to Tel Aviv the same cry of alarm can be heard, the
same demand for "firm and energetic action" to protect and save the pro-
Western regimes.
It was preciaely a resume of thoae appeals prepared in memorandum form
that Mr Brzezinski aubmitted to President Jimmy Carter and his colleagues
in January along with a plan of ~ction which, he says, will be implemented
according to the way in which t:he U.S. partners reply to his suggestions. ~
According to information obtain~: from authoritative svurces, the broad
outlines of the plan are as followa:
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1. Reaseur~ the U.S. allies, eapecially Che Saudl and oCher friendly
governmente diaturbed by eventa in Iran, as to Washington's deCerminarion
to play u vigorous ~nd dynamic role in the region in the future. That
role couYd even include a U.S. military ineervention if the survival of
thre~Cened regimes were at stake. It ie vital th~t those a~lies in Che _
re~ion underetand ChaC the U.S. "indeciaion" in Iran cannoC be interpreted
as a sign of wenkneas. It should be aeen in lighC of Che r~gional aitua-
tion and cert~in asaurances which the Whiee House obtained from the Iranian ~
milieary esCabliahment.
2. For the first time the U.S. Guvernmcnt is now prepared to diacuss the
poasibility of eatablishing a"certain form of regional cooperation"
inetitutionalized among the pro-Western countriea in Che region. The
form of Chat cooperaCion wi11~ of course, depend on the very attitude of
the capiCals concerned.
3. In exchange the Americane ara asking their regional alliea not to
remain pasaive and resigned. They must realize that regional defense
_ censiderations tranecend local teneion and conflicCs, such as Che ques-
tio~i of relations with Israel. In oCher worde, countries such as Saudi
Arabta and Jordan must stifle their disquiet and even their hostility
tcward the Camp David agreementa because much more than ~ust the Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty is at atake; the very survival of their own regimea
is at stake. What is more, a pe~ce treaty with Israel would enable the .
larter Co add its efforts to Che "~oint enterprise against the Soviet
threat."
_ 4. The Americans also want their interlocutors to understand that "the
perpetuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict plays into the handa" of the _
Soviet Union which is trying "Co infilCrate further into the region."
The threat brandiehed by certain Saudi leaders of recognizing the USSR
and establishing diplomatic relations with that country would only aggra-
vate the risks run by the pro-Western governments.
S. The Saudis should play a greater role ln the region in order to
- neutralize South Yemen and prevent any country "committed to Che com-
munist path" from achieving its aims. To that end Washington is pre-
pared to give Riyadh ma~or straCegic arms supplies to help San'a'--includ-
- ing tanks and squa~ron of F-S's. In f act that is an indirect appeal to
Riyadh to encourage North Yemen to attack South Yemen.
The memorandum of Mr Brzezinski's plan specifies: "After all, the Saudis '
have the money, the Egyptians the manpower (the army) and we (and Israel)
l~~ive the technology...."
Eiow can that "situation" be translated into a mutual defense system? That
was tl~e main ob~ect of Harold Brown's discussions during his tour of cer-
tain Arab capitals. Moreover, Washington points out that this is the first
_ time that a U.S. secretary of defense has visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia, . -
Jordnn and Israel. There is a poasibility that he will visit other Arab
capitals later, especially Rabat and Khartoum. ~ _
C01'YRICHT: 1979, Afrique-Asie
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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
MAURITANIAN MOVES POSING PROBLEMS FOR MOROCCO ?
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Jan-4Feb 79 p 16
[Article by Faiez Ouldna: "End to Ambiguities?"]
[Text] A few weeks ago the POLtSARIO Front alluded to the possiUility of
reconsidering the cease-fire which iC had unilaterally declared shortly ,
after the overthrow of Moktar Ould Daddah. This warning has created, among
Mauritaniar~, such a vivid fear that they were unanimous in approving the
new gove,rnment's declared desire to move toward peace.
~
It i4 a peace which nevertheless has not gone beyond the stage of ~ro-
clarnations of intenC and pious wishes, principally by reason of Moroccan
obstinacy in blocking all outlets leading to an equitable solution of
the conflict involving the Saharan people's right to self-determination.
"Made sovereignly and without previous consultation with any brother country
whatever," as the Mauritanian Minister of Information and Culture specified,
Nouakchott's decision to send an important delegation to Algiers to pay
a final tribute to the late President Boumedienne thus unquestionably
_ contributed to removing serious mi~r.tnderstandings which hung over the
Ould Saleck government's policy. However, before carrying out this
.lramatic gesture towards Algiers, with which, the Mauritanian Minister
_ of Information declared, Nouakchott "intends to reestablish friendly
and fraternal relations," the numerous areas of shad~w which affected
Mauritanian policy allowed one to believe that the worst was likely
to happen at any time. -
The most recent exa~;ple was the launching of an important wave of re- -
pression against the Saharans, in Dakhla in particular. And the parody
of the liberation of some fifty prisoners in front of the obliging
cameras of a French television channel did nothing to contribute to
blotting out its painful memory. Not to mention the last vote in the
~ United Na4ions when the Mauritanians, for once on the same side as
Israel, Indonesia and Morocco, voted against a resolution on Western
Sahara's right to self-determination.
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'1'here ~?re ao many tniliaCives which nre conCribuCing, in the meanCime, E~
to giving a qufte special appear~nce to Che viait to Algiers by the -
_ Mauritan:inn delegation, presided over by the minister oF foreign affaira.
- '1'his visit, now at 1ast, looks like a true about-face in comparison with
~ Morocco And ite hegemonist designs.
S~i the speech delivered on New Year's, President Ould Saleck was, moreover,
us clear as he could be. Addressing Che nntion, he indeed made a point of
emphasizing thnt "Mauritania will take all measures necessary to finally
ger out of Che war ehould a toral agreement remain infeasible."
That is to say--or how else to interpret this last sentence?--even if
Morocco refuses Co start on the road to a~usC pea~:e. _
_ "If rliere is blocking, reticence by one or the other protagonist,
_ Piauriraiiia is determined to setCle the Sahara question aC its level,"
reatfirmed President Ould Saleck, who is considering, however, the hold-
tng oE a referendum in the part of the 5ahara controlled by Mauritania
it a total solution to the conflict ap~ears impossible.
~
For tt~e moment, Rabat's only reaction seems to have been the sending of
an emissary to Nouakchott in the person of Mr Boucetta, Moroccan Minister
of Foreign Affairs. The latter reportedly delivered to Ould Saleck a
message from Hassan II containing threats.
This does not seem likely, nevertheless, to change the desire of Moktar
Ould Daddah's successor, although he has yet initiated direcC and official
negotiations with the POLISARIO for the purpose of finally setting the
_ problem which separates them.
As paradoxical as this may seem, in the country there also exists a
strong and powerful Moroccan lobby, whose influence is by no means to be
disregarded. It has in particular the support of certain Arab monarchs
of the Gulf and the monarch of Saudi Arabia. -
- Riyadh has gone so far as to propose recently in Nouakchott the installa-
tion in Western Sahara of a costly electronic array, the "Westmind" -
system, capable of dPtecting any hum.zn and material presence.
Moreover, one must not rule out the existence of a possible connection
- between the resi~nation of the chairman of the Mauritanian mining -
company SNIM (which may be explained, it is true, by a simple dispute
of technocrats witiiin the directing team) and the change of attitude
registered by the Ould Saleck government in the Saharan affair. The
ousted Piauritanian chairman, Mr Ismael Ould Ammar, is known for having
s~rong friendships in certain Arab oil-producing countries.
lie t!iat as it may, it must be expected that Hassan II is creating new
- obstacles in the hope of blocking the path followed by President Ould
Saleck. The monarch already carried out, let us recall, an important
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resettlement of Moroccan and Mauritanian populaCions in the territoric~s
oE the Western Sahara, in anticipation of a"coneulCaCion" of the Sahnrans ~
+ which the United Nations could recommend.
It is likewise in thie perspective that he recently named a Saharan,
Mr KhAli Nemma Ould Rachid, Co the position of Secretary of State for -
the Ministry of Saharan Affairs. Still in Che hope of vitiating a possible
inte rnational settlement, Hassan II counts a great deal on the support -
of the OAU president in office, Gasfar e1-Numeiry, as well as on rhe
= support of countries like Egypt and Zaire. _
_ CUPYRIGHT: i979 Afrique-Aaie
9181
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ALGERIA
MOVE INTO POST-BOUMEDIENE ERA EXAMINED
London THE MIDDLE EAST in Engliah Feb 79 pp 44-46
IText~ As Algeria moves into a new era it seems that there will be no
major break with the past 13 years of its history. This is the conclusion
drawn by Paris correapond~nt Howard Schissel, who toured the country last -
month, talking to officials and ta the man in the street, and examining the
econocnic aituation ~rhich ia still viewed with confidence by international
_ financial circles.
'fhe ~ieath of Preaident Hounri These measurea went hand in hend with
11~~unu�dicnne hns not only cut ehort the efforta to revive the only political party, the
~~f~~~;ta hc hnd mnde ta revit,nlise Algeria's National Liberation Front (FI.N), which
clnrsiinnt 4xilitical life, but also lenvee un� had been left to wither eince ite only con-
nu~~~~ered a hcx+t ~f questions conceming the gresa in 1964. Boumedienne wes known to
c~~u~~tn~'s economic future as well es its role have considered it ae "a body without a
~ in Arnb and Third ~ti'orld diplomacy, soul", In the National Charter the party's
_ ~inre he austed President Ahmad Ben eventusl role wae described ea "inspiring,
= Aella in the 19G5 "revolutio~iruy r~surgence" nnimnting and controlling the actione of the
Cc~lonel ~3oumedienne - whose real name state". In private, Algerian ot~'icials
~~�n~ 1lnhnmmad Boukamube - hed con- enviseged it as a potent force to counteract
r~~ntrnted a lerge degree of power in his own the often stifling weight of a wellentrenched
hnnds to pru~~ide the badly needed political bureaucracy.
- st~?hility fur the consolidation of a powerful Since the FLN lacka statutes and an "
ii~~Kli~m ~tntc appnratus and the building of elected leadership, one of President
a ~ulid eccm~~mic inGastructure. Boumedienne's trusted adviaets, Colonel
F.nj~~~�in~; ~~ide per~onal popularity, he left Muhammad Salah Yahiaoui, wss ~ppointad _
his �tnrnp cm Algerie through his austere temporary adminiatrative head of the party.
Gmn of ~x~inlism and his militant image on During the past year he has been bueily -
Ihe intrm~~tiunal uene. The vacuum in rebuilding the pyremid by atarting et the -
Al~;~rin's IeudcNhip nnd the tesk of finding a bottom. Party representatives were.named
suitnhlr ~ucce`4or will be ell the more in all edministrative unite. Yrobleme often
dclicnte since Prcsident Bounnedienne hnd arase on the wilayn, daira end communel
~iE~~xiinted nu ~~ice�president, prime minister levels concerning prerogativee of
ur defencc rniniater. adminiatretive and party ofT'iciels. At the _
Conlident in his positicm but wishing to same time Colonel Yahiaoui came ip-
e.~n~~lish an institutionel le~itimacy, creasingly into the political spotlight during
F3~~u~r~cclicnne hegan a drive for a bmader the preparatory congresses of the five FI.N- '
~emcK�rncy with the debate which eur- effilieted mese organisations - of workero, -
. n~unded the drafting of lhe National women, youth, former freedom fightere
Cliarter in 1976. Since then, electione for (Moudjehidine) and peasat~te - which took
~ locel assemblies, the Netional Popular place in 1978.
A.qsembly and the Preeidency have opened This political procese wae thrawn out of
the way to greater popular perticipation in gear by the President'e unexpected illneee
the political proceea. � and eventval death. Institutionalieation of
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- t he re~ime wne deluyed es the eight�member document in which it reaffirmed its fidelity
C~~unci) of the Revolution neaumed the to 'the Itne treced by Boumedienne and
cuunlry's ~x~liticnl lender~hip nnd the power declnred that "the Natic ~al Chsrter
to decide the genera) contours of pcx~t- remaine the fundament~il basis of the
Boumedienne Algerin, After the ndnption of country's politicul orientntion deftning the
the 1976 constitutiim, the council no longer ~(ne between the partieane of the revolution
had any legal existence nnd wns mennt to ~d ;ts enemiee, The Council of the
disappear with the secon~ FLN congmss, ~volution representa one of the guarantees
- ori~inally echeduled for the beginninR of for the continuation of the missic~n confided
1979. One of the major lecunae of the cnn� ~ the stute institutione".
atitution is that it does not spell out who It also appointed Colonel Chadli Ben
~~~nuld nr4ume tl~e t~iek nf ninning the Jedid, Commander of the Oran lVlilitary
_ cnuntn~ in cnqe of the Preaident e temporary Hegion near the Moraccan Gontier where
incnpe~cit}~. Thus the council, which had not moet of Algeria's armed forces have been
' met for ~~Imoet two yeare, etepped into the etationed aince the atart of th~ Saharan com
gap when the hend of etnte fell ill. flict, to act as co-ordinetor of defence policy. ~
- The counci) origineted in the 1965 coup, All aigns were that the council hnd choaen a
but in t hc pr~t 16 yc~re moet of it~ 26 presidential candidate from its own ranke.
members have either retired, According to the 1976 conetitution, when
gone into exile or died. the presidency is left vacant un ex-
_ The council is now composed traordinary FLN congreas muet be called to
of two active military offi- choose a candidate. In thie inatance, the~
cers, Colonels Abdulla congress will be juet a rubber atam~ for the
council e decision. During the 45-day
- Belhucet nnd C}~ndli Ben Jedid, five interim period, the Chairmsn of the
- members of the present Govemment, Nntional Popular Assembly, Rebah Bitat,
Foreign Minister Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, took ovcr as ecting heud of stete.
- � Agriculture Minister Tayebi Lerbi, Interior Moet foreign observers tend to consider
Minister Muhammad Abdel-Ghani, Wster that the Council of the Revolution can be
- Resources Miniater Ahmad Ben Cherif, divided into two principal parte. The, `
= Minister of Transport Ahmad Draia, and Foreign Minister, Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, ie
Muhemmed Salah Yahiaoui. seen to represent s more libere'. line entail-
~~'hile the Council of the Revolution wae ing a greater opening.to the We-t. ~pecially
deliberating in secrecy, the people of Algiera, France, a more moderete stance iu Arab and
= other main towns and the rurel areae went Third World affairs and diminishing of the
_ on with 2heir everyday preoccupations as if stete's prerogativea in economic mattera.
nothing unusual had occurred. Colonel Yahiaoui is thought to embody a
_ Nevertheless, Algerians wete far from continuation of a doctrinaire socisliet line, .
setisfied by the way in which information radical pan�Arab leanings and a militant =
- about Boumedienne's health was treated. position on all North-South issues. .
Aoth the Arabic and French-language In reality Algerian political life is more
- Co~~ernment-controlled dailies issued complex the:~ these explanations auggest. -
lnconic end cryptic medical bulletins which Those taking part include a technocretic
~.~ere almavt impossible to decipher. For in- elite, military hardlinero, conservative ,
stance, the pnp~ilAtion first leamt that the Muslima, and e aolid core of authentic `
President ��ns in a come when, et the end of socialista, and there ia e gap between
No~�ember, it wae announced that he had speakera of French and Arabic.
_ temporerily ernerged from it. Up to the present the council hes given
Thi~ leck of reliabl~ information the impression that it favou:a a form of
encow~ged n~?nours and caused the wildest collective rule based on compromise. All
speculation to be published in some Arab efforts have been directed towarde ~
and ~t'~tern ,jaumals. The result of t}?is un� presenting a united front against what one
aubtle handling of information wa~i that Algerien officiel described to The Middle
- nlmoet e~�cq~one tuned in to the already East ea "a plot againet the Algerian
pc~pular forcign radioe. Revolution". It is now practically a foregone
- The Councit of the Revolut~on took ` conclusion that the extraordinary FLN con� -
se~�eral men.~ures to ree.asure the population gress will approve the creation of the poet of _
nnd bring ebc~ut n smooth transfer of power. vice-president or prime minister, or both.
In necember it issued a major political Most Algerian leade~ have clearly in mind
the atrife and political infighting which
, 7
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plnKurd the yuunk m~~ublic junt ntter in� dependen~c nn f~r~ign supplier~, it wee ~
dependence and it is highly unlikely thet generally felt thnt Algcrie wc~uld Ue nble to
one of them would ri4k nMkinK thr lx?et, j~~ th~ rnnke of the developed nntinne only
Rrcnune of fnctiunal (iKhtin~ nnd if it~ oil nnd Ras rr+ourcea were repi;lly used
~x~r~?rtunl divi~iuna, ~?p~wrsition gmupe, to crente a eolid induqtriAl bnne, in fnct the
iniunly ha~rd Nbr~~ed, hnve pmved inetTec- re~untry hn~ rnjnyrd une of the highest raticw
~ tunl in rnllyin~ ~H~tential internal dincon� of capitnl formation to grose domestic
trnt, [~uth the F'nrty fur Rev~?lutumary product (GnF') with a fi~ure of 44 per rent
S~~cinli~+m (f'f2S), led by M~~hnmmad during the 1nBt plan (1973�1877), As fot thc
I~~~uclinf, nnd the 1'nrtiyEms uf Ait Ahmed g~w,th rate, few Third World Coutttriee did
- nre ~1iac�rrclited in the eyes uf the Algerinn better than the 8.b per cent nchieved by the
~ ~~ublir hy the ,up?~rt they rereive from ~ ~
- ~1c~nx~rn nnd thcir np~~rovnl of the Monxcan Algenans during the spme period,
rnu~~~ ii~ 1~ie SAhnrnn cunnict. Although reaults hnve generelly been
An intrrnal "1M~urgec?ia" up~x>aition under hoVe euffered e f rrr..cof~'benign neglect'Y
- ~ hr lender~hip of ~c: het Ahhns nnd Yousnef ARer 17 yenra of enforced austerity, the pop� `
F~i�n I~lu~lda furmed o so�rnlled 9th of uletion hae been demanding more conaumer
m~c ~t e~x~inli t~pol ci ee but the influenc of A~~ ~ea qu~~V~ the ~ regim e~ b s c
this ultrn�conservative fnction ie hi ghl y po~;cieti but expect the fruits of pragrese to
cirrumnrribed. be more equitably diatributtd. This is -
i.ikc~~7ae the redical left�wing oppoeition - ~~~ielly true of the rural sector. In epite of
the Algerinn C~c~?nmunist Party, which goee the egrarian reforms leunched in 1971, living
under the neme of the Avent�Garde ronditione in the countryside leg far behind -
~ Sc~ciali~t Party (PAGS) - has allied ?teelf thoee of the urban centres.
~~~ith the re~ime in hopes of pushing foe more '~'~1e is e serioue obstacle to increasing
- pm~;rc~.~ive reforms, ~inally, former preai� p~uction, which is necessary if the elar�
dent i?en nella is thought to be popular m~g ~rel exodus is to be atemmed. Last
ntnung the one rt~illion Algerinns living in autumn the Cavemment promulgeted e
~um~x~, but the possibility of hia political eeries of ineasures designed to atimulate pro� `
comebnrk ia remote, duMion from the ~~rivate aRricultural eector
- Stil) nnMher nign which tends to con� ~d reduce the country'~ f.1~ of a700 million
t rndicl t he harbingers of imminent politice{ e year for imported food.
di~c~rders is the confidence in Algerie's With e basic need [or the fine tuning of
M�c~nrnnic future recently demonstreted by the economy, e consensus appeare to exiat
intemntionnl banking and fjnenciel circlea. f~r the development of eocialiet measurea
At the UcKinning of December the netional ~;~e the nationaliaetion of key sect~ra of the
ail nnd ~;ns company, Sonetrech, wee ebl� to economy, eocieliet management in the stete
annrnince t:~e granting o[ elmoet a2 billion in ~y~~rprisee, free medical cate and ograrian
loniia fur ila embitioiis hydrocarbon develop~ reform. Thoee foreign o~ ~rs who are
rocnt Pnc~me. predicting e Sadat-type ..~omenon in
F~~en if inejor chengea on the economic Algerie are probebly talcing their wiahes for
fn~nt iire imNrobeble, the liberalieation ~~~ty~ e~ the essentiala of Algerie'e
me~t