JPRS ID: 8333 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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i3 MARCH i979 ~ CFOUO 4l79~ i OF 2
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JPRS L/8333
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13 March 1979
�
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' TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL
AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 4/79)
- U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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JPRS L/8333 .
13 March ].9 79
TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POI.ITICAL
ANp SOC~OLOGICA! AFFAIRS =
(FOUO 4/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
[N'I'I:RN~'I'IONAL
New Book betails Causes, ProspecCs of Near i:ast Conflict _
_ (Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, et al.; ANATOMIYA
BLIZHNEVOSTOCHNOGG KONFLIKTA, 1978) 1
`
- a - [III - USSR - 35 FOUO)
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� _
INTCRNATIONAL ~
i
N~W BOOK DCTAILS CAUS~S, PROSPECTS OF NEAR EAST CONI~'LICT
- Moscow ANATOMIYA BLIZIiNEVOSTOCHNOGO KONFLIKTA (Anatomy of the Near ~ast Cnn-
_ Elict) in Russian 1978 pp 1, 3-5, 191-355, 375, 376
, [AnnoeaCion and excerpts from book by Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov: Editor-
ial Board Chief T. A. Voskr~esenskaya, ~ditor L. G. Solov'yeva, Map Editor
L. D. Chel'tsova, Junior ~ditor N. V. Malinovskaya, arCistic layout by Ye.
V. F;~ztmirova, Artistic Editor T. V. Ivanshina, Technical Editor L. Ye.
Pu~ctiova, Proofreader T. M. 5hpilenko, Mysl'] �
[Text] The book by Ye. M. Primakov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy
of Sciences, analyzes the causes of the Near EasC conflict--one of the most
dangerous contemporary international conflicCs. The confrontation between
Israel, which is pursuing an expansionist ~olicy, and the neighboring Arab
states and also the Palest3ne resistance movement is traced on the basis of
extensive ttistorical material. U.S. Near East policy is analyzed. How
_ the energy crisis is affecting the development of events in the Near East
and influencing the policy of the United States and its Western partners
in this region is examined, in particular.
This book is dedicated to Vadim Petrovich Rumyantsev of blessed memory ~
The Near East has long remained a hotbed of dangerous tension. The absence
of a settlement of rhe Arab-Israeli confJ.ict is reflected most neg~~t.ively in
the position of tiie peoples and states of this region and ttce status and de-
velopment of peaceful economic relations, is threathening universal pe,tce
and is creating serious negative features for the process of the relaxa-
tion of internati,onal tension. The absence of a political settlement ur
the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the cause of or has created con~itions ~
conducive to the development of a number of "satellite conflicts" such as,
- for example, the bloody tragec:y ir. Lebanon in 1975-.I97G.
Wl~a~ is the cause of the Near ~ast conflict,* which is determining inter-
state relations in this region, engendering serious complications beyond its
*Tne term "Near East conflict" characterizes the main conflict in the Near East--
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both terms are of equal weight in the ensuing ac- `
count. 'Che author is aware here tha~ neither the first nor second designation
entirely reflects the nature of the conflict: the first represents merely a
geographic concept, while the second limits the conflict to an Arab-Israeli
framework, which is essentially wrong.
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conCines and disruprins Che normal development of a number of processes in- _
Cended ro improve the intern~Cional organism, which was undermined by Che
- "cold wnr"?
One of the mosC protracted and serious conflicCs of Che 20Ch century--the
= Ne~tr CasC conflict--has both inCernal and outside causes. The internal
ca~ises are rhe contradictions beCween Ziot~ism and, subsequenCly, also Israel,
,ahirh ig ~ur~uing an exp~nsionist course~ on Che one hand, and ehe Arab peo-
~ ple of Palestine and the Arab states on the other. The outside causes are .
tl~e policies of the imperialisC sCates since World War II, chiefly the Unieed
Stntes, which is directly supporting Israel's expansionist policy and utili-
�r.ing the Near rast conflict in Che inCerests of the struggle againsC the
n.zrur~~l liberarion forces in this region nnd world socialism.
The tn~ern~~1 and ouCside cttuses of the cc,~nflict have proven interconnected.
[t is c~ite~;orically wrong under these cor?ditions to either cor..fine rhe
caiises oE the Near ~ast conflict to "internal" Arab-Israeli contradictions
or ~o transfer them entirely ~o a"global level"--as is frequently the case
witti t~ourgeois researchers.~ _
The Near East conflict has been developed i.n the current system of interna-
tional relations, whose main and determining conCradiction is Chat between
socialism and capitalism. This has left its direct imprint on the nature
and ~ourse of the conflict. At the same time there is nothing more primitive
and incorrect th~n to depict the effect of international relations on Che
Arab-Israeli confrontation in the form of the struggle of "superpowers" for
inf.luence in the Near East. The concern of the two opposite social-political
systems for differer?t results from this conflict is founded on a class basis.
It is precisely from class standpoints that the two leading countries of
~ these systems--the Soviet Union and the United StaCes--are assisting and
- supporting the countries directly involved in the conflict: the USSR--Che =
Arab national liberation movement and the Arab peoples, who have become the
target oE Israel's expansionist palicy; the United States--the Israeli ruling
circles. which are pursuing a course in the Near East which is, generally,
coordinated with world imperialism.
T}iis book reflects the intertwined nature of the causes of the Near East
conElict. At the same time ~e author has considered it possible to succes-
sively examine them with the accentyinitially on the internal and, sub- _
sequently, on the outside factors.
; D3agnostics should be constructed on the basis of a comprehensive analysis
of the clearly highlighted and delimited causes of a phenomenon. It is im-
portant not to o4erlook either of them. And--this, possibly, does not need
s~~eci.~l emptiasis--diag~nostics Y~as never been and cannot be an end in itself.
Tt is designed to signpost the paths of recuperation and elimination of the _
itlness hott~ in the human organism and in relations between people, peoples
and states. It was for this very purpose that man acquired such a method
of co~;nition as anatomy.
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The author would like Co express heartfelt gratitude to his comradps and
colleagues �or rheir assistance in Che preparation nf thia book.
Fall, 1977. _
Chttpter 5. Stuges of the United Sttttes' NeAr East Policy
The United SC~tes~ aims and interesCs in the Near East examined earlier
_ nrecietPrmine~l rhp hivh ~IP~rPP nf 11.~. i_nvolvement in the Near East c~nflict
- and its aspiration to utilize this conflict to accomplish the task confront-
ing American foreign policy. The tactical line of the United SCates with
respect to the Near East conflict has never been hard-set and immovable but
has been modified from stage to stage of the implementation of ehe United
- States' Near EasC pol3cy as a whole.
And, moreover, in addiCion to the correlation of forces on global level, Che
status, nature and immediate prospects of the United States' relations with
t1~e most populous and most indusCrially developed country of the Arab world--
Lgypt--which played under President al-Nasir, despite certain inter-Arab
contradictions and difficulti~s, the generally recognized leading role in
tf~e Arab world~ have exert~d a principal influence on the evolution of
American tactics. There are serious grounds for directly linking U,S, at-
= tempts to impart this impetus or the other to the development of the Near
Cast conflict with its different political approaches to the Arab world, which
has found concentrated expression in U.S. policy in respect of Egypt. It
may, in particular, Ue concluded that the United States began to make active
use rt the Near East conflict in its own foreign policy intPrests after 1952,
which was marked by the revolution in Egypt which brought the "Free Offi-
cers" organization to power.
U.S, policy in the Near ~;ast since that time may provisionally be split into -
a number of stages. The first, which began immediately after the 1952 Egyp-
tian revolution, lasted until mid-1955. In this periad the U.S. Administra-
tion hoped and attempted to establish contacts with the new Egyptian regime
- and control its domestic and foreign poiicy. "Positive" methods in respect
of Egypt, including the extension of credit to Egypt and U.S. mediation
between the "Free Officers" and Britain on the question of evacuation of
Cl~e British military base in the Suez Canal Zone, prevailed during this
stage. Throughout rhis stage Washington gambled on tying Egypt, as, equal- -
_ l.y, other Arab countries, to the United States either in the form of their
- direct incorporation in a bloc structure or by the granting to them of -
American military and economic "assistance." At that time the American lead-
ers counted on the �'Free Officers" taking as the basis of their developmeRt
the model of the Latin American military-dictat~rial regimes, which would -
~ }~ave predetermined their tiltimate and strict dependence on the United States,
particularly under conditions where the traditional colonial powers in the
- Arab world--Britain and France--had manifestly forfeited both their prestige -
and tt~eir positions following World War II.
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'1'h:is U.5. line was udequaCely reflected in the American attieude toward the
Nezr Last conflict. 'Throughour this stage the United StaCes did not gamble
dir.ectly oti an inCensificaCon of Ar.ab-Israeli confrontaCion. And, moreover,
attempts k~Are made eo bring Israel and Cgypt closer together, which was
viev;ed as a means of the exertion o.f U.S. influence on boCh sides involvecl
in rhe conflict. -
'I'hP ~~rnn~l atn~P nf hh~ tl�i r~~t Sr t-a.. ~ yft~~ r;~~ ~ ?j.~ _
' ll. . 1 L ~v~i~.i cncomgl~JUt.U l.l{C
periocl Erom mid-1955 through 1957. Israel's military confronation with ~
= Cgyp~ began and Israel's armed clashes with Syria intensified in the spring
- of 1955. C~ypC reached agreement with elie 5oviet Union and Czechoslovakia
on ~rms supplies in the middle of 1955. This undermined Che imperial:Lst
West's monopoly on arms supplies to the Arab countries. In 1956 Egypt was
the victim of eripartite aggression. But, under pressure from Che peace- -
loving Eorces, Britain, France and Israel were forced in 1957 t~ ~aithdraw
their troops from Egyptian territory. Under these conditions the United
St~~tes effected a clear turnabout in its Near East policy. The means and :
~ mettiocts of U.S. actions in relation to al-Nasir's Egypt and other Arab na-
tional liberation forces began to acquire a subversive nature at this time.
To~;ethcr with this, the United States was unceasing in its atCempts to also -
cidopt a"constructive approach" toward Egypt for rhe purpose of taking ad-
vanta~;c oE the collapse of the positions of Britain and France, which became
~nantfest parricularly in the wake of the 1956 tripartite aggresslon against -
r~YPt� -
This line was expressed in the U.S. attitude toward the Arab-Israeli con-
- f.lict: tt~e United States began to strengthen Israel by degrees, not always
with its own hands, but preferring to operate through its allies; the United
States viewed Israel's confrontation with the Arab countries as a means of
weakening rhe al-Nasir regime; effo.rts were made simultaneo;~sly to "pull"
f:gypr up ro the Israeli terms of a settlement; and at the same time at this
= sta~e the United States was still leaving the doors open Co attempts to im-
prove relations with the Egyptian regime--the "flirting" with this country
~aas not yet over, and this predetermined the absence of automatism in strict,
- unconditio,-~al support of any actions of Israel dictated by its confronta- -
. tion with the Arab countries.
- '('he third stage, which began with the U.S. proclamation of the Eisenhower
doctrine, lasted until 1971. In this doctrine the United States formulated
~in independent course of its Near East policy, which was aimed atfilling the
"vacuum" which had allegedly been cr~ated in this region as the result of
_ tl~e coll:ipse of the influence of the traditional cvlonial powers--Britain
- zncl France. In the wake of the proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine
there f~llowed the armed intervention of the United States ar.d Britain in
f.ebanon and Jordan in 1958, which was intended to create a"barrier" to the
_ cievelopment of the national liberation process in the Arab world. As a -
whole, this stage of American policy was characterized by open U.S. hostil-
ity in respect of Egypt and attempts by any means to oust the al-Nasir ~
regime and liquidate the progressive trends in the Arab world. The United -
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_ St~7tes be~nn to pay parCicular atrention at this time to Che use of inter- _
Arab conflicrs and, following 3ts failure, embarked firmly, as of tt~e end of
Ct~e 1950's, on t1~2 path of the direct use of Israeli expansionist circles
in Che Near ~nsC conflict. _
- The fourth stage of the United States' Near East policy began wiCh the deaeh
of al-Nusir.It is characterized by a transition to greal�er "balance" and to
~~ttempts by the United States to make the maximum use in iCs own interests
of the economic und political shifts which were revealed in Egypt and cer-
tain other Arab countries at the srart of Che 1970's.
In t1~e period 1970-1972 the United States kept an eye on the siCuation,
frequently engAged in "reconnaissance in force" and, following Che :.973 -
_ October war, actively assumed the role of "mediator" in the business of a
- poli.tical settlement of the Near East conflict. It was prompted to this by
the ct~ange in the correlation of forces between the parties involved in "
the r.anflict and al~o by the clearly unfavorablP situation for the capitalist -
- worlcl which }~ad arisen as a result of the connection between the development
of ttie Near I:ast conflict and the inten~~.fication of the energy crisis. Here
tt~e U.S. mission for a political settlement was undertaken chiefly in such
clirec~ions and Forms as would secure to the maximum U.S. interests in the
- Near Cast, neutralize the elements which had emerged in the sitiiatien iii
t}~is re~ion and internationally which were unfavorable to Israel's extremist
_ Plans .1nd weaken tlie positions and influence of the Soviet Union. These aims
being pursued by U.S. policy are not facilitating but, on the contrary, mak- _
ing more diEficult the achievement of a lasting and just peaceful settle-
ment of the Near East conflict.
I,et us examine the stages of the United States' Near East policy in more de-
tail.
1. The Task--Involvement in Blocs (195::-1955)
- After the overthrow of KinR Faruq in 1952, the United States far from im-
mediately began to pursue a policy hostile to the new Egyptian regime. At -
the time of the coup the "Free Officers"--Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir wrote and
spoke about this repeatedly--attempted to establish relations with the United
States. Ali Sabri, a former member of the leadership of the "Free Officers,"
was authorized by the RQvolutionary Command Council to make contact with the
Americans immediately after the overthrow of Faruq, and for this purpose he
visited the U.S. Embassy ~.n Cairo. Following the coup, Ali Mahir was ap-
Pointed Prime minister (albeit not a controlling position since power was
actually in the hands of the Revolutionary Command Council, a ver,y import- -
ant position in the state, nevertheless) obviously not least in consideration
of }iis pro-American sentiments. And it was no accident that this appoint-
~ ment was interpreted so positively in the United States that Dean Acheson, -
secretary of state at that time, even announced a"new era" in American-
Egyptian relations.
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(~encral N~ jl.h, wlio lteACled Che Revolutionary Command Council Eo1l.owing the
- coup, made Fi whol.e number oP gestures which were evaluuted as pro-American. -
}le said in an inrervicw on 8 August 1952 Char ~~ypt atCached great signifi-
cance to rhe organir.ation oF ~ military pacC in the Near ~ASt and intended
~ to Curn to tl~e tinitecl States for milirary assisCttnce. On 19 Seprember 1952
N~~:jib ~ersonally took parC in a solemn ceremony on the occasion of the inaug-
~ ur~~tion of tt~e American Inforination Center in Alexandria and liad complimenr-
arv wc,rrlG rn Q:,~ r},~rA a~.~ut Ame:ic~:, ;,~'ic;; ia rcZatic.~ tc ~gypt. ::a~ib
openly advocated attr~cting American caPiCal ventures in Egypt.
'Chere is a dual expl~ination Eor this position of the new ~gyptian leadership
rollnwing June 1952: having concentraCed on the struggle against Britain and
Its landowner-palACe secret service in Egypt, the country's leaders were in
, neecl oE outside support or, in any event, wished to neuCralize as far as pos-
sible American si~pport for London in the Egyptian-British confrontation
which had begun, taking advantage of American-British contradictions in
- this region for tliis purpose. At Che same time the forces representing
the right wing of the new ~gypt:ian leadership wished, with the assistance -
oP isgypt's rapprochement with the tinited 5tates, to weaken the tendency of '
the reg9me's leftward movement, w:,:ch had been discerned immediately follow-
_ Ln~; tlie coup, and to blunt the an~,~-imperialist nature of the Fgyptian revo--
_ lution.
Washin~;ton also began its game in Egypt following the ouster of King Faruq.
if,S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in Egypt in May 1953.
~merican diplomacy simultaneously undertook "mediation activity," attempting -
to bring closer together under its "patronage" Britain's and Egypt's posi-
tions on t}ie question of evacuation of the British base in the Suez Canal
7.onc. A start was made on the implementation of a program of American
assistance to Cgypt of the order of $50 million. There was an outright -
pilgrimage of American officials, politicians and businessmen to Cairo.
Among all the aims of. its Near East policy, the United States highlighted ~
at the start of the 1950's, giving it priority, the task of the creation of
_ a military bloc, with the unfailing involvement of Arab countries therein. -
I~escribing the mission which Dulles attempted to accomplish during his
visit to Cari.o, the well-known Egyptian journalist H. Haykal, being also
the best informed as a result of his proximity to al-Nasir, wrote that the
U.S. secretary of state attempted "to advance his plan to surround the USSR ~
with military and political alliances, a plan which he implemented with -
rel,i~ious fervor and which was the main driving force of all his actions
in the Near East."
- Tlie first postwar idea of such an alliance was born 2 years prior to Dulles's ,
arrival in Cairo. This was a plan involving Egypt's unfailing incorporation
in a joint "Middle East Command," which the United States saw as a replace-
- ment For ti~e entirely compromised military imperialist presence in the Suez
Canal Zone. Formally the proposal Eor the creation af a"Middle East Com- ~
ment" was mude on behalf of the United States, Britain, France and Turkey
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in the fall of 1951, but WashingCon was the 3nitiator of and inspiration
_ behind this idea. A U.q. StAte Department bulletin formulated the basic ~
" principles of Egypt's planned p~rticip3tion in this military alliance: in
exchange Eor consenting to act as a founding member EgypC was promised a
number of higli posts in t;~c~ command, special training for iCs army ~nd arms
supplies from its partners. But in exchange for a11 this Egypt ~aas to have _
- undertaken tu afford the command "such straCegic, defense and other facili- -
ties on its territory as would be necessary for the organization of the ~
peacetime defense of the Near East." Tt also was Co have afforded "every-
~ thing necesanry and its assistance in the event of war, the impending threat
~ of war or in the event of a manifest international crisis." As Che bulleti.n .
poinCed ouC, the British military base in Che Suez Canal Zone would be formal- _
ly handed over to Egypt, bur in fact the "Middle East Command" would take
charge of it "with Egypt participaCing in the administration of the base."
The authors of the "Middle East Command" idea planned that Israel also would
be associated with it. This was dictated not only by an aspiration to uti-
= lize Israel's military potential in the imperialisr plans but also pursued
_ two other aims: bringing Israel closer to the Arab countries under the
= conditions of the spread of American influence to both sides in the conflicr.
(considering the nature of the regimes which existed in all the Near East
countries involved in the conflict at that time, the United States could
have counted on being successful in strengthening its positions "on both
sides" snd preventing the development of Israel's normal relations with
the USSR and other socialist countries.
- The "Middle East Command" idea, which represented an aCtempt to impose on the -
~ Near East a new form of co:~onial dependence, was re~ected by the Arab coun-
- tries. But this was not the end of American diplomacy's attempts to knock -
together a military bloc it~ the Near East under the aegis of the United
States. Following U.S. Secretary of State Dulles' trip to the Near East in
1953, Washington put farward a new plan for the creation of a military bloc
~ of Moslem countries alone--the Arab states, Turkey and Pakistan.
During the visit to the United States at the end of 1953 of an Egyptian dele-
gation headed by Ali Sabri, which had been sent for the purpose of purchasing
tlmerican arms, General Olmsted, the leader of the Pentagon's overseas mili-
tary assistance program, took advaztage of a meetirig with the Egyptians to
propagandize the idea of an Islamic pact. Making no secret of the anti-
Soviet direction of this pact, the American general said that in addition
to its role "in defense of the Middle East," the pact could exert great in-
_ fluence on the Moslems of the Soviet Union and China. "Everyone was shocked,"
Haykal writes, "when Olmsted began to talk about how it was necessary to
create a fifth column in these countries."
incidentally, it transpired later that, irrespective of the Egyptian dele-
~ation's react:ton to the general's words, the United States had absolutely
no intention of arming the Egyptian Army with modern weapons on a suffi- _
ciently large scale--this could only have occurred in the event of Egypt's
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reconcililtion with Israel, in other caords, in the event of Egypt refusin~ -
to supporr ~h~ Palesl�inian people's rights ro self-determination and 3rs
si~ning of a separate peace a~reement with Israel. U.S. d3plomacy s[rove
for this, bt~t unsuccessPully. Consequently, on American diplomacy's
scale of values Tsrael retained an even higher place Lhan realizarion of rhe
idea of Egypt's involvement in a military a113ance withouC its simultaneous
withdrawal from the confrontation with Israel. -
AFter the impracticabiliry of the idea of the creation of an Islamic pact
= became clear, Washington changed its tactics, acting as ehe actual inir3.ator
oC a bilaCeral Turki~h-Pakistan military alliance, counting on making it
tlie "ax:ts" of a broad military bloc with the condition of its obligatory
c~x}~ansion via the Arab states. A Turkish-Pakistan pact, arranged by Ameri-
can diplomacy, was concluded in 1954. On 24 February 1955 American diplomacy
_ siicceedecl in putting together a Turkish-Iraqi military alliance, which was
~iven the name o� the Baghdad Pact (subsequently, CENTO). Great Britain _
- joined it officially on 4 April, as did Pakistan and Iran in September-
November 1955.
It is signiEicant that the United States viewed Iraq's involvement in the -
_ mi..litary alliance as a means designed to disrupt Che Soviet Union's rela-
tions with this country. Under direct pressure from the West the government -
~ of Nuri al-Sa'id broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in
the period of the creation of the Baghdad Pact. "
Attempting to accomplish the main aim at the first stage--incorporation of
rhe Arab countries in a military bloc--the UniCed Sta~es did much to prevent
complication of the realization of this idea because of its close relations
- with Isr~el. While developing and strengthening relations with this state, `
in a number of instances Washin~ton aspired to conceal them and sometimes `
even to refuse to acknowledge the one-sided orientation toward Israel which
had beer? "ascribed" to it.
Primarily, the United States abandoned its initial plans for Israel's in-
corporaCion in a militlry bloc in the Near East. Moreover, in cannection
with r:~e American aspiration to drag the Arab countries into a military -
a1li.ance at all costs a nt~~ber of statements were made by U.S. officials
condemning Israeli policy. Thus in his report on his 3-week visit to the _
- Ne~r l:ast Dulles recommended that Israel "become a part of Near East society
and cease considering itself a foreign element in this society." Advocating
the need for the creation of a Near East military bloc, Dulles concluded his
report with the recommendation of "an impartial attitude toward the Arabs =
a~d Israelis." In Julv 1953 the Un9.ted States refused to transfer its -
embassy to Jerusalem, which the Tsraeli leadership had declared the state's
capital, contrary to UN reso:~utiuns. In the fall of 1953 the United States
vigorously protested Israeli raids on the territory of Egypt, Jordan and
Syria. After rhe Israeli attack on Qibya in Jordan on 18 October 1953,
t}ie U.S. State Department came out with a statement which said, in part: _
, "'it~e killings and robberies during this incident persuade us that the persons
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lnvolvrc: in ttii~ ~houlcl hnve proceedin~s ingtituted n~~ingt them ~nd th~t
r.ffec:tlve men~uree ~hnu1J bc~ ndopted to prevent gimilur nction~ in the future."
= r,erc~in r~preaentntfvee of ofEicinl Wnghington circleg went even further, -
_ ca~ting doubt in Cheir publir. apeeches on the policy of making Israel ~
, "homcl~nd" for ~11 Jew~. U.5. Assistc~nt 5ectnt~ry df St~te E{enry I3iroade
r.wice c~me out wiCh ~n undi~guised condemn~tion of Igrael's aspiration to
_ ber_omc~ "Che nucleus of world Jewry." On the first occaeion--on 9 Apri1 1754 =
in U~yton, Ohio--~nd, in repetition, in ~ speech Co the American Council Eor
Judaism (Che neo-zionist Jewish organization in the United States) N. Iiiroade
sh~rply oppoaed the Israeli leadership~'g aspiration to increase immigr~tion
into tt~e coun~ry and easentially developed the thesis from Dulles' report on
_ the need for Israelis "Co regnrd themselves in the proper light as a Ne~r ~
~ast gtate and to see their future in connection with this region and not
as the hendq~arCers and nucleus, so eo apeak, of ~roupa scattered around
] the world defined by reli~ious belief."
Such ypeeches and official st~temenCs of the State Department manifested an
~~:~rir~~tion "to play the Ierael card" in an attempt to effect a rapprochement
witt~ t}ie Arab countries and utilize this r3pprochement for drawing them into
~i military alliunce. At the same !:ime metallic notes also sounded itt the
Unitecl Stntes' voice in relaCion to Israel because Washington had begun to
display nervouaness in connecCion with the unbridled extremism of the Is-
r~~`!i ruling clique anc~ its unwillingness to adapt and insert itself into a
_ IJear i:~19C context (failing which~ in the opinion of Uulles and his entourage,
. Israel could not perform in full the rule of outposCof Am~rican influence in
the Near East), which could disrupt the U.S. maneuver, alienate the U5SR
and other socialist countries.
}lere Washing[on was, naturally, far from sacrificing its relations with Is-
rael for the sake of a policy of rapprochement with the Arab countries: it
was a question of tactics~� more precisely, of priorities in the accomplish-
ment of this task or thp other of American diplomacy. For this reason Wash-
ington did everything posaible to "amortize" for Israel the results of this
game and, in any event, to priss nowhere beyond its limited confines.
It is well known, for example, that on 20 October 1953 ,lulles announced a
suspension of aid i:o Israel insofar as the latter had refused to abide by
an in~junction of tlie UN Trusteeship Council concerning a cessation nf opera-
tions to druin swamp land and build a hydropower station .tn the demilitarized
~one between Israel and 5yria. But as soon as 28 October the United States
lnnounced the resumption of aid, satisfied by a statement of the Israeli UN
repreaentative concerning an agreement not to cease but simply suspend the
work.
At the s.~me time President Eisenhower appointed a mission headed by Eric
Johnston for carrying out a project to divertthe waters of the River Jordan
and create irrigation systems. The Arab states, which re~ected this proj-
ect~ not unreasonably termed it pro-Israeli since the United States had
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linked with ies implement~tion u solution of the refugee problem by means of
ttieir new settlement predominanCly on Jordanian terriCory, without their
return to Cl~e lnnds froro whi~h they had been expelled.
'1'he ~~spiration to draw the Arnb counerieg into e military bloc gave rise eo the -
need for th~ UnitCd SCates to propoae military assistance to a.wmber df
~1rab regimes either as a means of pulling them towar~l a bloc or as a re-
ward Cor t}~eir coneEnting Co ~oin it. Immediately following the conclugiott -
~f the military p~ce between Turkey and rnki~tan in 1954, the United Stntes .
sranted irnq military assistan~e for the p~rpose of atimul~Cing this Arab -
country's entry into the plannPd broad bloc. The agreement provided for
supplies af American arms to Iraq, Che establishment of n U.5. military
mis~ion in ehe counCry and the diapatch of Iraqi officers foi� Craining in
the United Stntea. -
, Proceeding preCisely from the task of reinforcing tha West's aggregate mili-
t~~ry positiong in the Arab world, Washington, as already said, displayed
diplomatic activenes~ in the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on
~l~e evacuation of the British base from the Suez Canal Zone. President
[:isenhower wrote on 15 July 1974 in his message to PresidenC al-Nasir that
"simul.taneoUSly with the conclusion of a Suez agreement with Great Britain
= t1~e UniCed 5taCes will be able to enter inro direct relations with Egypt in _
thc field of economic assistance and the strengthening of irs aru~ed forces." ~
"After it had fa~ilitated through unusually effecCive diplomacy the conclu-
sion of an agreement between Egyr~t and Britain on the evacuation of the Suez
ba~~, the United StAtes aspi;~ed more than ever before to draw al-Nasir into
a Western defense agreement and charige hia behavior in relation to Israel.
Arms were to be the main means of a~:complishing this, is how William Quandt -
comments on the aims of American participation in the Egyptian-British accord.
2. The Reasons for the Turnabout in Policy (1955-1957)
Desl~~te the flexibility it had shown, the United States did not succeed in
realizi*~g it~ idea of the incorporation of leading Arab countrtes in a mili-
tary bloc. Iraq was the sole exception. Egypt, where by this time the ele-
ments which had formed a group around al-Nasir and which possessed far great-
er revolutionary potential than the supporters of General Najib had conclu-
sively gained the upper hand, not unly sharply opposed the Bagdad Pact but
~lso directed its policy and its influence in the rest of the Arab world
:if;zinst tl~is bloc. As a counterweighc to the Baghdad Pact, Egypt signed
milit.~ry agreements witti Syria and Saudi Arabia. A government headed by _
Sabri al-'Asali, leader of the National Party, was in power in Syria at
tt~is time. Sa~di Ara'oia agreed to a military alliance with Egypt obviously
motivated by its tra~/itional hostility toward and rivalry with the Nashemite
~lynasty in Traq: King Sa'ud feared that Iraq's inclusion in the Baghdad �
- T'1ct would make this state the Weat's principal protege among the Arab
monarctiies. :here was also, obviously, considerable significance in the _
fnct thnt in 1955 there had been a sharp deterioration of Saudi Arabia's
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relationg wiCh nnnther membc~r of the Ifaghdad Pact--I3.itgin--ott ~ccount df
the a1-iiurayari oaeis, to which Che nritigh proCege Cha sulran of Muac~t
h~d r~dv~nnced cl~ims.
'I'h~ Unitcd StaCc~ netemptcd to prevenC C~ypt's conclusion of m1liCary
- n~;reemenC~ with oCher ArAb counCries, pnrticularly 5yrin, realizing th~t
this woulu put an end to the Americun plana for the cre~tion of iCf, 'bwn"
roilitary nllinnces in the Near ~~gt controlled or direcrly commnnded by ehe
United 5tae~s ~nd could also strengthen the Arabs' positiona in Che confront-
ation wiCt~ Imr~el. On 26 ~'ebrugry Che U.S. ambasaador in Dam~ecua handed the
5yri~n Government a memorandum which proposed thaC 5yria decline to subscribe
_ to the defenge alliancea. Syria interpreted this memorandum as interference ,
in it~ internal affairs and re~ected it. In responae Washington began a
campuigd oE prPeaure on Chis country unprecedented in American-Syrian rela-
tions. Clementa of thia pressure were n eharp exacerbation of Turkey and
iraq's relations with Syria, Israeli attacks and, finally, Che murder of
'Adnan al-Mbliki, Che pntriotically-minded assiaCant chief of the Syrian Axmy
General 5taff, which was connected with plana for the resCoration of al-
5hishakli's prd-American dictatorial regime. Despite this preasure, on
' 20 October 1955 5yria subscrih2d to a defensive alliance with Egypt and, a
week later, with Saudi Arabia. _
- T}iE pressure on 5yria was intended to put pressure on ~aypt also. But this
dicl nor stop al-Nasir, who called the Baghdad Pact "a prison for the peoples"
_ and stepped up the struggle against it.
A whole number of researchers in the field of American-Egyptian relations be-
lieves that this very struggle, Egypt's turning to Che socialist states for
' weapons in mid-1955 and, finally, Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal
Company in July 1956--a11 this also predetermined the turnabout in American
policy in relation to al-Nasir's regime. It is said that al-Nasir himself,
with l:is own hands, forced the United States to alter its position. This
concluston, which was aeaiduously disseminated even in post-al-Nasir Egypt,
particularly in the attempts to "argue" the policy of rapprochement with the
United States under the conditions of its continuation of rigid support for
Israel, is seen as inr_orrect and not corresponding to historical reality.
These measures on the part of the Egyptian leadership undoubtedly hardened
the American course, but the policy of the United States itself predeCermined -
the development which led to Egypt's implementation of all these measures.
Tt is obvious that we sho~~ld dwell on this in more detail, and not so much
for polc~mical purposes as for the restoration of the true picture, which
testified that, first, the United States began to pursue its anti-Egypt
policy on its own initiative and not in response to al-Nasir's actions di-
rected a~ainst U.S, interests and, second, that this anti-Egypt course of
the United States was entirely linked with the strategic position which
Washington had occupied in relation to the parties directly involved in the
Near F.ast conflict.
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SCruy,~;lin~; agaicist the ~nCi-imperiali~t trends in Ch~ pollcy of Lgypt a.nd
_ certain other Ar,~b countri.~s, the American leadership began to utilize these �
- ~ountries' con~rontcttion with IsrAel in ite own interesCS. It was gambled
tli~C the miliCary preseure of a"sCrong" Iarnel would compel Chese countries
to be more plianC in relations wir.h the UniLed StaCes and prevene ~he de-
_ vclopment of the proces~ oP their rapprochemenC. Isrnel's imporCance Co the
linited 5tates in ehe protection o~ its inCerests in Che Near ~ast grew under
; tl~e condieions of ehe PaiLure to enlise the Arab world in imperialist al-
tianCes.
A resulr af this was Clie UniCed States' remuval of a numbE,r of r~striceions
on the development of the Near Last conflict which iC had put up jn the
- Eore~oin~; period of its flirCation with the ~gyptian "Free Officers." In
rert~in instances the United 9taCes even resorted Co supporCing the policy of -
Isr.aeli "reprisals," which,, naturally, aggr~vated Che Near ~ast conflict.
Me~~nwhile this aggravation ulso acquired a logic of its own.
'I'}ie United Sr~tes made ~ strntegic choice in favor of Israel, which was in -
~onCllct with the Arabs. The development of the conflict required of the
United Srates a more clearly negative approach to the Arab side, parCicular-
ly in all queations connected with the possibiliCy of the growth of its de-
Ecnse c~zpability. It was possible for this ne~ativism to be of a"selective
na[ure" in this period: essentially only thrre Arab countries were in active
confrontation with Israel--Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The "oil factor" had
not at that time exerted a limiting influence on U.S. policy, which was anti-
C~yptian and, in relation Co the conflict, anti-Arab, which had taken shape
under the conditions of thc growth of anti-imperialism in the Near E.3st.
American oil interests in Saudi Ara':'a, Kuwait and Iraq seemed rPliably pro-
tected with the help of the local authorities, who maintained close rela-
tions with the United States. All th~ reg3~nes in the Arab countries where
American oil companies operated were oYertly or covertly anti-Nasir. -
The c}ironolagy of the i:nited States' anti-Egypt actions is significant in
the plane of what has been said. The United States began to put inCo ef-
fect its perfectly definite t.urnabout in its policy toward Egypt not follow-
tn~; tl~e purchase oE Czechoslovak arms and, even less, following the national-
iz~~tion of the Suez Canal Company but earlier than all this--back in the -
sprin~ ~f 1955. There was a gradual buildup of the United States' oblique
and direct anti-Cgypt actions, which reached their culmination in July 1956
in the withdrawal of the origi.nal proposal to grant Egypt financial as-
stst.lnce for the construction of the nswan hydrocomplex, which was important
to it.
Certain Western authors assert that Dulles' "sudden" withdrawal of previcus-
ly promised assistance was dictated by purely siibjective considerations: ~
I)ulles--a complex personality who had an extremely big influence on the
co~~rse of American policy in the Near East--was considerably irritated by
the 1:Fyptian propaganda campaign against the Baghdad Pact and its initiators -
.~nd participants. The majority ascribes the withdraw~al of assistance in ,
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r}~e Apwnn conc~truction to Dulles' reaction to the agreement wiCh Czechoslo-
vnkin on nrma ~upplicr~ to L~ypt which Jamnl 'Abd n1~Nnsir nnnounced on
27 SeptemUer 1955.
In apenking of tl~c "fUtal" n~nCure nP Dullea' rePusal~ whicli, indeed, pluyed
~~tn exceptionnlly big role in the further developmenC of evenCs (for it wae
foLlowed by Egypt's nationalizaCion of. Che Suez Cana1 Company, which, in
turn, gave rise to the tripartiCe aggresaion againsC Egypt in OcCober 1956)
a number of researchera in ehe West conaiders the motivea ~nd driving for-
ces of tl~e American deci~ion altogether "inexplicable" and "unexp~zined."
Yet riiia withdrawal by Du11ea was the logical conaequence of the changes in
American policy toward Egypt which lay chiePly in the plane of the Arab-
Israeli confli.ct.
Triie, as hns been said, internal changes had occurred in Egypt by the eime -
of the turnabout in American policy: Genernl Na~ib had resigned, al-Nasir
had finally gained the upper hand in Che leadership and vicCory had gone ko .
_ the most dynamic forces advocating the country's independent course of de-
velopment. But thig was not ~~nough in itself to change the American atti-
tucle toward Egypt. According ~o Haykal, Dulles was generally satisfied with
his meeting with al-Nasir which had taken place on 11 May 1953 in Cairo.
A1-Nasir did not take up Dulles' proposal concerning Egypt ~oining the MITO
(Middle East Defenae Organization), but Dulles could still detect in a num-
ber of his arguments the possibility of "constructive" discussions with the
Egyptian leader in Che future (resolute anti-imperialism became al-Nasir's
policy after a certain time, but in 1953 he was chiefly guided by a purely
- pragmAtic approach to the choice of partners and allies). "A1-Nasir proved,"
H. Haykal writes, "thaC if Egypt ~oined the pact prior to the departure of -
the British from the Suez Canal Zone, this would appear that it had done
this under pressure from the 8,000 British soldiers on the Suez Canal base.
- This was an argument which gave Dulles hope. He felt that after the depart-
ure of the British from the base, it would be possible to talk with al-Nasir -
about ~oining the pact. A1-Nasir also acknowledged the need to protect the
- country againat cormnunism."
Thus the United States did not lose hope that it would be succeseful in reach-
ing ac least a modus vivendi in relations with the Nasirite leadership. It
Is known, for example, that Washington succeeded--this was its "service,"
bayicnlly--in furnishing the agreement on the withdrawal of British troops
from t}~e Suez Canal Zone, which was signed in 1954, with clauses in accor~-
ance with Which the British armed forces could return to the Canal Zone in
the event oE an attack on Egypt and on other members of the Arab League or
Turkey. These clauses were viewed as being directed against the Soviet
Union and their purpose was to compensate for Egypt's refusal to participate
in a military alliance under the a~egis of the Western powers.
Nor wns Cr~iro's sharply negative reaction to the creation of the Baghdad
- Pnct n surpriae to Washington. Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir had repeatedly warned
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ehc U.5. leadershtp that he would oppose any mili~ttry alliance in the Near
I:aet in which an Arab counCry parCicipaCed. However, simulCaneously with
these warn~ngs he repeaC~dly emph~?aized, and in a number of his public speeches
~lso, l~is inCerest tn relationg with Che West, if such relutions were not
ronditioned by commiCmenCS to pt~rCicipACe in miliCary nlliances.
Nor could the withdrawal o~ American nssistance for the Aswttn consCrucCion ,
. have been the U.5. reaCCion to a1~Nasir's agreement with the socialist coun- ~
. trie:~ on ~rms supplies. More than 2 mc~ths after Che signing of the ~gypt3an-
Czer.l~oslovak agreement on arms purchases, in November 1955, Dulles met in
~J~nshington with Cgyptian Finance Minist~r A. M. al-Qaysuni and 'charged him
with conveying to al-Nastr that "the Soviet Union is helping Egypt wiCh wea-
pons�r but the United Stateg intends to help Egypt in the construction of ehe
hi~;h dam." '
rurt}~er, Dulles asked al-Nusir to ponder "tt~e difference in the nature of
the ~7ssistance of the two countr.ies and decide who Egypt's real friends are."
I.eavit~~ on one side the Pharis~ic methods of Dulles' diplnmacy, let us rurn
our attention }iere to the Pact that during his meeting with al-Qaysuni the
U.S. secretary of state had not only not removed the quesCion of American
assistance for the Aswan construction in connection with Egypt's obtaining
rarms Erom the socialist countries but, on the contrary, opted for this U.5. -
:~ssistance in tlie Eorm of a bridgehead for "competition" with the USSR for
influence in ~gypt.
And, indeed, in December 1955 the United 5tates declared its readiness to
granC Egypt assistance in the construction of the high dam in Aswan. The
UniCed States and Britain assured Cairo that they would grant it $70 mil-
lion, while the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development de-
clared its readiness to grant Egypt a loan of $200 million. .
Nor, obviously, could withdrawal of the assistance on the part of the United
States have been predetermined by the policy of Egypt's neutralism which had
been proclaimed and confirmed by al-Nasir's active participation in the
' Bandung Conference of nonalined countries in April 1955. It is known that
In tt~e middle of June bulles sharply opposed the policy of neutraiism, which
ii~ termed amoral. Nowever, all this was before the United States had agreed
to grant assistance for the Aswan construction and not in the time between
this a~reement and the subsequent withdrawal.
Nor does the ttieory of Dulles' "impulsive"decision withstand criticism. U.S.
inten~ions were fully revealed ~t a~.ecret meeting of Baghdad Pact foreign
ministers back in March 1956, that is, 4 months prior to his announcement
of the withdrawal of assistance for the Aswan construction. The totally
secret protocol of this meeting was photographed by an Iraqi minister and
handed ovcr in Beirut to Egyptian intelligence officials. Upon receipt
of t}~e document, al-Nasir doubted its authenticity; events, how~ver, con-
firmed its accuracy.
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rox or~icrni. us~ ornY
"
Whur, then, At Ch~C Cime were the main motives for such an extraordinary
measure us the United 5C~.tea' demonstraeive retreae from ita ~reviously `
promiaed aseistc~nce, a reereat which had been prepared in adv?nce, which
: could not fail to have attested the complete re~rganizaCion oE American po- "
licy in relation Co ~gypt?
Since ehe atart of 1955 there had been a sharp reduceion in American im-
perialiam's opportunities for maneuver, which had aesisCed previous atCempCs
Co reconcile Cwo muCually conCradictory aima of its Near East policy: on _
the one hand the sCrengtlnening of Israel as a strategic base of American
- control over the Near CasC and, on the oCher, the reinforcement of U.S.
poAiCions and influence directly in Egypt and other Arab countries. This
occurred und~er the conditions of a sharp galvanization of Israel's anti- _
' Arab policy ;ahich w~s formulated by Ben-Gurion, who had returned to pow~r,
ancl which resulted in the aetack on Gaza. Naturally, even under the new
condi[ions the United Statea did not rule out a pol3cy of flirting with
C~;ypt, but the UniCed States' opportunities for maneuver in this plane had
disCinctly narrowed. '
- The problem of military reinforcement in Che face of a real danger of Israel's
ermed actions confronted EgypC in all its magnitude. Cairo realized that
not only the fate of the "Free Officers" regime in Cairo buC also EgypC's
autl~ority and positions throughout the Arab world would largely depend on
[he extent of the opposition to these Israeli actions. Following Israel's
February attack on Gaza, ~gypt immediately began Co look for sources of arms
supplies. IC' was in vital need of such. According to its military represent-
ative, at that time Egypt had six operational military aircraft and ammuni-
tion for ranka for one hour of battle.
Initially Egypt turned to its "traditional" arms sources--Britain and France.
However, this request for the sale of weapons had negative results for Egypt.
The gover~unent of Anthony Eden, which had come to power in Great Britain in
April 1955, sharply increased the anti-Egyptian element in this ~;,ountry's
policy, particularly under the conditions wherein Britain had 3oined the
Baghdad Pact. The January 1955 election in France had brought to power the
~ government of Guy Mollet, which also, from the very first, occupied an ex-
tremety negative position in relatian to the Nasirite regime. This govern-
ment adopted u policy of resolute suppression of the national liberation
movement in Algeria, and the weakening or even removal of al-Nasir was con-
- sidered an important condition for this. One month after Guy Mollet had
become premier, France declined to sell 300 mortars on the grounds that they
could be passed on to the Alqerian insurgents. But simultaneous3;y with
its refusal of Egypt France sold Israel a consignment of Mystere aircraft
nnd other arms. France obtained the direct consent of the United States in
accordance with the "Tripartite Declaration" for Mystere supplies to Israel.
Uncler these circumstances J. al-Nasir even requested the United States itself
that it sell Cgypt arms to~the tune of $27 million. The State Department
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",~u~tifiably ~ssumed" th~~t nl-Nasir had no money and propo~ed Chae he pay in ~
cnsl~. AnoCl~er demand was ndv~nced aimulCaneously--that he take a group of
American military advisera which wos eo obaerve how Che supplied wettpons would
be used. A1-Nasir could not accept the Pentagon's demand, which threatened -
eo pue rhe Egypti,~n armed forces under the control of the Unieed States,
wl~ict~t~ad cloae relations with the oCher side o� Che conflicr--Israel. Wa~h-
ingCon immedinCely declared thne ~gypt's position did not a11ow it Co sell
it we~pons. Tt was right a~ter all this that al-Nasir turned to the Sovier -
ilnion and Czechoslovakia wiCti a request for arms saleg. His requesC wns
satisfied. -
'1'wo days after this became known in WashingCon (iC had learned officially of
r~ypt's agreement with Czechoslovakia from a1-Nasir's 27 September speech), _
.i. Allen, U.S. assist~nt secretary of staCe, flew eo Cairo for talks with _
- thc~ C~yptian president. A day later the 13ritiah ambassador called on al-
N~~sir ancl expressed, on behalf of his government, "profound anxiety." The _
- Western press carried a whole series of anCi-Nasir articles. It was per-
Eectly clear that ehe United States and the West European countries had
haseily coordinated their actions to put pressure on al-Nasir for him to -
renounce tlie concl~ided agreement, which impinge~3 on the West's possibilities
of conrrolling the Near EASt conflict in its own intereses. This pressure
i~ad no eEfect. The firat consignments of the purchased weapons began to
- arrive in C~ypt.
A few months prior to al-Nasir's request for Che sale of arms, the United
Stiites itself had propoaed military assistance to Egypt: American repre-
sentatives were constAntly informing Che Egyptian leaders that it could be
a question of a supply of various Cypes of arms to the tune of $40 million
to $100 million. Now, a few months later, the United States was refusing
C~ypt--wtiy? The point was that at the end of 1954 the specific purpose of
proposed American military assistance was totally different. The United
5tates believed Chat assistance "would make al-Nasir sufficient~y strong"
inside the country for him to be able Co adopt decisions on the appropriate
- form of military cooperation with the West (albeit in the form of the sta-
tioning of a permanent U.S. military mission in Egypt inpsecting the Egyp-
ttan Army) and on a separate settlement with Israel with a solution of the
question of the Palestine refugees. As far as the request by al-Nasir him-
self for military assistaiice was concerned, it was made at a time when it
t~ad become clear that Egypt needed the weapons to reinforce its positions
in the confrontation with Israel. It was precisely this which predeter-
mined Washington's ne~ative rQSponse. -
'ftiere are grounds for believing that Dutles' subsequent refusal to grant
~ I:~ypt financial assistance for the Aswan construction was also chiefly con-
nected with the fact that E~ypt had embarked on a period of active con-
Erontation wit}~ Israel, which was initiated by the Israeli attack on Gaza.
1'he U.S. ConRress was perfectly distinct in its opp~sition to the idea of
assistance to ERypt. A number of congressmen initiated a campaign against
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proposed U.S. asei~rance on the grounds thnt iC was being graneed to "Isruel's _
enemy." Aa a aupplement to this, Knowland, leadet of Che Republican minor-
ity in Che Senate, told Dulles that the Senate would noC approve US. assist-
ance for the conatruction in Aswan, putting Porward as a reason for this
negative ~ttiL�ude the fe~r of competition on Che part o� Egypt �or Americnn
cotton producers.
The very terms oP the United States granting a loan for the Aswan construc-
tion were linked wiCh the advancement of the idea of ~gypt making a separate
pence with Iarael. k'rior to his depz~rture from Washington for Cairo, ~C
the end of May 1956 Ahmad Eiusayn, Egyptian nmbassador to the United SCates, -
was received by Undersecre~ary of Stnte Herbert Hoover Jr, who was at that
Cime standing in for Dulles, to be given information to be conv~yed to his
leaders. Hoover puC forward the conditions whose adoption by Egypt was ta -
- precede an American decision concerning the financing of Che Aswan construc-
tton. Tt~e firsr part c.� them conCained purely financial and economic re-
quirements. The second part contained U.S. requirements of a political na-
ture. E~ypt, according to H~over, was to assume Cow commitments: declare
that in the future it would not conclude agreements on arms supplies with
the Soviet Union and reach a peace a~reement with Israel. The motive for
the renunciation of new agreements with the USSR was allegedly dictated by a
concern to insure that Egypt would be able to pay off its debts without
- mortRa~ing its cotton for arms; the peace agreement with Israel, naturally,
on terms close to those dictated by Tel Aviv, was presented as a means of
eliminating tension essent~al for the A:~wan construction. The American
position was perf~ctly clear: in exchange for assistance in the construc-
tion of the dam Egypt had to adopt a policy geared toward a separate peace
witn israel. While a renunciation of tt~e development of its relations with
the USSR was !:o contribute to Egypt's greater tractabiliCy in the face of
~ the diktat of Israel, where by this time the "hawks" were firmly at the
helm.
Judging by everything (this was mentioned earlier), Egypt had not occupied
a nihi~istic position on the question of the possibility of a settlement with
Israel, but al-Nasir was thinking of a general and not a separate settle-
ment, with the obligatory solution of tt~e Palestinian prob~em, and considered
the 1947 UN plan of the partition of Palestine the basis therQOf. At the
same time, after Ben-Gurion's return to the government, the Israelis adopted
a policy not of the search Eor compromise but for the overthrow of al-Nasir. -
~ � And under these conditions the American proposals resembled a diplomatic _
cover designed to promote this aim.
Wl~en it became clear to the United States that al-Nasir would not agree to a
sep.~rate agreement on Israeli terms or terms close to them, the White House -
and. particularly at that time, the State Department began to seek more ef-
Eective me~zsures ~ntQnded to break al-Nasir's resistance and bring his policy
under American control. A means was needed for this which was capable of
havinR an even greater impact on Egypt than the refusal of arms supplies.
The United States attempted to make its withdrawal of its previously
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promised assieC~tnce f.oz Che Aawan construcriott ~ust such a menns. Du11es
obvtously culculctred Chat auch a turnabouC could have the maximum impact
since it direcCly cnlled in question Che feasibility of a pro~ect of vital
- importance �or rgypt.
_ 'l'he Unitecl Sta~es was not nor could it have been in any doubt as to the
strengCh of the pain.ful method which it intended ro adopt in respecr of
[:gypt. It ~leliberately clecided on concentrated strate~ic presaure on A1- .
Nasir's regime. in his report to the Congress for Che secottd half of 1955
U.S. President Eisenhower wrote Chat the construction of the AswAn H~.gh Dam -
was "rhe key to ~gypt's capabil3ty of providing for its growing populaCion
in ttle Euture." risenhower explained the agreement of the United States,
Iiritain and the Int,ernational Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmenC "to
,fuin eEforCs" in rhe oPfer to finance the construction by Che "exrraordinary
importance of t1~e pro~ect." And Che UniCed SCates also decided Co play on
precisely the fact thaC the Aswan construction was of sucti importance for
the new regime in ~bypt. The American politicians counted ~n the surefire
nature of their maneuver. Dulles believed that after he had received the
United States' refusal to approach him with outstretched hand, al-Nasir
woulcl he forced to agree to all the American terms. Even if the Soviet
Jnion did supply Cgypt with weapons, it would not be in a position to cre-
ate a source of economic assistance as an alternative to the West, Dulles
hoped.
'fhe calculations,that the U.S. maneuver would break al-Nasir were also based
on the fact that in DecEmber 1955 Washington had not merely agreed to fi-
nance the starC of the construction in Aswa:~ but had also a?Znounced its
readiness to provide, in con~unction with Britain, assistance and financing _
for "subsequent stages" of the pro~ect.
Following the withdrawal of the United States, there i~nediately followed ~
witt~drawals from the financing of the Aswan construction by Britain and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
~ 'Thus by his withdrawal of his offer of assistance to Egypt Dulles was not
- responding to al-Nasir but acting on his own initiative. The fact that the -
import oE these actions of Dulles amounted directly to blackmail of Egypt .
is emphasized by many authors even in the West. One of them, Maxim Rodin-
son, wrote the following in this connection: "Having assumed that the USSR -
was not in a position to finance the Aswan Dam, Dulles announced on 18 July
that the United States was canceling its offer of assistance, adding cer-
tain disparaging remarks by the way of explanation.... For the Western
~ powers capitulation (of Egypt--Ye. P.) seemed entirely certain." ,
Speaking in Alexandria on 26 July, in response to Dulles' maneuver al-Nasir
announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The United States
sharply condemned this decision oP Egypt's. Immediately following al-Nasir's
declaration, Dulles met in London with the British and French foreign
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ministers, and, Ppllowing th~.s, iC was officially announced Chat the United
Stuteq had "temporarily" ~'zozen A11 the 5uez Cnnal Company's bank deposits
abrond, Thc i?nlrecl Stahes c~imultnneously cut back on supplied oF n number
of most �important commodities to ~gypC which had been delivered in accord-
ance with tt~e aid program which w~s in e.Pfect and refused it sales of food-
sruffs iii the immediate future. The United States thus actively ~oined in
- the economic blockade n~ Egypt.
- The U.S. secretary oP staCe was the initiator of the advancement of a plan
for the establishment oP ineernationaY control over the Suez Canal--a neo-
colonialiat form of depriving Egypt of sovereignty over a seaway situaCed
- in its Cerritory. This plan o.f an international consortium to administer
the Suez Cana1 cAme to be called the "Dulles Plan." At a meeting with his
British ~nd French colleagues Du11es proposed Che convening in London of a
conference o~ Suez Canal user-countries intended to establish "international
control" "on a legal basis." In a~oint statement of the three powers the
convening of a conference of user-countries was set for 16 AugusC 1956.
'rhe speect~es of the U.S. secretary of state at the London Conference, which
ended on 25 August since the Western states' neocolonialist position had
brought it to ~ie poinC of deadlock; the "Committee of Five" mission, in- _
_ spired by the United States and headed by Australian Prime Minister Menzies,
wliich was intended to impose the "Dulles Plan" on al-Nasir; a new separate -
- London conference, which had adopted, in spite of the most widespread pro-
tests throughout the world, a decision on the setting up of the Suez Canal
Users Associa tion--all this was aimed at taking away from Egypt it sovereign
rights to the canal. Western politicians did everything they could to doom
_ to failure the Egyptian initiative concerning nationalization of the company.
The West feared the success of this step not only because ~t had struck at "
their positions in Egypt itself but also because it had created an extr~~-
ordinarily danberous precedent fer them: other countries might follow the
Egyptian example. It might lead to the end of the era of the "inevitable
failure" of such actions which had been proclaimed by imperialist politi- ~
cians following the fa~lure of the nationalization of oil in Iran by
, Mossadeq.
Aehind all the measures designed at all costs and in any form to return the
Suez Canal to Western contro7, stood the United States--a country which, in-
cidentally, was far less interested in navigation along the canal than many
ott~er states. At the same time the United States did not take part and did
not support the armed triple aggression of Britain, France and Israel aimed
at restoring by force the Suez Canal to foreign dom:~nation. -
Completely different and sometimes diametr;icalJ.y opposed as~essments are
expressed concerning the American position in connection with the triple
aggression against Egypt. The British press has written of a"sobbing Prime
Minister Eden" during a telephone conversation with Pzesident Eisenhower,
who "refused" to support the allies at the decisive moment. Eden's memoirs
are bestrewn with reproaches leveled at the United States. A number of
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Western reaeaxchers even beYieves thaC Che U.S. poaition at Che time of the
evenrs was manifeatly "pro~Arnb": the UniCed StaCea failed Co suprorC ies
ullies which had made Che aCCack on Egype and voted in the UN General Assembly
Eor Che reaolution calling ~or a cease-~i.re and the withdrawal of Israeli
troops. There is also an opposite viewpoint~-iC was a maCter of a"division
oE rotes": whiLe Brit~in, :France and Israel were the direct participanrs in
the atCack, the United SeACes undertook to sec~ire the "international rear"
oE the operatian and Por this purpose did noC par:icipate directly in Che
Suez ~~dventure.
Whar, then, were the motives ~Eor thc American pos3tion in respecC of the
triple aggression against Egypt? Where do we Qind the meaning of the Ameri-
can statements nnd actions?
Tl~e explanation of the American position by Prof John Badeau, �ormer U.S.
ambassador Co ~gypt, who headed Columbia University's Middle Easr InstiCute
af.ter his retirement from the diplomatic service, merits attention. J. Badeau -
emphasizea that the U.S. refusal to support the armed attack on Egypt was
_ caused noC by fundamental contradictions in the aims pursued by the United
Stnres on the one hand and the states which perpetrated ehe aggression on
ttie other and not by the fact that rhe United States re~ected in principle
~ the methods of operation of its allies buC by the fact that in the opinion
of American politicians the moment had already been lost and that the new
- conditions did not allow them to a;.t with miliCary methods. "What was pos- . -
sible ~ week after the nationalization," Badeau wrote, "was not possible
3 months after." In reaching this conclusion the United States aC the same
r.ime gave its approval for France to supply Israel with an additional three
squadrons of MysCere aircraft.
There is reason to believe that even afCer the attack of Israel and then of
Britain and France of Egypt the U.S. position was far from simple and straight-
forward. In his study, which was published by the,Rand Corporation, W. QuandC
terms it, for example, an "open" question whether Dulles aspired "to post- _
pone adoption of the UN resolution calling for a cease-fire, at least until ~
the British were through with al-Nasir." In any event the United States -
did much behind the scenes to defer the adoption of this resolution in the -
Uniteci Nations, and it was only on the fifth day of the aggnession, 2 Novem-
ber, Chat it was p~ssed by an emergency session of the UN General Assembly
and, moreover, in the absence of Dulles, who reported sick. "Despite the
serious split in policy with the allies, the fundamental American assessment
of c~l-Nasir remained as before," the study "U.S. Interests in the Middle
East," which was published under the editorship of Prof G. Lenczowski, says.
"He (al-Nasir--Ye.P.) was an obstacle to the reinforcement of the United
State4' system of allies and roo ~riendly toward the Soviet Unioz." Haykal
is even more categorical on this score in his book "Cairo Documents": "It
should not be thought that Dulles' far-reaching aims differed from Eden's
aims. Ne also wished for al-Nasir's fall, but his brother (Allen Dul].es--
director of the CIA--Ye.P.) had ssured him that this could be achieved
cautiously. by means of a coup in the country.itself and not by an attack
from outside. This would not have caused resentment either among the Arabs
or the Russians." -
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When, on 3 November, B~xi~a~.n and, subsequenrly, k'rance re3ecCed the General -
Assembly reaolution and 2 days later dropped assaulC~landing units in Che
Suez Canal Zone, the.United StAtes condemned theae actions, but nothing more.
The �ollowing complex a~ c~.rcumstAnces appt?rently predetzrmined the American -
poaition at the t~.me of an immed~.ately a~ter the Suez crisis.
First, the Unieed States was ~orc~d to reckon wiCh Che policy of the Soviet
Union, which resolurely supported the vicim of the aggreasion~-Egypt. After
, the landing of the Britiah�and ~rench troops in the reg3on of Port Said, the
Soviet Governmene demanded the iimnediate convening of a UN Security Council -
session to diacuss the question "The Noncompliance by Britain, France and
Israel of the Ger.eral Assembly Deciaion of 2 November and Immediate Measures _
To Halt the Aggression o,~ the Said States Against Egypt." In a draft resolu- _
tion the Soviet Union proposed Lhat a time of 12 hours be given for the with-
drawal of a11 interventionist troops and, should Britain, France and Tsrael
not ceuse the aggression, that Egypt be granted military assistance by Che
Forces of the UN Security Council members.
'Ct~e global correlation of forces which had already come about by the time of
rlie triple aggression had led tothe~point where the export of counterrevolu- -
~ tion had become very dangerous. The British and French leaders were ready to
- shift responsibility to the United SCates in this case, leaving to it, as
leader of the capiCalist world, Che adoption of a decision on actions aimed
at protecting its allies. Eden and Guy Mollet put their trust in the auto-
matism of the American reaction when the United States' closest and most -
important partners happened to be threatened. In pursuing by their action -
against Egypt chiefly not all-imperialist (although there were these also)
but their own specific aims and~thinking of the strengthening of their own
positions in Egypt after the liquidation of the al-Nasir regime (perhaps
even hatching plans for a kind of revanche for the withdrawal under the
conditions of the galvanization of American influence in Egypt following the
_ ouster of King Faruq Britain and France were at the same time counti~ig ; on
the fact that the United StaCes would be absolutely automatically forced to
protect them in the event of global complications. -
Tiie American leaders wished to reserve the right to a free choice of deci-
- sion. The more so in that they were indignant that their allies, whose plans
they had, naturally, suspected and known in general outline, had not deemed
it necessary to notify Washington of the details that had been worked out
and th~e~date of and the procedure for the atCack on al-Nasir's Egypt. The _
day before~Israel's attack on Egypt, the British ,foreign secretary had as-
sured the American ambassador in London that he still did not have any data
- on Israel's intention oP striking at Egypt. At the same time; as became
perfectly obvious, and from Eden's memo:irs also, the coordination of Israel's
actions with Britain and France had been elaborated and accomplished in
advance in all details.
- Second, Washington understood that the action of Britain and France against
� ~gypt, which was undertaken without consideration of the time and circum- -
stances, would lead to the ultimate weakening and, possibly, the liquidation
_ ~
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of their posiCions j.n Ctte Arab world. I,f ~~,~lmerican poiieicians had Chought
- tl~~t such a we~kenin~ or liqu3dation would have been idenCical to the loss
' of "overall" Weseern ~nEluence, they would undoubtedly have acted far more /
, energEttcally in support o,P their parCr~ers. However, Che viewpolnl Chat _
the firmest guarantee oP the intere~ts o~ the entire imper3alisC West 1ay
in etie plane of the introduction and strengthening ot purely American posi- _
rions l~ad gradually gRined the upper hand in Washin~ton by that Cime.
It was precisely at this time that the "vacuum theory" had become quite
widespread in the United States, and, moreover, the United States understood
the ir.reversibility of Che process o~ the ~ormation of tr~is "vacuum" in
Western tn.fluence through the collapse of the positions of the traditional
colonial powers. Given their undeLS:anding of Che inevitability of this
process, [he Americ~n politicis~ns gambled on filling in the developitlg
, "vacuum." The actions of BriCain and France, which were dange'rous for the
entire WesC and for its aggrega~E positions in the Arab world, were carried
- out in a form of which Washington did not approve at that time. The United
States saw in this not only its partners' irritating blunder and the pos-
sible danger '~n this connection of the growth of revolutionary forces in the
Arab world rut also a good opporCunity to strengthen its own positions and,
through this--on a new, higher level--strengthen the influence of the whole
imperialist West in the Arab countries.
The new understanding of the situation and the UniCed States' role in the -
Arab countries, which were viewed as a part of the so-called third world,
was reflected in, for example, the following conclusion, at which J. Badeau
arrived in his analysis of American policy at the time of and afCer the Suez _
crisis: "The United States has completely irreversibly ~ecome th e custodian ~
of general WesCern positions. As a consequence of this, the American role _
has simultaneously become both independent and limited, It has become in-
_ dependent in that it has ceased to be chief ly a supplem~~nt to the tradition- -
al positions of the Eruopean powers, but is now based or~ an American deter- -
mination of interests and political aims. No single We~tern power could
successfully pursue a policy in the Arah worl,d which would conflict with
U.S. policy. ~uropean p~licy has become tite supplement, while American policy
- has become the foundation."
Third, following the ~ailure of Dullest trick o~ withdrawal of the original
- consent to finance the Aswan construction and a�ter American diplomacy at
the time of and after the nationalization o~ the Suez Canal Company had im-
paired even further the positions which the ilnited States had won in Egypt
witt~ great difficulty in the first 2 years following the overthrow of Faruq,
the Siiez crisis had created a favorable opportunity for Washington to at-
tempt to restore its prestige in Cairo. "Many Arabs were grateful for �
American opposition to the Suez aggression. Under such conditions it could
hsve been assumed that a new U.S. initiative materialized in strengthening
of its positions in the Middle East would prevent subsequent Soviet penetra- -
tion," W. Quandt wrote. Thus with the aid of its policy at the time of
1
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th~ Suez criei~ ehe United Stntea ~l~o pambled on counterncting the growth
_ of the uuthnrity oP Che U5SR and 5oviet in~luence (all this wa~ called
"penetrc~tion") .
- Fourth, Wnghinp,ton expected thnt the United States would httve suff icient
possibilities oP eeruring IsrAel's intereatx, including even thdse that
were manifesCly incompntible with the intereats oP the nei~;hboring Ar~b
stntes, by methocls whicti would not create a riek either of g glob~l cla~h dr
an undue w~akeni~g of imperialist poeitions in th~ Arnb world. Naving
occuriQd a definite position at the time of the 5uez crisis, the United
5tates simultaneously promiaed Israel that the U.5. delegaeion in the United
Nationo would addreas all its ePforts in its favor. "Confidence in thig
fact," bulles wrote in n memorandum to A. Eban, Israeli ambassador in Wash-
ington, "ie best capable oP securing the future for Ierael, nnd ttdt oCCUpa-
tion, wie}i ita chc~llenge to the overwhelmitig p~rt of Che world public." ~
~ llavin~ defined its position, the United 5tates even applied certain pressure ?
on igrael to compel it to lower the level of the crigis--implement the
- Gencral Assembly resolution and withdraw ita troops. But this pressure
was strictly limited--it did not go beyond the economic framework. 'The
United Stntes froze A loan to Israel.
This in itself could not t~ave played the determining role in compelling
Israel to ultimately evacuate its uccupation forces from Sinai. Even a day
before the attack on Egypt, Ben-Curion declared at a session of the Isrneli
Cabinet tliat the UniCed States, which had opposed Chis military action~ Would
not send iCs troops to force Israel t~~ withdraw from 5inai. The upp~:r limit
- of its pressure, according to gen~Gurion, wav the threat to break off dip-
lomatir. relations, a ban on private collections for Israel and the block-
_ ing of the American loan. Practicc ahnxed that the United States did not
even go so far as to threaten Israel with a break in diplomatic relations.
At the same time a clearly outlined and very decisive Soviet policy had
arisen an IsrAel's pnth. Israel was compelled to wiChdraw its troops from
5in~'.. :he only thing the Am~rican politicians' managed to achieve was the
introduction of UN troops on Egyptian territory and {n the region of Sharm
.~1-Shaykh, which controlled the entrance tq the Strait of Tiran. UN troops
were also stationed in the Gaza region. -
3. Prom Utilization of Inter-Arab Confcits to the Direct Gamble on Israel
(1957-1970) , -
A fundnmentally new situation had come about in the Arab world ,is a result
of the Suez crisis. The Porced withdrawal of the Israeli Army from 5inai ~
served the development of the national liberation processes in many Arab
countries.: Tremendous revolutionizing influence was exerted by the fact
- that the Egyptian leadership had ~ucceeded not only in nationalizing the
Suez Canal Company--not only foreign pr,~perty but a key facility which
lnrgely secured the system of foreign d~�nination and control over Egypt--
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, hut ~ilyo in clr.f'enclin~; itH ri~ht to nr?tionalizationdespite all the effortq of
state~ incomp~lr~bly more powerful tt~an ~gypt militarily ~nd economically. A
basic ~actor, which becc~me an obgtacle on the path o~ the export of cnunter-
revolutiott-~tlie alliance o~ the nntionnl liberntion movement with world eo-
ri.hli~m~-mnnit'e~ted itgelP clearly at the time oP thc Suez ~ri~is.
A p~ytrioric gdvernment enme to power in Jorclan in October 1956. It was
extremcly important that thi:~ wag preceded by electiong which even Nnerican
authors congider "the most democratic tn this country's history." Ae the
- time o� the Suez cri~is the new ,lordanian Government broke off diplomatic
rel~~t�ons with Britain and grance, The situation in the Arnb world had be- -
_ c~me so cnrdinr~lly different �rom everything which it had been in preceding
year~ that even the ~tatec~ which were traditionally considered the Wegt's
"reli~bl.e p~~rtner~" were ferced to enga~e in actions of ~n ob~ectively anti-
imt~eri.~liet nature. In the wake of i;gypt and Syria, at the gtart of Ir'ov;~~~ber
195fi 5audt Ar~bia also broke off diplomatic relations wirh Uritain and
~rance, wS~ile iraq broke off relations with ~rance. A1-Nasir's political
popularity assumed tremendous proportiong. The entire Arab world paid heed
to }~is speeches, .~ddresses and nctions.
It t~ad become perfectly clear that the prestige of the olcl colonial powers--
f3ritain and ~rnnce--in ttie Arab world and, even more important from the
American politicinns' viewpoint, their capacity for suc~esgful actions ,~ere
close to zero. At the same time there was a rapid growth in the a~~thority
ancl influence of the Soviet Union in ttie Arab countries, which realized
increasingly clearly the tremendous significance of friendship and coopera-
tion with ttie USSR for insuring their capacity for independent development.
Nor were W~sh!ng[on's hopes th~~t the public disagreement with Britain, France
and Israel at the time of the Suez crisis would automatically lead to a
sharp increase in U.5. possibilities in the "~rab world 3ustified. This
clisa~reement was not enough, especially since the American leadership and,
to an even greater ex[ent, the Nnerican press continued to emphasize the
limited n~ture oE the disagreemen[s among the allies, reducing thPSn to
_ rurely tactical factors.
. T}~e E~:isenhower doctrine w~s born under these conditions. On 5 Jgnuary 1957
the U.5. Preaident submitted for congressional approval a document which
said r_hat "the United 5tates is prepared to use armed forces to assist any
_ nacion vr group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression
perpetrated by any country contrplled by international co~~nism...." The
Congress approved tl~is document and proposed that the Presideat act on
the basis of its principles.
Ttie F.isenhower doctrine signfied fundamental changes in the Unitc~d SCates' -
Near f~;ast policy both in form and in content. Fo: the first time the United
5tates hacl appeared before the Arab world witt~ an independent docume~t de-
finin~ clie main ciirection of its policy. Prior to this, the United States
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hnd been nble to pt~reicipttt~ t~nd did particip~te ~n Che formulgtion of ~dint
dacument~ with it~ ellieg. 5u~h, ~or ex~mple, was ehe 1~50 "Tripareite Ue-
clar~tion" of the Un~ted States, Britain and Nrance, according ta which
these powere ur~dertook to gunrantee khe 1949 Ieraeli bord~rg and "con[rol"
the c~rmament oY the Nhc~r ~ast countri,eg.
" Attemptin~ to prove the ne~d for the pursuit o~ th~ foreign pnlicy cour~~
_ reflected in th~ ~ig~nhoWer doctrine, Americ~n poliCiciane re~orted, g~
alregdy menCinned, to the "vacuum theory." The firet premise of thig theory
~n~ the ineviCabil~ty of the f~rmatiott of n"void" a~ a result of the weak~
r_ning or collapse of the posiCi~ons of thia imperialiat.~ower or Che other in
the ~ast, while the second premise was the need for this "void" to be filled
in with the influence of another imperialiat power. This "need" wne deduced
from the seruggl~ of the two syateme in the world erena.
Tl~e ~uthora of the "vncuum theory" offered the following outline: g gtrug-
gle ig unc~erway between the so-call~d free world and ehe eocialigt cnuntries.
Therefore everything which is outside the framework of this atruggle, in~
cluding the national libnration movement of the peoples of the ~ast, has
no right to independent existence. Proceeding from this outline, the authnrs
oE the "vacuum theory" asserted: either the influence of the "free world" _
(the imperinlist West) or the influence of "int~rnational communiam." In
other words~ if che influence of a"free World" country comea Co an end, it
_ is easential to activize the influence of another country, namely, the United
- 5tates. This thought, for example, was emphsaized by Dulles in his apeect~
at the opening of the UN General Asaembly 12th Seasion, in Hhich he actually
denied the poasibility of the existence of Arab nationalism as an independ- `
ent movement.
The "vacuum theory" s~rved, firat, as substantiation of the United States'
expansionist plans and, aecond, as a juatification For iCs policy aimed at the
liquidation of the independent countries of the East championing the prin-
ciple of positive neutrality.
Although the U.S. President's message Co the Congreas contained no direct
references to the "vacuum theory," the American press neverthelees assid-
uously propagandized the EiaenhoWer doctrine, proceeding preciaely from
this theory. One of the doctrine's principal authors--John Foater Dulles--
alno provided the appropriate clarificaQi,ans. Qn 15 .Tanuary 1957, to a ques-
tion from Senaror Mnnsfield as to Whether the Eizenhower doctrine could be
considered the culminating point of American foreign policy after which there
would remain no single "vacuum" with the exception, perhaps, of the "va~uums"
in India c~nd Burma, Dullea replied: "Possibly, yesl"
ilowever, literally 2 months after the adoption of the doctrine, American
_ politicians were forced to huah up the "vacuum theory." Moreover, phrases
to the effect tha[ the United States was not attempting to fill any "vacuum"
became rou[ine in joint comnun3ques eigned by J. Richards, special repre-
- sentative of the U.S. President, and ti~e governments of certain Near East
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cnuntri,eg. Thig AmeriCan politicql figure, whose misgir,n wag to pErguade
_ th~ Near Cagt st~Ce~ to nddpt the ~igenhower doct:rine, publicly re3ected
tl~e "vacuum theo:y" n.vcn in l~~s intervieag. ~rank di~cug~ion of the "vgcuum
theory" elso t~~came cxer~mely unpopulctr in tl~e Am~rican pr~gs.
?n proclniming ti~e cloctrine American politicians ltttd ~~i1ed to tnke into
c mgider~tion the gerength and sc~le of negative reaction in the Arnb
countrieg. The "v~cuum theory," which w~g an insult to the Arab people's
national dignity, elicited the strnngese opposition. 5tnt~emen ~nd public
figureg di the ma~oriey o! Arab states spoke out ~gainst it. "We do not
~pr~~ with the West's idea oP the exist~nce of a'vacuum' in the Near and
Middle ~aet," ~gyptian pr~siden Jamal 'Abd al-Na~ir declared. "Thig idea
_ presuppogen th~t auch t~ 'vacuum' should be filled by th~ Wegtern Cduntries.
13~t we will fill it ourgelvea. Or, rath~r, we ltgve fi11~d it durgelves."
A cli~racteri~tic peculiarity of the Eisenhower doctrine was its distinction
- from the militgry commitmentis which the UniCed 5tate~ had sgsumed or pro-
posed that its ~uropean ,alliea assume in cottnection with the various plans
of ti~e creation of militE?ry bloca in the Near ~agt. It was then a question
of "defending" the region against the threat allegedly emanating from the
5oviet Union. Now, according Co the ~isenhower doccrine, the United 5tates
liad announced ita guaranteea of Che aecurity of "nll nations" of this region _
against nttack by countrie~ under "the control of intern~tional communigm."
tt w~~s perfectly clear that there had been a tilt toward the direct uge of
. inter-Arnb conflicts as grounds for American armed intervention. In this
p1.3ne the Eisenhower doctrine Was the firat time that the United 5tates h~d
~ormulated n means of the exploitation in American interestg not dnly of
the Arnb--Israeli but algo of nll other local Conflictg in the Near ~agt.
This also became apparent from the explanations made by American official
bodies, particularly in the countries which by that time had already been
incorporated in military bloca.
(?n 23 January 1957, for example, the Information Bureau of the American
i;mbassy in Tehran published in the lacal press replies to questions con-
cerning the ~isenhower doctrine. To a question as to why the U.S. Admin- -
~c,t?~~iu~~ did not act Jirectly ti~e oureau declared that direct aceions
"would possibly not be succesaful": "the measures of the British and the
French directed against Egypt did not lead [o the fall of al-Nasir's
~ovcrronent."
The new American tactica of struggle against sovereign states in the Arab
I:r~st amounted to the following: an independenC Arab country is accused of
becomin~ a"Soviet satellite"; a version is spread to the effect that this
country is threa[ening its ncighhors. Thc next s[ep Kas to be geared to
tlie organization of a request to the United States for arned protection
of the neighbors of this "aggreasive" state, "which has come under the in-
fluence oP internationnl communism."
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A ~Itpll.nrl.fvc Prnturr. 01' t1~r Amrrir.ctn linr_ zeElrCtecl ~.n the t.:i~t!nhowrr clar~
tr.ine wa~ n1.~d the ~erep~ put an th~ util.iz~tinn agnin~t revnlurian~ry trendg
in the Argb Woxld not only and, pd~~ibly, at this eta~e not ~o mc~ch of Igrael
of the Arab and other Moslem regimes dependent on the United 5tate~. Ig-
rael, ahich hed comprornie~d itgel,f with it~ un~urce~sPul attnck on ~gypt and
hctving been compelled to release occupied Egypti~n lnnd, hgd to withdr~w
fdr ~ time, nlbeit a brief dne, from eti~ role nf main fnrc~ in th~ struggle
againet the al-Nagir regime and the antiMimperial3~t elemettt~ in other Arnb
coutttri~g which were grnvitnting toward ie. A n~w gnti-Ar~b activ~tidn of
Ierael immedi~Cely ~fter th~ ~'ailutre of the 5uez ~dventure--and Americsn
politicinng ~e~uld not have fui.led ta have been gware of thi~--was fraught
with the danger of a~trengthening end con~olidation of gll the anti-imperial--
- igt forces in the Arab world as ~ whole.
tt may be c~ngider~d that in 1957 5yria became the Pirgt "proving ground" -
in which the United 5tatee put its new Near ~ast t~etics t~ the tegt. Two
_ dII)?9 nfter the ~isenhower doctrine aas m~de public, a UPI ce~rregpondent trans-
mitted from Waehington: "5yrir~ is a fin~ example explaining why President
~isen}~ower hns put forward his new doctrine," and the observer H. Baldwitt,
who was well knpwn at that time, termed 5yria a politicttl, eeonomic, military
and psyct~ological "'vacuum' whicl~ should be filled" in an articl~ published
in the N~W YO~tK TIM~5 magazine a month after the adoption of the doctrine.
Now, when many yeara have elapeed since that time, it is aCill inCeresting
_ to eli~�it which of the processes in Syria's internal life were evaluated by
American politiciang as g threat to U.5. interesta.
At th~ t~me ~f t1~e 5uez aggreseion Che 5yriang blew up the oil pipeline from
Kirkuk to thp Mediterranean, alonR which floWed oil produced in Iraq by rhe
Americnn-Angln-~rench Iraq Petroleum Company. But thia occurred at a time
of an exacerbation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, when this had reached [he
crisis stage. The United States attempted to change the regime in Syria some
time after this. It was thus not a question of "forced actions" dictatea
by "a need to maintain the system of the supply of oil to the allies in West
Europe": the oil pipeline from Kirkuk had been restored by this time, and -
only n comparatively amall proportion of the oil exported from the Near ~ast
countries flowed along it; there were no actions againsC the pipeline be-
longiny to the American Tapline Company, along which oil from Saudia Arabia
wae carried to the Mediterranean. The blowing up of the pipeline strained
American policy toward Syria, in our opinion, but was not the main reason
for ics extreme nggravation.
The United 5tates could not t~ave been pleased by the decisiveness with which
the Syrian authorities reacted to the conspiratorial activity of [he Americ.an
Embassy in Damascus. On 22 August 1957 the chief of the Syrian Army General
Staff called a press conference at which he accused U.S. F~bassy officials
Fi. Stone, [A. Klouz] and F. Jetton of having connections with circles of the
ousted dictator al-Shishakli and of conspiring for the purpose of changing
the nature oP the Syrian regime by force. But all this was a reaction to
~ American policy and not the re~son for it.
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- Waahin~ton }igd publiCly declare.d that "communi~t element~" h~d gnitted t}ie
upper hand in the 5yrian regime ~ttd, i.n order to appear more cottvincing
(thie i~ ~till done at th~ presenk time in many Americr~n gtudies of that pe-
riod), claimed that the "communist" who occupied the po~t of chie~ nf the -
5yrian Army Get~er~l StafP had actually brought it under "communi~C eantrol,"
mhe 5yri~n repime in 145b~1957 Nas and remained bourgeois. A. I3izri, chief -
of the Ceneral 5ta�f of the 5yrian Army, was never a member of tlie Communiat
I'~~rty. Moreover, in a number o~ its actions both the gavernment ~nd the
army command occupied a p~sition opposp~i to the 5yrinn Communise p~rty,
which, ~ivett tte pog~ibilities, wag u~~ble to influence the cduntry's poliCy
to ~~ny definite extent. Cert~in o:P th~.:c in the 5yrian Government nt that
_ time like Foreign Mini~ter S. al-~itar, for example, Chen held openly anti-
co~uniat poaitione.
~inul.ly, thp AmericAn prese wrote that Washington feared Syria's r~pproche-
- ment with the 5oviet Union. Such a rapprochement ag the ob3eckive result
of 5yri~~'s anti-imperialist struggle undoubtedly occurred. But it did not
t;o beyond the traditionnl framework of relations which the SovieC Union
t~c~cl with many other nonaociAliat countries. In nny event, nnthing gave
~rounds fnr the ;,rovocative report which appeared in the NEW YORK TIME5 on
10 December 1956: "The United 5taCes is worried by the movement of commun-
ist troops through the straite and their landing in Syrian ports. -
The re~l reason which Eorced the American politicians to sharpen rheir Near
~~7st policy ageinst Syria at the very end of 1957 was the considerable
c~pprehenaiona which had been aroused in Washington by the processes whirh
had bep,un in ir.ter-Arab relations. ~gypt, which had emerged in prac[ice
- from the Suez trials as the victor and which, as a result of this, had won
enormoua authority in [he Arab people's masses, even in itself represented
a great anti-imperi~liat force in the Near ~ast. The circ2es formulating
U.S. policy saw an even greater danger in the revolutionary dynamism of
al-Nasir and, naturally, in the fact that Egypt was becoming a center of
attraction for other Arab statea. Arab unity in that period acquired a
clearly exrresaed anti-imperialist nature. Egypt's closest partner in
spirit, in the domestic policy it was pursuing and in its attitude toWard
- outside forces was Syria. A bridge was built between Cairo and Damascus. -
This bridge, in the event of its builders relying more on ob~ective pro-
cesses and taking better accounC oP local apecifics in these two Arab coun-
tries, could also have been extended to certain other Arab capitals. This
threatened to change the appearance of ~he entire Arab world. The United
States resolved to undermine the Damascus foundation of the bridge of Arab
unity that was being erected immedia[ely after events had shown the stabil-
ity of President a1~Nasir's regime.
it is significant that nt the culminating point of the tension in American-
Syrir~n relations the llnited States slackened its pressure on Egypt. Every-
ching wns beinR done to slow down the trend toward unity betWeen them on
tlie b.~sis of common struggle a~ainst the West's imperialist policy. The
United States resumed the payment of a loan to Egypt on the basis of American
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technicnl ae~~,~tance which had been broken o~~ in November 1956 ~ttd relettsPd
~ome of the ~gyptian bank deposi.tg Nhich had been ,fr4z~n ~t the Cim~ of
_ ~gypt's nationalizat~,on o,~ thC Suez Canal Company. The pre~ident nf the
Internatinnnl nnnk for lteconetruction and Developmenr traveled Co Cgiro,
where talks wEre reoum~d ott th~ grant~ng o~ a loen en ~gypt Por ron~CrucCintt
di th~ A~w~n Dam. However, ne might fiave been fxpeceed, ehi~ trend of Ameri-
can policy in relation to ~gypt proved tempoz'~ryt it had pur~ly t~~Cicttl
funcCion~ and, moreover, ~ailed to elicit "stepe to meet the UniCed SCetes
hnlE-w~y" on ehe part o! al-Nt~~tr.
Thug Syrin became thp fir~t victim of the new American poliCy procl~imed in
- thp ~isenhoWer doctrine. The r�.ctiong againat 5yria were carried o~t in
nccordance with Che "scennrio" contained in the dactrine itself.
In the wake nf n loud propagnnda campaign, whoee purpoae wus to convince
public opinion that ~n independent Syrin wag a thrent to its neighbors~ a
special ~miasary--U.5. Assistant Secret~ry of State Lny Nettderson--lefC for
the Near ~ast. Judging by American pr~ss reports, he was entrusted with
prep~ring the ground for npplicntion of the Eisenhower doctrine ggginsC in-
dependent Syria. L. Henderson visited Syrin's neighboring counCries ~nd
h~d talks with the le~tderg of Lebanon, Jardan gnd Turkey nnd repres~ntatives
of traq. The gamble was that ttie neighboring countriea would off icially -
aCtest to the danger threatening them on the purt of Syria, which had al- ~
legedly become a"Soviet satellite." This would serve as grounde for ex-
tensive U.S. intervention on the oasis of the doctrine.
- It is perfectly clear that the United Stetee wiahed to obtain a request for
assistance primarily from the Arab countries bordering Syria. Appeals for
protection emanating preciaely from the Arab countries would have been more
convincing. At the same timet}te orgnnization of such a declaration would be
a serious blow to the trend of rapprochement among the Arab states, which
would afford the United States an opportunity to directl.y weaken the anti-
imperialisC foxces throughout the Arab world, which had be~n utilizing the
ob~ective procesa leading to Arab unity in the intereata of Che struggle
for liberation from foreign control.
The American politicians' assessments were mnnifestly unjuatified. King
5a'ud and Iraqi Premier al-Ayyubi visited Damascus, where the officially -
diapelled the rumors concerning t}~e danger allegedly emanating from Syria
whicl~ had been exaggerated by the United Sta[es. Moreover, King Sa'ud and
l�he Trc~qi premier declared t1~at they were ready to assiat "�raternal Syria'
in tlie event of aggression n~ainst it. Official figures in Lebanon and Jor-
dan ~ssociated themselves with these declarations. Thus those who, accord-
ing to the plans of the American politicians, Were to have helped in carry-
inR out the anti-Syrian plans came out ~ga~nst the United States at the most
decisive moment. This position oE the state leaders of all these countries -
W,1s predetermined by the profound process of state leaders of all these
countrica wAa predecermined by the profound process of the consolidation
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of the Areh peopleg whfch had d~v~loped paxttCUl~r1y ~nllowing the successes
of Che ~nti-imperialigt f~ree~ in ~gypt and which had not been properly taken
into congi~ernC~.nn by the authors o~ Che docerine.
tt w.~g precisely ~~s ehe r~sult o1` the development o.f Chis procegs ehat the
Unit~d 5t~te~ ~~i1ed to c~chieve even lormal approv~l of ehe ~isenhower doc- ,
trlne by any significant number of Arab gCntes. On1y three Arab counrri~s--
Irnq, Lebanon and Libya~--aith a total population ~t that time of 7.3 mil-
lion, which wAS lesg than 10 percent of th~ populaeion of the entire Arnb
world, officinlly addpted the ~ise:;.hower doctrine. It ie sigttificgnt that
the American poliCiei~ns 4ailed to impo:~e the dncerine ~ven on thoae Arab
countries which Were usually cnlled the United StaCea' frienda. It is per-
fectly obvious, for example, that the transmieters of ehe doctrine were
counting on auccese in 5audi Arabia. Moreover, J. lticharda, Che U.S. Presi-
d~nC~g specinl representative, who was sent to ehe Arab statea with the
_ a~signmenC of gigning 3oint etaC~ments on consenC tn ehe doctrin~, regarded
(as, moreov~:, did ehe overwhelming part o� Che Western press) the 5audi-
American communique signed in R3yadh as ~ document which legalized this -
country's adopCion of the Eiaenhowcr doctrine. This viewpoint was official-
ly repudiated by a 5 October 1957 statement of the Saudi Arabian Government
categorically denying the fact oP adoption of the ~isenhower doctrine.
In ~ddition, the events surrounding Syria showed that even Che Arab countries
whicti had officinlly agreed wiCh the American doctrine could not, under the
conditions of the growth of Arnb national self-awar.eness, be Che local found-
ation whose presence was esgenCinl for a struggle against independent Arab
~tates in accordance with the Eisenhower doctrine. In Iraq, in Lebnnon,
in LibyA the positions of the aupporters of the doctrine were highly un-
stable. It was opposed by a strong oppogition, which was winning increaging
support among the population. The Beirut correspondent of THE TIMES wrote
that doubts were increasing in Lebanon with r~spect to the advisability of _
government support for the Eisenhower doctrine. "The reference to inCer-
- nationul communism and the absence of any guarantees againat Israel in the
~oint statement" (the Aroerican-Lebanese co~unique eigned at the time of
Richards' visit--Ye. P.), THE TIME emphasized, "have provided the opposi-
- tion with an opportunity to perauade many people that the government has
involved them in an undesirable foreign pact." _
"The ~isenhower doctrine is approach~ng ita sunset," wa8 the conclueion drawn
by the i3ritish DAILY TELEGRAPH AND MORNING POST. "King Sa'ud, who gave it
- a cordial reception when it was explained to him by the President in Wash-
ington. is now making it understood that he will never associate himself
with it. Lebanon, which did this openly, now wishes to alter the wording, -
removing the re~erence to cmnmunism.... Iraq, although it has remained
solid c~ith the West against communism, is attempting to reassure...Syria."
It is in[eresting to note that this s[atement came from a paper which had
written back on 26 July 1957 that "the main succesa of the Eisenhower
doctrine lies in ~gypt's isolation."
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At the time of ~It~ Syriun event~ tt~e UniCed Stnees ~lso ~tCempted Co use non-
Ar~b countries in its own interest~--Turkish nggre~gi.ve circles were assigned
c~ hig role here. tlowever, yet another aerious obatacle, which hnd been under-
eptimated by the r.reatora o~ C}te doctrine, had arisen on ehe path of imple-
menCntion oE the plnng connected with Turkey.
In procl~iming the ~isenhower doctrine U.S, lead~ng ~igureg knew from the
' experience of the Suez crisis that ehe 5oviet Union and other socialist
Countriea would not remain on the eidelines in the event of the coloninl
- pawers' direct aggression against independene Arab counCries. However, the -
nuthors of the docCrine evidently imagined ehat they would succeed in neutrnl~
izing the nctions of the 5oviet Union under the new conditions, when ehe gam-
ble in the gtruggle agninst the independent Arab countries had been m~de
chiefly on a strike on the pnrt ot their neighbors, which were also Near ~ast
countries. These calculat3one were not ~ustified. The Soviet wnrning to Tur-
key's a~gressive circles left no doubt th~t they would not succeed in impnrt-
ing a local nature Co an anti-Syrinn action, while Che commitmenC of ~lmeri-
cnn troops to Syria would threaten an escalaCion of the conflict.
Tlie failure of the employment of the new American tacCics in relation to Syria
in 1957 predetermined the ahifting of cerCain accents in the policy of imple-
mentution of Che Eiaenhower doctrine. Thi~ became particularly dlear in cnn-
nection with the U.S. reacrion of tlie creacion in February 1958 of the United
Ar~1b Republic (UARj, which incor~~orated Egypt and Syrin. The United States -
made its aim that of surrounding this new state, which had sharply increased
_ the centripetal t~ndencies in th~ Arab world, with a kind of "cordon sanitaire."
~
Attempts to change the nature of power in both regions of the new state and
liquidate the anti-imperinlist direction in its foreign policy were, of course,
maintained here. But in connection with the Syrian failure the United States
still concentrated chiefly on strengthening those Arab regimes which at that
time were actual or potential allies for the ''zst. Here the United States
consid~ered ttie forces advocating various forms of all.iance with the UAR
the most ~langerous opponent uf these regimes. -
~ack in April 1957 the patrioric government headed by al-Nabulsi had been re-
moved from power in Jardan witli all-around U.S. support, including a show of
strength by the 6th ~leet, the direct participation of Mallory, the U.5. am-
bassador in Mvn.~n, and Military Attache Sweeney in the plot and the granting
of big funds in the form of "aid."
l:ven tl~e reactionary regime in Iraq became an ob~ect of American concern. The
clynnatic disagreements between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were lar~ely relaxed with
the participation of American diplomacy. A big role in the rapprachement of -
tlie two monarchies was played by the U.S. 5tate Department's organization of
= simul[aneous visit to the United States by KinR Sa'ud and the "strongman" in
Iraq--'Abd al-Ilah--the king's uncle. At the start of December 1957 Iraq's
Kin~; Paysal visited Suudi Arabia accompanied by 'Abd as~-Ilah.
31
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'Tt~e United 5taCes' official ~oinittg of the n~ghdnd PACe'g MiliCary CommiCtee
~erved Che purpose of strengthening tlie royal regime in Iraq. As hag alre~dy
heen g~id, the United Stntes had declined to associate itself with thig bloc~
which hnd ~cCunlly emer~ed on its initinrive. Wnshington hnd Curned down
ttumetoue requeetH from both Iinghdnd and London fnr direct U.S. p.7rtici~ntion:
ehc Amerlc~iny had no ~I�nce o[ "combining" Israel with Ar~b cnuntries in une
military bloc, but U.S. entry into n unified milie~ry a1li~nce with one oC
the parties to the conflict would, as American politicians emphasized, h~vc
tied their hands ~~nd diminished their opportunieies fur maneuver. However,
ar tt~e new stage, when the accent was being put on utilizing inter-Arab con-
trndictions in the interests of Americnri policy, the United SCntes, despite
isrlel's negative posiCion and, in consider~Cion of Chis position, sti11
declining to formally ~oin Che pnct, nevertheless officially ~oined the bloc's
_ m.lltt~ry org~nizr~tion--the Uc~ghdad Pact MiliCary CommiCtee.
- In mid-1958 the United Seatea cloaed the circle of uCilization of the mec}ian-
ism of the Cisenhower doctrine for the first time--U.S. marines were landed
in i.ebanor., where aC tl~at Cime a civil war wa~ underway between naCionalisC
forces ancl elements which gr~viCeted toward an alliunce with the West.
'Che situation in Lebanon became extremely exacerbated following the murder
o~~ 7 ht~y 1958 of the promin~nt Lebanese journalist-patriot Nasib al-Metni,
who tiad edited the newapaper TELEGRAPH, which had carried strongly-worded
exposures of Americ~n pnlicy in the Near ~ast. The Nationalist forces, which
were ~~tt~mpting to bar the pnth to pro-imperinlist reaction, which aspired,
- oper,~ting wiCh any menns, to impose Sham'un's presidency on the country for
:~ecdnd Cerm~ called for n~eneral strike on 10 May. The strike grew into