JPRS ID: 8350 TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN

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~3 ' MARCH i979 ' i OF ~
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JPRS L/8350
2? M~rch 1979
~ ~
T RANS lAT I ONS ON JAPAN
, (FOU~ 8/79)
U. S. ~OINT PUBI.ICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE `
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. NOTL�'
Jp[t5 publicuCion~ cont~hin information prim~rily from �oreign
n~wsp~pers, periodic~ls and books, buC ~lso from news agency
transmissions and bro~dcasCs. Materiale from foreign-lttng~~ge
sources are transl~eed; those from ~ngli.sh-language sources
~re transcribed or reprinCed, with the original phrasing nnd
other c~arncteristics retained.
~te~dlines, editorin; reporCs, ~nd material enclosed in brackeCs
(J ~re supplied bv Jpit5. Proceasing indic~tors such as (TexCJ
or (~xcerpt~ in thc first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how Che original informatiott was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- '
mation was sumrtwrized or extracted.
UnEamiliur names rendered pnonetically br transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark dnd enclosed in pa:entheses were not clenr in the
, original but have been supplied as appropri~7te in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originatc with the source. Times within items nre as
givcn by sourcc.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.5. Government. ~
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BIB~IOGRAPNIC DA1A 1~ Repon No. 2. Kccipienc'y Ar:ce~ei,>n Nu,
sMeer Jp~5 L/ 83S0
~~t e~n u tu e ~ S� cpoct rte
~ T~AN5LA'rI0N5 ON JApAN, (FOUO 8/79 ) 2 3 March .1.9 7�
6. ~
7, Author(t) 6. Per(orming Orgnaizrtion Repi.
No.
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Joinr I'ublications Research Service
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12 Sponiotiog Oc6~nisuioo Name ~od Addtea~ 13. Type of Heport bc Period
Coveted
Ae above
t~.
1S. Supplemeotuy Note�
16. Aburacts
The report contains presa and radio coverage on politicnl, economic, military,
sociological, scientific and technological developments. -
' 17. Kcy ~orda end Documeut Aoalyii~. 17a Deutipton
JAPAN
x Political and Sociological
~ Military
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x 5cience and Technology
176. Ideoeifiea/Open-Ended Term�
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JPRS L/8350
2 3 March 1.9 79
TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN
(FOUO 8/79). ~
~
CON1'ENTS PAG~
POLITICAL AND SOCIOIAGICAL
'SEKAI' Analy2es Fliture Course on Ohira Govern.ment
(Takao Iwami; SEKAI, Feb 79~ 1
Defense OPficials View Joint Naval Operations With United States
(YOt~v~z sx~?RT~rt, 8 Mar 79) 'r
Diet Masolution Within the Year ~Unavoid~able'
(Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI IaAII~Y NEWS, 21 F1eb 79) ~
flcperts To Stuc~y Bureaucratic Concegts �
(MAINICHI DAILY NE4lS, Feb 79} 12
SDF Planes Can Fire When Attacked
(ASAHI EVIIVIIVG NF~IS, 8 Mar ?9) 14
JSP Aima To Prevent Centrist-Conservative Coalition
- (ASAHI EVE~tING N~,WS, 7 1~sex ?9) 16
'YONB[kiI' on Criticism oP Ohira's Economic Policies
( Fdit ori al; T~ L1AII,Y YONQURI, 11 Mer ?9 ) . . � . . . . . . � . . . � . 17
Briefs
Fl~kuds. Deniea Retiring 19
ECONOI~C
Domestic Economi.c Activities Should Be F~cpanded
' (Editorial; MAIlVICHI DAILY NEWS, 13 Mar 79) 20
Government Approves Joint Economic Development of Siberia
( YONiIik~I SHINBiJN, 20 Jan 79 ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Japan To Flarther Ease bcchange Restrictions
(MAIl~IICHI L1AII,Y NEWS, 2 N~r 79) 24
' a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) ~Be
Labor Is Expected To Dema.nd More Money
(Editorial; NIAINICffi I~AILY N'Et~13, 23 Feb 79) 27
~ Doubts Linger on N.PT Procurenent
(Takao Oshiyam~.; MAIMCHI DAILY NEWS, 29 Feb 79) 29
~MASNICHI' Fditorial Rape U.S. for Ita Demand on Ni'T
(Editorial.; r~an~rcffi n~zr rrEws, i r~s 79) � ~ � � � ~ � � 33
_ Shippin Firms Plan Experimental China Sailings
~r~anJic~ ~rzY r~as, io r~r 79 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6
Top Businesemen View PRC Contract Suapensiona
(THE DA?S,Y YOMI~I, 7~ 79) 37
Briefs
Surplus Mu~t Be Cut 39
SCIII~iCE AND TECHNOIAGY
1Vucle~.r Diergy Policy Places Emphasis on ~Zture
(Editorial; MAIl~IICSI DAII,Y NEWS, ~ 7 Feb 79) 40
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAI~
'SEKAI' ANALYZES ~'UTURE COURSE OF OH~RA COVERNMENT
Tokyo 5EKAI in Japanese Feb 79 pp 264-268
LArticle by Takao Iwami: "Politics '79: The Future Course of Ohira's
Shi?~ of State"/
/Text/ Support - 42 percent
The popularity of a prime minister at the outset of his political power is
governed greatly by his character. According to a survey by rhe ASAHI
SHINBUN right after the formation of the Ohira cabinet, support for the
new government was 42 percent, which is high compared to the aiiministrations
of Kishi and Fukuda at their outset, which had 33 percent and 28 percent
respectively, and low compare3 to Ikeda's 51 percent, Sato's 47 percent,
Tanaka's 62 percent and Miki's 45 percent. This tigure is probably quite
fitting for Ohira, who is unobtrusive, lacking in farcefulness and does not
inspire too many expectations, but at the same time has a'personality that
manifests no sense of insecurity.
In Ohira's case, he did not have the media campaign that applauded Kakuei ~
Tanaka as "the emerging leader of the masses," or the "low posture" ploy
of Hayato Ikeda that developed in the turbulent period following the U.S.-
.Japan 5ecurity Treaty struggle of 1960. On the other hand, he is far
removed from the villainous i~r~age surrouding Takeo Fukuda after he frantically
sought to bring down the Miki govPrnment, and has begun his administra~ion
on a safe, even keel. For an operation by Ohira, who has established
himself as a coiner of new�phrases, the lackluster slogan "Trust and
Consensus" characterizes the uneventful change in administration that took
place in an atmosphere of economic uncertainty.
If e+e force a c~mparison, Ohira's debut resembles a transfer of power that
is close to the fixed path followed from Ikeda to Eisaku Sat'o. Also,'
"After Fukuda, Ohira" became the common opinion in government circles quite
early; what remained was merely the timing of the succession. This also
closely resembles the point that party members of the same cliques participated
in the struggle in the form of "patrons," i.e., Ichiro Kuwano for Sato,
and Yasuhiro Nakasone for Ohira.
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~Ok O~FICiAf, U51: (1NI~Y
[f Uhtra hn~ any etrong poi.nt, it is thut he ~ained contral by un election
based on direct p~rticipation in voting (primxry election of prime miniyter
candidates) by party members and aupporters numbering 1,SOO,OOG. The election
was cnrried out experimentally by Che Liberal DemocraCic Party (LDP) and
fre-~d the elecCion from the conventional backrnom, financially backed power
struggle (general election of prime minister) carried out by members of the
Diet. Moreover, in this event, the general consensus of "Fukuda in first =
pl~ce" was upset, with the tables turned in favor of Ohira's victory.
While Takeo Miki and Takeo Fukuda both ~;ained power through very obscure
means, Ohira was able to make clear his ~ualifications for prime minister
by "number of votes" and was able to geC by witho!.it bein$ sti~matized by
_ financial power.
This good fortune is considered to have increased his support by several
percentage pointa, even if we subtract ths negative image he got from receiv-
ing the full aupport of "Lockheed" Tanaka.
"Relatively a Dove"
Last year, on 18 December only a few days after Ohira assumed the post of
prime minister, there was an incident in which he was attacked by rightwing
extremists aC the entrance to his official res{dence, but this had the effect
of further strengthening his image as "Ohira the Dove" which was the targeC
of the rightwingers. There was also the aspect that already, in the Ohira-
Fukuda struggle, Fukuda was repeatedly marked as a"hawk" and Ohira as a
"dove," and with Nakasone's ultra-hawkish declarations, the criticisms of
Ohira made Ohira's position appear more dove-ish than necessary.
The criteria for distinguishing hawk from dove now have some obscure aspects,
but since Ohira entered politics (first elected to the lower house in
October 1952), if we look back at his political behavoir over what amounts
to almost 30 years, we cannot say definitely that he has been a dove, but
that he has pursued a conservative, orthodox path that cannot be termed
either dove or hawk. There are some LDP members of the Diet who say "Fukuda
is on the right, Miki on the left, and Ohira and Nakasone in the middle"
but compared to Fukuda and Nakasone, Ohira, relatively speaking, can probably
be called a dove.
The Trademark of Ohira's Politics ~
If we further analyze the merit of Ohira's ~olitice as thus defined, we can
say that he is more a dove in style than a~.iove in policy matters.
In }iis first news conference after assuming the post af prime minister
(8 December) Ohira was asked about the direction of his government, to which
he replied "We must not have a government that merely depends on power. I
consider of utmost importance a government that unites with the people and
shares their bitter medicine. Secondly, we must frown on a government that
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disseminatea optimistic dreama among the people. At the same time, T don't -
wunt Ct~e people to have excesaive expectations from the gnvernment. I a~ish
to say that if both understand each other it ia possible to have a fruitful
government." He added, "We have ~ust about reached a consenaus on a free
market economy and a framework for guaranteeing aecurity. I wish to exp~nd
the framework of thia consensus, follow and respect the maCUring situation
and steer the helm of government oi~ a course that does not deviaCe from this.
In so doing, we can naturally avoid those conflicts that leave no room far
compromiye. The people have also matured politically. The government should
not fall behind in this respect."
In this statement the basic concepts of Ohira's politics are rather clearly
spelled out. Previously, Ohira criticized Fukuda's politics as benC on
power. But what Ohira is aiming at is a principle of "tempered dialog" which
is the opposite of an oppressive authoritarianism. The ideology of partial
alliances that has alresdy become the trademark of Ohira's politics is a
concept of the same type, is a technique for running the Diet based on
' [horough discussion with the opposition, and can be called a practicial
method of dealing with the opposition, when evenly matched witih it, in which,
under certain conditions, a temporary alliance is formed with a particular
opposition party.
"While Looking Below"
A similar nuance also appeared openly in his views on defining the rate of
economic growth that he gave at his first press conference. Unlike Fukuda,
who continued to adhere to achieving a growth rate ob~ective, Ohira commented,
"To establish a level of economic ac[ivity is a method followed in every
country and each has had its own reasons. However, the macro and micro levels
have become separated and follow their own courses. It becomes a problem of
which course to follow: to walk whiYe Iooking down or while looking up.
Whether dealing with depression or unemployment problems, shouldn't we be
looking downward in considerable measure, seriously considering microeconomic
countermeasures and then as a result attempt to determine what the gr~wth
rate should be? Isn't i.t a fact that to preestablish a rate of growth and
take all sorts of steps to achieve it is an approach that, in the midst of
_ instabili~y of economic conditions at home and abroad, does not follow reality?"
Whether we call it an ideology of "microism," of "looking downward," or a
course of following dialog, it is dove-ish as a political technique. Ohira
claims, "just as my face is different from that of Yrime Minister Fukuda, my
political methods also differ somewhat. Fukuda practiced politics that were
faithful to his own character, and I will practice what suits my own nature,"
and he appears to be conaciously gaining reputation for an image that is the
reverse of Fukuda's politics, which gave the authoritative impression of a
macro ideology.
WEAKNESSES
}iowever, a weakness of Ohira's dove-ish methods is that they are remote from
a reformist administration and tend to maintain the status quo. In the debate
about emergency legislative action, Ohira's position was negativistic, i.e.,
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it was noC opposed ~,n principle but ~uggested that matters could be ~olved
under exisC~.ng regulations concerning Che Self-Defense Forces. It is fully
possible to imaglne that when faced with difficulties, th~ Ohira adminiatra-
tion wi11 adopt an evasive posture, and symptons of this are already in
evidence. WiCh regard to problems which require bold changes and revisions,
such as ~orrecCittg the unfair tax system and ndministrative reforms, which
call for considerable energy and leadership, the reacCion of the new adminis-
eration h~s been sluggish. Ohira's philosophy is "making haste slowly," but
such procedures become associated w:ith roundabout pulitics, and if they serve
to slow down the ability to move forwaru an administrative problems, Ohira's
government is sure to end up lacking tn attractiveness.
Amnng the items mentioned as policy ob~ecCives there have been more than a
few notable ones, but one that especially merits attention is the rural
cities concept. It is described only abstractly in his 1 December press
conference immediately after assuming the position of prime minister: "The
policies which have been carried out at present during the fluctuation of
the high growth reCe period have necessarily been haphazard. Now the high
growth period is over, the large movement of the populati~n into the cities
has ended and has partially resulted in a U-turn. It is r~~.~~.a time to recon-
sider the dispostion of past policy and to work towards creating comf~~rtable
living space in the regional areas." This contains Ohira's idea for tlle
reconstruction of Japan, and the idea of locally-based power formg its -
nucleus.
IE, as the concept is given to us, limitations are placed on the administrative _
~ power that is now centrally concentrated, its functions are entrusted to
local regions. The responsibilities for taxation, public works, welfare,
education and culture are distributed on a large scale to local autonomous
bodies, and regional cities of 200,000 to 300,000 people given a high level
of autonomy are distributed.throughout the country. This will be establish-
ing a revolutionary goal and be the forerunner of a"period of regionalism"
based on conservatism.
However, at present we can only say that it is unknown whether the Ohira
administrati~n happe~is to have the powerful political leadership necessary
to nake such a grand scheme materialize, and that if it fails it will become
a minus to the administration.
A Long Administration?
The distinctiveness and direction of the Ohira administration have not yet
clearly emerged, but regarding its life, there has from the beginning been
talk of its lasting a long time. The reasons for anticipating a long term
include: (1) he is the last of th~ "Big Four" (Miki, Tanaka, Fukuda, Ohira)
and has no strong rivals; (2) Ohira has excellent ~olitical techniques for
avoiding crises; and (3) by the time of the next general elections 2 years
hence, it will be necessary to "digest" three nationwide elections, including
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a unitifed r~giongl elecCion~ and electiona Co both housea of Che UieC,
_ but the LDP ia expected to put up a good �ight, riding on the wave of a
revival of conservatiam, and if Chey do, this will have the effect of laying
the groundwork for Ohira's reelection.
Whether or not it wi11 last for a long period, at any rate the chances are
great that he will have power for two terms, or 4 years. However, while he
seems to be blessed with the chf~nces for a long administration, it is diffi-
� cult to say that Ohira's power within the LUP is a11 that aCable. Although
at present one cannot find any factions that have declared open opposition
to Ohira, it is also certain the conditions exiat for an anti-Ohira flareup
wiChin Che party.
The firat factor to cause a union against Ohira would be the deep relationship
with the Tanaka faction that supports Ohira's power, and clues to Chis became
~ apparent in the personnel shakeup that occurred when Ohira seC out to form
his new administation.
Ohira's personnel affairs were forced to a dangerous start as he was pressed
to make a change in the selection of the pivotal post of secretary general. -
It was thought in the beginning that the higi~est cadre in the Ohira faction,
Yoshiyuki Suzuki, naturally would assume thP secretary generalshi.p, but
- first the Fukuda faction rejected him, giving the reason that "Suzuki is a
personality that is very close to Kauei Tanaka," and as result of the Nakasone
and Miki factions behaving in the same vein, the trend for development of -
a Fukuda-Nakasone-Miki alliance against Ohira and Tanaka grew stronger.
Moreover, the "Suzuki Re~ection" brought about various ripple effects
inside and outside of the LDP and Ohira, who was now in a dilemma, had to
drop Suzuki and switch to Kuniyoshi Saito, an unexpected person.
War of the Young and the Old _
The first personnel setback shows that the undercurrent against Ohira and
Tanaka is quite deep. The Tanaka faction, which was a driving force in the
election of Ohira, naturally insisted on Suzuki for secretary general,
exercising their strong voice, but they realized from conditions within
the party that it was futile and consented to a switch away from Suzuki.
This lends teatimony to the fact that factions had, to this extent, developed
in the party which would not permit the Tanaka faction to have its own
way.
With Ohira being the last of the "Big Four" to come up to bat, the faction
situa[ion within the LDP has entered a period of reshuffling. Aside from
Ohira's ruling faction and the Tanaka f.3ction which continues to maintain
controlling power, the changing of hands in the Fukuda and Miki factions is
continuing and the situation inside the vakasone faction is not stable. In
o;.her words, this is a chance for a rejuvenation of the leadership stratum
of the LDP, and a pattern has become evident here and there of a conflict
between the young and the old.
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~'rom now on, movements of the new power groups ~f Toshio Kawamoto (Miki _
fACtion)~ Shintaro Abe (Fukuda faction), Ichiroo Nakagawa (5eirankai),
Kiichi Miynzawa (Ohira faction), and Tokusaburo Kosnka (no faction) will
become active, which will probably bring about a change in alinements
including all the inCermediate factions. In Che presence of such fludity
it is apparently a fact Chat Tanaka, whiYe becoming alarmed at anti-Tanaka
Eeelings within the party, is seriously planning a strategy for a return
to power.
"'rhe Revivor of Conservatism"
pespite Che appearance of trnnquility within Ohira's LDP, under Che surface
we should be able Co'discern an increase in dissatisfaction growing daily.
In particular, we can say thaC it is inevitable thaC the hawkish political
forces formed from the Kishi-Fukuda-Abe-Nakagawa groups will move to establish
g~al posts in 1979-80 anci consolidate forces in order to strengthen their
poseure of confrontation against the Ohira regime on the issues of diplomacy �
and defense.
We can say that the period will soon beg3n when "Ohira the dove" will be
faced with the serious choice of either pursuing the dove faction line or
following the path of harmonizing the party thxough compromise. Secretary -
Yano of the Komeito has not concealed his reservations and distrusC of
Ohira, saying that the opposition parties will ~oin together and "it is clear
that the posture which on firat appearance is that of a dove will eventually
reveal its true colors out of deference to the hawks within the party."
Since this also is symptomatic of the dilemma in Ohira's power, the path of
the new administration is not an even o~te. Ohira has taken over the role -
as "Revivor of Conservatism" that Fukuda ~,~as ur.,able to play out ar.d it is
certain that he embraces the ambition to sCrerigthen the foundation for a
long term of office. His weathering the storm of the unified local elections
in April is one milestone for this. But if ~hira attempts tlTe trick of
trying to wln by leaving his political posture vague, this will probably
provc to be the dangerous bet that it is.
COPYRIGHT: Iwanami Shoten 1979
609 3
CSO: 4105
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOCICAL ,
DEFENSE OFFICIALS VIFW JOINT NAVAL OPERATIONS WITH UNITED STATES
Tokyo YOMIURI SHINBUN in Japanesa $ Mar 79 i~,rning Euition p 2 OW
[TextJ Director Ceneral of the Defence Agency Yamashita, testifying before.
the House of Representativea Budget Cormni~ttee on 7 March, declared th~at
"our country is barred from engaging in a collective act for self-deiense.
When it exercises the right of self-defense, it will always be on an indi-
vidual basis." Yamashita was explaining the adminisCration's position
regarding the conduc~ of joint operations between the Japanese Maritime
Self-defense Force [MSDF] and the U.S. Navy based on the "Guidelines for
Japan-U.S. defense cooperation" (agreed on by the Japanese and U.S. rn-
ments on 28 November 1978). -
Elaborating further on the sub~ect, Hara, chief of the Defense Bureau of the
Defense Agency., told the committee: 1) That in the event of an armed
attack on our country, MSDF ships will independently attack enemy submarines
spotted in our waters regardless of the presence of U.S. warships in the
- vicinity; and 2) That if U.S, warships should happen to be in the vicinity
during such an attack, and if enemy submarines are desrroyed in such attacks,
as a result the U.S, ships, roo, would be protected but the action of the
MSDF ~hips itself is within the bound of the individual se~lf-defense right.
The testimonies by Yamashita and Hara expressed the ad:~inistration'~ ~iew
that Japan would expect U.S. aarships to go along wiL�h MSDF ships and join
- in t}ie attack on enemy submarines (~r other warshils) under such circum-
stances on the basis of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. They revea'.ed a
firm line that "even in the event of an individual exercise of the self -
defense right by our country, it is possible for Japanese and U.S. warships
to launch ~oint operations against the same target."
Their testimonies were in reply to questions raised by Iwao Teram3e of the
JCP. Teramae, noting a~oint exercise held in mid-February near Okinawa,
_ by MSDF ships and a group of U,S. war vessels, including aircraft carrier
"Midway" of the 7th Fleet, maintained that "the Japanese and U.S. ships
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in th~ exerci~e r.onk the form~tion of jointly providing protectidn for the
USS Midw~y. T;~e 'g~idelineg f~r. Ja~an-U,S. defense cooperaeion' ~1sn
r~fer ro ~oint dpbratidng betw~~n M5U~ ghipg ~nd U.S. wgrehips." H~ Chc~n
~~sked the qu~geidn "Dneg ndti guch protecCion giv~n U~5. w~r~hip~ by MSD~
yhip~s ~~nnHtitui:e a~atl~Ctivu rx~rci~e nf Kclf-defcnse rights7"
In tha ragt, tiie govcrnmanc had avoided to u~e nn ~xpression which might
br int:erpreted ~s implyin~ direct "milit~ry op~r~Cions" iri Uiet Cestimnnies
daaling ~o,'.th ,1~p~in-U.5. ~oint operation~ ba$ed ot? nrci~le 5 of Che Jnpari-
- U.5. 5ecurir.~ TreaCy, p~rticularly a~oint action invdlving Japanese nnd
~ U.5, warship~.
COI'YEtIGN'C: Yomiuri 5hinbu~sh~ 1979
C5U: 4105
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poL-rrzca~ axn aocr~~LOarc~w
UI~T DISSOLUTION WITHIN T~1E YEAIt 'UNAVOIUABLE'
'Tokyo MAINICNI DAILY NEWS in ~nglish 21 ~eb 79 p 3
~NagaCncho Doinge column by Ta!~ehiko Takahashi: "Cloomy Atmosphere
Centering on raik of DiQt Dissolution")
ITextl The investigation of the truth in the McDonnell Douglas and
Grummgn cases has paesed one peak with the aum:noning of �ritnesaea for
two dnys by the budget comaittee of the House of Representatives.
~ollowing the testimony of the witnesses, the budget committee has
decided to seek an appraisal of the handwriting on the so-called "Kaifu
Memos" involving Nachiro Kaifu, vice president of Nissho-Iwai Co. and to
prosecute Kunio Arimori, former employee of Niasho-Iwai, for refusing to
testify. Thp Diet de~iberationg on the McDonnell Louglas and Gruaman
c~ses are likely to contittue briskly.
To what extent will the Mcbonnell Douglas and Gru~an cases affect tt~e
political situation? This is a big problem. Prime Minister Masayoshi
Ohira has atated that, depending on how this problem develops, he will
- "assume political reaponsibiliCy."
This hns led to the sudden appearance of u theory that thc House of
ttepresentatives might be dissolved. The commonsense interpretation of
"taking reaponsibility" is to resign. But that does not seem Co be what
thc prime miniater is saying. What he will seek is "3udgment anew by
Che people."
This is bec~use he has only recently assumed the premiership as the
result of the party presidential election. It is unlikely, it is said,
that fie will take political responsibility and resign over a case that
does not involve him directly.
_I
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~Ott d~t~ICIAL U5~ nNLY
Gdnd Et~~~nn~
N~v~rth~l~ee, there ar.c certgin factorg thae mnkc it almnst impcr~Give e~
di~enlva th~ Hnuge of Ftapr~gent~tiveg ~nd hold ~ g~n~r~l ~lectian b~fdr~
nutumn. Among them ar~;
1. Thig nuCumn will m~rk the pB~g~$p of three yearg ginCe the 1~~e g~n~r~l
~lection of Che Houge of It~preg~ntativeg. Ac~arding Cd pBgC ~x~mple~, Chp
time for ~ Di~t di~~olution ae~m~ to b~: ripening.
2. A gencrgl excise tax ig scheduled w be intrnduc~d nexr yegr. 'i'here
is strong ~ppogition to thi~. It wc~uld b~ mnre gdvantageoue for Che
Lib~ral-D~mocretic Party to hold a general election before the inCroduction
of thig C~c.
3. The House nf Counsellorg election will take plgce next year. Prime
Minister Ohira onc~ had the iden th~t halding ehe el~ctinne nf the Kouge
uf Counaellore and the Houge of Repregentativeg gimultaneously would be a
good policy for the LBP but there ie ~ome doubt whether this ia poeaible
. from the conetiCutional gtandpoint. If in order to avoi~i this, thc Houge
of Etepresentatives election were to be held aftQr that of the ktouse nf
Counsellors, Chat would come iamnediately before the ~.Up presidential
election. Opposition ie likely to arise frnm within the party.
' 4. When domeati~ and international conditi,vns are taken into considergtion,
� there ia ct atrong likelihood of the political situation becoming mnre
unf~voxable for the government and the LUP next yenr when campared with
this year. IC would be better to hold a general election before the
situation aggravates~
Tanaka'a Urging
In addition, an influential member of the LDP (belonging to an antimainstream
- faction) tias this to say: "The verdict in the firat trial of the Lockheed
case is likely to be handed down next spcing. There is strong possibility
that former Prime Minister K;kuei Tanaka, who is Ohira's powerful supporter,
will be found guilty. Tanaka ia likely to urge Ohira strongly to hold a
gEneral election before such a'guilty' verdict is handed down. Therefore,
a dissolution of the House of Representatives and general election within
. this year, particularly in autumn, t~rill be unavoidable."
This is Tanaka's personal reason. But when one thinks of the relationship
between Tanak~ and Ohira, and thc solidaxity of the Tanaka faction within
the LDE', there is every possibility of this becoming the key in the decision
to dissolve the Housc of Representatives.
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Udth ehe Ohirg and Fukuda factinns hgva alr~ady g~t up headqu~rt~rs fdr
elecCion counCerm~asur~g. The Tan~ka faceion hae gl~o zac~nCly d~Cided
ed c~g~abli~h an ~tecCion cnuntermc~asurne committ~~. Su~umu Nik~idn has ~
be~n ~~1~ceed ~g Che rhairm~n of thgt co~nittee, with Noboru Takeshita
es vice chai~an ~nd ~ateuo Oxawe ge secreCary gener~,l.
tt wgs zenko 5uzuki of the Ohira facrion whd firgt broached Che aub~ect
of a Uiet die~olution. (prim~ MinieCer Ohira wanCed to appoint Suzuki
ag chief cabinet gpcretary but thi~ w~e not realized due t~ oppoaiCion
by th~ ~ukuda faction).
R~actinn to Che Suzuki ataten~ent wa~ go great that the Ohire faction ie
trying rn deny it by d~claring that "an easygoing mood exiata within the
faction that the Ohire administration will be of long duraCion. It was
in order tn pull the �gctinn tdg~ther Chat Suzuki gpoke as he did. Prime
Minister Ohira ie not nec~g~arily thinking abouC g Diet digaoluCion."
It i~ generally said that a general elec,tion too soon after the unified
local el~ctions in April would be unfavorable for t~z LUP. If a aix-
monCh interim can be regarded gs being suituble, Chc gtrong poesibility
existg of a disaolution being carried out during the extraoa~dinsry Diet
session thia coming autumn.
At the same time, depending c~n how the McDonnell Douglas and Grummas~ case
develops, it may not be possible to wait until then. After the clase of
the Tokyo Sumnit, the political world will probably enter an emergency
period in which there is no telling when a Diet disaolution might suddenly
take place.
(The writer is an adviser to the Mainichi NeWapapers and former chief
editorial writer). _
COPYRIGHT: M8lnichi Daily News, 197~
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f'OLYfI'ICAL AND SOCIOLO(iICAL
~XY~EtTS TO STUUY 9UR~AUCKATiC CONC~PT5
Tokyn MAINICNI DAILY N~WS in English 74 Feb 79
~Text1 Prime Minieter Mnsoyoshi Ohira will organize nine brain trusts of ~
some 200 scholare and officials by April to give shape Co the politicgl
vision of "a natinn of garden cities" and "an era of culture" which he
~ gtressed l~at month in hia firsC policy speech as prime minister. _
Ohira's approach contr~ats with that of his predeceasor, Takeo Fukuda, who
anawered the quesCion, "who is your brain truat?" by saying, 'Snyself."
Ohira's plan mgy come from the advice of those close to him th~t the new
prime minister must slough off conventional bureaucratic concepts as an era
of high economic growth gives way to an age of low growth.
Ohira is expected to stress efficient use of fresh atinds to strip government
policies of conservative bureaucratic ideas.
The third such brain trust, "the group to study living concerns in a
pluralized society," establiahed Wednesday, holds its first meeting Saturday.
}leaded by Chikio Hayashi~ chief of the Education Ministry's statistical
resenrcti center, is co~posed of 19 experts including sociologists, psychol-
ogists and statisticians who will mainly atudy ways to translate statisticg
on social trends into policies for Ohira.
"The group to study a plan for garden cities," headed by Tadao Umezao,
directdr of the National Ethnology Museum, and "the group to study overseas
economic policies," headed by Prof. Tadao Uchica of Tokyo University, have
already started research into their themes.
All the brain trusters graduated from university during 1955-1964 or are -
persons of equal age.
Ol~ir.z evidently feared that free discussions might b~~ impossible if all
gr~up members were of senior stature.
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n:
In thc H~iccrtcm~ tli~, rrime minietrr'~ aidee n1H~~ rnnpi~lr.rr~l krnpinK n
I~nl~iiu~n l,u~wuun ~li~: 1~te+uiLbm ul ehu lnrc+ll~ntuald und Ciie reuliem nf the
o;C[icials. ~
By the middle of March, two more groups--one ro study the promotion ot what
Ohiru c~lls "pan-pacific cooperaCion" and the other to sCudy ways to consol-
idate "the foundation of Che family" are to seart rheir research.
Besid~s Chese five groups, four more are Co be organized. One of them is
"the group to study an era of culture."
The oCher three are "the group to study economic man~gement in the era of
culture" and "khe group to gtudy g~neral security" which will take a new
look at Che economi.c aide of his fundamental concept, and "the group to
_ study the development of technology" to examine the future of the oaeans
and natural resources.
"The group to study the overseas economic policies" ia to complete an urgent
report on 3apan-U.S. economic relationa by Che end of March, and anoCher
report on a Tokyo summit conference by the end of May.
The other seven groups plan to compleCe their reports in June next year.
Those close to the prime minister plan to have the main members of each
group participate in the aciivities of the other to ad,just discusaions and
concluaions.
Ohira's posture of trying to listen to the broad opinions of knowledgeable
people would seem to have popular appeal.
But the "life cycle plan" of former Prime Minister Takeo Miki and "a blue-
print to raise useful citizens for the 21st century" by former Prime Minister
T.qkeo Fukuda ended up in smoke.
In any case, it will take quite a long time for the 200 brain trust members
to obtain results.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News, 1979
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POLITICAL AND 5UCIOLOGICAL
SDF PLANES CAN FTRE WHEN ATTACKED
Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English $ Mar 79 p 3 OW
('PextJ Self-defenae forces' planes can, under the SDF law, use arms when
attacked by foreign planes Chat invade Che Japanese territorial sky, accord-
ing Co the goverrunent.
Answering questions in the House of Representatives' budget committee on
Tuesd~y, senior officials of the cabinet legislaCion buresu and the defense
agency said that the uae of arms in such a siCuation can be considered a
"necessary measure" as stipulated in ArCicle 84 of the SDF Law. The
arCicle deals wiCh steps to be taken in the evenC of an aerial invasion.
Yukihisa Yoshida, a member of the Democratic Socialist Party, queationed
the legal basis of the defense agency's instructions that the use of arms
was one of four steps to be taken in the event of such an attack.
In reply, Atsuyuki Sasa, a defense agency counsellor, said that the "neces-
sary measures"�stipulated in Article 84 of the SDF Law means the SDF planes
that have scrambled are required to lead any foreign planes which violate
Japanese airspace to a nearby airport or to lead them out of Japanese air-
space us promptly as possible.
But, S~~sa continued, if the foreign planes should forcibly resist orders,
the SDF' planes are entitled to use arms.
Hideo Sanada, director of the cabinet legislation bureau, supported Sasa's
opinion.
The government had previously not had a uniform opinfon on whether these was
a le~al basis for the use of arms by SDF planes in the event of an attack.
Hiroomi Kurisu, a former chief of staff of the SDF, was forced to resign
last year after remarking that members of the SDF might be forced to take
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guprulegal ncCion in the event of a nationAl emergency due CO the inade~
qunCy o~ the SDF L~w. He was thought Cq have bee;l re~exxing to a c~ae
in t~hich SDF planea were aCCacked by invading planea~ ~
GOI'YEtICHT: ASAHI EVENING NEWS
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pOLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
JSP AIMS TO PREVENT CENTRZ5T-CONSERVATIVE COALITION
Tqkyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in Engliah 7 Mar 79 p 3 OW
(TextJ Ichio Asukata, chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, said on Monday
that he would adhere to the policy o~ preventing a coalition between the
conservatives and the middle-of-the-road forces.
. Speaking at a meeting of the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan in Tokyo,
Asukata criticized the Clean Government Party (Komeito) and the Democratic
- Socialist Parzy for revealing their intention of approving the government-
proposed budget draft for this year if "minor" changes were made.
Even though this atep did not bring about any agreement among the ruling
Liberal-Democratic Party and the two opposition parties, it is a matter
of grave imporCance which might create a new trend in politics here,
he said.
The two opposition parties were in danger of neglecting the people's dis-
saCisfaction with the governmenC draft budget by agreeing to such a compro-
mise, according to Asukatd.
In order to prevent the recvrrence of such an inatance, AsukaCa said the
JSP, as a No 1 opposition party, would strive to reinforce a joint opposi-
Cion front.
Asukata said he would try to form a joint opposition fron:.~ on every major
policy issue and to form such a front with as many opposition parties as ;
possible. He stressed that his party would behave as "an honorable
opposition party" until it comes to power.
On the Chinese-Vietnamese barder dispute, Asukata said he thought China
violated its five-point peace principle which it has long espoused.
COPYRIGHT: ASAHI EVENING NEWS
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~
= ~oR o~riciat, us~ ox~,Y
,
PdLITICAL AND SOCIOLOCICAL
, '
~YOMIURT~ ON CRITICISM OF OHIRA~S ECONOMIC POLICIES
Tokyo TH~ UAILY YOMTURI in English 11 Mar 79 p 2 OW
(Editorial: "Japan Under ACtack"]
[TextJ The implementation of Prime Minister Ohira's economic policies has
been criticized as contradictittg Japatt's promiae at the Bonn summit of
indusCrial nations last July, but ~udging from the recent atmosphere at
~he prov~,aional committee of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), such
r.xiticism aeema to be easing~ though voices can atill be heard calling on ~
.Tapan to open its doors to specific importa.
7.'he Japanese economy represents one-eighth of the entire global economy,
c:oming second in size after that of the tlnited States.
F'ormer Premier Takeo Fukucla was very eager to fulfill this country's respon-
sibilit~es in the world ecottomy, notably through his promise to achieve a
J~percent economic growth rate, but he overreached himself with this
promise, and Ohira had to withdraw from this position after he became
prime minister.
Need To Check Inflation
Ohira not only wanted to employ a different political style from that of his
predecessor, hut he also needed to bolster the deficit--ridden state revenues
und prevent a recurrence of inflation.
~oreign countries, however, seemed to thfnk he intended to renege on the
promige of international cooperation made at the Bonn summit and Ohira had
to take several measures to elim3nate such a misunderstanding, with
c~pparent success as the IMF provisional committee seems to be weakening
its criticism of Japan.
Tli~ members of the committee, however, were primarily concerned at ehe pros-
pects of oil price hikes in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and
their effects on the world economy.
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In such conditiona, J~pan's economic policies ~re sure eo ~ppear more ttppro-
priaCe, Chough more criticism can be expected aC the cpming Japar?^U~S~ ~nd
Tokyo summits~
Yressures To Open the Market
While Japnn's economic policies can be considered fairly success~ul, "here
is ~till the problem of Che prosaure on Japan from noC only the advanced _
nations of Europe and the United Statea '~ut also ehe developing countries
to open the Japbneae markeC Co a degree worthy of an economic power.
Given the slow tempo of the talks currenely under way with the United SCates,
_ it is quite possible ChaC Che U.S. Consress will pass a bilY imposing a
~ surcharge ~n Japanese products, which will severely damage U,S.-Japan
relations even Chough PresidenC Carter is expected Co veto it.
Premier Ohira has Erequently said that Japan,U.S. relations are the mainstay
oE his diplom~Cic policies, but his words and conduct regarding economic
11Uernlization are~ nevertheless~ greatly lacking in clarity and decisive-
_ 110SS.
Ohira must realize the differen~zs between a pan~l of international econo-
mists, who have cool heads and a respect for economic rationality, and
- the U.S. Congress, whose member: m~~st pay heed to their electorate and so _
are forced to att~ck Japan for the enormous Crade imbalance in the latter's
favor.
COPYRIGHT: THE DAILY YOMIURI .
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I'OLI'TICAL ANU SOCIOLOGICAL
BRIEFS
FUKUDA DENIES R~TIRING--Former Prime MinisCer Takeo Fukuda Monday seemed to
suggest that he would run in the presidential election of the Liberal-
Democr~tic Purty scheduled for nexC year. At a meeting held in a downtown
hotel in Tokyo the same day, Fukuda said the LDP needs to be reformed.
Referring to last year's election for the party presidency, he snid he did
not think he had been defeaCed by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in the
primary election. He explained that he stepped down from a run-off in the
election partly because he wished to avoid splitting the party. Fukuda
emphatically stated that he had not retired from political life. Observers
say this indicates Chat Fukuda may run in next yE~ar's LDP presidential race
if circumstances permit. Fukuda said that he hac tackled the issue of party
reform and that in order to be effective in this ~natter he would willingly
disband his party, if so doing was required. Fuku~a called for the aboli-
tion of party factions, the increase of parCy membership, placing party
f inances on a firm basis and the realization of a p~rty presidential
election wfth participation of all party members and associates. Ful~uda's
criticism against factions in his party at the Monday meeting followed his
implicit criticism against Prime Minister Ohira for his passive attitude
toward an effort to that end, which he made at his faction meeting on
20 February. [Text] [Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 2~i Feb 79 p 3 OW]
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~CONOMIC
DOMCSTIC ECONOMIC ACTTVITI~S SHOULD BE EXPANDED
Tokyo M1ITNICHI DAILY NEWS 3n Engltah 13 Mar 79 p 2 0~1
[Cditoriul: "Ad~usting to Econamic Upturn"J
(7'ext] Preliminary daCa published last week by the Economic Planning Agency
showed tt~a~ the gross national producr for the October-November 1978 period
rose At an appreciahle rate of 1~7 percent in real terms from the previou~ "
quarter, or an annual raCe of 7 percent.
The fourth-quart~r gain--a manifestation of rapidly progressing economic
recovery since in or around last November--fndicates that the nation's
economy has finally come out of the long recession,
- Despite Che encouraging fourth-quarter economic picture, the general vi~w
indicates the economy for fiscal 1978 as a whole will grow by 5.8 percent
at best, from the preceding year following rises of 1.0 percent and 0.8 per-
cent, respectively, in the April-June and July-September quarters of last
year.
The 5.8-percent rise, if it is to be so, falls short of growth targets the
government intended to attain in the current fiscal year. Japan "inter-
nationally pledged" 7 aercent growth at first, then the government r~vised
the goal downward Co 6 percent late last year.
- Wh~t ~~ppears to be government inadequacy in setting growCh goals may derive
from its efforts to avoid international criticiam for low growth, but it
may invite even harsher criticism from or.her countries. Notwithstanding,
it must be said that the ecot~omic outlook has obviously turned for the
better. -
This is because demand in t}:e private sector has become stronger, though
belatedly, as the prime mover for sustained recovery, In fiscal 1976 and
1977, increased exports alone, and increased exports and greater government
spending for pu~lic works projects combined, acted as the prlme movers of
the economy, respectively.
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Under the prev~iling circumsCances, policy emphas~,s is now shi�Ced to how _
tn expand domeatic demund on a steady basis. .
However, in step with the growing domastic demand, the naCinn's wholesale
prices, which had remained steady unt~l lust October, kept rising for
4 consecutive months since November.
Bank of Japan Gavernor Teiichiro Morinaga is reportedly in favor o.i inCYO-
- ducing a policy Co stabilize commodity prices, in preference to one that
puts emphasis on economic recovery. The government, on its part, has made -
knowtt iCs int~~ntion of pursuing a policy ~.haC has a dual purpose: pepp:Lng
up Che economy while stabilizing ~orices.
It appears reasonable for *.he Bank of Japan to seek a price stabilization
policy, if the economy is heading for custained recovery, because it is ~
Che bank's duty to stabilize the value of the currency~ On this score,
_ it seems the government's plan to seek economic recovery and price stabiliza-
eion slmultaneously requires that precise and detailed ^~easures br: worked out. -
OE the 0.9 percenC wholesale price rise tn February, incr~aases in imported
' crude oil prices and overseas commodity prices, especi:ily for nonEexrous
metals, and the recent drop in the yen's value against the dallar accounted
for 0.6 percent. The remain~ng 0.3 percent was due mainly to domestic price
increases.
As an immediaCe step, the goverrnnent fs strongly urged to seek discontinua-
tion of some antirecession cartels~-cartels which were approved as "emergency
~ measures" to prop up the economy,
The government is also urged to make greater efforts to remove possible
causes of infl~.tion in the arena of speculaCive investments, such as the
real estate field, through tightened monetary policies.
Also, it is �rged to place under stricter observation the price movements
- oC some imported agricultural and fishery products, like coffee and tuna
fish, which have seen import price declines that are not reflected in
lower domestic prices.
As for the "earlier-than-schedule" investments in the public works sector,
a government step aimed at bolstering a sagging economy, the government is
urged to adopt flexible policies, which include c'.elays in fund allocation,
if domestic demand continues to be strong.
We are now of the opinion that the government should make greater efforts to
expand domestic economic activities, while keeping prices at bay, as it appears
Chat the current price management policy is appropriate for the majority of
commodities.
COYYRICNT: Tlainichi Daily News, 1979
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~Oa d~~tCIAL U5~ dNLY
~CONnMIC
COV~RNMENT A~'p~OV~5 JOINT ~CONOMIC U~V~LOPM~NT d~ SIB~RIA
Tokyo YOMIURI SNIIvgUN in Japane~e 20 Jan 79 p 2
lT~xt/ Since rhe conc2usion of the Sino~-Japanes~ Tr~gty of p~ee~ nnd
~lmiey, the greateet ea~k facing the government has been tn improv~ reletiong
with the 5oviet Union. Th~ government has decided upon icg bagic co~~rse nf
~~c:[ion on thi.e issue end "wil.l adopt substnntive policieg to nwintain b~l~nce
hetween tt~e PRC and Soviet Union by re~ponding decigively to Soviet requests
for cooperation in the economic sector." Thie decieion was made in connec-
tion with the approach to be tnken in Prime Miniater Ohire'~ first speecti
on administrative policy to be given on 25 January. Sourceg very cloae to
~ the prime minister are saying, "Actual improvement in relations in the
economic sector will certainly heve a Eevorable effect on Japanese-Soviet
political and diplomatic relation~." These sources suggested that Japan
will take a fairly positive attitude toward Siberian development projecta
which the Soviet side will propose in the executive meeting of the Joint
Japane~e-Soviet Economic Commis~ion which opens in Tokyo on 25 February.
The Uhira cabinet's position is that if Japanese-Soviet relationg improve
steadily and Premier Kosygin's visit to Jnpan can be realized, then, from
- a long-rang~ perspec[ive, it might be ~:ossible to conclude a Japanese-Soviet
long-term trade agreement.
The question of Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation directed mainly at
5iberi~n development had become deadlocked becauae of the stringent conditions
advanced by the Soviec side. In addition, the Chinese side had been pro-
poaing l~rge-scale projects, one a:ter another, such as construction of the
5hangha i Saoshan steel plant, since the conclusion of the Sino-.tapanese
peace treaty. Consequently, the quescion of Japanese-Soviet economic coopera-
tion had paled as an isaue. As a result, relations between Japan and the
. Soviet Ur~ion have been less then ideal on the economic front as well as on
the political front.
However, because of the shock of normaii~eu 5ino-American relations and the
rapidly changing situa[ion in Camboida, even people within the Japaneae
c:overnmen[ are o: the opinion that from the vie~rpoint ..f stability in South-
east Asia, it is necessary to take ~~no[her look at the onc-sided tilt
toward the PRC. `
22
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t~'OK n~l~'ICIAL 115~ ONLY
- I~'urth~rmdre, in g conv~r~gtidn an lb January, ~'areign Minigeer Sandd~
~~dmoni~hed ~hineg~ Amb~g~ndnr to Jnp~n ~u H~o ~bout ~ny ~ninr 5inaaJap~tteae
action nn the Cambodian digpuCe by t~lling him th~C "Jgp~n wi11 d~cide it~
oppogition Co h~gemony in g~Cerdnnce with itg awn independent fdrei~n ~dliay,"
'Che $nviet ~ide ~nnounced thnt it wel~omed thig dcti~n. This w~s the firet
thing ginc~ con~lugidn of ehp Sinn~J~panese tre~Cy ~baut which th~ Soviet
~aide expregg~d paliti~~l dr. diplum~tie apprecigtion aEter agying thae thpy
wduld ~dngi~tently 'Watch for specific ~ctfnng in Jnpt~n's re~gtic~ng wiCh
th~ Soviet Union." From the atandpoine of restoring Jap~nes~-Sovi~t r~lgtions,
which h~ve codled ~ince the J~p~n-pkC t~~aey, ane c~n ~~y th~e thig d~veldpment
provided hopeful materi~l.
At this time, hnwev~r, there is ~ chdrny territorial is~ue pending betweer~
J~pan ~nd Che 5oviet Unidn nnd, in add~tion, considerntion mu~t be giv~n Ca
avoidunce of throwing eold water on the friendly relatibn~ with China which
huve been develdping rgpidly, Thereforc, the governmenr decl,d~d eo emph~gixe
buildinR up e~onomic rel~tions far the pregent.
[n re~pon~e, business circleg say that they are ready to cooperate ns fc~r
as possible with the Japanese Government'~ policy, ~?nd thnt they are Envorably
impregyed with the fact th~c Che 5oviet side is not only aending itH lf~rgegt
deleRation Co date to t'~e execucive meeting of the Joint Jap~ne~e-Soviet
~~~nnomic Commission, buc is also moving tn prepare nnd propose new large-scale
projecta in addition to previously proposed pro,jects such as [he Nakhodka-
Vrnngel harbor expansion and construction of a p~per pulp complex at
Khabarovsk, etc. Accordingly, the key to future improvement ir. Japanege-
Soviet relations lies in the sort of new projectg the Soviet side will
present n[ this time, and [he Soviet side is gaid to be ~criou~ly intent
upon rolling back the advdnces made by the Chineee.
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shinbuneha 19~9
9111
C50: 4105
~3
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;
~Ott d~~ICIAL tJSE dNLY _
~CONOMIC
JAPAN 'CO ~U~tTf1EEt ~A5~ ~XCHANG~ ~~$'~RIC'TION5
'Cokyo r1AINICNI UAILY N~WS in En~liah 2 M~~r 79 p 5 UiJ
('CQxtJ Thc .Jnpanpge Gavernm~nt ~nd the Hank of Jap~n ~re moving Coward a
:~eriey of ineggureg td e~g~ foreign exchange regtrictinn~ ~+hich r~prpgent
a con~idergble degrce of turngbnut in monet~ry palicy r~g~rding the y~n'g
exChange tnte, 5ome of the chnng~a tn~y geer~ tpchnic~l or minnr but they
are o~ gignifi~ance.
onc has to do With the bondg sold fct yen in th~ Tokyn ~~pital mark~t by
foreign gov~rnments and intern~tional ~pencies. (Sears~ Rneb~ck will be
ti~e ftrst foraign busines~ firm tn float a bond is~ue here, in A~,ri1).
1'hc present regulations requtre ch~?t the foreign isguer convert the yen
pro~eeds fro~n the bonds into dollars or other foreign currencieg for
repatriation within one week. This period Would b~ ~xtpnded to on~ anonth.
'Che .i~pnnese authorities permit and encourage the flot~tion of foreign bond
issues as one Way of reducinq Japan's top-heavy paytnents surpluses.
_ Ti~c longer periud means the exi[ of [he funda may be delayed and push
back in time the demand for dollars in the Tokyo foreign excht?nge market.
The praccicgl efEect fvr che forciy,n i5sucr is that it has more time leeaay
in selecting what it calculates Would be the cime of the tnogt favorable '
c~xchnnge r~tc.
The first foreign bond i~sue to receive thr benefit of che nea longer
reTioa i~ tikely to be the Arazilir~n Governmen['s issue oE 30 billion yen
in l.~tte fiebruary.
A simtlar rhange aill also bc made on �rr~n loans by Japanese banks to
borroWCrs abroad. ~
The new mone[ary policy aill ~~lqo help the foreiRn banka in Japan, vhose
chief ~ource of funds for lending out here is the s~~rap accounts With their
purent banks abroad.
24
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~Ott O~~ICIAL 115~ dNLY -
'I'hrdu,~h th~ ew~p F1CCdUt1CAi th~ fdreign b~nkg itt J~patt get foreign-aurrettcy
fund~, u~uc~lly ~urodollarg ar Agiadall~r~, which they ~dnvert ined yen,
'Co r.h~ek a heavy infldw of ddll~r~ �rom thig ~ource which would pu~h up
the y~n'g excll~nge rate, th~ fin~n~e mini~ery ~nd tt~e B~nk of J~p~n pl~ee
ceilin~~ on the ~wap ac~ouatc- '~he total ceilit~g~ are now gbout $3.~
billidn, and th~ge wi11 be raiged ,~hortly by $6d0 tn $700 millinn.
't'he Japanege ~ureign ~xch~nge Bankg wil] ~et ~ gimil~r br~e~k. '~hey b~rruw -
~urodoll~rg he~vily whieh they canvert int.o yen :ar Lendiag out in Jnp~n,
but tt~e ~eilingg on guch borrowing have .,_en virtually froz~n since 1`3~U~
'Che increage i~ expe~ted to be ~round $700 to $~00 million, a reYntiv~ly
small g~m but nev~rthelege an incr~ag~,
~ict~lly, thc exeh~ng~ rrgtrietiong on incoming gtiort-e~rm funds nf farei~n
tndividuals ~nd businegs firmg other th~n ~-dnkg werc lifted lagt 5gturdgy.
'Cheye were applied in November 19~7 ag megsures t~ check fdreign specul~~-
tion in thc yen, when a reserve r~te aE 100 percent was applied nt~ in-
c:reases in "free yen" nanreeident acrount~ (yen freely convertible into
f~reign exchange) ~nd a prohibicidn pla~~d un ndnresident purch~?se of
Japaneye bondg with les~ than five years and a month to go to maturity.
Nonreyidents wa_re nls~ excluded Rarlier from buying short-term government
noteg.
Ttie chief immedidte reasons for che new m~asure~ t~re the easing of the
yen ~gainst th~ dollar sinne l~st November ~nd the likelihood that the `
relaxing or remdval of the restrictions poses no dgnger of another sudden
rise in the yen's exchange rate.
The government is also drafcing a new foreign exchange and trade law th~t
would scr~.~ ~n~~ny of the present controls, Which havE been the target of
ahar~ ~-riticism fror,: 1~!'~at~, i_' :~ic:7~, YJIlU~I:I .l'J~ili11.~LCelive stepS~ of
which the measurey described here are ~arc, by way of preliminary action.
~agically, heWever, th~ big factdr is the change in thinking of the authori-
tles about the yen's exchange markec.
In tttie pas[ two years ahen the yen was rising seeeply and relentle~sly,
chey, as well as most of business and the public, thought that the highcr
yen would deal crippling blows to .~apan's exports and produce a general
deflationary effect on the economy.
As the yen rose, the government was constantly holding crisis conferences
co gc[ in emergency imports, reduce the crade surplus and stop the climb
in tt~c yen.
25
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~OIt d~FICtAL US~ dNLY
`Th~ ll~nk u~ J~pt~n pdur~d nut vd~t ~umg of' y~n tn buy up billi~n~ of
ddll~rg in ~ v~in effotit to che~k th~ ven'~ ri~~.
Ag mgCt~rg turn~d ouC, nothing terrible h~ppenpd. The export indu~try
~hdwed ~mt~xing ~~pg~ity tu ndnpt to the higher yen, gnd mo~t exp~rt~
manufgceurp~ plgn ~nd np~rute on d yE'.l1-dn~lnr axchgnge r~ee nf 1~0 yen.
'~he nuthnritieg hgv~ ul~d found th~t ehe higher ypn, by m~king Ch~ nngt
df imported fuel ~nd m~teri~l~ ~h~~p~r in termg nf y~n, h~s be~n arid ig
eh~ mngt pow~rful f~ctor in hnlding down dnm~e~tiC infl~tinn. Th~ high~r
y~en, in st~ort, ig gnod, n~t bnd~ fdr the ennn~my. -
infl~tion ig nnw rhe big worry for the pnli~y makerg, gnd thp higher yen
i~ their mn~t ~ffective inflgtion fighter.
Algo, it is the big~egt fgetdr in holding dowr~ exports~ if finglly ~t~rt-
in~ to gtt, the paymenCg gurplug dnwn to more mgn~gegbl~ ~ix~ th~t ghould
h~lp ense trouble ~brond.
'~}ic g~nk of Jnp~n is now selling dollarg in the Tokyo foreign exchange
market to keep th~ yen strong ng~~inyt the dollur. The yen-doLlnr exChange
r~te l~st ~'riday w~~ abdut 201 yen, and the tnrget band would seem to be
in the 190 yen to 200 yen range.
COE'YFtiCNT: Mainichi Daily Newa, 1979
CSO: 4120
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I~c~it nl~ I~ t Ct~11. U5L�' oNLY
LCUNUM:CC
I,~~I~t)It 15 i.;il'LG"I'I:U 'CU UN~tANU MUKF: MUNt.Y _
'f~~ky~~ hL1tNlCl!l UAILY N(:WS in lsngli~h 23 ~'eb 79 p 2
~I;citt~?rEctl: "liu:cinc;~~ 'Crend ~tncl ~ShunCo"']
I~r~~x ~ 1 A t~vorabie bustness trend and unexpectedly
- bettrr earnings by business flrms ~re likely to
become two new elements in the annual "spring labor
- eftensive" or "Shunto." The management�labor
dtsputes will center on whether or not the workers can
enioy a larger part of the pie.
It is generaily believed that labor cannot expect a
hlgher pay rafse than the previous year because ot thc
unfavorable employment trend. What is difterent
rrom l~st yes~r, however, is thut business comp~nies
have accumulated larger e~rnings this year. ~
Except for such lndustries in ~ slump as ship�~ _
building and shipping, many industrial firms have
completed their adjustment to the low-growth
economy and have succeeded in gaining larger
earnings. In the March settlement of accounts, these
companies whtch are llsted in the m~jor section of the
Tokyo 5tock Exchange are expected to report in-
creased earnings and proflts. ,
Under such cfrcumstances, labor is expected to
demand more money by making an upward revision
ot its original pay raise demand p1an. Mitsuo
Tomizuka. secretary general of the General Council
ot Trade Unions ot Japan ~Sohyo> has sald that the
council would instruct attiliated unions to revise their
pay raise demand two or three percent upward.
Management, while admittic~g n restoration In the
business trend and higher earnings, is stiil cautious
and is likely to reject the labor demand. A typical
view of the management is that "the top priority must
' bc given to strengthen the financial strength of
companies which has been sapped by the recession. ~
An easygofng pay ralse would invite intlation and
unlavorably altect the employment situation."
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I't1R c)Pi~ tGYAL 1151. ONi,Y
In purticular, Takrshi S~kurada~ chalrm~n of the
~mployers Assoctatlnn of JnpAn fNikkeirenl ex-
preased a grlm vlew on thr spring labor off~ngiv~ ~t ~
recent press conference. After summer this year,
business tirms wi11 have to face high~r costs due to an
inrrease of the ofl ~rice And iose their abllity to pay
hlgher wuges, he s~ld,
Sakurada rc~mphaslzed that only Idw-geared
management c~a~r~tatn the pregent 1eve1 of em-
ployment.
Sakurada's view represents a genergl "theory ot
business tirms" but somewhat contradicts
Ntkkeiren's vtew that the pay ratse must be im-
plemented "in proportfon to the buslness firms`
earnings" and "within the Ifmtta ot the business
firms."
We c~n point out that 1Abor has apparently sup-
ported an Idea ot 1ow�geared management ~s an
~~emergency shelter." It must be remembered that
low�geared management carrled out by larger
companles has resulted in un untavorable cm-
ployment situation, especially among the mlddic
aged peopie. ThQ public has criticlzed such u con-
tradiction.
It is true that the survivAl ot buslness firms is
essential for the maintenance of employment. It is
also true that those business tirms cannot survive
without a stable society.
We can understand labor's derr~and for higher
wages by taking advantage of the favorabie business
trend but we want labor to remember that the trend
has taken place under the low�growth economy and
that we cannot expect another high economic growth.
Gabor must take into account the hikes ot crude
oil, commodity goods prices and public utility fares
which may invite another stagtlation, as is pointed
out by management.
In our opinion, labor should not devote its whole
energy to the wage hike but should work out other
measures which will improve the general livinQ
standaMs of workers And aiso expanded em-
ployment. 1n other words, labor can demand an ex-
tension ot the retirement age, shorter working hours
or full implementation of the f ive-day week system.
Such measures must bc worked out ~ointly by
management and labor. They must take advantage of
the current tavorable business trend in establishing a
maAagement�labor negotiations tormula on wages.
(X)PYKICl1'f: Mafnichi Uaily News, 197~1
t:SU : 4120
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r~~nrt ~r~~rr~tnt, ~?;;r. ~Nr,Y
LCONdMIC
I~t~Uli'I'S I. [NCI:[t t1N N'1'1' I'kOCIlK[:MI:NT
'I'okyu ~N 1N ICII [ UA II.Y NI:WS in i:n~l iyh 28 ~eb 79 p 5
~~r~ici~~ hy 'Cnkao (14hiy~ma, St~EE Writer)
~ Will Il solve trade trictions br� Jnpanese market" in ~s ~ftorts
lween Japan nnd the United to rectity lhe trAde deticlls with
States it Nlppon Telegraph and Japnn.
Telephone Pubiic Corporallon The NTT issue came to lhe
~ N T T 1 o p e n s u p i t s tore In ronnectlon with the
procurements to Ioreiqn Tokyo Round mulUlaternl taritt
telecommunicatlon equipment neqotlations in whlch It was
manutacturers" Or is It just advocated that toreian
nnother scapeqoat ~or the manutacturers should be
yawninaU.S.t~adedeticlt" allowed to rompete with ,
The Japanese RovE^nment is domestic manutaMurers In the
intent upon complyinq wllh the R~ernmental procurement of a
U.5. demand tor open{ng up cowtry.
N'CT procurements to foreian Governmental procurements
manutaMurers, and has taken usualiy run up to a huRe amount
unusually stern attitudes each year. And in the Tokyo
towacd NTf whicb has been 8~ ~~ti 1~~ Rovernamental
tranticaily detend(nR fts buying ~~m~~ ~d be made
p~actlces. P
The Rovernment Intends to and
2~�the op~enttenders should
settle the I~t7'T procurement
issue qulekly by openin~ be conducted without
neaotiationa wtth the u.S. the to-tollow procedures easy.
week. For lhat purpose.
aovernment sent a Forefqn However. when it comes to
Minfstry o(ticial to Ame~ica a~nciplesnto tpr cticegrone
bionday. The rankinR ministry p
ot[icfal ls beina accompanied country dit(ers trom another-
by N7'Tofficlals. tor instance, on the detinition
Since late lact year, the `TT ~d ~Pe ot Bovernmentai
procurement practices became otfices and agencies, and on the
the prime attark target for the total scale ot governmental
United States fn substantiatinR procuremeat amount includinq
itsclaimsthatJapanisaclosed purchases trom (oreian
markct. manutacturers.
i.everage ~t the Tokyo Round talk~ ,
Japan and the l3nited States
The U.S. is uslaa !he NTT have setUed between them all
;~suc ax a iever~ae to crark ehe ditterences on tarilt reduc�
opcn lh~~ all~~Krd , rl~?.~~J tion mar~ias. aRriculturai pcod�
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ro~ orrtcr~~. u5r orrc~Y
urly and ~n m~ bul M~t y~~l on demund In ur~~~r tu uvuld fur�
aovrrnmentnl prnrur~ments. ther rnmplleution ot thr
Jupan p~oposed at thc blluteralpconomicrelatlons.
m~eting that the governmental Ot the NTT procuremenG~
ptoeunment code will cover 30 wnrth GOd blllion ycn I~,OOu
centra! q~overnment oitices end mll lion purehae~~ trom
agencies whose aggregated torelgn communicatlon
purcha~es would,run up to ~ome ~qulpment manutactu~ers
~1,500 mlillon a year, ~ amount to ~ meagcr ~,000
The Unitpd Statea has mlillon yen ~i15 mill~onl or so.
malntained that Japan should This Is because N7T buyg trom
open up all the aovernmental over~as manutacturers what it
dttlees and aQencles numberinp~ cannot obtain trom domestir
some t10 and the aqgregeted communicalion equipment
amounta should be boosted to manutacturera.
about t8,000 milllon�i10,o00 A~ It has no manutacturing
milllon a year. piant of its own, NTT~ aince its
The U.5. ottered to make establishment. hea been
Rovernmental procurement ot procuNna necrsaary equipment
somp;16.000 mql~on a year and trom domeatir manuf~cquers
the ~uropean Community aome under close collaboration trom
=10,50Qmiillon. R& b on. it Aos been very
~eluctant to t~ke In the
Hottest I88ue knocket~s on the dooc tor a
Since NTT is e pubilc cor� number ot reasons.
- poradon under the supervision H'rT malntains that i) ali key
ot lhe Minlstry ot Posts and ~'~~rn European aountNes
Telecommunications and its allow their PTTs (posts,
annual procurementa run up lo telephone and telc~graph cor�
a whoppinR G02.S billion yen Po~$tions), both ~cvernmental
~~f,012.5 miliionl or so, thr and pMvate. to pr~ctke idrn�
handllnR ot N7T~ along with two tical procurement methods and
other public corporations, ere demandtng to make
became tl~e holtest issue be~ telecommunicetlons services
tween Japan and lhe U.S. which an exceptfon to the Tokyo
has very competitive, higA� Round agreement.
technotoQy communicationa ~:ven American Telepho~~e
equipment industry. and 1'eleRraph tAT&Tl. the
In vlew ot thP lop~sided trade largest American teleeom�
balance and the size of NTT municationi a~rporatfa~. a?hkh -
procurement~, Ih~ U.S.. is has the manutactwing arm
pressinR .Iap~n to yield. Thc Westcro Electcfc w~der its
U.S, has been explicitly critica~ wlnQ, pj~etias an almost
ot the Japaneae economic complete bt~yr Ameticon policy.
manaaement tor its inaDility to particutar:y buy Western
ax Japan's t~ade surplLLS and to ~
attaln a 7�percent real ~~Y
economic Rrowth in this tisral about tde ou~tlow ot ita -
year. U.S. President Jimmy proprietry ictormallon ob� _
('aner has cautfoned Japane~ tained fn research and
Prime Atinister 1lasayoshi development in the event of
Ohira twice by penunally trc+~, opeti btddin~ fot' NTT
wrltten lettecs tince the latter procurements. The Telecom�
came to pov?~cr la~t Dec. 7. mu~icatlon system oor~stitutes
'Mws, the Japanese aovern� a keystone ot natiaaal interest
ment teels vulne~able and andnationalsectrcityotJapan.
obliped lo accomodate the U.S.
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i~~~~t nrrtrtni, u~r~; nNr,v
mhr 'fplrcommunirntiuns sponsnred expnrt mission,
gygt~m Ia an extremely com� eonareggmen, and renking
plex, highly technology� Commerce t~epartment ot�
intensive, huge syatem ticlal~whovisitedJapanduring
~ requlrinq stri~t unity amona the la~t six months or so. NT'f
pleceg of equlpment to establ~shed Its~it unwittingly ~a
minimizc systems troubiea and A bad quy, it ~emg that
maximise rellaDttlly, ~o~ thfs ~~noto~iou~ NTC" surrounded
reason, mixlnq ot tore~qn by a"stone wa11" atlcks In the
~qulpmpnl has to be minimlr~ed. Amcrl:an mind.
And it toretqn cqulpment ~s to ~conoml~ attaln ministers
be Introduced. speciticatton held u~neclal me~ting ~eb. ~0
r e q y i r e m e n t g b e c o m e to dl~cuss the NTT Procurement
voluminous and procedurea tssue and came out wlth the
hiahly compllcated. ~ declsion to make N7T open its .
To ensu~e equlpment sfoora b torelgn manutacturer~
reilability requlres epot checks ~~trom a broader vlewpoint ot
~t the manutactuMng tacilitiea l~ational interest:" �
und It wili be viHually im� A! the slern qovernment
posslble to curry out thorough attltude, NTT pre~ident Toku~i
inKpcctlons nt monufarlurina Akikusa Indicated NTT's
tacilltleg of all the blddera In the wiilingness to change Its
r v e n t o t o p e n b I d d 1 n a proctitrements practlces At lhe -
procuremenls. Dlet lparltament) commlttee
~yslems maintenance meettnqthesamec+ay,
requires long�term, atable The sottening ot the N'I~C
aupply of equipment com� attit~de is also believed to have
ponenta and parts tor come trom~ ths qovernmental
replacemrnts. gyatems ex� ~�indication" to squee:e
par,alons ~nd ao on. Dellverv parachutinR ot ranking N1'T
dr~ayx could hamper ayslems otticers to wme 200 companies �
m ~intenance. doln~ business with NTI',
And open biddin~ .
procuremcnt could make im� Wire Pulling
possible planned productinn, On the other hand, there was
which will rai:je procuremcnt a grapevine rumor In the
cosis, and a smooth im� Jtpanese tdecornmunications
piementatlon ot the budget due industry that Internetiohai
to probable prolon~ment ot the B~~~ Machinea Cery. Is
procurement period. p~?iing the wires ot the whole .
Susptclon atfalr. The su~tdon was Ala
entettained by M'P leaders.
But these ~rguments ad� ~y ~~d ~ Ca~r ad-
vanred by (Y'iT relnlorced the ministratbn haa tormer iBl1i
American suspicfon that the otticeca In tAe cabinet posts and
Japanese are putting up In� concentration ot telecom� '
visibie non�taritt barriers municatton apparatus and
tIY'I'B) all around the islands, ~r~icoaductor ~nanut~cb~rers
ottcrtag Ameticans the prime in President C~rter's home
attack tarytet. The U.5. was stateotGeo~tla.
most intent upon elimiagting Moreover, such major
NTB at lhe Tokyo Round swilchin~ apparatus
negottations. manutacturers as NEC.
On top ot these. MCT Ba~e ~ujitsu, Oki Electric and
rather cold treatment to F{Itachi are also computer
member~ ot a U.S. government-
31
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I~~l~t 1?I~I'It:lAl~ II!ili ~1N1,1'
cuinp~?lllora ot Ikib1, Akwul .II
' ~x~reent nt tolal NE;C a~les ~nd
- H'ujilsu ~nlea Kn tu N7"I' and
uboul 30 percent ot Okl sulcu
gceg to NT1',
'l'heae makers, known an
~~NTT tamily," also benetit
trom NTT research and
d~velopment pro~ects. ~'or
~nstanre, when NT'I' decided to
develnp its own supcrlarqe
romputer "bips" tor data
rommunlcatlon~, F'ujitsu, NE:C,
nnd Nilnchl participated i~r thr
prnyert, benetltting both
technologically and tinancially,
And tB~~t la ateadily making
preparaUons (or startln~ It~ -
own data communicatlong
gervtce throuqh Its tolnt vcntuM
SBS ISat~eiiile gusinesa
SyS~~Q1i1. . . .
At any rate, the Japan~e
govcrnment Is planning to ac�
commodate the U.S. demand
by making tV9'T open up to 30~0
percent ot its 600~biilion�yen
prorurements to open bidd[nas.
But the~e couid remain the
feelUa lhal b(ddina Is one thinq
and actual pucchase ia nnother,
nulltying the Nhole purposc o(
reducing Japan's trode surp~us
with the U.5. 1'tius. (VTT may
weil become another symDol of
the Japan�U.S. trade fHction.
tn the bflateral trade
relations, there have arisen a
number o( heated disputes sinre
last year on such matters as
computer and tilm tarift
reductlons, import expan.~ions
ot (rc~h oranges, bert, and
Icathcr.
In this Ilght, the latest ~TT
issue couid be considered as a
step in the sequence. K�i1h
loom{n~ implications that thc _
(Y'fT Issue N~ould not be the last -
dispute unless the Ohfra cabinet '
drasticaliy slashes Japnn's
lrade surplus Defore the prime
minister visits the t'.S. in
spring. What. then, will come
next''
C~~I'YItI(~II'I': M.~iniclii 1)aily News~ 1979
r.s~~: 4 t 2n
3~
EOR OEFICIAI, IiSF: OM.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030053-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030053-9
l~Uk c1H'i~'[C1A1, tI~L c1N1,Y
LCONdMtC
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