JPRS ID: 8358 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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JPR5 L/8358
28 March 1979 I
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TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOU~ ll/79)
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1. u e~n ~u tit e S. Neporc ~)ate
TW1N5tATI0N5 ON N~AR EAST AND NORTN AFRICA, (FOUO 11/79) 28 March 1.979
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. 2 8 March 1.9 79
TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
cFOVO i~/~9) .
- CONTENTS PAGE
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Polieario's Tan-Tan Attack Renews Alge,cian-Moroccan Tension
(CAMBIO 16, 18 Feb 79) 1
IRAN
Leftists Defy Khomeyni in Second Round of Revolution
(Georges Menant; PARIS MATCE?, 2 Mar 79) 5
MOROCCO
Briefa
' Abu Dhabi Loan 8
" a ' [III - \I: A - 121 FOUOJ _
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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
_ POLISARIn'S TAN-TAtJ ATTACK RENEWS ALGERIAN-MOR~OCCAN TENSION
Madrid CAMBIO 16 ir~ Spanish 18 Feb 79 pp 48-~:9
[Te~t~ The Alqerian military now control the government
thanks to Colonel Chadli's election as president. The
Algerian cormnitment to the Polisario Front [People's
Front f~r the Liberation cf the Western Sahara] and the
= Sahaxan military successes aqainst Irbrocco are increasing
- the possibil�lty of a direct confrontation between Algiers
- and Rabat.
The process of electing the Algerian president took place against the back-
drop of the events of the war in the Sahara. The naming of ~endjedid Chadli
to succeed Houari Boumediene shows the Algerian Army's predominance over the
- other groups that were contendinq for power. _
All the groups within Algeria's FLN were agreed, however, in their support
of the Polisario Front in its struggle against Morocco. But Chadli's asstmip-
tion of thP Alqerian presidet~cy as a representative of the army provided the
- Saharans with decisive support a t a time when the Polisario Front was launch-
ing its so-called "Houari Boumediene" offensive aqainst Nbrocco.
The military actions ended with the occupation of a Moroccan city--Tan-Tan--
in an operation in which the Polisario Front used sophfsticated weapons and
~ demonstrated extraordinary maneuverinq ability. Morocco placed direc:t respon- _
~ibility for the attack on Aigeria and announced that the future it would
exercise the "right to pursue" the guerrilla fiqhters into P?lqerian terri-
tory.
With Mauritania out of the Saharan War, the Algerian-backed Polisario Front
_ is now operating on a single front. Saharan leaders have also announced
that from now on they will take their actions "all the way inta Moroccan
territory." This course of events seems to presage a further increase in
, the danqer of a direct military confrontation between Morocco and Algeria.
Ten days ago Algeria accused Morocco before the UN Security Council of acts
_ of sabot~ge and of clandestine arms shipments. The Polisari4 Front's military
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successes only increase the possibili~ty of large-scale Moroccan ac~ion tihat
could �orce a reaction by Algeria. The point is that the political process
in Algeria now has a ma3or protagonist: the Armed ~'orces.
i'ollowing a series of comings and goings, intense rumor campaigns, and color-
- ful interpretations by the Western press, and shoitly aE~er Algeria's Four~h
FLN Congress got underway on Saturday ~7 January, the figure of Oolanel Chadlf
stood out clearly as the choice for successor to the presidency.
In the early hours of the deliberations, the participants had alined them-
selves in definite camps.
9ut power--and even the delegates to the congress who were attending a party
meeting for the �irst time knew it--was in fact tn the hands of the 600 rep- _
resentatives of the Armed Forces and the eight mem~ers of the Revolutionary
Council. All the military were dressed unostentatiously as civilians. Every
- notable infoxmant in Algiers had identified Chadli as the most certain candi-
date f~r the presidency, not only because of his stand as a moderate but also ~
because he was the army's strong man.
As commanding officer of the Oran Region for 15 years and Boumediene's right-
- hand officer--he had fought alongside Boumediene in the war for independence--
Chadli had become a key man without whom no decision would be tnade.
And in the end, Chadli had to play that decisive role. The weiqht of the
military manifested itself when the time came to reconcile the two trends
that had appeared throughout the sessions. _
On the one hand, there was the group calling itself "pragmatic." Observers
identified its leader as Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Boumediene's minister of for-
eign affairs. And on the other hand, there was the more radical group headed
by ~1 Moham*ned Yahiaouf .
Bouteflika--a comrade-in-arms of the late Boumediene from the very first--
is seen by his political opponents as a"reformist with pro-Western inclina-
tions." And in fact, the minister of foreign affairs had been the only one
after independence to succeed in winning General De Gaulle's confidence and
establishing negotiating terms with France that were not entirely unfavorable
for the former French colony. Colonel Yahiaoui, according to his critics,
is "an extremist who advoc~tes Islamic socialism," a line in which he is
- reportedly siipported by Libya, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.
As a result, the only way to avoid a direct confrontation was to choose an
"alternative providing revolutionary cuntinuity," which is what Colonel
Chadli offered.
But the army's position was not monolithic, either, since the younq officers
preferred Yahiaoui. In the end, the factor that decisively tipped thE scales
in Chadli's favor was the colonel's prestiqe and the power he holds. Being
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in command of thQ Second Military Region means, in practice, having 65 per-
cent o~ :he Algerian Army under his orders.
, ~'he choice of the man to succeed Boumediene was not the only area of friction
and debate rluring the sessions. The most fiery debates concerned ref~rm of
the structures of power and the shape of the new line that would characteriz~
the next stagQ of the Algerian Revol~ition.
, A serie~ of reforms eventually won the approval of the majority, and it was
agreed to implement a number of ineasures provided by the 1967 Constituti~n,
onc such measure beinq the appointment of a prime minister. The president
will also be assisted in his administra~ion by a still-undefined number of
vice presidents. The final communique vaguely mentions "several" with~ut
specifying exactly how many.
= Chadli was ~ble to defeat Yahiaoui's followers, who wanted to make the latter "
secretary general of the party if he was not elected president, but their pro-
posal failed, and the post of secretary gen.eral remains linked to that of the -
chief of state. .
The Algerian media consistently placed more emphasis on the changes effected
within the party than on the actual choice of Chadli. The new makeup of the
Political Bureau, which has 26 members, is a clear indication nf the balance ;
that prevails. Neither Yahiaoui's radicals nor Bouteflika's liberals have
been excluded from it. That delicate balance would seem to oo~ltradict the
precipita te rejoicing noted in some E~snpean capitals, which suw Yahi.;oui as
Moscow's man and viewed Chadli as a driving force of Alqeria's "Weatezniza-
- tion."
Old-New Names
While the FLN Cbngress served to prove that power continues to rest aLnost
exclusively in the hands of the azmy, ft also confirmed an old thesis upheld
by Aoumediene: the party is the "transmission belt," since the army repre-
sents not only the backbone of the nation but also its "political soul."
~ A phase of collegial power is now beqinning, with Chadli in the position of
top leadership and the Armed Forces exercising unquestionable tutelage.
F'ollowing the referendum of Wednesday the 7th, there is still a question
mark with regard t~, two key posts; as~istant secretary of the FLN and prime
minister. The latter might be chosen by the National Assembly.
IIeyond the speculation about names, it became increasingly clear throughout
- the ses~ions of the conqress that no matter who the candid~ite Fras, "the path
to socialism in Algeria is now irreversible," to quote Cha31i's stat~nent
when he was proclaimed president. In the almost 2 montha since Boume3iene's
~ death, th~re has been nothing to indicate that there will be any important
changes in established policy on either the domestic or the foreign level.
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C:hadli will have ~o try to hold on to the position ~hat Boume3iene had won
among the leaders of the~ Third World as a result of the momentium imparted to
- the Nbvement of Nonalined Nations: he will have to remain an ideological ally
o� the socialis~ bloc while simultaneously keeping the Uni~ed States and
France as his country's principal commercial customers.
_ Also vital will be his role in the delicate balance of the Maghreb at a time
when, after 3 years of war i�.. the Western 5ahara, a few pieces are beginninq
~ t,o change positian.
I Since the military coup that overthrew Presiden~ Moktar Ould Daddah in July
~ of last year, Mauritania has not seemecl disposed to continue its commitment '
= to a war that it is in no position to pursue. Since the unilateral cease-
' fire decreed by the Polisario Front a few days after the coup, Mauaritania
has been engaged in dialog with the Saharan representatives in searc;h of a -
path to peace. At the same time, the Moroccan Army has had to withdraw the
9,000 men it had stationed in Mauritanian territory at the request of that -
country's government.
~ The Polisario Front--whose Minister of Information Salem Ould Salek was the -
only foreign r.epresentative invited to the FLN Cnngress--last week presented, -
to the pre;s the Moroccan prisoners captured during the attack on Tan-Tan on _
- 28 January. Morocco tried at first to deny that the attack had taken place,
~ tt~en downplayed its importance, and finally said ~hat it had killed 200 mem-
bers of the Polisario Front during the battle. Speaking to CAMBIO 16, a
= Saharan ~:epresentative rejected the Moroccan claim, explaininq that if it
were true, the 'Alawi regime would at least have exhibited the cor~ses. _
What we can say, without as yet puttinq our money on either of those t~,ro
claims, is that Tan-Tan seems to have revived tension in North Africa and
renewed the f riation between Alqiers and Rabat.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1979 ^_AI~IO 16
11798 ~
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IRAN
~
LL'FTISTS DEFY KHOMEYNI TN S~COND ROUND OF REVOLUTION
Yaris PARIS MATCH in French 2 Mar I9 pp 67, 81
' [Article by Georgea Menant: "I Have Seen Thousands of I~edayeen Def.ying
Khomeyni"]
[Text] IC did not tAke long. Th~ ~econd round of the revolution has begun--
and much sooner than expected�~-between the Ayatollah's religious xepublic
and the lay and MarxisC forces of the left. For one side, the revolution
is over, since rhe Shah has been dethroned and the law of the Koran is
the law of the land. For the oCher side, nothing has been achieved, since
the state of society remains unchanged and the dictatorship of the pro-
leCariat has not replaced the dictatorship of the kyrant. We have a dia-
- metric contradiction, which threatens Co produce, at any moment, u freah
eruption. On Friday 1 saw the duel engaged. That morning the city was
shaken on its awakening by the stupefying news: "Fonr generals were
- executed during the night." They were the chief of Savak, the commander
of the airborne troops and the military governors of Teheran and Ispahan,
, the four most detested figures of the imperial regime. All the details
= of the execution were revealed. It took place in the courtyard of the
school where ~?yatollah is housed and practically under his windows. The
four generals were lined up facing the wall, their wrists tied and their
eyes bandaged. A young moud~ahid, chosen by the families of the martyrs,
approached them Erom behind and fired a bullet from a pistol inCo the neck
of each one. Then bursts of machinegun fire hit the bodies lying on the
~raund. But we know practically nothing about the trial which preceded
the execution. We know only that the faur men were seated under a sign
quoting a passage from the Koran declaring that he who has killed must be ~
killed. We know, too, that the tribunal was composed half and half of
- religious and 3uris[s, and il1c1C some of the parents of the martyrs were
present at the jud~ment. But how was the trial prepared? Did the accused
even have a defender? All of that remains a mystery. L~'hich opens up truly
alarming horizons on the coricepts of the Islamic republic in matters of
justice. In fact, these four summary executions had only one objective:
to calm the leftist opposition at least for a time. BuC, exactly the
opposite was to happen. Early in the afternoon a procession of 20,000
fedr~yccn crossecl the city and headed toward the Ayatollah's residence.
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Heading Che procession was a porCraiC of the Iman, affectionately framed
wikh carnations. BuC behind, banners announced their real colors: "We
wanC an army of the people," "Thi~ army is poisoned." For 4 long hours, -
Che demonaCrators besieged General Khomeyni's he~dquartera. Nothing dis-
couraged them. Neither the interminable waiC impoaed on them, nor Che
black muzzles of the machineguns which the Ayatollah's PrnetoXian guard ~
trained on them. From Che crowd--which included numerous opposition
~ officers in uniform--rose slogans and increasingly virulenC invectives.
People explained to us: "Khomeyni is always talking of Che future, but
- we must act naw. We respect the Ayat�ollah as a religious leader. But we
demand the righC to criticize him as a political leader. His government
is composed of bourgeois and national capit~lisC~. We shall never accept
Che Bazargans and Sand~abis who are owners of factories. They executed
some generals, but it was to shut Cheir mouths." SCamping Cheir feet, they
chanted: "We want Co talk to the Ayatollah. Khomeyni must lisCen to Che
people." FinA11y, a loudspeaker answered them: the Ayatollah cannot
receive them. He hac~ 'ueen ill for Che last 3 days--which is a shameless
- lie since a morning ~ommunique had announced that the Iman had ~ust re-
ceived a group of 180 per3on--but he gave them assurance that the Islamic _
republic will re~pect all c:~inions. In the meantime, they must realize -
that this government is pr~~visional and that its decisions are not binding _
on the future. This waffie was received with ~eers and caCcalls. The
demonstration continued for a lonfs time thereafter, but finally the demon- `
strators dispersed into the night. Thefedayeen had not seen the Ayatollah.
But they had achieved their real ob~ective. The myth had suffered its first
blow. This sacrilegious show made a bi~ impression in the city. ~
- The next day, Saturday, was to be a test-day: it was the day set by the -
~ Ayatollah for the return to work. Beginning early in the morning, the
Bazaar had resumed its usual folkloric appearance. The merchants F:ere all
there, crouching over their stocks of food, carpets, or spices, amber
beads in hand, munching Sunflower seeds while keeping an eye on the
customers. For them the revolution was over. It had had only one objec-
tive: to overthrow the Shah's government and the new c13ss of businessmen -
it had engendered. The Bazaar keepers had supported the revolution with
their money. And now they meant to recover their stake. To start things
, going again, they were offering candies and pistachio nuts to passerbys.
And interminable lines stretched out at the doors of several restaurants,
where the o;,mers had vowed to offer a free kebab to one and all in the
event of victory. Outside housewives rushed to buy fruit and vegetables
displayed in pyramids. The rea~pearance of shaving cream made the men
appear more presentable, after days of unkempt beards. But the level of
_ business remained low.
As the result of the general strike, the lack of wages was felt everywhere. -
Yet the Bazaar could still create an illusion. In the ma~jor services,
banking, insurance, transportation, the doors remained closed. For techni-
_ cal reasons, it was stated officially: it would take several days more
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to p~it the machinery buck into operation. nut in a number of facCories
~.~round '['ehernn people h~nd roundly reEused to go back to work: there would
be no r~turn to wurk unril the governmenC had clenrly stuted ita int ntiona. -
And im m~ny places, Che trade unions had tied Chpir attiCude Co Ctie reo
~ gttni.zntion of the army, in the way C}~e fedayeen were demanding. And in
Abadan, one oE rhe most strategic centers, oil production remained at -
700,000 bt~rrels ~ day, that is to say ~usC eno~igh production to meeC the
needs of Che country. As for exports, the unions were demanding a compleCe ?
renegotiation of foreign conCracts before turning the pump on again. And
to all of these uncertainCies were added tt~e convulsions which had been
felt throughout the week in several big cities of the naCion. Such as the
- one in Tubriz, where after fighting which had resulted in several hundred
- deaths, the army was prnctlcally split into three secCions: one which had
ralli.ed to the Aya~ollah, anoCher which had made common cause with Che -
- fedayeen and a third which had taken to the marquis with its Cribes who
, remained 1oya1 to the Shah. To this was to be added Che insec.ur ity pre-
vailing by the insurrection having resulted in an increase of banditry
of all kinds.
_ 5uch wtts the nation, ravaged, divided and threatened, where Y~sir 'Arafat `
was to land Sunday evening: an 'Arafat who t~ad seldom been seen to demon- -
strate his joy with such exuberance. It is true that the change in Iran
represents an enormous asset for the Palestini~n cause. The money from
Iranian oil might, in fact, permit the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion) Co stand 3 little aloof from its usual "hard" or "moderate" financiers. -
The problem now is to know wiCh what camp the Ayatollah meana to aline his
country. And there, too, Che Iranian fedayeen will plny u d~ecisive role.
They t~ave already chosen their camp: on Friday one of their leaders re-
_ vealed to me that the objective of the attack on the U.S. Embassy was to
exchange the capti.ired ~`Jnericans for some Palestinian p;~isoners held in
Israel. A bluff or a reality? In any case, as 'Arafat himself has szid, -
events in Irai? represent for this already dangerously agitated part of th~:
- world, "a real cataclysm" in the midsC of which the dice are still rolling.
For the moment the only winners in the affair appear indeed to be the
Russians. Moscow equally Eeared two things: the Shah's victory, which
_ would nave strengthened thP American positions in the region; and hi5 de-
feat, to the extent thar. it would have resulted in the establishment of a
powcr Islamic republic, on the borders of Soviet Islam, whose nationalist
� tendencies are becoming increasingly strong. Today, we see ttie Russians
winning on both scores at once. The Shah's government has collapsed and ~
the Islamic state is already demonstrating difficulty in ruling. From now
on Moscow has only to wait for the third round, its own.
COPYRICHT: 1979 par Cogedipresse, S.A. -
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MOROCCO
' ~
BRIEFS -
ABU DHABI LOAN--The Abu DhAbi Fund ror Arab Economic DevelopmenC (FADEA)
on 6 February granted Morocco a loan of 1,875,000 dinars, about /.25 mil-
lion dollars, for a 3-year term with interest at 3.75 percent, then 4.5 per- ~
cent and 4.75 percent. The president-director general of the Moroccan Na-
tional Economic Development Bank (3NDE) was in Abu Uhabi 4-5 I'ebruary. [Text]
- [Faris MARCHES TROYICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 442]
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