JPRS ID: 8380 FUNDAMENTALS OF TROOP CONTROL IN COMBAT

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- D. A. IVANOV, V. P. SAVEL' YEV AND P. V. SHEMANSKIY
6 APR I L 1979 - i. Of 4
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6 April 1979
FUNDAMENtALS OF TROOP CONTROL IN COMBAT
- BY
D,A, IVANOV, V,P, SAVEL'YEV AND P.V, SHEMANSKiY
,
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIQNS RESEARCH SERVICE
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JPR5 L/8380
6 Apri 1. 1979
FUNDAMEN'fALS OF TROOP CONTROL IN COMBAT
Moscow OSNOVY UPRAVLENZYA VOYSKAMZ V BOYU in Russian 1977 s3.gned
to prees 15 Sep 77 pp 1-391
[Book by D.A. Ivanov, V.P. Savel'yev and P.V. Shemanskiy,
Voyenizdat, second revised and supplemented edition, 25,000 copiea]
- CONTENTS PAGE
Introduction��. . . . 0 0 '1 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 a 0 6 9~~~�� 1 -
Chapter 1. Content, Essence and Procedural Principles of Trocp Control.... 4
_ 1. General Concept of Control....~ 4
2. Specific Nature of Troop Control in Combat and the Requirements `
_ Imposed on It 16
Orgunization of Modern Troop Control Sys tems 17
oa s o Combat Troop Control, Ita Content and Esaence 23
Modern Requirements of Troop Control 38
CharacterieCic Aspecta of Troop Control in Combat 43
Chapter 2. Troop Control Units, Technical Means and Control Points........ 49
1. Troop Control Unita 49
Requirements Impoaed on Control Unite 49
' Role and Misaions of the Commander in Troop Control 53
2. Technical Control Meana 63
ComQnunicatione Means 64
Meana of Obtaining Information 71 _
Tactical Calculation and Information Proceaeing Meana 73
Documentation and Document Reproduction Facilities 78
Command Post Vehicles.................................................. 83
Proapects for the Application of Automation Media for Troop Control.... 85 ~
3. Organization of Communications and Control Pointa 90 -
Requirementa on Control Pointa 90
Restoration of Control Points 97
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
[II - USSR - FOUO]
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= CONTENTS (Con+:inued) Pgge
Communications Organization~~��~~~�~~��~��~~�~~~��~�����~����~�~ 101
Chapter 3. Organization of the Work of the ConCrol Unft..,...,...., 108
1. B&BiC Principleo of Troap Control�~~�~~�~~~�~��~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 108
2, Planning the Work of the Commander and the CQntrol Unit......,., 115
3. Scientific Organization of the LaUor oF the Control Uait
Officere 120
Chapter 4. Gathering and Proceeeing Situation Data When PrepaYing
for and During the Course of Combat Operations...,.....0 0 0 a 6 0 0 0 6 137
1. Content of the Situation Data and Requiremenrs Impoaed Un It.... 137
2. Procedure for Gathering SiCuation Data 143
3. Proceseing and Repar.ting Situation 148
4. Prospecte =or f.utomation of the Proceae of Gat�hering and
Procesging SiCuation Data.�~~�~~~~���~~~~~�~�~~~~~~~~~��~~~~~~~� 156
Chapter 5. Camb at Decision Making (Refinement) and Planning
the Battle Tactice of noope 158
1. Content of the Combat Deciaion 158
Basic Elements of the Decieion 158
Content of the Hasic Decision Elementa 164
2. Procedure for Combat Decision Making by the Commander........... 170
Esaence of the Procedure and the Requirementa Impoaed on It..... 170
General Content of the Conbat Decision Making Procesa......... 172
Logical Methoda of Thinking of the Commander During Decision
Making 1.99
The Application of Mathematical Methods and Means of
Mechanization and Automation When Making the Combat Decision..., 193
Organization of the Work of the Commandera and the Control
Units in Decision 199
3. Plnnning the Combat Operations 202
Planning Content and Procedure .......................e.......aoo 202
Planning Methode 214
Chapter 6. Delivering the Combat Miesiona to the Executive Agents
Reaponsible for Carrying Them Out. Qrganization and Support of
~ Troop Interacticm 220
1. Procedures for Reporting the Combat Mieaions to the
Responeible Agenta 220
2. Organization and Support of Continuous Interactions of
Troopa 231
' Chapter 7. Qrganization and Implementation of Meaeurea With Respect
to the Support of Combat Operatione and the Comnandant's Service.. 242
Reconnaiseance 243
Protection of TYoops Againat Nuclear Weapons 246
Securiry........................................................ 247
Engineering Support 248
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CONTENh (Continued)
-
page
Camouflage. I a ....................0 0
.
249
.

Combating the Enemy Rad3oelectronic Devices
250 -
Zbpogeodetic Support....~.....~........~~
252

Hydrometeorological Support...~~
253

- Rear Servicee and Technical Support.......................
,
t
254

.
Commandant's S~rvice.....~
~
255
.

,
Chapter 8. Formation and Ma3ntenance of High Mora1 Sp:Lrit of the
Troops in CombaC
261

~ 1. Ro1e of the Mornl Factor in Combat and Meana of Building Tt
in the Peraonnel
261
.~..........e......
2. Procedures for Maintaining High Morals in the Tr,.iopa During
Combat Opexatione
269

Chapter 9. Monitoring During Training and in the Courbe of
-
CombaC Operationa
.
.
276
,
.

1. Monitoring Problems and Techniques..........*..............

276
.

2. Organization and Realization of Monitoring
280

~
- ChapCer 10. Study of Combat Experience and Conve3�ance of It
to the Troops......
1. Urganization of the Work of the Control Units With Res
ect
286
p
to the St;:-Ay and Diasemination of Combat Experience........
286

_ 2. Seudy of Combat Experience
289

- 3. Conveyance of Combat Experience to the TYoopa
.
293
.
Concluaion
296 -

- Bibliography

302
.

Subject Index
309
r~
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Engliah title
Russian title
Author (s)
Editor (s)
Publishing Houae
Place of Publication
~ Date of Publication
Signed to press
Copiea
~ COPYRIGHT
i
PUBLICATION DATA
; FUNDAMENTALS OF TROOP CON7ROL
xN COMBAT
; OSNOVi UPRAVLENIYA VOYSKAMI V BOYi1
; D. A. Ivanov, V. P. Savel'yev,
P. V. Shemanski-�
; Voyanizdat
: Moecow
: 1977
: 15 Sep 77
: 25,000
. Voyenizdat, 1977
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UDC 355.42
FUNDAMENTALS OF TROOP CONTROL IN CGMBAT
[Book by D. A. Ivanovs V. P. Savel'yev and P. V. Shemanskiy entitled
"Osnovy Upravleniya VoyekAmi v boyu" second edition, revised and eupglemented,
~ Voyenizdat, Moecow, 1977, 2500 copiea, 391 pagest eigned to prese 15
September 1977]
Tntroductian
: The firet edition of thie work wae pr.epared for printing at the end of
~ 1969. On publication, the work received a braad reaponse and approval from
the military connauni.ty. It wae trai:slated anc.l published in the languagea of `
the German Democratic Republlc, the Hungarian People's Republic, the
People's Republic of Bulgaria and Czechoelovakia. After publicat-aon, many
noteworthy evente took place in oiir country and its Armed Forces wh3ch had
a direct or indirect effect and ccm tinue to have a large effect on the deve-
lopment of the theory and practice of troop control. 7he mqat important
among these even!:a unconditionally ie the adoptfon of t:he resolutiona for
further improvemet;+t of control in gll areas oF social lifs by the 24th and
" 25th CPSU Congresses and the plenary aeasiona of the CtSU Central Committee.
In accordance with these reaolutiona by the party, aclentific re-
search work has been done on a broad acale in the counCry to develop the
science of control founded by V. I. T.enin, as a rezult of which in recent
years mery major worke, textbooka, brochureo and a:ticles have been publiehed
on the prohlems of troop management and control, the authore of which are
famoue Soviet ecientiete and experienced administratora.
MPasurea have been taktn with reapect to basic improvement of the
selection, deployment and training of management c,n all levels for the
nationai eeononry. Economic reform hae been developed. New meane of inecha-
nisdti.on and automation of adminiatrative and control work have been deve-
. loped and introduced into practice. Entire sutomated control ayateme are
bei:Lg built. The atructure of the control elemente is being improved, and
~ tf.air functiona are being wre precisely defined. Tfie moat effective
:nathema+tical economic methods are being found for production planning based
on the uee of computers and other control equipment and also the theoretical
. principles of the Acientific organizaLion of labor.
1
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In evaluating the eignificance of Chese meaeurea, at the 25th CPSU
Cangress L. I, Brezhnev mnde the following stgtemenCt "s ..the meaAUres to
improve the managementi of the economp ehould be, must be, cane3dered ae the
' most important reserve, the use of which wi11 help succesafully to fu1fi11
the Tertth Five-Year Plan and prodvce a 1get3ng effect in the future."1
- Zte reeoJ.uCione o� the 24th and 25th CPSt1 Congreases and the plenary
_ seseion.s of the CPSU Central Committee with respect to the probleme of can-
trol of the national economy tmdoubtedly elso pertain Co the management of
the troops of our Armed Forces who constiitute a component part of the aocial-
iet society. The measures taken ott the basie uf the party resolutione
= throughout the country to improve the conCrol of the economy are an unprece-
dented form of ecientific approach for the military peraonnel to the aolution
of the problema :,f tsoop control arieing in connection with ecientific and
techn3cal progresa and with the revolution in mil3tary affaira taking place
- on the basio of it.
The fulfillment of theai~ party resolutiona will promote improvement
- of the combat readinese of our troops and, in the f3na1 analyaie succeseful -
- fulfillment 4f one of the primary mieaione atated by the 24th and reaffirmed
by the 25th CPSU Congreass "Everything that hae been created by the people ~
must be succesefully defended. To atrengthen the Sovl.et state meana to
atrengthen its Armed Forces and improve the defensive capacity of our home-
' land in every way posaib le."2
Zfi e important significance of the state of the art of troop control
for maintAining high combat readinese has been confirmed by the entirea his-
tory of military acience over many centuriea. The experience of past wars
and, esper.ially, World War II, gives ua many examplea where artfully con-
trolled troops have won brilliant victories over auperior numbers of the
enenry. However, there hrive also been caeea where wetl-armed troops have
auffered destruction only because they lacked scientific, firm, conaistent -
control on the part of the commanders and ataff. In order for thie not to
happen in the future, it is necessary to make conetant improvementa in troop
management and control and remember the beheat of V. I. Lenin that "any
battle includes the abatract poeaibility of defeat, and there ia no other -
meane of diminiahing this poesibility than organized preparation for battle."3
In addition, hietory confirma that the state of the art of practicing
troop control depends to a decisive degree on the depth of the theoretical
resolution of the control problems in the general military acience aystem.
1. Materialy XXV S yezda RPSS (Materia2s of the 25th Congress of the CPSU),
Mos,;ow, 1976, pp 60-62.
. 2. Materialy 7IXN S"yezda KPSS (Materials of the 24th CPSU Congresa),
Moacow, 1971, p 81.
~ 3. V. I. Lenin, Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Collected Works], Vol 6, p 137.
2
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This relation ie especially acutely manifeeted ati the preeene time when new
- ' meane and methods of armad comb ae have impoeed new, higher requiremente on
controlo the practical eatiefaction of which ie unthinkable withoue a ec9.en-
_ tific tlieory of troop conCroi.
The purpose of the eecond ediCion o� thia book is to anal.yze the eheo-
retical principles of troop control in modern combaC on the basis o� the
_ reeolutione of the party and govexnment with respece to the control probleme
and also the experfence of paet wars, mil3tary teachinge and changes in the
meane and methods of armed corob at, and Co demonetirate the poseible meana of
, improving troop control planned in tihe armies of the most developed coun-
tries in technical reepecte, Inaemuch ae it does not appear poseible to
- conaider troop con trol in all the elemente and various forma of their acti- _
vity (when carrying out cambat and politi.cal training, when doing interual
service, and so on) in a aingle woxk, the authore have limited themeelvea to
_ the analyeis of the control procees only under combat conditions, which hae
found ite reflection in the new, somewhat more precise title of the book
"Osnovy Upravleniya Voyekami V Boyu" [Fundamentals of Troop Control in Com-
bat] inetead of th e former title "Osnovy Upravleniya Voyskami" [Fundamentals
of Troop Control].
In order to redtice the folume of the work and avoid excese repeti-
tion, the so-called functional attribute ie uaed ae the baeis for its
etrucCures each of the baeic functions of control (gathering and proceasing
of data on the aituation, deciaion making and planning of combat operations,
and so on) ie coneidered in a separate chapter or aection both for training
and during combat. Thie atxucture ie taken as the basis in cannection with
the fact that Croop control, juet ae any other contro:l, is always cf a
clearly expreased cyclic nature--the majority of Che itroop control functione
during training and during the course of combat operaltions are miavoidable -
and are repeated again and again. Only their epecifii: content and condi-
tions of execution change, which the authors have takinn into account in dis-
cusaing each chapter.
When preparing the second edition, the criticall commenta of the
readers of the firat edition were also taken into account. "The authora ex-
prese their eincere appreciation for these commenta.
3
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y,
CHAPTER 1. CONTENTo ESSENCE AND PROCIDURAL PRINCIPLES OF TROOP CONTROL
l. General Concept of Control
e
In any ecience, the we11-founded nature of the theoretical conclusione
and the value of the pracCical recommendationa with respect to ths solueion
_ of one special problem or another are directly dependent on the proper un-
deretanding by the researcher of the'phenomena and the procesaes which are
of a more general nature with respect to the given problem and also the metho-
dology of the investigation, the point of view and general acientif ic prin-
ciples. Attaching important aignificance to the specific nature of control,
V. I. Lenin also warned: "...he who takes on special problems without
q first solving the general problems, will at each atep unconacious].y 'encoun-
ter these general probleme. And to encounter them blindly in each special
~ case meane to be doomed tb a policy that ia more vacillating and more un-
founded.il V. I. Lenin taught that the general is a"atep towarde under-
- standing the epecific.i2
Ttie given procedural principles obligate ue to conaider the general
concept of control and the principlea on which the cnnetruction and fvac-
tikmi.ng of all control systeme wi2hout exception are based before we talk
about: the special and apecific problema of troop control in combat.
A propers united interpretation of the terms that we have used has
important eignificance for theory and practice. Ttie experience of many
eciences ahawe that otherwiae no theory can be eucceasfully developed, and
there will be varioue mieunderatandinge, dieputes, and even disorganization -
of work b oth in the research collectivee and in the control agenciea. In
order for thia not to occur, another well-knawn French acientiat, Descartea,
in hie time advised: "Define the meaning of the worda preciaely and you
will save mankind half of his confueion." The validity of this opinion for
the topic that we have investigated will become more obvious if we coneider
that there ia a difference in approach between our Soviet pre8s and the
1. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Worke, Vol 15, p 368.
2. Ibid, Vol 29, p 252.
4
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; foreign preee when defining and interpreting certain terms and general con-
; cepte of contirol# Philosophy usually eharacterizes contrnl ae one of the
~ properCies of materia1 sys tems , and cybernetice 3a the procees of the move-
ment of infQrmatiang ordering or converting a eyetem from one etate to ano-
ther, Mathematic_atane are primarily intereetied 3n the poaeibilit3es of
' formalization, algorithmi.zation, quantitative description and eimulat3on of
' control processes in order to create Che mathematical baeie for their automa-
~ tion. Zte eociologiete and juriste most frequenCly emphaeize the eoc3al and
legel aepects which davelop in control eyreteire, and econemiste, the economic
aepecre of control,
Zhere are no theoretical errors in uny oF theae interpret-atiione. Haw-
_ ever, they aharacterize control only fro~.n one or several points of view
without giving an integral repreeentation of iC.
Zhe eseence of troop control in combat and operationa is in nend of
clear definition. Some of the definitions encounCered in the literarure
reduce the eseence of troop control to direction of t'ie Croope on the part
of the commandere and etaff, 7hie cannot be cone3dered eatiafactoryo for
the word "direction" aleo nee;:a explanation.
An inadequate definition of the essence of troop control is aleo pre-
eented in auch authoritative worke ae the "Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya"
[Small Soviet Encyclopedia]. It eayat "Troap control (crnnbaL and operation
control) is the greparationt -conduct an@ eupport of combat opexatione by the
commander with the help of thG ataff and other control elemente." 7he in-
exactnees of this definition at least includes the etatement that the com-
mander conducte combat nperatione with the help of the ataff and other
. agenciea. Indeed, the combat operationa are conducted by none other than
' the troope who are the object of control for the comnander, etaff and the
other agenciea. In addition) in the given definition the term "troop and
operation control" is used. Thie term is of a more figurative than acien-
tific nature. Indeed, both comh at and operation are two-way processes in
which both ;.)ur own troops and the eneury participate with explicitly oppos-
- ing (enemy) goals. Under these conditioxte, in order to control the combat
- (operation) it is neceseary to control not only our aan troopa but also the _
enemy. In the literal sense of the word "control" th2 latter Sa theoretic- -
ally impoasible at least because the commaZder cannot require reports from -
' the Qner.ry or give the enemy troopa ordere, asaign miasiona and su on, and `
without doing thie there ie no control. It is poeaible and neceseary, to
influence the enemy actively by the fire and the attack of his own troape,
reception camouflage and other meseurea in order to force the enemy to act
where, wIhen, and haw it is advgntageoue to have him act. Ziiis reflexive
sepect of control is of ten emphaeized by certain suthora in using the term
"comb at and operation control."
_ From what hae been stated it is obvious that there is an urgen*_ neces- -
aity for giving a clear, ecientifically based definition of the concepts of
"control" in general, and then "troop control in combat," in particulsr.

5
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In order Char this definition be understandable and, "Lhe main thing, that
it have practical eignificance, in oux opinion, it muse at 1e8et anewer the
�ollowing queotiones who (what) ia controlling, who (what) is being con- -
trolled, what is the control based on, for what purpoee and how is the cnn- -
trol specifically exerciaed?
It is poaeib Ye to solve the given problem only by baeing our solution
solidly on the methodology of Marxiat-Leniniat materialietic ecience. With-
out touching on a11 of the conclus ione of Chie ecience, firet of all let ua consider the principle that hy the essence of any procesa, including any -
control, we muet underatand ita deepest, general,>stable and cona tanCly re-
peating internal aepecta. Here the essence is not obvious on the surface
of the investigated grocese inaemuch se it does not coincide with the ex-
ternal phenomena.
Tfie latest achievemento in such sciences tal:ing into account the
varioua aepecte o� control euch as sociology, military acience, cybexnptics,
psychology and eo on can be of great seaietance in solving the p roblem with
which we are faced. The complex approach, that ie, the approach consi3ering
' the conclueione of all sciences, investigating certain aspecta of control, -
hae great procedural eign.ificance. Here the initial base for the investiga-
tion can be only practice, inaemuch as it is imposaible to think up any -
ecientific theory o�r �ormulation. It can be extracted only from the material
_ world aurrounding us, from actuslly, objectively existing facta. "i, e
point oF view of life .-.n3 practice," V. I. Lenin noted! �mttet be the first
and the basic point of view of the theory of knowledge.0
What du practice and tYie objective world offer ue with respect to the
problems of control if we approach theiry analyais from the above-discusaed
procedural points of view? .
Ab ove all, ttiey indicate that control is not a phenomenon that is
thought un or occura in a"vacuum," but is one of the general and 4bjec- -
tively required propertiea and conditions of the exietence and development
of the materia], world. Control occura in all 'Lorma of the movement of mat-
ter: mechanical, phyaical, chemical, biological, and alsa in eocial life. -
Without control no machine can operate properly, a current cannot travel `
over a wire, the.!:e can be no life, including our awn organism, an i,nduetrial
enterpriae cannot function, the kolkhoz and the government ss a whole cannot
function and no troop formation (subunit, unit, and so on) can wage b attle. _
Regiflning with thi9 fact, in modern ecience control is divided (clas-
sified) into the following three large types:
1) Control in i.nanimate nature, including machinea and ecmpltxea
of machinee;
1. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Workc, Vol 18, p 145.
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2) ConCrol in animnee nrganisns (biologicai eysteme);
3) ConCYOI in hurnan society, in co21ece3vee of people 3n their eocinl
11fe, including tiie conduct of armad combat (social conerol). _
There ie a significgnC differenca with respece to naCure gnd purpaee
among rheee eypee of control, gs we ehall aee below. It wouYd be a grng,j
error to'place an equal sign, for example, between a live cell gnd a tank
regimeiit., 'However, on the baeie of dialectic unity of the material world,
all forme of control are charactierized 'y identical formal attributeo, gene-
ral principles end lawe which are etudiad by the compargtively young a cience
of cybernetice, and the knowledge of which hae great thearetical and praG-
tical eignificarue. Ttie firet euch aCtribute of any con.trol ie the presence
of a defined etructure or organizaeion. Indeed, the term "control" iteelf
preeuppoaes in Ruseian thar khaxe is a eubject or object which controle and
together wirh thio, there ie the subject or objecC which ie controlled. 7he
fonner ie called the control agent and the latter, the object of conrral or
the target;
We are convinced, on the eignificence of the term "contirol" when we
- talk about the actione of an object which cannot and must not tgke place _
:-andomly witha,it trganization when eome guiding or organizing effect on the
' part of the control agant is rEquired. Hawever, in order that the Effect
be realizable, therg muet be 8ome communiCation between the control agenC
artd object. Such words ae "directicn," "correction," "management" and ao on are
identical wirh reapect to meaninf; (synonyms) with the word "control." These
worda are usually used where we wish to attach some shade of ineaning to the
control procees. Thus, the word "direction" is used, as a rulE, when we
ere talking at,out control on the part of the higr,er government, party and
military orgene and duty personnel, and when thie control ie of a more gene-
ral coordinating and guidance nature, it combinea not only econosaic or
military-atatistical func[ione but also eocial-politicsl and educatianal _
f.unctione, the selection and deployment of perannnel, coordination of their
activity, and so on. For example, we eay the "CPSU direcCs (n^t controls)
- the building of communiem in our country." "*he Miniatry of Defenae directe
the Arme3 Forces," and so on.
'ihe worde "guidance," "regulation," "correction" and others -t:z ssed
inatead of the word "control" as a rule, when we axe talking about control
during the course of the procese, in ite dynamic atate.
Thus, when analyzing the process of control from the point of view of
form in any material environment, we muet underatand this proceas to be the
activity of the control organ coneieting in the required guidance activity
via the communicetions channele on the object of control.
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The seC di these three elemente--the conCrol egent or orgac with the
technical meane and methedo of operation chargcteriet3c of it$ the objecC
- of the control end thu communicatione chgnnele between them--ie cglYed the control syetem1 (eee Figure 1).
Cv 0,71707;0U CeaJu (4) `
Ilo c~o' f aHq4pMaI3~ rocn~o.wNr~p) Cped' (5)
~1o,wt.xu
Opzaii
O~si'~rm yn nenu ~6~
- ynpaeneau,~, '~;u~ Cy)
~'onVA np Mou cesev ! ~oMexu
101I ' ~ ROMQNBHp~1 (/N06'aMdf(Il,I)
Figure 1. Schematic Di.agram of the Structure and the Operationa of the Con-
trol Syatem (the Closed Control I.oop).
Key: 1. Object of control;
2. Feedback channel;
3. (Iniormation of etate);
~ 4. En.vironment;
5. In,terference;
6. Ccmtrol organ or agent;
7. De:cieion making;
- 8. Intterference;
~ 9. Di.rect communicationa channel
(c:ommand information) ;
10. Ervironment.
In thie general system the ccmtrol agent eometimes is called the con-
trolling system (or sutisyetem), and the object of control or target ie some-
timea called tne controlled system (subeyatem). Zfie authors who exclude
*he ob;ect of control cr target from the concept of the "control system"
permit a gross procedural error inaemuch w such a system theoretically can-
not function without tte object of control (eomething to control). For
realization of the control process all of ita mater3al carriere axe needed--
- both the "producera" and the "conaumere," that is, a cloaed loop.
Conaequently, the control system forms an internal atructure, the
material base for any control proeess. Without the system, without material
1. In generei in ecience a system ie coneidered to be an organized, cloeed -
unit of regularly connected elementa capable of interaction (objecte,
subjects, opinione, and eo on). Here the properties of the system ae a
Whole are identical to the properties of each element or group of ele-
ments taken individ�ually.
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strucCure, ther.e c:en be no conerol and vice-verea, The system nature ie a
wtivereal properCy o� a11 matter and gn objecGively neceseary condition for
any control procees. The worid eurrounding us ie 1lterally "put togeeher"
from varioue eytems. "Now," F. Engels wrote in hie "DinlecCica of Naeure,"
"a11 nature ia spread out before ue as a system of relatione and procesees."
7he objective nature of ttie exioeence of the control systems does nae
mQen, however, that they remain unchanged. On the contrary, they are con-
etantly developing and are improving together with the development oF
material life.
Certain aCtribuCes of control ere obeerved in the mosC primitive
nucleated") form in the eyeCeme of inorganic nature.l During the prolonRed
courae of`hYetoric evolution on ehe baeis uf these elementary eyeteme more
. complex and organized biological conCrol eyatens arose, beginning with the
= live cell and endinR with the moet complex and highly arganized eyetem--
the human organiem. Ae a resulC of aelf control (autoregulation) in such
systems, blood preesure that ia permiesible for 11fe, temperaturet eugar
eantient in the blood are maintainedp and the producte of proceseing food are
eliminated, protection from harmful external effects if provided, and many
other procesees take place.
However, the development of control systems in nature did not end
with this. The genius of man, hia inCelligence and labor have created vari-
ous technical control eysteme (machinea). The dteam engine, the automobile,
the computers epacecraft, tank, antiaircraft misaile complex, and ao on--
all of these are control eysteme that were created by man. Here man him-
- self always appeara as the basic control agent. Tfie so-called "man-machine"
system is formed. Man uaes varioue levers, inetrumente and automatic con-
trol dev3ces whi.ch operate by a program compiled by him as aids. 7he ob-
ject of control or the target is either a machine (complex of machines) as a
whole or individual elementa of it. Tfie cormnunication channele between man,
the control inetruments and the machine can also be different: visual,
auditory, mechanical, electromagnetic, chemical, document, and eo on. Tbus,
a atill more complex "man-automaton (instrument) -machine" system is formed
(see Figure 2).
Heret if thP system ie rapable of operating without the direct parti-
cipation of the man (but by hie programs), then it ie said to be automaticg
and with the participation of man, automated.
1. For more details on control in inanimate nature see L. A. Petruehenko,
"Printsip Obratnoy Svyazi" [Feedback Principle), Moecow, 1967. Zfie author
indicates the inconeistency of the vtews which refute the preaence of the _
attributee of control in inanimete nature without the participation of
man inaemuch as they contradict materialistic dialectics.
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- 3imulCgnaousl3+ with the technical ayaeems, as ehe di.vision and co-
operatinn of humgn lgbor incrennes, vnrious eocial conerol eyetems have been
' created inaamuch ae man has lived and work8i noL alone but in collectives.
"Any direcCly eocial or joint labor realized on a comparaCively large scale,"
wrote K, Marx, "neede controi eo g greater or leeeer degree, which estab-
liehee the coordination between the 3ndividua'L operationg and performs gene-
rgl functions occurring from the movemene nf the entire production nrganiem
in contraet to the movemenC of ite independent elements. 7he individual
� violin conCrole 3eeelf, the orchestra needs a conductor.i1
djouMNQs ceAjb
cocedned cucmeMai
C (3) ICpMQAN nepomHnu ca9,w ~ (4~
(2) ~Q ~o,wexu 1e,~~ na
(5 A4aeKm ' . AemoMOr. p~oN 8e1tue-
y0pueseNUI ~ cmORa(uu
npudop o tur
(6) ~erru~ p ene~
X �`A'ONQAN OxMOt[ tOAd(!
_...i' I
- - . - -
(9) CJdu,unoA te,~Ji
c cocedned cutmeMOu
Figure 2. Conatruction of the Control System Ueing the Means (Devices) of
AutomaCion.
Keys 1. Mutual coupling to adjacent syetem;
2. Fnvironment;
3. Feedback channels;
4. Interference;
5. Object of control;
6. Direct communicationa channele;
7. AuLomatic inetrument;
8. Control organ or agent;
9. Mutual coupling to the sdjacent syatem;
10. Superior control organ or agent.
With reapect to purpoee, the social syatems, juet as the technical
syetems, are varied: the ehop, the induatrial enterprise, the brigade, the
kolkhoz, the echool, the acientific reeearch inatitute, the symphony orches-
Cra, theater, induetrial aesoci.ation, branch of the national economy, govern-
ment as a whole, and also the company, the battalion, the regiment, and so
on. Here either a man taken individually or a collective of people who
1. K. Marx and F. Engele, Soch. (Collected Worke], Vol 23, p 342.
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have different aeeignmentig are Cgken ae the Contirnl ggent or organ: the
chiefp the diYector (the bnard of directore), the brigade leader, the CIIMi1-
mgn (the board), the chancellor, the conductor, the minieeer (the board)l the
council of ministere, the commanders the shaff, and ao on. The object (sub -
ject) of conCrul in euch syeCeme glwgys ie people using the Correeponding
equipmpnC. Varioue channele beginning wiCh visual and audio channele and
ending with complex rgdio electronic devices mgking up the aueomated control
systeme are uaed for the coupling between the agents and objecte of control.
The eocial control syetem, consequently, by comparison with the Cech-
nical syeteme, ie dietinguiehed by great complexity and ie in the form of
e mult3faceted combination of the "man-automatan (inetrument)-mgn-machine."
Running somewhat ahead, let ue note Chat the propcr undereCanding of
the eesence and etructure of control eyetems hge not only great cognitive-
procedural significance, but aleo great practical eignificance. In the light
of the resolutione of the 24th gnd 25Ch CPSU Congresees in particular, it
obligaCes ue when finding meane of improving troop control to use the so-
called eyexeme or complex approach requiring improvement of the vgrious as-
pecte of control on the basie of the achievementa of a number of eciencee
eimultareously, not only certain individual elements, but a18o the sysCem
sa a whole, that ie, both the control agente or organe gnd their functionso
end the control objecte and the conmunication channele with them. Only in
this way can the desired resul.t be achieved.
Coneidering the external forml let ue now proceed to the analyaie of
the interna1 content of control by which we usualYy meen the set of inter-
connected functions realized by the control agents in order to operate in
the neceseary way on tr e objecte of control and achieve the final purpose.
Zhe control functiono in turn, ie coneidered to be the special form of
administrative labor of the control agent or organ which leads to the achieve-
ment of the epecial (intenoediate) goal on the path to the common, final goal.
The rank of control fucction therefore cannot include every elementery mea-
aure of the control organ. A function is a more independent, general and
cansolidated concept than any separately taken mea8ure. It includes the
stable group af ineaeuree that are uniform with reepect to nature, the reali-
zation of which permits achisvement of the epecial purpoee and an approach
to the perforwance of the aucceeding functiona althovgh in practice eome-
timee there ie a change in role and eome intertwining, a euperimposing of
one function on another with reepect to their time of implementation, Which
We ehall eee beloW. In the funetioaet the interrelations and the set, con-
eequencea, content, technology and dynamics of the entire control proceee
are manifested. Tfi eir manifestation ariaes from the eeparation and speciali-
zation of the control and adminiatrative work.
2n accordance with the funetions, the structure of the control agenta
or orgene ie con4tructed, and for the fulfillment of each of them ueually
the dietribution of righte, obligatione and reeponeibility among the compo-
nent parte (for exsmple, the duty personnel) of thePe agents. their epecial
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- knowtledge and ekills, the appli.cation af the corresponding eechnical cnnerol
meane and also the sequQnce of inethode and proCeduree fdr acCion are re- -
quired. 7'ha G]eercut definition of the funcC3ons conepquenCly hae great
~ significence.
In order correctly Co deflne r.he control funcCione characeeriseic of
any control organ or agent, it ie neceesary again to analyxe Che practice of
the actione taken by the latter. In thie analyeie wg can comparatively -
eaeily eatablieh above a11 the fact that the control procese cn the parti of
any control organ occure not in itsell, but ia the coneequence of a cauee, e
reaction to certain changes in the object of control or in the environmene. _
7hus, the leaf of a tree when 3t is heated in the sun begins to curl in order
to decrease the heating eurface and curtail the evaporation of moisture.
Thp chameleon, seneing danger, changes his color. On detecCing a turn in the
road to the right, the driver of a motor vehicle turns the wheel in that
direction. Ort recei.ving information about an approaching enemy aircrafC
from a radar or by persongl obeervations the commander of an antiaircrafC
battery gives the command to open fire. Measuring the corresponding para-
meters of motion of the aircraft, the automatic pilat takee action on the con-
trole and changes ti~e heading and flight altitude. It is poseible to present
an infinite nutober of euch examples.
What hae been etated indicatee quite obviously that the primary (ini-
tial) function of any control agent ie to obtain information on the state and
che actiona of the object of control or target and its environment via the
feedback channel (see Figuree 1 and 2). This information ie called the in-
formation of state in cybernexica. Without this information, successful
control on the part of any agent is theoretically imposaible, for this un-
avoidabl}� (sooner or later) entere into contradiction aith objective reality
and leade to destruction of the eyetem. Moreover, obtaining euch tnforma-
tion is alWays a epecific and complex form of activity of the control agent
requiring epecial rightel knowledge and the application of the corresponding
ueane and methode of operation. By these argumentg, it is entirely correct
to con$ider it a control function, and not an auxiliary measure. Tfi is es-
pecially pertains to the modern eocial control eyetems Where the information
flowe are growing every yeer. Tfierefore it ie no accident that the resolu-
tiona of the party and the government provide for the creation in our country
of an all-union automated eyetem for gathering and proceseing information,
and epecial attention is alWaye given to the gathering and study of data on
the situation in the practice of tactical troop control.
ThE reaction of the control agent to the received inforroation of
etate variee. In highly developed eyetem8, the cor.trol agent not only re-
ceivee but also perceivee, etores, Atudies and converte the information of
etate, it cocipares it With the given etate, and if necesaary, converte the
syetec, to a theoretically new atate correeponding to the altered conditiong.
At the eame time the control agent actively influencee the object of con-
trol. Thie active reaction of the 8yetem becomes poeaible as a reault of
the fact that the ba8ie for ite conetruction ie the feedback principle.
Thie principle neceaearily preauppaees not only receiving information of
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eCgte but aleo the 0ubsequenC function of the control agenC--plenning of the
actiune af the object of control, the moet important and obj8ctively neces-
eary act o� whi.ch i.s dpci.aion-muking. Withouti the decie3on of the control
agenr, no purposefui action of the object of control ie theoretically pos-
eible.
'1he eseence of making any decieion and planning ae g whole rnneisee
in the conxxol ggent's detprmingxion of the goels of the actions taken by the
object of conCrol, iCe epecific cnieeion, the sequence, the forces, the means,
methods and timen of their execution and also the meaeureg in euppnrt of
these ecCione on the baeis o� the analyeie and evaluaCion of the information
of etate attd aleo the lawe in the given medium.
Yn nybernetics, the decieion making proceoe usually ie defined ae
convereion of information of etAte to comroatid information (or contrcll infor-
mation) by the control agentl that ie$ convereion of the information of state
to information by meana of which the goals of the object of control tre
etated and at the eame time ite actiona and the fvnctic+ning of the syatem
ae a whole are aeeigned a purpoeeful nature. It ie perfectly obvious that
the purposelese randoa, actian on the part of any object cannot be conaidered
contro]ledl inasmuch ae they contradick the meane of the Fiord "control."
; My control is rea].ized not for the eake of iCeelf, , but so that the control-
led abject can achieve eome purpose. The purpoeefulneae, conaequently, is
also a mandatory and a pri.mary attribute of any type of control, indepen-
dently of where it is realized (in machines, live organism or in a collective
of penple).
With respect to ite nature, the goals of the control can be highly
varied. 7hey depend entire]y on the purpoae of the eyetem and the conditiona
of ite functioning. The determination of the goal by the control agent
takes place differently in systems. In the syetems functioning Without the
participation of man, for exmnple, of the organisms of animels, the goal is
formed on the baele of the unconditioned and conditioned reflexes acquired
during many hundrede end thoueande of yeare, adaptation to the fnvironment
and aleo the generated inetinate. 'ifie control goals are Zefined theore-
tically differently in the eyateme With the participatian of man. Nere the
baei8 for thie deteronination ie a higher farm of reflection of objective
activity--thought--the conecioua goal setting aimed at satisfaction of the
needa of nun. Nere man is capable of acting on ngt�ure, ideally foreseeing
the finel results nf the actionb taken by the object of control. According-
lyl K. Marx Wrotes "...the pooreet architect is distinguished from the best
bee fran the very beginning in thaz before the Wax cell can be conetructed,
it is already being conetructed in his head. At the end of the labor pro-
cess, a result is obtained ahich at the beginning of thie procese already
existed in the imagination of the man, that is, ideally.i1 In another place
he notrd that "in nature... one blind, unconscioue force acte on another,
in the interaction of which the general laws are exhibited. Tfiere ia no
1. R. Marx and F. Engels. Collected Worka, Vol 23, p 189.
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_ conscidue, desired goal her.e..ui the contrary, in the history af society
ppople who Cake acCi.on ere thoee who are gifCed with consciou..-ness, nppxoLch-
~ ing defined gor_'�.s carefully or paseinnaeely. Noth3ng is done tiere witholit
- conecioua inten~, without a desi.red goal.il When contirolling collecei�rea of
people 3n eocial life the gogl is not only defined, buC it ig achieved by
man. Here edministrative labor ie a verstnn of ineneal labor, and the reYa-
tione in the control syatem ta.ke on the form of soci.gl relations among peo-
' ple with Cheir purely human qualitiea (ideology, mnral Qutlooka, attitude `
toward labor, knowledge and ski.lls, adaptations, habite, and ao oa). The _
purpoae of control here has a deep]y claseicgl nature.
AfCer making a deciaionj the planning proeesg continues when necessary
and when poebible, and it ia completed. Here the control orgatt specifiea gnd
detaila the problems, procedures, sequence, meane usesd and the times of ac-
tion by the control objactd, the order of their inCeraction with each other
and the environmento and so on. '
2n eCrict accordance with the decieion and the plan-nf operations `
thet have been made by the control agenti, the following control funcLione
ere realized--atatement of the goals for the object of control (giving him
an order, giving a command, a eignal, and ao on), the organization of inter-
nction and relatione to it and the environment and aleo compreheneive gupport
of ite actions. Out of the8e functiona, the atatement of the goals for the
object nf control ie objectively neceesary and the moat important, for with-
out it, ite purposeful actiona also are theoretically wnthinkable.
When realizing the mentianed functions, the control agent ia dealing
not with the information of state, but with the material objecta and input `
to them by transmiseion of command (control) information to them. The im-
plementation of the decision and the plan of operationa is achieved organi-
- zationally. For these reaeons, eome authore combine the given group of
control functions into one larger function of organization wh ich, in our
opinion, can be coneidered valid, but with the stipulation that there ie no
aherp boundary between the functione: this boundary ia highly provisional
and mobile. This stipulaCion is confirmed by the fact that without obtaining
infoxmation of atate and decision makirg, no proper organization is poseible
and, on the contrary, the gathering of information, the decision making and
all the other functiona are in need of organization. Organization, con-
sequently, permeates the entire proceea of the control and operation of the
system itself.
All of the enumerated functions constitute a type of preparatory step
in the activity of the control agent and the gyatem as a whole (the etatic
control). After their implementation, a new, executive atep occurs in which
the control functione are realized during the courae of action taken by the
objects With respect to satiefaction of the stated goals, that is, the
dynamic control. The given fuactions of the control organ are often
1. K. Marx and F. Engele, Collected Works. Vol 21, pp 305-306.
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- generalixed mtd called regulr,"%on, correction or operative Control. Wieh
.respecC ro conCant and essen,:e they i.n many caees are eimilar to the pre-
ceding (preparat;ory) functione.
_ Yn ordmx to confirm whgt he.9 been 9aid .1ee us again return'Co the
practical applicaxion. During the course of gction of any object of aontrol
whan fulfilling its miseion, the control organ again receives 3nformation
over the feedback channel about ite etata and environment, it compares it
with the prev3ously muie plan, in case af a deviation (nonaomparison) iC in-
troducee the correspond3ng correctione into the plan or makee a theoratically
new decieion (wiCh eharp changea in conditione), and then sends ehe correctPd
or new prublem over the direct communicationa channel to the object of con-
trol, Chat,is, tr,::~'ismite the command information.
D Tbeee operations are iepeated until the object of control compleeely
carriee out ite miseion and ehe final goal of the acCion of the syatem ae a
whoie is achieved. The entire control procese consequently ie of a clearly
expressed cyclic nature,
Finally, it is neceseary briefly to diecuse another control function--
monitoring. 2he giv-n function ie mentioned in the papera of a number of
authore. However, the isolation of monitoring as an independent function can
be juetified to some degree only by the great aignificance which it hae in
the general control process, especially in tacticel troop control. It ie _
for these reaeone Chat in the present work the monitoring by the commander
and the ataff of the readinese and the actione of the troope in combat ie
considered in a separate chapter.
If we approach the given problem from the point of view of mainte-
nance, then the aeparation of monitoring into Pn independent control function
cannot be conaidered justified. We are easily convinced of thie by practice.
When monitoring both statically aad dynamically, the control agent merely
performs functions already investigated by us: namely, it gathere data on _
_ the availability, the actual etate and the actiona of the objecte of con-
trol, it compares these data with the decision made and the action plang and
in case of a divergence it determines the necessary correctiona (it more pre-
cisely definea the previoua decision or'makea a new one), and it givea the
corresponding inetructions to the object of control (it statee a refined or
new problem for it). Coneequently, the baeie for monitoring is the prin-
ciple of feedback between the organ and object of control.
Zhust the analysis performed by us from the point of view of material-
istic dialectice and cybernetics on any control procesa makea it posaible to
etate r.hat independently of where this procesa is realized (in a computer,
in a live organism. a collective of people or in the society as a whole) ita
camaon features are the following:
Tfie mandatory presence of a control syetem made up of the control
agent (abjecta) of control and the direct communicatione and feedback chan-
nela connecting them;
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The exietence of n cauae and effecC relation beeween Che elements of
the control eyetem;
J
Purposefulnesa of the actiona takett by the syetem and the preaence of
' a controlling parameeer;
The dyngmic naCure of the syatem, iCs capacity to convert �rom one
atate to gnother and in eo doing undergo large loads from the external input .
wiChout dieCurbance of ite structure and properCies.
With reapect to form, the control in any eystem is the procees of
_ purposeful input from Che cantrol organ to the object of control, and with
reepect to content, both in the eCatic and in the dynamic eituation iC in-
cludee different functions of the main, mandatory and stable onea peraistent-
ly repeat3ng in eacY cycle are the following: obtaining information of staCe
over rhe feedback channelo decision making on the basis of thie information
and the delivery of connnand information to the object over the direct consnu-
nicationa channel, that is, atating ite goal. Without these three functions, -
no contxol is theoretically poaeible. It is worthwhile to exclude at leaat
one of them ae the control process eooner or later is dieturbed or etops.
They permeate all the remaining functiona, they are cloaely intertwined with
them and thua characterize the deep featuree of the entire control procees.
'lherefore they fully fit the philosophical category of esaence and permit ue
to give the following definition to the general concept of contral: any
control is a proceea of input from the control agent to the object of con-
trol based on the objective laws of the given environment by obtaining infor-
mation about the state of the object of control, making a deciaion on the
besie of this information and atatement of the mieaion of the object. The
given definition correeponds to all of the questions impoaed on it; for
what is the control, who (what) controls, who (what) ia controlled, on the
basis of what does the control take place and how doea it take placf.
2. Specific Nature of Tcoop Control in Combat and the Requirements Imposed
On It
The general cybernetic concept of control inveatigated by ua in the
preceding aecCion ae a procesa occurring in any material environment per-
taine fully to the tactical troop control.
However, auch a general concept of control alone is entirely inade-
quate for the practical activity of the officere when managing troops in com-
bat. In order to understand the eubject more deeply, V. I. Lenin taught that
"it is neceseary to encompass, to study all aidea of the subject, all the
relatione and 'intermediate concepte.ii1 As applied to our topic, the given
procedural requirement means that in addition to the general concept of
control it is neceseary for the officere to have a deep underetanding of
1. V. I. Lenin. Gomplete Collected Worke, Vol 42, p 290.
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- the specific nature of troap control on vgrious level8, keeping 3n mind thati
~ thie epecif3c nature occupiee ehe domtnanG poeition and ie of a dual natura.
F3reti, in the case of troop control in comb at, ihe officere muet be guided
by the general lawe of social development and government cuntrol 3naemuch ae
any war 3e a eocial phenomenon) and the armed foYCes are a component part of
eociety and the weapone of the etate. Secondly, thoy must know and ekill-
fu11y uea the lawe and principlea of direct combat art following from the
baeic purpoee and structure of the troope as an o',%J,act of control and also
from the conditiions of armed combat which differ ei.gnificantly from the con-
ditione of any other phenomenon of eocial life.
In order to diecover the epecific nature of troop control in cotbat,
we again use Che methodology of the theory of knaalecige and we perform a eys-
tems aralyeie of the organizational et:-ucture of the troope, and the proceae
of their combat activitiee.
Organization of Modern Troop Control Systeme
With reBpect to thetr organizational etiucttire and the nature of the
troop operatione it ie poseible with complete grounds ro refer to the eo-
called large self-contiolled eyetems inaemuch as they are charscterized by
all of the baeic featuree characteristic of these syeteme: a comparatively
larae nucnbax of component elemente, complexity of etructure, variety of
relatione and interaction emong the elements and the external environmento
complex3ty of the problems eolved, high dynamic naCure of the syetem and ite
capacity to eolve new (previouely not provided for) problema, the preaence of
several criteria for estimating the reaulta of the opnrationa of the eyetem.
These features are especially clearly manifeated in the control sys-
tema for combined-arms eubunits, unite and combined units of infantry of a11
modern armiea. Therefore we ehall take them as the basie for the investi-
gation.
Tf we coneider thesp troopa as a sys tem and the comUined-arms battle
and armed combat ae a whole ae ite operatione, then, in spite of their com-
plexity, it is possible to eetablieh the following componente (see Figure 3).
2fie firet one of these is the aubunita of the combat arms, the sol-
diers of which conduct battle with the enemy directly by the application of
the available meane of destruction, they .-';.:::rnv hie manpower and materiel
by fire and attack. In the infantry of modern atmies, such troopa include
the motorized rifle troops (infantry, motorized infantry, mechanized), the
tank troope, miseile troope, artillery and antiaircraft defense troopa.
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~4~ ~ us ~ ns ~
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Figure 18. Schematic of the Organization of
Radio Communications in the
Motorized Rifle Battalion on
Attacking From the March
Key: 1. lst motorized rifle company
13.
Radio networlc of the antiaircraft
2. 2nd motorized rifle company
guided misaile subuniC
3. 3rd motorized rifle company
14.
Radio network of the tank com-
4. Antitank guided misaile
pany command
subunit
15.
Radio network of the motorized
5. Mortar platoon
rifle company No 3, coimnander
6, lst motorizEd rifle battalion
16.
Radio network of the motorized
7. Ist artillery battalion
rifle company No 2, conmiande*
8. Radio network No 1 of the
17.
Radio network af the motorized
senior conmnander
rifle company No 1, commander
9. Radio network No 2 of the
18.
Interaction radio network
senior commander
19.
Commandera of the defensive
10. Radio network No 1 of the
s,abunit
motorized rifle battalion
20.
I4otorized rifle platoon leader
co.mmander
21.
Combat reconnaissance patrol
11. Raclio n:twork No 2 of tlte
22.
Radiation and chemical recon-
motcrized rifle battalion
naiasance squad
commander
23.
Topographic reconnaissance
12. Radio link of the mortar
battery
platoon
24.
Radio network of the senior ar-
tillery chief
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,r
~Key continued frnm preceding page)
25. Chief of etaff of the motorized rifle battalion
26. Commander of motorized rifle battalion
27. Technical eupport radio network
28, Artillery battalion commander
29. Damaged tanke and armored personnel cerriers
30, Maintenance and � ~covery group
31. Chief of stgff of tihe art311ery battalion
32. Firing position
33. AdminleCrative platoon 1eader
34. Forward observation poet
35. Redio network of the artillery battalion commander
36. Radio network of Che battery 1 commander
37. Radio network of the bartiery 2 connnander
38. Radio network of the battery 3 commander.
F'or automatic radio relaying of Che transmitted radiatitm at the conCact
point of the radio relay channele and the radios, varioue epecial attachmente
ere ueed.l
An increase in range of Che radioe can be achieved ae a result of care-
fully planned location of the control pointe with respect to the combat (march-
ing) formation of the subunitet clear organization of their dieplacement and
also ekillful selection of the placee for deployment of the radioe. Here at
the battalion level it ie important to uae all of the cnmmunicatione means
complexly coneidering their propertiee and the poseibilities with reepect to
the eupport of faet and hidden information tranemiseion under the developed
conditions. Only under thie condition will it be poseible to eneure continu-
ous communicationa throughout all of the conbat period. At each command
level a united coYmnunications syetea ie created which is coordinated with
the systeme of higher headquartere and gubordinates, neighbora, interacting
subunita, and providimg for the requirements of the commender and the control
unite.
Ttie baeic initial data with reepect to the orgaaiaation of communica-
tione are provided by higher headquarters and the chief of etaff who defines
the communicatione mieaiona, the locationa of the control points snd also the
procedure for moving them under comhat conditions, with whom and at what time
communications must be provided.
Explaining the misaione received and evaluating the eituation aith
respect to comnunicationa, the communications chief determines the volume of
1. See: Voyennyy Veatnik (Military Vestnik), No 7, 1972, p 92; No 5. 19129
p 82; G. I. Garbuz, D. F. Loza, I. F. Sazonov, "Motoetrelkovyy Batal'on
v Boyu" (Motorized Rifle Bettalion in Comb at), Moacow, Voyenizdat, 19;2,
p 176.
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operations, the eequenee nf their execueion and the apecific missions eo the
signal aubuniC, Hare it ie poseible to beg3n the evaluation o� the conununi-
cations eituation wiCh an esti,mation of the oparations of our own troopet
what subuttite and what miesion, at whae epeed ie ie poeeibie Co advance, from
what 11ne the second echelon (reeerve) will engage in combat, whaC the die-
tance ie of the conCrol pointie froin the elamenCe of tha combae formation, Fad
whet the poseibilieies of the subuniti communications are. Beginning with the
estimgtes of our own troops, ehe beeic directinns are determined in which
communications mueti be realized and the expedient methode of trying varioue
communications meane, and the number of channele required eo eneure communi-
catione in each direction ere defined.
When evaluating the enemy, primary attention mueti be given by the eig-
nal chief to determination of the capabillty of the enemy for deatructiun,
damage to the communications and creation of radio interference, and he must
plan what meaeuree Co take eo that under theee conditione communications will
continue uninterrupted. Zhe Cerrain and the meteorological conditione are
evaluated from the point of view of their influence on the operating etabi-
litu of all types of communicationa.
2he careful explanation af the miesione and a compreheneive estimetifln
of the eiCuation with reapect to communications will permit the eignal chief
to define the organization of communicatione uaing all of the available meane,
to distribute them for the solution of the etated problems, to isolate the
reserve of the meane, to plan meaeuree with respect to the protection of com-
municatione againat the weapons of mnse destruction, ensurance of secrecy,
and eatablishment of the rm terial and technical eupport procedures.
It ie unqueationable that during the courae of combat operationa, in
connection with the appearance of additional problems and also loesea in com-
municationa forcee and means, the aignal chief will make changes in the ope-
ration of the aign,al subunit. The maneuvering by communications meane and
forces, skillful maneuvering of the communications channels coneidering their
load will find braad application. It ie also important to have reliable
internal communications at the control pointa themselves. Por organization
of thie type of connnunication$ different equipment ie used which providea for
two-way, loudepeaker communicatione. It ie not complex, and no great expen-
ditures of effort or time are required to establieh it.
Great prospects are being opened up for internal communications using
compact televieion and video telephone devicea, phototelegraph units and
radiophones. In the presence of atable, cloaed internal communications, the
necessity is reduced for personal calling of subordinates. Conditions are
created for improving operativenees aad achievement of coordination in the
operation.
Tfie index of clear organizational communicationa ia enaurance of the
eetablished procedure in the use of communications, eepecially in observing
radio diacipline. Not only the radio operators but aleo all of the duty
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pereonnel ueing radio communicatione mueC eericely adhere to the rules for
~ radio converegtione. On1y under thie conditton ie 3t poseible to achieve im-
proved etab311ty in the communicatione operaCione and to mainta3n secrecy -
with regazd to the content of the convereatione. Tharefore, when organiZing
- communicgeione, provieion is made for monitioring the use of the conmunicAtione
meane and obeerving radio diecipllne.
4
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CHAPTEtt 3. ORaANIZATION 0F THE WORK OF TEIE CONZltOL UNIT
i 1. Baeic Principlee of Troop Control
'ihe orgenization and methode of operaCion of conunendere and control
unitP in each epecific case depend on the nature of the comb at mieeion re-
ceive9, the timeg the levei of training of the officere, the degree of equip-
ment of headquartare with technical control meane and other Conditione. How-
ever, thie work is characterized aleo by certain general principlee, the
correct wnderetanding and obeervati.on of Which ie required under any condi-
tione.
As appliad to the troop control area, by principles We mean the basic
rules and principles by which the control units and commandere muet be
guided in their practical activitiea when aontrolling eubordinete eubunits.
Hsre, the principles are by nature the reeulC of ecientiRic generalization of
practice and follow from the objectively operat3ng leWa of the conducC of com-
bat.
"....Principlee are not the atarting point of our reeearch," wrote '
F. Enge18, "but the concluding resulte; these principles are not applied to
nature and to hwnan hietory, but are abetracted from them; it ie not nature
and man that agree with the principles, but on the contrary, the principles
-
are valid only inaemuch ae they correepond to nature and hietorq.il
Whereae lawa cannot be repealed or replaced by different onee, prin-
ciplee, in contras t, are more mobile. With a change in means and methods of
combat, the principles change. Some loee thefr meaaing and dthers are filled
out with new meaning; man ie relatively free in the choice of cextain prin-
ciplee. However, their creative application under other equal conditions
alwaye promotee uwre eucceasful fulfillment of the etated miesions.
At the eame time, principles cannot be identified with the require-
mente on troop control inveotigated by us above. Tfieee requirementa charac-
terize the qualitative state of control. 7iiey correspond to the queation of '
1. K. Marx ead F. Egels, Collected Works, Vol 20, p 34.
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what conCrol must be, in order to correspond to the neture of the combined-
arme combat and ineure ies euccese. The control principles, based on the
lawe of armed combae gnd the requirementie nf control, give recommendatione
about the mosC expedient operatione of the commnnder end stiaff, , They deter-
mite what muet be done and how iti muet be done in order to eatiefy the exiet-
ing requiremenrB on control. Iti ie entiraly oUvlous tt�t in the difFerenti
phaees of development of combnt art, the contirol principles operaeed differ-
gntly ineemuch ae the meane and methods of ariaed conibaC and the requiremenCa
on control heve changed. Thie ie the difference and the interrelutitm
between the requiremente on troop control gnd the principlea.
There ie an 3nCerrelation between the control principles and the etyle
of operation of the commandere and the control unite. If the principlee con-
tain the bgeic rulee which guide the commandere and the conCroi unirs in
their pracCical acCiv3ty, then the cheracCerietia featuree of thE, operaCing
etyle, what personal qualitiea ehey muet heve ttau what procedured, mcthods
gnd meane are more advantageous Co use for eucceeeful appl3cation of theee
pr3nciples and in the final analyeie the eatisfaction of the requiremente ott
control, gre indicated to them. The etyle of oparation, coneequentlyg ie to
a greater degree than the principlesg a oubjEC:tivE characCeristic of the
leadere. In other worde, the control principles are embodied and epecified
through the operating etyle. Tfie nature and etyle of activity of the com-
mander and the etaff to a eignificant degree determine the practical realiza-
tion of the baeic principlee. Zfie Leniniet etyle of operation, the zharac-
terietic featuree of which are ae follows, muet conetitute a model for them:
high aomnuniet ideology and principle, unity of theory and practice, aorde
and deede, innovation, proepectiveneeeo a bueineeelike attitude# modee ty,
independence, decieiveneee, demandingneee, organisation, clarity and Justi-
fiability.
In a number of Worka the authars indicate the extremelq large number
of principles, ae a reeult of Which their practical value is loet as the
basic principlee in the activity of the control orgarie, and they eeaentially
alreedy begin to exprese the featuree of the Work style or requirementa im-
poaed on troop control.
I
In order to avoid thie deficiency, at the pre9ent time only thoee
basic principlee are given which on the vhole constitute a united complex of
principles determining the theoretical baee and the direction and activity
of the control unit. The many yeare of experience of the laet var end aleo
postaar teaching will permit the etatement that the nwst important troop
control principlee are heartq naCure, ecientific epproach, prediction, one-
man commend and centralizatioq.
Tfie party na*ure ie the founding principle of troop control folla+ing
from the claee nature of armed combat and the decisive aignificance for auc-
ceeeful fulfillment of the combat mission of the moral-political state of
troop pereonnel. The given principle requiree of the commandere and etaff on
all levele of practical work in troop control that the palicy of the CPSU
and the Soviet government be initiated end implemented persietentlq, that
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r.,
eubordinates be educatad 3n the epirit of infinite devoeion eo their home-
land and haee for iCe enemies, faith in the oath, fr3endshl.p and fraternity
nf people gnd proletarian inCernat3ona11em. The practiical implemenCaC3on of
the party principle ie ineured primariYy by the guiding role of the CPSU in
the building of the armed forcee. The CPSU Program indicatee the folicnw3ngt
"The baeic principle of the building of the mil3tiary ie the leadeYehip ot the
Communigt Party exercised with regard to the armed forces, etrangthening of
the role and influence of the party organizations in the grmy and 3n the navy,
The party g3,ves constent aCtentian to improving its organizing and fuiding
effect on a11 life and ectivity of the arnry, eir force and navy..."
The I.eninist party principle Yequires the manifeetgtion of conetanC
concern f or the ideological hardetiing of the troope, the weging of an unflag-
ging battle with any manifeetations of bourgeois 3deology, the facte of a
pol3ricA1 outlook, againet the penetrgtion of revleioniet views. Life con-
vincingly confirme that the eucceeef ul fulfillment of the miseione is achieved
where the pereonnel are educated in the epirit of communist ideology and
party concerns, where a pexsietent etruggle 3e under way to converC the
ideae of Leniniem to deep pereonal convictinne on the part of each troop.
The given principle penetratee all the activity of the commander, the etaff
officere and the party-political apparatus. When eolving gny problem,
evalueti.ng f acte, eventa and phenomena, they are alwaye and everywhere obii-
gated to begin with the requiremente of party outlooks they correspond in
thie way tc the intereete of the 3oviet people and the goals atated by the
party in the given phaee for our Armed Forces.
The growing eignificance of the principle of ecientific approach in
troop control followe all of the baeic changee which have occurred in the
means and methode of armed combat which have eignificantly co*.plicated the
control and imposed new, higher requiremente on it. In ord*r to eatisfy
these requiremente, firat of all a scientific gpproach to troop management
ia needed.
In the brogdeet eense thie approach meana the use by the commanders
and etaff in their practical activity o� the objective lawe of varioue aci-
encea: Maraiat-Leniniet theory, military acience and engineering, phyaice,
chemistry, cybernetics, radioelectranics, mathamatice, pedagagice, psychology
and the advenced experience of the troope. It is obvioue that in order to
implement the given principle, deep, compreheneive irna+ledge of the basic
principli�e ef Marxist-Leniniet theorq, the underetanding of the lewa of eocial
development and the lawe of araied combati, the capacity on the baeie of mater-
ialietic dialectica deeply and camprehensively and objectivelq to analqze
and evaluate the eituation, to aee Wh at ie nev +and advanced, define the main
thing, the decieive link in a long cha4n of etated goals, skiil in clearlq
and creatively eacisfying the requiremente of the rules and regulatione
1. Prograaunna K+omnnmieticheekoy Partii Sovetekogo Soyusa (Program of the
Commumiat Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow. Politizdat, 1974, p 112.
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which const3tute a ecienCific generglixat3on of the many yeare o� combat eY-
periencal are required of the commanders and etaff on ali levels. Therefore
it ie r.o accident rhae the basic index of the ecientific approach to troop
contrei is tihe maki,ng of a eempreheneive, eubetantiated dec~sion by the com-
manderl effecCive utilizetion of the avgilable forces end materi.U, the
achievement af the combat miqeion with minlmtnn laeees and in the estab 1iehcd
timee,
In diecuesing the ecientific approach Co troop control, the role of
the pereonal (subjective) qualitiee of the officer, eepecially hie bueineea-
like approach, etrong will, decieivenees, bravery and also etrongly developed
intuition and even fantaey is i,n no way reduced. Above a11, in military
aff airs the role of these qualitiee of the leadar increasee significanrly by
~ comperieon with the control in other areas of eocial life. Consequent3.y,
_ troop contrnl etande before ue not only gs a ecience but also as an art, Che
_ capacity of the officer to use ectentific daCa in practice. The adminietra-
tlve work of commanders and rheir etaff iteelf ie also in need of ecientific
organization. The plannings purposefuinese and organization in work, proper
placement of the duty pereonnel coneidering their bueineeelike qualities
and eki11 in the efficient utilization of time acquire especially important
eignificance. `
Tfie prediction principle ie in continuoua relation to the principle
of acientific management; '_t eomehow complements and enrichea it.
In eseence, prediction coneiete in the capacity of the commander and
the eCaff eo provide in advarice for poeeible changea in the duration and the
probable course of the forthcoming combst operations. Thie principle plays -
an important role in the theory and practice of troop cnntrol inaemuch ae
without prediction it ie impossible to achieve victory over the enenry. The
role and significance of prediction followe frrnn the nature of armed combat
itself in which each of the sidee etrivea with gll meseuree to hide their
intention frnm the enenry, to achieve surpri8e and rout the troope of the
other eide. For this reaeon, in war there te a1Way8 ineufficient informa-
tion about the enemy, and some of thie Wormation ie accidental, ineuffi-
ciently reliable and even falge, Ha+ever, the ehortage of information doea
not relieve the commander of the dutq of making a timely, eubetantiated com-
bat decieion.
In c4nnection with the introductioa of nuclear weapone and the change
in the nature of combatl the role of prediction increaeee, and its area is -
eignificantly braadened. In particular, the coniumdere and etaff of all
levels are faced with new goale in the fieid of prediction such as the die-
covery of che grouping of the mesne of an enemy aucle+ar attack and determina-
tion of the poesible order of their application; coneideration of the effect
Which the application of theee meane aill have on the naral atete and combat
regdinees of the troope and aleo the nature of the terrain; forecasting the
radiation and ctiemica2 aituation; discovery of the posaible intention of the
operatione of various enemy reeervee aad other probleme.
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t!
ni6 vicienCifically oubsegctiated soYation of Cheee problens in the procees of prediction requiree ekill on the part of the commsnder end etaff
officere in ueing the dialectic meehod o� thoughti, the cepacity properly to
snalyze the eituation, tio diecover ite mein aepecte, end aiso deep keowledge
ef 'Che principiee of combined-erm combet. 5ki11 in pred3ct3on ig, there- =
forel an 3ndication of the overall tactical maetery and maturiCy of the offil-
cars In additian, proper predictiion ie~unthinkable withoue exaat calculationp
we11 laid out reconnaiesancel without deep knawledge of the mater3els the
organization of the troops, and the tactice of the enenq, for without thie)
it ie 9.mposeibre to predict the development o� the forthcoming operatiansl to
provide for the difficultiae which can be encountered when canying out the
combgt miesion and plan means of overcoming them.
7herefore under modern cunditionat the dagree of maetery by the off3-
- cere of the methodology of ecientific prediction to a great extent determinee
the depthe of analyeie of the developed conditione and the m;;.king of the besic
decieion. Here, the commanders and staff are greatly aesieted in etudying
the eituation and predicting the couree of combat operations by the ekillful
epplication of modern technical control meane, mathewatical mathode of invee-
tigating operatione, and PPRI planning meChode.
Tfie one-man commend constitutes not only the moet importent principle
of the building of the armed forcee, but also of troop control. Ae the con-
trol principle, it expreeees the one-man leaderehip by the commander of
subordinate troope on the basie of the authority granted him by the lawe of
the Soviet government and the or(lere given by the euperior officers. Tfie
one-man command comander pereonelly ie reeponeible belore the party a:d the
government for all aspects of the life and combat activity of the eubunit and
the unit. The operative-tactical, politicalg administretive and economic
functiona whieh offer the commander the poesibility of flexible and firm
control, the effective use of forces and meane in combat, ineurance of unity
of will and actione by pereonnel are concentrated in hie hands.
V. I. Lenin emphaeized the special neceseity for one-man commgnd in
building the armed forcee and in troop control under combat conditione. He
taught: "Zfi e irreeponeibility covered by references to group cortmoand ie the
most dengerous evil which threatene everyone who does not have great ex-
perience in the broad type of operation and which in combat leads unavoidably
= to catastrophe, chaosg panic, anarchy and destruction."1
Tn troop control the principle of one-mand cammand was always neces-
eary under modern conditione, in connection with changea in the armament and
the nature of combat operations of troops. Its aignificance has grvwn
greatly. It ie recognized ae ineuring effective application of the new con-
trol means, operative and reliable troop control and strong militarq diaci-
pline of the pereonnel under the complex conditions of highly maneuverable
_ combat operatione aith the application of nuclear weapona by both sides.
l. V. I. Lenin. Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Collected Worke], Vol 39, p 46.
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In our Armed Forcee, one-man commsnd is conatructed on the party basie$
which indicatee the high political consciouenesa of each commander and hie
pere3etent implementation of the policy of the CPSU, The mooe complete and
cle.arest refYection of the principJ.e of one-man comnand lies in the f8ct
= rhat only the commander beare complete gnd pereonal responeibility �or the
_ control of subordinate eroops and their eucceesFul performance of the combae
miseion, and that he alonQ has the right tio make the combat decision, which
is the baeis for aontrol.
However, !:hia in np way meand that in the case of troop control the
commander can ignoie the collective, not cons3der lt in h3e opinion. V. I.
Lenin, requiring etrict obearvation of the principle of one-man command, at
the same time warned many timee againet the oneaided understanding and appli-
cation of it, the use of bare adminietration. He taught that it is poesible
to lead by one proceee or another without basing the leaderehip on the creati-
vity and initiative of the collective, without maintaining cloee relatione to
the maeses, and without learning from them. Hence, the necessity ariaes for
akillful combinetion of thie principle with initiative and creativl.ty of the
collective which is tuade up of the party and Komeamol organizatione and also
etaff pereonnel and other duty pereonnel of the control unit.
"In other worde, in the recent past military art wae manifested pri-
marily in terme of the pereonality of the commaader, the military leaders,
_ a-d often the basie for the manifeatation was the personal qualitiea of the
commander, his lntuition and volitinnal risk. Naw military art, including '
_ Lhe mentioned elemente, is more and more manifested in terme of the creati-
vity of the collective based on exact calculatioes and compreheneive conei-
deration of the nature of combat, operatione and war as a whole. However$
the aingle conanender bears complete reaponeibility for decision making and
for the fulfillment of the stated combat miaeion.il
The concentration of the moet important control functione in the hands
of the single commander impoaee higher requiremente on hie moral and buei-
- nesolike qualities, hie profesaional training, ekill in forging the collec-
tive and mobilizing it for eucceseful operatione under any complex conditiona.
Tfie principle of centralization of control is continuously connected
with the pYinciple of one-man command. However, theee two principlea cannot
be coneidered identical.
By centralization of control we usually mean the combination by the
higher echelon of subordinate troope in ita hands and the direction of their
efforte to achieve the common combat goal in accordance with a united plan.
Rere, the senior officer not only etatee the miesione for aubordinates, but
in s number of caeea indicatee to them the proceduree for carrying out theae
miesions, and he also influencea the couree of combat operatione by the
forces and means at hie diapoeal.
1. V. Ku].ikov, Soviet Armed Forces and Military Science." KCtOtUNIST [Com-
mmiet]. No 3, 1973, p 83.
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F
On the clifferent hietoricai 1eve1, the problem o� the degree of cen-
trallzation or control wag eolved differenCly depending on the armamene, the
organizar3on ana the nature of the cnmbat opeYatione of the troops, the ].evel -
of training and experience of the crnnmand pereonnel and other conditione.
Here, the lees mobila the forme of combat, the greater the degree to which
troop control wae centralized.
- In modern combat, the fulfillment of the miesion ie achieved by vaxi-
oue combat araie and epecial troope with their varioue mater3el, which re-
- quiree, juet ae before, the centralized combinaeion of their conditione and ~
constant coordinaCion by the aenior officer of their operatione. The espe-
cially rigid centralization of control at the preeent time is needed when -
solving the problems of the application of pawerful fire weapone and above
all$ nuclear weapone. The obeervation of the pr3nciple of centralization in
this area permits the senior officer to make effective, and at the eame t3me
economica]., use of theee meane, to decieively influance the course of comb at,
quickly carry ovar the forces from one direction to the other and a18o Co
coordinate the operatione of all of the forcee and meaas participat3ng in
combat with the fire and the nuclear etrikea. Irn addition, the central3za-
Cion of command permite the achievement of complete unity of viewe in a11
echelone of the eolution of the baeic problems of troop control, the use of _
forces and meane in combat and aleo ineurance of purposeful training of the
troope, the commanders and etaffe for the forthcoming battle.
Hawever, in addition, the nare highly maneuverable nature of modern
combat, the reduction of the preparation timea for ito nonuniformity of ite
development, the growing fire power of the eubunite, the increase in volume
of operatione with respect to control and other circumetances require cloaer
combination of centralized connnand with granting of greater independence to
subordinate commandere and the poeaibility of exhibiting initiative and
creativity in carrying out their miesione.
Hence, the degree o� centralization and the dependence of aubordinatee
in the caee of centralized control will depend every time on the conditiona
of the situation. Hawever, the eenior officer must indicate to the eubozdi-
nate the method of performing hie etated comb at miseion only when this ie -
poaeible with reepect to time and actually required in the intereate of the
higher echelon.
In the majority of cases. the subordinate must be granted independence
in the selection of the methods of carrying out the combat miseion, the more
so since he alwaqe hae greater poasibilities than the aenior officer to con-
eider a11 the details of a epecific situation and to quickly r.eact to changea
in it. Considering the powerful fire weapons with which the troops are
equipped, and the highly maneuverable nature of the combat operatione, the
importance of initiative and independence on the part of eubordinatea has
increased greatly, especially during the courae of combat. Ignoring thia
, fact, an exceseive increPSe in centralization of control unavoidably lead to
bureaucratic red tape and confueion, for the aenior officer begine to be
involved in the detaila and decides all of the questione for the subordinatea,
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is de7,ayed in the reaction to changee in tht3 eituation and ati the eame Cime -
unneceesarily hol,de up the aperatione of thta troope. In additinn, th3e
breaks dawn the confidence of the eubordinat.ee themselves and accuetoms them
to paseively wa3ting for ordere or advi,ce from above. It is necessary to
note Che following important psychological aspect of troop controlt the
off3cer inepired by hie best ideae, buti without the authority to exhibiti ini-
tiative, gradually losea hie energy reserve. He becomee apathet3c and begine
to feel appreheneion, and not confidence. ThiB command practice ie in gene-
ral etrange to the apirit of the Soviet people, who are distinguiehed by
high activityg initiiatiive and creativity.
Asty initiative and independence of eubordinates must be, however,
reasonable and b e aimed at finding the best methode and meane of achieving
the general comb at goal planned by the aeniar officer. Only confident, deci-
eive and etrong-willed officere are capable o� auch initiseive snd independ-
ence. In addition, 3t is neceseary to ehow concern that the eubordinatea
have clearly conceived the aituation, underetand the intenCiona of the aenior
officer and have received timely reinforcement with the necessary forces and
materiel; withoue th3s, their man3featation of initiative and independence
is complicated, and sometimes is impossible. Accordingly, the etimulation
of initiative and heroiem on the part of the eubordinatea, eepecially award-
ing ordere and medals in a timely manner, popularization in the preas, the
conferring of military ranka, and eo on have important aignificance.
- Ttie invea tigated baeic principles of troop control are cloaely inter-
related, they are interconditioned, and are 3n dialectic.unity and play an
importanC role in control theory.
2. Planning the Work of the Commander and the Control Unit
Under modern conditiona, extremely limited time is allotted for the
organization of combat operatione, ae a ru1e. Hence, the moat important prob- lem hae become finding meane to insure the moet effective uee of the allotted
time. Tte solution to this problem dependa to a eignificant degree on the
clear organization of the work of the officera, ekill of the responsible -
agente in achieving maximum returne in working with minimum expenditures of
forces and time. .
It is no accident that many yeara of practice have generated a serious
warning to the commanders and staff that they, in organizing their combat
operatione, "not uae up" the time of the aubordinatea, that they not take as
their right the basic part of the time allotted to combat preparations. No
one refutes that the higher the command echelon, the more complex and reapon-
aible the miaeiona which mtiat be carried out. Nevertheleas, in any inetance,
the intereate of the auberdinates, their poseibilities with r.spect to pre-
paration for the forthcoming combat muat be of paramount intereat.
The struggle to eave time when preparing for combat begins before
receiving the combat mieaion. In order to prepare the map of the forthcoming
operations in advance, the neceesary forms are prepared, and reference
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materiale are eslectied. xhe.preeence at headquartare o� the lates ti situa-
tion data reflectieg the actual eituation, the etate and the ngture of ope-
ratione of our owm troope and tha enamp have e4pecially important eignific-
ance, Wh+en euch data are available, the responeible agente dn not need to
questiori'~Aha sourcee during organization of combat or to gather additional
data whith'detracte from their performance of the miesion.
Eepecially high realitation in the work is promoted by Che presence of
combat ~alcularione which are developed in time and are performed during the
couree of training, and exercisee talcing into accAUnt the pereonnel die tribu-
tion, the commuaicationa means and traneportation meana with reepect to the
control pointo determination of the epecific obligatione for each executive
organ. Hare, it is eztirely juetifiable that if the officer developa his
own plane on Che bae3s of them in which the data, ehe calculations, documente
and technical meane which are required of h3m are reflected in detail, then
the time calculation for performence of eaah measure is performed, the prob-
lems are cleerly defined which muet be coordinated with other duty personnel.
The baeic role in the organization of the work of the control unita
goes to the chief of etaff. He eetablfehea the volume, the times and the
executive organ for the work with reepect to the organiZation of combat ope-
ratione. He determines in what form the planning reaulte will be reflected,
what comb at documente will be developed and by what timea; he coordinates and
directe the wArk of all the control unita. He gives apecial atten tion to the
timely delivery of the data required by the subordinate commandere and staffa
for paxallel operation wifih respect to the organization of combat operatione
to the reeponeible agents.
The basie for the organization of the work ie the calculation of the
time for pxeparation of combat operations. Zhe procedure for calculating the
time usually reduces to the following. Initially, the total amount of time
available for organization of combaC is more precisely determined with
breakdawn of it into daytime and nighttime. Tfien a list of basic operatione
is made up which can be performed with approximate notation of the expendi-
tures of time. Simultaneously, the operationa which can be performed in
parallel are eatisfied at ote time or another; the times determined by the -
order of the aenior officer are etated; the operations performed at night are
grouped. Then the timea for the performance of all the basic meas ures are
more precisely defined. The resulta of this work ueually are reflected in
the calendar plan of combat preparation. One vereion of this plan is pre-
aentWd on pagee 196-197. In the preaence of limited time which is most cha-
racterietic of modern combat, it is especially important to include the basic
composition of the officera, the control unita in the operation of organiza-
tion of combat without any delaq. The succesaful aolution of this problem
depends to a great extent on the clear knowledge by each officer of what he
is obligated to do.
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Approvals
Commander Ranlc , -17e t name
(Date)
PLAN FOR PREPARATION OF THE OFr;.NSTVE
(eubunit) from ~ to
\ Time of receiving the mission Prepatation time for of�eneive
t CQOKN DWUOJIIICIINA. 4jWIII1
C
o l 4 3 wu
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anuuoil 06crauonKu
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8alliifl
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5
6
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~
10
II
12
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N8 3aAII4 HOhCKSN
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C?N C I(lJlbiO Y'1'04HCHNR pCII1EHNA H Op1'8Nd�
3auuu n3aF1ntoAeiicreNR
OpraFiNSaium HacrynnexHA s snexe pora -
BBDOJ(
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ticxonuoro paAoNa
ltiannuxcenxe N pa3neprwnnpNe ua oruenmx
noauuunx nprNnnepuH 11 r111HOMCTOD
BwlipttMsr.uee MOTOCTOClIKOBbIX (rauxaaUr)
n'+ap1311encimlY nu py60C arnKy
Tiunomicmie M;repeanumwx sanacoo, pe-
MUIIT 11 bOitKYAI(IfR IICIICffpflDH011 TtXI(NKIi
Konrpom, 3e paboroti noxmueammx 71
[See key on following page]
KoNiauAup, HW (g)
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i
Keys a. xtem number h. Sta�f, dapuCy commander
b. Meaeurea i. Commander
c. Execution Cimes hourb/ J. Commandere, a-Laff officers
minute k.. Subunit commanders
d. And so ot; 1. Deputy commander
e. Reasonabloi agenta m. Commander, deputy commander, staff
f. Note on eitecution
8. Commander, chief of
etaff
J 1.
Explanation of the received mieaion considering the actual eituation
2. Delivery of the preliminary ordera
3. Preparation of data and calculations required for deciaion making
and planning
4. Continuation of the evaluation of the situation, determination of
, the intent, giving the preliminary combat orders
5. Completion of decieion making, atatement of the goals for the
troope
- 6. ReporC of the decision to the sen3or officer
7. Performance of reconnaiaeance fn the terrain :1.n order more pre-
. cisely to determine the decie3on and organize the interaction
_ 8. Organization of the offensive at the company-platoon 1eve1
9. Preparation of the routes and equipment of the attack position
- 10. Advancement and deployment in the fire poaitions of arCillery
and mortar
11. Advancement of the motorized rifle (tank) eub unit to the assault
- position
12. Supplementing the matertel reaervea, repair and evacuation of
� failed equipment
13. Monitoring of the work of aubordinatea
14. Chief of etaff
15. (Rank, laet name)
NoCe. In the battalion, the given plan cannot be developed as an
independent document, and all measures with reapect to pre-
- paration for the offeneive are reflected by the chief of
e Caf f in the worki ag map.
There can be no standard for the distribution of duties among the of-
ficers. In each individual case, beginning with the present time, the con-
tent and volume of the probletas aubject to solution and also the peraonal
training of the officer and his apecialization, the apecific peculiar.Ltiea
will be determined. Unquestionably, the observation of the specialization
principle hae decisive significance in the work distribution. It is diffi-
cult to count on, especially under combat conditiona, the training of the
universal officer capable of carrying out a broad clase of missione with
high quality and in a ahort time. As the officer accummulatee experie.nce
and knowledge, the neceaeary prerequiaitea are created for the expanaion of
his dutiee. lfien it wi11 be poseible to tell him to carry out the dutiea of
another peraon on the level of mutual interchangeability. Otherwiae, it ie
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, 3mpoeeible ep be carCain o� the stab3lity of Croop conerdi and Che achieve-
mant of high opernCion,al efficiency of the work of the conCrol unit. To spe-
cialize the officsre gnd develop solid ekilis in them wieh reApece to the
performance of only a narrow ciaae of jobe without concern for mutuai re-
plgceabiliCy meane to work wlthout proepecCg for the .future, withoue eeeing
Comorrow, without preparing the etaff for work wnder the mogt diffieale con-
- ditiona which can develop on application of ehe nuclear strike by the enemy -
on the control point.
It is important not only to approaCh the determinatiion Qf the conCent
of ehe work seneibly. How to etate the miesion for the'reaponsible agent
aleo hes greae significance. Of touree, the personal qualieies of tihe reepon-
eible ggent wi11 haa�e dec3eive signi�icance here. However, under any condi-
_ tione the enecqy muet receive inetructione from hie commander; what to do, by
what time, and in wh at form to preeent the resulta of h3e work. It is neces-
sary to see that the officere of conerol units not expect developed instruc-
tione, but underetand their chief, ae they eay, wieh half g word, cupture �or
themselvee the content of the meaeuree following from the situation, the
- decieion of the commander and the received combat miesion.
Accordingly$ education in Che officere of asense of high responeibi-
lity for preciee execution of work in establiahed Cimes with high quality haa
epecial eignificance. It is important "that every worker," ae L. I. Brezhnev
pointed out aC hie meeting with the wnrkers of the xIL Autamob3le Plant,
"clearly eee hie role in the labor process, knaw what he is doing, why he is
doing its whaC dependa on him, feel that hie labor is a neceseary part of the
overall work."1
The organization of work will become high quality only if it reflecta
the advanced procedures and methode and aleo in full degree takee inta ac-
count the poesibility of the use of the available technical control meana.
In his time, F. Engels noted that the individual is evaluated not only by
what he doea, but how he does it. Zfie eelection of the advanced methoda moat
completely correeponding to the developed situation is one of the component
conditions of high-quality organization of work.
Mother index of high organization in aork is the maintenence of the
clear regime, which providee for the coordination in the work of all of the
duty peraonnel, atrict succeasivenese in the execution of the misaions,
rigid regulation of time allotted for each operation. A component part of
the organization of work is a18o ellowing for rest for the officere. It is
important not only to perform the work aith quality and on time but also to
conserve etrength for eubsequent operatione. Accordingly, skillful alterna-
tion of work and rest is required. Practice has demonetrated for a long time
that it is iaipoeeible to achieve high output capacity and not tearn hoW to
rest, not be concerned for the recovery of strength. No one denies that it
is difficult to provide in advance for the res t time of every officer "from"
1. PRAVDA, 1 May 1976.
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and "eo" enmp epeeified eirne, bue if rese ie noe pltinned, then ehere in a
denger ehat Chere wi7,1 be no posa3biliey for reot ae a resule of ehe course
of evenCe i.n genergl.
_ 3. 3cientific Organization of Che Labor c' the Control Unie 0�ficers
For clear organizatinn of the work of control uniteo in many eases it
in inauffieient to depen8 only on the viCai experience and practical knawledge
of the chief of seaff. In the control ephere, scieneific drgeniaat3on of iabor
is eepecielly necennary.
it 3e nacessary to cons3dar scientific only that organizatlon of ad-
mieistrative labor which ie bgsed on the achievemenCs of acience and gdvgnced
experience eystematically 3ntroduced into the activity of the commgnder and
the control unite, which insuree the greateet effective use in combat of
gubordinate Croope anQ the3r fu1fi11ment of the etated mieg3on in the eetab -
liehed timee with minimum expenditures of forceg and materiei.
In othar wor.ds, this ie the labor of the control unit officere, or-
dered, arrunged, reduced to a eyetpm in gccordgnce with the recommendatione
of ecience end the achievemente of aflvanced experience.
The difference between the ordinery organizaCion of labor end its
scientific organization coneieta in the methode nf taking certain measures,
the selection of the methode and pracedures. In one case the commander and
the conerol unite intuitively and mechenically repeat the cuetomary proceduree
which have been well mastered by them, and in the other, they pereietently
maeter end ekillfully introduce into prectice the lateat recoaimendatione of
ecience and the achievemente of advanced experience. The resulte Will uncon-
ditionally be different in the two caeee.
Therefore the primary goal of ecientific organization of labor ig
mgximum improvement of the efficiency of the labor of the control unit offi-
cere, the achievement of more efficient uee of time With minimum expenditures
of forces.
The baeic areae of the ecientific organization of labor in the opera-
tivn of the troor eontrol units can be the follawing: the education among
the officere of a communiet attitude toward their military duty, the introdnc-
tion of efficient methode and procedures into operation, the irrtprovement of
the methode of organizing work. improvement of the equipment of the Work
areae of the officere in the conmand poet vehicles, the development of norme
for performing the baeic measuree with respect to troop control, the ration-
alization of the Working conditione, improvement of the training and mastery
of the officers, ineurance of independence and creative acttvity of the
reeponaible egente. improvement of the practice of moral incentive for the
officere, eucceeefully carrying out their duties and eo on. In addicion. the
requirementa of the ecientiflc organization of labor are taken into account
by the deeignere When creating nea machines, inatrumente, and technical con-
trol unite. In particular, t+sing epecial etudiee, the admiesible le-,rele of
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noise$ tempergture fluctiuaCiona, degree of 111umination in commanfl pose
vehicles and structuree of the coneroi po3nt are defined. The 8egree of the
effect of eheea factiore on the fitness, the fatigue end efficienny of eerry-
3ng out the mieeione wieh reepect eo troop controi ie determined by the
methods of eng3neering paychology, paychophyeiology, peychoengineering, and
eo on.
In the practieal work of the control unite moot frequently the simpler
forms of scienCific organization af labor f3nd epplications obeervetion of
the work of the reeponeible agent, time studiea of the operetion and eubge-
quent analyeis of the orgaaization and the procedure for performing the work,
the performance nf experimente with the application of the lateBt methode,
technical meaneg and ao on.
7ha procaes of introducieg e cientific organizgtion of 1abor usuelly
begine aith a detailed study of the content of the work end methode of per-
forming it by the rerponeible agente. Tttie procees can be echemgt3caily
rrepregented in the follawing fora. Ynitlallq, the f3na1 goal or finai re-
eult of the work ia definedo end then a11 of the forthcoming work ie broken
down into componant elementee
For clarity in the given caee, one af the poeeible alternaCives ie
teken. Tfie etaff officer hae received an aesignment for the development of
combat ordera to eagage the 2d echelon in battie. The reaearcher has not
determieed, but fixad the component elemenCe of the operation of the reapon-
eible egent. In the moet coneolidated form they look like the folloaing
(in minutee)s the plotting of the mieeion for the 2d echelon from the com-
marder'e map onto their own aorking map 2; the etudq of the problem plot-
ted on the map 1.5; the more preciee determination of the aork area - 1;
coordineting the datg on the enemy With the chief of reconnaiasance 2;
ariting the heading attd the firet item 2; roore precise determtnation by
the engineering service chief of the clageification of the combat engineer's
eubunit aseigned to reinforce the 2d echelon 1.5; checking the time cal-
culation for advancement of the 2d echelon to the attack position 2; more
preciee definition of the fire mieeions solved by the artillery for aupport
of the engagement of the 2d echelon 1.5; writing the eecond item 4; _
~ ariting the third item aad completing the filling out of the combat ordere
_ 3; the preaentation of the ordere by the chief of etaff for checking and
teeting 2; printout of the combat ordere 8; eigning of the ordere by
the chief of etaff and oommanider 2; acceptance of the document for dis-
petch 1.5. The total ie 34 minutes. The officer has worked at high
epeed.
Out of the total time, aa insignificsnt amount of time Was epent
directly on the development of the documeat, and the greatpr part weat for
more precise determinatiaa of the problem, coordination, testing and
printing.
On the basie of the compreheneive analyeie of all of the elements
(the performdd operatione) it ie established which of them are wneceesaryl
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which aan'be simpllfieds wh3ch can be rep1aced by nthprs dr combined, howr
efficiene the procedures ueed by the off3,cer are. An a resu1t df ehig analy-
s38, the pnssibility of reduCing the time requirpd to perform the operaei.ono
is discovered,
_ In the given exgmple, it was entirely poeAible eo exclude the piotting
of the mieeton for the 2d echelon on their working map, checking of the ar-
ders by the chief af etaff (4 minutes); acquisition af missing data by cai-
. ling the required p8ople te Qombined (3 minuteo). The greateat time in tgkQn
in prtnting and writing by the drafeamen. When dictating the ordera directly
from the map to the typewrtter, sevinge of up to 6 to 7 ninutiea can be
echieved. If the officer ueed g formaliged order form, then filiing eut the
documenC took S mi,nutea, and there wae no neceesiey for printing.
Thus, oniy ae a rerult of improving the organizgt3on and the introduc-
tion of improvad proceduras in oparatione could the cacobgt ordere be wrltten
in 16 minutea. If Wa Btudy the performance of enalogoue aork by various
people, then it ia poeeible to diecover that one worka futer and the other
more slowly. Zherefore, one of the miesions of the ecientific orggnizatiun
of labor ie the etudq of ttte beat procedures and methods of operation for
their introduction into the practice of other duty pereonnel. It ie necea-
eary aleo to conside: that it ie very difflcult to convince the experienced
responeible agent that the methods of hie operatlon are imperfect. Ne of ten
remaina convinced that hia proceduree and methods developed by proper ox-
perience ara the cmly correct onee. Thle eauees a definite reaietance on
hig part to breaking the eetabiiehed pattern and introducing new methode.
Knos,rledge and practical u0e of t}ie advaaced methods in work will permit ac-
hieveaoant of maximum effect vith leaet expeaditureA of forcee, materiel aad
time.
7he principie of co-meesuremene of the expendituree of forcp8 and time
ahich providea the baeis for the ecientific organization of labor requirea
coneideration of at what price and by ahat methods euccess ie achieved. To
save time meane to deal with ehe lonsom *nd Preltia@ unneceesary expendituree
of force8.
The compreheneive enalyeie of the aork of the control unite aill per-
mit effect;ive evaluation of ahat ie good and ueeful, proper introduction
into practice of the aork of othere and, in additian, it shoae up the bottle-
necke attere forcee and time are aasted, ahirh hindere efficiency in the exe-
cution of their dutie8. It ie importaat ta eetablieh What is to be done,
i+ho is to do it, vhcn, in what ticnee and by ahat procedure; hoa effective
the organization of the aotk of the reeponeible agente is, and whether ehe
low dietribution ie being coped rrith normaliq.
Tfie chief of etaff aill deal best of ell with this problem. Dvring
the fulfillment of the aeaignment by the officer, he can find time to look
over the methods of operation of the subordinetee aith experienced eqes.
.
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The chief of gtaff uaually knowa the capabilieioa, the nature, eho. io-ve1 of
training of the office~e weii, and he ail1 un8era egnd readiiy the eewags for
miscaiculationa, Ne can shc,v how best ta approach the performance of the
miasian. The personal exampie is one of the most effective mo-ane of ineroduc-
tian of ecianeifin organitaeion of labor ineo practice and improvemene of the
opargting effieiency of the duty pereonnel.
Txper3ence �haaa that acientific organization of 1a6or is unehinkable
a3thoue the preeenee of normative, gdmisaibie indexee for the expenditure of
rine on perfoxmance of the operatians. Z'he normalization of labor ia the
baeie for ite ecientific orginiaation. The labor of any reaponsib,e agent,
Qepecially technical labor, 1s mada up of difined standard elemmts, each of
ahich can be quite clegriy normaliued. The purely cregtive, menta, opera-
tions are rubjactad to noreialisgtion aith the greateet difficuitq.
The reality of the orgaaiagtion of the operations aignificantiy in-
creases if it ie baAed on ecientifically developed tiee normativee for the
perfaronance of the bsaic coneroi opergtioes checkefl out in practice. The
detarmination primarily of the timee for decision making, the statement of
the goa1s and organization o� the interaation have decieive eigniffcance.
lhese times are taken ae the baaie far eetabliehment of the duration of many
other operetione.
Hoaever, it ie neceaoary to conaider that the determination of the
tim" for performaace of the adminiatrative operatione 18 a highly compiicated
mattar. Theee tims depend cm many factoreo including the degree to which the
staf# are up to fuil etreagth and the lmi of training of the officers, the
preeence of tachnical control maaaa, the qualiLy of organization of their
work, and eo on.
The expenditures of time on the performaace of operations under de-
fined specific conditioas can significantly devviate in one direction or ano-
ther from the aeighted mesn value. HoWaver, irnaing the average norms foY
time expenditures, it is alaays poseible to select the methodg of operation
correepondingly ahich, uader given coaditione, aill provide for the per-
fotrmence of the aork in the estebliehed timee, and more easily to detprmine
the officer's etaff for the opetations. 1fie normativee muet be eubetentiated
and correeoond in full meeaure to the modarn level of development of the
technicai control meane and advanced methode of operation. Hare the norma-
tives cannot be coneidered as invariaat, eetabliahed forever. Ae maetery of
the officere gra+e and new technical control mesna are introduced, they muat
be ehortened. Zfie nor.mativee are the limitg the starting point fmm ahich
the increese in maetery of the afficers and degree of efficiency in the work
of the staff sceually begin.
- Often the authore investigating the problema of iorpraving the effi-
ciency of troop coatrol reduce everythiag to the use of the automated control
syetem and leave out the possibility af ordinary technical maas which are
capable of greatly increaeing the efficiency of the aork of the officers.
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i ,
Therafore, perhaps in praceice the rneans aE so-+caiied meehanizagian and low
automaeian are not alaays euffieiently effeceiveiy put eo uge. Nevereheiess,
experienee convinringly indicetea that aiehout their he1p ie is imponaib1e eo
acceierate and faciliegee the work of the officere.
16 improvemene of labor on a ecientiflc baeig in a constant procea~l
and not a eparadic aetion calculaeed only to eliminate bnCtlenpcks in oppra=
eions IC is unquaationabiy the ease thae the acieatifie orggniitation of iabar
givee the graataee affeet under the condieione of the performanGe of a eingie
eet of measuree vith raepece to improving the ectivity of a11 of ehe congrol
unite. df couree, it ie impoesible co undereerimaee the "apecial proceAures"
mossureg aimed at el3mingting boetlenecke,
The complexo eystemntic impravement of the ectivity of the control unite
during the eoure8 of the orgenSaation and conduct of combat operatione wi11
p8rmit e@harp increaee on the ahole in operativeneee of the troop concroi,
The principie of completeneAe in operatian With reepect to the ecientific or-
geinization of lsbar foilows Eroat the close 3nterreletion end interdependence
of the aperationa and meeeure8 performed by tihe conerol units. On fgilure to
observe rhie principle, the often good end uaeful reconm~ndetione can turn out
to be ineffective. For exampie, the time eavinge achiewd ahen performing the
tacttcal calculations ueing computer engineering arp not fe1C in an improve-
mant in the operationai efficiency of controi if the commander mglcee the
decieion by prolonged listening to the prnposele of hie subordinates.
4hus, the complex approach alone to the organization amd performance of -
all of the operatione ineureg an incrpaee in opereCionai efficiency of the
contro2, it pravente the occurrence of now bottlenecke aB g re8ult of eome of
the reeponeible agente being ahead and othere behind. -
Nere the proceee of intraducing edvanced procedurpe and methode aad
- a18o the beet achievaaento of ecience in practice provides an effpct, if it
ie continuoue, in Which the officere of all of the cantrol unite participate.
One of the proceduree promoting improvement of the operational effi-
ciency in the operation of the control unit ie the epplication of PFRT charte.
ThP-y permit much more complete and deeper reproduction of the logical f1oW
charte of the eequence of the perfot7aance of the basie control functione
(meaeures) by compariean aith the traditienal etrip diagrams, they perctit
clear repreeentation of the entire procesn of preparation of cotabat opera-
tions and eubataatiated eeteblighment of the prioritiee and the timee for
perforwance of the operatione (eee Figure 19). r.
PPRT charte are eepecially irreplaceable ahen determining the optimal
vereions of the aork of the officere with reepect to organization of combat
operatione. As a rule, thie work is done in limited timee. It is partici-
pated in by a large number of reeponsible agents in cloeest dependence on
each other, and therefore exceptionallq clear organization ia required. Tn
addition, the baeic aieaeures With reepect to the organization of combat are
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based ott daEined normaeivea which are rubjncted eo quanneitaCive aonai.dpraeion
permiCtiag complately abjaceive deeermingeion of the effeativeneae of one
mathod of orgenizatioe of wnrk or another. The maehematical bgeis for c1ie
method of PBItT piannin$ ie the POtT chart (PFRT model, netwnrk) which parmito
deternd,nation of the volume af operations, eetabl3shment of the moet expe-
dient sequence of performance of the ebeaeureat the best diaeribution of
dutiea among the duty parsonnal, discovery nf the reaerve timpe aiid means oc'
reducing the tiew� for organization of combeC operaeiong.
The procedure for development of the chart ie d3eeinguiehed by greae
vaxiety. For exempie, ].et us ccros3der one of them.
The chief of staff propoeeet With the help of the chart, early determi-
natian of the moet axpedient version of the dietribution of operations among
the reeponeibie agente in the procees of organizing combat eperationg. Here
the time for organization of the cambat iA taken ae 4 hours. After develnp-
ment of the chart, the calculation c8n be made by the eame procedure for 5, G
or 7 houre.
When a ehort time 1e gliotted to the organizaCion of cnmbge, the
parailel operatinne of a11 of the duty personnel is unquesrionabiy 3u$eified
by their exercieing great independence in eolving the problemB dealing with
their functional obiigatione, maximum coordination of the operatione vith re-
epect to time and a],so reduction of the time for the performance of all the
meagures .
Under theee conditioae, the baeic resulte of the planning are expe-
diently reflected on the working mape, and without developing other aritten
documents, the miseions are delivered to the eubordinatee oraliy With record-
ing of their content in the aorking notebook or on magnetic tepe, reconnaie-
eance is carried out to more precisely determine the aolution and the prob lems
of interaction only in the direction of the main atrike. The chief of etaff
arrives at theee conclusions not by epecial investigations but based on ex-
perience in performing analogoug operations. In the preaence of other timee
for combat preparbtion, unconditionally it ie neceeeary to take other initial
poeitione for the calculetion. Beginning vith the content, volume and
eequence of perfot-mance of the operations. a liet of operationa ia prepared.
Experience ehoae that the timee for cospiling the chart are eignificantly re-
duced if the eteff has aeveral vereione of auch liste developed in advance as
applied to the most difficult operating conditione of the control unit. If
the liate are compiled, then one o� them can turn out to be appropriate for
the apecific conditioue which exiet in the given case or it ie necessary to
introduce individual, more precfae definitions vith respect to contento ae-
quence of performance of the opergtiona and the responsible sgents. It is
aleo neceesary to define the duration of the operatione in the list. Tfie
code for each operation cen be ineerted Whea developing the chart. '
tableUaually the list of operations is given in the fot~n of the following
.
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- :.s-
Tab1a w4}
' Duraeion
MAne of operation (in Raeponeible Opere- of operg-
eoneolldated forM) Qente tiionecode_ tion (min)_
Explanaeian of the miee3on received
Comnandere and
1.2
20
by ehe commander jointly wirh the
chief
of staff
chief of etaff
Plotting the miss3on on the eecond
Chief
of otaff
1.3
18
working map
Study and eveluation of ;:he enemy
Chief
of staff
1.3'
20
Calculation of time for orgeniza-
Chief
of etaff
21.4
7
Cion of conibat oFerationg (in the
praceee of explaining the mfeeion)
Giving lnetructione wieh respect to
Comtmnder
2.5
10
preperation of data and calcula-
tione required for making the deci-
eion end perfarmance of ineaeures with
respect to training troops for the
forthcoming combat operatione
Isauing preliminary nrdare to re-
Staff
officer
5.6
5
connaiseance eubunite
Isuuing preliminary combat
Staff
officer
5.7
12
ordere to the combined-arme
subunits
2eauing preliminary ordere to the
Service chief
5.8
5
epecial forcee eubuaite
EValuation af the enemy
Commander aud
5.10
20
ch3ef
of etaff
Report of data snd calculatione
Staff
officer
6.9
10
on the enemy to the commander
Explanation of the received mieBion
Service chief
8.14
10
Developmene of the calculation of
3taff
officer
7.13
20
the ratio of forces and materiel
Participation in development of the
Staff
officer
9.11
10
calculation of the ratio of forcea
and materiel
Statement of goals for the recon-
Steff
officer
11.17
18
naissance eubunits
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(Tab1e 11 rnnCinued)
. -
1
2
3
4
I'llepnrnCinn hE tiltic diitn nnd
Servtre chtc+f
14.15
32
cnlculations with reapect to
appllcaC3on (uee) o� the epecinl
forces subuniCe
Evalugt3on o� nur awn trnope
Commander, chief
10.12
25
of s taf f
Uevelopmene of Che calculution
Chief o� staff
10.16
12
of the time for advencement of
_ the troops to attack pos3tion
~ Estimation of the eiruntion and
Chief of staff
16.20
28
formulntion of the decieion
- rlanning of reconneissance
Staff officer
17.19
30
1'lanning measurea with reapect
Staff officer
13.18
25
eo camnuflege and Che cnm-
mandane's service
bevplopment of control plan
SCaff officer
19.24
18
and plgn for rendering aid
Dpvelopment of planning docu-
Service chief
15.23
30
ment wirh respect to use of
suburiite of apecial troops
Estimation of radiation eitu4-
Commander and
12.20
15
_ tion and terrain
chief of staff
Development of combat orders
Staff officer
18.22
20
Connnander liatene to propoagla
Chief of staff
20.21
5
of the chief of a taff with
reapect to the decision
StatemenC of the missions for
Commander
20.24
55
yubunit commanders, the giving
of orders with respect to in-
teraction, comprehenaive aupport
of combat nperatione, party-
political work
Checking and signing planning
Comnander,
24.25
15
documenta
chief of staff
More precise determination and
Staff officer
22.25
50
development of combat orders
and the reconnaissance plan
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[Tab 1e 11 conCinuad]
1 - . Z . . .3 . . 4
, Performance of reconnaieeance in Commander~ ch3ef 25.26 75
order more precieely to define of staff, eervice
the decis3dn and the interaction ch3ef
probleme
Report eo eenior o�ficer on Conmiander 26.27 5
readinese for attack
This lise hardly contains anything new; the etaff had previously deve-
loped the ordinary etrip charte for the organization of the control unita.
They aleo reflected the bneic miesions (operatione) which had to be performed
by the officere, Tfie times and the direct respnneible agents were indicated.
Nowever, in ehese charte the internal relatione of the proceeeee were not
obvious, the eequence for the performance of the enumerated operatione was not
clearly provided for, and it was difficult to determine what the consequencea
would be from the delay in completion of the individual operatione, what
maximum times for performance of the operatione are admieaible, where the
greatest bottlenecks are and which operatione muat be given greates t attention.
Therefore the reflection of the organization of the work of the control unite
in the form of a PIItT chart will permit nare careful selection of these prob -
lema and demonatrate in clear form the logical interrelatione and aequence of
all the operatione perfarmed by each reaponsible agent. Even if of all of the
- advantagee of the PFRT chart we use only the principle of repreaentation of
organization of combat in the form of a network, then it is aeceeeary Co re-
cognize that it ia unqueetionably uaeful. The significance of the PERT
model increases immieaeurably when complex work is to be done with the parti-
cipation of a large number of reeponaible agente. In this caee the internal
proceases and operatione of individual control unita (headquartere divieion)
- usually are indicated in the form of local PIItT charts which subeequently are
"sewn" into a common network.
When compiling the list, the eatabliahment of the duration of the aepa-
ration preaenta defined difficulties. ThiB ie all the nare complicated in
that in the majority of casea the establiehed normatives are in need of more
preciae determination as applied to the level of training of the etaff offi-
cera, the degree of inechanization and automation of the work proceeaes and
also the question of time. In casea where there are no normatives, probabi-
lity theory is used. For this purpoae three eatimatea are made of the duxa-
tion of rhe operation: Tmin is the minimum (optimiatic) when there are the
most favorable conditiona for performing the work; TVAX ia the maximum (pesai-
mistic) when the work is performed with disadvantageous courae of eventa;
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~ tp ' rW S p- M~~~~ JD I JD r 119 ~~fS-~` r
~
o I 41 ~ t!
tu 7 , IV ( r.+ ~ ss
r I
'!!I r r r rl r ~ w; r !1 ~
' I - ' -I
Rn l~ J ~!!1 Il ~ I ( ~ rt4 tS tl ! � ~ I
ltJ m ro m ~ 's + t 5 ( ~ ( I -v
I ~  r r 1
n r
r r r ~ 'S
~
(
m 30 - c~~-. I(
I
~ ~ -~j.S p..ID�p_~! JI ,10 ~ O 40 'S
Figure 19. PERT chart for the operation of the control unite with respect to
organization of the offensive (aimplified version).
Key: 1. let hour; 2. 2d hour; 3. 3d hour; 4. 4th hour.
THB is the moat probable duration of the work.l The mean or expeeted duration
TeXp ia calculated by the formula
T ~+uvt '...~.I 1+...
exn (1)
or
T ' :tT~~~;, ' � : r;.. (2)
_ t"!n
Formula (2) is simpler; the difference in the result of the calcula-
tions performed by one formula or another is small.
1. For more details on the method of calculating this time see P. G. Skachko,
V. M. Kulikov, G. T. Volkav, "Upravleniye Voyekami e Pomoehch'yu Setevykh
Metodov" [Troop Control Using PERT Methods], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974,
pp 36-43.
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' Howaver, rhe in3Cia1 data selected for detierminaCion of %xp are in
tuxnp randnm variablea; therefore errore in the calculation are poesible. In
order to determine which data are closer to the expeceed vaYus or, in other
words, what the magnitude o� the diepereion o is wi.th reepect eo ite expected
value, the following formula ie useds
v2 = Tmax"T 12
6 J (1)
%
_or the eimpler formula
u2 ~ 0.04 (max-Tmin)2 ' (2) -
The emaller the magnitude of the dispereion ie ae a reeult of the cal-
culation, the more precisely the estimate was made for the duration of the
, operations and, consequently, max and Tmin are closer to each oCher.
If there are developed normatives checked out in practice, then there
is no necessity to reaort to the indicated formulae for determining the dura- _
tion of the operation.
Here it ia neceseary to begin with the fact that the preparation of the
initial data and the development of the graph occupies a comparatively largs
amount of time which, for the most part, does not exist during the combat or-
ganizationa period. Therefore, all of the basic work with respect'to com-
piling the chart muet be done before receiving the combat miasion.
In the presence of initial data, the conatruction of the graph is
realized by combining the operationa (arrows) Chrough eventa (circles) in a .
defined aequence from left to rfght. Here the direction o� the arrows is
taken arbitrarily, and their length ie expediently selected in acale. Each
operation begins and enda with an event. In order to develop thie PFRT -
model, a detailed liat of operations and a clear distribuCion of them among
the responsible agenta are required. In the inveatigated example, these
developed indexes are not preaented, and therefore the PFRT model is not
analyzed in complete form. Beginning with the possibilities, several charac-
teristic veraions of the graph are used. In it an effort is made along with
the indication of the interdependence and basic relationa between the opera-
tiona to preserve the independence of the responsible agents in performing
theae operatione to the maximum. A second characteriatic�of the presented -
chart conaiats in the fact that the volume and duration of performance of
the operations by the responsible agents are directly dependent on the timea
for completion of operatione by the commander. Thus, they are placed in
defined frames, within the limite of which their obligations muat be per-
formed using the methods of operation corresponding beat to the conditions
and more precisely defining the volume of their work within reasonable limita.
Even in the presence of these characteristica on the chart (Figure 19)
_ proviaion is made for euch relations between the operations of the different
reaponaible agents.
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Among them undoubtedly the operatione performed by the commander (1.2,
2.50 5.10, 10.12t 12.201 20.241 2k.25p 25.26t 26.27) have decieive eignifi-
cance on the enCire procees of organization of the offeneive. Zfie t3mes and
methods of operation of aii of the other duty pereonnel are determined depend-
_ ing on the preparation and seyle of operation of Che commander and hie
_ knowledge of the eituation.
In addition to thi.e cunstiantly operating functiion, there are othere
which also have a'defined effect on the times and quality of the operatione
with reepect to the organization of combet. Most frequently, the relation is
encountered in practice where the subsequene operation cannut be etarted un-
ti1 the work of another officer has been completed. Zhis type of relation,
in epite of the granting o� the neceseary independence in perform3.ng the ope-
rations to the responeible agente, plays a eignificant role in the organtza-
tion of combatt operations. In particular, until the miasion hae beea ex-
- plained (1.2) preliminary ordere cannot be given (5.6, 5.7, 5.8); without
performing the calculatione of the time for organization of combat (21, 4),
- it is inpoaeible to give 3netructione to the duty pereonnel (2.5); without
evaluating the enesW (5.10), it ie imposaible to define the miseiane fox the
reconnaiseance eubunita (11.17) and eo on. Practice indicates that the more
frequently the given type of relation is encountered between the operationa,
- the mos;e complex it ie to achieve a reduction in the times of performance of
the operation ae a whole. In the graoh the given relation for the operationa
is depicted by 11nes made of points.
Cloeely related to it ie the function which indicates t:at the comple-
- tion of one operatian depends ou the completion of the other operationa per-
formed by another *esponeible agent. For example, the qualitative estimate
of the enemy by ::ae commander (5.10) can be completed only after obtaining
the data and calculatione on the enenp from the reconnaissance officer (1.31;
6.9); the evaluation by the commander of hie own troopa (10, 12) can be com-
pleted under the condition of completion of the catculation of the time of
advancement of the troope to the line for going over to the attack (10, 16)
and calculation of the ratio of the forces and materiel (13) ar.rl so on. Here
it ie poasible aleo to include the type of relation where completion of the
operation depende on receiving the neceseary instructions from the commander
(the chief of staff). On the chart thia function ie indicated by a dotted
line with two croes etrokes.
During the organization of combat, often the necesaity is encountered
for joint (simultaneoue) participatian of the reaponsible agents in the per-
formance of an operation. It ia characterietic for the performance of the
.-net complex operatione (the calculation of the ratio of the forces and
materi.el, eetimation of the eituation, and so on). The combination of the
forces of the different responaible agenta in the eolution of euch problems
ineurea the best conditione for the reduction of the time and improvement of
the quality of the work performed. The same type of interrelation which ia
coneidered together with it is the neceasity for coordination (more preciae
deCenuinatian) between the rebponsible agenta of the initial data on per-
formance of two different operatione. On the chart the given tqpe of rela-
tion is indicated by a dotted line with three traneverse marks.
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Table 12
Howap I Outeraarouuie
VN CObNR
r2
I 1, 3',6, 0, 9, 11,
17, 19, 241, 25, 26
2 I, 21,4, 5, 10, 18,
zo, ai, 24, 26, 26
3 l, 2, 6, 10, 12,
20, 24, 26, 26, 27
4 I, 3, b 7, I 3 , ,
'18
22, 25, 2~i
b I, 2, 5, 8, 14, 15,
23, 26, 26
FOR OFFICIAZ USE ONLY
PoOorw, oOpeayaWUe nyre
(3)
(1,3'),01,5), 15,61. (6,9), (9,11
(11,17), (17,19), (19,241), (241,25
(26,26)
11,2% (2'.4), (43), (6,Ia
(10,161, (16,20), 120,E1; 121,24
(24,25), (25,26)
11-,21, (2,6), !6,101, (10,14
(12,20), (20,24), 124,251, (25,26
127)
(1,3), (3,5), (5,7),(7,13), (13,18
(l8 22), l22 251, (25,26)
1i,2), (2b') (b~8) ,(8,14), (14,18
(15,23), (2~3,25), (26,26)
flpono8Ycu�
tcabuocts
IlyTll a
iyrax
216
235
240
230
222
Keyt 1. No. of path 3. Operations forming the path
2. ComponenC evente k. DuraCion of the path in m3autes
During the couree of the organization of the combat operationa, the
type of relation is encountered where one operation is imposed on the other
- and ie performed in parallel, "dovetailed." This type of relation exiats
between the estimation of the aituation (5, 10; 10, 12; 12, 20) and the
formulation of the decieion. In the graph it is indicated (partially) by the
dotted 1ine. �
The clear representation on the PERT model of the relation between ope-
rationa permite clearer regulation of the activity of each responeible agent,
exclueion of the noneyatematic intrueion of one operation in another$ and the
creation of conditiona for planned performance of hia o.erations by each
officer.
On the presented chart (Figure 19) five patha (flaws) are isolated
which are b ased on the beginning and ending eventa (eee Table 12).
Among these patha the longeat is the third path, which is the critical
one. In our axample it is not very shazply diffexsnt with respect to its
magnitude from the other pathe. The critical path, wh ich is outlined on the
graph ueing a double or bo],dfaced line, is the total duration of the opera-
tione which limit the entire proceea of the operationo determine the general
time of its completion. Ztierefore, in increseing the operational efficiency
in the work of the control unite, above all reducing (de creaeing) the dura-
tion of the critical path, has decieive aignificance. In order to solve
this problem, a comprehenaive analysis is made of the content and the proce-
dure for the performance of each operation located on the critical path, and
the optimal veraion of the organization of work is determined on L1e baeis
of thia.
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Ztie optimizaeion nf the PMx chart ia thO mose eomplex gtage and in
aimed at redueing the total durgtion of the works ne buia procpdures for
optimizetion can be the follawingt variation vf the eequence of perfornanee
of the ind3vidual operntion, or in other aerds, reexamination of the struc-
ture (topology) of the network; redistributien ef the officerg; repiacement
of certain efforte by othera; QxclUgion of the secoedary (uneeceanary) ope-
ratione from the network; maximum coordinaeion in rime of the performance of
- dif�erent megeuree# gnd so oe.
Decreaeing the duretion of the criticel pech (Ter) ia nog a one-tlme
action. it muet be carried out conetantiy, for th@ component elemenee or the
iniriai data determining tte magnitude vary. in particuigr, the technicel
equipment of the control pointe and unite varies, the level of maarery of the
comnander and the etaff officers ia improvad, gnd the methoda of their opera-
_ tion are improved. All of thia combined wtth ski11fu1 orgenization of aork
: hae a decieive effezt on decrQaeirg the magnitude of the critical path.
The commander and the chief of etaff~ 1cncwing the critical path, gre
in a posltion to coacentrate ~aeic efforte on the operattong on thie path,
achieving maximum reduction of L'neir performance time. In other aorda, a
eharp boundary ie drewm betaeen the baeic and eecondary itema. if it turns
out that the duration of the critical path exceeds the eetabiiahed time for
completion of planniug of the coubet opergtiona, then measuree are tglcen to
reduce the expended t,lme by changing the layout of the forcee or ueing im-
proved methode of operation.
Other paCha are noncritical (unetreeeed). For all of the operatione
of these pathe there are time reaerves. When neresearq thie permite reexamd-
nation of the work load of the responsible ageatso enabling them during the
time reservee to perform other operatiore.
The difference betaeen the duration of the criticai path Ter and the
duration of the other paths TZM ie the total time reeerve of the path
pZ(i)'
PZ,(i) - Tcr - Tl(i)
pl(i) indicetee the aawunt of time, aithin the limite of ahich an in-
creaee in the duration of the.operatione ie admieeible aithouC eignificant
effect on the total completion time of the plan. For exaaple, the timc re-
serve with reepect to the path L4 ie P(4) aI.3(cr) -1.4 2Qp..23p�10 minutee.
It is poeeible to define the time reserve ae applied to each event
(Pi). For thie purpoee, the earlieet (of the poesible) time of beginning 'the
completion of the event tp(i) and the lates t poesible time of completion of
the evente tw(i) are reckoned:
p(i) � tv (i) - tpW .
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Tab la 13
ne~
~n (11
t
S
3
/
6
/
~
!
A
10
H
14
13
tl
1b
ti
It
IA
14
40
fl
fi3
21
4t
7i
ll$
4f
tp ti~
0Z
48
25
30
39
,0
38
dy
M
50
75
70
48
60
67
77
gS
108
90
IUb
110
120
145
180
M
240
tp 0)
0 20
18
211
30
35
40
9
4 6
3 0
5,,
75
GO
45
77
62
73
S5
103
9d
95
IUS
107
145
1G11
21")
240
t all) tp ll)
0 0
10
5
0
d
to
3
4
n
d
0
lu
3
3
6
4
10
G
0
h
5
13
0
0
n
0
t
Por tha atrente on the critical path, there ie no time reeerva, ae a
resuit of which tnmotp(i). On the prarented graph, t p M for the evente (1)
- wiil be equal to aero the beginning of pianning ("the combat order of the
eenior officar hae bean receivad")= for the event (5) thir time wili be da-
fined ae the ewn 20+10l30 minutee from the time of receiving the combat order
of the aanior officer. Nere the times of ttte evente are calcuiated bagiening
with the maximum duration of all the preceding operattone.
'Ihe timae of lateet completion of the evante are defined ge the differ-
ence betaaen the duration af the'criticai path (240 minutee) and the duration
of the segmente located bataean the inveetigared aad final eventg.
The analyeig data usuaily are eacpreased in the form of Table 13.
In addition to calculating the time reeerve of the evente, the necea-
aity for detexmining the time reeerve atth reapact to each operetion ie ea-
cowntered. For this purpose it ie necaeeary to define the maximum admieeible
time of completion of each operetion beginning,With the duration of the
corresponding "critical" operatione for ahich, ae ie known, the time reaerve
' is equal to zero.
For example, ie order to determiae the operations (7.13), it ie neces-
eary that the eucceaeive iaterrelated operationa be traced. Tfie basic
reeponeible agent here ig the staff officex. He esn proceed With the per-
formance of operation (7.13) after the completion of operations (1.3). (2.5),
(5.7)6 that iet 40 minutee af ter receiving the combat miseion. Initially he
fills out the data for his oWn troopeg and then when another etaff officer
becoms involved in thie aork. theq continue the calculation jointiy. Thie
officer can be included in the operation only 45 minutes after the beginning
of planning.
Hhen astiaating the troope, the given calculation ie required for the
c�Uaumder approximately in the middle of the operatinn �(10 9 12). Ztiua, the
reeponeible agent hsa 63-(18+10+12)-23 minutes for compiling the calculation.
N o a ever, in t h is case t he time reserve for it is a total of 3 minutea, and
if the comaander tries more pr'sCieelq to define the procedure for evaluattng
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his awrt troops and he needs ro ealculgte ehe raeio of ehe fnrcen and mAeerie1
ut tht, beginning uf the operation (10l iZ), then Ehe reaponn3ble agene cannoE
rapreaent L-Itis calcu].ntlon !n rotnpleted i'orm+ The prerented exaniple clearly
indicaeea the advantgge of tbe PffitT piannl,ng, It offere the poAeibiliey of
objeetively determining the minimum rQquired tim for the pprformance of one
operation or another and Ae tihe oane time avoiding subjpetivfty in egeimating
_ the opergting timer. Oniy by camprehensive calcuiation end aeglyaio of ehe
interreletfons of a11 of chp opergeions ie the poseibiliey created for elimi-
nating boteleneclcs ahen org8niging combat operaticma end eharpiy reducing the
tifipg fot the performitnce of the beaic maaeurea.
Lee iia aasune in the firae version of thie operation thgt there ig a
aequance of the performance of the operatione by ehe staff officer ea followat
(102), (205)6 (5,6),(1o3'), (6,9)0 that ie, after the preliminary orders arp
delivered to the recatnaiesence eubunit, he proceede aith the etudy and egti-
nAtion of the eneny. As a reeult, the operation (5, 10) - the eetimate of
the enemy by the commander aas almoet completed beforp the staff officer
receiVed the data. This rituation created a threat to the timely performance
of the operation (5, 10)# In order to prEwent rhie, the foilawing eolution
is cleariy provided for on the charts a change in sequence and time of be-
ginning of the operatione of the staff officer. The operatione (1,31) went
into firet piace, that ie, on receiving the miaeion the staff officer aea
itamediately eucamoned to the commander, and during tho- couree of explanetion
of the miseion to thQ latter, he performed a etudy and evalugtion of the
enemy.
Approximately the same situgtion Wge created aith the performance of
the operatione (7, 13; 13, 18 and 16.20) by the other ataff officer. By the
times defined by the duration of the other operatione connected vith them,
they couid not be performed by one man. Aa a result, the neceseity atoee for
the redi8tribution and giving of operatione (16,20) to the chief of etaff.
Mother approach to reduring the timee ie noted i+hea performing the
operation (2, S). Nere operation (1,3) 18 also included in the graph the
plotting a� the aituation snd the mieeion received on the eecond thart. It
is performed eimultaneously vith explaaation of the miesion by the commander,
Which permits him aignificantly to reduce the time for giving inetructione
to the ataff officer and eervice chiefa. In this caee, they have the pos-
eibility of taking a eignificent part of the data from the staff officer.
A careful calculation of the time reeerves permite etudy of the of-
fieers and a substaatiated approach to determining the sequence of perform-
ance of the operations, achievement of expedient diatribution of the opera-
tiona maong the officers, aad establiehment of the actuai timea for their
beginning and ending. 1he preeence of the time calculation not only facili-
tatee the distribution of aseignmente among the reaponeible agenta, but it
alee permits correeponding determination of the methods of performing the
operatione ahich ineure their completion in the available time.
135
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An a rasul.t of the reCalculations it ir poosibie to obegin tha optimai
veceiane of the opgratione with reapeet to organiscaeian of the combae opere-
eione. With reepact to each operation, tha earlieet time of tha bAginning of
- eho aperation ie eats,bliohed along aith the lateet admieeible timee of begin-
niri6 and ending of opargtions end Che reeerve titeps permitting the parfetimance
of one opargtion or another to be put off aithoue breaking the finai dead-
iine. Thie optimised chart is delivered to all of the reeponeible agenC� snd
ret've� an the specific plan of operatione for ali of the coatroi officarr,
Zhus, thg skiliful utte of different methode of organization of aork ie
one of the condttions o� tlmely parformance by the control unite di their
eaiesione.
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CNAPTflt b, QA7NFRItQ(; ANA PROCE33IN(i 32Tt/ATTON DATA tiHffiN MtEPA1tING FdR AND
DURIN(i 7Hg COtritSS OF CMMAT OPF1tATY0N8
_ 1. Content af the Situation Dgta and Requirements Ymposed on It
During the decision-making end the implementation of the remaining mea-
eure$ aith reapect to troop control in combnt on the basia of the decieionj
the commender and staff must hava, evaluate and coneider varioue eituation
data, With all the variety, theee data are grouped according to the elememte
making up the combat eituatians the etemy, our ovn troopg3 neighbors; radia-
tion eituations; terrain; hydrometeorologicnl cnnditione; time of year and
time of drq; data on the economic condition of the combat zone and the so-
cial-political compoeition of a population.
The enea4 is the most important element of the conbat eituation. In-
aemuch as anq battle is a two-way combat proceee, conatant deep etudy of the
enesay bq the commanders and etaff on our levela is required; othen+iee it is
_ imposeible to count on effective application of our means of destruction and,
- coneequently, succees of the conibat operations.
It ie necesearq for any commander or etaff to knw the optimal amount
of reliable information about the combat compoaition and the structure of the
grouping of enenry forcee and materiei, the locatione and degree of readiness
of the enemq nuclear veapona, the degree of completenese and eupport of hie
subunits (unite), the moral apirit of hie ~,eraoanel, the troop control sys-
tem, the engineering equipment of the poeitione occupied by the enemy and
aleo the poseible nature and methode of enenW operations before the begin-
ning and during the course of combat. It ie eepeciallq important to know
the attitude of the enemy personnel ta+ard the given War, the interrelations
betaeen the enlisted men and the officers, the eocial-political composYtian,
the degree of combat training, creativeo volitional and organization capabi-
litiee of the coaaoanders and the etability of the personnei in a complex
eituation. Zfie combat capabilities, the intentiona end probable nature of
the enemy operations in the future, the etrong aad xeak pointe, the moet
important targeta the deetruction of Which will eharplq reduce the enemq
combat capability all of theee are revealed on the basie of theee data.
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Nowever, in a11 Ga9@s a11 of the commendera and aeaffe muot consider
that the enemy vili always be etriving go hide his grduping and his inten-
eions from them and also to confuse them. Rherefore, ge g rule there is nu
excess inforroation about the enen4r; on the contrgry, Chere in glwaye a short-
gge af informaCion, and the comman8ere and stgffe muee be ski11fu1 in drawing
the correct conclugionti an ttiE! grouping and inCenCions of the enen~y opera-
tions by the available spotty data. Under madern caniitiong, ail commgnders
and etgffe muet give primary attention to the moet detailed poaeible die-
covery of the nuciear reaourcee of the eneW (to individuai Weapone and
- iaunchers), although the other forcee and mgteriei of the en+anq in their xone
and on the flanica capable of influencing the combat mieeion hava been studied ~
with t':,s required deteil. Their detaile wi11 be different in diffprent rypee
of combat and different cantrol 1eve1s. Iri the compeny and bgtitalion level,
for example, data are needed on the eneury tgking up the defensive to the
individual fire point and platoon etrong point, and the superior echelon need
information about the enem4 with leee detaii.
The comeaander and etaff etudy their awn troopa with approximately the
eame indexeg aa the enemy. Theee indexee are ae follawe: poeition, combat
compoeition, grouping and mieaione to be executed; the combat capacity of
the troops, including whether they are ar full atrength, the presence and
condition of their equipment, the political-moral condition and the degree
of irradiation of the pereonnel; tha position and etate of the body, the pos-
gibilitiee with reepect to bringing up materiel, rendering medical aid, and
eo on. Simuleaneouely with etudying theee daCa, a calculation ie made of the
quantitative and qualitative relatione of the forcee and materiel of our own
troops on the enemy; the influence of the poaition on the performance of the
atated miasion ie establiehed, what regrouping muet be carried out is deter-
mined, a calculation of the time required for thie ie made, the combgt capa-
bilities of the troope are calculated, eapecially with respect to the appli-
cation of the means of deatruction, and also meaeuree are planned with
respect to improving these possibilities.
1he neighbors are atudied ao that in the final analysis it can be de-
termined to what degree their poeition, co;:jition and nature of operations
will promote fulfillment of our awn combat miesion. Initially the neighbora
on the right and left are etudied and then the troope operating ahead. Dur-
ing this study it is diecovered t+here and in what grouping they are located,
their combat problem and the decisione made and also the resulte of their
execution and interaction conditione.
Tfie radiation eituation Which hae developed as a reault of the pos-
sible application by the eneary of nuclear weapone ia studied by the recon-
naiesance, forecaeting and doeimetric control data. Tfie type, time and
method of radioactive contamination of the combat zone, the dietribution of
the radiation levels in it and how they will vary With time are eatabliahed
here. .
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xoR oFFIciaL usE ornY
lk''a raeult of etudying the enumerated deta, the conciueinns with re- -
opect to ehe methods of operation of the troopa when carrying out the combgt
mission Qre more preciseiy definad, and uoeeuree are planned with reapect to
protecCion of the troope from nucleer weaponn, including eliminetion of the
connequences of Cheir appiication.
The terrain an en element of the gituation under modern conditione haa
acquired eti1l greeter significance than egrlier with the complete motoritea-
tion and mechanization of tha troops. It 3n etudied with reepect to our
entire combat zone. The commander and etaff are required moet frequently to
lcnaw ite nature and type of relief, the preeence of natural and artfficial
obetaciee and hydroengineering erructureso the conditions for protection
against nuclear weapone, camouflage, obeeTvaCion, conducC of fire and orien-
tgCion of the preeence and condition of roade, the nature of the eoil, the
paseibility of thQ terrain and conditione of maneuvering the troope off road,
the presence of building materiele, eourcee of water eupply and topogpodetic
pointe. Specigl attention hae been given to predicting changes which can oc-
cur ae a result of the application of the means of combat by the oppoging
eidee. As a reault of etudying the terrain, ite effect on the operationa of
our own troops and the enenry ie establiehad, and it ia determined hoW best
to use it when carrying out the combat miesion.
The hydrometeorologicel conditione are etudied to determine to what
degree Weather conditione and the aRather forecaet, the force and direction
of the prevailiag winde, the precipitation, river conditione (canaloo lakee
and awampe) and eo on influence the performance of the combat miseion. Spe-
cial attention hae been given to the preeence nnd condition o� hydroengineer-
ing etructures aad the poeaib ility of flooding the terrain ae a reeult of
their deetruction from nuclear and fire etrikes, and during winter operations,
the properties of the ice and snow cover.
- The time of year and time of day are a18o atudied from the point of
view of their effect on the combat operations of our own troops and the enemy
and determination of the measurea which must be taken to decrease the nega-
tive effect. Tfius, for example, during operations in the epring segson
when roads are bad, measuree are aleo planaed with reapect to improving the
paesability of our troope, and during Winter operatione, measures to prevent
froatbite of the pereonnel. When etudying the time of day, the length of
the day and night are firet of all determined, end apecific measures are
planned with reepect to the tranaition from day operationa to night opera-
tione and back. During operatione at night, in addition, meaeurWS are plan-
ned with reapect to illumination of the terrain and camouflage and also the
order of observation of the enemy, orientation and target indication are
determined.
When etudying the econondc conditione in the area amd the aocial-
politicel compoeition of the population, special attention ie given to the
poesibility of ueing the repair enterprises by our am troope to repair the
materiel that hae failed, the medical inetitutione for treatment of the
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wounded and etck, the transport media, fuel and food reeerves, for Croop eup-
porc. It ie aleo imporeane to determine the meens of eatabiiehing the proper
interr8latione with the 1oca1 population coneidering ite ciaee and netionai
compoeition, traditions and cuetonm, politicgl moods gnd attitude toward our
troops and toward ehe war ee a whole. Meaeures are planned eccordingiy, with
respect to increasing the vigilance, maintaining order in the regr, etrengeh-
ening the eecurity of the controi bodieet especiallg in the preeence of a
population that 3e iil-diepoeed taward ue in the operations zone..
The enumerated situation data and the meaeuree following from them are
needed by the commandere and etaff not only ar the oparative bur a18o the
Caceical levele. They are mandatoryt for example, for the battalion coaumnder
gnd etaff operaCing in the forward detaii, in the airborne landing in the rear
of the enemy, during encirclement, and eo on. Ttiie information wi11 be of
vital intereet to the company commanders end platoon leadere when doing recon-
naiesance in the rear of Che anemy. Ignoring themo judging by the experience
of paet ware, ae a rule, hae led to eerioue coneequencee.
These are the elements and situation data studied and teken into ac-
eount by the commander gnd etaffs during combat troop control. It ie necee-
eary. hoaever, to note that ae the reeources of armed combat have been
developed, they have changedo ahich ie ehoam in the etrengthening of the role
of such situation elemente ae radiation and othere. However, with all the
variety, tha situation elemante aad the data making them up are clearly inter-
connected aad mutually dependent, and it ie impoeBible, for example, to atudy
the enemy, hie troope and the radiation situation apart from the conditione
of the terrain or the time. HoWever, the effect of the different elements
of the situation on one element of decision or another can be different and
even opposite. In practice it often happene, for example, that by the con-
ditione of the terrain the main atrike in an offeneive i8 advantageously made
in one direction, and with respect to the nature of the eaemy grouping on the
defeneive, in the other. Ia order to permit such contradictione, the art�of
the comntiander and the etaffs, their analytical minds, thn capacity to find
the main, decieive factor in the situation and to make the moet expedient
deciaion acquire primary eignificaace. It is important also to coneider
another thing, that the obtained information muet correapond to a number of
requirements, the naet important of which are the following: timelinesa of
obteining information, completenees, reliability and preciaion.
These typea of requiremente were also imposed on the situation data
previously. Now, they are acquiring a high degree of new aignificance.
First of all, thie pertaine to the timelineas of the arrival of the situation
data. It muet eupport the commander'e combat decieion making or more pre-
cise determination of the decieion during the course of combat in a time
Which offers the poesibility of deliveriag the mieaions to the reeponeible
ateate, preperatioa of pereonnel and materiel for battle, preceding the enenry
in opening fire and launching the attack. The combat experience of past wara
teaches that late situation data, ae a rule, ia useless. Its use hae often
led to errore in the commander'e decision with all of the reeultent aerious
consequencea.
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Fox oFFrcint, usE oxLY
In modarn combat, as n reeult of the increaeed mgneuverabiliCy of the
troope, tha epepd of the combar operatione and Che abiliCy of targete quick-
1y Co ehange their location~ the eignificance of the tima factdr when
gathering the situation data hae increaeed greatily. Thie fgctor acquires
opecial importance when trying Co prevent delivery to the enem4 of nuclear
weapone euch as tactical mieeilee, nuclear artiliery and aircraft. Ae hae
glreedy bean noeedo the weapone and rocket launchere can be pv.t into poeition
to fire within a few minutee. Under these condiCioneo in order eo prevent an
enenq r.uciegr etrike on ovr troopa, reconnaiseance data muet be obtained by
the etaff during these few minutee, it muet be evaluated end reported to the
comnander, who must make a decision either to pereonaliy destroy the enenp
materiei and weapone of deeCruction, or to deliver tha mieaion to the dther
etaff, which muet then carry out the miseion. From this it is obvious what
high efficiency is required of the modern etaff when governing and analyzing
situation deta. As for doing battle with enenpr aviation, here succeee or
failure will often be decided in a matter of eeconds.
Along with thie, the commander needs compl
which will permit him to know, the state of affgir
a well-founded combat decieion and correctly reac
tion during the course of baCtle. Tfiis completen
of information about each situation element will
troop situation, the nature of the combat miseion
knowledge of rhe situation by the commander and t
and other conditions. Therefore it ie impoesible
commanders and staffa for every variety of combat
a given problem. It ie only poseible to otresa t
to obtain as much detailed data as possible about
!Ce deta on the situation
~ comprehensively, to make
: to changes in the situa-
;se and degree of detailing
it any time depend on the
received, the degree of
te etaff at the given time
to have ready formulae for
activity with reapect to
at all of the staff atrive
the enemy aad have what is
usually sufficient information about our oam troopa with detaile two levels
lower, that is,, in the battalion to the platoon, in the regiment to the com-
pany, and so on. More detailed data are required only in individual cases.
Any commander requires moat complete data on each element of a situa-
tion during the period of preparation of conibat operations, when making the
combat decieion during the course of combat operatione he Will in turn be
interested in information about the elemente of the situation which at the
preeent time have the greateat effect on troop operatione and require more
precise definition or the alteration of a previously made decieion. In
modern combat thie will be information about the nuclear weapons of the
enenry, for they constitute the basis for the combat capability of hie trooas,
and the succees of the performance of the combat miaeion depende in tura on
their destruction by our awn troops. Often the data on the terrain, the
radiation aituation, the weather, the aupply of our troopa with fuel, ammuni-
tion. and eo on Will have if not decieive aignificance, then very important
significance. The abeence of certain data on the situation doee not relieve
the commander of the obligation to make (more precieelq define) a deciaion
in time or to talce measures with respect to troop control arising from the
situation on the basie of it.
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In modern combat$ reliability and accuracy of the situation daea, thae
ie, completE correepondence of them to the actunl activity, have acquired im-
portant eignificance,
With respect to the degree of reliab313ty, the situation data are
divided ittto completely reliuble, probable, doubtful and false. These data
are coneidered entirely reliable which are received frnm aeveral eources or
repeeCed from one reliable source, and which completely correepond to the
devaloped situation and cguee no doub t. The probable data 3nclude the daea
which correepond to the situation and the already available information, but
were obtained from only one or eeveral eourcea neading checking and additional
confirmation. The doubtful data are the data which contradict the informa-
tion prev3nusly received from other eourcee and therefore requiring checking
and mandatory confirmation. Falee datia are the data explicitly not corre-
eponding to the situation and contradicCing the i.nformation received from
other sourcee.
Of course, out of the enumerated types of data, the entirely reliable
data have the greatest value. Only with coneideration or' theea data is it
poseible to make efficient uee of the available forces and materiel and to -
achieve the goal of the combat. Any orrereighta in evaluating the eituation,
on the baeis of the growing deetructive pawer of modern combat meane, can lead
to undesirable cansequences unjuatifiable loases and failure to carry out
the combat miseion. Tfierefore, no commander or ataff officer has the right
to violate the requirement of correctnese and accuracy of reporting the
aituation, to color reality no matter haw unpleaeent it may be. Accordingly,
it is appropriate to remember the following behesta of V. I. Lenin: -
"...The Marxist muat coneider real life, the precise facts of reality...i1
"The moet dangeroue thing in war is u~ndereatimation of the enemy and feel-
ing contempt that we are atronger.'r2 Only when we learn to overcome, -
will we be unafraid to recognize our weakneee and deficiencies, will we truly,
however sad the aituation, look ourselvea directly in the face.i3 The clear
- execution of these beheste ie a matter of honor for each officer, his aer-
vice and party duty, and one of the moaC important indexes of high ataff
integrity.
In realizing :he indicated requirements, it is neceaeary conatantly ta
consider that under the effect of the lateat materiel and methoda of combat
the volume of situation data required at each control level will greatly
increaae. In a number of cases thie volume, especially during comb at, can be
not only equal to the remaining volume of operations with respect to subunit
control, but also exceed it. In addition, the data received during the
1. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Worka, Vol 31, page 134.
2. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Worke, Vol 41, page 144.
3. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Worka, Vol 44, page 309.
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couree of combat change quickly and sharply; they must be gathered from nume-
roue sourcas, from a larger epace that before with reepect to �ront and depth
end in ehott timee.
Ae never before, the commander and etaff are now required Co have
eki11 not only in quickly and correctly evaluating the available situation
data but also predicting and coneidering the changee in ie in time; above all,
they must have ski11 when creating a situation that ie advantageous for them-
selvea.tor thie purpoee, of course, it ie neceseary to improve the operat-
ing process of the commander and the ataff with the situation data in all
phaeee, the bae3c ones of whieh arQ the following: gaehering the situation
daCa from different eourcee; proceseing these data, that is, putting them in
a form that ie convenient for evaluation, study, and output, that ie, a report
on thie data to the commander, the superior officer (headquarCere), and in-
forming the aubordinates and interacting troops and neighbore of them. -
All of theee phases of working with the situation data are intercon-
nected and are carried out, as a rule, simultaneously. Let us consider them
in somewhat more detail. _
2. Procedure for Gathsring Situation Data
Zhe commander gathere situation data peraonally through the staffs and
chiefs of the combat arms (aervices). A'bove all data are gathered which are
required for making a deciaion or more precise definition of a decieion.
Before making the decieion, the commander can define in his inetructione to
the chief of etaff what data are miaeing, and by what time the data must be
prepared and delivered to him.
Zhe chief of staff organizee the work with reapect to gathering eitua-
tion data directly. He eetablishes the total volume and the content of the
information about the situation required to ineure control of the eubunita in
combat, he definea the apecific goals for the staff officers with respect to
the data gathering. In addition, the chief of ataff can eatabliah the sourcea
and the methods of ob taining the required information.
The information about tihe situation is obtained from different eources
(see Figure 20), which, in turn, includea the following: observation of the
combat field, the comnanders and ataff of the subordinates, the attached,
aupporting and neighboring aubunits; the reconnaissance aubunits carrying out
ground reconnaiesance and the reconnaiesance aircraft; the superior chiefs
and headquarters; prieonere, deserters and local residents; various types of
materials and documenta (referencee, mape, geographic deacriptions, and so
on) of both our own producCion and those captured from the enemy.
Every source hae different aignificance with respect to both quantity
and value of information. However, with respect to purpoae, they can be pro-
vieionally divided into primary and aecondary. The primary aourcea include
thoae which conduct direct observatione of some target about which it ia
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neceseary Co obtain informaCion end a18o have direct contact with it. Theae
sourcee can be people (the commanderl etaff officero observer, the pilot of
a reconnaissance aircraft, a acout from among the reconnaiesance group or
patrol, a prieoner, a deserter, local reeidenC, and so on) or technical meane
(radar, radio reconnaissance reeourceao radiation, engineering, meteorolo-
gical, eound metering reconnaiseance, and eo on). The aecondary eourcea are
those which do not obeerve the objects or events directly buC report the
generalized data qn ttiem received before thie from the primary aources. These
include subordinaCes, superior, adjacent and interact3ng commandera and etaffs,
the chiefe of combaC arms and aervices, the commandanC's eprvice agencies,
civ31 defense agencies and also their references, deacriptions, topographic
mape, captured combat documente, and eo on.
~Z~~~i~~u npl
`~D\
(3
5 ~�r~re~e ,~nx~u
ORyMEN~N
� ~
0\

(6~a~ aaav~
c
~r-
Vo~M�,
~9~OQNtOipp

(id=,r"',U
A+rkoyuawN�I n dbr�
~ ~
owNN 407

~nNaN1 i
~rquc~r dx~ra
v e.aa�~cm- (18)
ryarqur ed1cK
tMapmw(l9)
C~pv~orNa,ro,~20\
anrn~va ~
010ieefflucr 8, 4a
~a,vn~,
(L1
Figure 20. Sources of obtaining eituation data in combat by the commanders
and etaff headquartera.
Key: 1. Air reconnaissance
2. Reconnaissance subunits
(groupa, patrols, and so on)
3. Prisoners and desertera
4. Local reaidente
5. Captured combat documente
6. Captured materiel
7. Radio reconnaissance means
8. Radar reconnaissance
9. Televieion reconnaissance
10. Engineering and chemical
reconnaissance
11. Radiation and baeteriolo-
gical reconnai:eeance
12. Sound metering reconnais-
sance
144
"wv?(16)
13. Subordinate commanders and ata�f
14. CommAnder, ataff and other control
bodiea
15. Obaervation poat
16. Superior conanandera and ataff
headquarters
17. Civil defenae agencies and local
�orces
18. Staff of adjacent and interacting
troopa
19. Topographic maps
20. Referencea, deacriptions, bulletine
and so on
21. Commandant's sexvice agencies
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The combat expexience of World War II and the practical training exer-
~ ciees indiaate the highly important eignificanca of the complex utilimion
(combination) by the commander and the staff of a1l available enurcee con-
~ aider3ng both their poeitive propereiea and the3r defic3encies. Thue, for
example, v81uab1a information about the 7,ocation of nuclear weapona ox enenq
! reservee can be obtained by the staff by radio from onboarcl an air recon-
" naiseance aircraft. Hawever, it ie impoeaible not to consider that the
pilot cannot alwaye vieually exacCly determine the nwnber of detected tar-
gete, diatinguieh a falee target from a real one. Therefore, in order to be
convin c ed o� the reliability and accuracy of the information received, es a -
~ rule, it muet be confirmed, eupplemented and mora precisely defined ueing
aeveral eourcae.
Here, a11 of the staff muet give primary attention to the eki11fu1
uee of modern technical reconnaiesance equipment, aince only with ite help is
it poseible in a short time to obtain much of the neceseary data. Zfiis wae
confirmed by the expe;ience of World War II, although there wae then compa-
ratively little such technical equipment. Thus, during the course of the
b attles in eaetern Pruesia, on the basie of the radio reconnaieeance data it
wae poasible to diecover the grouping of the 8th Tank and 4th Field Armiea,
the 26th Army and 41et Tank Corpe of the German Faecist Forces. 7he staff
of our 71st Rifle Corpe, 61et Army, alone was able to capture and make uae of
more than 20 enemy radiograme in 3 days.
When preparing for the offeneive operation in the Crimea (1944), mul-
tiple photographing of the eneny defenaes in the vicinity of Perekop and
Sivash made it poseible to.diacover the enenW grouping, the nature of the
terrain and the eyetem of obstaclea to a depth of 25-55 km. Ttie photographic
aurvey data were reported by the headquartera staff to each company battery
and commander. The staff and the 86th, 125th and 63rd Guarda Rifle Divdsiona
of the Leningrad Front organized a proepective photographicwiaual survey
from the advanced observation poete to the depth of two enemy deFensive poai-
tiane; this was of great asaietance in preparing the offeneive, eapecially
when organizing the artillery fire.
The proceduves for receiving data on the aituation from the above
sourcea are characterized by great variety. The basic ones include the fol-
lowing: the peraonal observation of the cmmaaander and the staff officera of
the troop operatione; the reception of reports from the eourcea on the situa-
tion over the communicationa facilitiea and with the help of visual and sound
eignals; presentation of written reports (texts, graphs) or tape recorded
reporta; lietening to aub ordinates' oral reports on the situation (on per-
s onal intercourse with them); the interrogation of prisonere; the etudy of
photographa, combat documente and modele of enemy equipment, and so on.
The greateet effect is achieved, however, by the complex application
of these procedures. During the course of combat, for example, any staff
will find it advantageow to have the moet urgent and important information
ab out the eituaticm and nature of the operations of their own troops and the
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enemy Croops from the aubordinatea in the form of ahort radio eignals, and It
Chen to requixe of them Co preaenC a written or gxaphical combat repart cha-
racCerizing the situation in more detaix. Time wi11 be the basic criterion
when selecting one procedure or another for obtaining data in the majortty of
cases,
Many foreign epeciallats consider that the cardinal measure with re- ~
apect to cutting time fox gathering the situation data ia auComat3on of thie -
procese. Of course, it is impossible noC to agree with thie. Hawever, it
muet be remembered that many situation data on the modern 1eve1 of develop-
ment of acience are not eubjact to exact quantitative measurement, formali-
zation and mathemaCical eimulation. For example, these include the moral and
peychological etate of the peraonnel among our own troops and the enemp, tlie
degree of their combat training, the personal qualities of the commandera,
natianal traditione and cuetoma, and so on. Therefore, at the present time,
along with automation of the.data gathering procesa it is necessary to ach-
ieve high operational efficiency in the work of the commandera and ataff and -
the meane for ite clear organization. It is also importan.t that the afficers
be able to predict what changea can occur in thie aituation, wh at new miseion
they can receive from�the senior off3cer and what situation data wi11 be re-
quired accordingly for combat deciaion making and troop control during the
course of the combat operationa. lhey axe obligated actively and persiatently �
to obtain these data in advatice, not waiting for special inatructione to thia
effect from the chiefa. _
Zhus, for example, during peacetime all of the ataffa must comprehen-
sively know their troaps, etudy the location, armament and tactics of the
enemy, the conditiona of the terrain and eapecially the routes of the pro-
bable direction of operations. Being on the defensive, the ataff prepares
data in advance which the commander wi11 require on going over to the offen- -
sive; controlling the troope on the march, he takea every measure to provide
the commander with all of the data required for ambush and meeting engage- r
ment, and so on. With thi8 organization of the work, the commander and the =
ataff will have a eignificant part of the information about each element of
the situation before receiving the new combat misaion, which has enormoua
practical eignificance.
It is natural that with obtaining a new combat miasion, the work of
the commander and ataff with respect to gathering and etudying the situation
data will acquire a more purposeful and epecific nature. Hawever, for this -
purpose clear direction of the staff by the commander and the chief of ataff
is needed. In particular, it ia very important that the commander and the
chief of etaff Froperly explain the miesion, calculate the time, determine
what situation data are already known to them, and what data are miasing. .
On the basie of the explanation of the mieaion and timely atudy of the avail-
~ able information on the aituation, the comceander must at least in general
featurea plan and pereonally explain or explain through the chief of ataff
hia intention in combat to all of the control officera. He must point out
for whom by what time the ineufficient data on the situation and the
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calculgtiions muot be prepared, and what requires �peCigi ateention 3n aa
doing. Practl.ae showe that wlChouC such 1nstruetiofto an the part of the com-
mander and che chief of staff it is impoeeible to achieve purpoeefulneea and
organization in the aork of the conCrol unite, and the efforts of the offi-
cers wi11 eo a significant degree be 1n vain, for the egiculationa prppared
by them, the data end ehe propoeele can curn out to be eimpiy unneceegary to
the comtaander, In accordance with the inaeructions of the commando-r and the
chief of eteff, the work of thp remaining off3cera of the controi unite 1n
organized. Each of them is connected directly to certgin source8 ef ob tain-
ing information, and preparea the dnta for the cotnroander in accordance aith
hie job profile.
'Ihe daea obtained on the situation aa a whole are concentrated and
generalized for the commander, the chief of eteff end hie aeeietant. The re-
maining peopia gather only the informatian needed by them. Accordinglyt a
clegr].y orgsnized mutual ieformation about the eieuation betaeen ail of the
offiCers of the given conCrol point and a1so betWeen different points, hea
great importance. Th1s mutuai information pennitg deeper end more compiete
etudy of the eituation, end, the main thing, eliminatee the requesting af
information from eubordinateg by vartous duty pereonnel of the euperior con-
trol units which, in turn, unloada the communicatione shannele.
The organization of mutuel tnformatlon amoeg the contrnl officere on
the baeis of the ina tructione of the chief of seaff is the responsibility of
hie aeaistant. It is important that their basie for thie organization, in
addition to the direct aervice eubordination, be the concern of each officer
about the general eituation, healthy interrelatione among them, underetanding
by them of the leading role in control of the officer operators inaemuch as
they solve the problema cannected with the orgenization of the corobined arme
combat and the execution of the common combat mieeion. Any officer, receiv-
ing data on the e ituation, in addition to reporting to the comnander and the
chief of staff, is obligated to report as faet ae poeeible to all other in-
tereeted parties. The requeet from eubordinate headquartere for certain deta
by varioue duty pereonnei of higher headquartere must be categorically for-
bidden. For mutual information pereonal diacuesion and internal communica-
tione at the control point (by telephone, radio or aelector) are uaed. Tfie
gathering o� all of the duty peraonnel for exchange of informatian can be
accompliahed only in extreme neceseity.
The moet complex is the exchange of data during combat When the control
points are in motion. A significent part of the data is obtained even under
these conditions by the commander, as a rule, from subordinatea peraonally,
and he reacte to the changes in the eituation, that is, he makes a deciaion
(more precisely definea one) and atates the combat mission for the responsible
agents. Rendering assistance to the commander, the ataff gathers, proceasea
and reports data to him by various methode (see Figure 21). They report
orelly over tha internsl radio communicationa of the control point or during
peraonal diacueaion with the commander on ehort halts during the courae of
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combgt. Each duty pereon reportr on hie functions directly to the aommander,
or ali of the data on the changer of the situation are inie3a11y. reported to
tihe chief of eCaff who auma them up and reporte to the commender,
Figure 21. Procedure for reporting situation deta and informgtion ati the
control pointe.
Keys 1. Commander 3. Control officaxe 2. Chief of etaff 4. Sourcee o� obtaining the data
Using the technical conmpunicatione means to obtain the situation dat,a
from the eubordinates, juet as when traaemitting theee data tio higher head-
- quarterg, every officer muet strive for maximum poesible raduction of the eize
of the report in order to eave time and not overload the coumunicatioris ctian-
nele with excese information. For thie purpose it ie neceesary to request and
tranamit only the data which ectual.ly ie needed by the commander and the staff
for subunit control. Tfie previously mentioned requirement that the informa-
tion on our own troopa muet be gathered with detail two gtepe dawn must be
satisfied creaCively. Tfie reduction of volwne of the data tranemitted over
the comnunir,ations media and also the time of the officers can be achieved bq
the application of ehort, clear formulations of their thoughte, the use of
standard report forme aad establiehed eignals.
Tfie clear regulation of the tiaiee for presentation by subordinatea of
reports on the situation for which the situation data muet be divided with'
reepect to degree of urgency, has important eignificance. 1he moet urgent
data are thoee which require direct reaction by the commander. Theee data
include preparation of the enemy to employ nuclear weapons and a11 of the
eharp cheages in the eituation. Tfiese data are tranamitted ouCeide any prio-
rity to all of the intereeted cormnandere and etaffs. The lees urgent data
are the data not requiring direct action on Che part of the commander.
3. Proceesing and Reporting Situation Data
Tbe situation data receinPd from different sources are subject to pri-
mary proceesiug, the eseence of which coneiets in reducing these data to a
convenient form for atudy. Zfiey are plotted initially on the working mapa,
then entered in the notebooks or the f3eld booke of the duty control
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pereonnel, The newly obeaingd deta are ciaeeifies and compared with tihe g1-
Yeedy availgb],e date, the dagree of their urgency and reliability ie deeer-
mined considering the reliabil3ty of tha eourcee of obtaining ehem. Kere
time ie aleo teken into account to wbich the information belrmge, end ie ie
ee tablished what changee in Che eituaeion. could occur from the tiime of trene-
miaeion of tha deta by che primary eouree.
SimulCeneouely, the dgta ere coneolidated, it is eetabl3ehed what e1e-
ments of the combet formaelon of their owm troopa and the enen~y they belong
to. Zhue, by the locaCion of the individugl fox holes, the fire weapone and
the obeteclee of the enemy, it ie poeeible eo determine the outline of the
foYward edge of hie defenee, the preeence of piatoon and company atrong
pointe and battallon defenee poeitione, and by the locetion of the individual
batteries, it ie poeaible to detarmine the grouping of the enemy artiillery.
Redundant, falee and doubtful data are screened out in thie waq, and th8 in-
formation which ie mieeing ie determined. 7he latter are more precisely
defined and procured by additionel interrogation of the corresponding eource.
T'he moet important data on the map are reflected in more detail and
more clearly than the secondary data. The degree of detailing of the data
depends on the category and purpose of the map. For example, a reconnaie-
eance officer plots on hie map all data about the eneIIry without exception.
Other officere keep their working mape itt the volume and detail which they
need for their own aervice duties.
The working mape therefore are the baeic document where the eituation
is reflected. Zte generalized data on the eituation ae a whole are plotted
on the working mepe of the commander, the chief of etaff and hie deputy and
also the officere beading up the control points. Especialiy high require-
ments are impoaed on the mape of all of these afficers. Tlzey muet be a
genuine mirror of the eituation. Therefore, it ie neceseary to give primary
attention to the acquisition ai skills in keeping them. With the introduc-
tion of the meane of complex sutomation of the control processea among the
troops, the situation can be depicted on acreens, displays and other elec-
tronic devicee.
The clear organization of the work of the staff officera with reapect
to presentation of the situation data obtained from different aources to the
commender or the chief of staff has impaxtant aignificance. Under modern
condttions of training and, the more so, during the course of combat, pro-
longed meetinge of the commander with his aides and extenaive reporte on the
eituation are inadmiseible. The data of intereet to the commander are
reported in the form of brief, clear anewera to epecific questions. The moat
important information is reported by purpose at each control level and be-
tween them in the form in which they are obtained. These reports are added
to and made more epecific se new information comes in about the eituation,
eapecially the enemy.
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Thie ia haw. for exampie$ it wae done during Wor~,d War 11 when dis-
covaring the plane of the nerman Faecist command which tried to pull oue the
4th SS Tanlt Corps whtch was defendi.ng poeitione between the gugom and Vieloy
Ri.vere in January 1945 end reeeeign it Co Hungary for parCicipation in the
counterattack. 7'he procese of gathering.and studying the deea aboue this
eituation by our conanand want ae follawe.
On 30 December 1944o our radio raconnaiseance noted that the operation
of the radioe of the enem4's 3rd and Sth rank tiivisione had etopped. On 1
January 1945, eecret agente reported that the preeence of eoidiere with the
Sth Tank Divieion enaignia had been noted in Chenetokhov. On 3 January 1945,
radio reconnaieeance nored movemene of the radioe of the 3rd nnd Sth Tank
Divleione in the Kryukov-Der diYection. On 4 January 1945, by capturing a
prieoner of the 3rd Tank Divieion in the victn3ty of Komarno, the movemenC of
the 4th 33 Tank Corpe to Hungary wae finally confirmed.
When eCudying the received daCa it is neceeeary to take into account
the poeeibility of mieinformation on the part of the enen4. Let us preeent
one of the characteristic exempiee of the las t war. In June 19440 our radioe
took bearinga on the operation of the radio network of the Viking SS Tank
Divieion radio network in the area 25 1cm eouthwest of IGolonryya. In addition,
a"deeerter" cam over to our eide, who indicated that a tank divieion had
been moved Co the indicated area to tske the city of Chernovitee. The mie-
aion of more precieely defining all of theee data wae given to one of our
reconnaieeance groups operating in the enemq'e rear. It turnRd out that the
enemy wae periodicelly moving model tanke from the depths of ite defeneee in
the direction of Kilomyya and back on tracCors. The local population indi-
cated thaC there were no echelone with tanke or other equipment in the indi-
cated area. Zhe previously obtained data turned out to be false. Tfie plot
of the enemy to mieinform our command w8a uacovered.
In reporting eituation daCa to the commander, the chief of staff plays
an especially responsible role. On the basis of explanatione of the miaeion
received and eatimation of the aituation, he muet be ready to report to the
commamder: the poeaib ilities of the enemy with respect to the employment
of nuclear weapons and other means nf deetruction, ite grouping, the nature
of the operations, possible plans, weak and atrong aepects; the poeaibilities
of their subunita with reapect Co the performance of the given miesion, the
required regrouping of the troops and calculation of the time for its reali-
zation; quantitative and qualitative relatione of the forces and materiel;
eetimation of the developed radiation sltuation and its effect on the troop
operatione; propoeala with reepect to the decision, that ie, the most expe-
dient plaa of operations in the given aituation, what combat mtesione should
be given to the subordinates, the order of interaction of the troops, the
measuree with respect to eupporting combat operations, the orgsnization of
control.
Simultaneouely, the chief of staff must be ready to substantiate the
reported conclueione and propoeale. For thie purpoee, he, just as any other
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officer, musx alwaye liave a working map, the neceseary enCrienj ca1culaCione,
eehanaxice, photogrepheo tebles end oeher reference maeexial. Howeveri in the
reporC thie material muet not be convarted to "cri,b eheets"; iC ie neceeeary
to know how to make a clear oral report by the map and refer to the referenceg
- only in extreme necees3ty, for example, when diecueeing digitiai daCa which it
ie di�ficulC to remember. Usuglly the baeic calculationa connected wiCh
etudying the eituation end planning the combae operations include the fol-
lowing: calculation of the tiraining t3me fnr the combat operatione, the
raCio of forcee and meane of the opposing eides, calculaeione connectied with
the application of nuciear weapone, eet3metion of the radiation eituation,
troop movetaent, the manning of the airborney forced croesing of rivere, and
eo on.
When reporting the eituation datg to the euperior commander end head-
quarters, the egme proceduree are ueed as when obtaining them from the eubor-
dinatee$ namely the eituation report and the tranemission of the report over
the technical cottrtnunicetione media and through the etaff officere (pereonal
intercouree), presentetion of written or graphicai combat �:eports and eurveys.
With respecC to purpose and contenr there are combat reporte, recon-
naiseance reporte, communicatione, rear and other reporte, and there are ope-
rative eurveye, reconnaiseance eurveys, communicationa, rear, gnd so on.
In addition, the reporte are broken down into urgent, that ie, presented at
theestabliehed time to higher headquarters, and nonurgent, which are pre-
eented by the initiaCive of headquarters iteelf or by the basic requirement
of higher headquarCere in connection with eharp changee in the eituation.
The volume in contact can be quite varied: from a eignal, for example, of
readinesa for combat, to a developed combat docwnent made up of eeveral iteme.
Tfie conCent of thia combat report can be expressed graphically on the map,
tracing paper or ordinary paper. One veraion of thie graphical combat report
_ of the battalion commsnder ie preeented in Figure 22. Ite basic advantage
by comparison with the text report ie clarity and, conaequently, speed of
maatery of ite content. Hawever, significant time is required for filling it
9ut. Tfierefore headquartera often reaorte to the text combat report which
is uaually diecussed in the following order.
2fie first item of the report reflecte the general reaults of the per-
formance of the combat miaeion by our subunite by the time of development of
the reports ite eituation, the nature of the operatione, the condition and
support one etep lower.
In the eecond item, the eituation and nature of the operations of the
neighbore in the indicated, especia].ly in the case where they have an effect
on the operations of the subordinate troops, and the data on them for eome
reason are not knawn to higher headquartere.
The item of the report contains a compreseed general estimate of the
situation, the atate and the nature of enemy operationa. It ie proposed
that more detaile about the enemry are available in the reconnaiesance reports.
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r~nR 017tr,rnL ush' tlNl,v
xn the fourth i.tem there is a di,ecussion of the intention o� their
aperarions according to ehe conmander's deciei,on.
If becausa of the eituation i.e ie aeceseary for the.forces and materiel
of the senior officer to be ueed tn aseise the eubordinate, then th3e is dis-
cussed in the fifth item of the report. Thp appropriata content of thie re-
porC muat be ge followes
Claseification and series
To the commander of the Sth Motorized Rifle Regiment
Combat report of the 9rd Motorized Rifle Hattial3on No 05. Commandera observa-
tion poet hill 120.7 (1725). 5 January 1945 1100 hours. Mep 25000, Firet
edition 1943.
1. 3rd Motorized Rifle Hattalion performed the next miseion by 1030 houYS.
Tha 7th Motorized Rifle Company enveloped the enemy strong point on hill 140.5
from the north. Loesee: 15 killed and 10 wounded.
- 8th Motoriged Rif1e Company took the weatern edge of the grove (0722), (0622).
Losses: 10 killed, 18 wounded.
9th Motorized Rifle Company approached thr, bridge (0823) at the head of the
column.
The let Artillery Battalion was at the firing poeition, garden (0724).
2. Neighbor on the right 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion took Petrovka, on
the left lst Motorized Rifle Battalion halted at the line of the hill 100.5,
Ivanovka.
3. The enemy with strength of up to two infantry companies and 10 tanks tried
for reinforcementa on the weat bank of the Malyy stream. Simultaneously the
enemy advanced ite brigade reaerve for the counterattack, which was posaible
after 1 to 1.5 houre in the direction of Don, hill 153.2.
4. The decision was made; at 1130 hours to engage the 9th Moeorized Rifle
Company battle from the line of the northwest slope of hill 140.5 in the
direction of the bridge (0821), hill 147.1 (0720), and by 1300 houra on 5
January to take hi11 147.1.
5. I request to prohibit the advance of the brigade reaervea of the enemy in
the direction of the grove (0310)0 Don (0621).
Connnander 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion (rank, last name)
Battalion Chief of Staff (rank, last name)
152
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N'UIZ OFVLCiAL Util, ONI,Y
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Figure 22. Combat report of the battalion command.
Key: a. To the commander of the 5th Motorized Rifle Regiment
b. Combat report of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion No OS 5 January
- 1945 1100 houra
c. Map 25,000 lat edition 1943
d. Neighbor
e. Grata
f. lst Tank Platoon
g. 7th Motorized Rifle Company
h. 9th Motorized Rifle Company -
i. lst Infantry Company
J. lst Motorized Infantry Battalion
k. 3rd Rifle Company 1. Don
m. To infantry battalion
n. 1230 houra 5 Jan o. Executed 1 copy
p. Only to the commander of the Sth Motorized Rifle Regiment
q. Exp. (last name) 5 Jan. 1945
r. No by report log
s. 2nd Infantry Company
t. Yurovo u. 2nd Tank Platoon
v. 8th Motorized Rifle Company
w. lst Artillery Battalion
x. Vysokoye
y. 8th Motorized Rifle Company with deatruction of the enemy in the
vicinity of hill 151.6 is moved into the reaerve
_ z. 2. 9th Motorized Rifle Company with platoon ia aubordinated in combat
to the lat Tank Company (without 3rd tank platoon)
153
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Fnit nFFtCIAL U5C dNLY
(Key to Figure 22 conCi,nudd]
aa. 3. Our request Co prohibit edvance of ehe brigade reserves of the enemp
from the vicinity of the grove (0310)
bb. Commgnder 3rd Motorized Aif1e gaetglion (rank, last name)
cc. Battialion chief of atafi (rnnk, laet name)
Meke 2 copiee.
Copy No 1-- Headqugrters Sth Motorized Rif1e Regiment
Copy No 2 file
Ex... (laet name, initiaie)
Dis... (laet name, initials)
(dare) No
The given procedure for the diecueeion of a textual combat report muse
of couree be considared only one of the poea3ble procedures. In a number of
casee, the comb at report does not begin with the evaluation of the situgtion,
the condition and nature of the operatione of our own troopa and the enenp.
Nonurgent combat reporte are discuesed in arbitrary form, buC they always be-
gin wiCh rhe principal, defining thing in Che situation. 2hus, it ie neces-
eary to eelecC the moeC efficient form in the combat reporC each time. For
example, the applicetion of standard forms as followe ie poasible:
Zb the commaader Motorized Rifle Regiment
Combat report Motorized Rifle Battalion No
Connnandere observation poe tDate Time Map -
Constant data
1. Reaults of carrying out the mieeion and the
aituation of the eubunite
1. No, name of battalion took line and so on.
II. Evaluation of the enamy
1. No, compoaition of enemy
2. Defending of the line..., and so on.
III. Solution and request of the battalion
commander
1. Decided to engage the motorized rifle
compeny in battle from the line...,
and eo on.
154
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Fok OrFIr.rnL usE oNLY
Commander..s motori.xed r3fle batta],ion
(rank, iaee name)
Chief of etaff (rank, last name)
TranamiCCed (time)
Received (time)
Mgke one copy only for file
Ex... (laet name)
date No
Each report muet be extremely ehort, clear and accurate, and it must
be preeented to the addreesee in the establiehed time. Ite content is discus-
~ sed so thgt the aenior officer can quickly plot it on hie work map, etudy and
react in time to the information and requeste reporCed to him. Tfie reports
transmitted over the radio must be especislly ehort but without lose of cla-
riCy. They contain only what is moet important, approximately in the follow-
ing form.
"Kama-8" (code name of the eenior officer).
"3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion hae carried out ite next miesion. The
enemy is preparing a counter$ttack in the direction... The decieion has been
made at 1100 houre to engage the 9th Motorized Rifle Company in battle from
the linp..., and by 1300 houra, to take the tawn of Dallnyaya.
"Don-5" (code name of the conmiander of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Bat-
talion)
The combat report containing a diacusaion of the commander's decision
and addreeaed to the eenior officer is eigned by the comnander and chief of
etaff of the eubunit. 1he remaining reporte addresaed to the chief of the
higher headquartera are eigned bq the chief of staff.
Tfie commandere and etaffe of the eubordinatee, the interacting troops
and neighbore are informed of the changee in the eituation, ae a rule, by per-
sonal intercourse with them and direct conversationa with them over the closed
commnnicationa channels. Tfie changing situation data important to the senior
officer are explained as amatter of courae to them. The senior officer must
not. however. dietract the eubordinatee from direct work with respect to
troop control without epecial need. Each call of the subrodinates muet be jue-
tified by the neceaeity for delivery or receiving�important information. For
information about the enemy, in a number of cases, copiea of the information
documeate are aent out to them.
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4. Proepecte for AuComation of the Procese of Gatihering and Proceseing
Situation Data _
When analyzing the coneent of the commander'e and segff's work process
w3th respect to gathering and generalizing the eituation data in combat ie is
impoesible not to note that much in iC is aubjecC of formalization and eimu-
lat3on. Therefore the cardinal meane of accelerating and increasing the
efficiency of the given process ie, o� course, ite automation in the future.
At the present time it is difficulti to imagine the entire depth of the
- changee wliich can occur in the process oF gathering and procesaing aituation
data in each control echelon under the effect of sutomation. However, it is
- obvious that the degree of this effect will depend on the poasibilities of
the meane of automaCion with which the echelons and control unite will be
equipped. Here it is posaible to etate only certain proposals, summing up -
the experimental data and the theoretical views diecussed in the military
prese of foreign armiea in recent yearel.
Tfi us, the control echelons and unite which will have the bottom aet of
automation media the information sensors and the required number of
communicatione media, can automatically gather and output as directed not
everything, but only certain information: on the location of the commander's
control point, on whose vehicle the seneor is located, the radiation levels
and other information which will be tranamitted automatically to the euperior
control unit or body. At the same time, varioua types of signals, ehort
orders, commande and basic information about the enenry can automatically pro-
ceed from thie control tm it, to the aensor of the lowest echelon. The remain- _
ing volume of information must be ob tained and proceased by ordinary means
and methode for which the agents and duty peraonnel of the lowest control
echelon must be ready.
It ia propoaed that the capabilities of the control echelon which in
combination with other modern control meana have transceiving equipment
available directly in the vehicles of the baeic duty personnel will be com-
paratively large. The gathering and tranamiesion of the most important in-
formatian about the combat eituation in traneient to the higher echelon can
be realized over the telecode channels by using this equipment. Tfie higher
control echelon can tranamit aignals; commanda, ahort orders and the required information itself to the aubordinates over this equipment.
The greatest changes in the process and methods of gathering and study-
ing the aituation data take place in the control echelons and units which
have available computera, remote devicea from the computers and a set of
other automation media installed at the work areas of the basic duty person-
nel. The information coming from the var3oua sourcea will be proceased
1. American journals: ARMOR and MILITARY REVIEWl ELECTRONICS, ARMY TIlriES,
- West German journal WEHRKiTNDE.
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_ correepondingly, stored and output from the computer by requeet in alphanume-
ric form on printere and electronic dieplays in the machinee.
- The application of the automaxion media coiobined with other control
meane aleo offere a nwnber o� other advantages: it ineurea greater precieioa
. and reliability a� the informetion, optimalnese of the volume and epeed of
execution in the intereete of carrying out the combat miseion. 14iie is pos-
- eib 1e only on efficient combination of the automated and nonautomated devices
with the creative activity oF the duty pereonnel while maintaining the leading
role of the human reaeon. A still higher ievei of train3ng and organization
of khe work of the control agencies ie reqvired. Tfiey muet not only know, but
know how to practice to use the capabilitiee of the automation media, improv- -
ing the current developmente and eleo finding new, better procedureo and
methode of gathering and etudying the eituaCion data.
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.1 1
GHAPTIIt 5, COMBAT DECISION MAKING (REFINFMENT) AND PLANNING THE BATTLE
TACTIC5 OF TROOPS
1. Content of the Combat Decieion
Baeic Elemente of the Decieion
The combat experience of past yeare and the practice of poetwar train-
ing indicate convincingly that the euccessful fulfillment of the requiremente
impoaed on a combat decieion, especial!ly ita aubatantiation and timelinese of
= making the decieion, depende primarily on the depth of knowledge, experience
and will of the comaander. For thie purpose the cammander muet have a clear
idea of the content of the deciaion, that is, the kind of probleme to which
it must give fu11, accurate and etear anewere. The latter is also confirmed
_ by acience, euch as paychology. Yt eaye th at man cannot create a thought
model of any object, and then characterize it by worde, in writing or gra-
phically when ite structure, boundaries and operating principlea are unclear.
With respect to the problem of the content of the commander's combat
decision there can be varioua pointa of view, and in reality there are various
pointa of view. If the given problem is approached only from the point of
view of the neceseity of observing the principies of one-man command and cen-
tralization of control, then this solution under any conditiona of the aitua-
tion muat reflect all the phenomena and aepects of the forthcoming combat.
For this purpose it muet with respect to ite content include such elemente
as the idea of the combat operation, the problems of all aubordinate subunita
of the troope and epecial troops, the order of their interaction and also
neaeurea with respect to political work, the organization of control and all
typea of support of combat operatione, reconnaissance, protection againet
nuclear weapons, security, camouflage, engineering, rear aervices and supply,
technical, topogeodetic and other types of aupport and also the comman3ant's
service.
However, this approach alone to the content of decieion, in our opinion
ie inadequate. In addition to the indicated necesaity, we muet without vio-
lating the principles of one man command and centralization,'conaider the
paychological poeaibilities of the conananct, the level of his knowledge and
experience, the degree of familiarity with the actually developed aituation,
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the preaence of time for preparing for combati operatiione and including deci-
eion making, the compoeit3on of the subordinaee troopa and nature of the
combat miedion aseigned by the senior off3cer. Ie is a1so coneidered impor-
Car,C to Cake into accounC the level of training and experience of the officere
of the contrnl uniCs gnd the eubordinatie eubunit comnandera.
From the enumeraeed factore, the time thati the commander hae available
�or decieion making moet frequently hae the greatest effect cm the approach
to the content of the dec3eion.
For the commandar the moet favorable temporary conditione for deciaion
making for combat w311 be between the performed snd the forthcoming combat
operatione in the presence of a prolonged int.erval. During Wor1d War II of-
ten theae intervals amounted to several days, from which the commander of each
control echelon uaually received no less ehan 1 or 2 days for decision making
and for the organization of combat operationa se a whole. Under these condi-
tions, he could, without hurrying, coherenrly explain the mieaion and eati-
mate each element of the eieuation, perform reconnaiseance of the terrain,
_ th ink through all poseible vers ione of the courae of the forthcoming combat
operations, coneult with hie asaiatants, weigh everything carefully, calcu-
late and, in the final analyeis make a decision in which a definition is given
to the ideas and miseions of all of the eubunits of the troope and special
troope, the procedure for their interaction and also meseures with respect to
critical work, control, commvziications and each type of eupporC of combat
operationa. In a word, it ie not required that any reatrictiona be introduced
into the content of the decieion under theae conditiona. The neceseity for
reflecting all aepecta of the forthcoming combat in the deciaion was matched
with th e capabilitiea of the commander.
However, when atudying the given experience at the preaent time the
_ queation unavoidably ariees: will the conditione exist for decieion making
by the commander in a future war if it ia unleashed by the aggresaive circles
of the imperialist governments? The atudiee of recent years give a negative
answer to the question. -
When conducting combat operationa in the future, each commander will
unavoidably encounter a aharp contradiction between the volume of operationa
which must be performed in the decieion making and the time which he can
actually use for this. 'Ihis contradiction unavoidably arises with reapect
to the following basic causea. As has already been noted, the time for the
preparation of combat operationa has been aharply reduced. The prolonged
spaces b etween the active comb at operationa, as a rule, will be absent. Tfie
struggle with the enemy to gain time and lead time in making a strike will
become more acute. Tfie speed of combat operations will be greater, which
means the timea for the fulfillment of on@ miesion will be reduced, and the
obtaining of a new assignnent by the commander from the senior officer will
be accelerated. Zhe replacement of one type of operation with another will
be more frequent than before.
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Accordingly, Marehal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechka wrdte Che fol-
lawing in hie book "Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetakogo Gosudarstva" [Armed Forces
oE the Soviet GovernmenC] (p 263): "Whereae during World War II each opera-
_ tion, as a rule, was preceded by a preparation period, the duration of which
wae reckoned in several days and even weeks, and at the diviaion-regimenC
- 1eve1 usually 5 to 7 days were set aeide for the organization of offenaive
eombat, now i.t ia imposeible to count on such signif3cant amounte of time.
It is entirely probable that the new operation or battle of ten mueC be orga-
nized dur3ng the courae of continu3ng comb at operationa, under the conditi.ons
of unclear and frequently contradiclory aiCuations."
The indicated contrsdiction will be manifested eapecially aharply when
the commander receives a new comb at miesion during ehe course of the combat
operationa being conducted in order to fu1fi11 a previoua miaeion. Un.der
these conditione the ao-called period of combat prep$ration as it ia uaually
underetood wi11 not be available in general, and the commander will have to
make hia decision to carry out the new miseian aimultaneously with the control
- of the subunit conducting active combat operatione. Tfie amount of t3me which
will be used for decieion making and the organization of new combat operations
will often depend on the nature of the operatione of the enemy and be reckoned
in minutes.
For confirmaeion of what has been atated, let us present an example. -
A motorized rifle battalion had carried out ita misaion, it had taken the
enemy's atrong point and received a new mission to develop an aesault and
break through the defenaes at a line 3 km from the battalion for the occupa-
tion of which an enemy reaerve was advancing. On movement of the battalion
at a speed of 4 km/hr it could attack the enemy at the given line in 45
minutes. Practice showa that in thia time not even an experienced cotmnander
can make a deciaion with reflection in it of all of the prob lems of the orga-
nization of the forthcoming battle and its comprehensive support. He physic-
ally cannot perform all of the required organizational measures to carry out
the decision.
The given conclusion becomes more obvious if we consider that the sub-
ordinate commandera down to the squad leadere also require time to make
decisions and organize combat inaide their aubunits.
Thus; under the conditione of limited time the commander has the reapon-
sibilitp of peraonally making a decision with detailed determination in it of
a11 of the meaeures of the organization of the forthcoming battle and the
support of it thie means that he is f aced with unrealistic problems, he
ie forced either to make a superficial (unfounded) decision or use the time
which his aubordinatea need to prepare for the performance of their missions
or halt the troope and force them to wait until the decision is made. At the
same time the commander will doom the troops to passiveneas and unauccessful
action, break down his authority among the subordinates, discredit the prin-
ciplea of one-man command and centralization of control.
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F ~eru~uuQ ,
Na
e
-lll.ND/C"
OC'tl0/X
3)~dcmeu
17
d~ a
b
~
~ a

e~s~ a :e l~~g
6omle iildvvu
llOftNCNNEIX
l10[tpOdedAQNtltr ,
podoe OodcK (4
uA
/Ii~J1Ad0A'
OJQU~NOdBl1C/n4UN
(5) eodcK
meponAuimu 0 dG~t~.M-~
~Ooeo,ne,ececma H~~e~rv ~
oec~n~veNU.n ee+x ~l~d
( c ~e ~ u~oaaoNU,torsuu I
Ilpu or~Nt~ o cM Nu
nv %yoMGap qem
dO,IrMCUU/UC lhdQVf/~ 6� ovC
oWPOeyx n,%vupreM mnud
u OR4p.o#e+ nac~edy,n-
~~dar,~o (/doM~r yn~r~v-
)
25 13) (14) (15) ('16) (ly)'
Figure 23. Content of the commander's combat deciaion.
I
Key: 1. Combat decieion
2. Decieion elementa
3. Intent of the combat
operationa
4. Combat miesions of the
aubordinate subunit of
the combat arms
5. Order of interaction af
the troops
6. Measuree with reapect
to political work, com-
preheneive support of
combat operationa and
the organization of
control
7. In case of limited time
the commander peraonally
defines the most important
goals, and all the rest is
planned by the headquartere
and other agents with a aub-
sequent report for approval
to the commander
8. What exercise, with what
forces and materiel in what
sequence to destroy
9. Direction of the main atrike
(concentration of basic efforts)
10. Construction oF the Combat farmation
and nature of Che maneuver by troops
11. Motorized rifle (tank) subunit of the
lgt echelon
12. Motorized rifle (tank) subunit of
the 2d echelon (reserve)
13. Artillery (morC-ir) subunit (groupa)
14. Antiaircraft defense subunit
15. Other subunits (elemente of combat
formation)
16. With respect to purpose (goals)
17. With reapect to time of operations
18. With reapect to place (lines,
rayona, targete) of operations
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In eddition, with thie etatemenC of the situation the ground in unavoidably
prepared for the flowering of eubjectivism end voluntariem fraughC in combat
with especially ser3oue consequences.
In order for thie not to occur, the degree of centralization of control
and detailing of the decieion muet be crnmneneurate with the capabilities of
the commander with respece to information proceesing. The baeie for hie work
must be the differentiaeed approach to the coneent of the decieion. Practice
teaches that under the conditione of extremely limited eime the commander of
each echelon, including the battallon, muet pereonally define only thoae ele-
mente of the i9ecieion which in the given situation are the most 3mportant and
which cannot be determined by the3r people. Ttiese elements of the combat
decigion ueually are the follawing (Figure 23): the intent of the comb at ope-
ratione, the combat miesiane of the eubordinate eubunita of the combat arme
(moCorized rifie) tank, artillery, antiaircraft), that ie, the subunite which
do combaC directly wiCh the enemyo deetroy the eneny with its fire and aC-
tack; the principles of the inCeraction of the aubunita w::en they are carrying
out their coiabat miesione; the mean probleme with respect zo Physica1 workp
support of the combat operations and the arganization of corc:tol (indicated
in Figure 23 by the dotted 13ne).
Ae for the remaining problems connected with meisures w1, f::'ti n-wepect to
political work, the organization of all fornie of auppmrt of combat oparations
and troop control, in the presence of aufficient tirne, the coc+aaander himself
can, before giving instructione to the responsib].e agent` mske the deciaion
with determination of the miaeione, forcea, materiel, tiraej and methods of -
execution. In the absence of time, he can be compleCely hou,nd by the deter- _
mination not only of the moat important problems with respect to thia type of -
support which under the given conditione has the greatest significance, and
leave the reat of the planning on the basie of his intent to his deputies, _
ataff, chiefa of the combat arme and eervices (where they exiet) and then con-
firm or, if neceeeary, correct their plana. lfiie becomea more obvious if we
conaider that the circle of problema connected with implementing the enume-
rated measures ie quite broad and complex. It requirea additional snalysis
of the situation, the anewer to many dozena of problems, complex calculations -
'and even special knowledge. For examgle, let ua take the organization of
troop control. It cannot be reduced only to determination of the placea of
deplnyment of the control pointa which eometimea occura in the training exer-
cises. In addiCion, for organization and conCrol ir is neceseary to solve
and define the compoeition (the combat group) of each point, their technical
eq.uipment, the order of placement of each duty personnet and machine, the
organization of eecurity and defenae, engineering eqripment of the pointa,
the procedure for their movement during the course of the batCle, the proce-
dure for reatoration of control in the case of failure of one or another ~
point from nuclear blast and enemy fire, the orggnization of communicationa,
latent control and also the work of the duty peraonnel at each point with the
specific inetallation: who, where, when and how it must be done with the
implementation of each of the measures with respect to control.
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This eituation exiete in orggnizing the political work in each of the
many typeA of eupport of combat operatione. Here, eoo, before giving eubstan-
tiated indicatione to eubordinates, it is necessary Co determine the mies3onel
forcesl materiel, times$ methode and proceduree for carrying them out. It
ie eaey to see that if under limited time conditions the conunander pereonally
tries tia reeolve the enumerated measures in all details and give anewere to
a11 of theee questione, then he will unavoidably bog down and lose the main
thing dezermination of the intent of the battle, the comb at miseions of
the subordinate troopa and the procedure for their interaction. On the con-
trary, the differeneiated approach to the content of the decieion diacussed
by ue wi11 make it poesible for the coromander noe to have h3a attention divided,
to concentrate on the main thing and, using the collece3ve intelligence and
creativity of hie nearest $3des, to ineure a timely, high-quality eolution to
all of the probleme connected with the organization of the forthcrnaing battle
_ and ite eupport. W:lth thie approach, in addition, the kind of p robleme the
commander muet enalyze when explaining the mieaion and estimating the situa-
tion ie reduced, and thia meane the total time on decieion makfng ie reduced.
The experience of the exercises indicates that for the given approach to the
conCent of the decieion, the timely making of the decision is within the bat-
talion commander's possibilities even for a limited time.
This approach to the eolution in no way indicatea mu2tiple power. Tt
doea not contradict the principles of one-rman connnand and cEntralization
inasmuch us the right to maintain the plane of the asaiatante is left to the
commander, and the pereonal responsibility ie retained not hnly for their
pereonal acta but also for the actione of their aubordinates. It makes it
poasible intelligently to combine the principlea of one-man command of the
commander and centralization of control with initiative and creativity.of the ~
subordinatea, to reinforce the authority a� the commaa3amotig the subordi- .
natea and improve their activity and moral satiafaction with their routine
work. During the ]:ast war it wae stated convincingYy that the effort of the
commander under the limited time conditione to "comprehend the incomprehen-
sible," his lack of faith in the officers of the control organa kille any ini- -
tiative in them, it doea a great deal of harm to the troop control and, con-
aequently, to the succese of t,~.,e combat operations.
In the control collectives theae interrelations are the more inadmis-
eible under modern conditions when the dynamiem of the combat operationa has
increased aignificantly and the level of training of the officera has been
raised. Conaequently, not only the neceeaity but also the posaibility of
sharply improving the responaibility of each officer for the maCter with which
he is entrueted is at hand. "Ttie basic control principle...," taught V. I.
Lenin, "is that a definite peraon is wholly responsible for the performance
of a definite job.i1
Of courae, reaponaibility can be different. Zhe conmander and only
the comnander has the authority to make a combat deciaion as such. He is
1. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Worket Vol 52, p 23.
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; pereonally reeponeib],e �or the outcome of the comb3ned-arns combat and suc-
ceeeful performance of the combae mieeion by ehe eubordinetie troope. He has
~ no riglit Co puC thie reeponeibility upon anyone. Haaever, every chief muet
; be reepansible for h38 sectiott of the operation; otherwise, he cannot be
' called the chief. Wherever there ie eome reeponeibil3ty, ehere muet be ehe
; authority to define the corresponding meaeurea with respect to the special
probleme based unaonditionally on�the intent of Che commander in combat and
eubject to hie mandatory approval.
'Chis.approach to the maCter w311 correepond not only to the advanced
experience, but also the principlee of control theory that the decieione en-
' counCered in life are general and special. The combat decision of the com-
mander investigated by ue is a ganeral decision inaemuch as it 3ncludes hie
' intent perCaining to ell of the eubordinatee without exception, and simed at
the fulfillment of a common goal. The meaeurea with respect to individual
problems (political workere, organization and controi, types of eupport) csn
be conaidered partial decieione providing for the making of the general combat
decieion.
Finally, the ebove-presented approach to the combat decision will take
into account the trend taward a sharp increase in the role of the creative
and organizational work of the collectives of the control organe clearly plan-
ned in our country in recent yeare and etrengthened in the resolutions of the
25th Congreas of the CPSU and in the new Conatitution of the USSR. The pre-
aence of the general and apecialized combat decieione, coneequently, both
from the theoretical and the practical point of view, is entirely juetifiable
and doee not harm, eapecially in that they begin in the final analyeis with
the intent of one peraon the cotmnander and only with his conaent go to
the responsible agenta. Multiple power in this case is completely excluded. -
The general structure of the content of the comnander's combat deci-
aion and ite basic componenta muet be of this type under modern conditione.
Content of the $asic Decision Elemente
Each element of the decision is in need of a clear definition, apeci-
fication of content and reduction of volume. Inasmuch se it doea not appear
poesible in this book to give a detailed analyais of each such element in all !
oF the control echelona and in all forms of combat operationa, we ehall take
the commander's decision to attack from the march as the basie.for the inves-
tigation and accordingly, ae ehall try to eatablieh the general principles
of the approach to the given queation, the obeervation of which, in our
opinion, will help in practice in any other aituation.
The intent of the combat operationa expresaes the main guiding idea
of the coumander determining the purpoae of these actiona and also in general
form the forcea, materiel and methode of achieving it. ltierefore it ia the
most important element (nucleus) of any combat decision and the akeleton of
the model of the forthcoming combat operationa. All the remaining elementa
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of the decieion and a7,so all the epecial plans and actione of Che troops them-
eelvee are based on iC.
In order Go correspond Co ita basic purpoee, the plan muse clearly
ard epecifically anower the foYlawing bos3c queatiione for the eubordinatee.
1. What enemy, where, with what forces and materiel and in what se-
quenca doee the commander plan the attack? Tte anewere to the given ques-
. tione are needed primar3ly because the final purpoae of any combat cannot be
echieved by only one, even powerful but ehort etrike or the uae of only one
meane. In any form of combat it ie always neceesary to break down the gene-
ral problem with reepecC to the purpose, place (lines) and time for a numbex
of aucceesively fulfilled inCermediate goa18, calling on the corresponding
forcea and means of destruction for their fulfillment and the application of
varioue methods of operations. In the offeneive theae miseiona usually are
the next and eubeequent miseiona, the direation of the future advance. Each
of them can be broken down into a number of emaller apecialized problems
with reapect to size connected with the destruction of enenry targets (atrong
poinre, fire weapone, control pointe), penetration of hie intermediate lines
of dafenae, repulsion of the counterattacks, forced crosaings of rivere, and
_ so on. On the defensive, this clear division of the general misaion usually
is not made, but the combat plan always provides for succesaive damage to
the enem4 with respect to directione on the approachea to the defense, when
deploying for attack, during the attack and when wedging into our defense.
Both on the offenaive and on the defenaive, it is especially imporCant
that the plan define the targets and haw the baeic weapona of destruction are
to be used in theory.
2. In what direction is the main atrike made in the offeneive or by
the basic forcea concentrated in the defensive? The given question follows
from the moat important principle of the conduat of any comb at requiring that
the forces and materiel not be split up uniformly over the entire front, but
that they be concentrated in the decisive direction in order to achieve
superiority over the enemy in thie direcCion.
3. How is the combat formation of the troope and what form of maneu-
ver is planned for uee by them during the forthcoming combAt operationa?
The answer to the queetion is closely connected with the preceding ones. It
somehow gives material embodiment to the main idea of the commander in the
corresponding grouping of forces and the methoda of its operationa.
The moet expedient content of the combat operationa plan is of thia
type. Aa is obvious, it should not be overloaded with secondary meseurea; otherwiaer it will be difficult for the eubordinate commanders to underatand.
In addition, in the effort at brevity it is neceasary not to strip the plan
down too much, to limit it too much, for example, only to determination of
the directi;n of the main etrike of the offensive, for this is clearly
165
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insufficient for explanaCion o� the baeic idea of the superior commgnder t,o
Che eubordinate. `
The combat mieeione of the eubordinare eabuni,ts of the troopa are
determined in the decieion in serice correspondence to the p1an. The eesence
of the term "combat miseion" conaists pr3marily in determination of what
enemy grouping (target) muet be deetroyed or neutralized by f3re and attack
by each eybun:.t o= the firet echelon, eecond echelon or reserve, the artil-
lery and mortar subunits, and so on. It followa from the very eseence of
the combat operatione. However, inaemuch se these operations are always con-
ducted within the framework of time and epace, the second component of the
concept of,the "combat miseion" ie always determinat3on of rhe readinese
_ timee, beginning and end of execution and the locatiion (area, 11ne) of opera-
tiona.
Thie ar`prnsch to the content of the combat miasion has great not only
theoretical but also practical aignificance. It permita formulation and
freedom of rhis content of many aecondary (supporting) measurea, aC the same
time acceleraCing the procesa of making the baeic deciaion and then the re-
porting and explaining of it to the reaponsible agente.
In order to confirm the given concluaion, let us present the expedient
content of the combat mi.saiona of the aubunit in the offenaive from the
march. In hie attack decision, the commander can limiC himself to definition
of the combat miesione of the aubunit in the following volume:
a) The motorized rifle (tank) subunit of the lat echelon the rein-
forcement meane, the line of traneition to the attack, which enemy and where
the attack is to take place and what line is to be taken as a result of the
fulfillment of the next and following miaeion, the direction of the future
advance, the readineas time; when necessary the delineating lines between
the subunit and the neighbors can also be planned;
b) Tfie 2d echelon subunit the means of reinfnrcement, where the
advance is to be made at the beginning of the offeneive, the poaeible linea
of engagement in combat, wbich enemy, where the rout will take place after
engagement, what line ia to be taken (the next misaion), the direction of
the future advance;
c) The artillery (mortar) eubunit the area of the basic firing
positiona, what objecta (targeta) are to be neutralized or destroyed during
artillery preparation, support and accompaniment during combat in the depths
of the enemy s defenses, and the readinees time;
d) The antiaircraft aubunit the area of the basic fire poeitiona,
who, where and when to cover, and for the coverage of which targeta to con-
centrate the basic efforta.
Tfie analogous approach ie necessary for determination of the combat
misaions and other elements oF the combat formation if they are created.
166
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x'hie approach becomes not only necessary but also compleeely possible if we
also take inGo account the importanC fact thae the cdmbat mise3one are con-
tinunusly connected also with the corresponding element of the decision
the principles of interaction of the troope. The aepararion of Chese two
decie3on elemente 3e of a highly provie3onal nature. Indeed, when determin-
3ng the combat mioe3one for the troope, that is, eetab].iahing what enemy,
where and when the eubordinate aubunite of the troopa must be routed, the -
commander aC the eame Cime laye down the basie for their interaction, the ea-
aence of which cone3eCa in matching the forcee and operationa of the troopa
with respect to the target (goals), eime and location (lines, areae and direc-
tions). However, ae the experience of World War I1 has demonetrated, one
definition in the solution of the combat m3eaiona of the troopa for achteve-
ment of their close interrelatione ia inadequate. In addition to theae, it -
_ ie neceaeary to determine and then ind3cate the methode of performance of the
apecial miaeione by the subordinate aubunit when eolving the general problem
in order that mutual aid and clear-cut coordination of operatione be ineured.
ltie degree of detailing of theae methods of operations in the differ-
ent echelone and typea of comb at operationa can be, of course, different
depending on many factores the nature of the problem, the preaence of time,
the conditione of the terrain, the level of training and experience of the
subordinates, and so on. It is impoeaiUle and inexpedient to give a aingle
outline which ia suitable for all casea encountered in real life. Yt is only
- poasible to etate that this stage musC always have a reasonable limit which
can be aeen from the work experience of battalion commanderr 8j P. Ivanov in
one of hie exercisea in attacking from the march.
After studying the plan and the instructions of the regimental com-
mander, explaining the miaeion and evaluating the situation, Maj P. Ivanov
made his own combat plan, he planned combat missiona of the subordinate eub-
units and then set about defining the order of their interaction. From the
decision of the aenior officers, he took the following into account: the
time and procedure for advancement of the aubunit from the waiting area to
the line of traneition to the attsck; the lines and the timea of succeasive
deployment in combat formation; the beginning, the duration and construction
of combat formation, the order of operations during thie period of the fire
weapons and all other subunits of the batCalion; the location, times and
methods making paseages, deoignation end uae of the paesages in the obstacles.
Taking thie into account, thebattalion commander defined the formation and
the line of ruahing and attack of the motorized rifle and tank subunit, the
procedure for their use of the reaults of a nuclear attack by means of
superior officera, artillery fire, direct laying weapons, tanks, armored
personnel carriers and other means; methoda of maneuvering the subunit (en-
velopment, circumvention, maneuvering of fire) with joint seizure of the most
important strong pointa of the enemy, during combat in deptha of enemy de-
feneee and repulsion of enemy counterattacka, rendering mutual sid among the
motorized rifle, tank, artillery, mortar, engineer and other aubunit; the
nature of operations of the aubunit in case of an enemy attack during the
advance and during counterpreparationa; procedures for operations in the
167
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tl,!
case of at1�.atkack without the application of nucJ,ear weapone; target indicg-
eions muC'ual recognition and warning eignals.
'l.tiiQ circle of problems eolved by the battalion commander when deter-
mining the interaction procedure hae completely juatified ieself. The bae-
tallon hae succeesfully performed ite mieeion.
LeC us preeent enother, oppoeite example aleo exiet3ng in the tact3cal
training and describad by former troop commander nf the Order of Lenin Moecow
Military DieCrict, General of the Arm4 Ye. Ivanovekiy in ItItASNAYA ZVEZDA (Red
Starj for 20 June 1972. The commander of one of the tank batitalione decided
to deploy the eubunit at the attack 11ne eomewhat before the establiehed time.
Ttiis "initiative" turned out to be mieplaced. Aa a result, it did not result
in coordinated aimultaneous operatione with the neighbore. At the eame time
the force of Che strike was weakened. During the careful analyeis of the
causea of thie error it was die coverad that the battalion coimnander ssw the
general tactical aituation, hie place and role in the execution of the plan
of the aenior officer incorrectly. Zherefore the effort to be active on the
battlefield turned into a harmful fiaeco.
From these examplea it ie obvioue haw carefully and creatively the
commander muat proceed when determining the order of interaction of the troope
in hie deciaion. On the one hand, he muet see that his subunita act as a
clearly organized and united organiem and forestall the enemy in launching
the attack. However, on the other hand it ie impoeaible to coneider the prac-
_ tice normal when one commander or another unnecesearily and without conaide-
� ration of the actual posaibilities atrives pereonally to define in detail
all of the procedurea to be followed by the troops which are the "internal
affaira" of the eubrodinate commandere. These procedurea can be defined by
the aubordinates themselvea inaemuch ae they note the aituation which muat
be taken into account in detail.
The same thing pertaine to the problems of political work, typea of
aupport and organization o� control. Here it is also necessary harmoniously
to combine the principlea of one-man command and centralization of control
with independence, initiative and creativity of the officers of the control
organe and the subordinate commanders amd not to accuatom them to look to the
senior officer and wait for instructione regarding the procedures for their
own operatione.
V. I. Lenin, attaching enormoue eignificance to one-man command and
centralization of direction, nevertheleea emphReized that "unity basically
andi eeaentially ia not dieturbed, but it is inaured by variety in details,
in local peculiarities, in the methode of approaching a matter, the methods
of realizing control..."l
1. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Worka, Vol 35, p 203.
:68
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Accordingly, it is ueQ�ul agai.n to mention the experience of Wor1d
War II. In iCe initi.al period, when the commandere of the tactical elements
etill had not received sufficienr combat experience, there was a very high
= degree of centralization of control on the part of Che senior officers, espe-
_ cially when preparinR combgt operations. However, eubaequently when the
command peraonnel acquired experience, the combat operatione came to be more
of a maneuvered naeure, and the rimes for their preparation were reduced.
This centraliza+Cion became unneceseary and even harmful. Considering t'he
given faces, on 18 May 1943, the General Headqunrtera of the Supreme Command
was forced to publieh a epecial directive to the troops according to which
the senior officere were forbidden to intervene unnecessarily in the function
of the subordinate commanders, to control the troops "through their head."
Theae instructione by General Headquarters played a highly positive role in
improving troop control.
It is important again to note that the harmonioua combination of one-
man command and centralization of control on the part of the senior officers
with independence, initiative and creativity of the subordinates is one of the
basic trenda in the development of moderti control in a11 areas of country's
social life. Tfie given trend haa been given a great deal of attention in the
resolutione of the 24th Congreea of the CPSU. L. I. Brezhnev made the fol-
lowing statement in hie summary report to the Central Committee of the CPSU:
"When a deciaion is made, it must be entirely cZear who beara reaponeibility
for it. And it muat be preciaely juet as clear who bears reaponaibility if
the timely decision is not made or it is delayed. On all levels of control
it is important to determine the volume and the relation of the righte and
responaibilities... Each level of the adminiatrative eystem must deal with
its own affaire eo that the h-igher levela will not be cluttered up with a
mass of current affaira diatracting them from the large problemg, and the
lawest levels can operatively aolve the problems entering into their compe-
tence.i1 Considering the exceptional importance of the given problem, he
again touched on it at the 25th CPSU Congress, stating in the summary report:
"Tfie easence of the organizational probleme, eimply apeaking, is that each
one, having the neceseary authority for thie and within their limits bearing
complete authority, deals with its awn affaira. ltiis elementary everyday
rule is at the same time a baeic principle of the acience and practice of
control."2
Tfie fulfillment of the given party requirements in the case of troop
control in combat will permit more complete use of the great creative possi-
bilities of the commandera and staffs ef all degrees, the creation among them
of a healthier "paychological climate," and the main thing, improvement of
1. Materialy IIXIV S"yezda KPSS [Materials of the 24th Congresa of the CPSU],
Moscaw, 1971, pp 68-69.
_ 2. Materialy 70N S"yezda KPSS [Materials of the 25th Congreas of the CPSU],
_ Moacow, 1976, p 61.
169
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the auhetantiaxion o� ehe combat decisione, reduction of the time for making
the dec3eiona and delivery to the eubordinates, the granting of more time to
the eubordinatee for preparation for combat operatione and in Che f3na1 ana-
lyeis achievement of the eucceseful fu1fi17.men t of their combae missione.
2. Procedure for Combat Deciaion Making by the Commander
Esaence of the Procedure and the Requirementa Imposed on It
The well-foundednese and timelineae of the decieion making depend to a
great extent on the procedure which is used in Chis case.
- By the procedure in general in ecience we mean the aeC of procedures
and methode of performing aome operation based on objective lawe of reality
and ineuring achievement of the planned goal.
In order to apply the given definition to the comb at decieion making
procesa by the commander, it is firat necessary to take into account the fol- -
lawing peculiarities. Firet, thie procese basically is of a clearly expreased
creative nature, for it is always connected with the search for the new and
beat meane of routing the enemy and succesaful fulfillment of the misaion.
The gtven peculiarity ariaea from the fact that any forthcoming combat will
be organized in a new, variable situation, and therefore it admetimea is not
an exact copy of the preceding battles. Secondly, the combat decieion making -
procese, as a rule, takea place under conditione of limited time, and there-
fore ita auccese depende to a great extent on the clear organization of the
- work of the commander and his subordinate officera of the control unita in the
decision making.
Coneidering theae peculiaritiea it is poeaib le apFroximately to give
the following definition of the esaence of the combat decision making proce-
dure: the combat decision making procedure is the basic set of procedurea
and methods of creative thought of the commander based on the objective laws
and principles and a18o the organization of hie joint work with the officers
of the control units in the decieion making procesa. Its purpose ie, under
any complex conditiona of the eituation, to aseiet the commander in the time-
ly, well-founded definition of the combat operations plan, the combat misaiona
of the aubordinate troops and their interaction. For this purgose the proce-
dure muat correspond to a number of requirements follawing from the conditions
of the specific nature of the decieion making procese itself.
Inaemuch ae the given proceas basically is of a creative, cognitive
nature, the most important requirement on the combat decision making proce-
dure is its correspondence to Marxiet-Leniniat dialectice, the theory of
knowledge, logic, the lawa of armed combat and the principles of military
ecience. "The Red cammander," wrote M. V. Frunze, "must learn how to fully
maeter the method of thought the art of analysis of phenomena which is set
forth in Marxiat teachinga."i The achievements and conclusions of such
1. M. V. Frunze, Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya" [Collected Works], Moscaw,
Voyenizdat, 1965, p 70. 170
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aciencea as peycho],ogy. mathematice and cyberneCice can be of great aeaiat-
ance to the commander in combat decieion-making under modern conditione. His
miseion. consequently, coneiete in perfect maetery of the entire set of
Yogical and mathematical methode of thought and knawledge generated by modern
ecience.
Zhe obeervation of the given moet important requiremente will permit
the fulfillment of such requiremente of the decision making proceas ae uni-
versality and flexibility. The essence of the latter cons3ats in euitability
of the procedure for decision naking not for any one, but for any type of
battle: the offeneive, defensive, arid so on and also under various condi-
tione of the eituation, including with limited time. Tfieir eatiafaction is
recognized ae freeing the eommander from a long, difficult aearch in each
apecial cese for the methoda and the thought aequence and also the methods of
organization of Cheir work during the combat decision making.
What hae been etated, of couree,, does not mean that the decision mak-
ing procedure is recognized to give the commander aome previously compiled
achematic or queationnaire from which, on filling it out, he obtaina a deci-
sion for any b-ttle in finiehed form. "To make up a formula or a general
rule... which will be good in all cases is abaurdity," noted V. I. Lenin.1
The purpose of the procedure is different to arm the commander with scien-
tific methods of thought and.the most efficient methode of organization of
hie work offering the poaeibility of exhibiting creativity, art and peraonal
talent. The presence of auch a common procedure for all types of combat doea
not exclude, but, on the contrary, preeupposes use of apecial laws and prin-
ciplea of the conduct of each type of combat and also the peculiarities of
the combat operation by various troop echelons (company, battalion, regiment,
and eo on).
It ie neceasary to indicate sur.h requiremente on the combat decision
making process as simplicity and clar:lty permitCing ita comparatively easy
and fast asaimilation by all cotmnandera, including the young onee not having
sufficient practical experience.
In addition, it ie necessary to conaider that the practical satiafac-
tion of the enumerated basic requirements on the combat decision making pro-
cess is unthinkable without deep and comprehensive knowledge of the com-
mander, without hia solid mastery of the entire araenal of logical-mathema-
tical methode of thought. In addition, during combat decision making an
important role belonge to the eubjective qualities of the commander, espe-
cially those auch as ekill in predicting the course of'the forthcoming combat,
the development of intuition, atrong will, courage and decieivenesa, clever-
ness, akill in deceiving the enenry. independence, the capacity for creative
thought under a h igh psychological load, readiness to enter into a reasonab 1e
riek and take responeibility for the outcome of the combat operations. Tfie
1. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, Vol 41, p 52.
171
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combaC and Craining practice indicate that if the commander does not have
euch qua7,iti.es end aC ttis firat difficulty vacil].atesl then no we11-developed
procedure wi11 help him to maka ehe decieion.
General Content of the CombaC Deciaion Making Process
Both thA cnntent of the decision itself and the procedure for making
it by the commander are definitely influenced by the following initinl data:
the nature of the combat mieaion received from the senior officer and his
inetrucCi'one with reapect to the preparation for battlel; the developed con-
ditione of the eituation, eepec3ally the presence of the decision making
time; the pereonal quelities of the commander and hia aubordinates.
In apite of the variety of these data, the thought af the commander
and organizaCion of hie work during the combat decision making, the general
principlea which we ehall die cuse belaw are characteriatic.
The tliinking procese of the commander in combat decision making oc-
- cupies the predominant position in his entire multifaceted activity with re-
apect to troop control, inaemuch ae it, in turn, determinea the aubstantia-
- tion and timelinees of the deciaion, wh ich meane, the succese of the combat
opexatione of the troopa. Tfierefore, the atudy of this procedure has been
given a great deal of attention in all armiea, eapecially in recent years
in connection with the changes that have taken place in the materiel and
methods of armed combat.
It is necessary, however, to note that the thought proceas of any com-
mand during decision making, especially the thought of the commander during
combat decision making in a complex aituation, is very difficult to aubject
to analyais and deecription. Some authors even call the given procese the
"age-old secret." Neverthelesa, we shall try to do this based on Marxiat-
Leniniet theory of knowledge and the results of studies of the advance ex-
perience of war and training exercisea.
In many of the official and unofficial sources,2 the commander's com-
bat decision ie entirely juatifiably conaidered the reault of his explanation
of the combat mieaion received from the aenior officer and evaluation of the
situation (aee Figure 24).
1. Here and hereafter the decieione are not taken into account which were
made by the commander with respect to hia initiative in the absence of
communicatione with the senior officer and eharp changes in the situation.
2. See "Taktika" [Tactica], Voyenizdat, 1966, pp 115-116; "Reaheniqe Koman-
dira Na Boy" [Combat Deciaion of the Commander], Voyenizdat, 1964, pp 20-
38; "Vvedeniye v Teoriyu Vprabotki Resheniy" [Introduction to the Theory
of Aecision Making], Voyenizdat, 1972, pp 15-17.
172
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Figure 24. Combat decision making process of
the couumander.
Key: 1.
Plan of the aenior officer 18.
Plan of combat operationa
2.
Commander's miseion 19.
Combat miesions of the aubunits
3.
Intermediate misaions
of the combat arma
4.
Special miasiona 20.
Procedure for interaction of
5.
Misaion trEe
the troops
6.
(Targets for destruction) 21.
Measures with respect to poli-
7.
Explanation of the mission
tical work, support of combat
8.
Evaluation of the eituation
operations, and organization
9.
Enemy
of control
10.
Our awn troops 22.
Selection and formulation of
11.
Neighbora '
the most expedient version of
12.
Terrain
the solution
13.
Hydrometeorological condi- 23.
Note: Degree of detailing by
tione, time of year and dsy
the commander of the measures
14.
Radiation aituation
with reapect to the political
15.
Economic condition of the
work, type of aupport of combat
area, combat operationa and
operations and organization of
apecial social-political
control dependa on the presence
compoaition of the population
of the time and other condi-
16.
Elemente of the situation
tions of the situation.
17.
Versiona of the decieion
elemente
173
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klawever, thQ commandex's thought proceea itself when making a deciaion
- often ie divided into three independent and eucceaeively reallzed etepa;
initially the problem ie explained', and then the eituarion is evaluated, and
only then ie the decieion made, It ie impoaeible to fully agree with the
laet thinking, for it does not entirely correopond to reality, advanced ex-
perience and the theory of knowledge. The independence and coneietency of
realizing the mentioned thought operatione of a commander are of a liighly pro-
oleional naCura. They are more a feeling than a reality. The nature of the
proceae of explaining the miseion itaelf ie auch that during iCe realization
the commander ie forced to one degree or another to become involved in evaluat-
ing the situation. Hie thinking from the very beginning of the decieion making
proceae is none other than the creation of the thought model of the forth-
coming battle by conatant comparieon of the miseion with the conditione of ita
execution and, above all, with the counteraction of the enemy. Without knowing
the aituation perfectly, it ie impoeaible properly to explain the given mie-
aion.
The goals of man," V. I. Lenin pointed out, "are the reault of
the objective world and presuppose it...i1 From the knowledge of this "objec-
tive world," the real combat situation, the thougfit process of the cummander
muat begin in order to deeply underatand the goal of the combat operations
planned by the senior of�icer and hie miaeion. In order to confirm what has
been atated, let ue firet consider the easence and the content of each of the
indicated operations connected with deciaion making.
By the explanation of the combat mieaion, we mean the thought proceas
of the commander aimed on the one hand at deep perception of the intention
of the aenior officer and on the other hand, the atudy of the content of his
combat miasion and eatabliahment of the role and the location which.hia sub-
unit will have in fulfilling the misaion of the higher troop echelons.
7'he proper understanding of the mission and the inten tion of the aenior
officer and aleo his conibat mieaion will permit the cammander clearly to
represent the purpose of the forthcoming battle and the means planned by the
senior officer, the times and methode of achieving the goal, explanation of
the requirementa on hie own deciaion and the actions of the subordinate
troops. In addition, thia explanatinn af the problem offers the commander
the possib ility in the ehort term to replace the genior officer in case of
failure during the force of combat operations, which is eapecially important
in the case of use of nuclear weapona by the enemy.
The evaluation of the eituation conaists in recognition ef the objec-
tive conditions of the performance of the assigned miasion. As a result of
thia recognition, factora are discovered which promote or complicate the
achievement of eucceae in the forthcoming battle. These factora are, as ie
knawn, the above-inveatigated elementa of the aituation.
1. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Worka, Vol 29, p 171.
174
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The sequence for eeCimating them can be differ.ent, besica1],y beginning
with two eventies the mutugl relaeion beewedh the elemenxe and the.i.mporeance
o� each of Chem under epecific given conditions. IC is impoesible, for
example, to eatimare the radiation situation before evaluating the weather,
And the enenry and hie troope separnCely from the terrgin on which they are to
operate. The importance of eanh of the elemenee of the eituation can aleo be
dtfferent. Thus, on compleCion of the march, the presence and condition of
tihe roads and the march poeeibilities of the troope can have a baeic effect
on the content of the commander's eolution; on breaking through a prepared
defense, the enemy; on forcing a r3ver croaeing, the properties of the river `
itself, and eo on. Therefore it ia imposeib le to establieh any 83ngle se-
quence for all cases in real 11fe of eetimating the elemente of the eituationg
and thoae who permit th3e poeaibility are in error. They enter into conCra-
diction with the dialectice and guide the commander's thinking along a�alae
path. The conclueione from evaluating each elemene of the situation are
usually of a dual nature. On the one hgnd, in generalized form they ref lect
the main thing, in one eleme:t or anoChero and its effect on the performance
by the troope of the combat miesion, and the other, they determine the apeci- L
fic content of the corresponding element of the decieion (where it ie necea -
eary to apply the principal etrike, haa to aee up the combat formation of the
troope, and so on). Theae epecial conclueions with respect to each element
_ of the situation and with reApect to the deciai on in the thinking procesa are
r,ompared with each other and with the conclusions from the explanation of the
miseion. When necessary the latter are more preciaely defined and are made
more apecific with respect-to target, ti.me and place. With thia comparison, `
the commander again unavoidably encountere an entirely regular dialectic
_ contradiction expressed in the fact that each element of the situation or
groupa of elementa has a different effect not only on the solution as a whole
but also on one element or another of it. For exatnple, it is not excluded
that beginning with the plan of operations of the neighbors, it is expedient
to apply the main etrike on the right flank of our own troope; from an evalua- -
tion of the enemy, in the center of the combat formation, and from an evalua-
tion of the terrain, on the left flank. As a result of this contradiction in
the commander's thinking during the decision making, a"struggle of motives"
- unavoidably arisea, end eeveral alternative ciecisione appear.
The final selection of the beat (optimal) or moet expedient (close to
optimal) among theae poeaible veraione of the decision and then formulation
of it conetitites the easence of the concluding operaticm and the entire
thinking procead o� the commander during comb at decision making.
In general `eatures thie ia the procedure followed by the commander's
thought during combat decision making.
~ For more epecific explanation of its content, let ua preaent a sample
l.is t of ques tiona in the form of a awamary table to which the commandei muF t
provide anewers and also the conclusione to which he muat arrive during the
proceas of making a decieion Co attack from the march (aee Table 14).
175
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The aequence of determinarion of the 3ndicated decision elemente in
Table 14 end Figure 24 cen be different. Thue s in treining prncCice the pro-
cedure ie we],1 recommended in which initiially the miesion ie explained and
each element of the eituaCion ie eatimated eeparately. The combined effece
of the corresponding nlamentd of the decision ie annlyzed, and only then are
the generalized conclueione drawn. Thie procedure ie eometimes provieion-
ally called decision making by elemente of the eituation,
Ite'baeic advantage coneiete in tihe fact that it gives the commnnder
a complete, epecific claee of probleme for which he muet cone3etantly find
we11-founded anewere during combat decision making. Ae prectice hae demon-
etreCed, it ie eepecially valuable during ehe 3nitial training of young of-
ficere in the decision making proceee a.t the military training institutione
and the commander'e training eyetem among the troope when they are given the
aesignment with a new, complex and entirely unknown eituation. In thie case,
the trained officer, being guided by the given procedure when preparing for
the exerciee, carefully analyzee each element of the eituation, and during
the course of the exerciee, hie leader bringe the trainee to an expedient
decision gradually, etep by eCep with the participation of the entire collec-
tive of the training group in thie proceea. Tndped, the hietory of the given
procedure indicatee ite designation primarily for training purposes. It was
comprehensively developed during the yeara immediately following World War
II in order to train the officera in ekills of deep analyeie in the exercises
of each element of the eituation and thua making well-founded coiabat deci-
aiona.
However, the given procedure has aignificant deficiencies. The
basic one is that a great deal of time ie required for making the decision
by this procedure which, as hae already been noted, the commander se a rule
will not have available in combat. In addition, it artificially aeparates
the explanation of the mieaion from evaluation of the situation ae a whole
and each of ite elementa, it inaufficiently completely analyzes the dialec-
tics of the commandcr's thinking procese, it doea not entirely clearly indi-
cate to him how in the final analysie to approach the decision and find the
correct anewere to the numerous queetiona which are presented in Table 14.
The meana of eliminating these deficienciea, as advanced practice and
theoretical etudiea have demonstrated, can also be different. One of them
- has already been investigated in the preceding aection. It conaiate in a
- clear definition of the content, a reduction in the number and volume of each
element of the decision ae a reault of exclueion of excesa parts and aup-
porting meaeures from them.
176
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A eecond important meana of acceleration of the procesa of preparing
the decision and improving its eubetantiation ia the ekillful combination (but
not replacement) by the commander of the above-indicated decision making se-
quence with respect to developmente of the eituation with somewhat different
order, which can be provieionally called decision making by the decision ele-
mente. There ie no theoretical difference between theae two procedures and
there can be none inasmuch ae both are baeed on the eame procedural base: the
explanation of the miseion and estimation of the eituation. The difference in
them consiste only in the thought sequence of the commander.
During the combat decision meking by elemente of the decision the com-
mander explaine the aesigned miseion and evaluates each element o� the eituu-
tion in close interrelation and by the angle of their complex effect on the
corresponding element of the decieion. On proceeding with the generation of
the deciaion, the commander immediately states a epecific problem (where to
make the principal etrike, how to construct the combat formation, and so on)
and finda the answer conaidering the requiremente of the senior officer's plant
the etructure of the enemy defenae, the nature of the terrain and all other
conditions of the eituation on which the answer dependa. At the eame time,
from the very beginning his thinking acquirea a more purposeful nature, ir pro-
ceede along a ehorter path, which means more quickly making the final goal
determination of the plan, the combat mieaiona of the troopa, and the princi-
ples of their interacCion (Figure 24).
For the application of thia procedure the commander not only has the
neceseity but also the poesibility. It is caused by the preaence of the above-
indicated dialectic relation between ttie proceas of explanation of the mis-
aion, estimation of the eituation and between the elements of the situation
and also the circumstance that the commander in combat receivea much data on
the eituation and atudies it in time, that ie, before asaignment of a new
misaion. In this he differe eignificantly, for example, f'rom the atudent of
an academy who receives an aesignment to h old a meeting. On receiving the
mission, the commander in combat has no need to begin "from zero" and auccea-
aively sort out each element of the situation mentally inasmuch as he hae al-
ready done this work. He therefore hae the complete posaibility of immediately
proceeding witlh the latter the determination of the elementa of the deciaion.
This ia also required by the lawa of logic and the theory of knowledge. In
order to be convinc:~:d of thie faet let us refer to Table 14.
On careful -unalyeis of this table it ie easy to see that the thinking
proceae of the commarder when making the decision cannot be artificially
broken down in any way into the independent and aucceasively realizable steps
auch as explanation of the mission and evaliiation of the situatim. These
operations are eo closely connected that the amallest diaturbance of this
relatiori leada directly to a contradiction with the requirementa of theory
of knawledge, the esaence of which consista in the following.
The conecioueneas of man is formed by reflection of the objective will.
From this fact it follows that the procesa of combat decision maKing by the
185
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t~
commander, juet ae any other cognitiono must necesoarily begin with the ean-
eitive perception of the real combat eitiuation, objective reality and follow-
ing along the path "from vitial contemplation to abetract thought and from it
to practice euch is the dialectic path of recognition of the truth, recog-
- nition of objective reality.i1 Failure to fulfill the given requirement of
the theory of knawledge can lead Co groes errore, eapecially in the case wheYe ,
theae errors have been permitted by the senior officer and the errors of the
commander making the given decieion are euperimposed on them. xn order for thie not to occur, before the commander resorte to epecific, deeg explanation
of the aseigned miesion, the eituation muet firat be analyzed at leas t in gene-
ral autlinee, and for example, it is neceasary te determine such factore se
whetd our awn troope and the enemy troope are located and what they are doing
(taking the offeneive, defeneive, on the march, and so on), what approximately
their compoeition is and also the general nature of the terxain. Without
this, he cannot correctly anewsr any of the problems of the explanation of the
miaeion presented in Table 14. How is it poesible, for example, correctly to
. underetand arid deeply realize the goal of Che operation, that ies wh at enemy
the aenior officer plane to destroy, what enempr is to be destroyed by our own
(eubordinate) troope, what linee ara to be taken, not having even the moat
, general concept of the enem4r in the terrain. Without this, when axpl aining
the miseion it is imposeible to take even a a tep along the path to the deci-
, eion, to plan, for exauple, even the approximate direction of the principal
-ac . attack.
.
The given con clueion is confinaed also by the practice of the thinking
~ of experienced commandere during decieion making during the past war and poat-
war training exercises. 1tiey have always explained the aeaigned miesion and
estimated the situation in cloae dialectic interrelation and casuality. In
addition, as has already been noted, there has been no necesaity, but a pos-
sibility for this. Indeed, in combat reality the commander alwaya knowa the
situation of one degree or another. He conatantly lives it. Thus, b efore
ob taining a new mission from the senior officer, on the basis of his p relimi-
nary ordera. and prediction of the future operatione he constantly etudies the
aituation, the atate and the capabilitiea of hia troops and also the eneny
oppoeite, the terrain in the direction of probable operations, weather and ao
on. On aesignment of the m-'.aeion, he only gathers the misaing information and
. makes a more purposeful atudy of all of the ob tained data on the aituation
considering the nature of the miseion. Therefore, the commander does not
_ need to find anawere to the dozens of questions reflected in Table 14. Many
of these anawers he has in his head or require only refinement. He can uae
the aituation not as the "raw material" for atudy but as the finished "parts"
for constructing the "building" of the deciaion. Here the capacity of the
commander to encompase a11 of the numerous factors of the aituation with his
thinking, quickly to find among them the main ones determining one element or
another of the decieion.. These main factorR wi11 look different under dif-
ferent conditiona. For example, the sequence of the routing of the enemy,
the direction of the primary attack and the combat formation o� the troops
1. V. I. Lenin, Complete Col].ected Worke, Vol 29, pp 152-153.
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.
depend primarily on the etructure of ehe enemp defenae, the form of the
maneuver on the presence of open flanks and gaps, the content of the com�-
bat mission and tha order of interaction of eubordinate troops their coin-
baC capabilitieB. However, it is not excluded that other factore can turn
_ out to be the main factoreo for example, Che condltinn of the terrain, the
radiat3on situation, the aupport of our own troops, und 8o an. Ttie art of
_ the commander wi11, in particular, consiet in quickly analyzing the complex
labyrinth of the eituation and finding the proper way out of it. This art
ie within the power only of a 13terate, experienced officer.
Thus, the commander's explanation of the mission and his evaluation
of the situaCion are not independent etepa in hia thinking ieolated'from
each other, but a united creative process of deciaion making. After explana-
tion of the mieeion, the evaluation of the situatian doea not begin, but con-
tinues and goea into greater depth in order more cumpietely and in more de-
tail to find out all of ite poaitive and negative properties influencing the
performance of the stated mission by the eubardinate troops.'
The given theoretical s ituatien permits a diffe rent approach to the
content of the proceae of explaining Che mission itself. It offere the pos-
sibility for the commander not ta be limited only to the analyais of the
thinking of the senior officer and hie mieeion, but to take a more certain
step along the path to his awn decision, to drop his explicitly inexpedient
version, to make the plan approximately, to give the troopa epecific preli-
minary ordere, to give his further thinking a more purposeful nature and
thua eignificantly accelerate the entirs deciaion making procesa. In addi-
tion, in explaining the sesigned mission in combination with the general
conditione of the eituation already known to him, the commander can break
down the mission into a number of intermediate and special problema (sub -
problems) and eimultaneously.diatribute the latter among the responaible
subordinate aubunita. Thie procedure ie widely diecuased in the literature
on the theory of production control under the name of conetruction of the
"problem tree" or the "target tree," and it ia used completely in the mili-
tary affairs considering, of course, their specific nature.
In confirmation of what has been atated, let us present an example of -
the application of the given`procedure when the commander explaina the mis-
sion to attack a reinfarced enemy motorized infantry company. Rnowing the
organization, weaponry, reinforcement standards and tactics of the company
in advance, the battalion conanander mentally divides the mission into a
number of special miseiona during his explanation, such as destruction of
the enemy in three platoon atrong pointa, neutralization of 15 machinegims,
one large-caliber machinegun, three mortars, 10 entrenched tanks, six anti-
tank guided mieailes, eix recoillesa guns, two radar, and one obaervation
post. He can simultaneously plan the diatribution of all theae enemy tar-
gets among his available forcea considering the app].ication of the means of
destruction of the aenior officere with respect to eome of them. In apite
of the fact that thia dietribution is of a preliminary nature (without spe- cific indication of time and place), it permits the creation of the form,
187
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- the "ske],eton" of Che future decision which then can be filled out with re-
epect to content much faetex and muc'h more eaeily. The close combinat3on of
the process of explaining the misaioin with evaluation ot the eituation con-
- sequently hae great practical eignificance.
It is imposeible to cons idar the last, concluding operation in thP
thinking of Che commander determination of the exped'ient veraion and formu-
lation of the solution as an independent atep. Moreover, it cannot be
called decision making, ae eome authora eay. We have seen above that the
_ combat decision doea not form in the coneciouenesa of the commander imme-
diately or suddenly, buC ae a result of complex, at timea agonizing thinking, weighing the many proe and cone when explaining the misaion and estimating
the situstion, that is, over the extent of the entire decision-making process.
The nature of the given proceae itself ie characterized by s eearch
- nature, inasmuch as during ite courseo on the basie of the contradictory ef-
fect of the varioua elemente of the eituation eeveral alternative versiona of
- the decieion unavoidably occur to the commander in the form of hypotheses.
- At the end of this procese, no decieion making takes place, but the selection
of one out of several veraions which the commander for one reaeon or another
(by one index or another) conaidere the beat, the optimal or the moat expe-
dient, that is, close to optimal.
The search for this version begine at the very b eginning of the deci-
aion making procesa. During the course of thie process, a literate, ex-
perienced commander comparatively eaeily aifte out the explicitly erroneous -
from the aet of poasible versiona. The remaining few (two or three) expedi.-
ent or rational vereiona are compared by the commander at the end of the
deciaion making procese by the expected combat reaulta (the poesible losaes
to the enemy and his own troops, the coneumption of materiel and time for
fulfillment of the miesion, the capture of the terrain, and so on) and he
finally selecte the best of them. Let us note that at this time not only the
mind but also the will of the commander has great eignificance. The force(: -
decision is not to decide anyth ing, that is, in action. Af ter selecting the
best version, the commander formuJates and explains his decision to his
aub ardinatea. The decision making procesa enda.
Hawever, thie ending of the givett procese can be considered only rela-
tive. Subsequently, the thinking that 1:he commander does about the eolution
continues, especially for special changes in the situation which is most
characteriatic for the time of conduct of the combat operations. During the
given period, the commander unavoidaoly muat refine, supplement and specify
one element or another of the previously made decision again and again, and
in case of a sudden, eharp change in the situation, make a theoretically new -
deciaion ae a whole. Moat frequently, the neceasity for more precise deter-
mination or alteration of the previously made deciaion will occur during the
course of combat on eharp changes in the aituation which will be difficult
for the commander and ataff to foresee in advance before the beginning of the
comb at operatione. Zhus, on the approach of the advancing troops to the
188
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D. A. I VANOV, V. P. SAVEL' YEV AND P. V. SHEMANSK I Y
6 APR I L 1979 ~ 3 OF - 4
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fonaard defeneive line of the enemy, whieh cannot be rt-cnnttoitered in gIl the
details before the beginning of the batCle, the commander cgn obtiain entirely
new deta on the grouping of the enena and the lncgtinn o� his firp power which -
requirps more precise definition not only of the miesions nf his arCillery
but aleo the etructure of the combat formation of the subunits and somQtimes
the direcCion of the siain etrike. Stiil greater refinements and changee in
the decieicm can be required gf ter a suddpn nuclear ettack by the enenwo his
destruction of hydroengineering structuree, flonding of the terrain and other
analogoue ettuatione.
Thus, the connnander's thought procegs about his decision occuxs in a11
phases of troop controlt beginning with the time of dbtaining the comb at mig-
sion and ending with its fulfillment. No conmander can hope that after making
even a eubstantigted decisiun and issuing the coab ati order everythtng will
proceed automaCically on ite ownt ingemuch as the enenry will always strive to
take the corresponding countermeasures. There is no diecontinuation in thittk--
ing or creativity of the commander in battle.
Logical Methode of Tfi inking of the Commander During Decision Making
Now let ue consider which epecifically logical methode of thinking the
commander cisn use when making a combat decision.
- Out of these methode, the comprehenaive dialectic materialistic method
- of recognition of the truth hae primary aignifl.cance. From the very begin-
ning of the thought proceee when making thp combat decision, it requirea that
the ccnnnander base his thinking primarily on the objective fact, the actual
conditions and situation, correctly evaluate them from the quantitative and
_ qualitative points of view, coneider them in close interrelation, cantinuous
development and change, discovery of contradictions of this development,
finding the basic elemenC, diacovery of the poseible fac:ora having a deci-
sive influence on the succesa of the fulfillment of the combat mission by
the troope, that is, see the eseence of the battle as the external phenomenon.
When uaing the given method it is especially neceasary to discuss the
importance from the commander`s point of view of the consideration of the
comb at situation not so much statically as dyn amically, the chaages and
development during the couree of combat. Only with thia approach can the
connnander not eimply passively coneider the situation but be ite creator,
actively influence the operatione of his troope during the couree of battle
end through them, affect the enemy. For this purpose, the capacity of the
commander to predict the poaeible changes in the situation and the coiirse of
the forthcoming combat operatione has primary aignificance. It is easier,
General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko notea in his memoirs, "for the combat
chiefs heving the gift of foreaight to generate and quickly make decisions.
Frequently it occura that one commander or another experiences great diffi-
culties when making a decieion, he considers the various versione and doea
not know which one to take. Another commander, in the same aituation, imme-
diately selecte a vereion and throws out the others. This occui-s because the
latter, ae they eay, can eee ahead."1
1. S. M. Shtemenko, "General'nyy Shtab v Gody Voyny" (General Staff Du�ring
the War Years), Book 2, Fascw, , Voyenizdat, 1973, p 494.
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Skill.in predicting the course of the forthcoming combat operattone
during tiorld War II Weo charecCerietic of all af Che commandere of the 5oviet
Arary who+ad mastered the dialectic method of thiaking perfectiy. For exam-
pie, thie1e what A. Chakovekiy writee in hie novei "Blokada" [BlockadeJ
about the'think:,ng practice of Marahal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov:
"Looking at the mapt Zhukov did not eimply rnproduce thp picture of the paet
battle, he knew how to predicr the neture of the future barCie, in calculated
minutea, eomehc+w 'play out' the varioue vereione firet for himeelf and then
for the en'emy. He knew haw to abekract out of himeelf and become etbodied
in the enenry, then, again becoming himself, to evaluate the intentione of rhe
enemy, r'
During combat decision making, the combination of euch general theore-
tical nethode of logical thinking ae a-ialysie and eyntheeie, abetracting and
generelization, induction and deduction, analogy aa3 comparieon aleo have
important eignificance.
By breaking dam the general mieeion into a number of intermediate mie -
aione and the general situation into individual elemente, analysie permits a
deep study of each of them and a diecovery of the main onee among them and
eeparation of the secondary ones. An example from the experience of World
War II confirma how important euch analyeie is. When making the decision to
go on the offeneive in October 1944 at the reinforced Shtallupenekiy rayon,
the decieive factor in routing the enefloy aga proper eelection of the vuiner-
able eoot in hie defenee. The commander of the 96th Guards Rifle Divieion
diacovered on the baeie of the data obtained from the unite and eubunite com-
mandere when etudying the enemq tt:at southeset of Shtallupen the enemq haa a
f teld type defenee: thie also determined the comb at decision making. 1fie
decision was made to make the main etrike against this Weakest point, bqpas-
sing the reinforced region from thP eouth which insured duccess of the of-
feneive.
The method of analyzing the situation ie continuously connected With
synthesie, which permite joining the resulte of estimating the partial ele-
ments of the eituation obtained during the analyeie proceas into a united
whole, vhich is eepecially important when making a decision bq ite elements.
F. Ingele emphaeized that without aaelysie there can be no synthesie, b ut
gotether wiCh it "...thinking coaeiete ae much in expanding the objecte of
coneciouaneae to their elemeats ee in combining the elemente connected to-
gether into a uaity."1
Analyeie and syntheeie are ueed in making decisione in close combina-
tioa not only with each other but aleo with such metho9e as induction and
deduction. Induction helpe the commander, on the baeis of eingle, at timee
ineignificant facta of the combat eituation, to arrive at general conclu-
eions. Deduction, on the contrary, permite, on the basie of the knowledge
of the geaeral principles of the conduct of comb at operatione, judgment of
l. R. Marx aad F. Fngele, Worke. Vol 20, p 41.
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the special phenomenon of combnt reglity. The conclusione mAde by the induc-
_ Cit�e meChod of thought alwey9 Pxn checked out by the method of deduction and
_ vice verea. Induction and deduction con8equenCly "....are rilated to each -
other in the eame neceeeary way ae eynthesis and analyeie. LeC us demon-
etrate tb.ie in e eimple example.
In one o:E the etaff command exercises the battalion commr;nder received
, reconnaic+eance iigta that in the vicinity of M there were to be 10 to 15 epe-
cial vehicles atid crane vehicles under reinforced guard. Oci receiving thie
epecial type dara, knaring the enemy's materiel in advance, he immediately
aesumed by induction thaC the enemy's miesile battery had errived in the indi-
cated area, but which one? The deductive method helped him to answer this
queta!ion. For this purpoee he plotted the area of concentration of the
vehiclee on a outp, compared it with the general etrucCure of the enemy'8 de-
fenee, and eetabliehed that it wae within 10 km of the forward line between
the defensive pnaitione of the enempr. Knowing the general principles and
no~mativee of the use by the enemy of the miseile troopa, he drew the aolid
cinclusion that a battery of tactical miesiles wae being deployed in the
,liven area whic;h could launch a nuclear attack in 15 to 20 minutee.
Zn thie way the commander was ab le to determine the atructure of rhe
enemy's strong point by individual entrenchme-_te and higher pointe, by ths
operation o.f individual radioe, the syetem of enemy coatrol painte, aad so on.
Even in these eimplest examplee we can see that in addition to the
above-men tioned thought proceeses the commaader also uses such processea ae
abstracting and generalization. lfieir role is especially important in the
more complex eituatione where it is necessary to withdraw from thie bit of
information about the aituation and concenCrate attention on the main, deci-
aive information for the given time. clowever, the discovery of the main ele-
ment of the eituatioa le not a simple problem, the more so in that manq of the
situation data caa be missing, and paxt of them will be false. Accordingly,
analogy and comparieon can be of great assistance to the commander, the ea-
sence of which coneists in comparison of the available data on the situation
with the previously icaawn caees aad thus finding the necessary conclueione
for the preeent and.the future. However, euch conclusiona, as a rule, are
of a propoaitional (probability) nature, they appear in the form of hypothe-
aee inasmuch as the situation ia nonrecurrent, and one battle ia in no way
eimilar to another. Ignoring thie fact, the etandard copying of the previous
operatione aoaner or later leade to failure to fulfill the mission. On the
contrary, creative consideration of the chaages in the eituation, finding
what ie new always promotes euccess. For confirmation of what has been said
let us present two examples from the experience of World War II.
In carrying out the offeneive operation, in February 1943 our troops
were engaged in battle at Lugenek. In the city itself and on the approaches
to it the enemy created a strong defeaae. Repeated efforte to take the citq
ended in failure, and not oaly becauee of the lack of superiority over the
enemy. Our troope made an error in that the repeated attacka were ueually
1. R. Harx and F. Engels, Worke, Vol 20, p 542.
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made at the eame Cime: Chey began in the mnrning and ended at dark. The
enenry quickly mgde uee of thie: he ueed n3ghC to regroup hie forces and
materiel and reinforce hie defenees. Thus, by the beginning of the daytime
= ettack by our troope the enenp was prepgred ggain. When thie aituation was
_ properly evaluated and the neceeeity for atracking at night was underetood$
the corresponding decieion was made. Thpn the offeneive was r.rowned with
= success. In the given caee the decieive role was played by dnparture from
the sCandard, proper and creativa selection of the time of beginning the at-
tack when making the decieion.
Let ue coneider a secoad exemple. One of the battalione was to croea
a large waCer barrter and capture a powerful streag point of the eneny. This
mieeion was quite compllcated in itself$ and the battalion commander. Captain
Tret'yakov, complicated it etill more, it would eeem, by the decision that
he made after detailed familiarization with the situation. He considered it
neceesary to make the rirrer croesing where it eplit into three arme flawing
Chrough a difficult ewampy area. powever, in reality thie moet difficult
alternative turaed out to be the ehortest path to victory. Ifie enew defenses
here were the weakeat, and in addition, the eneuy did not expect attack from
this dirsction, was taken by eurpriee and routed.
Tfie characteristic of the thought process of the commander when making -
Che combat decieion would be incomplete if he did not employ the so-called
inductive-heurietic methode. In recent yeare a great deal of attention has
been given to them in all armiee. Their essence consiets in the capacity of
the commander to make a decieion without a developed opinion and intermediate
phaees of their thinking pxocees with subsequent mental aelection of all of
the eituation elements. In other worde, these methode are based on the abi-
lity of the commander to "eee" the decieion, to draw afast, developed mental
conclueioa, to eelect the main item from a eet of initisl situation data and
immediately arrive at the final reeult the deciaion.
Thege Qethods are moat clearly exhibited during decision making in
the couree of comb at operations when fast reaction of the commander to the
changes occurring in the eituation ie required. 1hey are baeed not only on
the aubjective qualities of the commander, but primarily on his deep knaw-
ledge of the objective lawe of armed combat, the princip].es of militarq science,
solid mastery of the dialectic methods of thought aad great practical expEri-
ence. Conaequently, they do not eo much contradict the logical method but
eupplement aad extend them in the united decision making proceas. In addi-
tion, they are closels� connected with the psycholcgical atate of the commander,
hie inapiration, mood. collectiveness of will, and spiritual ancl phqaical
- forcee.
- Zfiis peculiaritq of the combat decision making by the commander has
been figuratively characterized by General of the Army P. I. Batov in hia
memoirs "On the March and in Combat." Ae writes: "The front li.ne commandera
know hvw many though ts crcwd together when qou look at the location of a
forthcoming hettle for the laet time. Like eny creation of the handa and
Will of man. the battle is ;?alized twice firet in thought and then in
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reality. x� the chief of sCaff ie an operations mathematician, thie in ineuf- -
ficient for the commander. He muet have the power of fantaey, etra3ning his
aenseal to eurvive the firet mental battlee the parte of which are etill
imprinted in hie memory 11ke frames of photographic fil,m." '
- The Application of Mathematical MeChods and Meane of Mechanization and Auto-
mation When Making the Combat Decieion
In order Co make a timely, eubstantiated combat deciaion, the applica-
tion not only of logical but aleo mathematical methoda by the commander hae
great importance. Thie is indieated by all of the many centuriee of history
- of military ecience. A. Makedonekiy had AriatoCle ae his "advieer on mathe-
matica," who helped him develop the diepoaition of the battles and the forma-
tion of the troops on the battlefield. For A. V. Surov, one of the basic
- operating principleu, along with epeed and impact, was visegl estimation.
It is wnqueBCioned that the role of the mathematical methode in modern
-
combat hae increesed greatly inaemuch as now ineCead of movement of the -
troops by foot and arrangement of cantinuoua uniform columma on the battle-
_ field it is neceseary to calculate theoretically different and more complex
phenomena to the radiation situation, and to eupplement the ordinary cnlcula-
tione and "estimation by aight" there are linear and dynamic programcning,
probability theory, differential equatione, ayetems analyeis, operations
research, game theory, PFRT planning, progranani.ng and computer engineering.
Without mathemaCical methode, without quantitative and oualitative subetan-
tiation. it is impossible to adopt a proper, especially an optimal decieion
in modern combat. One heslthy idea, experience or iatuition is now insuffi- -
cient, the trial and error method is in general inadmissible, for in nuclear
~ warfare many errore turn out to be uncorrectable.
In addition to neceesity, the application of mathematical methode
arisee from poaeibility. The creative nature of the deciaion making process
doea not mean thaC it is not characterized by operations which can be
formalized, algarithmized and expressed by mathematical la-:quage. Zhese
operationa primarily include the performance of varioue cal.culations required
for making a subetentiated decieion to use the available forces and materiel
in combat. Zfie most important aad moet recently encountered calculations in
control practice are ueually the follawing:
a) Calculation of the combat capabilities of the combat arms and
apecial troope on both eides (Table 14), such ae, for example, artillexq and
mortare with reepect to damage of the eaea4 targete from closed fire
poaitione; the direct-laqing methode aad antitank guided missiles with re-
apect to deetruction of the fire pointe and tanks; the antisircraft defense
meane with reapect to destruction of eir targete; the eagineering troops
with reepect to making paesages aad obetructiona, laying out routeap the
support of river croasinge. and eo on;
b) Calculatioa of the quaatitative and qualitative relations of the
forces and materiel and the created deneitiea per km of front;
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, c) Calculation of the poesible 1osses to the troops on both eides; ~
d) Calculatione connected w3th the movement and transportation of
- troops by varioue forme of traneportation, eurmounting water barriere, air-
borne landinge, and compreheneive eupport of combat operatione; -
- e) Calculatione with reepect to forecaeting the radiation aiCuation
and irradiation doses of the pereonnel. ,
Depending on the type and ecale of combat, other calculatione$ of
course, can be nade. Anoong them, the calculations permiCting comparieon of
the combat capabilitiee of our own troops and the enemy have important aigni-
- ficance$ not only thoee which occur at the beginning of the combet operatione
(in etatice), but alea thoee which coneidering the expected lossea of the
- aides can occur during the couree of combat (dynamically) when aolving the
intermediate and epecial problemat breakthrough from the march of the defen-
eive poeitione in depth, repuleion of the enemy counterattacks, accompliehitLg
river croseinge, and eo on. On the b aeie of these calculatione, the com-
mander and the eraff determine the number and ratio of the forcea and materiel
required for succeseful eatiefaction of the goal. grouping of the forcee and
- the methode of their operation. The quantitative and qualitative aepects of
the forces and materiel are uaually calculated in several veraions. Thus,
. in the offensive it ie initfally determined in the entire zone of forthcoming
- combat operatione and the entire depth of the mieeion, and then when perform-
ing each partial miseion also separately on the dixection of the principal
attack. During operatione involving uae of nuclear weapons, in addition, it
ia necessary to define the ratio of the forces and materiel after the pre-
suppoaed (eacpected) nuclear etrikea of b oth aides.
The basic indexee by which the calculation ia made of the ratio of the
�orcea in the battalion echelon are %%he following: motorized rifle (motorized
infentry) subunite, tanks, artillery and mortars (by calibere), the antitank ~
meana. The initial data for the calculation are the following: the actual
composition of the subunita participating in the given combat, the grouping
of forces and materiel which can participate in the fu1f311ment of each
mieaion, the grouping of the enemy which will withstand our troops each time.
On the basis of theae data, the number of forces are calculated, and the
previously defined quality of the forces and uiateriel on both sidee ie taken
- into account. Then by divieion of the greater indexes by the smaller ones,
their ratio ie determined. The resulta of the calculation are uaually -
recorded in the table forme that are prepared in advance.
: As practice ahowA, the greatest accuracy of auch calculations can be
achieved when using the so-called coefficienta of commensurablenese of the ~
combat poeeibilities (the fire pawer, the etrike farce, maneuverability,
and so on) of varicue typee of materiel and combat potentials of the sub-
- unite as a whole of their own troops and of the eneary. For example, taking
the combat capabilities of our 122-inm howitzer and motorized rifle battalion
. as the initial unit `1.0), it ie poaeible to compare the combat capabilities
of the other meane of destruction, aubunits and units of our awn troops and
- 194
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the enemy with them and at the eame ti.me obtain eheir commensurablenese co-
efficiente (the combat potentiale) permitting the calculation and comparieon
of the combat capabil3tiee of any grouping of the troopa on the e3des.
The consideration of the changes in these capabilitieso dependiag on
the type of troop operatione (offenee, defenae, meeting engagemenC), the
nature of the terrain, the amount of engineering equipmenC, weather condi-
tione and also the suffered or expecCed losaes of the troope on both sides
can be realized uaing additional (correct3on) factore.
Ueing the presented coefficiente, the commander and the ataff can
alao if neceseary determine the moet expedient procedure for replacement of
cerCain materiel or eubunite by othere in order to improve the combat-capa-
bilities of their troops and inaure their greatest superiority over the
enemy. especially in the primary direction. Thus, the ineufficien't nuanber
of tanke on the offeneive can be compeneated for by an equivalent increase
in number of artillery, and the capabilities of the antitank means on the
defense can be increaeed by instelling antitank b arriere, and so on. .
In order to perform the calculations in all of the modern armies, the ~
moet different meane find appliCation, beginning with the calculation rulea,
tables and graphe (Figure 25), the nomograma, and ending with the keyboard _
calculators and computere. All of these meane permit aignificant accelera-
tion of the performance of the calculations and improvement of their precision.
_ Tfie previously prepared standard calculations euch as, for example,
the calculation of the required amount of artillery for doing damage to the
enenry at the platoon and company strong point, the depth of the marching
column of subunite on the marchr the required number of tranepart means for
- movi.ng the eubunite, and many othera are of great asaistance tio the commander
in his decision making. Having theee calculations at hand, the commander
can quickly uae them in finiehed form or if necessary somewhat refine them
_ beginning with the spacific conditione of the aituation.
For performance of the calculations using computer engineering, at ~
each staff headquartere it is expedient to have apecially trained officera
~ and sergeants and also advance compiled pxocedures, forms and formulas. Of ^
course, this does not relieve all the reat of the officere of che obligation
of knowing hew to perform the calculatione, but the specialization of some
of them is of great use. It permits time to be saved and the precision of
the calculations to be improved.
In addition to the performance of the calculationa, in many modern
arniea a great deal of attention is given to the so-called mathematical
simulation of the dymamice of the forthcoming combat operations of the
troopa. It can be ueed during the couree of the entire procese of decision
making. However, it is especiallyitaportant during the concluding operationa
of thia procese when the coaimander eelecte the best (optimal) or most expe-
dfent, close to optimal out of eeveral poesible versione of the decision.
195
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Figure 25. Graph for determining the required time, magnitude of the tranai-
tion or epeed of the troope on the march.
Key: 1. Movement time, minutes 2. Movement time, hours
3. Speed of the column, 4. Length of the route, diatance to the
km/hr post (line) or depCh of column, km
This operatfon ie called optimization of the deciaion, the basis of which is
. not only logical and qualitative but also quantitative substantiation inaur-
ing the moat effective uae of the available forces and materiel. When
realizing the given operation, the knowledge, art and will of the commander,
his capacity to overcome contradictione and have the last word, to give the
. decision the atrength df mandatory law for all of the aubordinates are exhi-
bited to the higheat degree.
The eaeence of any eimulation coneiats in the conatruction of the
model of the object (aubjecty reflecting with some accuracy and completenesa
of the atructure, the course and the final quantitative results of the ope-
ration.. After etudying the resulta, it is posaible to introduce changes
into the model and at the same time diacover the conditions by meana of pro-
cedures and times for achievement of higher reaulta.
The eimulatian procedL~ree can be the moat varied: logical, heurtvtic,
cybernetic, graphical, expe:-i_mental and so on. Tfie comb at deciaion of the _
196
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0
commander which we investigaeed is none other than the logical model of the
dynamica of tihe forthcoming batCle. xhe relief plan or map with the decieion
ref],ecCed on it is a graphicgl mode], of the battle. The tactical training
in a eieuat3on which is elose to the conditione of ehe forthcoming combat is
its experimental model (repetition). 7.fie b seic bott3eneck of all auch models
is the absence of sufficient quantitative tases. The maChematical aimulation
of rhe conbaC oparatione is recognized to eliminate the given deficiency.
By mathematical simulat'ion of the dynamic;, of the forChcoming combat
operations, the formalized algorithmic and logicaY description of them is
underetood (in the form, for example, of the ayetem of equatione and logictal
rules) then permitting use of a computer to play out their couree in several
poseible versions, to predict and determine by the selective criteria the
final quantiCative resulte af Che combat and on their basie to nelect the
best vereion of the decia:,jn.
C
2
0
The combat operations which pureue the goal of deatruction of some
enemy targete having no resietance or which are of a dual nature and are con-
ducted by some individual combat arme with the application of identical meane
of deatruction are comparatively eadily subjected to this type of mathematical
simulation. Their reaulta are usually es*_imated by same basic criterion
(index), for examp'le, by the,numbar of enemy loases. 'ifiese operation$ can,
in particular, include the combat operationa of the antisircraft defenae troopa
againet the enemy aircraft. If for any veraion of their grouping we take the
expected number of enemy aircraft knocked down se the baeic defici.ency cri-
terion, then the mathematical model of their operatione can look as follows:
0 w �
NO T.firingOPenearyOKcontrolSKparticipation'
where M0 is the mathematical expectation of the number of knocked dawn air-
craft; N0 is the number of available antiaircraft firing unite and the given
version of their grouping; Tfiring i8 the number of firings which can be pro-
duced by each firing unit in,one enem} attack; Penemp i8 the probability of
destruction of an enemy aircraft by one fire unit in one round; K is
control
the reliability equation of the fire control syetem; R is the
participation
coefficient of participation of the availab]e fire unita in the repulaion of
the enemy aircraft.
Using the given model and a coii:nuter, when making a decision the com-
mander (chief) can quickly obtain an answer to the queations, for example,
of how many enenry aircraft can knock dawn the available antiaircraft defenae
means in or.e attack for each veraion of the plaaned grouping or how many'
fire weapone are required to ineure damage to a certain number of aircraft
and what regrouping of them muet be carriPd out in cbnnection with this.
Tne analogoue mathematical models can be campiled for the combat
operationa of the antitgnk aubunixe against the enemy tanks; for the artil-
lery, on damage of various objectas and eo on.
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As-�or the combined-arme c:ombat ae a whole, in which a large number of
, troop subunite and epeciaX troops parti,cipate on both eides distiinguiehed
- from each other by purpose, organization, srmament, capabilitiee and methode
of operaeion, then comparieon of the nathematical model reflecting all aepecte
of the operationg of their troope and the enemy ie a complex matter. Zhe
baeic difficulty, ae we have noted in the firat chapter, consiete in the facti
_ that the expected resulte oP the two-way combined-arms battle muet be esti-
nwted not by eome one criterion, but by eeverai contradictory (not commeneu-
rate) indexeer namely, the expected enemy loeses; the poesible or preventable
loeses o: our own troope; the ccnsumption of materiel and time for execution
of the miAeion; taking (holding) the terrafn, and eo on. It 3s desirable to
- hbve some of theee indexes maximal or minimal. In addition, a number of the
- initial data required for mathematical simulation are difficult or imposeible
ti.t formalize and to measure quantitatively (the combat training, diecipline
and moral-peychological etate of the personnel on both sidea, the mental and
organizational capacitiee o� their commanders, the national charaaterietice
of the people, the social-political consequencee of the work, combat opera-
tione, and eo on). A number of tha initial data are of an incomplete, randamp
contradictory and even logical nature. Ttie compilation under such conditione
of a"victory equation" reflacting Che entire variety of combat operatione ie
not an eaey matter, and therefore no miracle should be exp-cted of the
mathematician, c?ne muet not only not underestimate mathematice, but also not
overestimate it. The fact ehould not be ignored that the enemy eooner or
later will lrnow our "equation" and take countermeseures.
It ie possible to aurmount the noted difficultiee by a single path
akillful cotabination of the above-inveetigated logical methode or thought by
the connnander when making the combat deciaion with mathematical methode,
eapecially with the performance of the maetered calculations and also with
manifestation of creativity, art, courage and clevernesa, the capacity to
deceive the enemy, achieve aurpriae in attacking the enemy with skillful
application of the principlea of the conduct of battle diecuased in the
rules and regulatione. Any arbitrary mathematical ain
fitting the mode formula can lead to
errors in the conanander'9 decieion, w
even a diaruption of the fulfillment
Ttie decision of A. V. Suvorov to atte
Ryrmiik with only 10,000 soldiers wae
the uae of the combat chaxacteriatice
_ incap acity of the Turkiah comnand to
wae a risk, but the riak wae reaeonab
' quality of the troopa. It coinpletely
examples come to ue from the experien
' General Headquartera of the Supreme C
go on the offeneive in the epring of
city of the German-Fasciet troope to
during the eeason when roade were bad
.31ification of the combat operations,
a ueelesa expenditure of time and groas
sich meana, to unjuetified losee8 and
)f the aeeigned misaion by his troope.
:k the 100,000-man Turkieh Army in
)ased not so much on mathemetYce ae on
of the Ruseian "mi-aclemen" and the
:ontroi ite 1arge army flexibly. Ttiere
le, based not on the number but on the
juetified itself. Many analogoue
:e of Worid War II. The decieion of
)mnand of the Soviet Armed Forces to
.944 wae based primarily on the incapa-
:arry out their comb at operations
I 'Itle launehinQ ef thp nrinrinnl
' 198
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attack of our farces in the Beloruseian opexation through the difficult
ewempy terrain wae jueCified prim$rily by the achievement of eurpr3ae attack.
The analogous approach ro the decieion is poeaible also on a tactical
_ ecale. AC one of the troop exerciees in the Far Eastern Military Dietrict
the tank battallon commander MajlN. Revnichenko, in order to achieve a aur-
priAe aCtack, decided to advance acrose country, acroae sections of mountainous
forested terrain and passes with croasinga over the aolid ice on the river.
Inasmuch ae the "enemy" did not expect the tank attack from this direction,
the atCack of the battallon wae a surpriae, it was faet and could not be
repelled.1
, An the whole, the c].ose combination of log3cal and mathematical
methoda in combat decieion making ie ene of the moat important indlexea of the
maturity of the commander, hie knowledge and hie akill in troop cbntrol.
The preeence of computers and mathemat3cal meChods does not decrease, but on
the contrary, increases :he role of the thinking proceas and the creativity
of the commander, for in thie case he ie committed, in s6dition to performance
of the ordinary functions, to define the problems for the computer, direct
~ the development of the programe for it, and make creative uae of the results
� of the computer operationa. Only cloae interaction of the human commandez�
with the machine with the deciaive role of the former can insure the satis-
faction of modern requirements on combat decisione.
Organization of the Work of the Commandera and the Control Unita i�n Deciaion
Making
- The final resulCa of the creativity of the commander when making com-
bat deciaiona, the subetantiation and the timelinesa of the deciaiOn depend -
to a great extent not only on knowledge, experience, the thinking lproceas,
the will of the commander and his use of mathematical methode and computer
equipment, but also the organization of his work in the given period which
ie compatible with the control elements. This organization, in tuirn, will
be determined.every time by many factors, among which the deciaive effect
again will come from the presence of time for decision making. Inlismuch ae
thie time will be different under varioua conditions, with respect to the
given problem it ie imposeible and inexpedient to give any aingle i�ormula
- which is suitable for all cases. In the organization of the work of the
commander and the control units in decision making, a creative gpproach,
akill and inventiveneas are a18o necessary to order to make economi.c uae of
every minute and to give the subordinates as much Lime as possible to prepare
for decision making.
Conaidering what hae been etated and a].so the general princi.ples with
respect to the organization of the work of the control unita, let us cr~n-
~ sider the apecific nature of thie organization during decision maki,ng under
. the most difficult conditione from the point of view of time.
1. See "Kraenaya Zveida" [Red Star], 25 January 1974.
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More or lees eignificant time for decision tnaking wi11 be availab 1e to
- ttte comQnander when preparing for the offeneive from the march with an advance -
from the buildup zone. In addition, in thie case the entire eituation will
be comparatively favorable inaemuch ae the subordinate troope are located _
outaide direct contact with the enemy and the combat operatione are not con-
ducted with the enemy, excluding, of courae, Che protection Prom nuclear
atrikesl contro7, of aviation, airborne and reconnaiesance-diveraion groupe.
From the point of view of time, khe conditione will be dietinguiehed in the
better direction aleo when making the transition Co an attack from the defense
poeition, although in thie case ae a rule there will be no prolonged breake.
Under all such conditione the work of the commander and the officere
of the control unita during the combat decision making can be organ3zed
approximately ae followe. After evaluating the general aituation uaually to-
gether with the ch ief of �taff and explaining the combat misaion aesignad
from the aenior officer, the commander makes an approximate operF'.ione plan, _
he determinea the apecially timed measures.with respect to preparation for
combat and he calculatee thA time available for this. The chief of etaff
- familistrizea the rest of the leading officere of the control organs with the
miesion and the commander's plan in the time establiehed by.him, and he aimul-
taneously gives them inetructions about reporting the preliminary combat
ordere to the eubordinate eubunit connnandere and also preparation of the
miseing data for the commander on the eituation and the calculation. _
The poaitive aepect of thia beginning of operationa cona iats in the
fact that it gives the future operations of the aubordinates a purpoaeful
nature, for the officera of the control unita knaw in what name (in the name
of what coamander's concept) they must prepare the data on the eituation and
thecalculatione , and the eubordinate conunanders ancl chiefs have the posai-
bility of proceeding with epecific preparation for combat and the performance
of it in parallel with the higher control echelon.
Continuing to evaluate the situation, the commander in the operating ~
procedure lietens to the conclusiona and proposala of the chief of etaff and
ather people with respect to the questiona of intereat to him and in the
final analysis formulates and explaine hie decision. All of this work
usually is done first by the chart, and then its reaulta are more precisely
defined and apecified on the terrain during reconnaiseance. `
The commander will be forced to organize hia work differently on mak-
ing a decision or more precisely defining the decision under the conditiona
of limited t3me, for example, in obtaining a new mission during the courae
_ of combat operations already under way. Judging by the experience of the
- exercises, the moet efficient organization of the work will be that where the
commander ia located in the field when making the decision or at the control
point and ia worcing in a apecially equipped location (in a dugout shelter
or a etaff command vehicle) together with the chief of staff, hia deputies
and other leading officera, he explains the new misaion with their help and
eatimatea the latea t changea in the aituation, h e exchanges ideas with them
200
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brief].y with reepect to the moet important problems and at the same time
makes (more prectsely defi,nes) and explaine hie decieion. At the control
point the combat contxo], center ie organized eimultaneously. If the decision
, is made by Che chart, then if there ie time the commander more precieely de-
finea it during tha ehort reconnaissance time ueing armored staff command
_ vehiclea only in the principal direction and with the participaCion of a
= atrictly 1lmited circle of people.
, The version of the organizarion of the work ie not excluded where the
- commandex w31l be forced to make one decision directly or more precieely
define it and give ordere immediately (give inatructiona, a signal) to Che
_ subordinates for the execution of the decision. Moat frequenCly this vereion
wi11 be unavoidable when making and refining the decieions during the course
of comb at oparations in the iinnediate reaction to aharp changea to the aitua-
- tion when every minute wi11 be valuable: the decision to repel a sudden
counterattack by the enemy, eliminate the enemp grouping or airborne pene-
trating into the rear of our troope, and eo on. Under such donditions, the
. control wi11 be realized by the comandere by the principle of "T see (I
hear) the command."
In all of the remaining casea, the commander must use the amalleat
poeaib ility to exchange opinione with hie closest aseistance, eapecially with
the chief of eta#f and the epecialiat for the use of the cambaC arme and ape-
cial troops. The timely combined-arme combat is conducted with the applica-
tion of very different Rnd complex materiel. It is difficult for one com-
mander, even if he has a higher military education, correctly to eolve all
the tactical and purely technical problems connected wi th its use. Tfiere-
fore, in the organization of euch combat it is very important to remember the
beheat of V. I. Lenin that "any specialiat must be valued as a unique achieve-
ment of engineering and culture without which nothing, no comnunism could
exiat."1 At another point, diecouraging the leaders from taking a purely
bureaucratic approach he wrote: "Isn't it diagraceful to correct the work of
hundreda of the beat apecialiata in an offhand manner and expreas disapproval
as if i t were aimply ajoke?i2
In addition, V. I. Lenin often warned of the inadmissibility of long
meetings and conferences when working out decisions. "Tfie range of the dis-
cuasion," he wrote, "must be reduced to the necessary minimum, with due
regard to the apeed and aolidnese of the decieion.,,rr3 7his advice by the
leader ia eapecially valuable for the modern commander when controlling
traops in combat. The foreign reporte, discuesions and contradictory
1. V. I. Lenin, Complete Collected Werka, Vol 40, p 217.
2. Ibid.. Vol 42, p 344.
3. Ibid., Vo7, 39, p 308.
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4
propoeals of the eubordinaCea when making decieiona, of c:ourse, are inadmie- r
aible, for they unavoidably lead to Jos'e of va],uabJ.e times and can confuse the
commander, especially if he etill doee not have euffi,cierit experience. A
ehort ex6hange of ideas with hie closeet eubordinatea$ tYieir clear reeponse
to questlone of apeci�ic interest to him a11 of these are what the com-
mander neads for combat decision making. The role of thE: chief of staff is -
eapecially greaC here. Above all, he muet always be reaily to demand that the
commandeic give a ehort, exact anewer to any question connected with evaluat-
ing Che bituation and also propoeals with reapect to the decision with -
required eubetantigtion by 2elculation and conclueione.
It ie .aL+. waceseary to note the peychological aspect of the part'icipa-
tion of the col'!.ecCive in generating the deciaion. Practice confirms that
during collect:ve work there ie adjuetment in the commander's paycholadical
state: hie receptivenese, eelf-criticiem and reaction to the conditione of
the eiCuation are improved, the danger of eubjectivity and voluntarism ie
decreased. 7he euuordinate officers of the control units, in turn, have the
poaeibility.zf more deeply and identically underatanding the pians of the
commander arid hin miseion. The atmoaphere of bueinesslike cooperation,
mutual underetanding and trust is strengthened, the certainty and the cor-
rectneas o'f the decision made by the commander and the achi.evement of succeae
- in the forthcoming battle and satiefaction in their military labor are
strengthened.
. On the whole, the superior personal qualities of the commander, hia
akill, independer_::e and etrong will combined with the collective reason and -
_ creativity of the officere of the control unite are the mos t important condi-
tion of making a timely, well-fownded combat decision and purposeful further
�work of the control units with reapect to combat operatians. �
3. Planning the Combat Operationa
Planning Content and Procedure
, In the preceding eectione we eetabliahed that the combat decision `
made by the commander cannot fully encompase all aspecta of the organization
and conduct of the forthcoming combat o�?erations. Therefore, it ia unavoid-
, ably in need of further detailed development and documenting. Thia detailing
and documenting of the decision aleo completes the planning oi the combat
operationa.
The first part of thia procesa the detailing of th e decision
conaista of a detailed determination of the forces, materiel, the procedurea
and times for the fulfillment of each misaion planned by the commander in
the decision, and also the procedure for the deployment of s ubimita, combat
arna and special forces. the organization of the interaction, measurea with
respect to political work, the compreheneive aupport of the combat opera-
tiona, the commandant's service, the organization of nonitoring and control.
202
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The eeeond pare of the planning procese ehe documenCing df ehe com-
bgC operation decieion is needed eo thae the decisicm will be evatlable to
other peopie and tg1ce on g compietied, regular form.

/~r~mue gweNUA u nmnr,
Aos~r'w~t 6oeee~xA~i~u}
....~ow, ywo,~,~oum y~.
a~eov do emkv. mms &wwmu.
tA% S (6) .
~raMVV~ouw s~cuwo ~ovu~ qw,vAODUn nodtor,
d~a~neu~ ~adc~r. db~eeaAr~aneu~ eoueK K ee#V*W"
Kaapda v nduawe, j 9 )
Figure 26. Plaaning location in the eyeCem of basic meaeure.e With rerpect
to the orgenization of combaC operatione.
' Key: 1. Decision making sud pianning of combat operations
2. Reporting the combat mieeion to the troape
3. Orgenizatioa of troop control
4. Orgeaization of the interaction of troope
_ 5. Organization of combat operations
6. Organization of training of the troopa for performance of the
forthcoming miseion
7. Organization of compreheneive eupport of combat operations
8. Organization of political vork
9. Monitoring and assietance
_ Thua, the plaaaing is based on the decision, it malces up the contin-
uous unity aith it aad at the eame time is cloeely connected with other
measurea performed by the comosander and the control unite with reepect to
the organization of Che comb at operations (Plgure 26).
During the planning process baeic attention ia concentrated in deter-
mining the nwst pffective deploqment ia combat of subordinate troopa, deter-
mination of the beet procedures for their operation, inauriag maxdmum rout
of the oppoeite grouping of the enemy 1n short times With the leaet expendi-
ture and materiel. ltte achievement of this goal is coneidered takiag into
accouat the role of nuclear aeapons in caee of their use by the eenior ~
officere ahea carrqiag out the combat mieeion. It ia the decisive factor in
determining the coateat aad procedure for implementiag the planaed measures.
Depeudiag ou the nuober, the hour and the type of nuclear ezploeione used by
the eenior officer's pian aad the expected results of their use, the utili- ~
zatioa of our am forces and materiel in the forthcomiag battle ie aleo
plaaned.
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The planning ueually begine wiCh receiving the prellmingry orders or
the combat mission from the senior officer, and it ende during tihe orgeniza-
tion of tha combat by the developnent end signing of the combat documente by
Che commander end the chief uf etaff. During tihe couree of combat opera-
tione, the planning crm tinues. In accordence with changea in the eituation
and the decieion of the commander, correctione and more preciee def'initions
ere introd+ccpd inro the previousiy developed plen, end on eharp viiriations
of iC or obtaining the new, next mieeion, the planning ie again repeated.
When time ie ehort for preparation of comb at operationg, the eupport
of perallel work wiCh reepect to pleaning in all echelons permitting reduc-
tion of the total time epent on planning by two or three times hae epecial
eignif icence. This parallelneea in the work is achieved primarily by re-
porting the preliminary combat ordere to the subordinatee after the commander
defines the intention of the operationa, in which they ere acquainted with
the nature of the preceding combat mieeion.
The epecific content, voluome, eequence and methode of plenning combat
operations depend on the planning level, the form of the combaC operatione,
the nature of the aeeigned miseion, the eetabliehed style of operations of
the connnander, the quantity and the level of preparation of the etaff offi-
cers, the preeence of technical control meane and aiso time for preparation
of combat operatione.
At the battalion and even the regimental 1eve1, the decision making
by the commander, the planning of the ccmbat operatione, the development and
filling out of the baeic combat dncumente ie alwaye a united, interconnected
proceee. As the cowmander makee a decieion, he plots it on the map, and the
required text information and calculatidns are entered in the work noteb ook.
After making the decieion, the individual probleme are detailed, and the
filling out of the documenta is completed. Let us briefly coueider this
process ae applied to the offensive.
Many yeare of experience have developed a defined, most expedient
sequence in decieion making, its formulation on the map and the planning of
the combat operatione, the obeervation of which correeponda to the estab-
liehed order of operations of the cor.,mander with respect to explanation of
the miaeion, estimation of the Bieuation, determination of the operations
plan, combat operations, the principles of interaction, ingurance and con-
trol (Figure 27).
The formulation of theae decisions begins with the plottiag of the
data from the combat order received from the senior officer on the previous-
ly prepared map. Tfie etrip of forthcoming operations is first plotCed in
the offenaive. This immediately determinea the bouadaries within the limits
of which the data will be shown with the greatest detail on the enemy de-
fensea and also the utilization of the forcee and materiel of the senior
uff2cer in hie etrip. Part of the data can also be taken frrnn other docu-
mente, in particular, from the reconnaiaeance system and the summaries,
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photogrephic diegram , phntographic plane, gnd eo nn. The degree of the Q-
factor of the populatton is determined by the aevel o� coemmnd organs.
The foliawing are usu811y p1oCCed on the enemy map of the bgttalion
commander: the outiine of the forward edge and poeitione, the platoon strong
poinrs and thair engineering equipmeet, the fire eyetem with details to a
eeparate fire point machinegun, tank, anCitank miesile, weapons the
vicinitiee of the fire poeitiong of the artiillery and morCar eubunite, the
eyetem of obetgcles in front of the forward edge and in depCha nf the defense;
the aregs where the closeet enemy reeervee are located and the pnseible nature
of their operatione (the deployment linee and the directione of the counter-
attacks, the occupetion of the prepared positione or areae), the locatione of
the enen~yr control pointe. The moet coneolidated data are ploteed on the map
in the higher-lying echelone.
After the data on the eneny hae been reflected, it ie neceseary, witn
coneideretion of the elemente of the defense and the etructure of the combat
formation, to plot the combat miesion on the map. Simultaneou8ly with thie
it is necessary to alao indicate the problems which are aolved in the offen-
sive zone of the subunite by the reeourcee of the aenior officers, especielly
the data on the uee of aircrafr, airborne, artillery and also the planned
lines of engagement in conbat of the 2d echelon, the firing linee of the
sntitank reaerve and the mining linee for the mobile obetaciPa detail. The
areae of deployment of the forces and materiel which are intended to rein-
force the aubuaita are also plotted.
A component elemmt of the situation is the neighbors. In the order
of the eenior o:ficere, the miesione of the neighbore equivalent to their
unite (aubuaite) will be indicated. Therefore the staff will require a
decieion making process by the commander to obtain from the neighbore aad
plat on the map the data on the subzmita which will directlq affect the
f lanke .
Where the route of advance, the initial line, the control line, the
deployment line into the battalion, company end platoon columne, the line of
- conversion to the ettack and the time of paseage or emergence at these lines
are indicated in the order by the eenior officer, then they are aleo plotted
on the map. If these data muet be defined by the commander and the ataff,
' then they are reflected later on the map, during the decieion making procees.
Tfie above-enumerated information ie used by the commander as initial
data that he neede for making a aubetsntiated decieion.
During the couree of the compreheas ive evaluation of the aituation,
the grouping of the eneny and the poesible nature of the eneary operations
when fulfilling the stated mieeian by the aubordinate aubunits ie reflected
, in more detail on the map than Would occur in the order by the aenior officer. `
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4
-
,
.
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y
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v
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m
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07
Figure 27. Working chart of the reinforced bgttalion comnander with a deci- -
sion to gttack from :he march (veraion).
Key: 1. Working map of the commander of the 1b;. MoCorized Rifle Battalion;
2. 2/14 Motorized Rifle itegiment; 3. Started on 5 June 1975; 4. Ended...;
5. "Ch" 5 minutes; 6. Zelenyy foreet; 7. 3d Motorized Rifle BatCalion;
8. Firet line of the Tigr PSO (decontamination station); 9. 2d line of the
Lev PSO; 10. Ch 15 minutes; il. Ch 30 minutee; 12. Paee Ch 2.00;
13. 3d line of the Pantera PSO; 14. Shipka; 15. 3d Motorized Rifle BaCtalicm;
16. Ygdloko; 17. lot Motorized Rifle Co; 18. Uch-k No 2; 19. V2�20 km/hr;
20. Uch-k No 1; 21. V1-25 km/hr; 22. 81-1 h4 30 minutes; 23. Vyaokoye;
24. lat Motorized Rifle Co; 25. let Motorized Rifle Bn; 26. Rear; 27. 3d
Motorized Rifle Co; 28. 2d Motorised Rifle Co; 29. Helovo; 30. 4th Mortar
Hattalion; 31. 3d Infantry Co; 32. Lykevo; 33. Viahnya; 34. lot Motorized
Rifle Co; 35. 2d Infantry Co; 36. let Tank Co; 37. Duby; 38. la t Motorized
Rifle Bn; 39. lot Motorized Rifle Co; 40. lot Tank Co; 41. 3d Motorized
Rifle Co; 42. Sth Motorized Rifle Regiment; 43. lot Motorized Rifle Bat-
telion; 44. Rottte No l; 45. Marfino; 46. 3d Motorized Rifle Co; 47. Ararat;
48. 2d Motorized Rifle Co; 49. Silva; 50. Vikhrevo; 51. 1/44 Motorized Rifle
Rgt; 52. Pamir; 53. Lipetsy; 54. Reeersre route V-$ km/hr; SS. Deciaion
number 15 min; 56. B; 57. Pik uaund; 58. Gorskoye; 59. 4th Motorized
Rifle Co,; 60. 47-N; 61. 5.6 15.00; 62. Provisional notation; 63. Miesions
of the senior officer's artillery; 64. Artillery (mortar) miseion by decision
of the conimander of the 3d Motorized Rifle Bn; 65. Aviation strikes; 66. 2d
Motorized Rifle Bn; 67. Dynya; 68. 3d Inf Co of the 2d Motorized Rifle Bn;
69. Yurovo forest; 70. Motorized Rifle Bn; 71. Artillery Bn; 72. Structure
of the columna during the advance; 73. lat Tank Co; 74. Mortar battery;
75. ls[ Motorized Rifle Co; 76. 2d Motorized Rifle Co; 77. 3d Motorized
Rifle Co; 78. Rear; 79. Depth of column km.
1he boundaries of the etrong points, the possible lines of deployment of
reservps and the directions of their ettacks, the location of the control
206
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pointe not only in the subunit offensive zone but aleo in the xones of thei.r
diYect neighbore are defined and ploeted eepecially cerpfully.
Uuring the couree of determination by the commander oF the elemente of
the decisiott. the,y are plotted on the map. Initiglly the direceion of the
perimary geeack and all the elemenee of the combat formaCion at the attgck
time are indicetied. If the traneition to the offenaive from the bnildup zone
ig noted, then for each subordinate eubunit of the ]ae echelon the following
are plotted: the line of conversl.on to the ,aetack and the eime of emergence
addedo the direction of the attack and the line of the nearest and eubee-
quent miasione, the direction of the future attack, the lines and the times
for paeeing tihemb the iniCial, reguleting and deployment lines into company
(platoon) columne, the Aafe removal lines, the limiting lines between the
aubunits.1
For the 2d echelon eubunite, the following are defined and plotted:
the rnute of movement, the line of engagement in comb at, the line for the
next miseion, the direction of the future offeneive, the time of pageage nf
the lines initial and regulation.
On the map, the missions are reflected which are performed by the
authorized and assigned artiliery and mortar subunita with respect to periods
of combat operatione of the artillery during the artillery preparation of
the attack, the artillery eupport of the attack and the artillery accdmpani-
ment of the offeneive during combat in depth of the enenry advance; the, re-
gione of the fire poeitione planned during training and during the couree of
development of the offengive.
The anCiaircraf tsubunite are given the fire positiona, the direction
of displacement and the regione in ahich they must cover the troops from
enemy air strikes.
The antitank reeerve, if it ie called on in the operating zone of the
battalicm to deatroy the fire aeapons of the enemy by direct laying during
artillery preparations, the poeitions and the timea for taking them up are
indicated. For the period of combat operatione, the lines are reflected
from Which the senior officer plans to uee thie time to repel the counter-
atteck of the enemy tanke; for the mobile obatruction detail the mining
linee.
On the aap the place9 and time of deployment of the control points
and thedirection of movement of the command poats during the course of the
offensive are noted.
~ It has been poseible to consider the decisione completely formulated
if the basic probleme of interactiun have not found reflection on the mep.
1. See Pombrik, I. D.. Shevchenko, N. A., Rabochaya Karta IGomandira
[Working Nap of the Commander), Moacow, Voyenisdat, 1972, p 41.
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Here ehere ie no doubC ChaC the principles of the inCprgction are deCermined
- by the commander in hie decieion. However, for coordinaeed application of
a11 the �orcee and materiel in conbat, the neceeeiCy grigee for gdditiional
- eolution of a number of probleme. In particular, it ia neceseary tio coordi-
naCe the action of the subunite in caee of nuclear str3kes in accordance
with the pian of the senior officer and aleo wieh the fire and etrike by con-
venCional weapone of destruction. For thie purpose, firet of a11 the Cargets
are distrib uted between the fire weapone coneidering the poseib le reeulte of
nuclear etrikes. The procedure to be followed by the eubunite on advance to
the arCeck 1ine, during the atCack of the forward edge, during the baCtle for
importgne objecte and the lines in depth of the enemy'e defenses are defined.
When plcitting a11 of these data on the map it in neceesary, however,
eo conaider thar exceseive detail can make the map confuged gnd complicated.
'1'herPfore, in our opinion, in eddition Co the previously indicated problems$
the following can be reflected on the map:
a) Whett performing artillery preparation: the dienwunting lines the
line for putting on the minesweepinQ blgdes for the attached tenk eubnnit,
the pointg of paseage through the obetaclee in front of the farward edge of
the enemy and the time for making theee paseages;
b) When carrying ouC the next mission: the direction of attack of
the subunit during joint operations When capturing the attack of etrong
pointe end destroying the enemy grouping jointly with the neighbor, the
methode of repelling possible enemy counterarCack;
c) When performing the next misaion and developing the fu`cure offen-
sive in the depth of the defense: the linea for repelling poaPible counter-
attack, the forces and materiel called on for the solution of this problem,
the direction of the strikee to complete the rout of the counterattacking
enemy group, the antitank reeerve line and the mobile obatruction detailg
the misaiona of the artillery subunit with respect to deatroying the enemy
- reserves With concentrated and barrage fire during the advance and deploy-
ment.
A significant parC of the interaction problems Will be reflected by
the connnander in hie working notebook. The details of theae entries aill
depend to a great extent on the degree of training of the comnander himself,
the preaence of time for organization of the offeneive and the methods of
bringing the interaction of problema to the subordinatps.
On the same map aith the solution, the baeic results of planning mea-
sures with comprehenaive eupport of the comb at operetions can be reflected
such as, for example.
Nith respect to reconnaissance: compoeition, direction of operatione
and the misaione of the reconnalesance groups and scout patrols;
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With respect tn prntection from nuclear weaponet the area of deploy-
ment of the composire deeail �or the elimination nf the cnnsequencee of
nuclear etrikee, the planned areas for complete epeciglized proceesing;
With respect to engitteering auppore: the compoeieion and direction
of the operations of the deeail far supporting movements, the reserve or
bypasa routee, prepared by the enginer.:rs euiDunit 3n cgee of destruction of
A eectione on the basic groupe, paseagea through the obetaclee;
_ With respect Co rear supports the point of deployment of the rear
 aubunits during the course of the offeneive.
In the warking notebook of the commander and partiially on the fiel:is
nf the map the following are reflected in the form of tableg: the distribu-
tion of forces and materiel, the raCio of forcee gnd materiel (Che comb at
poseibilitiea), the conetruction of the areillery preparaeion, the interaa-
t3on signal, warning sfgnala and Carget indication eignals, the presence and -
dietribution of material reeourcea.
In addition to the map with the decision, ite detsiled development
will find ita reflection in the planning of the problema of uae in combat of
the subunits of the combat arme and also the measures with respecC to poli-
tical work and .ompreheneive e-upporC of the combat operatione. Ae has already
_ been noted, with respecC to tnese problems, the comnander usually def3neg on-
ly the basic goals and the areae of their execution in his deciaion and at
the eame Cime offere the reeponeible agent the posaibility of independent
aearch for the best methods of uging the forceg and materiel eubordinate to
them. Zhe role of the officere of all of the control units ae creative or-
ganizere of the combat operations 18 clearly manifested in this.
2he number of all other (except the comnander's deciaion) combaC docu-
ments and a18o their content and completeness of the diacuasion are deter-
mined by the chief of staff considering primarily the practical necesaity of
the presence of time and nature of the misaion fulfilled by the troopa. Tfie
documents mugt be clear and multiple, they must be written in compressed
form, without substantiation and general phases, with the uae of simflle terms
of speech and with obeervation of the adopted form and also the proviaional
eigns and notation. In addition, the content of the documente muet be exact,
clear and reliable, not permitting otiter interpretation even if someone
would like to underatand the content differently.
Qften it is possible to hear that in modern combat in the case of
rapid development of the aituation there is no meaning to expending time on
cereful proceasing of the working maps and combat documents. Practice con-
vinces us otherwise. Nherever the operating mapa are being carelessly kept,
and the more so, if the Written cortb at documents are carelessly developed,
rejects in operation are more frequently permitted, there are more errors
in calculating the time and determining the mieaions for the subordinate
subunits. In addition, the careleesly developed Working map doea not
209
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educnCe a eenae of high reepnnslbility in the officer ge work for the preci-
eion of ploeCicig the situaCion, iti doee noe orient him in the procedure,
organization and culture control. He becomes accuetomed to commanding the
subt.miee tlithout exacC caleulation, without eubjecting the compllcated eitua-
tion to deep analyeie.
In thie reapect the pnsi.tiive experienae of the work of etaff head-
quartere during World War II ie indicative. Studying the maeerialg of the
laet war in the archive, you always investigate with deep respecC the combat
documenCe of the etaff of the 311th Gugrde Rifle Aegiment of the 108th Cuards
Rifle Divieion.i More than 30 yeare hava paased, and theee flocumente ae
before retain their high quality. They eerve ae an example of how it ie
neceeeary to relate to their development. The main thing 3e that they are
diatinguiehed by brevity, ciarity, and accuracy in being filled out. Zhey
are a11 executed with a high sense of responeib3lity for the quality of the
work. Now it ie even difficult to imagine that the mgjority weie developed
itt the trenchee, under enert~y fire, with poor lighting, and eometimes in bgd
weather. Not one etrikeover, not one rorrection or carelesely formulated
eentence. The people who wrote them underetood the high purpose of combat
documente and used all their effort and mastery in their development.
Credit goes firat of all to the chief of ataff, Lt Col I. F. Tarkhanov,
who went through the enormoue achool of work in the operative determinatiun
of divieion headquarters. Tfiie ie only one of the componenCe of the work of
the chief of etaff.
The realization of the planning tn ehort periode of time ia Pcquiring
excepCionally important aignificance in modern combat. Hence the nece8aity
arises for reducing the volume and number of documents, refusal to develop
awkward plans and, in addition, broader application of oral ordera with aub-
sequent writing of them in the practice of control. Under these conditione,
the role of the working map increasee. With thie help the commander esti-
mates the mituation, makea the decision, atates the miasiona for the eubunits,
organizes the interaction, and monitora the miseione received for execution
by the troopa. The reflection of the basic problems with reepect to the
organization of the combat operations on the Working mapa and the calcula-
Ciona and reference materiala, in the working notebooks, permit aharp educa-
Cion in the planning time.
In addition to the working maps, during the planning process, as the
training practice e}iowa, in a number of caees it is more advantageous to
develop other documents graphically. ltiey inaure not only better clari r;
and convenience of use, but they aleo permit a sharp reduction of the time
for processing them and study by the addressee. Tfiis was especially true in
that the tapographic base. the explanatory inscriptione and table forms in
Arkhiv MO SSAR Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defenae), f. 4794, op.
144509. 144510, p 2-6.
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the,m have the pnaeibi,lity of being executed ahead of time, be�ore receiving
the comb at mieeion, on the baeis of a preliminary order of the senior officer.
In particular, on the map they can be reflected in advance: errors
of deployment of oux own subunies, datg on the enenry, radiation eituaeion,
the routea of advance hate beea raised, the bottlenecke in eham have been
- defined and the bypaes routea have been marked. In addieion, it ia possible
to wriCe in the name o� the documents "The decieion of the commander of the
- 1sC Motorized Rifle Battalioh to advance to 17.9" or "7he wor::ing map of the
commander of the lat Motorized Rifle Battalion. Started... Ended..." For
convenience of working on the map it ie important to raise the populated
areaso their altitudea, i� neceseary also to apply the coding.
A aignificane reduction of time can be achieved if the required table
_ forme ere prepared in time. In parCicular, when preparing for the offeneive
battle it ie poeaible to ready the follawing table forms (see Tablpg 266-
268).
Table 15
Diatribution of Forces and Materiel in (type of combat)
Forcee and materiel of reinforcement & eupport
Artillerv Antitank Engineering and
Subunit b mortar Weapone Tanka other aubunies
ls t motorized rifle
battalion, and so on
Table 16
The ConsCruction of the Artillery Preparation of the Attack
Fire Buration
- attacks (minutes) Time of conduct of fire
let, and so on 10 Ch-0.32-- Ch. 0.22
Tab le 17
Comparieon of Forces and Materiel in the Offensive Zone
and the Combat Poesibilitiea of the Sides with Reapect to
the Situation at (the time)
Number Ratio
Nnme of forcee and materiel and Our own Among the Conaider-
the basic indexes of the combat troops... enemy ing qug_
cepabilities of the troopa (composi- troopa... Quanti- lity (of
tion) (compoai- tative the combat
- - otentials
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a
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(Tab1e 17 continued)

Tota1 pereonnell including in 4 tha combat eubunie of the '
motorized rifle company (moto-
rized infantry co)
Density per km , .
Tanke general number
Among them s meciium
light
Deneity per km
Amphibioue combat infentry vehicle '
and armored peraonnel carrier
total numbPr
Deneity per km
Artillery and mortare
Total weapone and mine,
of them more than 100 m -
gaUge _
Density per km
Total area of destruction
of the open manpower lb/k
(hectare) -
Antitank weapons
Total antitank units,
of them: antitank guided miaeile .
on the armored carrier
portable antitank .
guided mieaile
M titank weapone
Grenade launchers
Density per km
Total number of damaged tanke
Antiaircraft defense
Total of the defenae meana Among them: the antiaircraft
miseile eystem of
the antitank weapona
(inetallation) rype
Total number of a3r targete
knocked dawn per attack
Automobiles and trailera
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i,'~~-i~ 'Ii;�~ 'A't;)C..~;J~, ,.,.~,1.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
xable ia
. . , .
� The' Pf6sen6e and- Driitributio~ of .the.Matexiel
~ n .u:;.~ t,... . .
_ Reserves on the Oftensi.ve....
Available Consumed -for fulfill- ~
A,l
Name of reserves and preaettt mianC
.
at Hauled. to... ` ;,Artiillery
(time) (time) ;Prepar.atinn,,,, . Next
" of attack mission...
Artillery ammuni-
tion (b /k) , and so on t ,.t ~i,~�., ~ � ~ .
. _ �r: i , . i~;~1.. ,
. ' � , , . . . 1
Tab le 19
Signal �or MuCual Recognition, Targer'D'esYgil'a'tiotn
, and Wnrning for the period from,-.. iCto
, .
_ I,igh t Name of eignal By radi.o (visual) Sduttd
~
Going over to Che
attack
� Calling for artillery ''`i`
~ ~ r,;. rrr~, ; ' ' '
- Ceseation of artillery , .
fire
Danger from the air
?tItGJ.:'P.s;
Here are our troopa,
and so on
The broad poesibilities for reducing the planning time'-"aro-'reflected
when using formalized combat documents. The fokm9li26tiori- pYbce86`'i's based
on the fact that the documenta contain conatant and varigtild,"value`s or put-
ting it differently, permanent and variable inforntaCi~w:~"~'~'"' 1
-i~. . p'rrt� � ,
The analyeis shawa that out of the totel conCetit.� bf' e'a6 document, up
_ to 50 percenC goes to permanent informatiom- r,.Thus; lhhlf :of''the document can
be written in advance on a blank form, which,Fzil-l,permit'e'dignificant reduc-
tion of the time for its development. In the pra9enCe'of1'thp previously
prepared forma with a liet of conetants, the compilitibft`of"the document
reduces to the entering of the variable data in the'foHa':of 'Ttames of popu-
lated ureas, local objecte, dates, numbere, and so on. In this case there is
no necesaity for formulating the final propoeals which unconditionally will
reduce the time for development of the document.
Decreasing the planning time can also be achieved as a result of bet-
ter thought-out organization of the work with reapect to writing the docu-
ments. In a number of casee, it is justified to call on several officers
213
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for rhe development of individual documentet for example, the combat ordars.
Ytt addition, it ie imporCant more completeYy to introduce the advanced pro-
cese of writing the documente: to do away with the preparaeion of rough
drafte, to write plainly or dictate the text to a typiat from the mape. This
method of preparing the comliat documente requirea definite ekill. Before
- dictating, 3r ie necessary to prepare a11 of the necessary data, plot the
mieaion on the working map (if the combat ordera are written), place the
populated areae which will be ment3oned, make an entry in the working map
fielde of the meane of ampllfication, time, measuxea to aupport the combat
operatione, and eo on. The officer muet clearly imagine the aequence of the
diecuasion of Che combat document. Then he does not need Co be diatracted
_ to obtain the miae3ng information or more precisely determine the procedure
for writing the document, and he concentrates all his atCention on the exact,
multiple reflection of iCs contenC.
Planning Methoda
During the proceae o� planning combat operations moet frequently two
methode have found application seriea and p arallel. A slifferent comb ina-
tion of them ia aleo poesible.
The series method reduces to the fact that the planning of the combat
operaCione is made eapecially in each comnand level: on completion of plan-
ning in one element the problem is brought to the next subordinate level.
Subaequently the planning movea from top to bottom, involving subordinatea
in the work. This was the basic method of organizing planning during World
War II, and under those conditiona it was completely juatifted.
A positive aspect of this method is the fact that under the condition
of isolation of sufficient time for working in each ievel, it ineurea a more
qualitative perfor-mance of the operations with respect to planning. The
officers of the control units can, as soon as thQ combat operationa are
planned, render actual aesistance to the subordinate ataff in aolving the
missione set before them. This assistance is especially useful to the etaff
outfitted with officere who do not have sufficient theoretical training and
have little work experience. The aeries method promotea maintenance of
aecrecy of the preparatione for combat.
However, there are significant deficien cies characteristic of this
method. The basic one is that with this organization of work, the planning
proceas takes too much time. In addition, the aeries method frequently is
characterized by exceasively rigid centralization in the troop control,
which significantly reduces the possibilities of subordinates in the inde-
- pendent, creative solution of the problems.
Whereas during the past war thia method was basic, under modern condi-
tions it can find application when planning combat operations when and only
when a great deal of time is put into the prep aration of combat.
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