JPRS ID: 8384 TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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9 APRIL i979 CFOUO 3r79~ . i OF ~
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, JPR5 L/8384
9 Apri1 1979
. ~
_
� TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERPJ EUROPE
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 3/79)
l
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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. JPR5 L/8384
9 April 1979 -
TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE -
_ POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS -
(FOUO 3/79)
CONTENTS PAGE _
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
FRG Official Reviewa Work of FRG-GDR Border Co~ission
(Klaus Otto Nasa; EUROPA-ARCHIV, 10 Jan 79) 1
POLAND
. Briefs
Military Salaries 11
ROMANIA
Romanian Independence From USSR Examined by French Source
(Jean Grandmougin; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 22 Jan 79).. 12
- a - (III - EE - 63 FOUOJ
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GERMAN D1~i0CRA,TIC REPUBLIC
FRG OFFICIAL REVIEWS WORK OF FRG-GDR BORDER COMMISSION
Bonn EUROPA-ARCNIV in German 10 Jan 79 pp 19-28
[Artic:le hy Dr. ~ur. Klaus ~Otto Nass, unCi.l 1976 department chairroan at
the European Commission in Brussels~ now staCe secretary in the Ministry
for Economice of Lower Saxony and for a period of almost 2 years~ 1976~1978,
I.ower Saxony's member of Che Border Cowniasion]
(Text~ The Protoccol Over the Inner-German Border `
F~r a period of almoat 6 years, from 31 January 1973�unCil 28 November
1978~ the Commission, consisting of delegates from the ~overnmenta of the
- FRG and the GDR (Border Commission), met at irregular but never Coo distanC
- intervals, alternating between towns of both German st~tes, usually clode
to the border~ before the leaders of both delegations, each for his own
governmenC, on 29 November 1978 signed a document in Bonn which is identi-
fied as a"Protocol" between the two governments.
A contract regarding the foundations of the relationship between the FRG
and the GDR (Basic Treaty) of 21 December 1972 had created this mixed
commission. It had given it a dual task: first, to control the border
markings between the two states and, tf necessary, to renew or supplement
them, as well as to compile the necessary documentation regarding t1~e
course of the border; s~condly, ttie Border Couimission was "likewise" to
_ contribute to the "settlement of other border-related problems, e.g., -
water rigt~ts, supply of ~nergy and pest control."1
With this Pr~tocol, which consists of five artir.les and a footnote regarding
tt~e ElUe River, the governments sanction the results of all past work by
the Border c:ommission. The Border Commission had submitted a report about
its past work, which is attached to the Protocol as Appendix I.2 Further
at[ached to the Protocol are: Parts of tlie border do~umentation, as well
as a total of 20 agreements regarding other border-related problems, 12
of which had already gone into effect before the signing of tl~e Protocol
- and :inother 7 of whict~ became effective at tt:~ time of signing but which
had been (with one exception) in tentative use "beforehand." A few of -
these agreements have only local significance for a cerCain area near the
borcler, but otl~ers would merit tt~orougl~ cons~~eration, which must be omi tted
here because of limited :3pace. ~
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- Prominent among these important texCs is 'the regulaCion regarding pest
control at the border and principlea regarding upkeep and extens~.on of
water'resources at Che border, as well as Cheir water supply inatal.lations;
furthar agreements about �ishing in Lubeck Bay, soft coal mining in rhe
Harbke-HelmstedC area, which covera land on both sides of Che border, as
well as border crossings by recreational boats and other amphibious
vehicles on the We:rra and Saale rivera. As far as the marking tasks of
the Border Commission are concerned, it is evident from forber documents
and the report of the Border Commiasion that 1,296.7 km of border have
been aurveyed geod~Cically. Not yet surveyed are border sectors 7-9
(Elbe River) (approximately 95 km) and a part of border section 24
~ (Warme Bode) (approximately 1~2 km).3
Peculiaritiea of Inn~r-German Border Determination
The past work of khe Border Commiasion ahowa peculiarities in at least
three different respects: _
Firat, according to Article 2 of the treaty regarding relations between
the FRG and the Three Powers (German Treaty) of 26 May 1952, the Three
Powera (France, Great Britain, United States) xeCained those rights and
reaponsibilities regarding Berlin and Germany as a whole and after the
Lransition of sovereignty to the FRG which they had held and exercised up
until then within the framework of Che Four Power agreements. Therefore, _
the government of the Federal Republic was not empowered to agree to any
- deviation from the demarcation line of the inner-German border, which had
been drawn by the occupational powers.
The GDR acknowledged thia limited sovereignty in Art~cle 9 of the Basic
Treaty, which provides "that through this treaty nn earlier treaties by _
- them [the FRG and the GDR~, or international treaties between two or
more parties concerning them, shall be affected."
This deCermination was related expressly to the agreements among the
Allies in correspondence between Federal Minister Egon Bahr and Secretary
df State Michael Kohl. In accordance with thia general limitation, both
parties to the treaty stated concretely in the Basic Treaty: "The course =
of tt~e border...is established according to the determinations in the London
Protocol of 12 September 1944. Wherever the border deviates locally from
- these determinations on the basis of later agreements of the occupational
powera, its exact line is determined and marked by the Commissicn at the
site in question taking into cansideration all relevant facts."4
The practical consequence of this legal position was sometfines costly
research into the intentions of the occupational powers as expressed either _
in writing, orally or by inference. Thereby the "customarily used
- border" viaible in the terrain, which had not been changed after control
passed into German hands, served as an essential guideline. -
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Secondly: In spiCe of ~:his unambiguoua binding of the work of the Border
Commission to the allied agreements regarding the borderline, different
interpretaeians regarding bc?rder righta exiae on Uorh sides. This dis-
crepancy is openly atated in the Basic Treaty, the introduction to which
expreasly mentions the "differing opintons" of boeh statas "on basic ques- `
tions~ amoug them on the national question." To the GDR it ie a nat'.onal
border which is sub,ject only to international law.5 The FRG~ on the other
hand, goes by the ruling of its Supreme Court, which describes Che border
"as a border between two atatea under consCitutional law," with the -
"peculiariCy thnt it exists on the foundation of the atill exiating state
of 'Germnny as a whole,' so that it is therefore a atate border similar
to those between the atatea of the Federal Republic."6
Thia difference of opinion regarding the legality was in itaelf without
aignificance as fer as determination of the intra-German borderline is
~ concerned. However, it gained in significance through the initial atCempC
of the GDR to formu?ate the documentation which concludea the past work .
of the Border Commission. This attempt failed, as will be ahown below.
The "border policies"~ of ~he GDR are the third notable element, although
it is not the task of the Border Commiasion to treat them as auch. Inci--
dents along the border adversely affected current talks more than once. ~
The. FRG delegation tried to contribute Co clearing up and avoiding such _
incidents. Yt was beyond the powers of the West German delegation to pre-
. vent the GDR from systematically building up its fortified installutions, [
even during the last 6 years. The Border Commission has, nevetheless,
contributecl to a decrease of tensions at the intra-German border to an
extent which is not yet fully measurable.
About the Problematic DTature of a Comprehensive Document
- Determination of the border ia at any rate one prerequisite among others -
for the prevention of Uorder conflicts. Why did the FRG agre~ to this
~ ~'rotocol which, although it clarifies the borderline, does not noticeably
lessen the inhumanity of the GDR "border policiea"? This ques~ion -
ultimately contains a criticism of the Basic Treaty, which established the
Border Commission and charged it with the determination of the borderline
and the handlin~ of orher borderline-related problems. ~he Basic Treaty
is, however, in the interpretation given~by the Supreme Court, the legal
~uthoriCy; pacta sunt aervanda. -
But isn't there a danger that the GDR wi11 attempt to attribute to this -
- Protocol the character of a treaty, of an international border treaty? -
? Surely the GDR would like to see the Border Commission as a commission
- exclusively ut>~er international law. In the opinion of the FRG, however,
what is special about the Basic Treaty (and, therefore, the Border
_ Commission as well) is "that, although it is a bilateral treaty between
J two states whict~ is subject to international law and which ha~ the same
validity ~s any other international treaty, it is between two states which
r~re parts of a still existing, if inoperative, encom~essing state of a
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total Germany with a homogeneous pupulation..."$ No one can expecC that -
the CDR will embrace this view. Anyone not wanCing to supply the GDR
- with the pretext for describing a documenr ae a purely international `
treaty would have to aimply re~ect any negotiations and agree+_.a~nts with
the CDR. ~
At any rate~ iC wae advantageous to recapitulate the extensive resulta
of yeara of work of the Bor,+er Coramisaion. If one wishes to appreciate
the choaen form of a governmenC prc~Cocol, it muaC be aeen against the hack-
ground of the interests of boCh negotiattt?g partnera. While possibly a
report of the Border Commission could, in some respects, have been sati.s-
factory to the Federal Republic, two demands of the GDR remaiu unfulfilled,
- namely, the conclusion of a formal treaty and its formal ratification. -
In other reapecCa~ certain aspects of the diacussion ~whict? ensued 3uring
the provisional aigning of the document in the FR~) over the treaty nature -
of the Yrotocol in Che sense of Article 102 of the UN Charters did not
- address the actual problem. The document is, in view of the special nature .
- of intra-German relAtions, noC an "internaCional" agreement; in particular,
- neither the Basic Treaty nor ita subsequent agreements are filed with the
UnitEd Natione. But even if the document could be r~g~st~red with the UN
Secretariat~ ttie exc:lusively declaratory character of thr border determina-
tion in ttie border documentation could in no way be disputEd. The decisive
criteria for ~udging the government Protocol ia this questton: does the
document contain a constitutional b'order determination, or does it merely
give tl~e appearance of an autonomous agreement between the two German states ~
reg~rding the course of the border separating them. _
Not a Constit~tional Border Determination
. The answer ia unambiguous: No. The more intensively one examines the
wording of the Protocol, the more it becomes clear that it does not permit
any other interp.etation. Even its Ereamble makes clear that the entirc: _
documEnt resta "on the basis of the treaty of 21 Aecember 1972," which had -
ittstituted the Border Commission. Taken into consideration are Article 9
~ regarding rights reserved to the Allies, as well as the Protocol definition -
regardin� the tasks of the Border Commission. with its express reference
to the London Protocol and later agreemegts there between the occupational
powers. In addition, the addendum which outlines the tasks of the Borc3er
Commisaion and the Protocol definition mentioned above are cited five
ad~itional times (Art 1, par 3; Art 4, par 1; Protocol footnote Elbe No 1;
Protocol footnote Elbe No 2; :.eport of the Border Comr:Ssion No 1). One
~ can hardly imagine a closer interpretation of the Basic ~~.�aty clause, in
which the GDR also expressly acknowledged the princ~ple of a nonconstitutional
border drawm by the occupational powers. To the co:~trary, 34 years afeer the -
conclusion of the London Protocol a common text of both German states
refera to thie Allied legal foundation.
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_ Nor can th~.s inCerpretation ~uf the text be weakened by referring to Che _
facC tht~C the Preamble cantaina clauses which in parC appear ko be de-
rived from~ the Finnl Act of the CSCE [Cottfarence on SecuriCy and Cooperation
in Europe~ (e.g., "refraining from rhreats of force or use of force,"
"inviobility" of the border, "unlimited respecC for territor~.al integrity"),
c~r those which belong to the universally recognized rules of inrernational -
law. Alk elemenCs wiChin the Preamble ar~ (also) conCained in the Basic
Trer,ty jPreamble and Article 3, which ia the basi~ of Che Border Commisaion)~
and any enumeration in the Preamble of the document is subordina[ed to the
reference to the Basic Treaty by the preceding word "accorciingly" ("on
= the ba~~is of tne treaty...accordingly in the effort..."). Thus it ia clear:
The Bar~ic Treaty is the sole basia for the Protocol, and neither formuYas
~f tt~e CSCE Final Act nor general rules of international law, but only
parts of the Basic Treaty, are repeated in the Preamble o� the Protocol.
This faterpretation of the do~ument as a text which merely notea but does
not change the borderline is confirmed in many instances; ~such as when the _
"existing" border is mentioned (heading, Article 1~ etc.), such as when
_ Articl~e 2 speaks expresaly of the "determined courae of the border exiating _
betwee~l tne FRG and the GDR," and simply by the fact that both governmenCe
- have evidenCly not reached agreement on the Preamble, ae in the Basic Treaty,
but rath~r merely say that they "agree."
3~ina~ly, the government ProCocol itself does not mention border markings,
, but rather confirms thaC the work of the Border Commission agrees with the
Basic Treaty. This border documentation has been available for years at
the Bureau of Survey for the respective border seRments. Both sides in
- the Border Commission had agreed on ths points in time on which they based
their, practical measures from the verified, marked and surveyed borderline.
- It ~.s unambiguous that the text has neither drawn new borders nor claims _
to autonomously redraw the borders drawn according to occupational law.
And in addition: the documenC, in contrast to the Basic Treaty, changes
nothing as fur as the legal nature of the border is concerned, nor does'iz -
change the ].egal character of the relations between the two German states.
After the signing oE the documentti as we?1 as befure, these relations
have the same character as that outlined by the Federal Supreme Court
decision of 31 Ju'y 1973. ~
Fr~m that it can also be concluded that the FRG cannot be accused of not
- having improved its legal position as compared with the Basic Treaty. Such
- a basic improvement was not the goal of the negotiations, and could not -
_ be the goal of the"negotiations~ if the corresponding intentions of the GDR
were to be met with as much success as was actually achieved (e.g., the
~ GDR intention to conclude a treaty with constitutiona?. clauses), considering
- the initial regulations binding beth sides. ~
There might also be criticism of the fact that the Preamble of this Protocol
did not--as, for example, the Preamble of the Four Power Pact of 3 September
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- 1971 on Berlin--conta~n a passage like "without damaging theiY~ legal _
positian." Even such criticism would mieunderetand the character of ttiis
Pxotocol, which is depec?denC on the Basic Treaty (especially regarding the -
national quesCion and ciCizenship prob~.ems). On the contrary, an un-
apecific, general, legal reservation on both sidea which deviated fr~m _
the Basic Treaty would have given to the GDR a pretext for claiming Chat the
- Protocol had departed from the underst~nding achieved in the Basic Treaty
binding ~he obligations of the occupational powers. A reservation was `
indeed included where it was meaningful, namely, regarding the unsolved
Elbe River question.
The Omiseion of the Elbe River `
In four border aegmenta (Elbe and part of the Harzbach Warme Bode) there
was a failure to achieve an understanding on the borderline determined by
= the occupational powers. The problems relating to the course of the Elbe -
border10 cannot be dealt with in this report. It may suffice to mention '
= that the ~econd Criminal Panel of the Supreme Court in ~ustifying a de-
cision, stated on 2 February 1977: "AC Elbekilometer 540.5, according to
historic development, the border between the FRG and the GDR runs along the
east bank of the Elbe River"; the GDR, on the other hand, acco:ding to a
decision by the chairman of ita highest court on 9 November 1971, assumes
~ a movable border on t.he river, namely, the lowest point of the valley, th~.t
is, the channel. ~
As far as the Elbe River is concerned, the work of tihe Border Commission is
not yet concluded but continues. Both parties are in agreement on this in
- the document (Protocol Art 1; Protocol footnote Elbe No 1 and 2). Therefore,
, it was not a case of the application of Protocol def~inition No 3 of the tasks -
of the Border Commission, which states: "If the Coannission cannot reach
- agreement on a problem at hand, this problem will be submitted by both
aides to their governments, which will settle it by ~aay of negotiations."
By this formal statement, which essentially agrees n~~t to agree, government
- negotiations on the Elbe border could be avoided. Tl~e GDR, on the other
~ hand, had a fundamental interest in continuing work ~~n this problem, es-
pecially since the unresolved Elbe border could be considered a symb~l of
the unresolved German question. In spite of this sytnbolic content, the FRG
could, even had to, consent to the GDR wish not to ciiange the legal position
- outlined in the Basic Treaty through this Protocol, especially in compliance
with the above-mentioned principle. For that reason it was able to confirm -
that the mission of the Border Commission, which has no time limit, remains -
in existence.
Thus, wh~ is in effect is the expressly stated willi~ngness to continue
th~ work n ~nly of ascertaining the course of the t~order but also of
other relattd problems, for example, the exercise of fishing rights on the
- entire river and in the sloughs of its eastern bank. The FRG's interest
" in solving such questions was quiCe intense but nevet~theless did not lead it
- to question basic principles for the sake of practica~l solutions. '
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Avoidable Border Incidents '
Even in the future Che lnek of ambiguiCy which could be achieved at other
_ border segments through border documentation will, therefore, noC be achieved
at the Elbe River, which, incidentally, is a Federal waterway according to
the addendum to tt~e Feder.al Waterways Law of 2 April 1968. BuC, now as
before, tt~e river is navigaCed by ships of the FRG and the GDR. In the
Protocol footnoCe mentioned above, both sides start frocn the premise Chat
the traffic treaty of 26 May 1972 conCinues to apply to this area. This -
treaty, however, does noC regulate in detail the coexistence of ships from -
both states on the Elbe River (compare~ especially, the Protocol fooCnote
to Article 23 of the traffic treaty).11 In view of the bilaterally unregu-
lated responsibilities and the unresolved borderline, the potenCial for
conflict on this river can flare up at any time. The previously mentioned
' principles for pest control at the border which were worked out by Che -
' Border Commisaion on 20 September actually also apply to the border seg-
men~s in the Elbe region; but, ~Dr example, the bilaterul obligation it
contains, "to take all poasible measures...to prevent the occurrence of
damagea to the area of the other atate" (Article 4)~ presumes an agreement ~
as to where the area of the other ataCe begins and one's own area ends.
For Chat reason, there is specia? significance in that part of the Protocol
' footnote referring Co Elbe-related problems which says: "Until an agreement
is reached, both sides will continue to Cake inCO consideration the cir- ~
cumstance that the work regarding border segments 7-9 has not been concluded." -
In clauses, both governments thus declare their willingness to avoid con-
flicts which could arise through the unreselved border guestion in the Elbe
_ area. This sentence does not contain a bias favoring a certain courae
of the border, not even in the refer.ence Co the past ("will continue to");
it particularly does not provide any binding arrangement which goes beyond
the traffic treaty regarding existing practice on the Elbe River. "With
all measures"--those are measures in "border segments 7 Co 9." Where the
border runs, whether on the river itself or along the east bank sloughs,
remains open. Additionally, the following sentence contains a reservation
regarding the "interpretation of the legal +~osition."
The value of such clauses is, t~owever, qvestionable, as l~ng as the views
aboul- ~"provocaeion" at the border are as far apart as ttiey are betweei~
Ll~e GDR anc~ the FKG. When the GDR par;:y secretary, Erich Honecker, declares, -
"In 1976 alone more than 1,000 provo~ations and attempts against our border
troops were made by the FRG," Chen '.ie has--assuming the number is correct-- _
= counted every furrow that a West German farmer has il].egally, but not
necessarily intentionally, plowed on GDR soil. Such border violations by
the GDR are not even possible, because the land at the border is not used
agriculturally; rather, there is a continuous belt of fortifications and
barrier installations between the border and the population which is meant
to prevent not only accidental, but especially intentional, border crossings
from east to west.
= 7
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- The situation is similar in the border region of the Elbe River: while
anyone may row on or swim in Che river from Che wesC bank of the river,
ri.ver access from the GDR side is prohib~.ted to private indiv3duAls. A
West German pleasure boae which gets into ~he eastern aloughs is considered
a border provocateur. However, noC every West German pleasure boater
acCa as the somewhaC dangerous situation demanda. If the GDR should desire .
a conflict on the Elbe River, iC could al.ways creaee or find a�pretext. -
Whether all is "~alm" on Che Elbe River does not depend on what is happening _
on the river as much as on the total n~ture of the relations between the two
neighbors. Clauaes like the one cited above are proof of the good will--
at least at present--of the signatories. As for the rest, ehe border prac-
tices of the GDR, as long as they are not fundamentally changed12undeniably _
remain "a special hindrance to the normalizaCfon of relations~. ~
~
Future Taska of the Border Commission
Can the Border Commission help prevent border incidents in the future? .
According to the Protocol, the Border Commission continues in existence. -
- When t~ne Border Commission began its activities,�both delegations had
stated in Protocol footnotes that the agreements on pest control and
border watere were to go "into effecC together with the documents concludiug
the work of the Border Commission." Its task, however, has no time limit,
according Co the Basic Treaty. The fuCure tasks of the Border Commission
will be (besides continued adt~.:ce on Elbe-related problems) the checking
and, if necessary, repa.acing of markers, participation in the carrying -
- out. of agreements concluded or prepared by it, as we1113s ThegresROnsibilit
~ further problems related to the course of the border. P y -
of the Border Commission to contribute to the settlement of border incidents,
which is thus implied, does not limit the ~urisdiction of the permanent
representatives in Bonn and East Bexlin; neither are parallel actions on
both avenues excluded. But routine methods on the bureaucratic level in
a regularly convening commission are sometimes better suited for easing the
situation than proceedings of a more political nature.
The Protocol now concluded refers expressly to the legal grinciples which
have a plied until now for the work of the Border Commission (Art 4, par
1; Artp4, par 2; as well as "principles according to Article 4" attached
as Appendix IV). With that it is made c~ear that this is the same Border
Commission that the Basic Treaty instituted and not a new commission based
on this Protocol. To be sure, some policies which until now have been
unofficially in use are no't specified in writing; but as before, Article _
3, Addendum to the Proto~ol, and the Protocol definiCions of the Basic
Treaty remain in effect. Further evidence of this is the fact that, al--
though work on border segmenta 7 to 9 is to be "continued," the decisive
~ determinat~ons of the Basic Treaty (as, for example, the passage staxing that
"the necessary documentatidn regarding the borderline" must be compiled are _
not repeated. -
The Boxder Commission will therefore continue to deal with all problems
relatinfi to markings and the borderline. As before there is no posSibility
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� of direct negotiations L~etween, for exmmple, a West Germnn Kreis adminisrra-
tion or sCate adminiatraCion with the corresponding local officials of the
GDR. That does not rule ouC the possibility ChaC lacal experts (e.g.~ a
geodeti..ist) can be consulted or given special assignments by the Border _
Commission. Two reasons are decisive for this concentration of tasks: First-
the cenCrally organized GDR is totally unwilling to delzgate power; and
_ second, the apeciat nature of inner-German relations includes a central
~urisdiction of the FRG in relation to the GDR which might even exceed the -
general rights of the Federation to foreign representation as laid down in
Areicle 32 of the ConsCitution. It even governs matters within the FRG .
- which are sub~ect to exclusive inCernational ~urisdiction; Ct~is has been
confirmed indirectly by the Federal Supreme Courr in that it declared the
Hasic Treaty valid, noC aub~ect to modificatian by state legislatures,
even in thoae cases in which it regulaeea international matters (e.g.,
Article 7 regarding cooperation in the cultural �ield, as well as point
- No 10 of the Addendum Co Article 7 of the Protocol regarding radio and
television). -
As the above arguments have ahown~ tt~e significance of the Protocol lies,
on the one hand, in the confirmati.on thaC the border between the two states
(excep~ for Elbe and Warme Bode) was unambiguously marked and documented
by the Border Commission, and, on the other hand, in the settlement of _
numerous, moatly local problems. -
_ The border policies of the GDR are, however, not relaxed by this Protocol;
they continue to borden Che relations between the FRG and the GDR. But
the Border Commission has, in the past, contributed to the avoidance, or
rather, settlement of border incidents. It is hoped that it will succeed -
in that in the future as well. -
The policy of keeping the German question open will be successful only if
both states continue Co Calk and if misunderstandings ~nd prejudices at~e
reduced. On the ~ther side, the GDR leadership, for reasons of self-
identity, continues to need a policy of demarcation toward the FRG, which
limits the poss~bilities of talks. Seen in this light, the Border i:ommission
does not contribute to the German partition but, on Che contrAry, by con-
tinuous dialog, to incre~sed bilateral understanding.
FOOTNOTES
1. Article 3, Basic Treaty of 21 December 1972; Addendum to Protocol t~
Article 3, Basic Treaty, as well as Protocol definition of the tasks of -
the Border Commission by both leaders of the delegation, also of 21 _
December 1972. Quoted in BGB1 II, 1973/1~ p h21 f~; EA 1/1973, p
D13 ff. T
2. Compare Protocol wording and certain attachments on p D3 ff.
- 3. Compare in detail: "The Border Commission--A Documentation of Principles
and Activities." publislied by tt~e Federal Ministry for Inner-German
Relations, Bonn, November 1978.
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4. Prorocol D~finition (footnote
S. Compare~ for exomple, Erich~lion~ck~r~ intervie~� by S~49~ff (550)r~G~
19, 20 and 21 F.:.ruary 1978~ excerpts in ~A 20/1978, p
a 6. Conetitutional Law of 31 July 1973, C~natiCuiiKgige~egndVPeter~Roggen,
For an apparenCly differing opinion, aee Kar
"The Eastern Policies of the FRG in the framework of Western Politics
of Detente," in "Die internaCionale Politik 1970-72~" Mupnchen-Wien
1978~ p 179.
. 'i. Compare "Woerterbuch zum Sozialietischen St~at~" Dietz-Verlag, Berlin
1974, p 3G3.
8. ConeCitutional Laws~ Vol 3~, p 23.
9. Compare FRANKPURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 27 October 1978.
10. Compare Dietrich Rauachning~ "Featshrift fuer ~berhard Menzel, Berlin
1975 p. 492 ff.
11. Quoted in: EA 13/1972, p D320 ff (Protocol footnote p D327). _
12. Federal minister for inner-German relationa~ "Report and Documentation
of the Develorment of RelaCions BetWeen the FRG and the GDR 1969-1976~"
p 11.
~ 13. Compare No 21, paragraph 3 of the "Principlea of Art. 4" of the
Protocol, p D5.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik Gmbh, Bonn
9328
CSO: 3103
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pOLAND
~
BRIEFS
MILITA~tY SALAFtIES~-Young Poles ~ obliged to serve for two or three yeare
with a galary ranging Prom 170 zlotys for a private to 250 zlotya for a
corporal, nevertheless axe proud to ~oin an army which is not only ~ tech-
nical echool but also a achool of social attitudes, combat hardening
_ and discipline. And above aL1~ he is realZy coneiderea "a man" when he -
returns f~om military aervice. ~ExcerpJ ~Parie ~1RMEE3 D'AUJOtk~D'HUI
No 37, Jan-Feb 79 pp 14-1~
cso: 3ioo
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ROMANIA
ROMANIAN INDEPENDENCE FRA'M U33R EXAMINED BY FRENCH 30URCE
Parie VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 22 Jan 79 pp 36-37
_ [Article by Jean Grandmougin]
[TexC) Cambodia~ the Warsaw Pact: Ranania accentuatea ita diplomatic
independence from the USSR. The threat of armed normalization takea ahape.
Nicolas Ceaucescu's regime continuea its internal rigidity and flaunte a
diplomacy which differe with the Kremlin. A phenomenon due to the country's
"latinity?" In any caee, three days before laet week's recepti.on of
Giscard d'Estaing, who to sane extent ie a apokesman for the West, Buchareat
~ knocked up againet Moscow over Cambodia. _
In effect, the Raaanian Ccxamuniat Party censured the invaeion of the country
by Vietnameae troops. "There is no justification, in any form, that war-
rants one country interfering in the affairs of another," it was atated.
This wae not a trial flight for Ceauceecu. Duriag last November's t~4oacow
meeting of the consu;lting coumittee for the Wereaw Pact, the Romanian chief
of state had refuaed to accede to two Rueelan demands:
Though Romania contr:Lbutes a bare 3 percent of the Pact's militaxy budget,
it would not agree t~~ an increase. The reaeon: "Inteneification of arn~a-
ments will make imprcrvements in the people's standard of living impoeaible."
"Demagogic reaeoning;," Brezhnev protested. What ia happening, he eaid,
ie "unilateral disarn~ament."
Ceaucescu would not ~~gree to greater integration 4f Pact forcee. He
~ affirmed: "We will c~ever allow any Rananian unit or any Romanian soldier
to receive orders frcm a foreign aource. We mean to run ourselves."
Under cover of refor?t~ing the Pact, the Rusaians intend drawing their Euro-
pean alliea into thei.r quarrel with China. Juet as Vietnam's entry into
CEMA reaulted in Eastern Europe taking on a part of the burden of econaaic
aid to Vietnam, eo it wae anticipated that Vietnam's entry into the Wareaw
Pact during Prime Miniater Pham Van Dong'a viait to Moscow in early Novem-
ber w~ould entail military aid.
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~ Thie would lead the US3R'e European parCnera eo aide with ie in the con-
flice with China, even to military operations in Asia or elaewhere, not
covered by the Warsaw Pact. The Pact envi.sagee only "meeting imparigliae _
aggreseion againet aocialiet countriea in ~urope," Ceaucescu reminded them.
Though for Ch_ ttusaiane the Chinese have become Che roola of NATO in Aaia,
for the Romaniane thQ Chinese are to be conaidered ae friende.
Lest summer~ to the Kremlin'a displeasure, the Chineae president, Hua
Guofeng [Hua Kuo-feng], vieited Buchareat. And if Nicolae Ceauceacu talke
of Warsaw Pact reform, it ia to advocate that ataf� leaderehip be taken in
turn by a repreBentative of each member nation--a raform the U3SR ie not
able to accept.
Laet November 3oviet troop movecaents n~ar the Rananian frontier h~ving
been reported, CarCer had diepaCched to Bucharest his aecretary ~f the
TreaBUry, Mr Blumenthal, charging him to deliver to Ceauceacu during their
90-minute talk a message congratulating him on his "conatructive role."
With 140,000 men and 300 MiG'e over a 1,700-kilometer border, both land -
and aea, the Rananian Army would hardly present excessive resistance to a
3oviet incursion~ but Ceauceecu seee himself ae withouC fault. Far from
preaching the hum$niet look for eocialism. In Romania, he maintains the
most Staliniet regime of all the Eaet European countries except for Albania.
Ceaucescu hae more power than Brezhnev. Like Stalin, he has kept any pos-
sible aucceeaore at a dietance. By meana of "executtve rotation" every
two or three yeara, Roananian leaders change asaigrnnent~ transferred by the
party in the adminietration, they move from one region to another without
being given time to establieh a baee.
Only the chief of state's family escapes the maelatrom: Elena Ceauceacu,
who has juat received on her birthday the medal of the Star of the lacedi
ise Republic of Ranania, first class; and Ceau~cescu'8 son-in-law, p
at the head of atudent organizations, as well ae some coueine.
General Pacepa'e defection to the ~leat, the head of Security~ gave
Ceauceacu an opportunity of getting rid of anyone euepect for "lack of
vigilance," or otherwiee said, of fidelity to him pereonally.
But the Romanian economy will not obey theae rules: it deteriorates and
discontent is growing. In 1977, 30,OOO.minera in the Giu valley Went on
atrike and--curiously--48 hours after a visit frnm the chief of etate
the Piteati refinery wae accidentally destroyed.
Ceauceecu knowa very Well he muet have a loophole for eacape ahould there
be a clean eaeep made "after Breshnev." Thie ie why he ia raking in pledgea,
thinking there will be no need to redeem them. Sign of independence: he
haen't given up on conetructing a Raaanian airplane to market if not to
China at least to the Third World. The Romanians have invested 350 million
dollars in aa aesembly line eet up for a highly sophisticated plane, pos- _
aibly of Gesman origin.
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Ae for the ttussians, th~y are atill working to encircle Itomenia. The
Romaniane having always refused t:, open a corridor through their Cerri-
toYy for Soviat or orher tzoops to pase through to Bulgartg, the Sovieta
have recently put four ferry boats into daily servi.ce on the Black ~e~
bqtween Ilychev, south of Odeesa, and Varna. Four fifths of the traffic
between USSR and Bulgaria ie by cargo boat. The last fif~h tranaita
through Romania by rail. Bue the widt.h of the tracke being differene in
Ruesia fran the rest of Europe, the Rueaiane compl~in that merchandise
shipmente take up to four weeks ta get acrosa Romania. Henceforth this
traffic wi11 be asaured by the ferries.
- Frelude to a blockade? Each ferry can take on board 100 railroad cara or
150 5oviet T62 tattke. SovieC tanka landing in Bulgaria will find themselvea
480 kilometere from Yugoslavia, 400 from Greece and 280 from Turkey. The
Yugoslave are pricking up their eare. They know that to attack them the
~aetern forcee muat go through Hungary nnd Bulgaria. So it ie laid out in
the Polarka plan revealed by General Pacepa.
COPYRIGHT: 1919 "Valeura actuellea"
8860
_ CSO: 3100 END `
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