JPRS ID: 8410 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 46
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/09= CIA-R~P82-00850R000100040046-6

Z~~ , , ~ ; ~ 1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8410 ,
` ao Ap~~.i i9~9
~ r
,
~
1'RANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(F~UO l6/79)
~ r
. ~ ~ ~
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESE~?RCH SERVICE
~ ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
NOTE
JpRS publicaCiona conCain information primarily from foreign
newapapers, periodicals and books, bue also �rom news agency
transmisaions and broadcaeCa. Materials from foreign-language
sources gre Cranslated; those from Engliah-language sources
are Cranscribed dr reprint~d, with Che original phrasing and
other characeeristics reeained, -
Headlines, editorial reporrs, and maeerial encloaed in brackees
are supplied by JPRS. Yrocesaing indicators such as [Text]
or (Excerpt] in th~ first line of each item, or following the
� last line o� a brief, indicaCe how the original in�ormation was -
procegsed. Where no processing indicator ia given, Che infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or CranaliCerated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate ~n context.
Other unaCtributed parenthetical notes wiChin the body of an
item originaC~ with the source. Times within items-gre as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represenC the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
~
~ COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOiVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN ~REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE OI~i~'i
~
JPRS L/8410
20 April 19 79
. TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
~ c~ono ~s/~9)
CONTENTS PAGE
IN'.CL'Ei-ARAB AFx'AIRS
� PFLP Leader Calls for Progressive Alli~nce To Oppose
~utonomy Pro,ject '
� (George Habash Interview; AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI~
~-8 t~1ar 79) 1
'Arafat Expounds Fatah Political Pos'itions
(Yasir 'Arafat Interview; AL-WATAN AL-~ARAB?',
23 Feb-1 M~r 79) 6
PNC Fail To Heal. RiPt in Palestinian Leadership
~AL-WATAN AL-'ARAEI, 2-8 Feb 79) 16
IRAQ
Reporter Investigates Iraqi Positions on Arab Isaued
(Wa'il Ra3ab; AL-W.4TAN AL-'ARABI, 23 F1eb-1 Mar 79). 22
MOROCCO
Journal Carries Interview With Hassan Aide on Sahara
Problem
(Ahmed Reda Guedira Interview; JE'UNE AFRIQUE,
4 A~' 79) 28
- a- [III - NE ~ A- 121 FOUO]
FOR OFFICIAL JSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-A1tAB AFFAIRS
PFLP LEADER CALLS FOR PROGIZESSIVE ALLIANCE TO OPPOS~ AUTONOMY PROJECT
Paria AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 2-8 Mar 79 pp 16-17
' ,~Interview wiCh Dr George Habash about PaleaCinian unity, situation in
Lebanon and events in Iran: "I Am Calling for Progresaive Alliance To
Confront HosCile Plans and Foil Autonomy Pro~ect; Popular Front SCands in
One Trench With All Factiona of Reaiatance in Spite of Differences"; time
and place not given/
,[TexC/ In the course of investigaCing the positions of the factions of the
Palestinian resistance at this Curning point in time which is characterized
by changea in Tran whose final impact has not yet been felt, AL-WATAN AL-
ARABI conducted this interview with Dr George HabRSh, the secretary general
of the PFLP. -
The interview consisCed of a review of recenx developments. Dr Habash
began the interview by presenting his evaluation of Lhe preliminary results
of Che Iranian revolution and its effects on the Palestinian question and
the Arab region.
He said, "The revolution has brought about the crushing defeat of a
reactionary regime that was endorsed by international imperialism as an
agent for its buainess and an executive agent for ita plans not only in
Iran, but also in the eatire Culf area. The collapae of the regime and its
institutions constitutea the collapae of an important executive tool whoae
use imperialiem has had for a long time. It was able through this regime
to plunder the reaources of the Iranian people and ta use the Iranian Army
against liberation movements. Imperialism has lost one of its aignificant
geographic, economic, political and military strategic spots.
"The victory of the uprising dealt a mortal blow to local monopolies that ~
were under the control of the Zioniat movement which is allied with inter-
national capitalist monopolies. The Zionist movement thus lost an important
position which it had used for a long time to pZunder the funds of thP
Iranian maeaes and to serve the Zionist entity in occupied Paleatine."
Elaborating upon what has already been said, Dr George Habash thought that
as a reault of the Iranian uprising the reactionary imperialist Zionist
alliance did lose a crucial link in ita aeries of links, and that this has
led to an upset in the other links.
~ 1 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FOR OFr'ICIAL USE ONLY
Although ehe governm.Enr o~ rhe shah represenred a natural enemy, threatening
even con~ervati.ve regimes ehrough ~.es ambitions in th~ Gu1f, Dr George Habash
~ rhinks tliat rhe calla~~se of the shah~s government has mgde ehe conservative
- r~tiimer+ lnp~~ r~n'a1li,ed military and gn economic base, und that Chia is mnkin~;
tlirm r~en~E~ impanding danger.
The Loss ~or Tsrael ,
Witl~ regard Co how ,chis is affECting Israel, Dr George Habash said, "The
'Lionist entity, which for years gone by had considered the Shah's regime
nnd inHtltutions to be centralixed poinCs for atriking at the progreasive
forces and regimes in the Arab area, rrembled at Che victory wl~ich removed
these centers. 'lhe Zionist entity lost a basic source of oil, and it also
lost a Eundamental base that it had used for a long time to Crain its
military cadres. It lost an important inCelligence center.
The fact is that in spite of their strategic imp~rtance, the souree of
zionist alarm is not confined to these aspecCs; it ratY~er transcends them
to thp other pQliCical and moral aspects which are represented in Che ma~or
_ thrust towards the Palestini~xn revolution and the question of PalesCine.
- The reins of Chis trust were loosened by the victory of the Iranian people.
Dr Ceorge Habash analyzed the directions of the immediate ateps that were
taken by the United States to deal with this. This was done by means af
air force reviews anel Che expeditious dispatch of weapons to some regimes
Chat were in league with the United States. He expressed his opinion that
these measures will not be the only alternatives, and that other alternatives
will be proposed. These will focus on the means of restoring the bases
and the al].ied entities that h~ve been torn down. These alternatives will
have a basic position at Camp David between the representati~es of the United
States, of the EgypCian regime and of the 2ionist entity.
br Habash deduces from this thaC signing the sepR-ate peace between al-Sadat's
regime and the Zionist entity has become one of imperialism's urgent demands.
1{e wenC on to say:
"This will have a ma~or impact on the area. It will quickly place historical
responsibilities before the Arab progressive forces to confront the alliance
that is being railroaded in spite of the Arab masses.
It is th~es that tiie historical.responsibili.ty~which is being borne by the -
_ Arab progressive forces compels them to gather the new factors of th:~.s
momentum and use them advantageously to develop their own alliance to confront
Chese plans."
Itesultti of National Council Meeting
lc2uQstion/ You came out of the 14th session of the National Council without
electin~ a new executive committee. What has t`:e course of Palestinian
national unity achieved?
2
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-0085QRQOQ1 QOQ40046-6
FOEt O~FICIAL USE ONLY
LAnwwc~r/ 'l'he N~l�lonul Pnlet~tiniun Council cume nut of its 14th session
with yome pogitive results. ~C approved a po~.~Cical progxam that was ggre~d
upon by ull the faceions. ~t also approved an organizational program tihat
determined the organizational princ~.ples+and bases for frnnt action within
the liberation organizat~.on.
But the council failed to elect ~ new executive committee, and this made
our Palestinian end Arab masaes look with anxiety aC the conCradiction
between the positive results Chat were previously mentioned and thia neggtive
result. Hence, the council's failure Co elect a new executive committee was
a clear indication of what we hgve always gaid about Che need to continue
the struggle ta solve the problems that pertain to the esrablishment of a
national unity an sound bases.
Building Palestinian national unity cannoC be carried ouC unless two basic
factors are closely connected.
The first factor consists of an accurate, theoretical view of the bases and
~~r.inri~~l~~ of the unity~of. rhe national and progressive forces during the
stage of national liberation.
The second factor consists of establishing and applying scientific standards
that must be used to estimate the balances of power and their proportionality
among the factions of the Palestinian ~evolution.
With regard to the firs~ fact~r there are bases /and principles/ recorded "
in the council's programs and resolutions which we consider sound and
scientific. But these bases /and principles/ beconie mere ink on paper
(as happened in the 1Gth session) in the absence of tl~e second factor.
/Question/ How are the members of the National Council selecCed?
/Answer/ The Palestinian National Council ia the highest legislative
- authority in the liberation organization, and this makes the selection of
its members a sensitive and an important process. But we do not yet know
of the existence of standards to se~ect or elect its members, and this makes
the application of sound organizational bases a difficult if not an impossible
operation.
We Are in One Trench
jQucstion/ How is work carried out in the institutions and departments
of ttic organization?
/Answer/ There are no standards for front-line action within these departments
and institutions, and this makes building national unity in the revolution's
3nfrastructures a difficult, in fact, an almost impossible case. Therefore,
w~ belLeve khat establishing and applying sound scientific standards to
c~valuate ti~e balances of power on the Palestinian scene ~nd relying on
sound organizational Principles will put the process af building national
unity on the righC track.
3
FOR OFFICIl,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-0085QRQOQ1 QOQ40046-6
~OR ~t~'t~'ICZAL USE ONLY
~ '1'hc E~ct thaC ther~ ure ehree Palestin~.nn orgnnizationa outside the framework -
of the execuCive commiCtee and the fact Chat most of the organizationa
� remttin ourside the organi.zation~e deparementa and inatiturions cannot possibly
he nn ~ndication o~ a sound direction for building national unity.
We wil.l cnntinun Co Clght on the popular attd on th~ political level to ~
c:or.recC the picture And to bring about progress in building na~ional uniCy.
BuC I would like to indicate clearly thar the popular front stands in one
trench with a11 the Factioc~s of the revolution to confront the conspiraciea
of the imperiallst, Zionisr and reactionnry enemiea regardleas of the
differences beCween us about the organizational question.
~ The AuConomy Conspiracy
- LQuestinn/ The autonomy pro~ect on the WesC Bank and Che Gaza Strip is
a conspiracy whose purpoae is Co sCrike at the PalesCinian Revolution and
liquidate the question of Palestine. What do you think are the means of
Eighting this pro~ect?
LAnswer/ The autonomy pro~ect is in fact the most dangerous episode of the ,
direct conspiracy against the question of Palestine at this stage. The
pro3ect is tied, on the one hand, to t;~e Camp David agreement, and, on the
other hand, the leaders of the Zionist entity regard it as "their pro~ect"
for solving the question of Palestine.
We cannot talk about fighting this pro~ect in isolation from the general
and comprehensive confrontation of the reactionary, Zionist, imperialist
plots in the area. In spite of the pro3ect's specificity and the necessity
to have a special plan Co confront it, it is tied to imperialism's more
comprehensive plan. Therefore, the resistance's own program must n~cessariiy
be tied to the comprehensive confrontation program. '
The general outlines of the confrontation program lie in the progrr~ms of
the Arab and Palestinian progressive and national forces which opposed the
" Camp David agreement: the program of the Steadfastness and Confrontation
F'ront; the Syrian-Iraqi Covenant; and the political program that was recently
approved by the Palestinian National Council. But the special confrontation
will undoubtedly require detailed programs to ensure that our masses inside
the occupied land, and basically on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, will
remain steadfast. _
By steadJ'ast, we do not mean political steadfastness only. We do mean
material steadfastness which requires dealing with the livelihood problems
of our masses inside the country; dealing with their economic, agricultural
and industrial problems; and dealing with their educational problems, etc.
We, thereforet think that the liberation organization is being called upon
to dr.~w up a detailed program to solve these problems and to adopt the
budgets that are necessary for them. The budgets that were approved by the
Bagl~dad Summit Conference in this regard will help solve these problems and
~uarantee their requirments.
4
FOR OFFICIAI, llSE ONLY
r
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-0085QRQOQ1 QOQ40046-6
,
FO[t UFFICIAL USC ONLY
A@ter ~nsur~.ng the mnterial bas~,s for sreadfastness ~.nside ~rhe occupied
1Anct~/, it i~ our opinion th~e the organizations of the revoluCion are to
unify ehe~,r popular and polltical efforts and to embark upon a series of
egc~l~ting struggles to foil the pro~ecr polirically. The organizAtions
are alsn eo unify efforts to prevent any cooperation with the advocates of
the conspiratorial pro~ecC.
'fhis, of course, is in Addition to the necessity of continuing Co escalate
military nction against the Zionist entity. We would thus guarnaCee the
fuilure oE the pro~ect.
~'fhe Plan Continuing in Lebanon ~
%Queseion/ How are mattera going in Lebanon?
/Answer/ Tn Leb~non the separatist Zionist alliance continues to implement
the pLan that was drawn up by the Zionist enemy. In South Lebanon the
'Lionisr enemy is establishing his occupation as time goes by and is entrench-
ing his postCions under the auspices of the agent Sa'd Haddad.
In the areas that are controlled by the separatists, preparations are
continuinb to force the imperialist Zionist pro~ect on all of Lebanon over
~ the long range.
In this period in particular U. S. imperialism is holding or? to the Lebanese
c:ard as a means of exerting pressure on the Syrian regime, on the Palestinian
resistance, on the Lebanese National Movement and on all the forces that
are opposed Co Camp David /in an attempt to/ exhaust them.
We think that confronting the separatist Zionist plot is the function of -
the Lebanese masses in their battle. As far as the south is concerned, it
is the duty of Arab progressive forcQS to take a responsible position in
view of the establishment of the ZionisC occupation of this part of our Arab
homeland~ It is in this context that the Palestinian revolution can play
its historical role.
COPYRIGH'P: 1971 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
C50: 4802
5
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-0085QRQOQ1 QOQ40046-6
FOR OF~'ICIAL USE ONLY
~ , INTER-ARAB AFFAIItS
,
'ARAFAT EXPOUNDS FATAH POLITICAL POSITIONS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 23 Feb-1 Mar 79 pp 16-18
/Interview with Xasir 'Arafat by Shafiq al-Hut: "'Arafat Defines Position
of Palestinian Resistance on Khomeyni's Revolution, Dialogue With Jordan,
Camp David, the United SCates and France; Our Relationship With Revolution-
aries of Iran Goes Back Many Years; U.S. Intelligence Conspired To Kill
Abu Hasan; the Fact That Traq Joined Confrontation States Compensates Arabs
for Egypt's Temporary Depar~ture; France Retreated From De Gaulle's Palestinian
Position Under U.S. Pressure
LText/ This is the second time for AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI to initiate a
dialogue with Mr Yasir 'Arafat. Without defining his /official/ capacity
it may be very difficult to distinguish between Mr Yasir 'Arafat the chair-
man of the PLO and Mr Yasir 'Arafat the lead~~ of Fatah. This is because
the dividing line between the responsibilities of the two commands disappears
and vanishes in many vital occasions in view of the influence exercised by
Fatah in guiding the PLO and in view of the logic of things, which does not
accept duality on the revolutionary scene.
Major and significant events have taken place, and very significant developments
have occurred since the interview which AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI conducted 8 months
ago with Abu 'Ammar.
~ ,
Uuring this period al-Saijat signed the Camp David accords alone, challenging
30 years of strategic Arah ~;,iidarity around the question of Palestine.
Uuring this period the Pan-Arab Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation
was formed; the historic agreement between Syria and Iraq took place; and ~
the National Action Covenant was issued by them to achieve unity. These
months also witnessed the Baghdad Arab Summit %meetin~/ and its success
in spite of the fact that bets were made i-'~.>ut the impossibility of convening
it. Bets were then made while it was i:~ session that it would fail.
I)uring this period a prominent Arab leader who was one of the biggest allies
of the Palestinian revolution departed from the Arab homeland. /This Arab
leader is/ President Houari Boumediene. During this period the people's
- revolution in Iran led by Ayatollah Kohmeyni was victorious. It thrust
6
FOR OFFICIl,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-0085QRQOQ1 QOQ40046-6
~OR OFT'ICIAL USE ONLY
onCo the scene in rhe Middle East variables that were turning Tran into x
rein�orcemenC factor fox the PalesCini,an revolution. Consequently, it
encouraged the con�ronCation camp against the capitulatory programy.
in view oE these variables from which Che Palestinian revolution was nflr
divorced--in fact it may have inherently assumed the o,pinions of Abu 'Ammar
either as chairman o~ the PLO or as leader of Fatah--/Che revolution acquired/
apecial significance in a period characterized by a review of considerations
by nll the parties.
- Tl~e text o� Che interview that was carried ouC with Mr Yasir 'Arafat follows.
'I'tiose who know Abu'Ammar closely, and especially thoae who live c~iCh him
d~y nnd night, are saying that he has not yet recovered from the wound he
received when Abu Hasan was killed. Abu Hasan was like a son to him; indeed,
t~e wa4 "his dearesC son" as Abu 'Ammar says whenever someone mentions
Abu Hasan in his presence. It is known thaC Abu Nasan was the only one
~ oE his c~alleagues who called Abu 'Ammar, Father.
Nevertheless, when I met ?iim to record this interview, which was, as usual,
completed in interrupted sCages, his face was radiank; his eyes were shining;
and his Face was smiling, 'Phat was on the evening of 10 February. He had ,
~ust finished a telephone conversation with the headquarters of Ayatollah
Khomeyni in Tehran, and he appeared to be confident thaC the revolution
there would be victorious in spite of the danger of these hours which pre-
ceded the settlement of the battle on the morning of the following day.
I did not want to spoil his ~oy, but I was not able to hide my concern and
my apprehension about the gloomy acts of fate that lay hidden beyond these -
hours. I found myself, in spite of myself, saying:
Khomeyni Will Win
LQuestion/ Some are blaming FaCah and are blaming you in particular for
rushing into a public declaration of your position on the Iranian revolution.
If Khomeyni fails, this could bring about negative reactions that would
have designs on the Palestinian revolution.
He rep.lied immediately and confidently.
/Answcr/ Don't worry. Khomeyni will win. They have informed me that
they were turning everything in the streets of Tehran into barricades and
ehlt the pec+ole have taken up arms.
I thought he would not say any more in response to my question, but after
finisl~ing a number of telephone calls that lasted over an hour, he c~me
bnck and he said:
, /Answer/ Those who accuse Fatah of revolutionary ventures do not understand
I~.ztah ~~nd d o not understand the revolution. They think that we discovered
7
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
tl~e Iranian revolut:L'on the day they heard about it in the newspapers some
months ago, because they do nor know how deep and how old is our relation-
ship wiCh this revoluCion. Some of them did not understand the secret behind
my participaCion 2 years a~;o :Ln eulogizing one of the men of th3s revolution.
He was 'ALi Shari'ati in rhe al-'Amil3yah School in Beirut. Some of them
. attacked me under the slogan oF secularism. But Fatah, which came inCo being
against the Zionist conquest to liberate our people and our homeland, will
- remain loyal to all those in the world who have been vanquished. They can _
be of any rel3gion or o� any color as long as they are fighting for their
�reedom and Cheir dignity against sub~ugation.
~
. Therefore, our relationship with the Iranian revolution and its men goes
back many years. We used Co offer its young men, its leaders and its
- advocates everything we could. We were on their side because this is how
we understand revolutionary solidarity. It is a question of principle
before being one of profit and loss. At the same time they were with us in
the trenches of the baCtle and the lioly war; they fought with us and Chey
died with us. They were wiCh us in Europe in their legions; everywhere
they were found, they suffered with us.
Abu 'Ammar stopped talking for a while, and then he resumed his conversation:
[~ighting against Zionism and colonialism is not a mere matter of words to
be spoken or slogans to be painted on walls. Fighting Zionism and calonialtsm
is a matter of action and movement. One who knows the conditions of the
deposed Sh~1h's Iran realizes what kind of stronghold of colonialism has
collapsed.
The conversation was lnterrupted for a moment when Abu Jihad entered /the
room/ and Abu 'Ammar added with a chuckle:
Here is our brother Abu Jihad who would rush to the South Pole Co help and
to offer whatever assistance he can if he hears about a revolution there.
This is ~ust; it is right; and it is /orr,r/ duty. We have found and we
are still finding those who help us and ,support our revolution.
/Question/ Although the revolution's position on the Camp David accords -
and your sCatments and struggles against these two agreement:: are clear,
we wo~ild like to have your appraisal of what the course of this capitulatory
settlement has achieved.
/Answer/ At the beginning we must affirm the principle behind our position
as a revolution and as a people: we are re~ecting this course completely
in form and in substance. When we announced our position the parties of
Camp I)avid th~u~ht they might be able to f ind substitutes for us. But then
they were confronted with the firm nationalistic position in the areas
that were accupied in 1948. Prodded by their Palestinian nationalism they
took part in rejecting any agreement or solution that did not guarantee
aur national rights and was not agreed upon with the PLO in its capcity as
B
FUR OFFICI~,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-0085QRQOQ1 QOQ40046-6
I~'OR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
- the yole le~;~.tl.m~te representativa of thE people of 1'~lesCine. The Americans,
C~r.ucl und al-S~dAt w~re not able Co mbke u single Pale~tinian citizen budge
from the posit�lon that was declared by the PLO. ~urthermcre, our masses
escalated their struggles on a11 levels and by differenC means, until there
was no longer any room /for them~ in the enemy's ~sils, All the methods
of sub~ugation, terror and torture--and all this was atteste~= to rv
Miss Johnscn, rhe Pomer consular charg~ d'affaires b: the U.S. Consulate
in Jerusalem--did not dissuade a single fighter from his ~~~tionalist position.
Our time bomb which blew up in the faces of the Camp David trio is made up
of our great people in the occupied land. This was the first blow that was
dealt to the parties oL� Camp David on the PalesCinian scene. Then the blows
that were dea1C to Chen on Che Arab scene succeeded each oCher. These began
with the creation of Che Arab FronC for Steadfastness and Confrontation;
- then came the Syrian-Iraqi agreement, the Joint National Communiqu~ and
recently, not finally, the Baghdad Arab Summit.
/(2ueseion/ What was the most recent blow7
He replied with a smile that covered his face:
/Answer/ Cven though.... The revnlution in Iran.
lQuest;ion/ Would you te11 us some details about the Arab blows?
- jAnswer/ We will return to this in a while, but let me now discuss the
~ blows that fell on the Camp David accords ~n the international scene. First,
in spite of tr~mendous American pressure the:e was no enthusiasm for these
two agreements at the United Nations becsuse there is a unanimity there that
' overlooking the question of Palestine and not establishing a solution to it
will not bring peace to the area. The Euro~ean Common Market bloc, which -
is allied Co the United States, had the same reaction. Afterwards we find
that the bloc of non-aligned countries, the Islamic bloc and the African
group were clearer in Cheir position: they saw no alterna:ive to the need
to guarantee Palestinians their national rights as a basic conditioit for
any political solu~ion that ensures the safety of the ar~a and the survi~ral
of this peace. The positions of the Soviet Union and of the socialist
countries are known and so are the UN resolutions. Today the American are
working on two conflicting courses: the first calls for expedition in sign-
ing the i;gyptian-Israeli pact and the other calls for waiting, because a
treaty that is not worth the ink and the paper it i3 written on would be .
of no use.
LQuestion/ Let iis now return to the political talk on thp ~rab scene.
1Answer/ You know ~nd everyqne knows that ever since it came into beitig
Catah has used one criterion for its relatianship wiCh othe:s: it is their
position on t}ie Palestinian question, the Palestinian revolution and the
organization that represents the Palestinian people. Support for Pal~estine �
9
FOR OFFICIEiL llSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
~Ott O~~ICIAL US~ ONi,Y
ig n~ ldngpr m~r~1y a Chpor~C~,cn1 pog3Cton, ~speci~lly wh~n we Cglk about
br~eh~r~. The ~upp~re rhar i~ ~xppcted fr~m ~very Ar~b cauntry diff~re ~n
qu~liCy ~nd in qugntiey frnm th~ ~upp~re rh~t ~.g ~xp~~t~d frnm ~ny Afrirgn
nr t~:urp~an nation, be~~ug~ the pan-Arab n~eur~ of thp quegtiun ~nd our
cmm~~n Arab deeeiny r~ryuireg th~ maqnit~de and th~ kind of support Cc~ u~
eu b~~ Cnmm~n~urntr wirh our netional faith and eh~ r~letinnHhip oE dngriny
etigt hdLdK u~ tog~ther.
'Ch4~ ig g mgttpr nf principle. We had tn ref~r eo ie ~o eh~t we wou~d not
J los~ our~elvee in deCails, in pasging ~vente or tn the n~gaCive gtmoephere
- thnt mny ~om~timQ~ com~ over the Arab r~cenp. Therefore, after al-Sadat
dis~~nted frnm c1ic~ pnn-Arab coura~, and a�thr hi~ a~rinug renuncietion of ~
the pnn-Arab que~tion, it wee natural for the Areb psyche to be ehaken and
for eh~ Arab caunCrip~--~t 1ea~t some of them--to begin cG~~fronting the
t1pW.xitu~ridn tihat disturbed th~ balance of power.
te i~ gelf-~vid~nt that we wcre among rhe firet ro und~rtake this course.
'Che imm~diatp r~eceion was rhe pan-Arab gaChering that convened in Tripoli,
in Algiers ~nd rhen in Uama~cus. 'f.t later became k?,~own as the National
~ront for Steadfastnese and Confron?~etion. In the course of the conversa-
tion h~r~ I would likp to mention wfth all loyalty and gratitude the role
di the lnte President, ~ur7 brother Houari Boumediene. People near and
fgr know how cloae he was to our revolution. Ne had a basic role f.a the
contexC of rhe front, and hia ideas and opinions were extremely it~~ortant
nnd ~trategically far-sighted. Of course, we mentioned Boumediene in partic- .
- ular because he is now in the arms of God and we owe it to him to remember
}iim nnd algo to rem~mb~r the role of the other brothers who are leaders
of the countrieg th~t pgrticipated in establishing thi~ front. We are hoping
to stimulate the role of the front after our brothers in Algiera settle
their affairs.
After that, in view of the universality of the imperialfst-Zionist-al-Sadat -
attgck, we had to make more ~effort to gather and to stabilize the Arab
ranks. The Syrian-Ireqi agreement fulfilled a hope that many faithful people
hove been eeriving fnr for g long time. Our confidence in the ability of
our nation increased when the two fraternal countries took their step toward
unity in the Joint National Covenant. There ia no doubt that the fact that
fraternal traq did ~oin the confrontation countries gave us a gignificant
strat~gic depth and compensated us to a large degree for the departure of
t~gypt from the ~cene of struggle--a departure we hope will be temporary.
~ut the surprise that astonished Washington in particular was the fact that
the Arab Summit Conference had convened in Baghdad. Washingtan did rot
believe that the surmnit would take place without al-Sadat's regime. When
tl~e conference did convcne, Washington thought that the summit would e~cplode
Crom the inside and that the Arab countries would not agree on a minimum
~~rogrnm to confront Camp David. But what did happen and did surprise Wash-
ington was the fact that the conference was not only convened but that it
.~dopted important resolutions. On the Palestinian question Arabs cannot be ~
clasr~ified into moderates and extreminsts. Wi.thin certain limits all Arabs
c:nnnot but agree.
10
� FOR OFFICI/+L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
F0~ d~~'~CIAL US~ bNLY
U. 5. p~li~y id an ~i:upid wf~~n i,t irnngin~~ th~t Ch~rc i~ nn~ Argb offici~l
~ whn w~ulJ, for ~xnmpl~, uce~pt J~ru~~l~m'~ ehr~at~ ~~m g~ying, for ~x~mp1~, `
nnd ~1ic~ E~cC i~ Ch~ th~ Camp D~vid ~ecdrd~-,in E~~e, ev~ryehing in ehe
~;r~mp 1)nvid accorde--eanne b~ e~c~pe~d by nny hon~~e Ar~b. Th~~~ twn ggr~p-
mentH d~priv~ ~;kype ~vc~n of it~ indep~nd~ne~. W~ mu~t be~r in mind th~t
with thh~e ewo ~gr~~m~nt~ rhe United Se~t~~ wene b~yond ~h~ limit ev~n wiCh
itg Ar~b aLli~~. '~oday, the talkg ar~ falt~ring over ~hp priority of
~gypti~n ~~mrnitm~nt ~nd wh~ehpr this prioriey b~lon~g td ~~ypt'g eommiCmenCs
ro egr~~m~nCg it m~d~ with the Ar~b~ or eo it~ ~gr~em~nt wieh thp Zinni~C
~nemy. mh~ nnly Ching that the Camp U~vid p~rtie~ offered to Che people of
Pgl~gtin~ w~g ~ n~w ~l~very whiCh Chey gre being agked Ca legitimize ~nd
th IICCppt.
i will ~~y dne more rime th~t U.S. pnlicy f~ ~o ~tupid! It consider~d
t~n SmiCh'~ black ma~ortty pro~~ce in Rhode~ia unacc~pCgble and ~C th~
g~m~ ~ime iC wag offering the people in Pglegtin~ whne ig legs then ~antuatan.
I wnuld lik~ t~ s~y here thet the gaghdgd Summit w~g g pginful blow to th~
Capitulntory getClement prn~ecC. It~ resoltuion~ eurb~d, even to some
extent, tf~i~ declining c~urg~ in the policy of Che ~gypeian r~gim~. BuC
thi~ dde:~ not mean that we ere p~tigfied with this limiC of 3oint political
nction. W~ ~11 knoW the capabilities and the reeources of our nation; the~e
}~nve ndt yeC been u~ed. Our ttation hae the weapon of oi1, and it hae petro-
l~~m fundg; it has numerous people; it hgs a atrategic loration; it has
- otlier natural regourceg; and it h~s everything so as to impose ita will in
(1EtlCC nnd in war.
Our aelatidn~ With Bag:~dad Are Improvin~
,[Quegtion/ Prior to the aummit conference in Baghdad, r~lat~ons between
some Palestinian organizations and some Arab rapitals Were over~:ast. What
effec[ did the sununit conferences have on these relationships?
/Answer/ The fgct is thnt before the Baghdad Summit all Arab relations
were overcast and tense. But the conference dispelled many of these clouds
nnd relnxed many oE these tensians. The atmosphere today ie not like it
us~d to be; it is becoming clearer and better. 'C~ke Eor example the change
that has come over relgtiong between Syria ~nd Iraq--what Chey were and
what tiiey've becomc and rhe efEect of chis change on national ac:ion.
I.ikewi~e. the rel~cion~ of aur brothers in ~emocratic Yemen with num~rous
Ar~~b countrtes have also improved and continue to improve.
Aa fnr ar~ %our rrlntton~/ in ~atah with the brothers in Iraq are concerned,
tiic l3~~hd:iJ Summit Was a suitgble occasion to turn over thE paqe that was
not in thc interests oE all of us and to turn /instead7 to a new page of
mutual rooperation and agreement. Today ae are continuing our contacts ~.�ith
our brothers in Baghdad in order to further and to strengthen this coopera-
tion nnd tlii~ a~recment. We would mention that Brother Abu al-LutE, the
[nre[~n affairs official in the liberation organization, had visited Baghdad
almast 2 mnnth~ ngo and that his visit was fruitfuZ and benficial.
1.1.
FOR O~~ICII.L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FO[t O~FICtAL US~ ONLY
'Chc ImrnrrnnC~~ e?~ Ui,alogue Wieh Joxdan
lt~u~~tinn/ Wl~at abn~t "~legtininn-Jordunian r~Yutinng? Much ha~ br~n
~aid ~bour th:La sub~ect, especially at the laet National Council. Nave you
reach~d lan a~;reement? on a united poeition with a11 Che brothers?
,~Answer? Poli~tical struggle muat not be held back by emoCion no maGCer
how ~~ver~ th~. wounds and how painful the memories. In the courae of our
~truggle Co fc?i1 the American-Israell-al-SadaC seCtlement we have to gort
dut ~nd Co def'ine Arab positions. Then we have,to ~trengthen those positions -
that oppo~e tfiis settlement, and we have to work to ehange those positions
tttat ~upport i:t. 'Tl~is was Che starCing po3nt in the eub~~ct of resuming the
diaingu~ with Jordan. tr i~ known ~haC the Jordanian gc~:ne conet~CuCe~ a
vie~l, nn impc~rtent and a baeic geopolitical and demographic reality for
ehe etruggle c~f our peuple. In apite of the neggtive factors end even the
~ontrgdictionEi that may come over our relations w3tih Jordan, we must alway~
rememb~r this geopoliticgl and demographic reglity. In gddition to the fact
that n lnrge ~ercentage of our people live in Jordan, Amman is our ggteway
to the W~gt Ba~nk~ to Che Gaza SCrip end Co our occupied homeland. There-
fore, we diEf~red with some of our brothers who were oppoged to "the principle
of talking with Jordan." We also differed in opinion about what may be
called a framework for Chis dialogue.
i do nnt want to promote myself o~~r others, ~ust gs I refuse to let others
promnte themselves ov~r me. We have already taken a number of poaitiona -
and we have set up several agreements. Some of our brothers had reaervations
about these posiCions and these agreementa. In fact, some of them opposed
these positions and these agreements and accused us of extravagences when
we undertook them. Then the days went by, and the positions changed and
what was rejected became acceptable. This is what happened when we signed
the Cairo Agre~ment with Lebanon and wh~n we decided eo go to the L'nited
Nations. There are other examples. Brother Abu al-Lutf will saon viait
AmmRn to make preparations for a visit I intend to make afterwards.
~ America and the Palestinian ~uestion
L~uestion/ There ie another subject which provoked long and heated discussion
during the lagt National Assembly; it pertained to communications with the
United Stgtes. What is your pogition on that sub~ect?
,`Angwer/ Thiii ix an old and a new question. I remember that you asked
me Che
~ame question during our lagt interview 7 or 8 months ago. Do you
remember my reF~ly to it? Because my reply is still the same.
Wr began searching among the papers'that were in our hands for the former
unswer, but Abu 'Ammar did not give us time to find the papers, and he
Haid:
LAn~wer/ 'Chat'H all right. I remember my answer. The gist ofE it was that
tl~e U. 3. ndministration still forbide its employees fram making any formal
~
FOR OFFICI/.L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
~tlR nH'~ICIAL ti5~ dNLY
~~nCMCC with Ch~ PLn. z r~mpmb~r I~~~d Chati ~lrhnugh we ~re gw~re df rli~
U.5. pnyttiion, wiiich i~ cxer~mely bi~gpd rdw~rds Iqrnc~l, nnd ~lthough we ~rh
~nwnr~ nC Che United Stae~~' imper~.ali~t pol~.cy, we do rec~gnixe ae eh~ e~me
rim~ r~1C imporrance Chi~ country h~s in inC~rnaCion~l politicg. Anydne who
doe~ nor recognize thi~ or who m~nimiz~~ the import~nce of ehi~ role i~
making a big misC~k~. Th~r~fore, w~ think ChgC, fireC, w~ mugti--in fact,
it is our duey~--in~orm thE American p~opl~ about Ch~ realiCies of rhe gtruggl~
in Che areg and c1ar~.fy eo them the po1lt~.ca1 and the natinnal. goals to
~Chi~ve whiCh w~ bor~ ~rms.
In this cnnCext I kept ehe door open for every U. S. afficial who wgnted to
inquire ~nd Cried rn undersCand. It was never a gecrer thae T have received
numerdue senaCory, represenratives and Lother/ U.S. figures. To do ~ugtice
to tt~e CruCti ler me ment3on thnt some o� rhem were eouched ~nd were reapon-
~ive. They return~d to the UniCed StnCe~ with poine~ of view ehat w~re
rttdicnlly dif�rrciiC from ttiose which thcy h~d,pr~viously h~1d.
As fur gg o~firinl communications are concerned, none nf which hae raken
- p1~e~ sd far, w~ have gnnounced repeatedly Chat we will alwayg be willing
to make suCl~ conCncC provided t!~at Chere be no pre-conditions and thaC this
Contnct be made publicly in fron~ nf the whole world. I think thnt rhe time
}~as come for some of our brothers who have reservations about such political
acrivity to ;ealize that dialogue does noC neceasar.ily mean accepting the
point of vipw of the pnrty with whom we are having the dialogue. Let us
keep in mind how many years the secret and the public dialogue went on
between the Vietnamese rebels and the Americana. As far as dialogue with
the United States is concerned, there i~ no doubt that if it were to take
p1aC~ the task will be throny and difficult. BuC it is our duty to explain
nur qu~stion ours~lv~s to the whole world and to try to achieve the recognition
nf ~11 the countriey of the world and especially the ma~or countries.
The Process of Role Distribution
%(~uestion/ By the way, would you comment on the statments that were made
by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young about tl~e necessity
c~f talltin~ to tlie Pnlastinian~7 5ome ob~ervers considered hi~ statements
tc~ be dall t~nce witl~ tl~e ltherntion or~anization.
lle ~hook hic. head and replic~d:
L~n~wer/ Brzezinski sr~id, "Bye b,ye PLO!" The U.S. State Department ignored
the most impudent pnlitical decision of this age. I am referring to the
resolution of tt~e Israeli Knesset which came before the attack on South
Lebanon. The resolucion called for the annihilation of the liberation
nrganization and its military forces and the liquidation of its political
leadersl~ip. Then Young said what he did say. This appears to bc an agreed
upon distribution of roles. The U.S. administration may have thought that ~
timin~ such a statement with the session of our National Council would
reduce the inten~ity o� Palestinian wrath with its aggressive policy.
1.3
FOR O~FICIl1L U5~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
~Ott OI~F~CLAL US~ ONLY
'~hr. U~S. udmini~eraCidn h~~ lnyt ir~ Cr~dibiliCy. We ttL1 rcmember eh~
Nc?.ricH nf i,rr~~nluCe aCr~ by Che Unir~d Se~teg wh~,Ch p~vpd Che way for
n1-Sndur'a vi~ir Co ,T~rus~l~m and afC~rw~rd~ to Che C~mp Uavid accord~.
'fher~ wag relk gbout hom~l~nd fdr the P~lestiiniens" and about official
recognition of the face that "the ~iberaeion organization repreaenC~ a
bn~ic pgrt of the people oF paleseine. Th~s was a~oinC U. S.-SovieC
communiqu~ which included fc~r tihe firgt Cime U. S. recognition of the facC
ehaC ehe people of Pnl~~tine exist and tha~ Chey have legitimeCe r3ghts.
_ The U.S. edmin~.stration took g11 this back until it came to th~ "autonomy"
3oke.
After ~11 rhig we no longer believe the geaCements Chat are made by Carter's
administrae~.on. And here in thie regard I muat raise an imporCane questioa
abouC Che role of the U~ S~ CenCral Intelligence Agency in Che assaseination
nf Che br~ve Palestininn legder Abu Hgsan Salamah by Israeli intelligence
m~n or by men from Begin'e special office. Is it poseible that U.S. intelli-
gence wg~ not connected wiCh thie crime when we know about the axrong
relntionship thgt exisCs between Moesad and Begin's office which has been
Ker nside Eor U. S. intelligence? We are certain thae Igraeli intelligence,
like all tt~e inCellig~nce a~encies of /Che couneries? revoling in the orbit
nf th~ Unieed StaCes, receives its orders from ~J. S. intelligence iust as
ie receivea Che capabilities for its support and survival.
~rance Retreated From Its PosiCion
,`Questtnn/ The last question I have is abont the l~berAtion organization'~
relatiAn~ with th~~ ~rench Government in particular, whose guest recently
was Moshe bayan.
_ LAnswer/ I am very sorry about the fact that French policy is still
Eluctuating in its position and has not taken one step forward beyond the
course that had been charted by the late great ,~leader/ de Gaulle and
by Pompidou after him. Furthermore, it hurta me to say that there has
been some retreat with regard to the French position on the queation of
Palestine, on the Palestinian revolution and on the libergtion organization.
tt ha~ become clear t~ us more than any other time in the past that the
t~rench position nn our people is very much affected by the American position,
wliich is compietrly biased towards the Zionist enemy.
tt is regrettable to see ~rance retreating from its independent policy to
return a~ain to the American orbit. I 3m saying with all candor that if the
official French position continues to be what it is, the Arab naCion will
be called upon by the Palestinian revolution to reevaluate its position and
it considerations with the French Covernment. Arab-French friendship cannot
cantinue to be one-~ided, on r.1ie side of the Ar.abs.
14
FOR O~FICIl,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FOtt nI~CICIAL USL ONLY
In ChiH r~g~ird I wnuld like Co ref~r en a staCem~nti made by Moghe U~ynn g
Cc~w day;~ ugn. Ur~yan s~~.d ehat rh~ governmpnr of ~'rance hc~d t~lked wiCh him
r~bouC Ir~ poHit~.nn vi~-~t-vi~ ~ Pa1~sCinl.An ~ntity and noe n Palestini~n
r+lnt~~. tin t'nr lhe l~r~mc~li h~~vr nnC d~nied rhiK, xnd t ennnnC imn~;tn~ thne
m;itt~~r;~ lu~v~~ r~~ri~~lu~d tli~~ ytn+,~~ wl~ei~ I)~iyriit h~~r~~mrH iiti ul'I'Icli~l N~)t1ltl`Nllltlll
fur lhe l~r~nch Min~.srry of ~'or~ign Affairs.
COPYltICH'C: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARt1BI
85y2
csn: 4~nz
_ 15
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
~OR O~FICIAL USC ONLY
IN't'1~it-A1tAlti A1~'1~'~ilt~
PNC rA~LS 'TO H~;AL RIF'C IN ~ALESTINIAN L~AbERSHIP
Parie AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 2-8 Feb ~9 pp 27-29
lArticl~ dispatched by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI correaponden~ from Damascus:
"Whnn Wind~ of Political Troubles Blow and Branches in Foreat Become
Cntttngled; Whnt 1{appened Behind Scenea of NaCional Palegrinian Council;
hroblem of ProporCionate R~presentation Behind PoatponemenC of Election of -
New ~xecutive Cnmmittee"/
lTexe/ At rhe bar of the Meridian Hotel which facea the building of the
(tencrul i~'Ederation o[ Syrian Workers, where Che Palestinian NaCional Council
1PNC/ was meeting in its 14th sesaion, I overheard one of tha foriegn
correspondenta saying to his colleague:
"One who tries to cover news of the Palestiniang finds himaelf inadvertently
covering news of all the Arab countries. The nature of the Palestinian
question, the multiplicity of places where Paleatinians reside and the
multipliciCy of political currents among Chem are making their congreases,
in spite of their Palestinian identity, appear to be national congreases or
congresaes of the League of Arab Nations."
The fact is that Che truth in Chis observation ia not inconsiderable, and
it applies even to the Fatah movement which was established in 1965. This
i~ because the oeher different Paleetinian factions and forces are no more
than developed extensions of national and patriotic navements Chat go back
for decades. Even Fatah itself is not free of figures who had been members
of some nf these forces, parties and movemenCs before joining Fatah.
Although Palestinian political statements are generally imited on the
pcinciples on whtch Palestinian politics is based, one detects more than
ane tone when one hears those statements. There is a nationalist tone, a -
Ba'athist tone, a leftist tone, an Islamic tone and a tone that may be
cnlled, especially after this council meetin~ in particular, a Fatah tone.
Therc is ncither viliCication nor praise in Lthis observation/. This is
an ob~ective fact that was prescribed by numerous factors: soine of these
ure inherited, and some are acquired. This is not the place for providing
details about these factors, but they do in fact exist. One who @eala with
the question of the Palestinian revolution must inevitably take these factors
inCO consideration if he is striving for ob~ectivity and reality.
16
. FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
' ~0lt nN'I~'ICIAL US~ ONLY
'I'hc NnCian~1 Counnil nhage n~mascu~ as the sitie of ~.~s 14Ch eegsion Th~
Syridn cupi,t~tl thua b~came eh~ :f3ret Arab c~pital en hosC the PNC aince ehe
PLO c:am~ lnto ~xi~t~nce,
AftEr et~~ accupat~.on og ,Terusalem and Gaza~ it had become cuatomary for ehe
Pale~eininn~ ta conv~ne Chc~ir cnngreageg ~C Arab Le~gue hegdquarrers in
C~irn. They did not want to twrt people's feelings ~.n Che o~her Arab cgpiral~,
~nd th~y wanted eo avoid erou~ing any aena~,rivities, whinh are numerous in
nur vaHr Arab homeland.
namttscus in particular was choaen after al-Sadati's Cairo dissented from Arab
cnn~eneu~. The choice w~s made a~rer ehe pan-Arab agreement berween Iraq
~nd Syrin. In spite o� the great eateem which Paleatiniana have for Algeri~
nnd the kreaC esteem which it holdg for the Palestiniang, Algeria wae ruled
aut %a~ a posaibLe sire/ be~ause of Che death of Che late Houari Boumed~pne.
'l'liLs ~r.yKton of the PNC wa~ named gfter him.
'Cl~u~ r~iere wer~ clear and nbvious shadows thaC loomed ahead for t~~e council.
'I'hen PresidenC Hafiz al-Asad's staCempnC confirmed %the existence of? Chese
shndows. This either urged or inspired Mr Yaair 'Arafnt to te11 him, as he
oEE~red him Che council's gift--a replica of the radiant rock--thaC the
Pnlesrinian revolution was Affirming its pan-Arab character and that it was
hoisting Che flag of the Arab revoluCion and of Arab nationalism.
The Unity oE the Resistance: an Imp~rCant Indicator
'1'he Ettct thnt I~resident ul-Asad included in hia address at the opening
session sn indiscriminate requeat Co Palestinian factions to support the
iraqi-5yrian agreement did attract attention.
President al-Asad said, "The Iraqi-Syrian agreement needs the efforts of
all of you. It needs your protection and your increased support. The
ngreement is Eor all of you, for all of us and for the entire Arab nation.
ft ia not for individ:~M1R, Eor leaders or for specific groups." He said,
"Uur brotl~er~ in [raq ~nd we view this matter from no other framework than
tliis. 'i'I~~rcfc~re, thiH i;~ how you must look at it."
'I'l~is ~dvice from President al-Asad was co~sidered tantamount to an
~~cknowled~;ement oE the importance of the Palestinian revolution and of the
vitality c~f its role in the Arab area. It also indicated an interest in the
unity oE tt~~ revolution's factions and the need to have them settle their
- diEferences on the nature of the make-up of the organizations' executive
committee.
fiut nobody expected tt~is subject in particular to become critical; nobody
expected tf~e National Council to fail in reaching an agreement on electing
new exrcutive committee because of a disagreement about quotas. This is
I~ecuuse all the organizations had been working hard for many months and had
fc~rmulnted a nationnl unity pro~ect in two parts: political and organizational.
i'j
FOR OFFICI~.L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FOCt O~i~'ICIAL US~ ONLY
Sinc~ ngr~ement upon Chis p~0~0Cti Wg5 compl~Ced prior to rhe agreemenC
beewe~n Syria and Iraq, ehe counci.l was care�ul eo ~.ntroduce the necess~ry
amendments to i~ be�ore endorsing it so that the pro~ect would include
, rCferc~nCC to Che Joint Nutional Covenant, ~n apprgi~al of ie, ~nd an
~~x~~r~~r+Hic?n nf i.~K ~.mrnrknnc~c~ nH n naC~Lonn1 ncCOmp]iHtim~nC nnd n bluwnrk fnr
~I~e I'ri1~~:atin:tAn r~vc~lu~loit.
The facr is that the Iraqi-Syrian Covenant hgd prov~.ded Che suitable climate
for rneificgtion of the polit~cal and ~rggttizatiional program ro which ehe
factions of ehe resiseance.had agreed.
Uisagreement About ProporCionate RepresenCation
There wr~s digagreement, however, about proportionaee representation. Rely~.ng
on one o� the organizaeion's bylaws, Che council was saCisfied with an
endors~ment of the existing executive commietee as rh~ organization's legiti-
mate cnmmanding body until the council should convene again in an emergency
or a regular seasion. This may take place in 3 months.
'rhi~ unexpected ouCcome, especially after the unanimous ratification of the
political program, aroused the interests of numerous political agencies
inside~nnd ouCside the Palestinaian scene. There is no doubC thaC the Arab
- citir.en who is concerned about these organizational Pnlestinian affairs did
read nn~ilyse~, Justifications and defenses that are nnt free from some bias
aguin~C this or Che other pnrty.
'rhe Lact is that it is very difficult to evaluate the position of every
nrganizarion a.nd to make a~udgment about it without risking being accused
of sidins with one party and not the other. There are such entanglements,
cross-purposes, analogies and incompatibilities on the Palestinian political
map that--as they say--a Moroccan astrologer would sometimes be need~d to
. analyze its riddles and reveal its secreCs. NoC everything that is known
fs being said. Palestinians often disagree about what they don't say and
not about what they do say.
- i.et us cite an example.
'['he ;;uh,jer.t of Palestinian relations with Jordan took more than three
consecutive days oE the council's time. More than 50 ~members and all the
represent~tives oE the organizations without exception had statementa about
the sub3ect.
'I'I~er~~ wo~ild be no harm in citing another example to indicate how entangled
tt~e branches in the Palestinian forest are. This example is from the minor
sphere 4f private relations beCween the factions. -
An internal disa~;reement in one of the factions of the revolution, the
(teneral Command of the PF'LP, took place between the previous and the current ~
:sessiong of the National Council. As a result of this disagreement--which
lf3
FOEi OFFICII~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FOIt 0~~'ICIAL US~ ONLY
no nn~ was ~b1e ro conCn~.n ox rzanscend-�a group sec~ded Erom the fronr,
,~~,a LieH mNmbers? nnnnun~ed rhey would aee up a new org~n~.z~tion c~?11ed
tlic~ t~n1~;~t�ln~,nn Liberne~,nn I~ront.
'Ph.ty drg~niygtion aeked the PNC to recognixp ~.t, and Che cnunCil fo~nd
~Ley~lC in n dilemma becaus~ thQ o1d organ~.zation,[,i.e., the PFLP~ wag opposed
Co recognition for the Pal~sr~.nian Liber~tion ~ronC and threseened to with- -
dr~w from thp PNC if ?:he counCil accepted the new front in the PNC. The
m~mb~rq of the new front were ehreatening that denying them reco~nition meant -
n denial of actual nation~l i~nity. They said that they would not be respon-
~ eible in the future for any actiona they mighr undertake, because they were
removed from the sphere of ~oint action. Try and solve this problem if you
' c:an !
An CxampLe I~'rom the IneernaCional Sphere
l~rom this small sphere we cite an example from the international aphere.
. 'Chis is the third example of political torture on the Palestinian scene.
In the pasr during the days of Mao zedong it wag cuatomary to mention the
Peopl~'s Republic of China in the course of greeting the friends of the
revoluCion. But this time Chere were those who refused to greet China
because China was opposing everything the Soviers had ngreed to, and it was
~ ugreeinb witl~ everything th~ Soviete had opposed. China rhia time aupported
the Cr~mp David accords, and no Palestinian can coneider such a position to
be that of a friend, conaidering the magnitude and the kind of friendahip
that extsted between China and the Palestinian revolution.
What is to be done? And the discussion ~oes on: do we accept this or not?
The conEerees weigh acceptance against re~ection, and they ultimately sort
out the profits from the losses, anu so on.
I cited these examples ao I can return to the sub~ect that has attracCed
everybody's attention: it is the failure to establist~ a new executive
committee that would be on a par with the ambitious unifyin~ political pro-
~gram in spiCe of the fact that there was agreement and consensus about this
progr~~m.
We will be brief, and we will try to be as ob~ective as possible.
I~:~t.~}~ i:~ statin~ something to this effect: "Now that we have agreed on a
:~tn}~lc political progrgm, proporCionate representation in the executive
cc~mmittee must reElect the real proportiona of the organization. It would
not be permissible for ~'atah to be ~ust like the other organizations when
all I~ave acknowledged that it has been the backbone of the resistance and
tl~ut it I~ad borne 90 percent of che burdena of the war in South /Lebanon/
n};ninst Israel." "
~9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
~OEt 0~'FZCIAL USC ONLY 4
r~tah.becomee even more cand~,d and etates~ "mhexe ig not a narional front
, in nny revoluCion i.n th~ world thae doe~
noti have a managing body. ~'~C~h
is Ch~ manag~.ng body Lo� th~.s revolutlon/ in the coneext of a group leader-
Hhip wh~r~ Che minority ~.s sub~ecC eo the ma~oriCy. This is etipulated
in ehe organ:zat~.onal bill for national un~.ry which has ~lready been raC~.fied."
On the baeis of rhis staten~ent FaCah was making proposals Co every fo~mula
,~rhae wgs being proposed/ to form the executive comm~.ttee ta ensure ehat
the aforementioned stiatement is reallzed.
B1.owa From Every Side
In accordance wirh ehar, moaC of the organizatians are in agtieement with
rhe following state*;~nC:
"~n spite of the prestige of Fatah, the situation requirea the establishment
oE a ytrong command that includes all ehe forcea and makes a new qualitaCive
change in PalesCinian acCion." -
'I'hey ndd, "As lon~ as we have agreed on one p~ogram, why is ~atah insisting
~n cl t~t1.n};uL~hing iL�~e:l.t ev~n tl~ou~;h' nothing will actually be changed or
ul.tered by the presence o� more than one of its representatives in the
committee as long as he represents Fatah ~and its prestige?"
On ehis ba~is represenCatives of the other organizations insisted with
vfirious degrees of vehemence that it was neceasary not to favor Fatah with
mnre than one represenCative. This, of course, would be in addition to
having Abu 'Ammar in his capacity as the leader of the revolution.
They did not agree. Their discussion lasted for a long time, and for a
. long time they were engaged in conversations thaC muddied the waters more
, than they cleared them.
'i?~en they left tt~e old /arguments/ and they rushed back to South Lebanon,
where sparks were warning against a new war. They went to the capital,
Beirut, to bury a brave fiphter whom the Zionists were able to snare after
having pursued him for 6 years. He i.s the late 'Ali Hasan Salamah.
it i~ unfartunate thaC the Arab citizen, who is not familiar with Che
cc~mplexity oE Pnlestinian action and does not care to become familiar with
it because he is only concerned about the revolution as a whole, can do no
more than expregs considerable grief when he sees that the brothers in the
P:ile~tiniun command have not yet taken in the significance of these blows
which they are receiving from every side.
'I'!ie hope remnins, however, that the brothers will return soon and they they
wtll detach themselves from the atmospheres of emotionalism and rhetoric
to reconsider all their positions so as to achieve the permanent Arab
Palestinian dream of bringing about the substantive change in their relation-
ships and in their struggles against the enemy that lies in wait for all
of them.
20
FOR OFFICII,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
~OR OI~CICIAL USC ONLY
Muy Chey lE~xrn ehe '1~~.~on n~ truth from the outcome n~ the council's session,
which rhey began with n salute to Che la~e Houari Boumediene and concluded
wirh a salure to the lAte Yalestinian Lf~~hCer/ 'Ali Hasan Salamah.
COPYR'CCH'C: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
85 9'l
CSO: 4802
2~
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FOIt O~i~'TCIAL USE ONLY
i Knc~
, 1tEP01tT~R INVESTZGATES IRAQI POSTTIONS ON ARAB TSSUES
Pari~ AL-WATAN A1~-'ARAnI in Arabic 23 Feb-1 Mar 79 p 30-31.
/Arricle by Wa'il Ra~ab: "To Thoue Who Are BetCing on Che Shi'ites of
Iraq AfCer the Events in Iran: There Are No Conflicts Between Religious
I~'eelings and Feelings of Arab Nationalism; National Unity Is Strong and .
Establishment of ConsCituCional Organizations Will Make It SCronger; al-
i3a'th Party Gave Iraq Stability Thae Helped It Perform Its Mission in Gulf
and in Mn~or Homeland"/
lText/ The alarm that was sounded by different sources in the med~a
regarding the effects of Iranian developments and evenCs on the Gulf area
and regarding their negative and positive impact on the neighbor~ng countries
was one of the factors that motivated the Department of Investigations in
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI to send the colleague Wa'il Ra~ab to Iraq to conduct an
ob~ective, fact-finding investigation into Iraq's position vis-a-vis what
the differen~ media sources are describing as "the cauldron which is boiling
over with possibilities."
I was not alone in my ~ourney from Paris to Baghdad. I was accompanied
�rom the very first moment and all during the 5 hours on board the Iraqi
Airways airplane by numerous questions about the motive that several inter-
national media sources had in helping each other exaggerate Che impact of
~ Iranian events and in singling out Iraq as the location that would be in
the spotli~ht. They did so in a manner which indicated the special attention
Tran is getting from the countries of the area or from the international
pnwers that have po~itions of influence in the area or the means to attempt
to inEluence the course of events.
Why?
Wl~at ar.e the strategic motives and considerations that lie behind this?
, These were difficult questions that Iraqis, especially concerned officials
:~nd ordinlry citizens, had to respond to. The proverb states, "The owner
c~f the house knows best what is in it."
22
FOR, OFFICI/~L USE ONLY
_ _ .
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
, I~OIt OFCYCiAL USC ONLY
And ehus ehe queaC~,on ehat x r~~.sed here ~nd Chere was Chie;
Wh~r nre ehe fac~.~rs Lhnt l~e behind this foreign inter~st in Irgq? WhaC -
~re the motives beh:Lnd gi,ving expresa~,on Co Chis interesr, which emphasizes
linking developments, possibilities, Traq's vital atraregic location, iGs
milit~ry capabilities, its oi1 resources, its human capabilitiea dnd its
rnle in shaping prevailing~trend3 in the area?
The ob;jective and comprehensive reply to Chis question may lie in whati an
informed source stated; he turned the spotlighC on rhe aspects of rhe sub~ecC
when he said:
~ "There are several and numerous factors Chat lie behind the intereat in Iraq.
Two vital and important matters are among Chem.
"The first is thAt the regime in Iraq does not consider iCs geographic
locarion to be the legally determined land that is defined by we11-kn~wn
internaCional borders. The regime in Iraq was created by Che Socialist
Arab Ba'th Party. The missions of the Iraqi revolution Cranscend the nation-
al bounduries and inclucie the entire pan-Arab scene. Iraq:is affirm that this
understanding of their revolution does not meari that they are "surrogate
. revolutionaries" f~r the Arab people in their different counCries, nor does
it mean overlooking taking advantage of the Arab status quo without hampering
' the factors of its develop~~~ent. ,
"This was actually what they affirmed at the summit conference. This policy
is a fact that is not unknown to anyone because it is the essential nature
of the candid national ideology of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party.
"The second /vital and important matter/ is that tre strong, settled nature
o� Iraq since the outbreak of the revolution on 17 Ju1y 1968 affirms that
the masses' ties with their revolution and their confidence in Chis revolu- ~
tion, which was led by the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, are deep and are
~ ~characterized by a very effective inviolability. Thus, the stability of
conditions in Iraq along with the growth in the strength of theae conditions
in a manner that is consistent with the advance of the %revolution's/ course
focus the spotlights on two considerations that explain and ~ustify the -
interest in Iraq.
"The first one of these considerations is that no bets are beiz~g made on
strengthening relations with Iraq, and no precautions are being taken in
anticipation of dreaded surprise.
. The se;cond consideration is that the stability of a strong, r.ational regime,
whic~~is independent of international tendencies, does, not appeal to these
tendenc:ie~.which try tn various ways to control the area: to have a certain
amount uf ir~i?.uence to affect its directions; and Co mo%iify its courses to
make them consistent'~with their own ideological or poiitical ob3ectives.
Consequently, the stability of this nationaZ reK~me is of interest to these
23
FOR OFFICIE.L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
i~'Ott dl~'~IC~AL USl: QNLY ~
' t~ndenCi~~ i,n n npg~tivc~, ~nnergdieenry ~~n~~, eha~ i~, in ~1~~ ~~n~~ dE
rc~~rricttn~ oppnreuniti~b ox bincki.ng gom~ nf Ch~m frnm b~i'ng u~~d b~ ~h~
S~ci.nliHt Arab 13a'th party, whi~h i~ l~nding ehe ~t~tp ~nd ~a~ieey,~in
tr~~/,
"tt ir~ Chug rhaC th~ id~ological and poliCicgl coure~ lnf ehig r~gim~/
cnn~ele~t~g ~ nuie~nc~ /ta the~e tendenciea%. In add~tiont eh~r~ iga
nn~ehtr r~~~nn which incren~~g nther p~ople'g di~pl~~sur~ with rh~m: Chi~
Cour~~ h~~ n~up~rinr nbility tn d~a1 with and to conrr~l ~v~nee. A~ ~
r~~ult ev~ry enunter-r~~etidn thgt $oeg in another dir~neion turn~ the
cnemics' plnng up~id~ down end in on~ mom~nr turn~ th~ ~uec~~~ of ~dv~r-
ynripg intn ~~~t~~~~xrrc~nt~e. Ir~ry'~ iniri~eiv~, for ~x~mple, eo bring ~bnuC
pr~i~~Arr~h nl t~nment In aCCOrdanc~ wiel~ rhe rc~enlutiong nf Che Ba~had
SummiC C~nl'cr~n~:e and Co achiev~ Iraqi-Syrian unity illugtret~~ the highe~e
d~gree aF cnmpet~ncy in directing the practi~al course~ of ideological
pnlitic~ in a manner rhat would deal crughing blow~ ta th~ ~nemi~~ of the
nutinn ~nd ~xnre~~ Chp pfficiency of the ~traCpgic mind in its d~votion to
the O~,~ECt~Veg ~nd the eapir~tidn~ nf rh~ Arab nation."
'Che~e nnalay~e~ that wer~ offered to me by an informed sdurct linger~d in my
mind ~g i eried to d~rermine the fe~tures of the actidn that Iraq wnnt~ ~n~d
en compare them with the other posgible trend of concerned countriee in th~
Argb regiou or in the Middle ~a~t r~~ien.
Irgq has ulwayg n~mainpd in the midat of the region's evento. Thie ig a
fact Cliat indicates Irary's destiny in the pae~, in the pres~nt, and in Che
future.
To divrrsify my gourc~s in completing the picture,~of the ~ituation in Iraq~
I asked my companion a question abour what he thought Iraq'g position might
be in any policy that may be drawn up for the area. LI posed the question/
as the car carried u~ through Baghdad's crowdea streets and a cnld breeze
brusl~ed against Lour/ faccs.
Av 't said, the question was no more than another gttempt ta find the truth
from more than one ~nurce nnd from different positions. After eome deep
tl~ought my companion said, "I will give you a clear end a simple answer.
The feature~ of Iraq's pogition in eny policy that is drawn up for the area
w~re determined by our great companion Saddam Husayn in one of this talks
when I~e said, 'No comprehensive policy will be drawn up for the Middle
C.7~t unles~ Irgq is placed on the sand table /military m~neuver planning
bnxrd/, ti~~ tl~nr tn cm~~ wny or another it can be i,ncluded in the considerations
or in th~ treatment."'
My mind continued to pursue this deep vision and to tie the movement of
events in the area with Iraq's position. From this vision I fota~ulated
s~tron~; Ides~s ~bout the kind af ma,~or hopes that ~raq is striving for, about
ti~~ w~rri.~~ tl~at ochers are having about ita course, about the kind of
worries Iraq may have and about the kinds of victori~es the achievements of
whLch appears to be inevitable.
24
~OF~ O~FICI/.L US~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
~
FOR ~F'~tCtAL UJ~ ONLY
Tt� 10 dnyd ~h~t I~p~ne i,n ~r~q w~r~ ~h~r~rt~ri.x~d by ~~etii~~ ~f r~di~~C ~
~ii,eturp~ ~boue eh~ Go~tinuou~ ~ffere,[e~ achi~v~~ thp gc~~~~ df rh~ n~~tdn;
~d r~infdr~p thh gociaii~e ~Cru~Curp; eo ~~e~bli~h d~mo~r~~y a~ ~~yaC~m of
id~dlugi~el v~lu~~ ~nd ~ pr~c~ic~l cour~~; ~nd eo bui.ld ~oci~li~m in ~li eh~
ar~~~ a~ a e~ntral 1aw ta se1v~ th~ prob~~m~ of so~iety?~
Uuring my vi~ic ta th~ ma~e di~~in$ui~h~d Leawn df~ ~1-N~3~f, th~ glitnmer
d[ eh~ gaid~n dom~ on top of ehe final r~~tin~ pl~c~ nf a].-Imgm 'Ali ibn _
AUi Tn~ib ioam~~1 in th~ di~tanc~ b~tw@en K~rbala' ~nd al-N~j~f. It w~~ like
t~ lighthdug~ e~lling ~~n~raeio~~ th~ gtory of th~ imr~er~~1 hero~~ ie thp
- iif~ dF eh~ n~tion. ~rom ~far Ch~ dom~ ~pp~~red eo b~ a gioa3n~ fiam~ ~nd
~~limmpring iight. I eonf~~~ eh~t the b~~i~ of my vi~it to th~ sacred
~hrin~~ in K~rbala' and a1-N~jaf was e de~ire to eee the Gha~C~ buria~.
~roundg. 'Chi~ a~g combined with a~eer~t that moved me a journaliet who
er~~t~ down ~nd ~nalyzes Et~~nta. I w~nted to know the truth about the aneic-
ipaepd ~v~2nt~ th~e th~ w~~e~rn m~dia wae ptcturing wirh re~ard to th~ imp~et
th~ ~rarian er~~ig ui11 hav~ an Iraq.
'Ch~ w~gterri m~di~ ~re erying--~nd they are trying very hgrd--to picture the
~venh~ ~h~~ ar~ happening an ehe Ir~nian gcen~ a~ evpntg that wiil heve an
imp~ct on Irgq. ~h~y ~r~ Crying to ghow Chat it would be eagy fdr Che Sht'ite
Mo~l~m~ of Iraq to be n~gatively affect~d by whaC is happening in Ir~~n.
In the cnureyard uf Ch~ ~1-Nayd~ri mosque where a group of m~n were gEtting
rrndy ro perform th~ nnnn prayer, I tried in an indirecC way to poae some
. qup~tinn~ with which I intended to verify some maCterg. A dignified older
man wcuring g white turban and with a grey beard said~ "Whar ig happening in
trt~n i~ nn internal event. It !e a matter of interest to the citizens of '
ir~n, end nmong them ar~ the religiou~ men. We hold the knowledge of
Aygta~llah Khom~yni in high e~teem. He ig free to adopt for Iran the courgc
- he Findg guitable for it. This is an gccepted fact. But if the countries
that do not want Iraq and the Arab nation to achieve progress and unity are
hoping that the Iranian crisis spurred by their attempts will have negative
eFfects nn the Shi'iteg in Iraq, this would be a different thing.
"Our Arab character is 3ust ng gncred as our religion. ~he pride we have
in our Ar~b charaeter and in the course that our rulers are pursuing ie
tundnm~nt~l."
in tf~e light oE what I heard i felt my face flush with embarrassment
becauKe t hud embarkpd upon thie line of questioning. But What elae could
br done wl~en Journalism iq the profession of difficulties and of searching -
fnr tlie trucl~7 Reluctantly i put the question to an official just as I had
put It tn muny other pcople h~re and there and in al-Na3af.
Tl~c otEi~tnl replied, "When western rtc~dia correspondents write much about '
Irnq'H frnrg of [he events in Iran and the fact that these events may gener-
,7te problrms witl~ Iraq' and when they overexert themselves in writing abouC
25
POR OF~ICI/,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
~
~OR Of~'~tCtAL U~~ dNLY
eh~ ~hl'ie~~ arid r}~e tact that th~y nrp ~ub~~ee eo nppr~~~ion, eh~y do nat
dcs :asi wt~liau~ rdliti~nl enn~id~r~eiong~ tt i~ ~ur Gnn~td~~pd opinion ~h~t
~wt~ I'n~C~1rH Clcnrly undErli~ thi~ ~ieuneinn: _
"t~'ir~t, there i~ ~n ~tt~mpe t~ pi~y on ~~e~~ri~n ~~ttsitivitf~~ t~ fight th~
r~valutian~ but eh~ fgrt ie that thig ~~ceeri~n chord i~ edrn gnd is incapabl~
nf prnduGing thu deeir~d eun~.
"Seehnd, th~ rr~nd eo unitp wieh Syri~ ha~ t~rn~d th~ b~l~nce of power in
ehe ar~a nnd h~~ cr~~t~d g dang~roua ~tr~e~~ic erack in ho~tile tend~nci~~
nnd ~dn~fder~tiong. if ~ueh ~ tr~nd i~ dang~rou~, th~ mo~t dang~rnu~ thing
nbout it i~ it~ ideologic~l b~~ie ~nd it~ ~olid doctrinal courge. Enemieg'
~ttempt~ to portray tltie Iraqi-Syrian agreement ae a fearful re~c~ion ro the
~vene~ in iran are attempt~ whose ob~ectiv~ i8 to remove the agreement from
it~ idenlogicel end hi~toric~l context and present it a~ ~ polieie~l agcee-
ment ~nt~r~d into in anticipation ~f emergencies and hypotheeical event~~ ~
Thig i~ one of th~ mdtiv~~ und~rlying the rec~nt #.ncreage in commentari~~ ~
~b~ut th~ impact of the Iranian crieis on th~ Shi'ite~ in Irgq.
"'Thig tendency on the part of weatern media correepondentie reveals the
drgr~c nE rriviglity to which wegtern m~di.a agencie~ hge declined. Thia
trend aisd rev~als their intentions againat Iraq and against Arab unity."
The oEficic~i added, "We ere confident that ~11 our people have achieved g
d~gree oE ideoldgical immunity which makea their naCional unity firm and
unghakeable. if there are those in the weet aho are dreaming that event~ in
Iran will have neg~tive effecte nn our Shi'ite Arab citizpns~ we tall them
drenm on. They will soon find themaelves in the midst of a terrifying
nighemare." And here the ~ffi~ial did not hide c~~te fact that had the evente
nf Iran t~ken plnce during eny adminisCrgtion other than that of the Socialist
Arab Ba'th Party, they wnuld have had a negative impact. "This ie due to
the fact that these administrations which had a sectarian basis were not able
to establi~h just laws for life. They were nrisoners of their sectarian
makeup."
5tability Ig an ~xisting ~act
"Are y~u confident thut stability in Iraq cen only become firmly established7"
~ 'fhe affici~l replied, "Thig is the truth. We do not make thie statement
nerfunctorily; we rather make it ag a result of the courge of the revolution
nn~ of the horizons that it will achieve in the future. A country which
feur~ the possibilities tlint may shake its stability cannot resolve to expand
che democratic process for the masses."
~
"Hoa i~t th~t7"
Without any prefatory remarks the official said, "Did you not hear Comrade
5nddnm Husayn in a speech he aiade to the workers refer to this ma~or question,
wl~ieh is that the�command has approved general elections for all the people
2G
POIt O~FICIkL U5B ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
.
1~'Ult UP'I~'ICIAI~ il;il~~ t1N1~Y
uE L~aq t~~ Cli~t eh~ Cnt~eral ~nun~-11 df eh~ r~ap.l.p~~ r~pr~~~ne~eiv~~, Ch~
~~rliamLn~, may b~ er~~Cr~c!? t~ ~�i.11 hp n~~ rh~ con~~itu~ien~i r~pr~g~nC-
- uCiv~ in~ritutione whNr~in ehe ma~s~e wili pgrticipat~ in formulati.ng
~ r~~olution~ ~nd in building ehe ~Cae~ and eoCiety."
I tried ro excus~ my~~l~, but I wae gtopped by the offici~l'e voie~~ He
wa~ s~yin~, "Thi~ not the only th~,ng that th~ command intend~ to achieve.
Ie he~ on ie~ ~~~nda a eompl~t~d study ~bout the democra~ic manag~menC of
' th~ ~t8e~'~ ~fl~ei~~eio~~. Thia etudy w311 snon ~~ke ehe form of law. Thi~
m~ang eh~e eh~ work~re ar~ to b~eome ~xe~neivei.y and eolleeeiv~ly involved
in a l~ge1 ~nd in 8 r~volut~onary manner 3n the m~n~gementi of th@ ~tate'~
ng~neip~. `fhie wi11 b~ done according to ep~Cia1 princ~pies for prgcticing
d~mocracy in r~horting, criticizing and sup~rviging."
'~hi~ dev~l~pm~nt indicates quite eloquently thar event~ in Iraq are
proc~~din~ on tl~eir courAe. It i~ re~pondin~ to many quegtions in a
pructicel wny by providln~ eentralixed re~ult~ instead of reactione. In
thia r~g,~rd an nbg~rvpr finds a g~ner~1 g~nse of optimism in the fact tihat ~
eh~ erailbl~xin~ pxp~riments which Ireq i~ experien~ing will gucc~ed ~nd
eh~ ma~nr gen~ral national hopes that er~ hanging on the uniCy of Ir~q and
Syria will be ac:hieved. Everyone one meetg in Haghdad will aseure oee that
thi~ uni~y i~ undoubtedly coming. I~ i~ th~ hour of des~iny, and unity
,[wiCh Syria/ wag an gtill is thp destiny of Iraq.
COpYRIGN'T: 1979 AL-WA'TAN AL-AttABI
8592
C50: 4802
27
~OR OFFICL~~I. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
FOR OF`eiCIAL U3E aNLY
MU1tnCC0
.~UUWVAt CARitI~S INT~[tVI~W WI~1 1tASSAN AIUE ON SAHARA ~ROB1,~M
Pnri~ JLUNC AFRIC~U~ in ~r~nch 4 Apr 79 pp 71-73 LD
CInC~rvi~w with MoroCCan King Hasean'e ~dvi~er Alun~d R~d~ Cu~dira by
tl~mid narr~da "exciueiv~": "Morocco Wi11 Give Priority eo th~ Queet for
n Negoetared Solution to th~ Problam of Sahgra"--date and place not
~pecif i~d ~
(Exeerpt~ JEUN~ A~ttIQUE: How would Morocco react to anoCher ettack by
the Polisgrio firont aimilgr to the aCtack againat Tan-tan in February?
Aluned ~~d~ Guedira: Nitherto the Moroccan atmy was eatiefied with ineuring
rhe citizens' security and defending localitiee uader artack. Henceforth
it wi11 go further then that--it will pursue aggre~sore, trying to inflict
on tf~em the greatest possible losees but etapping ahort of fu11y exercis-
t~ icg right of purguit (droiC de suite~. Thie ie one of the aspecta of
et~e poliCy stgted in the royal message of 8 March.
.1~UN~ A~RIQUE: Why has Morocco, which repeatedly and galemnly stated prior
to 8 March its intention of fully exercising the right of purauit, refrained
Erom exCrcising it?
Ahmed R~da Guedira: Because we have deliberately limited our army'8
~ction.
J~UNC AFItIQU~: In that cusc, Why did you mention the right of pursuit?
Ahmcd ttedn Cuediru: In order to remind people oE a naturally and legally
~~knowledgrd right pogs~eg~ed by any country ahoae territory is violated
by aggregsors baged abroad. The exercise of this right dependa on the
politicul situation. Both the eacigencies of defenae and diplomatic
requiremenCs mu~t be congidered.
.iL�'UNi: AC'(ttQUE: Wilt the National Security Council have any army officera
nr~ mc~nb~rs?
AtBneJ Rrcia Guedira: All council membere Will be repreaentatives of
"organized political mov~nents." Members of the government and certain
28
FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
~pEt d~F~CtAL U5~ ONLY
r~pr~~~neutiv~s of eh~ army wiil partie~.p~t~ in eh~ councii'~ d~~.3b~r~eian~
wh~u~v~r rh~ir pr~b~nr.c iy d~~m~~ nae@~~urv.
J~UNL AN'tt~QUE: 3oma p~op1~ b~1~~ve th~C Che new Sah~r~ pol~.cy amount~ ~o
uE~'~ring eh~ oppo~i~ion ~ foole' barge~.n--war aga~nst Alger~g in ~xch~ng~
df goc 3~1 p~ae~.~.. ~
Ahmed tteda Gu~dira: Thi~ ~n erroneous 3neerpret~e~on eince the mee~a~e
r@ferr~d to Sahnra ~nd noeh~ng e1~e.
JE:UNC A~ttIQU~s Non~th~l~~~, ~,e could be r~~orted Ch~e ~h~ n~w S~h~r~ policy
i~ n~e d~vnid of ult~rior mot~ves conn~cted with ~ocia], ten~ione.
. Atvn~d Reda Guedira: I~an ~saure you ehat the King did noe intend to make
any degl wieh rh@ oppo~i~ion whan he add~e~eed hi~ mesaage eo parliamgnC.
~e i~ rru~, how~v~r, Ehat a certain meaeure of ~ocial p~~e~ i~ nac~g~ary
ed ~nnb1~ M~roe~o fully to ~~~ume the reepon~ibil3eie~ impo~ed on it by ehe
gituation pr~vailin~ in our Sghare.
J~UN~ AFRIQU~: The King'e recent vieiC Co ~rance, which ~~emed to presage
a panc~ful aolution, wag immed~ntely followed by a hardening in Morocco'a
nttitiud~. Should it be deduced from ~his that the vis~t proved to b~ of
no avail after ~11?
Ahm~d it~da Cuedira: L~t me repeat that the meseage constitutes a clerifica-
tion rather than an indication nf the adoption of a more hardline policy on
our p~rt and that in this context Morocco Will continue to give priority
eo th~ que~t for a negotiated solution. Ae for the Kieg's viait ro France,
it ha~ in no vay proved ueprofitable since it enabled the two heade of
state to exchange views on a queetion Which rema~ns of fundamenCal
i~,rortia~~~ to Morocco.
JCUNE A~RIQUE: Uid the two heads of atnte exchange viewpointg or did their
viewpoint~ clash? .
Ahmed Redn Cuedira: Both.
JEUNE A~RIQU~: Will not ~ranco-Moroccan relation~ auffer as a result of
Rabat's new policy?
Ahmed Reda Cuedira: Absolutely not. As far as I knoa, President Giscard
cl'Estning I~~~s nd apeciEic or personal policy With reapect to the Sahnra
problem. It se~ms to me that he is trying to help the parties concerned
out of this de~dlock and find a satisfactory solution.
.i~UN~ AFRTQllF: Is he more lik~ly to achieve this now (after 8 March) than
i~e wns in tf~e pagt?
Ai~mcd acdi~ Cuedirn: Certainly. If he has not, it would not ba aur fault.
29
FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6
~o~ o~~tcrn~ us~ ortLY
JLUNL Af~'[tI~U~: Mr 01ivi~r Srirn, ~r~nch ~~Cr~~~ry df ~ege~ g~r for~3~n
uCEnir~, ~tidughr fie ed gCBCp eh~r ~ m~etiin~ beew~~n N~~~~n II ~nd Ghadii
w~~ "n pn~~ibility.'' IC i~ U~1i~v~d in cer~aifl ~r~neh dipirm~ri~ C~~'h~_pq
ehne it wn~ m@r~ly ~"~1ip oE Ch~ Congu~" ar a"blund@r" an hi~ p~r~~ WhnC
c~xnrely h~pp~n~~1?
Ahmec! R~d~ Guedirn: te ig noe Up eo m~ e~ ~xpl~in Mr ~Cirn'8 ~t~eemgne~.
Ndw~v~r, I am ~b1~ tn ~e~e~ tihat whae h~ ~~id had no eonn~etion wi~h tih~
c~n~~nt~g di th~ ealkg be~we~n Pr~~ideae Gi~eBr~ d'Ege~ing ~nd Ki.ng H~s~~n II.
JCUNC A~tt~QU~: ~'he King'~ r~c~nC ~egt~m~nt~ on Americ~n C~levi~ion sugge~t
thnt h~ h~g b~~n unable tn modify ehe U.S. ~teitude, ~~pecially ~ow~rd
eh~ qu~~Eic~n oE nrm~' ~upplie~ tio Mnrocco.... _
A1im~d [t~de Gu~dirn: ~n 1960, Moro~co and ehe Unit~d St~e~g eoncluded ~n 8rm~
~~rc~mpne. `~h~ Am~rie~n~ hav~ impo~~d on ug a v~ry srriet inrerpree~tion ~
df i~ whieh, in my view, i~ e rong~quen~~ of mier~gding af th~ agr~~mgne,
~~p~Cially wieh r~f~r~nc~ Co S~h~rg.
.JCUNC A~ttlqU~: I~ Che United Stgeeg pr~par~d tn I~t Mord~cn u~~ ~rms iC h~e
~uppli~d in ~drm~r 5pnni~h Snhgrn?
Ahmed Rcdr~ Guedir~: W~ in Enct use American arms to protect Sahara but quite
nfr~n we h~ve to ~xplnin th~ gituation and discues mattere firet.
J~UN~ At~'RIQU~: Uo ydu Chink that you wi11 be uble to modify the American
~ttitud~7
Aluned it~d~ Cu~dirg: We hav~ conducted, and Will continue to conduct, g
l~rge-sncle explan~tory c~mpnign among American leaders. Deapite the
difEiculCieg with which we have been faced, we have not lost hope that
the United 5tates will come to gssesg the situation more correctly and gain
n better understanding of nur policy.
J~UNE AFRIQU~: Will rhe American attitude not lead to a rnpprochement between
Mnr~cCO nnd the Snviet Union?
AhmeJ tted~ Cuedira: We have excellent relations with the Soviet Union and
tl~ere is nn rengon why we should not ask it to aupply us with arms.
J~UN~ A~itIQU~: Would it agree to gupply arms to you2
AluncJ Rid.h Cuedira: Certninly.
, CUI'YIt[CII'I': .Ie~me AErique CRUPJIA 1979
CSO: 4400 ENb
30
~Oft OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040046-6