JPRS ID: 8444 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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JPRS L/8444
7 May 19 79
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TRAI~SLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
, (FO(;~ 19/79)
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JPR5 L/8444
, 7 May 1.979
TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTN AFRICA
(FOUO 19/79)
- CaNYENTS PAGE
INTER-AftAB AFFAIRS
Arab Energy Strateg,y Launched �
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Apr 79) 1
Edward Sa~id, Palestine National Council Member, Tnterviewed
(Edward Sa'id Interview; THE MID~LE EAST, Apr 79) 5 -
E(}YPT ~
Suppression of Political Parties Escalates
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 9-15 Feb 79) 11 -
Reasons for Degortation of Economic Unity Council
Secretary Analyzed
(AZ-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 16-22 Feb 79) 15
New Elit~ ~nerging in Business World
(AI,-WATAN AI,-'ARABI, 16-22 Feb 79) 20
Briefs
U.S. Aid to Media 23
_ KUWAIT
Crown Prince Emphasi;,ea Regional Security in Intervieca
- (Saad al-Abdull~h al-Sabah Interview; THE MIDDLE
~T, APr 79) 2Lt
LIBYA
Qadhdhafi~s Suppor+, of Kurds Causes Surprise
(AI~-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 9-15 Mar ?9) 26
a- [III -NEF~A-121FOU0] -
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- CONTENTS (Cont3nued) Page
SUDAN
Suspected Members of Ba'ath Party Arrested
- (AT,-WATAN AI~-~ARABI~ 16-22 Feb ?9) 27
UNITED AR,AB ENQRATES -
UAE Unity Efforts arowing -
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Apr 79) 29
-b-
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A'Uk UFFTCIAG U513 dNLY
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ARAB ENERGY STRATEGY LAUNCHED
London TH~ MIDDLE EAST in English Apr 79 pp 100,102
- [Text] -
F
The Firet Arab Energy Conference~ held in Abu Dhabi in March~ ended with
- a cnll for a pan-Arab energy commtttee to co-ordinate energy developrnent
- for the beneflt of both oil-exporting and oil-importing atates. But msny
topica wer~ diecuseed at the conference without getting a mention in the -
rednlutione. Naomi Sakr sent thie repo~t from Abu Dhabi.
' S~x~ke~men for the developing repreaented only the intereate of Although the idea of the con� ~
cuuntriea frequently point out the biggest and richest energy ference wes firat conceived at en
thnt they leck a t~-ordineting consumeca, but they appeared Oapec maeting in 1973, its even�
inNtitutiun equivalent to the to be taking little or no joint tual timing could hardly heve ' -
Oryci~niantion for Economic Co� action to aet up an alternetive been more appropriete. Indeed,
u{xrntinn and Development "intemational" egency of their the turmoil raging in the worl~
which represente 24 countries of owrs. oil marke`c with the resumption
the industrialised world. Not The Fitst Arab Energy of Iranian oil exports on new
nnly ie there no developing� Conference, held in Abu Dhebi terme after a 10-week
nnu~try equivalent to the OECD from 4 to 8 March, mey thus suspension may even have
itr~lf, but there is none either for have come as something of e suggested that it was an '
the vnria�,q agencies which have aurpriae to observers inside and emergency reaction to ahorteges,
~~m~uted from it - notably the outnide ~he Areb world. The Huctuating prices and !'ears of
Intenit~ti~~nel Energy Agency confer~~nce was admittedly not herdship on the part ~f the
((N;A), which apreng up on a US intemational in the full senae, poorest non�oil Arab atates. But
initi~~;~ve in the wake of the but in bringing together a group at least the extreme
U~kc uil price increa.yes and the of oil�importing, eelf�sufficient circumstances managed to draw _
Anil~ i~il embergo of 1973-?4. and oil�exporting countries it a large at~endance and highlight
Five yeun ago, perhaps, the did represent a signiHcant step the impoetance of the subject
n~~ecl fi~r en IFA for the develop- towerds promoting regional being discussed.
inK countries wea not energy co�operation outside the In fact the turmoil in the oil
imnie~li~itely obvious. The con� indu9trielined world. And, in industry seemed to reach a peak
c�~~;~1~ ~~f energy conyervation and recommending the establish- just as the conference opened.
o~,~rrK~~ncy oil�shnring seemed to ment of a pan�Areb energy Libya has just increesed ita -
huv~~ little relevance for non� council, linked to both the Arab prices by another $1.20 a barrel
in~lu~trinliyi~cl countries that Fund for Econumic and Social and there were rumours thet
- wem ritl~er uil ex~xi~ters or c~a� Development (AFE.~D) and the Algeria might raise ita prices by
Nu~~irn ~~f ener~,v ~n e very amell O~Hni~aticm of Arab Petroleum 16-25�,b from 1 April. This wa~ in
N~�~~I~~ Ex~x~rting ~ountriey (Oepec), it addition to increased premiums
'I'h~~~~~ outai~ic~ the IEA elan went some way towards in- and aurcharges elreedy an-
mw~ior~~~l itr t~eing ce+lled "inter� etitutionelining that co- nounced by other Arab oil ex-
iwi~~m~~l" when it clearly operation. pocter~ euch ae Kuwait, Qatar
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and the UAE, (lu~~~i~~i~ N~ero with the fundnmeiUnl i~~prct~+nf which etnted thet, einee tha fre� '
. also being aeked nn tu ~hether a long�term Anil~ energy quently forecnat oil ehortages of -
$audl Arebie wuuld amtinue to etrstegy and it wuH the~e fun� the 1980e might fa11 to -
nllow the oil comp~~nire to lift ein damentals which mnde the c~m� materialiae, and r~al oil pricea
- ~ extre lmn bnrrele n d~y eRer the ference whst it wnH, might fall, oil p~oducere ehould
endofMerch, Fi~st and forem~wt, then, the p~pa~ for thie oontingency by
At the eame tinte t+eletions ~nference wan ne~t forum fc~r adopting a common pricing snd
with the oil ^otnpnnieri a'eee discuseing current oil prices. p~uction atrategy that would
growing etreined, with p~ce fixing i~ univeMnlly "exert a poeitive inHuence" on
mounting s'legutiunx th,~t they~ recognised to be nn Opec the development of higher-cost
were taking edv~~nt~iKe of the prerogative and dcleKn:es in additionel resources,
crieie to reise ptic~ be~nnd Abu Dhabi were well nwun thnt Higher oil coets, of courae,
anything impoeed on lhem by Opec ministen~ would be although eccepted, are not
the oil�pmducinK etete+. UAE merting in Ceneva barely three necesearily welcomed by every
Oil Minieter Mnnn Bin Seid ~,ke later, on 26 March. Arab etate snd there was some
Otalba reveelrci ~mething of Certninly the iseuee of pricing inteneive lobbying by Arab oil
~ � the teneion tn hie opening ~d to be ralaed, in no far ae oil coneumera at the eterE of the
addrese to the Energy rir.cs are linked to the rofl� conference for e ial treatment
Conference, whe~ ha rcferrnd to ~~biNly of nltemative eources of in meeting their
oil bille. Here
the poeeibilily of bl~ckliating ~~~N~p? end form s crucial egain, however, es with the iaeue
guilty compenies. element in any comprehensive of ahort�term oil price fixing, the
Oil ccmceme waro ~x~t the only enerypr plan. There were even "special treatment" reque~et
- eource of nnxiety to mnference ~n1e eharp exchanges on thie represented a divecsion that the
participanta, however. Therc aubject between Arab delegates majority of delegaces refuaed to
wae aUeo tha eurprine announce� N~d Weetern repr~entatives follow.
ment that US Pre.rident Cnrter whu had been invited to put The idea of creating eome
_ wae about to viait the Middle theic {wint of view, form of facility for fuiancing oil
Eeet, a~th all thpt ?.hie implied p;erre Deeprairies, Chairman imports, such es that operetcd
in terme of eu~ in~minent of the Boacd of the Inetitut by Oapec for a very brief period
Eqyptien�teraeli peHCe treaty F~~~Aie du Petrole, conceded, between 1974 and 1975, found a
thet would ectivete the for example, that oil price in� predictably ready c~esponse from ~
resolutiona reletinK to the c~i~~ were desirable ao long es d e 1 e g a t e s r e p r e s e n t i n g
boycott of Egypt taken at the they encouraged investment in Mauritania, Somalia, Jordan,
November Arab eummit nuciear energy and coal end he theYemensan.~Sudan.
- meeting in Beghdnc~. ei1duned the idea of increases at Sudanese Energy Minister
The economic and politicel re~~~~ ~~iyg~, gut when he Sherif al-Tohami con6rmed to
fector.+ effecting the Areb worid W~med thet euch increeses The Middle East that Sudan
during the fuat two weeks of ahould not be eo great es to hed been eo severely hit by
March were con~equently disturb whet he called "tt~e rising oil pri~es that it was
unusuel and thia fect no doubt fn~Kile economic balance of most having to divert precious funds
contributed W ettrarting ~~dustrie?liaed rnuntries" and away from development to
mnny miniaten and top oil euggeated aiming for an oil price paying oil billa. The Islamic
offic~Ris to Abu Dh~~hi. The only of S~�3U a ban~el (at 1979 Development Bank was helping
- amHpicuoun abacuteeY o~�er the P~rry) by the year 2000, hia pro- Sudan to pay for the purchase of
four and e half dnyA were the oii ~NI9 were not vAry well petroleum products from
_ miniaters of Seudi Arabia, ~eived. Kuwait, he o~id.
Algeria, Egypt encl (rny. On the whole, however, � aan hed discussed the
_ But, despite thP unusuel riCin did not rove ta be e
,circumetence~, dey-tu�day ront~ver~ial iseue among the oil ~e~i~ble~ma
'th~h~~e~r non~-
etYaira were not all~~weci to preb atates themselves. Their agreeable to any formula for a
dominate the talky. Onpec nnd besic upproech seemed to be aubeidy or oil facility that would
AFF.S() hed belwern them eummed up in a paper be acceptable to all aides."
meneged to prevent thia by pre.rented by the Unit ~d s~~~ p~ident Nimeiri had
f
rnnce~~d~xumentuli~~~dr I ng Natiuna Economic Commission ~ady esked for an Arab
- for Wezuem Asia (ECWA) meeting to diecuas such a for-
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mule, Tohemi said, but "the p~~,~cularly fonnidable, einc~ partirip~itiun of eome 3U0
tesponee hed not been prompt", Saudi Arebia ia in need of con� delegate~ nnd gueytA or the sub�
The ooolneee of the oil�eurplus eiderable additional capucity, mission of 24 scholarly papero,
etatee towerde the notion of eapecially tn rurnl ereas, end in additinn ta country�by
eetting up yet another fund oe thie could be designed to co� country re~x~rts,
fecility wae clearly felt at the ordinste with other atates, But Indeed, those whu did not -
energy conference, tt aeems to have been decided attend the conference and who
Delegates fmm two key con� that the technicel aspects of have only the concluding atate�
tributors to any oil fecility - euch s project rendered it un� ment to judge it by mny even
9audi Arabia nnd Kuwait - euitpble for immeciinte con� aek themwelves why the event
were unenthueteetic and wece aideration, end the prop?~+~+1 did Was held et ell, Fortunntcly for
anyway unable to take decieione theae 1
on the epot. Moreover, Qatar'a eubmitted at he ond~~n~ ~u.~iun+ tributio
s~ co ering ev~e~rything
repreaentative to Opec, Ali ps ;t heppened, thc:~ cun� from inter7ntionel energy
Jeldah, told The Middfe East fecence concluaions, embudiecl po~~cies and their impect on
that the inatitutions to deal with Arnb atntes to the lifes en of
the importere' payment pro� ~n e 10�pege document p
bleme (euch ai+ the Opec Speciel circuleted during the tinel ~Areb oil ~reservea and the
Fund) hed elready been eet up. ~ion on 8 Merch, COl1I(I N~ell socipl cost of oil revenuea,
Atwther propoeal, put before have been written montlu will be published by'Oopec.
- the patticipants by the Syrian before the oonference wn~ e~�en [n the meantime it can only _
- delegetion, wes aleo briefly convened. be pointed out that when you
noted but not followed up..Thia ~r a preamble in which put govemment officisls and in- -
concerned the creation of a joint attention i9 drawn to the need to tellectuals, ecunomiats and
power grid 1Wcing a number of monitor IEA policie~ nnd, et the engineers all tog,.ther in one _
Areb etstes, including Seudi game time, to document and mom for day a(ter day of
Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria rationalise energy consumption plenary diecuseiona, you are
in the Arab worid, the bound to find yourself uneble to
snd Lehanon, with each other ~~~ncluding atatement" goes on eummarise the result in 10 peges
, and pc~+ibiy Turkey ss well. ~~mmend the estnbli~h� of typescript.
Such a grid, it wae pointed ment of an "institutionel This method of conducting
out, could be based on nuclear ~amework at the nation:~l and the meeting, with elmoet ell dis-
power, with the advantage thet ~,p~b levels". cuaeion taking place in full con-
the centrat nuciear power plent At the national level this ference rather than in emall,
coutd be eited in e desert area ~uld mean eetting up, or specialised working groupe,
and etill eerve thoee emell, etrengthening, centrnl energy ceuaed some fruetretion among
- deneelypopuleted countries, committees in each Areb thase who felt that their -
such ae Jordan, Lebanon end country, charged with rn�ersee- particular probleme were being
Kuweit, which dere not build ing consumption and develop� ignored.
nuclear planta of their own. ment of enetgy+ from a!1 so~u~~es. "It'e an Arab conference in a
One elight obetacle to a At the pan-Arab le~�e~~ the E~~~ euit," commented a
' regionei network, mentioned recommendation is for a joint member of the Egyptien
by FCWA coneultant Edith preb Energy Committee, com� delegation, who felt that talk of
Penrcx~e in her paper on energy ~ed of a geogrephically energy conservation in reletion -
uu+titutiocu+ in the Areb vwrld, ie representative group of enecgy ~ a eociety where water ia etill
the [ect that the power eupply epecialists and finenced by pumped and land ploughed by
inatalled by US companies in Oapec and the AFESD, which ~imal power was rather
Seudi Arabia operates eccording ~uld co�ordinate and prumote miaeing the point. "Minietera
to epecificatione different from ~~ch and prepere for future ~d intellectuala both felt they
thoee ueed in neighbouring Arab Energy Conferences. ~d to do their own thing," ex-
� etatea. One Syrien delegate These conferences are W take p~s;ned s development
hinted privetely that this dis� p~ace every threeyear~, with the aasistence e:pPrt. "The
crepency could well heve been a next one W be held in ' oha, minieters felt they had to be
delibernte move on the part of Qatar, in Mar~h 1~82. passing policy resolutione and -
the US companiea. The drafting of such bland the intellectuals aimply wanted =
No one questioned on this recommendatione clearly did to explore the policy options
topic felt the obatacle to be not require the week�long available."
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In many waye it ie th~t in�
tellectual exploration which will
probably prove to have been
moet valuable in the long run.
Much ettention wes peid during
the ftnel eeseione, for example,
to the need for Arab countries to
contribute to tnternetional
nuclear energy reeearch, tnstead
of temeining pasaive recipienfs
of nuclear technology. -
It wee recognieed thst no
Acab rnuntry hae yet echieved
- nuclear fuel cycle capability and
- thet one etep towards thia would
be the joint establishment of a
- emell power teactor, So far only -
reeearch resctors hsve been
built,
A project auch ea thie could
provide e motivation and an
outlet for the reseerch efforts of
the many giRed Arab ecientists
who are now working at uni�
versities in the WPat. If the -
mininteriel decisions taken in
Abu Dhabi can restilt in -
channelling Areb technical
sbilitiea into Arab development,
then the innovative mix of
perticipante at the Firet Arab
Energy Conference ~vill have
been no bad thing. O
~ COPYRIGHT: 1979 IC MAGAZINES LTD.
CSO: 4802
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1~'Olt Ol~P'fc;l~l.. USi: UNLY
INT~R-ARAB AFFAIR5
EDWARD SA'ID, PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEI~BER, INTERVIEWED -
London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Apr 79 pp 65-68
- [Interview with Edward Sa'id, Palestine National Council member and Colum-
bia Un ivereity professor, by Mark Br~tzonsky, date and place not given]
� [Text] "Are we a national independence movement or are we a national
libera tton movemen~t?" ~olumbia University Professor and Palestine
National Council member Edward W. Said asked in this candid di~cussion
" with Forum Editor Mark Bruzonsky. "We're at the ~uncture where we have
_ to make a decision." Said was born in Jerusalem, raised in Egypt, and
educat ed in the United Statea. He is one of four American academics of
Palestinian origin whose namea cropped up last year as possible repre-
_ aentatives of ~he Palestinians who would be acceptable to the United _
States. His new book "Orientalism" is being widely discussed in intellec-
tual c irclea. (THE MIDDLE EAST Books Section features a review of
"Orientalism" next month.)
Bru:onaky: Were there any eign;flcant needed 'u o very clear enuncietion of ~
decielon~ at the recent Damaecu~ PNC Pale~tinian political process around which
meeting? W}~v didn't you go? people can organise and work and
Said: I wee ill, but I followed the reporte es significxnt edrances can be made. -
best I n~uld. WhaY came out of note waa the Ob~~~+usl~�, ~~~e need a clearer progra~nme
prvgremme of netional unity that wes for pn~,~re::a tow�errl peace - forthright
ndoptecl. !'m not eure thet PNCe are where statemec~tri of n twn-state solution and eome
~crest dr~~elopments are decided. indicati~u~ of hoH~ this might come about,
O Thcre were many expectatlon~ and beyond al~~ena like "armed atruggle",
_ telk of a gov~rnment-In�exUe betore the '�contin~u~ the atruggle" snd eo forth which
meetinR, we s11 kno~~�, The question is how do you
O It w�x.a more an intenal meeting and advt~nce the political process to your edvan-
didn't Etrike me es one of the more in- tage ~i~�ei~ the ~~vrld in which we live, a poet-
tere.tina nnes. I think the 1974 and 1977 Camp Du~id atuld. -
meetin~ H�ere more cruciel. One hae the p A,n yau ~uggeetiaR the Paleetinlan
impre~~icm thet there hean't been much mo~�emrnt ought to diecuee how two -
advance in Palestinian politice aince Camp ~tate~ c~n cro-exiit in Paleetine with the
David, ideoloRiral etruggle and the etrugglt
O Ideological~y you mean? o~�er hl~tnrical Interpretatton continu-
O In ell H~eye. A lot of people eay that the ing~ but the ~lolent, the milltary,
Ba~hdnd eummit wae crucial. It wea impor- ~trugRle cnding?
tant as e forum for inter-Areb diecueaione. O Partl~� tlu~t. I'm not talking about a
But I'~~e felt eince September that what ie
. 5
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decleratton of peace, but abnut political to ney. If w~ r~jecl 242 wilh a reaervutinn
reelieation of the fect that the ermed whet alterneLive do we present? So fer
ntruggle thet wae enuncieted bsck in 1969 ie there's no nltrrnnlive, nnd I cnn't outline the
not the principal progremme of the epec9flc et4~~x+ heceuse then I'll hnve pro�
Paleatiniane, Now, whet ie the political pro- bleme. -
gramme7I don't heve an anewer, O So, bnck to thc prio:!~ies. The flret ie -
I'm eimply talking about the need to oFen Jorden end the second Ameirice. Are
a epace for debete in the Palestinian oom� therc moro?
munity. There'a n lot of surreptitioue di~� O Certninly cur relotions with the leading
cusainn that we need to talk to the US, to re� Areb cauntrien. It Peeme to me that eome
form our tiea with Jordan, to do something redefinit'sun of our relations with Egypt,
to get the Syriane off our beck, Seudi Aret~in, Iraq nnd Syria ahould be in
1 want thie debete to take plsce in forume the offing. I'm not saying chnc there
- thet will meke it poeeible for theae thinge t+o neceNSarily hae to be a dramatic change -
- heppen - not juet an occaeional journalietic thet ell of e Hudden we embrace Sndat. I'm
leak like Arafet'e tslking to Anthony Lewie !alking ebc~ut making our poeition cleer.
and then the whole thing being dropped o But eren t you continuing to beg the
next time somebody comee around. I went it ~i~~eation of what that new clear policy
to be embodied in Pal~etinisn politicel ehould bc?
ectivity. O Well, I myeelf am confused. I'm not cleer
O Are you indltectly cxltici~ln~ juat what our poeitiona on these queatione
Aretat'o leader~hip oP the PL~? ere. I don't thu~k many Paleatinians are. Are
O No, no. I think that in the prenent �'e e nationel independence movement or s
circumetancee he'e the .only pereon who netional liberation movement? In a certain
could lead the PLO. He ie the figure who Wey we're cleiming to be both. We're at the _
repreeente the Pelestiniane' fete todey. Md ~ur?cture Nhere we heve to make a decision.
I think that he now neecL the eupport of The period of indecision between one alter-
, more Paleetiniana like myaelf who believe netive and the other ia pretty much at an
that eomething more than juet eurvivel te end. .4nd I would ralher it wea taken by ue
- neceaeary. We want to try to tranelete the than in eome eense imposed upon ua.
Palestinian diepereion and fragmentation 0 Many pcople think not much will
into proceea which will not alweye leeve w happen until 1981, after the American
on the fringe, ettached to some other power, presidentiel clection.
? 9o what are the prlorit{e~? ' O R'ell, I'm not so eure about that. I think
O Firet, we ought to regulariee and im Carter'a stalced an awful lot an this. Some
etitutianaliee our reletions with Jordan, kind of drxmatic move toward peace - ea
o Th$N~ being done, ien't it? defined by the US - may be in the offing.
O Yee, it'e being done, eo, in other word~, O Do you lhink thie dramatlc move _
haeten it. Second we ehould begin to eddreAe ~U' be something the Palestinian
the US in a eerioue wey. movement could co-operate with?
O Mesnin~ what? O~'~'ell, no, I'm worried that, on the oon-
O Meaning that, if we believe the US hau traq�, it will lcave the Paleatinian movement
intereets in the area and that we etand a+e eu? even further out.
- edveisaiy with regard to theee, then we O And you'rc worried that Arabs other
ehould addreee the US politically. then Sadat will co-operate with the
o You mesn ~how the U9 how � American~?
Pale~tinian ~tete eould be in the ln� O Yee, of cnurae, it'e perfectly poseible that
terestr of the U$? eventuslly~ the Jordanians might mwe in
O Precie~aly. Not only in the intereete of the ~d thet eomc Palestinians might be found
U3 but in the intereete of peace. We ~hould ~~e �'est Aank end Gaze to co-operate.
demonetrete that peace is in the intereet ot O V1'hat a�ould be the reaction within -
everybody who hee intereste in the area. the Palestininn community if the PLO
O Then all you have to do i~ to let the leaderehip chose to be a"nationel
Certe~ Adminl~lr~tion know you'll mo~�ement" Instead of a"liberation
ncc~~pt 242 wlth repervatione, mo~�ement" ae you've suggested and
U But that'e not nece~.qerily the way we 86reed to rrcogniee Ierael in exchange
E~erccive it. Tlinl'e preciNely what I'm trying ror an indrp~mdcnt Palestinian etate?
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0 1 think if it came ebout within the nccom modation to this - then it would l~e e
context of mavinR the Palestiniane out of the yuite different thing from the Zioniem of
_ pre~ent m~u~~, Rnd if it wers politically today.
preFx?red Gv tl~rn 1 think it would gain much ? Would you agree with whet Abu-
- ncceptnnce, Iyad eaid in Eric Rouleau'e new book
' O Evea at the ~ra~s-root~ level t~om that when the Peleetinlen~ get thelr
people li~~inK In the area, in the camp~? etate the military etruggle will end?
O Yee, by political preperetion. Whet I o Yea, I would baeically egree.
would accRpt ae a Palestinian ie not "tske it o Ion't thir really a three-etQte
nr leave it, thie ie e peckago deal", But if tt eolution? .
appeared ae part of a re-examinetion of the o You mean with Jorden. Yee.
whole Paleetinisn caee and if the whole Demographically the Hashemite Kingdom
question of Paleatinian right~ ie diecuesed {n ie part of thia Palestinien entity. '
the context of peece, then I think it would be ? 9o an hietoric accommodation to let
accepteble, the King live es long u~
lf it wes poanible to see thie two�etnte o Now that I really can't eay. I meen,
yolution in the conlext ~f e wider diecuaeion &ankly, I don't eee eny eimple solution ta
of the fate of those Paleatinians let'e eay in the question of Palestinisn nationnlinm
I.ebanon who are not from the West ~e~us Ha~hemite nationalism at thia pnint.
Benk How are their national righte to be They do aeem to me to be in conflict, I.et'e ~
nddretu+ed, their laet property, their national eay historically in con.Fiict. _
identity, their repatriation? Then there'e the o You tal~ af reaolving your reletlom -
fate of the Paleetiniane ineide Israel, with the Ieraell~, why can't you re~olve
So if the overture tnwarde peace wae them wfth Amroen?
mnde in the context of addreseing all of the o There ie overlep between the two, with
issues in detail, then I think it would be ~th making cleime to the 8ame co~t�
willingly accepted, But if it's alweye eeen in atituenc~~, Thia ie quitc different from Ixrael
the context of eolving the Palestinian end a Paleatinian etate.
probiem once and for all by confining all O At Blr Z~it Unlverolty a few month~ .
Palestiniana on the Weet Bank in a etate ago tho etudcnte eeemed very vehement
domineted by Ieraol, then no~ody will buy that r~roncflielion with Jordan could
~t, only bc poeelblc without the monarchy,
O You per~oaally believe n1D tho~e pro- O I think m~x~t Palestinians feel thet if there
bleme eaa be ~olved and etill allow for a is ever e live Palestinien political entity it
viable Ierael etate ~omewhere within will in Ihe end be a chellenge to the
the 1967 boundarte~ profeeein~ to monnrchy. Moet Pelestiniana under~tand
Zioni~t ideolo~y ln a moderate and non- thet e choice hea to be mede between the
expanefonl~t form? � monarchy and Arnfat. Whe~ I'm talking
o You're putting words in my mouth. There ebaut ie nn engegement between opposing
is a Zioniet etste. There ie an 18ree1. I think poeitionn in which, in the end, tha just
we heve to credit moet Paleetiniane with poeition will prevail.
seeing that there ie a stste and a eociety. ? What doce that mean? I thought we
- We're not talking about a coUection of were tniking ebout a two-state and
people who can juet be sent eway tomorrow. maybe a Ihree-slete compromise where
I aleo give ue credit for eeeing that etate and the Palcwlinians will in reality if not
our etete in the area reaching ~c~me kind d ideologicully give up their claim to 70 -
modua uiuendi. per ccnt ~f what used to be
When you eey Zi~niet ideology, for me Peleetine...
- 7.ioniat ideology deniee the exietence of e O I didn't sey they would give up their _
Pnlestinian people. U there'e ncime cleim. I enid the cleim would be addressed.
recognition that there ie a genuine 0 But you may~ never get that chance if
Peleetinian netional identity which hae e you don't convince enough people `
right to exiet in the land of Pnlestine which O It's not ebout convincing. I'm sayina that
' w~~uld elao mean that for the firet t.ime we have n political position which is besical-
7.ioniem would heve mnde an iYver~�powerful,verypotent.Itisapoeition _
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we hare not yet used, which would force the impreeaes me as time goes by is the total
tRinE~1A nnd the Americans, who have for blank where the Palestinia~~s are concerned,
yeare gollen nlong by ignoring us, to engage One can u:-.~eretand that in an nbetract way
with us, We have to make ourselves irrescati� he wante peace and juetice, But n~y un-
- ble. And I dou't mean ettrective. I mean deretanding by the Adminiatrntion that the
thet a~e have to be dealt with as Dayan Palestiniane are a functioning, political
recently intimated, It wae a triel belloon, society with their hietory, culture, and
We heve to be able to make more tradition, and their particular predicament
etatementn of that kind hsppen. ie lacking.
And the way you do thst is nut juet to ? Don't you think thie ie more 9adet'e
makc remnrks, but to fight politically for s teult than Carter'~? _
- programme. And the programme is clearly a 0 I don't know. Sedat represente a certain
atate ~~~hex~e lines are x, y, and z and whoee kind of thinking, which is to accommodate
pro~~iaiunp are e, b end c... what seems to be the American perception
= O So ~~ou ore sayin~ that tor the time- of thinga. Ard he's willing to play along, in .
being you need to play the polltical his own interests, with thie view.
game to gol a etate. You are ae~uming a Saying it's Sadat's fault ia too eimple. It's
tecticul rether than an overail obviously co-operation between the two in
- elrate~ic, long-lerm poeture. what eeema a mutuall�~ sati~factory viaion uf
O No, It'~ e definile political goal. We heve thinge. But it ie totaily out of touch with
to etake our political activitiea on goale and ~al~h' es ie obvioue to even a deteched
aima fi~r which w~e are responeible, Theee observer. ~ -
can't be lett floating and vague indefinitely. ? But you earlier implicd that you re
And i[ thnt menns that we want a etate - one et111 hopeful about Carter.
with clenr contouts and a known con� O Well, I'm opiimietic in the epnse thnt 1
atituenc~' which elro engages the whole believe in the end common sense pmveiln,
problem af Palestinian netional righte in Certainly it seeme ta me that, given whwt'e
lsrael, etc - ihen we ahould adept ourselvee hAppened in Iran and whet'e happening _
to th~+t ~+al. throughout the Arab world and Mie,
? R'kp� don't you play the auton~my artnngemente where we rely upon rulc~+ who _
gamc - rl~~cl an autonomy council ~s~ act neem to give setiafection will chenge. _
ao a Pnloetine etate and ayk for UN p Sometime~ you speak a~ en _
obecr~�rr rtetuf, and let world opinion American and sometimee a~ a
come to It~ defence every time the pQleetinian.
' , laracli~ r.lnmp down on 1t? 0 I'm both.
. O Vb'ell, ?x~cause the autonomy game hes p There'e a echool o~ thought whlch
rulee ~i~iKhted in favour of the lsraelia end eeee Paleetinian incereete ljnked up to
the F.~~�~~linna. thoee pertiea who have Soviet intereete.
de~i.cd it, lt certeinly is not weight~ed in p~k. I can't apeak for other �alestiniane,
fa~~our ~d the P+ilestiniane! There is a kind of just for peoNle like myself. I grew u~
vetouyt ~utharity inveated in a 3oint essentially in the West. Md there'e no
_ Egyptian,leraeli, Jordanian and Paleetinian queation that hiatoricelly and culturelly our
nuthc~rity. ties a~~e more intimate, more strongly linked
So the Egyptiene and the Iaraelis heve e with the West. �
~ direct interest in the functioning of O And politically and economical~y?
eutun~my - es do the Jordaniena and the O Well, for me - end I strw~a just for me -
lareelie. Palestinian autonomy becomes e thoee are abstractions. I cen understand and
function of ell eorts of other autonomies. I feel a kind of sympathy with the left. I con�
That kind of geme ia precisely deeigned eider myself a man of the left. But thet dcee _
never lo let me echieve anything resembling not necessarily meana Bolsheviam for me.
= my real pc~litical goal - independence. I have yet to see a satisfactory tranelation
t7 You ~re an Amcrican citizen, and I of ~;wopean Marxism into Arab or Third
nseume you watch Carter ae closely ae World teram9. That hasn`t ~:~me about yet. -
xny of ue. How do you evaluate him? There is no successiul Marxist orgenieatian.
~ O I lhnught thet his early etatements were There have been attempts - noble, valiant,
very encouro~ing end unu.qusl. But what heroic ettempta, the Egyptian Communiat
{ulrt~' nnd so forth - but . . . -
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- Ae for political end economic Intrreete il'e to Pnd which in the end will prevail if it b e~
_ certainly not loet on eny I'aleetinian thet the common view. It'~ a pol{tiCAI pI'OCp.Ba W~CM
Soviet Unlon orig{nslly eupported partilion, (nvolvNe cvnetan: conflict and organieation.
thet the Soviet Union eupporta?A2, dcx~ not O Why t~o you think Sadet dec{ded to do
eupport all our programe, and doee not come thr nppa~ite n[ what he hae beeti~ in-
ta our afd, for exemple in the t~weeion uf the ~tructing hle Foreign Mfnietry people
nouth of Lebenon la~t March, to do?
O You reoeet~y foceca~t another "wove o He d~ea eeem to be a rether btrange com�
ot Middle Ea~t ln~tabflity" and ~eld bination of Mesaiau~iem and erratic
th~t the UB could have prevenled it. quelitiee. At ons ~rint in his autobio~rephy -
' What do you h~ve In m[ad? he eeye, "I'm Egypt", ur eomething like -
O It would ~eem tc~ me that US reliena on thet. He eeee himeelf on e very large cenvee,
J Sadat and reQimee Iike thle - which in Ihe but hie politicel paet ia essentially n emall
ftnel ansly~is en going to take hnrrher one.
- meesuree agaLut the o~paeition, Nill To anyone who followed the revolution
pol~ riee the eociety more eherply, 71u 9edet wae not one of the great figures. He
ree~ite will probably be more oppreenion end doean't have e dremetic eense. He'e a flgure -
a greater outbunt et the end, A lot of thet, it who remeined in the beckground an9 wae
- ~eeme to me is due to the etnngtheniry~ of content to ewim along in the currente
Sadet'~ hand witl~ arme eu~d palitlcal creeted by Areb netionyliam and Abdel�
euppott. Nanaer,
O What ehofce doer a~tatu~ quo povver It eeema to me that he has eu.'Tered a too
haveT Tbbte'~ Joedan, E~ypt ~nd S~udi repid traneition from the amall flgure to the
Ar~bfa. You can't hed~e your bet~ ~nd ~ ~erge flgure, and that the erretic quality ia a
~upport the~e re~ime~ at the ~~me Ilme. ~enee of dieorientation. He'e denling in a
~ o No u can't, if you continue to conNder world, and I'm talking about the West now,
everyt~~ u awent~ally bileteral: the l!S in which he'e not accuetomed to be petient
and F.gypt, the US and SeudS Mebi~, and and follow thinga through.
eo on - and w con~ciauly promote conAict He'e a tl~ndementally lonely man from
~ between stater in order to ~afe�~uetd ~rur everythin~ I've been able to gather - ae nrc
paitian u medi~tor. But there'~ no aa~m ma+t leaden like thet. It doesn't eeem to me
why that automettc,~lly need be the N~ay to thet he lietene very much.
_ P~~� O But he doee have e large part o! the
o You're ~u~~e~tin~ a re~ional vlewT E~yptlan people, if not IookIng to him
O Yee, a er~iend, s reali~tic focw. When a~ the only leader the country hae~ at
you don't deal with the PLO, when you leaet acquleecing fn hfe poltcy. -
don't deal with the BeethLta, you'ro not O Whet'e the achievement in that?
msking these thin~ ~o away. O Well~ It i~ n~t ae lf he'e running a
O Do you belleve the Pale~tinian i~ove- totally repre~eive etate llke the Shah
~ ment could act badly and fafl to ~et wae, He really does have a baee of
enythtn~? ~uppurt.
o Yee, abeolutely. You know I would like to o But ( think it'e poeeible to eee Egypt
~ay hutory'~ on au ~ide, but hiatory's g~~ing the wey of Uen, it eeeme that the
_ littered with "jwt" a?u~ee thet have died by eppnretu~ and the [unctionaries of govem�
the w~y~ide. It ian't enou~h to have e juet mrnt ere loeing touch with the political,
_ c~ure. Md it L per[ectly poe~ible that an eam�rnic, eociel and even cultural reality of
w~er�eztended Greeli ~tate, includin~ the ~e beae, I think Sadat'e camed elonQ more
- Weet Bank and meybe the Eaet Bank too, by thie epparatue than by the people. And I
will fsU. But that by no meew guerantees think the danger of ieolation ie iiucnaein~,
that we as Pelestintane will benefit from thia O What will be the e!lect on E~ypt if
lell. I don't belteve tn hietorical Carter dcea ~ucceed in puehtng 9edat
determiniem. I don't believe thet juetice will Into a tnaty with I~rael?
preveil O From the very beginning when he went W
O Or pe~ce? Jerusalem I've felt that Sadat 6~equently
O Abeolute!y. I believe you heve to mobiliee w}~~ ~~a getting into. Md he
for e political goel thet you feel committed ~~y ~y}~en hia Jenisalem
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trip wue annnunced i felt eurpriee and a eort Saudie need the US ecwnumicul~y and pro~
of combtnation of edmiration end dlegwt et bably militnrily~ T:!e 9eudle get maro
the theetticel quelity of the goeture. politiral cepital in the reet of tho Arnb avrld
~ I~bo felt thet he dldn't really know what by not lying dnwn end takin~ this, by
he wee dotn~, Ned he ~tudied and found out ehowing that they're etill Intrrested in
a bit more ebout Begin and about the Jeru.'e.lem and in Paleetinian ~i hte,
politicel arene whtch he w~s entering he ? Why aren't the Palert~nlan com-
wouldn't have done it. munity ~nd the Arab community
O Cceueeecu told him Eirgin wee a preparing for 1981? _
~ rearonuble mun. o They don't know enything ebout it!
O ie thet the way a head of etete behaves? There ie no intellecwnl inatitution,
He ehould heve tried to underetend in more ecademic ine2itutinn, even cdmme~:ial in� LL
detail what he wea denling with. etitution in the Are,b ~vorld Wdny w~ich mn�
O Do you think thst in two or three eiders iteelf resp;,naible for the atudy d the
month~ we cnuld 8nd 8adat changing US.
couree agalnl This ia whet I meant also by the need for
- O Totally, ~?nything, ae~ous E'alestinian etCocts. When they want
O You haven't �aid anything ~bout to reject 242, it tnkea the Pelestinien~ et the .
- Sadet'~ ~elatlonrhip with Certer. Centrel Council three minute~ to eay "no".
O I d~sn't undero!and thet. I don't un� But when they went to diecu:~~ ditTerence~
dentniul Ce?ter'e pen+cmal relntionship wi:h between the rejection h~ant end Feteh, it
~ny}x?~y. Thet to me ia a cypher. Certer, takes nine hours. There'e something wrong
whetever elee he is, ie not a fool. HP ie here.
dealing with con~+tituencies end not In e You're dealing with e country whfch ia
pnlitical vacuum. The idee thet the US ie politicel reality in the re~ion - the US. It'e
Fwliticelly a~~d economicelly in a pneition to pert of the political leader~ reaponeibility to
reatart a Mer~hell Plen ori the ecale thet know something ebout thi+ cuuntry.
Sedet wante, ae it did in Europe efter Wodd The Arab world has become n rnnsumer
War Q i~ ineanity! But $ndnt ob~iou~]y market and tL.ey think it'a eU n metter of _
wanted to hear thnt. mnaumerism. If you wenr biue jenna end
? What do you make o~ the 9yrian- drink Coke and watch the Ezorkford File~
Iraql rapprocbement? you understand Americe.
O It'e tirribly important. It'~ A dramadc O But the Arab Americur? community
event, fdut we need to ~ee whoro It'~ ~oini. hae varioue organisetione and Intellec-
O Wouldn't the 8aud1� bs ~c~iou~ tuale. Why aren't you providlnK what
about a la~tln~ 9yrirn-IraQi untty the Jews are providing for feruclT
whlch ml~ht st~o brlnK Jord~n, v We're trying to. But we're a rnmmunity
LeLanon and maybe ~ nnw Pple~tial~n ~ery divided politicelly. And it e a com� ~
~tate (nto rome kind of federKtlon? munity with very ehort ra~c~ in tho ~+cciety.
O From one poini of view yev~ end from Mo~t Arebs in this country d~?n't participete
another no. The more there rnuntries im~est in the life of the American repuhlic.
in etability and the epperntue nf go~ern� And above all, in my opiniun, it'e a `
ment the better it i~ for the 3n~~d(r, functio~elly illiterate community. 'I~e
O I~ the Saudi ~chi~m with tbe U9 P~P~e are moetiy technirinru~, culturelly
~eriow? very diatant from the reel w~r~rking.r of the
o Well, the Saudia ere inei~ting that it ie. US and they have no more underotending of
Cectainly thet'~ the me~.+nge they've been the eociety works thnn do the Arab
trying W Qet ecraee. On the other hand the ~~eties from which they come. O
COPYRICHT: 1979 IC MAGAZINES LTD.
CSO: 4802
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- EGYPT
SUPPRE5SION OF' POLITICAL PARTIES ESCALATES
Parie AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 9-15 Feb 79 pp 24-25
[Article: "Eecalating Suppreseion on the Pretext of Strengthening
Democracy"]
_ [Text] Ie iC now the Moslem Brotherhood's turn? ~his is being asked by
political observere in Cairo in view of the indications that President
al-Sadat ie beginning to feel uneaey over the Moslem Brotherhood leadera'
reticence to endoree hie policiee publicly and in view of the anti-Camp
_ David sermone being given in the moequea not under the control of the
Minietry of Religioue Truete. It is reported that President al-Sadet has
warned the Moslem Brotherhood leaders that he will not stand for political
- "duality" and has reminded them that their political activity ie not
protected by an (irrevocableJ licease.
Thie development comea in the wake of a raid by Egyptian officials on the
National Progressive Unity Party's headquarters on 18 January, in which the
party's typewriters--and even the ditto machine used for internal
communicatione--were confiscated. Political observera were apprehensive
that thie etrong meaeure migh~ eoon lead to a freezing of the party's
activities or to bringing ita caae before the Committee on Partiee in
preparatioa of disaolving it.
J
Thia ~acalation~ aimed at crippling the leftiat Egyptian party, raises
= queetiona about the future fate of political developments in Egypt. Ob~ervere
are =onvinced that no one~ in or out of Egypt, can predict uith certainty
thgt etability will last beyond 3 to 6 months. This assesament is based on
an analyeis of the moet recent paet.
_ In the first half of 1979, Egyptian political parties included:
The Egyptian Party, which held an abaolute ma~ority in the People's Asaembly,
aa~ Which~ in the xor~s of ite chairman~ Mamduh Salim, looked up to A1-Sadat
as its apiritual father and leader. This party has eapouaed the principle
of democratic socialism and led the movP.ment toward internationalism;
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f~'Ok 0~~]:i;iAL U5li dNi,Y
The Sociuliet Liberal ParCy whoae chairm~n~ Muetafa Murad, was appointed
oppoeition lea3er by President al-SadaC; ,
~ The Coalition ParCy which, despite recenr aetack~ a~ainet it, was preparing
to hnld ite firet national convention in ~ebruary of Chia yenr;
A1-Wafd Party~ which wae born with great difficulty and which represents
an alliance of Egypt's traditional pnliCical elementa--elemenCs who favor
the new open economic ayaCem~ middle-of-the-roadere~ uniona, and a variety
of elementa loyal to the al-Wafd party eince its inception following the
~ 1919 revolution;
The NaCional Front which, under the leaderehip of D. Mahmud Qadi and Mumtaz
, Naesar~ attempted to elect 20 repreaentativea to Che People's Aasembly in
order to gain legal recognition;
The Muslem Brotherr.ood wro were "almoat" free Co carry out their political
and eocial activiCiee and to iesue their own publications but were not -
licen~ed legally.
In the second half of 1978~ following the passage of the ao-calle.~ National
Unity Law, the political blueprint began to change perceptibly.
The EgypCian Party came under extremely heavy attack by the ao-called
national newepapera. It was accused of inability to meet the challenge of
- the oppoaition in the political arena. It wae soon, and melodramatically,
put to rest, after having reigned as the "lsading" or "pioneering" party.
It wae replaced, as ie well known, by the Natton~al Democratic Party. When
this latter party came into being, it claimed that it was a deacendant of
Mustafa Kamil's party before it became connected with the 23 June revolution.
The Socialiat ~iberal Party began to come apart when sume of its representa-
tives were "abducted"--we use the term deliberately--by the Egyptian party.
Furthermore, from the president's perspective, thia party exaggerated the
effecta of the scandals and mieconduct which tt helped to uncover in
- Mamduh Salim's government.
The New Wafd Party, which preferred to disaolve following the passage of
the so-called National Unity Law.
Following thie, the party'8 lesder, Fuad Sira~ al-Din, became the target
of a severe, pereonal and political attack. But the nucleus of the party's
leaderahip remained miraculous]~ intact, so much ao that in Decemb~r
A1-Wafd was able to put up ite candidate, Mr 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Shurab~i,
for election in the Lawyer's Guild campaign.
_ The Coalition Party, ahortly after suspending its political ac~ivity in
proteat againet the NatiAnal Unity La~i, resumed publication of its ~
newapapera AL-'AHAL7. But all iesuea but one published after the law
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wae paesed, were confiecated~ The parCy wae thue reduced to iesuing only
ite internal publication~ PROGRES5~ produced on a dieto machine.
The NaCional Front Party, under the leaderehip of D. Mahmud a1~Qadi~ _
~ailed to get 20 representeCivee elected Co the People'e A~sembly Co gain
legal etanding. The party, however, continued to prepare ita political
program.
The group of the Egyptian party's representativee which refused to ~oin
A1-Sadat's party, headed by the former miniater Engineer 'Abd al-Azim Abu
al-'Ata, is currently intensifying ita political activity in the People's
Assembly as an oppoeition group.
Th~ Moslem Brotherhood continues to exercise ita political activity and Co
argue "~,t:acefully" againat the Camp David accorde. It has good relations
with che government, as described by one of the group's leaders, 'Omar al- -
Talmaeoni~ who said recently: "We have no complaints againet the government~
except for the fact that it hae not restared our legal atanding." ,
" Thus, the summer of 1918 hae ecarcely ended when all news of the four partiee
(the Egyptian Party, the Liberal ParCy, the Coaltti~n, and the new Waft
Party) dieappeared from A1-JUI~iURIYYAH, deapiCe the fact that three of
them are atill legally recognized. ~~:~ould mention of any of the partiea
become neceesar~~, the item 3a relegated to the "crime s~^ction." Netional
newapapere, eimilarly, mention only two potitical parties:
_ A1-Sadat's Party, which ie the ruling party;
The oppoaition party (Socialiet Action), which has been legally ao designated -
on the condition that it conducts itaelf as an "honorable oppoaition." In
the face of this "mercury-like" blueprint for future political life in
Egypt, observere are attempting ~:o learn what motivates th~ changea or
explains the incredib3e lack of ~~onsietency. They are inclined to cite
three obvious factora:
1. The government's insiatence on signing a peace treaty with Israel; ,
- 2. The gradual evolution of an Egyptian policy that ia increaeingly more
complementary to the American atrategy;
_ 3. The continuing economic deterioration and the suffering of the vast
majority of the Egyptian massee. -
The firat of theAe coneideratione requires the neutralization or the stilling
of any oppoaition to A1-Sad~t'e policy of arriving at a settlement with
Israel. And eince A1-Sadat is convinced that peace with Israel is inevitable,
there is a need to prepare a new "crew" to take over tk~e reigns--a crew
_ that is socially and psychologically ready to cooperate with the new
Zeraeli ally and is free vf connectione, immediate or remote, with the July
23 revolution.
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- The second coneideration makes it imperative that A1-Sadat move quickly from
his claim of deeiring to establieh a socialist democraeic governmene (based
on a multiplicity o� partiee in the European tradieion) to a two-party syetem
patterned after the American eyetem~
_ The third coneideraCion, which ia respone~�ble for the rapidly deteriorgting _
economic eituation, requires Chat euppression measuree against the oppoaition
be eacala~ed. Thie is preciaely whae ~ave riae to the "control" lawe which -
were inetituted in 1979. The aim is to edminister a preventive blow, one
that will aborC any movement opposed to the new policv, which hae sent
prices spiraling at an average annual rate of 25 pe. _nt, by official
government estiimates. The raCe ia cloaer to 45 percent according to the
oppoeiCion. In light of Chese c~neideraCiona, th~ final touches are being
put on a truly compreheneive policy. Keeping in mind that EgypC ie a land
- of comedies--comediea Chat are more likely to call for tears, ae deacribed
by the poet Abu al-Tayyib al-Mutanabbi--escalation of auppresaion and the
impoeition of total government are being perpetuated under the banner of
entrenching democracy.
Observere are certain that these three elemen~,~ and Cheir inCeraction will
lead to ineCability as a fundamental feature oi the social and political
aituation. These variables are likely to produce two other reaults:
Further divieion within the government, ae indicated by the resignation
of three foreign ministers, the exile of numerous nfficials such as Mari'
and A1-Gammaei, and increa8ed opposition among the middle clasa to the Camp
David policy;
Increased loas of government credibility before the maeses. This dangerous
development makea people wary of governmentxl promises of peace, proeperity,
food security, a house for every citizen, hot water in every home, and a
green revolution in every place.
The lack of credibility ie another aCory, howeve~, and will be considered
separately.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 A1-WATAN AI.-'ARABI
9063
CSO: 4802
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EGYP'1'
REASONS FOR DEPORTATION OF ECONOMIC UNITY COUNCIL SECRETARY ANALY2ED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 16-22 Feb 79 pp 26-27
[Article: "Al-Sadat Reaigna from Arab ~conomic Unity Council"]
[Text] Reaction to the forced police deportation of Dr Fakhri al-Qadduri,
on the ordere of Egyptian authoritiea, has not died down. Dr al-Qadduri
is the aecretary general of the Arab League's Arab Economic Uni~y Council
and has made hia permanent residence in Cairo. The deportation action,
carried out in a tactlesa faehion, presages an ominous change of directon--
as is apparent from the preae campaign to ~uatify it--aimed at obstructing -
the implementation of one of the moat eignificant accompliahmenta in
Arab cooperation.
The Arab Economic Unity Council ia the moat important Arab inatitution working
toward achieving a real complementary Arab economy, which is the corneretone -
- of Arab financial and economic unity. Since its creaCion in 1964, the
council has euccessfully overcome a aeries of regional and colonial plans
aimed at diluting its national character and bent on reducing it to an
ineffectual tool. But what ia the real etory behind the viscioua attack
againat the council by Egyptian authorities, and what is the reason for
departing the council's presideat, on an unwritten order auppoaedly related
to security?
To answer this question we muet return to the council's last session, No 22,
in Dubbai at which the aecretary generRl gave a report dealing with a
aeries of probable agreementa between the A1-Sadat government and the Zionist
entity in the event that norn~al diplomatic relationa are establiahed between
them. Following the report, the council adopted a reaolution attesting to
- ita appreciation of the report's assesament of the dangers and complications
that were bound to ensue ehould normal relations, including ctionomic and
coam~ercial cooperation, be established between Egypt and the Zionist
entity. The report was further applauded for outlining the dp:,ger poaed
to Arab economic unity agreements and the threat to the ~oint A~ab market
r~eolution and the Arab economic boycott of Israel. The council is said
to have reaffirmed ita determination to remain united in the face of this
new attack.
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On a second point, the council underaco~~ed Che neceseiey n~ supporting the
resolutions of the Arab economi.c b4ycott offices againet Israel and approved -
meneures Co eafeguard the Arab economic un~ty agreement and the resoluCion
_ of the ~oint Arab market.
The cou~cil called on Che secretgry's office and all other Arab organiza-
tiono to maint~in a wAtchful eye and to report any development that could
weaken the unity agreements so that Che counci~. can remain ready to take -
whatever economic mPaeures that have been agreed upon gt the Baghdad Summit
conference.
As might be expected, the report was not pleasing to~Cairo and it used it '
as a~uatification to aCtempt to paralyze the council's work, convinced ~
that Che c~uncil ia a atumbling etone on the path of ite miedirected economic
_ plana. Cairo paved Che way for ite attack by sending a secret letter from
'Ali Jamal al-Nazir, Egypt's minister of aCate for economic cooperation
_ and ite permanenC repreeentative to the Arab Economic Unity Council, to the
council's aecretary general on 13 December 1978. The text of the letter
followa:
Dr Fakhri al-Qadduri, _
Secretary General of the Arab Economic Unity Council:
~ I wae informed yeaterday by Mr Madhat 'Abd al-Aziz, deputy minister for Arab
and African cooperation affaire, and deputy to the permanent repreaentative
to the Arab Economic Unity Council, of the contenC of your report at the
council'e regular aession, no 32, which was held in the United Arab Emirates. -
- Mr 'Abd al-Aziz relaCed to me the diacusaions that took place at the meeting
and described the efforts to distort the council's recommendationa and to
leak to Arab and foreign presa agencies and broadcast atations a variety of
conflicting reports aimed at inciting Arab countries against Egypt.
I am sorry to have to remind you of Che secretariat's obligation to maintain
strict neutrality, as atipulated in the Arab Economic Unity agreement, in
order to preserve a balanced impartiality in dealing with the member countries
in the council, and of the aecretariat'e duty not to become a political
instrument. -
As careful ae Egypt is in aupporting the council's work, it regrets, ahould
this aituation continue, that it will have to consult with other council
- membera on ways to place necessary reatrictione to maintain the atrict
neutrality and impartiality of the secretary's off ice.
The letter is aigned, 'Ali Jamal al-Nazir. ~
The letter was accompanied by a hysterical preas campaign against the
council and its secretary, Dr Fakhri al-Qadduri, and by a wave of episod~s
calculated to make hie life uncomfortable, aided by the professi~nal
Egyptian intelligence department.
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Dr Fakhri al-qadduri hastened to respond officially by letter on 16 January
1978. The 1erCar, which wae addresae~ to Mr 'Ali Jamal g1-Nazir, reads:
I received your letter, da~ed 13 December 1978, which appears to convey the
impreseion that your excellency has become the Egyptian permanent repreaenta-
_ tive to Che Arab Economic Uniey Council~ As I congratulate you and wish
you good luck, I promiae to help you and a11 the permnnent representativ~e
at the council. I wish to express my appreciation for ~~ypt's former
permanent repr~aentative to the council, hia excellency Dr Hamid al-Sayih,
and to thank l~im for hie excellc~nt relations with the council's aecretary _
- cinae I asaumed the office on 1 May 1978.
Your Excellency: -
You ref~r in your letter to diatort3ona in the council's recommendations
_ and indicate that various reporte were leaked to Arab and foreign presa
_ agencies and broadcast atationa aimed at provoking Arab countries againsr
- Egypt. I wish to inform your excellency that the council made resolutions,
not recommendationa, and that these resolutions were not dietorted. As for
the charge about provoking Arab nationa against Egypt~ my responoe ia thaC -
ae a loyal Arab citizen and regardleas of where I happen to reside or the
nature of my responeibility, I have never entertained auch a thought.
Furthermore, the reporta that were released to the newa media never had -
the intention described in your letter.
The ma~or portion of the newa that had been released was doeumented and
, can still be found in the official r_cords at the secretary's office. The
information released to the media ob~ectively reflected what transpired
at the council's aeesion. The aecretary's office is prepared to provide
your excellency with ph~tostatic copies of the preas release made by -
this office ahould you wiah to review it.
If, however, some reportera added to or modified some expresaions of the
release, the phenomenon ie a usual occurence in and outaide the Arab world.
I wiah to atrees to your excellency thaC the information I released in the -
_ form of newa itema and resolutiona was approved according to established
procedurea and ie documented. The verification of the presa release, as
was the cuatom at previous aeasiona, was carried out by his highness A1-
_ Shaykh Sultan al-Mualle, the miniater of economy and trade of the i1~nited
Arab Emirates, and the council's chairman, as well as by the general
_ aecretary, following the concluaion of the council's last session on
7 December 1978. Also, according to cuatom, official copies of the adopted
reaolutioas were diatributed to all council members, including, of course, -
Egypt.
You mention in your letter that "as careful as Egypt has been in supporting
_ the council's work, it regrets, ahould this situation continue, to have to
- consult with other council members on ways to place necessary restrictions
to maintain the atrict neutrality and impartiality of the secretary's office."
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Whi1e I agree cvith your excellency that Egypt, as Weii as any other member
coun~ry, hae the right to bring to the council's aCCent~.on any procedural
queation relating to the secretary general or his office, I had hoped that
the EA;-htian delegation would raise this queat~.or. during Che council's last
aeaeic~n, especially in view of the question's urgency. However, as I, too, _
view ~he queetion with urgency and feel that it touches on the confidence
placed 3n m~ by all member naCione, including Egypt, when I was elected
council president, I invite you to bring the matter before ehe council for
. appropriaCe action. The council is, after all, the final arbiter. -
In his leCter, Dr A1-Qadduri goes on to invite the EgypCian miniater Co
review the record of the 32nd aeesion Co acquaint himaelf with the council's
. poaiCion Coward the accueaCion of partiality placed against the aecretary
general by the chairman of the Egyptian delegation. The charge of a lack
_ of nautrality was aired when the secretary general included in his report
' to the council a section entitled "Ierael and the Complementarity of the
Arab Economy." The EgypCian delegation's requeat that this item be deleted
_ from the report was turned down after a full diacuasion by the council. The
entire controversial eection wae thus left in the secretary's report.
Dr A1-Qadduri in~ormed the Egyptian minieter that the council's action cleara
him of the Egyptian delegation's charge. -
_ In a relaCed development, and in an attempC at further clarification, Sultan
ibn Ahmad a1-Mu~lla, che UAR's minister of economy and trade, and iCs per-
manent delegate to the council, aent a letter to his highnesa Ali Jamal
al-Nazir in which he denied the charge of partiality by the council and iCs
aecretary general. These chargea are the tool by which Egypt had hoped to =
obatruct the work of the council. -
The UAR's minieter of economy and trade began hia letter by commenting on
the Egyptian preas campaign against the council and ita secretary general.
Here are some excerpts:
"As chairman of the aforementioned sesaion, and anxious to put the facts
before your excellency and to safeguard the poaitive relations, characterized
by truat, that exist among all member nations on one hand and between the
member nationa as a group and the secretary general on the other hand, I -
- wieh to clarify to your excellency certain matters related to the council
sesaion in order to deacribe the aituation more precisely.
"1. The council listened to all delegation chairmen on all matters placed
on the agenda in a cordial and constructive spirit. All resolutions were
made according to the procedurea. They were verified officially and
dietributed to all member nationa without any diatortions.
"2. The aecretary general conducted himaelf with neutrality and ob~ectivity
in expressing hie viewpointe on the mattera on the agenda. He was extremely
cgreful to ineure that discusaiona took place in a positive and conatructive
_ apirit.
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- "3~ I wish Co aseure your excellency that the delegation chairmen and the
eecretary general did their best to maintain a brotherly atmosphere in
liaCening to and in debating the varioue viewpointe, and that the council
ie responeible, firat and laoC, for ita resoluCions. -
"I hope tk~at my leeter wi11 help Co set the record atraighe and to prevent
~ any future obetacle to the work of the council, whoae goaJ. ~s to further
and support Arab economic unity, an ob~eative we are all careful ~o eafeguard."
The letter was aigned by Sultan ibn Ahmad a1-M~alla.
DeapiCe all theee aseurancea~ Egyptian authorities were intenC on going
ahead with their previously drawn plan. They thua informed Dr A1-Qadduri
orally of the deciaion to deport him as a firat step in carrying out their
deaign, which ie calculated to paralyze the council's work and to defy all
Arab nations. -
The problem posed by this siCuation requires a quick solution based on
Article Seven of the council'a rulea of pr~~cPdt,re. This article permits the
convening o� an extraordinary sesaion upon tn~ request of two na~ion membera~,
or on the prior request of~the secretary general. The purpoae of such a
aession is to resolve the is~ue for which an extraordinary aession is called.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI -
9063
CSO: 4802
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EGYPT
~ NEW ELITE EMERGING IN BUSINESS WORLD
Parie AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 16-22 Feb 79 pp 28-29
[Article: "A Portrait of Egyptian Bureaucracy"]
_ [Text] In Cairo a famoue street goes through the center of the city. It
ie called Sharif Street. On thie street etands one of Egypt's beat
known buildings--the Imobilia building. On the lOth floor of this
- building there ie en office belonging to A1-Shams Company, one of Egypt's
public liousing and conetruction companies. On the eixth floor of the
~ same building there ia another office belonging to the same company.
~
The difference between the two offices is striking and serves to underacore
the contraet betw~een the ordinary Egyptian society and a new society
developing alongeide it, without any hope that the two will ever converge.
The elevator ia full of office workers. Some are neatly dressed, indicating
that they have come to work by bue; the othera atill carry their car keys
in one hand and are bueily ad~ueting their tiea with the other. Wk?en the
elevator atops at the sixth floor, the operator goes out fixat to make a
path for the employeea who work on this floor. When it stopa on the lOth
floor, the operator simply announces the fact in a loud voice. .
The entrance to the lOth floor office is in a state of semi-disrepair. The
office boy who runa the information desk is there only to record which
employees have reported to work. He aoon disappears to return to hia taxi-
driving ~ob or some other side occupation to supplPment his income. Whenever
he is on the job, he is often diatracted and preoccupied with his daily
concerns. He is obviouely displeased when one asks him a question. When
an office worker aeka him to bring a cup of coffee or tea, he does so
hesitatingly and only after the requeat is repeated several times. -
Some off ice w~orkers work,and some ait around. They are much like their
telephonea and other equipment which function only some of the time. The
only pleasing ae:pect around is the exterior and interior appearance of the
director's office. The dominant spirit of the place is: "Who doesn't work
today works to~orrow."
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, From rhe inatanC one entera the sixth floor office, however, one ~oine a
new society. Everything ie clean. The decor is unfamiliar. The wallpaper
_ ie new. The semi-circular entrance to the offi~e, with indirect lighting,
_ ie staffed by a neatly dreesed, polite clerk, who ie eager to help. Everyone
ie busy here; even the telephones which belong to the eame company und are -
hooked to the seme telephone network ring inceeeantly.
The World of Bureaucracy �
In order to get a~ob on the lOth floory ane muat have a high school diploma -
- and undergo a chest and eye examination, both of which are at the company's =
clinic. In the clinic no one carea about your time. The isauance of a
medical report requires a week to 10 days. A succesaful applicant (with a
college degree) ie paid 30 pounda per month. He may or may not find a
vacancy. To obtain a~ob on the aixth floor, however, one muat pasa a foreign
language exam~ demonatrate typing ekilla and be reaeanably attra.ctive in
appearance. The company then eencis the proapective employee to a epecial -
clinic (poasibly the cempany's own). But here one receives excellent care
anat undergoee a series of tests, including a blood test and a heart examination. -
The medical report is iasued within 2 days. A succeasful applicanC is p,3id
150 pounda per month or poseibly more~ What is important is that there wi11
be a vacancy and a well-defined position. On the lOth floor, workers report
at 8:00 am and leave at 2:00 pm--unlesa they aneak out early. On the sixth
floor, by contrsat, one reporta for work at 9:00 am and remains till 4:00 pm.
Furthermore, no one leavea work early.
On the lOth floor you might be tempted to go with your colleagues to the
_ director to convince him to have the company purchase a bus for the workere. _
He will likely respond that he has no such authority or that the budget does
_ not permit it. On the aixth floor, and in similar circumstances, the
director is willing to lend you money to buy a private car and to have the -
long-term loan deducted from your salary. -
On the lOth floor you work for a atate, public company. On the sixth
floor you work for a new company ~ointly owned by a foreign company. If
you work on the lOth floor you may not ~oin a club unless you have outside
income. If you are a sixth f.lo~r employee, the company demands that you
~oin a club and pays your fees. This is only one example. On other streets
in Egypt one finde other examples~
Aa one paeses through Qasr al-Nil Street (a short diatance betwee~n Talaat
Harb Square and Liberation Square), one's attention is drawn to the
American branch of the Bank of Egypt. The bank's design is so ui.ifamiliar
that it does not seem to fit with the dominant architecture on t?ie street,
inside or out. The mode of operation within ia also differ~r.*_.
Anyone who watches what ie happening in Egypt today will observe the
- emergence of a parallel aociety. The characteriatics of this society
- reflect the economic system it emulatea, specifically capitalism. This
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_ new society has ita own psychological and cultural values. It seems to
_ re~ect our cultural heri~age and to venerate ever,yChing foreign~
�
The mainatay of this p~rallel eociety is the private wealth that has been
_ accumulating in the hande o� +:he country'8 former capitalista, in cooperation
with capiCaliet leaders, politiciane and aome miliCary officere. Before -
the country's "open econ~my policy" came on the $cene, this group managed
~o accumulate great wealth under the former economic system. It then worked
openly to transform the economic syatem into one centered on private capital
under the guieo of uehering the so-called "open economy" aystem. The new ~
~ syetem is a compromise throwback to ita former practices after they failed
- to undermine the previous syatem completely. The public oatcry againat
_ this group's attempts served to dilute its effort. It was thus compelled
to create ite new economic lifestyle alongside and parallel to the exiating ~
system in the hope that tha latter wi11 ultimately collapae under the onslaught
of ita claime and alogans. Egyptian society, dnce again, finda itself in
_ circumstances not very differeat from those th~at prevailed early in the
19th century when economic development was etifled under Muhammad Ali, who
imposed a eimilar "open economy" syatem on the country.
Foreign and ~ointly-owned banke have played and continue to play, a signif i-
can~ role in creating thie parallel aociety. These banks have always foun~
- in Egypt a solution for the problem of what to do with their excess deposits,
- most recently exacerbated by s flood of petrodollars. Fearful of political
instability, theee banka do not participate in direct economic development
pro~ecta; fnstead, they prefer to deal in loan and insurance operations,
ever careful to take their profits out of the country as they pile up. A
careful analyais of their activitiea shows that they are merely interested -
in supporting the economic activities of private enterpriae.
The outward signs of this parallel society are everywhere. All new economic
establishments which cater to the n~w society are extensions of their
parent branches overseas, even to their decor and furnishinga. One who
frequents them ie led to believe he is not in Egypt. Their operating
methoda are etrikingly different from their nat3ve counterparts. While they
use the same public utilities--telephones, electricity, etc--they receive
better aervice by paying a"little e.~tr~" on the side. Some of them have
even inatalled private microwave telephone aystems, or have their own
electric generatora and hospitals. Their employees have nearly taken over
the clubs and changed them into closed societies. The new society has its
own lawyers, doctors, as well as a local airline company. The average
monthly salary of ita elite employeea-graduatea of foreign language schools
and children of influential people--is 250 pounds, the equivalent of a
_ deputy miniater's or miniat~;r's salary. The new society is now attempting
- to dominate the cultural ari educational life of its members by freeing
- them from government controls and entruating their education to the private
aector.
- COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
9063
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1~OR pN'N'ICIAL US~ ONLY
EGYpT
BRIEFS
U.S. AID TO MEDIA--Reliable eourceg clo~e to the Minietry of Informgtion
confinned that there ie an American propoanl to ~xtend extengive finenciel `
aid Co Egyptian newspgpere and other information media to help Bgypt to
counter the Arab naCione' propaganda campaign ageinet the Camp David
agreemente. The eources indicated thet thie epecial ee~istance, described
ae urgent, may reach $50 million, a major portion of which will go to
AL-AHRAM, AL-AKHBAR, AL-JUMHURIYYAH~ DAIt AL-HILAL and ROSE AL-YU5U~, to
- improve production~ printing and ediCing, and to make their formats more
attractive, A portion of the aid, according to the eources~ must be epent
on the purchase of better American editing and photographic equipment.
In addition, the U.S. propoeal involves financial assisCance to Egyptian
radio and televieion to improve broadcasting and increase their trane-
misaion range. The aid package also includes the financing of a series of
informational campaigne to be directed at the Arab world. The distribution
of the aid was diecuseed at a recent meeting attended by the U.S. ambassador
to Cairo, Mr Herman Eilte~ and chaired by Mr Fikri Mukarram 'Ubayd~
deputy prime miniater and secretary general of the National Democratic
Party. A prominent participant at the meeting wae Mr Mansur Hasan, who is
in charge of the information eection of the National Democratic Party
and a candidate for the position uf etate miniater of information. The
meeting also conaidered using eome of the aid funds to publiah AL-LIWA' _
- e~nd make it the official epokesman of the National Democratic Party.
- Mr Mukarram Muhemmad Ahmad~ an editorial secretary of AL-ANRAM, has been ~
chosen ae the chief editor. [Parie AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 9-15 Feb
79 p 15J
COPYRIGHT: 1919 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
- 9063
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N'OEt O~~ICtAL US~ dNLY
KUWAIT
CROWN pitINCL~ ~MPHASIZES 1tEGI0NAL 5~CURITY IN INT~itVI~GI
London THE MIDDLE EA3T in ~nglish .~pr 79 pp ltb~ ~7
~Intervie~ with Crotim Prinae ~nd 1'rime Minister Saed al-Abdullnh gl-Sabah
by F'uad Mattar, date ~nd place not given]
~Text] Kuwait~s Croan Prince and Prime Minister, 5haikh Sa~d al-Abdullah
al-Sabah, has given a strong warning that the gecurity and protectian oF the
Qulf region must be left to the people of the grea. "It will be totally
unaceeptable for an~y eountry from nutside the regian to interfere in the -
affairs of thie very vital region of the xorld," he dec~ared.
C-
3peaking in one of hig rare intervierrs, Shaikh Saad told F'uad M~ttar,
editor of our sist.er Arabic public~tian AL-IKTISSAb AI,-ARAgI, ^If the Arab
~ountries cooperete more strongly~ their unified forces ui.ll bring about
a lot of changes on the international scene." Ne algo gaid that the Arabs
vould hgve no choice but to irage another xar against Israel unles~ it
became 1as~ obdurate 8t1f~ Lltll@99 ~alestinian rights Were recognized. The
Croun Prince denied recent reportg that Kuyrait has frozen some of its
inveatrnent pro3ects in the Arab xorld. Excerpts from this exclusive inter-
viex folloxs `
O How do rou vf~uali~e r~~~qm~hement between the Culf etstes. in
Kuw~it (n the year ~,000 and f~~1, my dreem i+ to be eble to witnese either
what tole do you ~ee ol! w~ity ~~r e kind nf fedetation between al) the
- pibyin~ in the future4 Arnb c,~~mt~e, Our main rnncem i, that
O Kuwait u e emel) and th~~ I'~~le.tinisn penple alx~uld be able ta
~xn~cful country. Out telatiot?~ hx~~in their M~rnelend betw~een now end the
with uther state~ are built on co� year nXlr). Ae for oil, we roneider it ~ major
eperati~m and undentanding. nationel r+e~~urce and we are obliged to con�
W~ do not interfere in other peo� een~e it for futute generetion~. We have
ple e offei~, and we do not ellow alrrady drawn up the pleru for the ennuel
~~thcn~ to inte~ferc in wra. rete ot oil production. gut that ~ twt our
And thi, i+ what wT want to ~o1e cancem. Our ecientiaw are working on
mRintein during the temeinint pett ~ enetqy in anticipation of the
~~t the antury. Net~rally, in the mean� daY ~ oil run~ out.
timr, we wane Kuweit and the other M far as development i~ concemed, w~e
- C~~It ~tatr.+ to e~joy ~tability and ~ecurity. aR Putting a lot of empha~i. on the nted to
Wc very much went to ~ee Auther dtablish new industrie~ which witl enable
- the Mab countriee to become eelt�eul~icient
in the IonR run. I muet urese het+e that it u
2t~
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roEt ~~~ICiAL US~, dNLY
in our bng�rnn~e intere.vta ilnhrnin, ~al.er, lhe UA~, and Omen were
end tho~ of the A,�eb ~,ur1d if ell ~~ery nucre~u+ful and I eqreed with the leadetr
= eil revenues ete epent dn inve~t� nf thc~e countries on the need for full ca
ment projecte end fndu~trice a~~er~tion, coordination of policies end un�
(neide the Areb world, and ntr ((irntion ot our ~tande in the flelde df {nfor�
not trensferred to foreign mation, culture, and economy.
c~nuntrie~. Sueh e p~licy will M for Gul! aecurity, I think thet by the
bpneflt all the Arelx+. ?~rxt meeting of Areb ault ~oreig~~
tt l9ome reportr havu xlleged MII11AIpfU, the picture will be muCh rlearer,
thot Kuwsit ha~ ~ru~rn ~ome i muet etreae here our strong cunviction
o~ It~ lnv~etments In the ~hnt the recurity of the Gulf s}wuld be left to
Arab world for politirxl the people of the area. It witl be uneccep�
reaion~. I~ thi~ true~ lable tor eny country from outaide the region
- O dut t~eleticme ete gwd with all the ta interfere in the effeire of this very vital
Arab countriee that have eccx~omic rrlnti~~ne rr~tii~n of the worid~ -
with ue. It b nnt true thet any pn~jcrt hes 1] The Arab world le guing through
been etopped, dit'ticuit time~ and a eprie~ o~ crlre~.
d How would you beet deecribe the Naw du you ~ee ue gctting out of them?
(t~ture otdemocracy In Kuwalt? O 1 thinl~ the difficult times we are paeetng
d Kuweit ie nne temily, Unity ~nd un� Ihnn~gh require more unde~tanding and
den+tending G every~ne'e mutur in thie Mliderity between the Areb oountriee.~'Il~e
country, We ell look W ou~ ruter ae e eymbol inet ~ummit conference held {n Beghded
ut thG unity. I?emocrecy e:teu end i~ hen +~~n~ e etep in the right direction. Neturally,
to ~tay. We an rx~w workinR for ~ ntum to lffurta ere etili being exerted to bring about
~wiriiementary life in ite proper form, We Rirther Atab enlidarity and undcr~tending.
- wnnt tht kind of democrscy that builde and 1 oAen wonder why Areb leadere do not
not deet~vy, one that bind~ end cfope p~~t more emphasie on do-nperetitin, because
u~?~ divide. We wsnt the kind of demaracy thet would make them e force that the reet
~lu~~ c~n ~efeguerd the pre~ent end future ~~~t~ ~ve to reckon a+ith. 'tl~e
oxi~~cnce otKuweit. moment the rest of the world beceme aware
n You ~n eonNently tnvolved ie ~~his, a lot ot chenges would take place ~t
mrdisUo~i enoH~ in the Gulf rerion. ~+temational ievel.
Whst I~ your vt~lon for the tuture of the ~ Your medf~tion etrort~ le Leb~non
Cul~ ~nd wh~t are your view� on Cutt h~ve met rrlth relative ruccea. Are you
~rru~~~yT plNnnin` a ft~rtber role in th~t crld~ or
O'i'he ~tate of Kuweil futly reali~ee the im� do you think the Lebanere problem h~�
~rKtnnce ot thie region for the ~eat of the R'pched the potet otno returnl
v?,?rld. We atrongly believe in continued co- ~ Tf'~~ ~ uttle doubt thut what hae
~~~K~rntinn between the various etata af the h"N~"~ ~~~0" Msb
r~,~on. My ~?et vieite to Seudi Atebie, Kuwait haa particularly esercieed ite
rt.~{xx~~ibiliry in trying to eolve the probl~en.
Hut txcauee of factorb bcyond our eantrol rve
Mrrc uneble to bring ebout e wlution and
t1M fi~hting and desinution heve oontinued.
Il~~~~ite this, r?e heve not lo~t all hape
A~ e mettet of principle, I wip not h~eitate
t~~ m~ke yet another medietion e~ort. but
~IM ntmaephere muat be right before thst
r~n be done. By thet I mean thae all the
~x~hin~ concrmed muet abide by v~hatever
{'n~ident Sarkis decidee on. A new page
t~u?~t be opened based on love and tu~�
~ieMt~nding. On1y then can au mediation
~thtred. o .
COPYRIGHT: 1979 IC MACAZINES LTD.
CSO: 4802
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~dlt n~~IC~AL U5~ tINLY
LII3YA
QADH~HA~I' 8 3UPPOlt~ OF' KUItD5 CAUS~5 SU~'RIS~
P~ri~ AL-WATAN AL-'AI2A$I in Arabic 9-15 Mer 79 p 14
(TexC~ Paleetinien circl~~ close to the regime df Col Mu'ammar a1~Qadhdhafi
heve be~n hinCing at extremely important infnrmation about the very cloae
relationahip which our brnther Mu'annnar has established with some of the
"brethren" Kurd aeparatieCe.
Theae sourcea have e~r~eeed grea~ aurpri~e at tt;ia new "Qadhd~fian"
wisdom which ie oppoaed to all the sloggne of "faith" in freedom, eocialiam
and unity raieed by the "liberator" of Ju1y~ who was forced to eWallow them
throughout the long life of the "revolution." -
Th~se sources explain the new Libyan iniCiative in extending friendship and
cooperation to the Kurd separatieta as compatible with the intellectual
aecendance of the Qadhdhafian theory~ so that the call for carving out a
portion of the lgrge fatherland is an example of the "revolutionary" purity
and unification efforte.
Obaervera here believe that the "effuaive" aupport of the Libyan government
- for the new unification approach betweea Iraq and Syria is merely a
diveraion to cover up the cune~iratory activities of those aeparatiata
which Qadhdhafi now is trying to revive after Iraq had aucceeded in halting
completely. eo that thie group of aeparatiete has no refuge left but the
advocates of nationaliem and unity.
AL-NATAN AL-'ARABI learned from Paleatinian sources that theoe circlea
posseae laportant information which, when made known, will create a great
commotion in the Arab world because it involvea certain practices of the
Libyan regime which are in no way compatible with the slogana touted.
Beaidee, in a theatrical move~ Qadhdhafi declared last week that he is
relinquiahing "power" so as to devote himself to "revolutionary" Work.
No one~ hoWever, took Qadhdhefi'a etatement aeriously, especially aince
brother Mu'gmmar has managed in the la~t few months to perform a complete
dislocation of poWer bases~ which was reflected in the total chaos that
reaulted in all areas at all levels.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
2760 26
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~Ott U~~IC~AL US~ ONLY
- 5UUAN
SUSPECTLb MEM$LRS 0~ $A'ATH PAIt~Y A1tRE5TED
Parie AL-WATAN AL-'AItABI in Arabic 16-22 ~eb 79 p 4
[Text~ Similarly to Che "dawn raidere" in ~gypt~ the "dawn raidera" in
5udan are expanding their activities in order Cn frighten and arre~t the
element~ who oppoae PresidenC Nun~yri in his aupport of Sadat'g policies.
One of Che moet prominent pereons arrested for being accused by the Sud~ne~~e
authorities of belonging to Che Socialiat Arab Ba'ath party wae Mr Mohammad
'Ali Jedin, aseistant to the under secretary of finance. The regeon for
his arreet wae that he had in hie poeseseion pamphlete againet Sadat'e
- vieit to Sudan.
- The Sudanese police also arreated for the eame reaeon Mr Yuauf Hamsit, former
mangger of the People's Cooperative Bank~ and Mr Amin 'Abd al-Baseta Atumd,
an attorney.
The Sudanese Bar Aaeociation hae ob~ected to theae arbitrary arreats and
hae begun to demand that the suthoritiea release thoae arrested or
arrange for their trial immediately rather than keeping them in temporary
jai18~ against conetitutional laws. -
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's correepondent in Sudan reports that the Sudaneae
authoritiee have arrested a number of citizena in al-Ubayyid and al-Nuhud
in western Sudan for belonging to the Socialiet Arab Ba'ath Party~ and
have savagely raneacked a number of homes under the pretext of aearching
them.
- The police aleo arrested Mr Sa'id A1-Mahdi, member of the Student Militant -
Front at the Univereity of Khartoum, as Well as tWn Palestinian atudenta
during their preparation of a meeting held on 20 January 1979 and attended -
by about 3~000 atudente to protest Sadat's vieit.
The Sudaneee authorities have been continuing their oppreasive measures
againat etudents~ including auepen~iing them from achool for merely
suepecting that they belong to the Ba'ath Party. Their actione seem to
indicate that they are a reeult of epecial instructions from Cairo.
. 27 _
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Obe~rver~ b~li~vp Chat the incr~gaed pnpulgr di~plea~ure are~Ced by Chese
atee~ure~ indicgCe tha~ Che ~l~m~nte of a poliCicgl Crisi~ ere looming in -
th~ horizon.
COPYttYGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'AItABI
2760
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_
_
i~c)It f)l~i~'tCtAl, tt5i: ONLY
UNIT~U AItAI~ ~MIItATC5
UA~ UNITY EFFOttT5 GitOWING
- London THE MIDDLE EAST in ~ngliah Apr 79 pp 12,13
~TeXt ~~eclinge have never been ~tronger in the There ie no doubt that the poeition of the
UAE for real unity, The younger generat{on, UAE ~'reeident 3h~ikh Ze~yed - the main
in particular, ie impatien! with inter�etate architect of the union - hae been
bickering, foreign intederence and the fear etcengthened, It ie significant thet the 40�
of drowning in a eea of tmmigrente. member Federal Council mecting has been
And now thet the upheevsle in Uan have called for the firat time ainre 1976.
draetically chenged the belnnce of povver in And thie time it mey accrue more power -
the region, the poeeibility of achieving union ~ itseV if ghe?kh Zeyed can ralse the ~n�
{n the real eenee ie greeter then ever befote. dlvidual emirete~ contributiona to the
The meMive demonetrotions during the federal budget from 25 per cent ta b0 per
Fedaral Council meeting wete witneee to e cent of their revenues. The other difficult
wide~preed underetanding of the new i~eue ie the unificedon of the armed fones
~itwtion. which hes hitherto been blocked by Dubai�
For one of the biggeet obetaclee to union Abu Dhebi rivs~ry.
har been rremoved - the tueele between But it G diseatisfection arith intemel
Riyedh and Tehran for the allegiance of in� ~~opmenta which mey give union the
dividual emirete~. Uan'e metn ally, Dubai i~Petue it needs. At preeent the
(the eecond biggeat emirete) which oppoeed federation G little more than a formality.
unity mova by Abu Dhebl, hes bcen oon� Viraa and work pertnit~ are needed to go
eidernbly weakened by the 9heh'e doamfall. ~m ~e etate to another and telephone
Outeide threate have eleo been romoved ~ be~n emiretes ere cons~dered to be
to eome extent, for Oman can no longer "~~metionel".
pureue ib temtorial claim wer part of Rai The only etete which in effect contributed
d�Khaimah now thst Irxnien tmops have ~ the federel budget ie Abu Dhebi, and
been rvi~wr fcom Dhofar. All its ~�"~"g up nny precticel policies for the
sttentton muet noa? be focused on this �eration ne a whole ha+ prvved almoet im�
wuthem pevvinee .rhene the Popular Front P~~ble. Partly because of thie, immigrant
for the Liber~tion ot Oman hu never aaeed ~rke~ now constitute about 86 per cent of
~ ~ a~~. the total populetion.
Moreover~ thee~e u nov? ~ itrong chance ~e demand~ put by the demonatratora
that Iran will ~i~~e b+ck the ~tretegic ieland+ ~O ~e Federel Council included me~sures to
of Abu Mourea und the Creeter and I.e~eer rontrol thie increa~ingly dangerous
'ILnb~ which it ~eiud (tum Re~ al�Khaimsh eituation.
end Sharjah in 1971. A memorendun cetled for "amputation
of the foceign economy dominaeion by its
29
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o~~ ~ ~ ~
' ~'OEt U1~ F' 1C I AL L15L ~NI,Y
roote", control of oil produrtion by "our
eprcialieed eone In the fleld", a unite~l army,
and en end to "intemal bordere",
That the Abu Dhabi newe agenCy
- Wampreas published thn demande in t~ll is '
nn indl~atinn of the extent ta which Shaikh
Zeyed feeL thac he fe now on ftrm ground,
The recent celle for "demncrncy" and for
the Netfonal A~semhly (pnrliament) to talce
a more ective part ie aeen by observe~ ns a
deetre for efflcient orgnniNntinn nf the union.
And here agein Shaikh Zeyed is on flrm
ground for the recently re�elected Spenker -
Teryem Omran Teryem le eeen en n etronK
eupp~rter of the federetion,
If Sheikh 2syed can push theae measurey
through, end give the federatiun some teeth,
the UAE will be in e p~x~iti~m to play e murh �
greater role in rc~ionnl politice. Its weelth
and atretegic pmitinn will meke it en impor�
tant power in the area now thet [ren ie nn
_ lenger a threat. O
COPYRIGHT: 1979 ?C MAGAZINES LTD.
CSO: 4820 END
30 -
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